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Faust's Begehren: Revisiting the History of Political Economy in Faust II

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Abstract
Since The Publication of Faust II, commentators interested in economic aspects of the text have focused primarily on three of its five acts. Bernd Mahl, whose work on Goethe's economic knowledge remains a standard reference, writes that the topics most frequently addressed following its publication are the creation of paper money in act 1, Faust's renewed activity in act 4, and the commercial ventures of Faust and Mephistopheles in act 5. More recent investigations have generally continued this trend. Given this lengthy history of interpretation, what is one to make of the second and third acts of Faust II with respect to economic matters? In the "Ökonomische Lesart" (Economic Reading) section of his Faust commentary, Ulrich Gaier offers this assessment: "Angesichts der Tatsache, daß sich der 2. und 3. Akt in Fausts Kopf abspielen, kann es hier nicht um reales Wirtschaften in der geschichtlichen Folge des Wirtschaftsgebaren des Neuzeit gehen" (Given the fact that acts 2 and 3 are acted out in Faust’s head, real economic activity resulting historically from economic behavior in the modern era cannot be at stake here). While Gaier accurately describes the tendency of literary and economic analyses of Faust II—including his own—to focus on the other three acts, his claim deserves closer scrutiny. It clearly hinges upon what he calls “reales Wirtschaften” (real economic activity); yet he does not define it or specify how it relates to the history of modern political economy. Admittedly, the second and third acts do not appear at first glance to contain the traditional economic elements found in the other acts. However, as I shall argue, to discount the two acts encompassing the Helena episode simply because they unfold in Faust’s head severely underestimates the complexity of Goethe's political-economic thought in this significant portion of Faust II. Goethe does not simply set aside the keen insight into economic matters that he skillfully demonstrates throughout the rest of his self-described “Hauptgeschäft” (main business). Rather, he accentuates in acts 2 and 3 the subjective nature of value, particularly as it relates to the economic principle of demand. Goethe repeatedly employs and couples Wert (value) and Begehren (demand) in scenes leading up to and including the Helena episode. Moreover, he demonstrates in these two acts a significant change in his own approach to value, from an intrinsic to a subjective view of it.

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WILLIAM H. CARTER

Faust’s *Begehren*: Revisiting the History of Political Economy in *Faust II*

**Economic Readings of *Faust II***

Since the publication of *Faust II*, commentators interested in economic aspects of the text have focused primarily on three of its five acts. Bernd Mahl, whose work on Goethe’s economic knowledge remains a standard reference, writes that the topics most frequently addressed following its publication are the creation of paper money in act 1, Faust’s renewed activity in act 4, and the commercial ventures of Faust and Mephistopheles in act 5. More recent investigations have generally continued this trend. Given this lengthy history of interpretation, what is one to make of the second and third acts of *Faust II* with respect to economic matters? In the “Ökonomische Lesart” (Economic Reading) section of his *Faust* commentary, Ulrich Gaier offers this assessment: “Angesichts der Tatsache, daß sich der 2. und 3. Akt in Fausts Kopf abspielen, kann es hier nicht um reales Wirtschaften in der geschichtlichen Folge des Wirtschaftsgefahren der Neuzeit gehen” (Given the fact that acts 2 and 3 are acted out in Faust’s head, real economic activity resulting historically from economic behavior in the modern era cannot be at stake here). While Gaier accurately describes the tendency of literary and economic analyses of *Faust II*—including his own—to focus on the other three acts, his claim deserves closer scrutiny. It clearly hinges upon what he calls “reales Wirtschaften” (real economic activity); yet he does not define it or specify how it relates to the history of modern political economy. Admittedly, the second and third acts do not appear at first glance to contain the traditional economic elements found in the other acts. However, as I shall argue, to discount the two acts encompassing the Helena episode simply because they unfold in Faust’s head severely underestimates the complexity of Goethe’s political-economic thought in this significant portion of *Faust II*. Goethe does not simply set aside the keen insight into economic matters that he skillfully demonstrates throughout the rest of his self-described “Hauptgeschäft” (main business). Rather, he accentuates in acts 2 and 3 the subjective nature of value, particularly as it relates to the economic principle of demand. Goethe repeatedly employs and couples *Wert* (value) and *Begehr/en* (demand) in scenes leading up to and including the Helena episode. Moreover, he demonstrates in these two acts a significant change in his own approach to value, from an intrinsic to a subjective view of it.
The model of subjective value Goethe presents in *Faust II* draws on his wide-ranging experience in Weimar as a privy councillor specializing in tax and finance matters, on the one hand, and his extensive knowledge of contemporaneous political-economic texts, on the other. In official writings from 1785 and 1793, Goethe relies on the concept of intrinsic value when addressing taxes and money, respectively. After the turn of the century, his introduction to the work of Adam Smith through Georg Sartorius demarcates a shift in his approach to value toward the subjective view that he presents in *Faust II*. Another, lesser-known Scottish economist likely contributed to Goethe’s understanding of demand. Goethe was introduced to the work of Sir James Steuart as early as 1777. Steuart was well known in Germany at the time, and his *Principles of Political Economy* (1767) was in fact more prominent there during the 1780s and 1790s than Smith’s *Wealth of Nations* (1776). In *Faust II*, Goethe applies his practical experience and theoretical knowledge to the classical example of Helena. His point, I maintain, is that Helena does not possess any intrinsic value. Quite the opposite: she characterizes Faust’s subjective valuation of her or, to put it in Faustian terms, his striving. At the same time, Helena fleetingly embodies not only Faust’s “desire” but also his economic “demand,” as *Begehr* had become synonymous with *Nachfrage* (demand) by the middle of the 1820s. The duality of the key term *Begehren*—Faust describes Helena as “mein einziges Begehren” (7412; my sole demand/desire [translation modified])—allows for an economic analysis of acts 2 and 3. Precisely by situating the Helena episode in Faust’s mind, Goethe models a subjective approach to value that anticipates the work of the Austrian economist Carl Menger. In his *Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre* (1871; translated as *Principles of Economics*, 1976), Menger presents a subjective value theory and the related concept of an “economizing individual.” In the “Palast” (Palace) scene of act 5, Goethe depicts Faust as an economizing individual in extremis, set against the backdrop of “Krieg, Handel und Piraterie” (11187; war, trade, and piracy). I conclude my analysis by reconsidering this line within the context of Goethe’s earlier political-economic reading. I maintain that he references an obscure Greek dialogue titled *Xenocrates oder Ueber die Abgaben* (Xenocrates, or On Taxation, 1784), which was written by his brother-in-law, Johann Georg Schlosser, and dedicated to him. In addition to offering a belated acknowledgment of Schlosser’s work and a commemoration of Goethe’s sister Cornelia, this line provides the context for Goethe’s application of his subjective model of value in the final act of *Faust II*, where Faust undertakes his riskiest venture and ultimately pays the highest price.

**Begehr/en as Economic Concept**

The prominence of money and gold in *Faust II* lends the text to economic readings. In act 1, Mephistopheles famously introduces paper money to the Emperor during a time of fiscal need. Acting as economic consultant, a position he holds for Faust throughout the text, Mephistopheles evaluates the monetary situation: “Wo fehlt’s nicht irgendwo auf dieser Welt? / Dem dies, dem das, hier aber fehlt das Geld” (4889–90; Where in the world
is something not in short supply? / Someone lacks this, another that, but here the lack is money). Perhaps not the answer to every need, it is a logical response to the Emperor's present dilemma, Mephistopheles forcefully argues. Despite the Chancellor's objections, the Emperor famously decrees: “Es fehlt an Geld, nun gut so schaff es denn” (4926; money is short; well, go and get it then!). Economic analyses of act 1 regularly address the creation of paper money that follows, but they tend to overlook the fundamental matter of value that calls for the fiscal elixir in the first place, one that does not transform metal into gold but the prospect of gold into paper money. After the Emperor's decree, Goethe uses the term “Geld” (money) on occasion but prefers to employ “Gold” (gold) in its various forms until the last scene of act 4, “Des Gegenkaisers Zelt, Thron” (The Anti-Emperor's Tent, Throne), which is the final scene he composed for Faust II. Following the mention of “Geld” in line 4890, Mephistopheles speaks of “Gold” a few lines later: “Ist Gold gemünzt und ungemünzt zu finden” (4894; you'll find both coined and uncoined gold). The materiality of a coin's weight goes hand in hand with its value, he explains: “Was ihr nicht wägt hat für euch kein Gewicht, / Was ihr nicht münzt das meint ihr gelte nicht” (4921–22; what you can't weigh is of no weight to you / and what you do not coin, you think of no account). While the Emperor's various advisers debate the proposed solution, the Astrologer considers the situation from his perspective. Prompted by Mephistopheles, he offers a hierarchy of metallic value corresponding to the planets. The sun represents gold and the moon silver. Mercury and Venus are mercury and copper, respectively, while Mars is iron and Jupiter tin (Schöne 422). Saturn comes in last as both planet and metal (lead) because of its size and weight:

Saturn ist groß, dem Auge fern und klein.
Ihn als Metall verehren wir nicht sehr
An Wert gering, doch im Gewichte schwer. (4962–64)

[while giant Saturn seems remote and small. The latter is, as metal, not much venerated and has, despite its density, but little value.]

