Document Type

Article

Publication Date

12-2002

Journal or Book Title

Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics

Volume

27

Issue

2

First Page

390

Last Page

405

Abstract

Subsidies and fines are compared to voluntary and mandatory refuge insurance (insurance for pest damage on Bt corn refuge) as mechanisms for securing grower compliance with EPA refuge mandates. A conceptual model partially ranks mechanisms. Tradeoffs between mechanisms using grower welfare, payments to growers, and monitoring frequency are quantified empirically. Grower welfare is lowest with mandatory insurance because growers pay all costs, and is highest with direct refuge subsidies because public funds or companies subsidize all costs. Assuming typical premium loads and ignoring distribution considerations, we develop monitoring budgets for fines and subsidies, above which voluntary or mandatory insurance is better.

Comments

This article is from Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics; 27 (2002); 390-405.

Rights

Works produced by employees of the U.S. Government as part of their official duties are not copyrighted within the U.S. The content of this document is not copyrighted.

Copyright Owner

Western Agricultural Economics Association

Language

en

File Format

application/pdf

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