Campus Units

Philosophy and Religious Studies

Document Type

Article

Publication Version

Accepted Manuscript

Publication Date

9-2012

Journal or Book Title

International Philosophical Quarterly

Volume

52

Issue

3

First Page

285

Last Page

301

DOI

10.5840/ipq201252334

Abstract

Hegel famously argues that Kant’s account of critical distance depends upon an impoverished conception of freedom. In its place, Hegel introduces a richer conception of freedom, according to which the self who is capable of self-determination is multifaceted: wanting and thinking, social and individual. This richer conception gives rise to an account of critical reflection that emphasizes engagement with our motives and practices rather than radical detachment from them. But what is most distinctive about Hegel’s account is the idea that when we reflect upon motives and practices, we draw upon shared self-understandings that are neither universal nor just particular to individuals. There is, Hegel argues, no presocial identity or self that can be detached from our socially constituted contexts of thought and value. This has important implications for how we conceive of critical reflection.

Comments

This is a manuscript of an article published as Walsh, Kate Padgett. "Distance and engagement: Hegel’s account of critical reflection." International Philosophical Quarterly 52, no. 3 (2012): 285-301. doi: 10.5840/ipq201252334. Posted with permission.

Copyright Owner

International Philosophical Quarterly

Language

en

File Format

application/pdf

Published Version

Included in

Philosophy Commons

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