Familiarity, religiosity, and authoritarianism: the acceptability of gay rights and same-sex marriage

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Familiarity, religiosity, and authoritarianism: The acceptability of gay rights and same-sex marriage

by

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A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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Program of Study Committee:
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Iowa State University
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ABSTRACT

The acceptability of gay rights (specifically same-sex marriage) at the individual level is constantly changing and this is revealed in the changing attitudes among states that have legalized same-sex marriage (37 states and the District of Columbia as of February 14, 2015). Current research shows that familiarity plays a part in increased acceptability of gay rights and same-sex marriage and also shows evangelical religiosity and authoritarianism as deterrents to acceptance. This thesis shows that familiarity is the strongest of the three variables and that religiosity and authoritarianism do affect acceptability, but only when familiarity is low. Using questions from the 2012 National Election Study that address familiarity, acceptability of various areas gay rights, authoritarianism and religiosity, I analyzed and tested the variables to determine if these variables correlate in rising together or falling together. I found that increased familiarity does increase acceptability of same-sex marriage. I also found that evangelical religiosity and/or authoritarianism do lead to lower levels of acceptance. However, when a respondent knew someone who is gay, a higher level of religiosity or authoritarianism didn’t appear to affect acceptability. Therefore, familiarity appears to be the stronger variable even when religiosity and authoritarianism are considered.
INTRODUCTION

Egalitarianism is a characteristic most Americans will agree is part of our evolving national heritage. Civil rights movements for African-Americans, women, Latinos, Muslims, and the “worker” have changed and brought with them new protections against discrimination. In recent years, civil rights for gays and lesbians (specifically same-sex marriage) have taken a prominent position in the national conversation in the United States. Some view this as the next step in our civil rights conversation while others see it as an immoral and destructive lifestyle that is bent on hurting what they view as “traditional America.” Regardless of one’s view, greater recognition for gays and lesbians seems to be on the rise, especially in the area of marriage.

In 2003, Massachusetts was the only state to have legal same-sex marriage. Since then, thirty-six more states have legalized along with the District of Columbia. The remaining thirteen states with bans are largely in the south (Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Texas) but Michigan, Missouri, North and South Dakota, Nebraska and Ohio represent the north and Midwest. Twelve of these states have bans through both constitutional amendments and state law, whereas only Nebraska defines its prohibition of same-sex marriage solely through an amendment. In 2009, only six states had legal same-sex marriage, so it is clear that there is some level of increased acceptance over time. It should be noted that court decisions, largely citing equal protection, overturned twenty-six of the thirty-seven state bans which is not necessarily indicative of a change in public opinion. Eight state legislatures legalized these unions through state statutes, and three states overturned bans by popular vote (ProCon.org).
At the federal level, Washington D.C. legalized same-sex marriage when the Council of the District of Columbia passed legislation and Mayor Adrian Fenty signed it. Following a mandatory review by Congress, marriage licenses were issued in the District beginning March 3, 2010 (ProCon.org). The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was passed in 1993 defining marriage as a union between a man and a woman. Twenty years later, on June 26, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court (*U.S. v. Windsor* 2013) overturned section 3 of DOMA as it violated equal protection for same-sex couples in over 1000 federal statutes.

For decades, there was little conversation about same-sex marriage even as gay and lesbian culture in general was becoming more accepted through the television media and Hollywood celebrities. The more recent upsurge in support for same-sex marriage and gay rights in general, could reflect both a shift in aggregate public opinion and potentially, in our culture. What has effected these aggregate changes likely began at the individual level and is the subject of extensive research.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Scholars have studied age, religion, familiarity, political ideology and authoritarianism as factors that affect individual attitudes toward gay rights and specifically same-sex marriage. Examining these factors can contribute to a better understanding of the overall shift in acceptability toward gay rights as well as why some states and regions have not gravitated toward greater acceptability.

Familiarity (Social Contact with Gays and Lesbians)

Scholars, including Amy Becker and Dietram A. Scheufele, continue to focus on numerous factors that could explain the dramatic shifts in more acceptability of gays and lesbians marrying. Recent research has suggested that increased familiarity with gay friends or family members positively affects attitudes toward same-sex marriage. One key factor is the familiarity with a close friend or family member rather than an acquaintance. Younger generations are more likely to be accepting of gays and lesbians. Becker says, “Given fewer obstacles for younger individuals looking to come out of the closet and be more open about their sexual orientation, it makes sense that younger generations in particular should have more social contact with gays and lesbians” (Becker 2012). A 2006 report suggests that teenagers are choosing to “come out,” on the average, at age 13. (Becker and Scheufele 2011). Also, as younger voters “replace” older voters, we are seeing a more noticeable shift in public opinion favoring same-sex marriage.

There are some questions as to whether this is due to “increasing rates of social contact” or just “generational replacement.” Becker uses data from the Pew Research Center’s January 2010 Millennial Survey which interviewed 2020 adults in the United States. Her results showed that social contact, attitudes toward same-sex parent families, and support for same-sex marriage all
varied dramatically across generations (Millennialians were more positive compared with baby boomers). Their results confirm that “age, or generational affiliation, is inversely related to issue support, and that Millennials have the highest rates of social contact with gays and lesbians, the most liberal attitudes toward same-sex parent families, and show the broadest support for same-sex marriage…rates of social contact are an important predictor of support for same-sex marriage irrespective of generational cohort membership” (Becker 2012) Even though the younger generation appears to be more supportive of the shift toward legalized same-sex marriage, this can’t be attributed purely to “simple generational replacement.”