Commentators offering economic interpretations of this passage have not discussed the Astrologer's mention of “Wert” (value), a central economic term that Goethe repeatedly couples with Begehr/en (demand/desire). In contemporaneous economic literature, the term Begehr was synonymous with Nachfrage, as illustrated by the first edition of Karl Heinrich Rau's very influential Lehrbuch der politischen Oekonomie (Textbook of Political Economy, 1826). Rau discusses the principle of supply and demand using precisely this term:

Das Mitwerben (die Concurrenz) der Kauflustigen, welches man die Nachfrage, oder den Begehr nennt, nützt den Verkäufern, indem es, je größer es ist, desto mehr den Preis zu erhöhen strebt; dagegen haben die Käufer um so mehr Vorteil, je stärker das Mitwerben der Verkaufslustigen, das Angebot, ist, indem dasselbe auf eine Erniedrigung des Preises hinwirkt.
Competition among eager purchasers, called demand or desire, benefits sellers: the bigger the demand, the higher the price. Buyers, in contrast, have greater advantage with more competition among eager sellers (supply), as this contributes to a lower price.]

Goethe incorporates the economic concepts of Begehren/en, Begier/de (desire), and Bedürfnis (need) at significant points throughout both parts of Faust and in other major works. In his second and final appearance, the Astrologer—again expressing Mephistopheles’s economic sentiments—speaks of Begehren. The Emperor is anxious to recover the gold, which Mephistopheles has convinced him lies buried underground, before it is stolen. Not one to curb his enthusiasm, Mephistopheles encourages him to take up the spade and begin immediately. The Astrologer, still playing devil’s advocate, suggests that the Emperor wait until after the upcoming festivities:

Herr! mäßige solch dringendes Begehren,
Laß erst vorbei das bunte Freudenspiel;
Zerstreutes Wesen führt uns nicht zum Ziel. (5048–50)

[Sire, moderate this eagerness until the merriment of carnival is past; we’ll not achieve our end if we’re distracted.]

The Emperor agrees that the business of “Begehren” should be kept separate from the pleasure of the “Freudenspiel” (carnival). The distinction between the two, however, may at times be tricky. Goethe’s employment of Begehren is a prelude to both the creation of paper money and the Helena episode. Mephistopheles warns Faust that the latter is more complicated and riskier than the former:

Greifst in ein fremdestes Bereich,
Machst frevelhaft am Ende neue Schulden,
Denkst Helenen so leicht hervorzurufen
Wie das Papiergespenst der Gulden.— (6195–98)

[and you are meddling in an alien sphere; you’ll end up with worse debts than ever, if you believe that Helen can be conjured up as easily as phantom money.—]

For Faust, as we shall see, despite the likelihood of creating “neue Schulden” (new debts [translation modified]), the potential benefits outweigh the costs. Here, as in acts 2 and 3, Goethe clearly situates Helena within an economic context.

Goethe first couples value and demand in the masquerade, when Plutus/Faust commandeers the Herald’s staff in order to open the chest conveyed upon his chariot. Plutus, “des Reichtums Gott” (5569; the god of wealth), then commands those present to behold a golden caldron:

Es tut sich auf! schaut her! in ehrnen Kesseln
Entwickelt sichs und wallt von goldnem Blute,
Zunächst der Schmuck von Kronen, Ketten, Ringen
Es schwillt und droht ihn schmelzend zu verschlingen.
(5711–14)

[The chest flies open. Look! See how, blood-red,
in brazen pots, gold surges up,
beside it choicest chains and rings and crowns,
and threatens to engulf and melt them.]

The depiction is reminiscent of the “Hexenküche” (Witch’s Kitchen) scene, which ends with Mephistopheles invoking Helena sotto voce: “Du siehst, mit diesem Trank im Leibe, / Bald Helenen in jedem Weibe” (2603–4; With this drink in you, you'll soon see / in every woman a Helen of Troy). It also recalls the “Walpurgisnacht” (Walpurgis Night) scene, where gold and blood are closely related. In the present setting, Goethe has the crowd of spectators voice their demands. In “Wechselgeschrei der Menge” (scene description prior to line 5715; Crowd Exclaiming in Turn), we hear:

Gefäße goldne schmelzen sich,
Gemünzte Rollen wälzen sich.—
Dukaten hüpfen wie geprägt,
O wie mir das den Busen regt—
Wie schau ich alle mein Begehr!
Da kollern sie am Boden her.— (5717–22)

[Vessels of gold are being melted,
golden rouleaus are tossed about.—
As if just minted, ducats dance
and make my heart begin to leap—
to see all I have ever wanted
rolling now along the floor!—]

Coins hold more immediate value for the anonymous crowd than gold in its more decorative forms. As Faust progresses toward his first encounter with Helena, Goethe increasingly juxtaposes value and demand. In this scene, the Herald, having relinquished his power by yielding his staff to Plutus/Faust, tries to restore order to a scene spiraling rapidly out of control, as anonymous cries replace his official voice. He attempts to reveal the illusion that has captured the crowd's attention:

Was solls ihr Toren? soll mir das?
Es ist ja nur ein Maskenspaß.
Heut abend wird nicht mehr begehrt;
Glaubt ihr man gab euch Gold und Wert? (5727–30)

[What is the meaning of this madness?
These things are only make-believe.
No more such greediness tonight!
Do you believe it’s gold you’re getting?]
Despite his efforts, the potential satisfaction of needs, wants, and desires trumps reality for the moment.

In Faust II, gold is regularly associated with coins and their value. Before the overnight creation, distribution, and overwhelming success of paper money, there was a demand for coins as bearers of value. Metal may have temporarily given way to paper, but speculation in the “Papiergespenst der Gulden” (6198; phantom money) remains based on the fundamental correlation between value and demand. In addition to the Emperor’s reproduced signature, which lends credibility to each of these new notes, comes the following guarantee: “Zu wissen sei es jedem ders begehrt: / Der Zettel hier ist tausend Kronen wert” (6057–58; To whom it may concern, be by these presents known, / this note is legal tender for one thousand crowns). Interpretations of the creation of paper money in act 1 frequently revolve around the complex issues associated with the promise—that cannot be kept—of buried treasure endorsed by the Emperor, who does not recall committing his signature to paper (see Hamacher 131–87; Vogl 310–51). However, as soon as the paper notes are accepted everywhere, the fine print is of little concern to “ders begehrt” (6057; he who demands/wants it [translation modified]) such as the “Fleischer, Bäcker, Schenken” (6091; butcher, baker, tavern [translation modified]). Mephistopheles fully endorses the new currency, which skips the steps of “markten” (bargaining) and “tauschen” (6121; haggling) that had been necessary due to the lack of a common exchange rate. In lines 6091 and 6121, Goethe clearly references Adam Smith’s famous description of self-interest at the beginning of Wealth of Nations.11 Mephistopheles adds, with no uncertain irony, that if one yearns for the old-fashioned feel of metal, there are moneychangers who would gladly exchange old coins for their paper equivalent. And if none are available, one need only take up the spade, which is the same advice he had given Faust (2351–54). Mephistopheles makes these claims knowing full well that his audience, at this point, has no intention of testing their validity, because their immediate needs and wants have been met.

