Endogenous Market Structure and the Cooperative Firm

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2014-05-01
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Hueth, Brent
Moschini, GianCarlo
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Moschini, Giancarlo
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Center for Agricultural and Rural Development

The Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) conducts innovative public policy and economic research on agricultural, environmental, and food issues. CARD uniquely combines academic excellence with engagement and anticipatory thinking to inform and benefit society.

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Abstract

When the threat of entry by followers includes cooperative firms, the maximum fixed cost that a profit maximizing leader can endure is endogenous. The aggressive strategy required for entry deterrence curtails the leader’s expected profit and can discourage its initial entry. In such circumstances a cooperative firm may yet be viable, despite having a cost handicap and no first-mover advantage.

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