Age and Gender Affect Familiarity

Age and gender also seem to play a role in both one’s level of familiarity and therefore their level of support for same-sex marriage. In a 2011 study, Becker and Scheufele use age cohorts as their variable to see the factors that mold public acceptance of homosexuality and same-sex marriage. They used data from two national surveys, and their research suggests that familiarity has a larger effect on the attitudes of younger respondents which influences their acceptance of same-sex marriage in a positive manner. Alternatively, religion and ideology have a greater effect on the attitudes of older respondents. Younger people tended to have “higher levels of deliberative engagement with the issue debate, while older individuals rely more heavily on their predispositions when determining issue stance” (Becker and Scheufele 2011). In 2008, 49% of those under the age of 30 responded positively in support of gay marriage where 67% of those age 65 and older opposed legalizing it. Women are more likely to support gay marriage over men, which is thought to be affected by a higher level of familiarity with people who openly identify themselves as being gay. More specifically, 47% of women compared to
35% of men report they have a close friend or family member who is gay or lesbian. This study suggests, as do others, that familiarity and growing personal contact with gays and lesbians is “directly related to higher levels of political tolerance and greater support for policies like same-sex marriage.” Becker and Scheufele speculate that with this direct effect, the “Obama generation” may be more likely to grow in its tolerance toward gays and lesbians given its increased contact with gays and lesbians through its “social networks.” As an aside, media exposure does not appear to have a major effect on either group suggesting that other factors play a larger role on public opinion (Becker and Scheufele 2011).

**Religion and Ideology Affect Acceptability**

A 2008 Pew Research Study confirms previous research that shows “more religious individuals, defined as those who attend church more frequently and have a more devout sense of doctrinal commitment, are significantly less tolerant of gay men and lesbians” (Becker and Scheufele 2011). Furthermore, there is evidence connecting “conservative ideological orientations, religiosity, and opposition to same-sex marriage…83% of conservative Republicans and 73% of more religious individuals oppose gay marriage, compared to 26% of liberal Democrats and 43% of less religious individuals who oppose gay marriage” (Becker and Scheufele 2011). Studies also reveal that religiosity can influence a person’s level of political participation, especially when the issue is a “pressing moral matter” or the clergy has called on people to be involved.

Andrew Garner uses religion more as a moderating variable inside the larger “conservative-leaning” or “liberal-leaning” voter. He, like Becker and Scheufele, looks at the effect that contact or familiarity with gays/lesbians has on citizens’ attitudes toward gay rights,
but applied this “contact” study to both conservative-leaning (evangelical Christians, strong conservatives, and strong Republicans) and liberal-leaning citizens and found that contact can create an “ambivalence” among strong conservative-leaning citizens and cause “internal conflict between their political values and their contact with gays and lesbians.” Because of this conflict, their behavior is less predictable. He also found that contact or familiarity with gays/lesbians for liberal-leaning citizens creates the opposition effect thus “reducing ambivalence and making their attitudes more predictable and uniform.” Contact with gays/lesbians does impact the “mean level of support for gay rights, as well as the clarity or certainty of those attitudes, although its effect differs across these two dimensions of public opinion.” As gay rights groups work to stabilize attitudes and increase support for same-sex marriage, this unpredictability could pose a problem for these groups making it difficult for them to advance their mission of acceptance. (Garner 2013)

Like Garner, Poteat and Mereish look at the differences between conservatives and liberals as they apply to same-sex marriage (and abortion) and focus specifically on identifying the “factors that moderated attitude differences.” They acknowledge that a lot of research exists about the differences between liberals and conservatives, but there is not much attention to how much these differences can vary within the ideology itself. They narrow their variables to include group identity strength, issue relevance, and attitude strength along with ambivalence to an issue. This is important to the greater research community as ideology and party identification continue to play a role in attitude toward same-sex marriage. Poteat and Mereish help to more narrowly define what it means to be conservative and liberal in this particular context, though not all typical descriptors are included. (Poteat and Mereish 2012.)
Evangelical Religiosity/Morality Affect Acceptability

Dawn Baunach’s research echoes Becker and Scheufele’s, but covers a more specific period between 1988 and 2010. She uses the General Social Survey (2011) and found the more traditional characteristics thought to affect opinions of same-sex marriage adversely (Republican, living in the southern part of the United States, evangelical Protestant Christian, and being African American) all are connected with attitudes in recent years whereas in 1988, opposition to same-sex marriage was higher for all groups. Those classified as highly educated, urban, less religious, or less conservative did have lower disapproval responses, but all showed significantly lower approval for same-sex marriage than all groups in 2010. Her “decomposition analysis finds that changing same-sex marriage attitudes are not due to demographic changes in the American population. Rather, the liberalization in same-sex marriage attitudes from 1988-2010 is due primarily to a general societal change in attitudes…reflecting a cultural shift.” (Baunach 2012)

Baunach’s research also reveals that religiosity seems to have a dramatic affect on same-sex marriage attitudes across all years of the survey, specifically for evangelical Protestants. Though it affects all years, it is stronger in the later years with the growth of evangelicalism nationally. Political party also has a strong influence, more so in the later years with the alignment of the Republican Party against same-sex marriage as a morality issue. Of all the variables she considered, only gender and education are consistent over all of the years surveyed. All others influence attitudes toward same-sex marriage only in the later years. Religion continues to “be a brake on full acceptance, and the combination of politics and religion has particular impact on views in 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010” (Baunach 2012.) With this, Baunach goes on to make an interesting point: just as conservative politicians used their opposition to
same-sex marriage to embolden their base, the increased attention to the issue could have encouraged the public to think more about it and indirectly encourage them to increase their familiarity with the idea and increase their tolerance of the issue (Baunach 2012).

The high level of opposition to same-sex marriage in 1988 across the variables could be due to a lack of any familiarity. By 2004 this opposition was more “localized to specific subgroups—older Americans, southerners, African Americans, evangelical Protestants, and Republicans.” Baunach does caution that because she used secondary data, some measures necessary to understanding some of these attitudes might not have been available. (Baunach 2012)

Baunach has also looked at “decomposing trends” considering specific media frames (morality and equality or tolerance.) Her 2011 study used several subgroups across the United States including age, sex, place of residence, education and religious groups in the data and posits that “equality/tolerance” framing of same-sex marriage helped to move public opinion to a more tolerant state. “When it comes to gay marriage, two media frames have been in competition—a ‘morality’ frame and an ‘equality’ or ‘tolerance’ frame” (Baunach 2011). The morality frame describes gay marriage as a threat to traditional family values where the equality/tolerance frame looks at gay marriage as a civil rights issue. Interestingly the civil rights frame started the gay rights conversation, and it wasn’t until 1977 that the first anti-gay movement began and using religion, tradition and morality to challenge the civil rights framing. Things like the HIV/AIDS epidemic, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” DOMA, and the 2000 and 2004 elections, strengthened the morality frame where the 1998 murder of Matthew Shepard, various television programs and movies featuring gay characters, the movement away from HIV/AIDS being a “gay disease,” and various celebrities “coming out” all pushed more attention to the
equality frame. Baunach’s research doesn’t focus on organized movements for or against gay marriage, but rather “on attitudes toward gay marriage, which may respond to messages in the public discourse, particularly frames, as well as events and other cultural developments.”