The scene closes with the Fool consulting Mephistopheles on the value of the “Zauber-Blätter” (6157; printed charms). When the former complains, or perhaps boasts, that he has just “lost” five thousand crowns that he never had in the first place, Mephistopheles replies that at least he seems to have enjoyed it. In all seriousness, the Fool wants to know whether the new notes are truly as valuable as other forms of money: “Da seht nur her ist das wohl Geldes wert?” (6165; Is what I’m showing you the same as money?). The answer depends upon the value one places on the new bills, Mephistopheles replies. The new currency satisfies the needs of his belly, does it not? “Du hast dafür was Schlund und Bauch begehrt” (6166; It will supply your gut’s and gullet’s wants). But what of “Acker, Haus und Vieh” (6167; some land, a house, and cattle) or even a “Schloß, mit Wald und Jagd und Fischbach” (6169; A castle . . . with woods, a chase, and fishing?), the Fool inquires? Might those material wants also be met? Mephistopheles, the unrelenting facilitator of immediate satisfaction, responds affirmatively: “Traun! / Ich möchte dich gestrengen Herrn wohl schaun!” (6169–70; I’d give a lot to see you as a country squire!). As he departs, the Fool begins to envision himself as a property
owner. Mephistopheles adds in closing: “Wer zweifelt noch an unsres Narren Witz” (6172; Who still can doubt our Fool has wit!). In other words, one should keep in mind the old adage about a fool and his money. Goethe understood that currency, whether paper money or specie, is based on the perception of its value. In the “Klassische Walpurgisnacht” (Classical Walpurgis Night) scene, he has Thales describe this specifically in terms of demand and value: “Das ist es ja was man begehrt, / Der Rost macht erst die Münze wert” (8223–24; This sort of thing is much sought after; / the patina enhances the coin’s worth). Value, both aesthetic and economic, may accrue over time, given the proper circumstances and depending on what one deems valuable. Having established the economic relationship between value and demand in act 1, Goethe offers a model of subjective value exemplified by Faust’s search for Helena in acts 2 and 3. Helena, as both libidinal “desire” and economic “demand,” demonstrates Faust’s striving as well as its limits.

**Helena and the Limits of Faust’s Striving**

Act 2 begins with Faust lying in a state of paralysis following his unsuccessful attempt to lay hold of Helena’s conjured figure at the end of act 1. The body of Faust, an “Unseliger! verführt / Zu schwergelöstem Liebesbande” (6566–67; unhappy victim of love / whose bonds it will be hard to break!), thanks to Helena, remains in this condition for the duration of acts 2 and 3. During this time his mind is set free to wander where his body may not. It is within this absolutely subjective context that Helena fully characterizes Faust’s striving, which Goethe expresses in terms of demand. Speaking of Helena in the “Classical Walpurgis Night” scene, Faust proclaims: “Sie ist mein einziges Begehren!” (7412; she is my sole demand/desire [translation modified]). Goethe’s employment of value and demand in the scenes leading up to the Helena episode provides the context for Faust’s declaration, yet important questions remain. What role does Helena’s unattainability play in Goethe’s model of subjective value? What is her function with respect to the principle of demand, understood as a willingness to pay a certain price for a desired good or service? How exactly does she characterize Faust’s striving? Finally, what is Goethe’s contribution, in acts 2 and 3, to the history of political economy?

In the “Classical Walpurgis Night” scene, shortly after Faust arrives, Chiron and Manto discuss Helena in a brief conversation that ends with the coupling of “wert” (value) and “begehrt” (demand/desire). As Chiron prepares to depart, he explains Faust’s motivation to Manto:

Helenen, mit verrückten Sinnen,  
Helenen will er sich gewinnen,  
Und weiß nicht wie und wo beginnen;  
Asklepischer Kur vor andern wert. (7484–87)

[He is resolved—his wits are crazed—
to make fair Helen his, although he doesn’t have
the least idea of how and where to start.  
A special case for Aesculapian treatment!]
“Den lieb’ ich der Unmögliches begehrt” (7488; I love the man who demands/desires the impossible [translation modified]), she replies. Heinrich Rickert writes of Manto’s line that “sie spricht damit ein Wort, das man als Motto über die ganze Faustdichtung setzen könnte” (with this she speaks a word that one could use as a motto for all of Faust). The word to which he refers is, of course, “Unmögliches” (impossible). Earlier, in the “Rittersaal” (Knights’ Hall) scene of act 1, the Astrologer speaks of the impossible in a similar fashion, as Faust prepares to conjure Paris and Helena: “Mit Augen schaut nun was ihr kühn begehrt, / Unmöglich ist’s, drum eben glaubenswert” (6419–20; See now before your eyes what you have dared to ask for: / what is impossible, and hence is surely truth!). Despite her “impossibility,” Helena appears in convincing fashion both times, just like the “Papiergespenst der Gulden” (phantom money) to which Mephistopheles had earlier compared her (6197–98). During act 2, Helena’s libidinal-economic role takes greater shape. While she may have remained out of Faust’s reach at the end of act 1, in the subjective realm of his mind she not only is attainable but also has a child with him. The implicit Verkehr (intercourse) that produces Euphorion adds another political-economic layer to the Helena episode. In discussing the transition from eighteenth-century cameralism to nineteenth-century Nationalökonomie (political economy), Keith Tribe discusses the central term “Verkehr”: “‘Good government’ was displaced by Verkehr, the free interaction of economic subjects in which order was produced out of a mutual satisfaction of need” (Tribe 209). Goethe predicates Faust’s participation in this new economic order, in act 5, on his model of subjective value in the Helena episode, one that underscores the role of needs and their satisfaction and corresponds to contemporaneous political-economic discourse, which by the early 1820s overlapped with the arts and sciences.

In an 1822 article on Bedürfniss (need) in the Allgemeine Encyclopädie der Wissenschaften und Künste (Universal Encyclopedia of Sciences and Arts, 1818–89), Johann Gottfried Gruber begins with the distinction between need (Bedürfnis) and necessity (Nötig haben). Both indicate an absence of a means to an end. In the case of the latter, he gives the example of a field lacking rain. With regard to the former, Gruber emphasizes the psychological aspect of need: “Bedürfnis [drückt] einen gefühlten oder gedachten Mangel [aus]” (need expresses a perceived or imaginary lack). In expressing lack, need is not simply a result of perception but rather corresponds to sentiment and feeling: “das Bedürfnis tritt hervor mit der Empfindung und dem Gefühl” (Gruber 324; need emerges with sentiment and feeling). The object of need (Bedarf) must be understood as part of the process initiated by Bedürfnis. Gruber then introduces the concept of Begehren (desire) for clarification:

So wie der erste Mangel sich dem Gefühl ankündigt, wird im Innern die entgegenwirkende Kraft geweckt, durch welche allmählich alle Vermögen des lebenden Wesens, eins nach dem andern, instinktmäßig, zur Thätigkeit erregt werden. Der Mangel fodert Abhilfe durch Selbstthätigkeit, und diese zeigt sich auch sofort im Begehren nach dem Gegenstande des Bedürfnisses, d.i. nach einem Bedarf. Dieses Begehren ist ein unwillkürliches, bloß blind wirkendes Streben—ein Trieb—nach einem anfangs völlig unerkanten Gegenstande,
der aber doch notwendig zur Abhilfe des Mangels herbeigeschafft werden muß, damit das unbefriedigte Gefühl, dieser treue Wächter für Erhaltung und Wohlsheyn, wieder ruhig werde. (Gruber 324)

[As the initial lack announces itself to feeling, a counter force is awakened within. Through this force all abilities of the living being are gradually, one at a time, instinctively, aroused to activity. The lack demands remedy through self-activity, and this also manifests itself directly in desire for an object of need, that is, for Bedarf. This desire is an involuntary, purely blind striving—a drive—toward an initially, absolutely unknown object, which however must, as a matter of course, be obtained in order to remedy the lack, so that the unsatisfied feeling, this true guardian of conservation and well-being, may return to calm.]

Need stirs internal energy that produces activity. Beginning with scarcity, Gruber shifts the emphasis to an active demand for something deemed essential. The emphasis on Begehren in this discussion of need highlights the process that drives the individual. In the case of Faust, Helena is the initially unknown catalyst that fuels his demand, or his striving, but she also exemplifies its limitations. For just as needs are endless, so too are the demands produced by humans. In Goethe’s description of Helena as Faust’s “einziges Begehren” (7412; sole demand/desire [translation modified]), the adjective denotes impossibility. She is indeed his Begehren, but as such, she cannot remain his “sole” desire or demand.

