Title

Bioeconomies of scope and the discard problem in multiple-species fisheries

Campus Units

Economics

Document Type

Article

Publication Version

Submitted Manuscript

Publication Date

7-2009

Journal or Book Title

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volume

58

Issue

1

First Page or Article ID Number

72

Last Page

92

DOI

10.1016/j.jeem.2008.08.005

Abstract

We consider the problem of multi-species fisheries management when targeting individual species is costly and at-sea discards of fish by fishermen are unobserved by the regulator. Stock conditions, ecosystem interaction, technological specification, and relative prices under which at-sea discards are acute are identified. A dynamic model is developed to balance ecological interdependencies among multiple fish species, and scope economies implicit in a costly targeting technology. Three regulatory regimes, species-specific harvest quotas, landing taxes, and revenue quotas, are contrasted against a hypothetical sole-owner problem. An optimal plan under all regimes precludes discarding. For both very low and very high levels of targeting costs, first best welfare is close to that achieved through any of the regulatory regimes. In general, however, landing taxes welfare dominate species-specific quota regulation; a revenue quota fares the worst.

JEL Classification

Q02

Comments

NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, [58, 1, (2009)] DOI:10.1016/j.jeem.2008.08.005.

Copyright Owner

Elsevier B.V.

Language

en

File Format

application/pdf