Interestingly, Baunach’s research shows an attitudinal shift toward equality with increased exposure through the media where Becker’s seems to show little effect by the media. (Baunach 2011) Regardless, Becker, Scheufele and Baunach’s recent research could be the beginning of a clearer understanding of how overall familiarity with same-sex couples increases acceptance of homosexuality and same-sex marriage.

Susan Gaines and James C. Garand’s research focuses on the determinants of support for same-sex marriage, looking specifically at morality (defined by religion), belief in same-sex marriage as a civil right, and living near a greater number of same-sex couples (a proxy for familiarity). In this study, the authors examined several determinants of attitudes about same-sex marriage in the United States. First they looked at religion as a variable and saw depressed support for those identifying themselves as religious (i.e.: religiosity, evangelical religious beliefs, and church attendance.) They also found that those who “are active members of traditional Christian churches, and are adherents to more conservative religious faiths will tend to resist changes in traditional moral values and will hence be opposed to departures from the traditional heterosexual marital form” (Gaines and Garand 2010). The authors also looked at connections between support for civil rights for women and African Americans and support for same-sex marriage rights. “The key question is whether individuals see support for same-sex marriage in a manner similar to how they view equal rights for blacks and women.” Their findings do not suggest that this is the case. Some groups have “framed” same-sex marriage as a civil rights issue, but this frame or view does not seem to be the lens used by the public at large.
Lastly, they explored evidence that suggested that people are more likely to support same-sex marriage if they live in localities with larger number of same-sex couples. There was little evidence “to support the inference of a direct effect of context on individuals’ attitudes toward same-sex marriage.” But the empirical evidence suggests “effects for the small subset of individuals who reside in counties with a percentage of same-sex partnered households that is more than one standard deviation above the mean on this variable. For these individuals, there is a strong interaction effect for attitudes toward gays and lesbians on one hand, and the percentage of same-sex partnered households in their home county, on the other.” (Gaines and Garand 2010)

Andrew Whitehead brings a new variable into the religion discussion with his research associated with the belief that homosexuals choose their orientation, rather than it being biologically determined. In his findings, “religion is strongly associated with the belief that homosexuals choose their sexual orientation…[and] religion maintains a significant association with attitudes toward same-sex unions despite inclusion of an attribution variable…Even if a biological explanation for homosexuality is ultimately proven, unfavorable attitudes toward same-sex unions will most likely endure due to religion’s persistent effect.” (Whitehead 2010) It should be noted that the religious variables he uses are attendance, belief in biblical literalism and perceived images of God (God as an “angry God”), and denominational affiliation. To control for affiliation, he uses a modified RELTRAD or religious traditions theme where individuals are put into the following categories: black Protestant, evangelical Protestant, mainline Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, other religion, and no religion. (Steensland et al 2000)
Religion and Race/Ethnicity Affect Acceptability

Ellison, Acevedo, and Ramos-Wada focus their research on religion and attitudes toward same-sex marriage but with a caveat toward ethnicity. They narrowed their subset to include only Latinos. Though public opinion of same-sex marriage is the subject of much research at present, one area often neglected is the opinion/attitude of Latino/a Americans concerning same-sex marriage. This oversight is noteworthy, as Hispanic Americans have passed African Americans as the largest minority group. And, despite the fact that Latino Americans tend to have Democratic leanings, they are also culturally conservative and one could presume they would have negative attitudes toward same-sex marriage. Also, assumptions are sometimes made that most Latinos are Catholic while in fact, U.S. Hispanics make up approximately one-fourth of U.S. Protestants, and most of these are conservative (Ellison, Acevedo & Ramos-Wada 2011) According to the Pew Research Center’s 2013 National Survey of Latinos and Religion, 55% of the nation’s thirty-five million Latinos identify as Catholic while 22% identify as Protestant (16% of these being evangelical or “born again.”) Ellison, Acevedo & Ramos-Wada examine variations in religious attitudes and public policy preferences among Hispanics in the area of homosexual rights and same-sex marriage. They look at belief in scripture, “cues” from clergy, and the role of religiosity in helping to form political ideas.

Interestingly they find that Catholic Latino Americans tend to “hold more moderate views of same-sex marriage than conservative Protestants [and] opinions of same-sex marriage vary widely among mainline Protestants.” For Hispanic evangelical Protestants, frequency of church attendance and a literal interpretation of the Bible do not seem to play a part (unlike studies of evangelical Protestant non-Hispanic whites.) They had limited data examining “the role of beliefs about the causes of homosexuality, which may account for at least part of the
conservative Protestant ‘effect’ on same-sex marriage attitudes.” For Hispanic Catholics, church attendance does seem to affect views of same-sex marriage where those who regularly attend Catholic services tend to oppose same-sex marriage by two to one to those less devout. (Ellison, Acevedo & Ramos-Wada 2011)

Sherkat, de Vries, and Creek also examine race and religion as variables toward acceptability of same-sex marriage. Where Ellison, Acevedo and Ramos-Wada looked at the Latino population, Sherkat, de Vries, and Creek “examine racial differences in support for same-sex marriage, and test whether the emerging black-white gap is a function of religiosity” (2010). They find that African Americans tied to sectarian Protestant religious denominations who have a high rate of church attendance tend to oppose same-sex marriage, and that other more secular influences appear to have less impact in forming beliefs about same-sex marriage among the African American community. Alternatively, Caucasian seem to be affected from both religiosity and secular influences. (Sherkat, de Vries, Creek 2010) Like Ellison, Acevedo and Ramos-Wada’s findings, race does seem to be an indicator when religion is also a variable. For them, however, the Latino religious population consisted of both Catholic and Protestant.