Johann Gebhard Maaß contributed the article “Begehren, Begehrensvermögen” (Desire, the Appetitive Faculty) to the same volume of the Allgemeine Encyclopädie der Wissenschaften und Künste. Maaß was a professor of philosophy at Halle with an interest in psychology, and his writings in this area include “Versuch über die Einbildungskraft” (Essay on Imagination, 1792), “Versuch über die Leidenschaften” (Essay on Passions, 1805–7), and “Versuch über die Gefühle, besonders über die Affecten” (Essay on Feelings, Particularly Emotions, 1811–12). His encyclopedia entry complements Gruber’s discussion of need and elaborates on the psychological component of Begehren (desire). Maaß explains that Vorstellung (imagination) initiates Streben (striving) toward that which is imagined. The combination of imagination and striving, in turn, produces Begehren. He adds: “Also, nur ein vorstellendes Wesen kann begehren, und auch dieses nur solche Dinge, von denen es irgend eine Vorstellung hat”15 (Thus, only an imagining being can desire, and only such things of which it has some idea). Maaß stresses that Begehren is uniquely human and its applications are limited only by the imagination. In transitioning to his second topic, the appetitive faculty, he underscores the range of human Begehren: “Daß nun der Mensch Vieles begehrt, ist Thatsache. Er hat also ein Begehrungsvermögen” (Maaß 341; It is a fact that the human being desires many things. He therefore has an appetitive faculty). He begins the account of Begehrungsvermögen (the appetitive faculty) by distinguishing between two forms of Begehren: Begierde, which seeks the realization of an object, and Verabscheuung, which seeks the removal of an object. Vorstellungen (ideas) also fall into two categories, sinnlich (sensual) and vernünftig (sensible), which generate corresponding forms of the appetitive faculty. He then equates “das vernünftige
Begehrensvormögen” (the sensible appetitive faculty) with “der Wille” (the will); however, the distinction remains one of degree, as both are “eine und eben dieselbe Kraft, die nur nach Verschiedenheit der Vorstellungen, durch welche sie bestimmt wird, aus verschiedene Art sich äußert” (Maaß 341; one and the same force, which finds various expression in accordance with the different ideas that determine it). In summary, Maaß offers three general principles of the appetitive faculty. First, Vorstellung is the basis of Begehren. Second, the desired outcome, either the presence or the absence of something, must be viewed positively; otherwise, it would not produce the necessary striving. Third, the process must be deemed possible:

Was begehrt werden soll, das muß nicht als unmöglich vorgestellt werden. Denn nach Etwas streben, sofern man dasselbe für unmöglich erkent, widerspricht sich selbst. Denn Wirklichkeit schließt Möglichkeit ein; also, was man wirklich machen will, das erklärt man eben dadurch für möglich. (Maaß 342)

[That which is desired must not be imagined as impossible. For striving toward something deemed impossible is a contradiction, as reality implies possibility. Thus, what one wishes to realize, one declares precisely in this way as possible.]

He concludes with potential avenues of further inquiry relating to Begehrungsvermögen such as the role of drives, inclinations, and passions as well as the question of freedom. These two encyclopedia articles show the extent to which political-economic concepts (Bedarf [object of need], Bedürfnis [need], Begehren [demand/desire], Begierde [desire]—and let us not forget Vermögen [assets]) had become ensconced in philosophical and psychological discussions of the time. The fact that neither Gruber nor Maaß explicitly references the economic background of these notions underscores their incorporation in other discourses as well as their redeployment to address the libidinal economy, which would have its own science by the end of the nineteenth century. In Money Matters: Economics and the German Cultural Imagination, 1770–1850, Richard Gray maintains that, in contrast to an economics of excess characterized by the creation of paper money and Faust’s colonial endeavor, Helena represents “the embodiment of aesthetic and libidinal wealth” and “most closely parallels money as the concretization of economic riches” (Gray 389). While she undoubtedly represents aesthetic and libidinal ideals, Goethe clearly situates her in an economic realm at the same time. He updates and complicates the classical example of Helena by having her characterize Faust’s demand as well as his desire, thereby adding a level of economic meaning that intersects the other two realms as in a Venn diagram.

**From Intrinsic Value to Subjective Value**

The Helena episode demonstrates a shift in Goethe’s approach to economic value. During his first decade in Weimar (1776–86) as a senior adviser to Duke Carl August, he employs the notion of intrinsic value in official writings dealing with money and taxation, two topics that go hand in hand. In an
extensive 1785 tax report on a local farming community, Goethe proposes a tax concept based on “ein innrer Werth der Güter”\(^{16}\) (an intrinsic value of goods). A number of years later, in a coin report from 1793, he writes that “Geld [sey] nicht durch den Stempel, sondern durch den innerlichen gewissen Werth Geld”\(^{17}\) (money is based not on a stamp but on a certain, intrinsic value). The question of intrinsic value dates back to Plato and Aristotle, who held opposing views on the subject.\(^{18}\) In Germany during the late eighteenth century, proponents of both physiocracy and Adam Smith continued to discuss the matter, which raises the larger question of the nature of economic value.\(^{19}\) Goethe’s formal introduction to the work of Smith through Georg Sartorius offers insight into the development of his approach to value. In 1806, Goethe thanks Sartorius for sending two books he had written on the Scottish economist:\(^{20}\)

Nicht ohne Lächeln sah ich den Titel der interessanten Bücher, die Sie mir überschickten. Sie belehren uns über die Elemente des Nationalreichtums, und wahrhaftig wir sind bald wieder bey den Elementen, beym ABC, und es ist also recht gut, daß man uns an die Quellen hinweist, da unsere schönen breiten Reiche und Seen abgeleitet und ausgetrocknet werden. (Quoted in Mahl 412)

[Not without a smile did I see the title of the interesting books you sent me. You/they instruct us in the elements of national wealth; and we are truly quickly returned to the elements, to the ABCs, and it is indeed good that one points us to the sources, as our lovely, broad realms and bodies of water are being drained and dessicated.]

Sartorius was central to the reception of Smith in Germany. He was Smith’s closest reader as well as one of his sharpest critics, and his theory of value differs significantly from the one in Wealth of Nations. Sartorius distinguishes his approach in the first essay of Abhandlungen, die Elemente des National-Reichtums und die Staatswirtschaft betreffend (Essays on the Elements of National Wealth and Public Economy, 1806), where he aligns himself less with Smith and his labor theory of value and more with future advocates of Nationalökonomie (political economy), who favored a subjective value theory.\(^{21}\)

In the preface to the Abhandlungen, Sartorius reflects upon his earlier contribution to Smith scholarship, which was intended for layman and expert alike, but he quickly arrives at a point of disagreement with Smith, for whom he has great respect and with whose work he had actively engaged for more than a decade. The first and last of the four essays, he explains, were written “gegen Adam Smiths Vorstellung vom Werth der Dinge, und besonders gegen den von ihm aufgestellten unabänderlichen Maßstab desselben”\(^{22}\) (against Adam Smith’s idea of the value of things and particularly against the immutable measure of said value postulated by him). Smith’s approach to value, in the view of Sartorius, leaves much to be desired. At the beginning of the first essay, he describes Smith’s work on value as “theils dunkel, theils mangelhaft” (partly opaque, partly insufficient) and proceeds to question the proposition that labor is a valid measure of value (Sartorius 1). He begins, as Smith does in Wealth of Nations, with use value; however, Sartorius quickly departs
from Smith by emphasizing that different needs, tastes, and enjoyments make “Verkehr” (commerce) possible (Sartorius 4). Individual wants may contribute to both use value and exchange value. Further, exchange value introduces the corresponding market variables of supply and demand. Sartorius emphasizes the role of demand (Nachfrage), which must be taken into account given the contributing factors of “Bedürfnis” (need), “Genuß” (enjoyment), and “Geschmack” (taste) (Sartorius 9). Yet he concedes that one’s needs and wants are not always attainable because of the competing needs and wants of others, production costs, and competition between buyers and sellers. The realities of the marketplace underlie his critique of Smith’s labor theory of value. The invisible hand that has become synonymous with Wealth of Nations does its part to undermine Smith’s theory of value in Sartorius’s reading of it. Having presented his own view of use value and exchange value, Sartorius arrives at the foundation upon which Smith’s value theory ultimately rests: “Adam Smith stellte nun zuerst, als einen unwandelbaren, ewig gleichen Maßstab des Werths der Dinge, die Arbeit des Menschen auf, und diese seine Behauptung ist nicht ohne Beyfall geblieben” (Sartorius 16–17; Adam Smith first established the labor of humans as an immutable, always constant measure of value, and this assertion of his has received much acclaim). A seven-page Smith citation follows. As measured as his earlier Smith summaries were, Sartorius does not temper his critique of Smith in the final portion of the essay. He begins with Smith’s reasoning: “Wirklich ist das ganze Raisonnement eine merkwürdige Erscheinung” (Sartorius 24; The entire reasoning is really a peculiar occurrence). Aside from the problematic nature of any absolute measure of value, how can labor, measured at various times and in different places, maintain a reliable standard? Sartorius then critiques the labor theory of value in no uncertain terms:

Das Bestreben, einen solchen ewig gleichen, unveränderlichen Maßstab alles Werths zu finden, hat den vortrefflichen, scharfsinnigen Mann am Ende so hingerissen, daß er ihn auch wirklich in der menschlichen Arbeit, deren Wesen er gleichwohl so gut kannte, so fein entfaltet hat, durch einen seltsamen Trugschluß gefunden zu haben glaubte. (Sartorius 24)

[The endeavor to find such an always constant, immutable measure of all value so entranced the admirable, insightful man in the end that he believed, because of a peculiar fallacy, truly to have discovered the measure in human labor, despite knowing its true nature so well and expressing it so precisely.]

