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War came to the Iowa community

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The local community in action
service, sentiment and sacrifice
campaigns, rallies and ceremonies
lags and gaps in war programs
accomplishments and blunders
recommendations for new efforts
Foreword

What happens when war upsets the normal life of peaceful communities? This bulletin tells the story of community life in Iowa during the Great War of 1917-18. Although this study was prepared during the summer of 1941, before war actually was again upon us, we believe that it is even more timely than when it was written.

We wish to emphasize our sincere efforts to provide citizens with information which can be useful today. This usefulness would have been lessened had we refrained from the discussion of mistakes and confusion. Nations and communities, like individuals, may profit both by a recognition of mistakes and of accomplishments.

Our objective has been neither to flatter nor to indict any community in its war effort, but rather to analyze what took place with a view toward even more effective civilian action in the new conflict. While our recommendations for current action are based primarily upon the study of the earlier war, it is our conviction that many of the problems and processes in community life will be re-lived in the current crisis.
SUMMARY

In time of war the community changes from a cluster of loosely bound organizations toward an integrated whole, each group related to each other one through the war programs. The pitch of social participation is greatly increased both by greater activity in existing peacetime organizations and by the creation of numerous new organizations specifically organized for the community war effort.

More and more groups, old and new, put their shoulders to the wheel. Sewing, canning, parties for soldiers, bandage rolling, food production and a multitude of other tasks are taken up energetically by local communities. Campaigns in rapid succession strike the community with feverish intensity. Rallies, send-off parties, demonstrations, flag ceremonies appear in a never ending stream enthusing people to work on specific programs and revive their patriotic zeal.

This unification of organizations and the creation of the frame of mind consistent with it do not come over night; they are the product of weeks of service, conflicts of local interests, the overcoming of personal biases and selfishness, and, perhaps more importantly, the building of a war focus in the mind of each member of the community. Many problems arise in this transition.

Organizations do not agree on how they should function, people are frequently untrained for what they are to do, some of the work is not directly useful, leadership is drained off from the community by war demands. These and other problems may be expected in any attempt to integrate the peacetime community into a "war community."

Along with modifications in social organization we find equally marked changes in attitudes and community opinion. The variety of interests in the community is curtailed in favor of the dominant war issue. The criteria of success now applied to individuals and to organizations are not varied as in peacetime; there is now one test, "Does it help to win the war?"

This unification in spirit is the outstanding quality. A desire and a demand for personal sacrifice arise, and, at
the same time, the problem of making sacrifices equitable becomes even more difficult. As the war spirit grows, the non-contributors attract attention, and the possibilities of bitterness become more difficult for leaders to control. War, with its trials and bereavements, must inevitably be viewed with emotion, and an ever present problem is to prevent the emotionalism of wartime from handicapping rational war work—even as this same zeal stiffens the spirit in the community for further effort.

With growing unanimity and growing emotionalism, toleration is difficult to preserve even where criticisms are constructive. People become more suggestible, accepting rumor as fact, and hopes as evidence. Even more dangerous from the long-time viewpoint is the reaction of war hate which in the last war was fostered by atrocity stories and flaming pictures. By these we may blind our reason in the heat of emotion and both wage war less effectively and demand a peace of retribution rather than one of world order.

Many of the problems felt in 1917-18 will plague us again in the present war. Many of the effective organization plans used then will again aid us in great achievements.

The epics of success and the fumblings of cross-purposes which make up the history of Iowa in 1917-18 can serve now to guide us as we unite with the nation on a new front.

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War Came To The Iowa Community

BY C. ARNOLD ANDERSON AND BRYCE RYAN

On April 6, 1917, the United States of America declared war. Throughout the country, communities marshalled forces to meet the situation. Today the United States is engaged in another war, which is creating problems of social and economic war planning on dimensions greater than those of the war in 1917-18.