**Authoritarianism and Attitudes Toward Gay Rights and Same-Sex Marriage**

Though the scholarly literature on authoritarianism is extensive, Hetherington and Weiler focus their attention on a few characteristics associated with authoritarianism that are particularly significant to understanding political conflict in today’s American politics. They first describe people inclined toward authoritarianism in this way: “Those who score high in authoritarianism tend to have a different cognitive style than those who score low. The former tend to view the world in more concrete, black and white terms…This is probably because a they have a greater
than average need for order. In contrast, those who score lower in authoritarianism have more comfort with ambiguous shades of gray, which allow for more nuanced judgments…those who are more authoritarian embrace and work to protect existing social norms.” (Hetherington and Weiler 2009) In their work, *Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics*, the authors show distinct connections between those scoring high on the authoritarian scale as having a lack of acceptance of same-sex marriage (and most all gay rights for that matter.) Those scoring lower on the scale are more accepting or have no opinion. Using data from the 2004 National Election Study (NES), Hetherington and Weiler show that those identified as authoritarian at minimum showed 71% in support of gay marriage while those showing authoritarian at maximum had only 19% support. Authoritarianism “ought to structure preferences involving groups that challenge established norms, as gays and lesbians do…It appears, however, that once an issue becomes a relatively established practice, even those with the greatest concerns about difference will come to accept that change.” It should be noted that “[the] deepening of the authoritarian cleavage in contemporary American politics is caused more by a change in the opinions and behaviors of nonauthoritarians than those of authoritarians …authoritarians’ assessments tend to remain relatively constant over time. It is those at the other end of the scale who show variation.” People can show opposition for gay marriage for reasons that do not have their origins in “intolerance of difference caused by a need for order.” However, even when controlling for a wide range of variables, the relationship between authoritarianism and support for gay rights is statistically significant. (Hetherington and Weiler 2009).
Initial Conclusions From Literature

Numerous factors affect acceptability of same-sex marriage on an individual level. Religion appears to be the strongest indicator though it should be noted that conservative evangelical Christians are less accepting of same-sex behavior and marriage whereas mainline Christians have more accepting attitudes. Therefore there is likely an ordering of acceptance between religious groups, and Christianity in and of itself is not an indicator of more or less acceptance. Familiarity or contact with same-sex couples also appears to play a large role in acceptance and seems to be woven throughout the research. However, in areas where you control for conservative Protestant religion, the level of approval does not seem to go up. This could be why states with a large population of conservative evangelicals have not moved in the direction of protecting marriage rights for same-sex couples. In fact, most of these states have either passed legislation defining marriage as between one man and one woman or they have passed constitutional amendments that do the same.

Whitehead’s research that explores the belief that people choose to be homosexual as opposed to homosexuality as a biologically determined phenomenon, adds a new explanation to conservative evangelicals’ unwillingness to accept homosexuality or same-sex marriage rights (Whitehead 2010). Ideology, gender, education, age, and race also play a role in acceptance. Those who identify with more liberal principles seem to be more accepting of same-sex marriage while those with more conservative principles do not. Women are more likely to change their attitudes to more positively view gay rights and same-sex marriage, especially after more contact with same-sex couples and same-sex couples with children. Men are not as affected by this familiarity.
Age cohort succession is also an indicator of acceptance of same-sex marriage in the aggregate. As older people who identify as more traditional are dying, younger people who are more likely to have a friend or close family member who is gay are replacing them. Becker refers to these “Millenials” as the “Obama generation” and sees their new social networks as another path to familiarity. (Becker 2012) Race and ethnicity are also indicators of an attitudinal shift when controlling for religion. African Americans and Latinos tend to view same-sex marriage less favorably but this seems to be not a racial distinction but rather that so many African Americans and Latinos align with more conservative evangelical religious beliefs. Finally, according to Hetherington and Weiler, one’s level of authoritarianism proves to be a statistically significant indicator of their likelihood of acceptance of same-sex marriage as this new institution is a challenge to social norms and potentially a threat to one’s traditional sense of “order.” A higher level of authoritarianism shows a reduced level of acceptance of same-sex marriage and a lower level allows for greater acceptance.
RESEARCH QUESTION

When you control for evangelical religiosity and authoritarianism, how does familiarity affect the acceptability of gay rights and of specifically same-sex marriage?

THEORY

Scholars have examined numerous variables that may or may not affect the acceptability of same-sex marriage and gay rights in general. Race, religion, gender, political party, and political ideology have all been shown to affect individual attitudes. The specific variable focused on here is familiarity (or contact) but when factoring in evangelical religiosity and authoritarianism. There is significant research showing that familiarity encourages a greater acceptability of gays and lesbians. There is also research that shows conservative or evangelical religiosity and a high level of authoritarianism as strong variables that lead to a lower level of acceptance of gay rights. This research posits that familiarity does increase acceptability except when evangelical religiosity or authoritarianism is factored into the equation. Though there are several other variables in addition to familiarity used to examine attitudes toward gay rights and same-sex marriage in the studies cited earlier (race, ideology, gender, and ideology), the two that would appear to have the greatest effect are religiosity and authoritarianism. Further explanation of all the variables used in this research is necessary to better understand the relationship theory.
DATA

The ANES 2012 Time Series Study is the source of data for this research. Data collection began in early September 2012 and continued into January of 2013. Pre and post-election interviews were conducted with respondents, and the study asked questions of individuals across the fifty states and the District of Columbia with a total number of respondents of over 4,400.

Using this data, there are two groups of dependent variables in this research, both of which measure acceptance of gays and lesbians. The first dependent variable is an additive scale that combines the respondent’s answers to four questions encompassing different areas of acceptability of gay rights. These include gays in the military, gay marriage, gay adoption and gay discrimination laws (Appendix). The second is a single dependent variable that measures acceptability of gay or same-sex marriage only. To be clear, acceptability of same-sex marriage is defined as acceptance of two people of the same gender entering into a marital agreement, and does not reference a civil union or domestic partnership. Using the additive scale variable provides richer data, but testing the theory using the single marriage variable alone is also appropriate.