These are clearly not the words of a Smith disciple, and they are even more remarkable given when they were written. By the turn of the century, Smith had been the prevalent Scottish economist in Germany for over a decade. Sartorius criticizes a fundamental tenet of Wealth of Nations during a time when Smithianismus (Smithianism) was in full swing (see Tribe 133–48). Furthermore, both the Abhandlungen and the second edition of his Smith summary were published in 1806. Sartorius understood the enduring significance of Smith’s work and remained not only one of his greatest advocates but also one of his most insightful critics. A significant contribution to the development of German economic thought during the early nineteenth
century, Sartorius’s approach to value emphasizes the subjective nature of its appraisal and offers a theoretical challenge to Goethe’s earlier view of intrinsic value.

By the time Goethe composes the second and third acts of Faust II, he had moved away from the view of intrinsic value as fundamental and toward a subjective approach to value. In order to understand this shift, we must revisit the history of political economy in Germany beginning in the final decades of the eighteenth century, during which German economic thought drew heavily upon French and Scottish theories. “Germany,” writes Kenneth Carpenter, “was an importer rather than an exporter of economic ideas.”

Goethe showed an early interest in the work of the Scottish economist Sir James Steuart, whose Principles of Political Economy appeared in German translation in 1769, two years after its publication. In a letter to his mother dated November 16, 1777, Goethe writes: “Schlosser soll mir das Buch Stuarts Finanz System von Lenz . . . schicken” (Schlosser is supposed to send me Stuart’s finance-system book from Lenz). Johann Georg Schlosser was a career government administrator and Goethe’s brother-in-law. Officials in Weimar were also familiar with Steuart. Listed among the subscribers to the 1770 Hamburg translation are Geheimer Rath (privy councilor) Fritsch, Geheimer Rath und Regierungspräsident (district president) von Greiner, and, topping the list, the Erbprinz zu Sachsen-Weimar (heir to Saxe-Weimar). Whether he was following a recommendation by a colleague in the Privy Council (Geheimes Consilium) or was simply curious about this new treatment of “political economy,” Goethe was evidently interested in a work that would become “the most widely cited British text of the 1780s and early 1790s” in Germany (Tribe 136). By comparison, Smith’s Wealth of Nations, which had been translated into German shortly after its publication in 1776, gained popularity toward the end of the century. Smith was, of course, familiar with Steuart and had a simple strategy for dealing with the work of his fellow countryman, as he reveals in a letter from September 3, 1772: “I have the same opinion of Sir James Stewarts Book that you have. Without once mentioning it, I flatter myself, that every false principle in it, will meet with a clear and distinct confutation in mine.”

Despite Smith’s attempt to relegate the Principles of Political Economy to subsequent obscurity, which was largely the effect of Smith’s decision not to address the work, Steuart’s contemporaries and nineteenth-century German and Austrian economists readily acknowledged his contributions to economic thought. The Principles, for example, offered not only “the first systematic treatise on economics in the English language” but also “introduced into English the term ‘political economy.’” The first two volumes of the Principles along with Abhandlung von den Grundsätzen der Münzwissenschaft (Essay on the Principles of the Currency System, 1761) were in fact written in Tübingen, where he had resided for four years. Steuart is significant with respect to Goethe’s employment of demand because he is credited with theorizing supply and demand in the Principles, where he shifts the discussion from “wants” to “demand”: “Was wir im ersten Buche, wenn vom Tauschen die Rede war, Bedürfnisse (Wants) nannte, das werden wir itzt, da von der Handlung die Rede ist, mit dem Worte Nachfrage
(Demand) ausdrücken”31 (What we called in the first book wants, when speaking of exchange, we will now express as demand, as we are discussing merchant business). In acts 2 and 3, Goethe demonstrates how Helena, as the embodiment of Faust’s Begehren (demand/desire), has no intrinsic value. Rather, she represents the value that Faust ascribes to her. Toward the end of the third act, Euphorion’s “Kleid Mantel und Lyra” (scene description prior to line 9955; robe, cloak, and lyre [translation modified]) are all that remain of Faust’s Verkehr (intercourse) with Helena. These material remainders serve an important function: they validate the “reality” that Faust experiences in the Helena episode.

Goethe’s model of subjective value in Faust II anticipates the work of Carl Menger, whose Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre emphasizes the relationship between value and the satisfaction of needs as they contribute to well-being: “In allem Güterwerth tritt uns demnach lediglich die Bedeutung entgegen, welche wir der Befriedigung unserer Bedürfnisse, also unserem Leben und unserer Wohlfahrt beimesen” (In the value of goods, therefore, we always encounter merely the significance we assign to the satisfaction of our needs—that is, to our lives and well-being).32 For Menger, value is not an intrinsic quality but an external attribute determined by individual needs and subjective assessment:

Der Werth ist demnach nichts den Gütern Anhaftendes, keine Eigenschaft derselben, eben so wenig aber auch ein selbstständiges, für sich bestehendes Ding. Derselbe ist ein Urteil, welches die wirtschaftenden Menschen über die Bedeutung der in ihrer Verfügung befindlichen Güter für die Aufrechthaltung ihres Lebens und ihrer Wohlfahrt fällen, und demnach ausserhalb des Bewusstseins derselben nicht vorhanden. (Menger, Grundsätze 86)

[Value is thus nothing inherent in goods, no property of them, nor an independent thing existing by itself. It is a judgment economizing men make about the importance of the goods at their disposal for the maintenance of their lives and well-being. Hence value does not exist outside the consciousness of men. (Menger, Principles 120–21)]

His use of the adjective “wirtschaftend”33 (economizing) emphasizes not only the shift from subsistence to productive economic activity that had been under way in Germany since the late eighteenth century but also the resulting active, economizing individual. Composed over the course of six decades, Faust not only archives the genealogy of German political economy but also anticipates mid- and late nineteenth-century subjective value theories, ranging from the economic textbooks of Karl Heinrich Rau and Wilhelm Roscher34 to the work of Carl Menger and Sigmund Freud.35

**Goethe and the History of Political Economy**

Where does Goethe rank among his literary contemporaries with respect to the history of political economy? The economic historian Wilhelm Roscher provides an answer to this question and underscores the prevalence of economic discourse in German literature during the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries. In his *Geschichte der National-Oekonomik in Deutschland* (History of Political Economy in Germany, 1874), he begins the final part with two sections dedicated to prominent writers of the period. In his opinion, showed no interest in economic matters, and Lessing, despite addressing such issues in *Nathan der Weise* (Nathan the Wise, 1779), was less concerned with this area than with others in which he excelled such as aesthetics, literary history, and theology. Wieland and Herder were more in tune with the economic theories of cameralism and physiocracy prevalent in Germany during the late eighteenth century, yet they also ultimately failed to address “wirtschaftliche Fragen” (Roscher 476; economic questions). In contrast, Schiller and Goethe critically engaged these questions in their work. Roscher praises Schiller for his interest in history and his “Erkenntnis gleichsam der sittlichen Atmosphäre, worin alle Wirtschaft sich bewegt” (Roscher 477; awareness, as it were, of the moral atmosphere, in which all economy moves). Goethe, on the other hand, brought a different type of economic insight to his literary endeavors. As a privy councillor, he had learned practical lessons that he would subsequently apply in his poetic work. In *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre* (Wilhelm Meister’s Journeyman Years, 1821/1829), for instance, Goethe understands that matters pertaining to “Provinzialökonomie” (provincial economy) and “Staatsfinanzwesen” (state finance) reflect the “gute[n] Hauswirth” (Roscher 478; good property owner). With respect to *Faust II*, Roscher considers the following topics relevant to “das Nationalökonomische” (the political-economic) in Goethe’s late work: “die Wunder des Papiergeldes” (the wonders of paper money), “die Eindeichung, Kanalbauten, etc., selbst mit der dazu gehörigen Expropriation” (dike building, canal constructions, etc., with their corresponding expropriation), and “das Bild eines freien, thäti-
gen, blühenden Volkes als Höchstes im Leben” (Roscher 479; the picture of a free, active, thriving people as the pinnacle of life). The historian of political economy falls in line with the majority of scholars discussing economic issues in *Faust II* when he addresses the creation of paper money and Faust’s land reclamation project. One should keep in mind, however, the context in which he presents Goethe’s literary examples. Roscher credits Goethe not only for his engagement with “wirtschaftliche Fragen” but, more importantly, for his insight into *Nationalökonomie*. Further, Roscher calls attention to Goethe’s official experience in Weimar, where he developed the practical foundation upon which his theoretical considerations and subsequent poetic depictions of political-economic matters ultimately rested.