As the defense effort expands, each community will face a notable increase in organized group activities, in new integrating organizations, heightened enthusiasm expressed in rallies and campaigns, new regulations of private lives.

Everyone today recognizes that war involves readjustments in our society. Economic and political adjustments are obviously serious. Equally drastic are the necessary modifications in family life, in churches, in recreation, in education, in the innumerable activities which in peacetime follow so normal a routine that we accept them as a matter of course. These problems are no less vital to the welfare of our people than the effects of war upon land values and prices of farm products. The preservation of a democratic way of life depends upon the actions and attitude of all members of the nation in their local communities. The successful adjustment of individuals to these changes, and the organization of our energies for effective prosecution of the war require an understanding of the problems which will be involved.

A classification and tabulation of events recorded in issues of the Des Moines Register from April 6, 1917 through Nov. 11, 1918, provided an index of community participation not only in the city itself but also in many of the small communities of Iowa. We have drawn from Iowa

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1Project 383 of the Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station.
2Assistant Professors of Sociology.
3We ignored all news items not referring specifically to Iowa. We did not include strictly business or financial items, nor certain categories such as the detailed operation of the army draft or the daily grist of news from Camp Dodge.

Our charts are not to be taken as accurate measures of the actual number of events of any type occurring everywhere in Iowa, but rather as indexes to the relative importance of one kind of happening compared to another type and the relative importance of different types of events at different times. No doubt Des Moines is overweighted in our data, but we believe our picture is essentially accurate for Iowa.
Fig. 1. Fluctuations in all wartime activities reported for Iowa communities.

Chronicles of the World War published by the State Historical Society.

A preview of the intense and spirited participation of Iowa communities in the war is shown in fig. 1. Several features stand out. The declaration of war led to a rapid crescendo of patriotic ceremonies and service which quickly faded out by summertime. Then the intensity of work picked up through the autumn until Christmas. This effort failed to gain more, barely holding its own until a new high level was reached in the spring. Once more the summer months witnessed a decline in citizen contributions. The new autumn rise was cut short by the flu epidemic in October, 1918. Although the seasonal changes in activity
were quite similar in both years, the general level of 1918 was distinctly above 1917.

In order to deal with the complexity of community activities we have divided our discussion into four main parts. First, we ask what happened to the existing organizations, what new organizations appeared, and how all the activities of these groups were carried on and interrelated? Second, what were the shortcomings in the pursuit of unified community effort for the preservation of a democratic world? Third, how were campaigns, rallies and ceremonies used to further the war effort? And fourth, what were the attitudes and sentiments of the members of these communities in wartime? Finally, we have attempted to draw from this information recommendations which would be of use in conducting present day civilian defense activities with maximum speed and efficiency and a minimum of suffering.

If we are prepared in our minds for the changes which the emergency will bring and foresee the adjustments which will be called for, we shall be able to make the adjustments more easily. This preparation can facilitate carrying on new activities more promptly and more capably. Not least important, we can avoid some of the fumbling and disorganization and some of the misunderstanding and bitterness which flourish in haste and anxiety and unguided enthusiasm. Foresight and planning can aid us in preserving our democracy while defending it.

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS IN WARTIME

Churches, women's clubs, chambers of commerce, lodges, schools, these and all the many other organizations in the typical community were wrenched out of their normal channels to find their purposes and activities reoriented in the wartime society. Beside them grew up new groups and new branches of old groups—a food administration, new local branches of the Red Cross, clubs of girls to entertain soldiers, many other large organizations and spontaneous local groups. What were these group changes as they actually worked out in World War I and as we may in large part anticipate them for the present crisis?
CHANGES AWAY FROM PEACETIME PROGRAMS IN EXISTING ORGANIZATIONS

War Goals Permeate Every Group

With the call to arms in 1917 there was the beginning of a tremendous impetus to forsake the programs of peacetime, to forget the individual goals of peacetime organization, and to unite in an all-out front to "win the war." Questions such as these were heard on the lips of citizens on every street corner: "What can we do in our lodge to help win the war?", "How can the ladies' aid be of the most assistance to the Red Cross?", "Should our bridge club change to a sewing society?" At the minimum, programs already under way were justified as having new value because they contributed to war plans.

