Campus Units

Economics

Document Type

Article

Publication Version

Accepted Manuscript

Publication Date

2005

Journal or Book Title

Review of Economic Studies

Volume

72

Issue

1

First Page or Article ID Number

247

Last Page

268

DOI

10.1111/0034-6527.00331

Abstract

Using data from the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery, we find that firms with a preference for extreme, rather than moderate, policies are much more likely to participate in public meetings where regulation is determined. We also find that participation rates are higher for larger, closer, and more influential firms. These results: (1) improve our understanding of a very common institution for resource allocation, “meetings with costly participation”, (2) they refine our intuition about regulatory capture, (3) they provide broad confirmation of the recent theoretical literature predicting that polarization and bipartisanship should emerge under a variety of democratic institutions, and finally, (4) they may help to explain management problems in U.S. fisheries.

JEL Classification

L11, Q22, Q28

Comments

This working paper was published in Review of Economic Studies (2005) 72 (1): 247-268. doi: 10.1111/0034-6527.00331.

Copyright Owner

The Review of Economic Studies Limited

Language

en

File Format

application/pdf