A final example of how Goethe’s official duties and engagement with economic texts ultimately contributed to *Faust II* may be found in the frequently cited lines “Krieg, Handel und Piraterie, / Dreieinig sind sie, nicht zu trennen” (11187–88; war, trade, and piracy together are / a trinity not to be severed). I maintain that this description of war, commerce, and piracy echoes the work of Johann Georg Schlosser, whose writings include moral, philosophical, political, and historical essays as well as the first German translation of Aristotle’s *Politics* in 1798. Among his final publications were two attacks on Kant in 1797 and 1798, which were not well received by Schlegel and Schelling, among others. In November 1773, he married Goethe’s sister Cornelia and then relocated to Karlsruhe, where Margrave Karl Friedrich
awarded him the title “wirklicher Hof- und Regierungs Rat” (van der Zande 19; senior privy councillor). Schlosser had gained notoriety for his 1771 *Katechismus der Sittenlehre für das Landvolk* (Catechism of Morality for the Rural Population), and Karl Friedrich was seeking “ein Schmuckstück für seine Regierung” (van der Zande 19; a jewel for his government). Following a quick promotion to Oberamtsverweser (chief administrator), the Schlossers moved to the country, where they enjoyed a comfortable life. Schlosser was responsible for twenty thousand people and was an early advocate of physiocracy, which was grounded in agriculture. However, he soon experienced its shortcomings firsthand. Karl Friedrich had implemented physiocratic reform in three towns in 1770. When Schlosser was tasked with overseeing two of them in 1774, his dissatisfaction with the imported French theory grew, and he voices this discontent in *Politische Fragmente* (Political Fragments, 1777). By 1784, he would entirely renounce the theory that had taken Germany by storm from 1770 to 1789 (see Gray 109–69). He does so in a 1784 dialogue titled *Xenocrates oder Ueber die Abgaben: An Göthe* (Xenocrates, or On Taxation: To Goethe). By the time of its publication, much had changed in the lives of both Schlosser and Goethe. On June 8, 1777, four weeks after the birth of their second child, Cornelia died. In September of that year, Schlosser married Goethe’s childhood friend Johanna Fahlmer. Goethe writes his mother on November 16, 1777, regarding their engagement and also mentions that Schlosser is supposed to send him a copy of Steuart’s *Principles of Political Oeconomy* (Goethe, *Weimarer Jahrzehnt* 109).

Schlosser’s position as a senior administrator gave him unique insight into various political-economic theories in Germany and their practical implementation. He demonstrates this knowledge in *Xenocrates*, a literary critique of physiocracy set in ancient Greece. Schlosser conveys his message in a dialogue, in which the interlocutors Demetrius and Xenocrates represent positions for and against physiocracy, respectively. Schlosser plays Xenocrates to Karl Friedrich’s Demetrius. In the dedication to Goethe, Schlosser explains that *Xenocrates* is intended as a commemoration: “Wir leben ißt weit von einander, lieber Bruder, und die Zeit, in welcher wir zusammen lebten, kommt diessets des Grabs nie mehr zurück. Laß uns ihr, wenigstens zwischen uns, ein Denkmal setzen” (We now live far from one another, dear brother, and the time we shared [lived] together shall not return on this side of the grave. Let us, at least between us, erect a monument to it [her]). This memorial to time spent together by the living cannot help but, at the same time, recall the dead. Cornelia’s grave in Emmendingen kept open a connection between Schlosser and Goethe that Cornelia had established “this side of the grave.” Although Schlosser is no longer his brother-in-law per se, Goethe remains the uncle of his sister’s children. The second part of the dedication indicates that Schlosser has reconsidered certain ideas (read: physiocracy) that he and Goethe had once discussed. He continues: “Ob die besser waren als jene, weiß ich nicht; aber das weiß ich, daß das die beste Weisheit für uns ist, immer das zu denken und zu thun, was jedes Zeitalter und jede Scene unsers Lebens will. Lebe wohl” (Schlosser 14; Whether these were better than those, I do not know;
but I do know that the best wisdom for us is to always think and do that which each era and each scene of our life wants. Live well). Goethe and Duke Carl August had followed the physiocratic experiment in Baden and spent a few days in Emmendingen in September 1779. Yet they were far less enthusiastic about physiocratic reform than Margrave Karl Friedrich, no doubt because of Schlosser’s experience in the towns of Balingen and Theningen.46 As far as enlightened despots go, Carl August would have been more receptive to Xenocrates than Karl Friedrich, to whom the work was not, after all, dedicated.

Xenocrates begins with the title character in debt to his rich Athenian friend Demetrius. Demetrius pays for the release of Xenocrates, who had been detained and was to be sold into slavery because he could not pay the tax levied on foreigners. In the ensuing tax discussion, Xenocrates ironically defends this and other taxes while his patron calls for their abolition. The dialogue revolves around physiocratic doctrine in general and its advocacy of a single tax on landed property (impôt unique) in particular. Demetrius makes the case for physiocracy, which Xenocrates refutes before convincing him that the physiocratic tax system is impractical to implement, falls short as a source of state revenue, and ultimately hurts farmers. During his first decade of official service, Goethe dealt regularly with tax and finance issues. Xenocrates, as it happens, was published a year before Goethe issued a lengthy report on the tax situation in a local rural community.47 Let us consider the role this text might have played for Goethe. As his official writings illustrate, Goethe agreed with Schlosser that theory was no substitute for sound practice. In terms of practical application, Schlosser refutes physiocratic doctrine but does not propose an alternative tax system. This may account for why Xenocrates remained an obscure economic work among their contemporaries. The fact that it was written as a Greek dialogue might also have had something to do with this. By the time Schlosser published Xenocrates, Goethe was an experienced administrator, and the topic of the piece would have certainly interested him. Bernd Mahl writes that although it is not clear that Goethe read Xenocrates, Schlosser definitely sent it to him (Mahl, Goethes ökonomisches Wissen 241). I argue that Goethe was indeed familiar with the text, which is rather short compared with most eighteenth-century works on political economy, and that he references it in the lines dealing with war, commerce, and piracy in act 5.

In the “Palast” (Palace) scene, we find Faust in a world envisioned by Xenocrates, in which “die ganze Welt von Menschen mit einander verbunden werden sollte, durch die Leichtigkeit und Freiheit des Transports, durch Eröffnungen der Seen, der Hafen, der Flüße” (Schlosser 85; the entire world of humans should be connected through the ease and freedom of transport, through the openings of the seas, harbors, and rivers). Mephistopheles describes the setting of Faust’s latest undertaking:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Vom Ufer nimmt, zu rascher Bahn,} \\
\text{Das Meer die Schiffe willig an;} \\
\text{So spricht daß hier, hier vom Palast} \\
\text{Dein Arm die ganze Welt umfaßt. (11223–26)}
\end{align*}
\]
[and from this strand the willing sea
allows your ships a speedy journey—
admit that here, here from this palace,
you have the whole world in your reach.]

