Campus Units

Economics

Document Type

Article

Publication Version

Published Version

Publication Date

2012

Journal or Book Title

Journal of Labor Economics

Volume

30

Issue

4

First Page or Article ID Number

915

Last Page

962

DOI

10.1086/666654

Abstract

The optimal balance between keeping marriages intact, despite spousal conflict, and allowing for divorce is a subject of policy debate in the United States. To explore the trade-offs, I construct a structural model with information asymmetries, which may generate inefficient outcomes. Parameters are estimated using data from the National Survey of Families and Households. I find that eliminating separation periods decreases the conflict rate by 9.2% of its baseline level and increases the divorce rate by 4.0%. Perfect child support enforcement decreases the frequency of conflict and divorce by 2.7% and 21.2%, respectively, and reduces the incidence of inefficient divorces.

Comments

This is an article from Journal of Labor Economics 30 (2012): 915, doi:10.1086/666654. Posted with permission.

Copyright Owner

The University of Chicago

Language

en

File Format

application/pdf

Included in

Economics Commons

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