Campus Units

Economics, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

6-2013

Journal or Book Title

Marine Resource Economics

Volume

28

Issue

2

First Page or Article ID Number

111

Last Page

131

DOI

10.5950/0738-1360-28.2.111

Abstract

We present a general dynamic model of within-season harvesting competition in a fishery managed with individual transferable quotas. Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE) harvesting and quota purchase strategies are derived using numerical collocation methods. We identify rent loss caused by a heterogeneous-in-value fish stock, congestion on the fishing ground, revenue competition, and stock uncertainty. Our results show that biological, technological, and market conditions under which rents will be dissipated in a standard individual transferable quota program are fairly special. We offer new insights for designing rights-based programs capable of generating resource rent in marine fisheries.

Comments

This article is from Marine Resource Economics 28 (2013): 111, doi: 10.5950/0738-1360-28.2.111. Posted with permission.

Copyright Owner

MRE Foundation, Inc.

Language

en

File Format

application/pdf

Share

COinS