The scene begins with Lynkeus supplementing the failing faculties of the centenarian Faust. Ships pull into port as evening approaches, and in the canal a vessel nears the quay. Lynkeus comments that some sailor has fortune to thank for his safe return and Faust to thank for a place to dock. Lynkeus then announces the arrival of a “Prächtiger Kahn, reich und bunt beladen mit Erzeugnissen fremder Weltgegenden” (scene description prior to line 11167; splendid vessel, richly laden with colorful exotic wares) and its crew, captained by Mephistopheles (pirates also require a secure port to unload and enjoy their spoils). The small crew of mighty men praises their ship’s proprietor, Faust, whose investment in their speculative venture has profited tenfold. Mephistopheles continues to oversee Faust’s business dealings until the very end and for a good reason. Having invested great time and effort as Faust’s agent and economic adviser, he fully expects a big payoff. Beginning with two ships, Mephistopheles and crew return with twenty as well as their loads. Because the law of force prevails on the high seas, there is no need for thought, only acquisition, as he explains:

Das freie Meer befreit den Geist,
Wer weiß da was Besinnen heißt!
Da fördert nur ein rascher Griff,
Man fängt den Fisch, man fängt ein Schiff, (11177–80)

[On the open sea your mind is open,
and no one gives a fig for prudence;
you have to grab things in a hurry:
you catch a fish or catch a ship,
]

As representatives of unchecked Gewalt (force), Mephistopheles and Company expedite the seemingly boundless expansion of Faust’s new realm. Their actions demonstrate how violence is often more easily legitimized than restrained, especially by those believing that might makes right. Explaining that the acquisition of ships makes it easier to acquire even more, Mephistopheles states the law, or lawlessness, of the sea: “Man hat Gewalt, so hat man recht. / Man fragt ums Was? und nicht ums Wie?” (11184–85; since it’s a fact that might is right— / not bow but what will be the only question asked). Two members of his crew, Eilebeute and Habebold, had earlier applied this rule at the end of act 4 when they sought compensation for their part in the war effort. The Faustrecht (rule of force) that Mephistopheles declares and his crew implements extends beyond nautical borders:

Ich müßte keine Schiffahrt kennen.
Krieg, Handel und Piraterie,
Dreieinig sind sie, nicht zu trennen. (11186–88)
[Unless I’m all at sea about maritime matters, war, trade, and piracy together are a trinity not to be severed.]

The combination of war, trade, and piracy echoes a line from Xenocrates and suggests that Goethe read the work dedicated to him after all. Toward the end of the dialogue, as the discussion turns to Bedürfnisse (needs), Xenocrates explains that worldly events shape both real and imaginary needs:

Der Theil der Nation aber, welcher keine Produkte hat, wird sich dann glücklich schätzen Sklave derer zu seyn, welche haben. Was bleibt ihm auch anders übrig? . . . [D]as wäre der Fall der halben griechischen Nation gewesen, wenn nicht Seeräuberey, Handel, und die Persische Kriege uns täglich neue Bedürfnisse, und durch sie, mehr Beweggründe zur Arbeit gegeben hätten, als die bloße Bedürfniß der Produkte geben konnte. (Schlosser 77, emphasis added)

[The part of the nation, however, that has no products will then consider itself lucky to be a slave to those who have them. What else remains for it? . . . [T]hat would have been the case for half of the Greek nation had piracy, trade, and the Persian wars not given us new needs daily and, consequently, more incentives to work than the mere need of products could provide. (emphasis added)]

Goethe, following Schlosser, identifies a Teufelskreis (vicious circle) amplified by the speed of modern exchange. War, commerce, and piracy contribute more than their fair share to the political economy and must be taken into account. As senior government officials, the authors of Xenocrates and Faust II dealt regularly with the contingencies related to this convergence—in other words, with the risks associated with modernity.

In the conclusion to Kalkül und Leidenschaft: Poetik des ökonomischen Menschen (Calculation and Passion: Poetics of the Economic Human Being, 2002), Joseph Vogl maintains that the transition from Enlightenment economic thought to Nationalökonomie around 1800 produced “eine tiefgreifende Veränderung des Wissens darüber, wie sich Wünsche und Lüste der Menschen in ein System komplexer Austauschbeziehungen einfädeln und investieren” (Vogl 348; a profound shift in the knowledge of how human wishes and desires are arranged and invested in a system of complex trade-offs). As he explains, the shift changed how one viewed and dealt with needs:

Hier geht es nicht um Bedürfnisse, die unter bestimmten Bedingungen von ihrem natürlichen Weg abkommen und sich der Gefahr einer exzessiven Begierde aussetzen, sondern umgekehrt um ein Verlangen, das in den Gestalten von Bedürfnis und Bedarf nicht mehr wiedererkennt. Sind gesellschaftliche Produktionen stets Wunschproduktionen, so hat sich mit dieser Wendung die Ökonomie als Libido-Ökonomie und das Subjekt als begehrendes Subjekt reformiert. (Vogl 348)

[Here it is not a matter of needs, which under certain circumstances deviate from their natural path and expose themselves to the danger of excessive
desire, rather, conversely, a longing that no longer recognizes itself in the figures of need and want. If societal productions are always wish-productions, then with this turn, the economy and the subject have reformed themselves into the libido-economy and the desiring subject, respectively.]

*Faust II* epitomizes for Vogl the economic developments that begin with *Verlangen* (longing) rather than with needs. Between the masquerade and Faust’s ambitious development project, Goethe depicts this new political economy and its vicissitudes. Faust, as “begehrendes Subjekt” (desiring subject) par excellence, exemplifies the new economic human being, “ein Mensch, der in der Fülle das Fehlen verspürt, im Mangel die Bedingung seines Wünschens erfährt und die Kunst des Verfehlens beherrscht: nämlich im unendlichen Streben endliche Güter zu wollen” (Vogl 345; a human, who feels absence in abundance, experiences lack as the condition of his wishing, and masters the art of failure: that is to say, in the infinite striving for finite goods). Vogl’s conclusions, which he arrives at with almost no analysis of the second and third acts, support my reading of Faust’s *Begehren*, which adds detail to Vogl’s account in terms of both *Faust II* and contemporaneous political economy. In addition, I contend that Goethe’s economic vision exceeds the Age of Goethe by anticipating the theoretical innovations of Carl Menger and his contemporaries, “who rejected the labor theory of value in favor of a model of value that focused on taste, demand, and price.”49 Mary Poovey eloquently summarizes the advances of Menger and the other marginal utility theorists (W. Stanley Jevons, Alfred Marshall, and Leon Walras) during the 1870s:

According to this theory, the modern economy was no longer organized by the problem of scarcity, with its auxiliary dynamics of production, distribution, and needs; instead, in an economy of abundance, the dynamics that mattered were consumption and desire, for, when individuals were able to choose among an almost infinite variety of consumable goods, the way that they developed and articulated their tastes was more important than labor and the accumulation of capital. (Poovey 276)

Faust’s deal with the devil is nothing if not the replacement of scarcity with abundance. His journey is accordingly filled with excess thanks to Mephistopheles. This trajectory culminates in Faust as an economizing individual in extremis, entirely consumed by his land reclamation project. Mephistopheles points out apropos of the lemures digging Faust’s grave: “Man spricht, wie man mir Nachricht gab, / Von keinem Graben, doch vom Grab” (11557–58; The word I heard was more banal: / they mentioned graves, not some canal). Goethe’s forecast of marginal utility theory results from his detailed knowledge of value theories and fundamental concepts such as *Bedürfnis* (need), *Bedarf* (object of need), *Begierde* (desire), and *Begehren* (demand/desire). By revisiting the history of political economy in *Faust II*, from the role of demand (Steuart) and the critique of Adam Smith’s labor theory of value (Sartorius) to the question of needs (Schlosser) and the “economizing individual” (Menger), we see the progression of Goethe’s economic thought, which produces Faust’s final undertaking, an economic project that would not have been possible without the libidinal-economic
model developed in the Helena episode. Acts 2 and 3, in the end, do indeed illustrate “reales Wirtschaften” (real economic activity), provided one considers the long history and devilish details of political economy (Gaier 625).

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NOTES

1. Bernd Mahl, “Goethes Faust—Höllischer Ausbeuter oder Himmelsstrebender Tatmensch? Zur Deutung der ökonomischen Motive in Der Tragödie zweitem Teil,” Faust-Blätter 36 (1978): 1491. Mahl’s major contribution to Goethe scholarship is titled Goethes ökonomisches Wissen: Grundlagen zum Verständnis der ökonomischen Passagen im dichterischen Gesamtwerk und in den “Amtlichen Schriften” (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1982). Scholars pursuing Goethe’s economic interests have long drawn on this seminal work. However, they have too often done so uncritically, and as a result, our understanding of Goethe’s economic knowledge has been filtered through Mahl’s reading. Goethes ökonomisches Wissen, in my opinion, must be revisited critically if we hope to gain a better understanding of this significant aspect of Goethe’s life and work.