Of most importance in this research are three independent variables: familiarity, evangelical religiosity, and authoritarianism. Familiarity or “contact” is time spent with a close friend or family member who is gay or in a homosexual relationship. This variable is measured singularly as either knowing or not knowing a friend or family member who is gay, and also as an interaction term where the root variable is multiplied by the ‘know someone who is gay’ variable. These show how the affect of an independent variable like income or age can change based on knowing someone who is gay. Evangelical religiosity is another additive scale variable
that sums the respondent’s answers to several religiosity questions including identification as a Christian, being a ‘born-again’ Christian, using religion as a guide in daily living, importance of religion in one’s life, frequency of prayer, Biblical literalism, and church attendance (Appendix). The authoritarianism variable uses a summary score of four questions regularly asked of respondents to measure level of authoritarianism. These questions, which are specifically about children, concern obedience, manners, consideration, and respect. (Appendix).

In addition to the three independent variables, there are eight control variables in this research: gender, race, ethnicity, party identification, ideology, income, age, and education. Though the focus of this research is not on these controls, they appear to reveal some interesting results when combined with the aforementioned ‘know’ variable. The variables are largely ordinal as many of the questions ask for a range of opinion (i.e.: strongly approve…strongly disapprove) though some are nominal (gender, age, income).

When data analysis is complete, it is expected that acceptability of gay rights/ same-sex marriage will rise when contact with homosexual or same-sex couples (familiarity) rises. However, it is also expected if the respondent scores high in religiosity or authoritarianism, his/her acceptability of same-sex marriage will be low, regardless of level of familiarity. Ultimately, where there is higher religiosity and/or authoritarianism, it is expected that acceptability of same-sex marriage will be low, even if familiarity appears to high according to the other responses given.

A linear regression is appropriate when examining the combined dependent variables of acceptability of gay rights, but an ordered probit regression is better for the single acceptability of same-sex marriage dependent variable.
RESULTS

For all interaction terms in this research, knowing someone who is gay contributed to a higher level of acceptability of gay rights. Not knowing someone who is gay generally showed a lower level of acceptance. Though these results varied among the different terms, familiarity appeared to contribute to a greater acceptability of gay rights across the variables. This is consistent with the first part of this research theory.

As expected, respondents with a higher level of religiosity had much less acceptance of gay rights than those with little to no religiosity (Figure 1). Those with little to no religiosity appeared to accept gay rights with or without knowing someone who is gay and those with a higher level of religiosity appeared to have little acceptance for gay rights regardless of familiarity. It should be noted that familiarity did drive up acceptability but only slightly (0.88 to 1.07). Contact or familiarity with a gay person did not have a statistically significant impact on acceptability of gay rights among those with a high level of religiosity.

![Figure 1: Religiosity and Familiarity](image-url)
Similar to religiosity, it was expected that respondents who scored higher on the authoritarianism scale would be less accepting of gay rights, and the data supported this (Figure 2). However, when familiarity was factored in addition to the authoritarianism variable, knowing someone who is gay did not have a large effect on one’s acceptance of gay rights. Strong authoritarians scored between 1.24 and 1.46 with a difference of 0.22 when considering contact with a person who is gay. Those lower on the authoritarianism scale showed less effect with only a 0.12 difference. Familiarity or contact with someone who is gay had some effect, but it was not statistically significant.

![Figure 2: Authoritarianism and Familiarity](image)

With religiosity and authoritarianism considered, knowing someone who is gay did increase the level of acceptance of gay rights over those who didn’t know someone who was gay. However, contrary to the theory posed, when respondents scored high in religiosity or authoritarianism, their level of acceptance did not drop dramatically. With both variables, the
lines between those who know someone who is gay and those who did not were parallel showing little effect from the dependent variables. Familiarity matters but only slightly and was unaffected by religiosity or authoritarianism.

In addition to religiosity and authoritarianism, several other variables were considered in this research to see their interactions with knowing someone who is gay and how that affected a respondent’s acceptability of gay rights. As expected when considering political party identification (Figure 3), Republicans had a lower level of acceptability of gay rights than Democrats overall, and the difference between knowing and not knowing someone who is gay had some effect but not a lot (1.64-1.74). For Democrats, however, knowing someone who is gay had little effect on their acceptability of gay rights as the spread is only 0.02. Both those who had familiarity with someone who is gay and those who didn’t both showed a higher level of acceptance of gay rights overall and those less familiar actually scored slightly higher.

![Figure 3: Political Party Identification and Familiarity](image)
With political ideology, the lines are almost parallel (Figure 4). Those who responded as being the most conservative showed low acceptance of gay rights regardless of their familiarity or contact with a gay person (only 0.14 difference). Those who responded as the most liberal showed the greatest acceptance though familiarity did have a little stronger effect (0.26 difference).

![Figure 4: Political Ideology and Familiarity](image)

When looking at how race and ethnicity affect the acceptability of gay rights, among those who did not know someone who is gay, Blacks had a slightly higher rate of acceptability of gay rights than Whites (1.58 to 1.64 with a difference of only 0.06). Among those who knew someone who is gay, the acceptance rate between Whites and Blacks was the same (1.7). Familiarity did affect acceptance of gay rights within these two races but only slightly (0.06). With ethnicity (specifically Hispanic or Caucasian) knowing someone who is gay did contribute to a higher level of acceptance of gay rights. Whites scored 1.7 where Hispanics were only slightly higher at 1.73. For those who did not know someone who is gay, both groups scored
lower (1.58 for Whites and 1.63 for Hispanics.) The lines were almost parallel, and familiarity with someone who is gay showed no statistical significance on acceptance when considering only ethnicity (Figures 5 and 6).
As with the other interaction terms in this research, when considering education, those familiar with someone who is gay scored higher than those who reported not knowing anyone who is gay, regardless of level of education. As education levels rose, acceptability of gay rights also rose for both groups. Again, with the lines almost parallel, there was not a notable significance in how education AND familiarity affect acceptability of gay rights together (Figure 7).

