Title

Heterogeneity of southern countries and southern intellectual property rights policy

Campus Units

Economics

Document Type

Article

Publication Version

Submitted Manuscript

Publication Date

8-2008

Journal or Book Title

Canadian Journal of Economics

Volume

41

Issue

3

First Page or Article ID Number

894

Last Page

925

DOI

10.1111/j.1540-5982.2008.00490.x

Abstract

We develop a model with one innovating northern firm and heterogeneous southern firms that compete in a final product market. We assume southern firms differ in their ability to adapt technology and study southern incentives to protect intellectual property rights. We find that, in a non-cooperative equilibrium, governments resist IPR protection, but collectively southern countries benefit from some protection. We show that, in general, countries with more efficient firms prefer higher collective IPR protection than those with less efficient firms. Given the aggregate level of IPR protection, it is more efficient if the more efficient countries have weaker IPR protection.

JEL Classification

F13, O34

Comments

This is a working paper of an article from Canadian Journal of Economics 41 (2008): 894, doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2008.00490.x.