8. The historian of economic thought Keith Tribe writes: “The arrangement and classification that Rau established in his Lehrbuch prevailed in the teaching of economics
in Germany until the final years of the nineteenth century; those who studied economics up to that time studied a system whose foundation rested upon these three volumes first published between the years 1826 and 1837.” Keith Tribe, *Governing Economy: The Reformation of German Economic Discourse, 1750–1840* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1988) 183. Further references appear in the text as Tribe and page number.


10. Recall Faust in “Wald und Höhle”: “So tauml‘ ich von Begierde zu Genuß, / Und im Genuß verschmacht‘ ich nach Begierde” (3249–50; I reel between desire and enjoyment, / and in enjoyment languish for desire). While Goethe uses *Begehren* (demand/desire) and *Begierde* (desire) sparingly in both *Wertber* (1774) and *Die Wahlverwandtschaften* (Elective Affinities, 1809), he applies the terms generously throughout the Wilhelm Meister novels.

11. “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.” Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, ed. R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford UP 1976) 26–27.


13. *Nationalökonomie*, he explains, “emphasized the economic activity and needs of the individual as the founding moment of economic order, and not the activity of government over the populations of territorial states” (Tribe 92).


19. On the German debate over physiocracy, see Gray 109–69; and on the German reception of the physiocrats and Adam Smith, see Tribe 119–31, 133–48.

20. Goethe owned both the 1806 second edition of Sartorius’s *Von den Elementen des National-Reichtums und von der Staatswirtschaft nach Adam Smith* and his


24. Kenneth E. Carpenter, introduction to Dialogue in Political Economy: Translations from and into German in the 18th Century (Boston: Baker Library, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1977) 12.

25. Goethe was not the only one to misspell Steuart’s name. Adam Smith did so as well. In fact, alternative spellings of both his given name and his surname offer insight into the publication and circulation history of this seminal text. In 1769, the Hamburgische typographische Gesellschaft produced a two-volume quarto edition translated by Johann Ulrich Pauli, which proved useful for Cotta’s translator Schott. The same year, Cotta produced a less expensive octavo version. What gets lost in the publishing rivalry is the one thing not needing translation: the author’s name. The Hamburg edition has the author as “John Steuart” and the Tübingen version has “James Stewart.” The latter is especially ironic considering Steuart had lived in Tübingen for many years, was a friend of the translator, and most likely provided Cotta with a copy of the Principles to translate. The spelling variation offers some clue to the popularity of the different versions. Tribe writes: “The fact that most references to Steuart in the later eighteenth century misspelled his name in the manner of the Cotta edition is a possible indication of its greater influence than the Hamburg edition” (Tribe 136n13). By 1772, the Cotta edition consisted of five books in seven volumes. “It would appear,” Tribe concludes, “that Cotta’s edition sold quite well, with reprints being made in a somewhat haphazard sequence as stocks ran down of the earlier volumes” (Tribe 137). The Hamburg edition, on the other hand, was more prominent among academics, booksellers, and government officials, as the list of subscribers printed after the title page demonstrates.

26. Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Das erste Weimarer Jahrzehnt: 1775–1786, ed. Hartmut Reinhardt, vol. 29.2 (Frankfurt: Deutscher Klassiker, 1997) 109. The commentary to this line indicates that Schlosser owned the 1769 translation of the Principles and that Goethe had earlier borrowed it from him through Lenz, who returned it to Schlosser upon his 1776 departure from Weimar (801).

27. Adam Smith, The Correspondence of Adam Smith, ed. Ernest Campbell Mossner and Ian Simpson Ross (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Classics, 1987) 164.
28. Roger Backhouse, a historian of political economy, writes: “Hume welcomed the book, and Steuart’s advice was sought by the British government. However, the book rapidly fell into oblivion, at least in Britain. The main reason was clearly the publication of Adam Smith’s *Wealth of Nations* only a few years later. Smith’s work caught the public imagination more effectively than Steuart’s, and Smith adopted the effective rhetorical strategy of completely ignoring the earlier book. Part of the reason, however, may have been Steuart’s rambling style, which did not always make the message clear. In Germany, however, where Steuart’s mercantilist ideas found a more receptive audience, the book continued to be read, and his discussion of supply and demand received considerable attention in the early nineteenth century.” Roger Backhouse, *The Ordinary Business of Life: A History of Economics from the Ancient World to the Twenty-First Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2002) 120–21, further references appear in the text as Backhouse and page number. Sen defends Steuart against the charge of mercantilism: “Even a cursory reading of his works should convince one that he was anything but a mercantilist in the conventional sense of the term.” Samar Ranjan Sen, *The Economics of Sir James Steuart* (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1957) 96 (emphasis in original).


30. Sir James Steuart, *Abhandlung von den Grundsätzen der Münzwissenschaft mit einer Anwendung derselben auf das deutsche Münzwesen aus der englisch-en Originalhandschrift übersetzt* (Tübingen: Cotta, 1761); published in English in Sir James Steuart, *The Works, Political, Metaphisical, and Chronological, of the Late Sir James Steuart of Coltness, Bart.,* ed. General Sir James Steuart, Bart, vol. 5 (London: T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1805). In this early work, Steuart emphasizes a subjective approach to value: “Value is the estimation mankind put upon things; and this estimation, depending upon a combination of their own wants, fancies, and even caprices, it is impossible it should be permanent” (Steuart 5:175).


33. The translators of the *Grundsätze* note: “The terms ‘wirtschaftender Mensch,’ ‘wirtschaftendes Individuum,’ and ‘wirtschaftende Person’ occur continually throughout the work. The adjective ‘wirtschaftend’ does not refer to the properties or motives of individuals but to the activity in which they are engaged. More specifically, it does not refer to ‘the profit motive’ or to ‘the pursuit of self-interest,’ but to the act of economizing” (Menger, *Principles of Economics* 48n4). Breithaupt discusses Menger in his study of the relationship between the ego and money since the late eighteenth century. See Breithaupt 161–66.
34. Backhouse discusses Rau's and Roscher's contributions: “These were Smithian in that they accepted Smith’s ideas about the importance of saving and division of labour for economic growth. However, they rejected the labour theory of value. Instead, they took from Steuart the idea that prices are determined by supply and demand. Unlike most of the English classical economists, they attached great importance to demand. . . . Their textbooks discussed demand before supply, and explored the connections between demand and human needs. The result was a subjective theory of value in which the value of a good depended on what other goods people were prepared to forgo in order to obtain it—subsequently known as an opportunity-cost theory” (Backhouse 146).


36. For a thorough literary-historical analysis of this period, see Gray, Money Matters.


42. Backhouse explains: “Trade was essential, which meant that it afforded a secure means of obtaining subsistence, but agriculture remained fundamental. The main reason for this was that it alone, the Physiocrats argued, yielded net revenue—a surplus over the necessary cost of production. They expressed this by describing agriculture as productive and other sectors (trade and manufacturing) as sterile” (Backhouse 101).


46. Two years after the publication of Xenocrates in 1784, Schlosser unequivocally states in a letter to Carl August (February 27, 1786): “Das elende Physiokraten-System, dem der Marggraf und Edelsheim [his minister, W.C.] täglich starker anhängen, lenkt alles nach Principien, in die ich nicht eingehen, nach denen ich nicht arbeiten will.
noch mit gutem Gewissen kan. Alle Mühe, die ich mir gegeben habe, Gewerb und Handel und Bergweesen [sic] empor zu bringen, wird deßwegen durchkreuzt" (The woeful physiocratic system, to which the margrave and Edelsheim adhere more strongly every day, guides everything according to principles that I cannot adopt, neither want to work toward, nor with good conscience can. All my efforts to elevate commerce, trade, and mining are being thwarted on account of this). Quoted in Fritz Hartung, "Ein Brief J. G. Schlossers an Herzog Carl August von Weimar," Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins, n.s., 72 (1918): 422. Schlosser wrote this to Carl August in search of a position. Goethe took leave the same year, headed for Italy, but Carl August was not seeking to replace him. Goethe had recently implemented a number of reforms that were working, and he would be returning. Schlosser had to settle for a transfer to Karlsruhe.

