Title

Information Sharing and Cooperative Search in Fisheries

Campus Units

Economics

Document Type

Article

Publication Version

Accepted Manuscript

Publication Date

6-2014

Journal or Book Title

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volume

58

Issue

3

First Page or Article ID Number

353

Last Page

372

DOI

10.1007/s10640-013-9701-8

Abstract

We present a dynamic game of search and learning about the productivity of competing fishing locations. Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium search patterns for non-cooperating fishermen and members of an information sharing cooperative are compared with first-best outcomes. Independent fishermen do not internalize the full value of information, and do not replicate first-best search. A fishing cooperative faces a free-riding problem, as each coop member prefers that other members undertake costly search for information. Pooling contracts among coop members may mitigate, but are not likely to eliminate free-riding. Our results explain the paucity of information sharing in fisheries and suggest regulators use caution in advocating cooperatives as a solution to common pool inefficiencies in fisheries.

JEL Classification

D8, Q22

Comments

This is the working paper of an article that appeared in Environmental and Resource Economics 58 (2014): 353–372, doi:10.1007/s10640-013-9701-8. Posted with permission.

Copyright Owner

Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

Language

en

File Format

application/pdf