Campus Units

Economics

Document Type

Article

Publication Version

Submitted Manuscript

Publication Date

2003

Journal or Book Title

Journal of Economic Theory

Volume

108

Issue

1

First Page or Article ID Number

1

Last Page

44

DOI

10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00018-2

Abstract

We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. We prove limit uniqueness: as the signal noise vanishes, the game has a unique strategy profile that survives iterative dominance. This generalizes a result of Carlsson and van Damme (Econometrica 61 (1993) 989–1018) for two-player, two-action games. The surviving profile, however, may depend on fine details of the structure of the noise. We provide sufficient conditions on payoffs for there to be noise-independent selection.

JEL Classification

C72, D82

Comments

NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Economic Theory. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Economic Theory, [108, 1, (2003)] DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00018-2

Copyright Owner

Elsevier Ltd.

Language

en

File Format

application/pdf