![Figure 7: Education and Familiarity](image)

Though not the focus of this research, some interesting results surfaced when income was factored in with familiarity and measured against acceptability of gay rights. Statistically significant with a p-value of 0.023 (Table 1), those with lower incomes had only a 0.17 difference in their acceptability of gay rights when considering if the respondents knew or did not know someone who is gay. However, as incomes rose, so did acceptance among those who
knew someone who is gay. Acceptance of gay rights among those not knowing someone who is gay seemed to make no difference between those with lesser or greater income. Those showing the greatest wealth and knowing someone who is gay had significantly higher rate of acceptability of gay rights than those of greatest wealth who did not know someone who is gay (0.48 difference—Figure 8.)

Factoring in gender also proved to be statistically significant with a p-value of 0.042 (Table 1). Men had less acceptance of gay rights than women overall, but knowing someone who is gay did raise their level of acceptance some (from 1.4 to 1.59). For women, familiarity made less of an impact (only 0.12). Women were generally more accepting regardless of whether or not they knew someone who is gay (Figure 9).
Another interesting result came when looking at how age and familiarity together affect the acceptability of gay rights. As seen in all other regressions in this research, those who know someone who is gay had a greater level of acceptance of gay rights than those who did not know someone who is gay. What is notable here is that for those who know someone who is gay, there was virtually no difference in acceptability when factoring in age (score of 1.7 from ages 20-80). For those who did not know someone who is gay, age seemed to matter. At age 20, respondents scored 1.54 but when reaching age 80, respondents showed a drop in level of acceptance to 1.42. Familiarity does appear to affect how older people accept gay rights, though only slightly (Figure 10).
In examining the ordered probit regression with the acceptability of gay marriage as the dependent variable, none of the interactions are significant and so do not warrant much discussion. The interaction term (political ideology*know someone who is gay) did have a p value of 0.055 but even that was not statistically significant. As mentioned earlier, the dependent variable using the additive scale of various areas of gay rights provides richer data for analysis than the stand-alone dependent variable of just gay marriage (Table 2).
CONCLUSION

This research concludes that increased familiarity does lead to greater acceptance of gay rights, even when you factor in evangelical religiosity or authoritarianism. The research theory predicted that religiosity and authoritarianism would be stronger variables, but they do not appear to be. Respondents who scored higher in religiosity do have a lower level of acceptance of gay rights than those who identified as having a low level of religiosity. And respondents who scored high on the authoritarianism scale also have a lower level of acceptance of gay rights than those who scored lower on the authoritarian scale. Research has shown that younger respondents and women have greater acceptance largely due to their increased familiarity. In these two groups, familiarity did appear to affect acceptability, and religiosity and authoritarianism had little effect. Though religiosity could affect acceptability of gay rights to a slight degree, no affect showed statistical significance that those religious factors weighed more heavily than familiarity.

Of the other independent “control” variables, only income and age showed statistical significance when combined with familiarity to measure acceptability of gay rights. Neither of these variables were the focus of this research, but these results produce some interesting questions. Is there a relationship between having higher income and greater familiarity with someone who is gay? Does having more money make it more likely that you will know someone who is gay?

Much research supports younger people being more accepting of gay rights and specifically gay marriage. The age/familiarity interaction term reveals the possibility of a different relationship, however. Knowing someone who is gay doesn’t affect acceptability for those ages 20-80. However, for those who do not know someone who is gay, age seems to
matter. Younger respondents were far more accepting of gay rights than older respondents when familiarity is not considered. This seems to say that familiarity is a stronger variable than age, however, other controls do likely play a part.

One limitation of this study is the lack of questions specific to gay marriage available in the NES survey. Though the additive scale dependent variable of “gay rights” gives rich data, more questions about gay marriage specifically would better reveal acceptability of that particular issue. The ordered probit regression produced no results of statistical significance, which begs the question of whether or not more questions specific to gay marriage would have produced different results.

Examination of individual respondents’ personal opinions can guide researchers who examine aggregate public opinion. It is assumed by many that areas of the United States with larger evangelical populations are resistant to increasing gay rights or legalizing same-sex marriage due to their religious beliefs. The next question might be to see if these areas or states showing resistance to gay rights have a citizenry with a generally lower level of familiarity of people who identify as gay or lesbian. As it would be unlikely that there are just lower populations of gay and lesbians in states with fewer gay rights, that could be due to a general lack of acceptance of gay rights by the community which leads many people to keep their sexual orientation a secret.

More specific to gay marriage rights, another interesting next step in the research could lie within those states that have legalized gay marriage. Of the thirty-seven states that have legalized, only eleven did so through actions of their state legislatures or through popular vote. Most states had legislation in place that banned same-sex marriage, and it was only through court rulings that these bans were found unconstitutional. Where bans were lifted through legislation
or popular vote implies a public opinion shifting toward greater acceptance, yet this applies to only eleven states. Furthermore, what is the level of familiarity in the remaining thirteen states that have yet to legalize? Is religiosity high? Is familiarity low? Assuming they eventually legalize, will it be through the courts or is public opinion shifting enough to bring it about through legislation or action by the people? Nine of the thirteen are in the South where religiosity and authoritarianism are typically higher, but that does not speak to familiarity, which according to this research, appears to be the stronger variable. Personal opinion leads to public opinion and public opinion leads to policy. A closer look at aggregate public opinion about gay rights and how knowing someone who is gay affects how people accept gay rights can give researchers a better idea about the direction that policy will take in the area of gay rights and more specifically, gay marriage.
REFERENCES


Windsor v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2884 (2013)

Table 1. Attitudes toward Gay Rights (Additive Scale)

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Adjusted R-Square 0.3527
N 4413

Entries are OLS coefficients, followed by standard errors in parentheses.
* = p<.05
Table 2. Attitudes Toward Gay Marriage

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N = 4397

Entries are OLS coefficients, followed by standard errors in parentheses.
* = p<.05
APPENDIX – ANES SURVEY QUESTIONS

This appendix includes all questions from the 2012 ANES study used in this research and how each question was recoded (**) to run these regressions.