Religious doctrines changed their emphasis from loving your neighbor to defending democracy, "It is God who has summoned us to this war. It is His war we are fighting... This conflict is indeed a crusade. The greatest in history—the holiest. It is in the profoundest and truest sense a Holy War..."—an unfortunate neglect of the problems of a Christian peace. Missionary societies clothed Belgian orphans as well as Hottentots. Recreation was not merely pleasure or protection of health; it was keeping fit so that one could become a soldier or give longer hours to war work. Schools became the seedbeds of democracy as well as training grounds for individual talents. Women's clubs became guardians of the home front instead of personal recreational associations.

Each Organization Separately Takes on War Activities

Parallel Work on Similar Tasks

In the first tumult of a war emergency each group started out separately to make its contribution. There were certain obvious ways in which assistance was needed, and these activities therefore tended to appear simultaneously and independently in the programs of different groups. Almost every group became an agency for selling war bonds, Red Cross memberships, collecting food pledges, listening to 4-minute speakers, reporting disloyal statements.
Particularly striking was the way the Red Cross movement permeated the typical women's organizations with practically a single purpose—Sew for Soldiers. Whereas in April, 1917, very few organizations could have put sewing as one of their central objectives, we find already by July "sew, sew, sew" had become the watchword. Figure 2 indicates how this new objective swept across the social life of Iowa. Frequently the objectives of peacetime were forgotten or postponed.
Search for Unique Ways of Contributing

Each group also sought to show its special fitness to serve by launching its own plans in addition to sharing in some comprehensive program like Red Cross sewing. One club conceived the idea of collecting “smokes for soldiers,” another collected field glasses. Some groups served by gathering junk or old clothing, others made curtains for hospital wards, others collected reading material and phonographs. The Des Moines Chamber of Commerce had 16 different committees working on Camp Dodge problems. Beginning with the Christmas season of 1917 soldier parties and benefits became a constant part of the social calendar.

Relation Between New and Old Activities

Some organizations such as sewing circles made their contributions primarily by doing more of the things they were already doing. Other groups continued existing programs but expanded the total of their programs by adding new war activities.

The wartime goal became, for many of these organizations, far more time consuming and the cause of more ex-
penditure of energy than the peacetime programs had ever occasioned. The Food Conservation and the Red Cross programs, soldier parties, benefits, etc. were taken on in addition to their usual functions. Many organizations compromised with the emergency by holding two or more meetings per week, one of which would be devoted to club affairs, and some organizations set aside a portion of their afternoon meetings for war activities. In the extreme case, previous programs were completely displaced by war work.

Division of Labor

As war progressed, the necessity for planning to avoid unnecessary duplication and to make sure that all vital needs were taken care of became more urgent.

The single goal of “winning the war” became many goals, and as the war effort became more strenuous these became more diversified and less like the familiar tasks. Winning the war became not only sewing for the Red Cross, producing or conserving food, but also entertaining soldiers, dealing with the social hygiene problem, teaching wounded soldiers new occupations, selling a bond to every citizen, and innumerable others. Gradually these jobs were parcelled out among various groups, although some (such as sewing) were widely shared in. Some groups were able to aid in a great number of programs. Not even at the end of the war was the allocation of these multiple tasks organized most efficiently, but this was the tendency.

A certain conformity to usual activity prevailed in this division of labor: women took over sewing, children collected fruit pits, chambers of commerce spread knowledge of new regulations of the food industries, the schools developed adult education programs in cooking and canning, and farm bureaus organized to meet the demands for food.

