Green payment programs, by which the government pays farmers directly for environmental benefits, have been proposed as an alternative to the current method of achieving environmental benefits by restricting farming practices in exchange for deficiency payments. This paper examines a green payment program applied to irrigated corn production in the Oklahoma Panhandle, where nitrogen fertilizer is a conjoint source of pollution.
This working paper was published as Wu, JunJie and Bruce A. Babcock, "Optimal Design of a Voluntary Green Payment Program under Assymetric Information," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 20 (1995) 316–327.
Wu, JunJie and Babcock, Bruce A., "Optimal Design of a Voluntary Green Payment Program Under Asymmetric Information" (1995). CARD Working Papers. 150.
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