1. Gender of respondent. 0 for female and 1 for male

2. Where would you place YOURSELF on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about this? (**Recoded using seven point scale and extremely conservative scoring at 1 and extremely liberal scoring at 7.)
   1   extremely liberal
   2   liberal
   3   slightly liberal
   4   moderate; middle of the road
   5   slightly conservative
   6   conservative
   7   extremely conservative

3. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a [DEMOCRAT, a REPUBLICAN/ a REPUBLICAN, a DEMOCRAT], an INDEPENDENT, or what? (**Recoded using standard seven point scale with Strong Republican scoring at 1 and strong Democrat scoring at 7. -2=. All other values are coded as missing.)
   0   no preference
   1   democrat
   2   republican
   3   independent
   5   other party (specify)
   -8   don’t know
   -9   refused

4. Do you FAVOR or OPPOSE laws to protect gays and lesbians against job discrimination? (**Recoded with -9=. -8=. -1=. 5=0, 4=1, 2=2, 1=3 Strongly favor, favor, don’t care, oppose, strongly oppose)
   1   favor
   2   oppose
   -1  inapplicable
   -8  don’t know
   -9  refused
5. Do you favor such laws STRONGLY or NOT STRONGLY? Do you oppose such laws STRONGLY or NOT STRONGLY?  (**Recoded with -9=. -8=. -1=.)
1 strongly 
2 not strongly 
-1 inapplicable 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused 

6. SUMMARY REV version—favor laws against gays/lesbians job discrimination.  
(**Recoded -9=. -8=. -1=.  5=0, 4=1, 2=2, 1=3)
1 approve strongly 
2 approve not strongly 
3 disapprove not strongly 
4 disapprove strongly 
-1 inapplicable 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused 

7. Do you FAVOR or OPPOSE laws to protect homosexuals against job discrimination?  
(**Recoded -9=. -8=. -1=. )
1 favor 
2 oppose 
-1 inapplicable 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused 

8. Do you favor such laws STRONGLY or NOT STRONGLY? Do you oppose such laws STRONGLY or NOT STRONGLY?  (**Recoded -9=. -8=. -1=. )
1 strongly 
2 not strongly 
-1 inapplicable 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused 

9. SUMMARY STD version—favor laws against gays/lesbians job discrimination  
(**Recoded -9=. -8=. -1=.  5=0, 4=1, 2=2, 1=3)
1 approve strongly 
2 approve not strongly 
3 disapprove not strongly 
4 disapprove strongly 
-1 inapplicable 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused
10. SUMMARY REV version-favor laws against gays/lesbians job discrimination
   (Recoded 5=0, 4=1, 2=2, 1=3)
   1 approve strongly
   2 approve not strongly
   4 disapprove not strongly
   5 disapprove strongly
   -1 inapplicable
   -8 don’t know
   -9 refused

11. Do you think gays and lesbians should be allowed to serve in the United States Armed Forces or don’t you think so?
   (**Recoded -9=. -8=. -1=. 2=0)
   1 gays and lesbians should be allowed to serve
   2 gays and lesbians should not be allowed to serve
   -1 inapplicable
   -8 don’t know
   -9 refused

12. [Do you feel STRONGLY or NOT STRONGLY that gays and lesbians should be allowed to serve? / Do you feel STRONGLY or NOT STRONGLY that gays and lesbians should not be allowed to serve?] (**Recoded -9=. -8=. -1=.)
   1 strongly
   2 no strongly
   -1 inapplicable
   -8 don’t know
   -9 refused

13. SUMMARY REV version- allow gays/lesbians serve in US armed forces
   (**Recoded -9=. -8=. -1=. 5=0, 4=1, 2=2, 1=3)
   1 feel strongly that gays and lesbians should be allowed to serve
   2 feel not strongly that gays and lesbians should be allowed to serve
   4 feel not strongly that gays and lesbians should not be allowed to serve
   5 feel strongly that gays and lesbians should not be allowed to serve
   -1 inapplicable
   -8 don’t know
   -9 refused

14. Do you think homosexuals should be allowed to serve in the United States Armed Forces or don’t you think so?
   (**Recoded -9=. -8=. -1=.)
   1 homosexuals should be allowed to serve
   2 homosexuals should not be allowed to serve
   -1 inapplicable
   -8 don’t know
   -9 refused
15. Do you feel STRONGLY or NOT STRONGLY that homosexuals should be allowed to serve? Do you feel STRONGLY or NOT STRONGLY that homosexuals should not be allowed to serve?
   (**Recoded -9=. -8=. -1=.)
   1 strongly
   2 not strongly
   -1 inapplicable
   -8 don’t know
   -9 refused

16. SUMMARY STD version—allow gays/lesbians serve in US armed forces
   (**Recoded -9=. -8=. -1=. 5=0, 4=1, 2=2. 1=3)
   1 feel strongly that homosexuals should be allowed to serve
   2 feel not strongly that homosexuals should be allowed to serve
   3 feel not strongly that homosexuals should not be allowed to serve
   4 feel strongly that homosexuals should not be allowed to serve
   -1 inapplicable
   -8 don’t know
   -9 refused

17. Do you think gay or lesbian couples should be legally permitted to adopt children?
   (**Recoded -9=. -8=. 2=0)
   1 yes
   2 no
   -8 don’t know
   -9 refused

18. Looking at page [preload: prepg z] of the booklet. Which comes closest to your view? You can just tell me the number of your choice.
   (**Recoded -9=. -8=. -1=. 3=0, 2=1, 1=2)
   1 gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to legally marry.
   2 gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to form civil unions but not legally marry
   3 there should be no legal recognition of a gay or lesbian couple’s relationship.
   -8 don’t know
   -9 refused

