Campus Units

Economics

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1-2015

Journal or Book Title

Marine Resource Economics

Volume

30

Issue

1

First Page or Article ID Number

97

Last Page

119

DOI

10.1086/679461

Abstract

Regulations to reduce bycatch of non-marketed marine species often impose gear restrictions, reductions in harvest of the target species, and/or spatial and temporal closures of the fishing ground. These regulations can exact significant social costs in commercial fisheries. We evaluate performance of a cap-and-trade bycatch management policy. Harvest of a target fish species, costly avoidance of the bycatch species, and harvesting efficiency are examined in a stochastic production environment with and without at-sea observability of bycatch, and with and without trade in harvest quotas and bycatch caps. Our results suggest that precise implementation of a socially optimal management plan is possible only if bycatch is observable and trade in fish quotas and bycatch cap is frictionless. Conditions exist in which quota/permit trading raises bycatch relative to a no-trade environment. The results offer useful guidance for designing cap-and-trade bycatch management programs.

Comments

This article is from Marine Resource Economics 30 (2015): 97, doi: 10.1086/679461. Posted with permission.

Copyright Owner

MRE Foundation, Inc.

Language

en

File Format

application/pdf

Included in

Economics Commons

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