19. Now on another topic…Do you consider religion to be an IMPORTANT part of your life, or NOT?
   (**Recoded -9=. -8=. -1=. 2=1)
   1 important
   2 not important
   -8 don’t know
   -9 refused
20. Would you say your religion provides [SOME guidance in your day-to-day living, QUITE A BIT of guidance, or a GREAT DEAL of guidance/ a GREAT DEAL of guidance in your day-to-day living, QUITE A BIT of guidance, or SOME guidance] in your day-to-day life? (**Recoded -9=. -8=. -1=0)
   1   some
   2   quite a bit
   3   a great deal
   -1  inapplicable
   -8  don’t know
   -9  refused

21. Please look at page [preload: prepg r]/[preload: prepg b] of the booklet. People practice their religion in different ways. Outside of attending religious services, do you pray [SEVERAL TIMES A DAY, ONCE A DAY, A FEW TIMES A WEEK, ONCE A WEEK OR LESS or NEVER/NEVER, ONCE A WEEK OR LESS, A FEW TIMES A WEEK, ONCE A DAY, or SEVERAL TIMES A DAY]? (**Recoded 95=. -9=. -8=. 5=0, 4=1, 3=2, 2=3, 1=4)
   01  several times a day
   02  once a day
   03  a few times a week
   04  once a week or less
   05  never
   95  other (vol) (specify)
   -8  don’t know
   -9  refused

22. Please look at page [preload: prepg s] of booklet. Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible? You can just give me the number of your choice. (**Recoded -9=. -8=. 5=. 3=0, 2=1, 1=2)
   1   the bible is the actual word of god and is to be taken literally, word for word.
   2   the bible is the word of god but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word.
   3   the bible is a book written by men and is not the word of god
   5   other (specify) (vol)
   -8  don’t know
   -9  refused
23. Do you go to religious services [EVERY WEEK, ALMOST EVERY WEEK, ONCE OR TWICE A MONTH, A FEW TIMES A YEAR, or NEVER/ NEVER, A FEW TIMES A YEAR, ONCE OR TWICE A MONTH, ALMOST EVERY WEEK, or EVERY WEEK]?  
(**Recoded -9=-1=0, 5=0, 4-1, 3=2, 2=3, 1=4)  
1    every week  
2    almost every week  
3    once or twice a month  
4    a few times a year  
5    never  
-1    inapplicable  
-9    refused

24. Would you call yourself a born-again Christian, that is, have you personally had a conversion experience related to Jesus Christ?  
(**Recoded -9=-8=-1=0, 2=0)  
1    yes  
2    no  
-1    inapplicable  
-8    don’t know  
-9    refused

25. SUMMARY- R race and ethnicity group (**Recoded -9=-8=.)  
1    white non-hispanic  
2    black non-hispanic  
3    hispanic  
4    other non-hispanic  
-8    don’t know  
-9    refused

26. PRE: SUMMARY-R level of highest education (group) (**Recoded -9=-2.=)  
1    less than high school credential  
2    high school credential  
3    some post-high-school, no bachelor’s  
4    bachelor’s degree  
5    graduate degree  
-2    missing, other not codeable to 1-5  
-9    refused
27. CASI/WEB: SUMMARY—Pre family income (see also: inc-group_prepost)

(Recoded -9= -8= -2=) Not sure as -9, -2 and -8 do not appear here.

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>under $5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>$5,000-$9,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>$10,000-$12,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>$12,500-$14,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>$15,000-$17,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>$17,500-$19,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>$20,000-$22,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>$22,500-$24,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>$25,000-$27,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>$27,500-$29,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>$30,000-$34,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>$35,000-$39,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>$40,000-$44,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>$45,000-$49,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>$50,000-$54,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>$55,000-$59,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>$60,000-$64,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>$65,000-$69,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>$70,000-$74,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>$75,000-$79,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>$80,000-$89,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>$90,000-$99,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>$100,000-$109,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>$110,000-$124,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>$125,000-$149,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>$150,000-$174,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>$175,000-$249,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>$250,000 or more</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28. Do you consider yourself to be heterosexual or straight, homosexual or gay, or bisexual?/Do you consider yourself to be heterosexual or straight, homosexual or gay or lesbian, or bisexual? (Recoded -9= -8=)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>heterosexual or straight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>homosexual or gay (or lesbian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>bisexual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-8</td>
<td>don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-9</td>
<td>refused</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
29. Among your immediate family members, relatives, neighbors, coworkers, or close friends, are any of them gay, lesbian, or bisexual as far as you know? 
   (**Recoded -9=. -8=. 2=0)
   1 yes
   2 no
   -8 don’t know
   -9 refused

30. Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have: INDEPENDENCE or RESPECT FOR ELDERS.
   (**Recoded -9=. -8=. -7=. -6=. 1=0 3=1 4=1)
   1 independence
   2 respect for elders
   3 both (vol)
   4 neither (vol)
   -6 not asked, unit nonresponse (no post-election interview)
   -7 deleted due to partial (post election interview)
   -8 don’t know
   -9 refused

31. (Which one is more important for a child to have:) CURIOSITY or GOOD MANNERS?
   (**Recoded -9=. -8=. -7=. -6=. 1=0 3=1 4=1)
   1 curiosity
   2 good manners
   3 both (vol)
   -6 not asked, unit nonresponse (no post-election interview)
   -7 deleted due to partial (post-election interview)
   -8 don’t know
   -9 refused

32. (Which one is more important for a child to have:) OBEDIENCE or SELF-RELIANCE
   (**Recoded -9=. -8=. -7=. -6=. 1=2 3=1 4=1 2=0)
   1 obedience
   2 self-reliance
   3 both (vol)
   4 neither (vol)
   -6 not asked, unit nonresponse (no post-election interview)
   -7 deleted due to partial (post-election interview)
   -8 don’t know
   -9 refused
33. (Which one is more important for a child to have:) BEING CONSIDERATE or WELL BEHAVED? (**Recoded -9= -8= -7= -6= 1=0 3=1 4=1)
1 being considerate
2 well behaved
3 both (vol)
-6 not asked, unit nonresponse (no post-election interview)
-7 deleted due to partial (post-election interview)
-8 don’t know
-9 refused