Effects of War Upon Schools and Education: An Illustrative Case

With so many new problems and new activities, it is hardly to be expected that the major institutions of society could proceed in their accustomed paths untouched. The whole fabric of family relations is subjected to new strains. Political institutions are reorganized to carry the new bur-
The church must harmonize its doctrines of peace with the moral decision of its members to wage war.

There is not sufficient space to analyze each of these situations in turn, even though one cannot fully understand why war is so productive of social change without tracing these changes through the whole of society. Instead, we will show how the educational system of Iowa reacted to the war, as reported in the newspaper.

The most noteworthy adjustments of schools to the war came in three areas: Curricular change, staff and enrollment, and participation in general patriotic activities.

Curricular changes were many. Athletic programs were sharply reduced. Some subjects were dropped, of which the most conspicuous was German. This action took place at first in particular localities upon the initiative of principals, parents, patriotic societies, or students—in some cases students refused to continue their work. Later the governor ordered all such teaching stopped. Students received full credit even for uncompleted work. The ban on use of all foreign languages in public did not apply to the schools except for German. Colleges, however, continued to teach German and defended its importance for military efficiency. One is startled to read in the papers of the day numerous pleas to study South American languages and history to prepare for the coming reorientation of American trade and cultural intercourse. Apparently few schools took up this suggestion.

Military training was introduced in several colleges, and this practice became uniform with the Student Army Training Corps in 1918. The diversion of time to drill was at the expense of academic subjects. Although there were many proposals to carry the plan down into the high schools, this apparently occurred in only a few places. In some instances women and girl students also drilled.

Courses were reoriented in two general ways. Many subjects received new content based upon the war, e.g. courses in history focused on the current war. Home economics classes rather generally turned from personal sewing to Red Cross work, and cooking centered on conservation recipes.
The second modification consisted of adding new courses or new study projects of various kinds. First aid and nursing classes were introduced quite extensively in both high school and college. Gardening was perhaps the most general project of all. Special training courses and summer schools were set up in auto mechanics, telegraphy, stenography, food conservation, thrift lessons and many other subjects of pressing importance. The colleges also offered intensive courses in the above subjects, a definite departure from the type of subject previously offered, as well as coaching-schools in French, geography, etc. The colleges also assumed responsibility for a diversified educational program at Camp Dodge.

Of particular significance as an indication of the attitudes of educational administrators and public leaders was the addition to the curriculum of new courses in loyalty, patriotism and war. Teachers' conventions discussed little except the war.

These many additions to the classwork of pupils plus the taking on of many outside activities undoubtedly contributed to deterioration of learning in the established courses of study.

The main effects upon school enrollments were withdrawals in the spring of 1917 to enlist in the army and to work on farms. Pleas to young men to continue their schooling in college for the good of the nation until they should be needed by the army had considerable effect, and the establishment of the S.A.T.C. in the fall of 1918 kept college enrollments higher than could have been expected. School officials carried through many plans for granting high school boys full credits in courses even though they left school weeks early to work on farms. When the war ended plans were afoot to stop school in April in order to release needed labor.

In addition to the interruptions of school work by various campaigns and projects and the shortened period of study just mentioned, the duration of schooling was cut by other factors growing out of the war. The Christmas vacations of 1917 were lengthened in many towns and colleges to conserve fuel, and in January of 1918 numerous schools were
forced to recess by lack of coal. Then in the fall of 1918, at first town by town and then for the whole state, special vacations were ordered to halt the spread of influenza. In some towns the schools went on a 6-day schedule to offset these losses of time but this was not a general practice.

Schools lost staff members as well as pupils. Many principals and men teachers resigned to enlist, and, of course, many more were taken later by the draft. College presidents were granted leaves to serve the government, as were many professors.

Newspaper items of the period seldom refer directly to losses of women from the teaching profession, but indirect statements show that some were drawn off into civic positions as nurses or home demonstration agents, and many more were attracted away by wartime wages to positions in industry or business. It was reported that over 150 schools in Iowa had no teachers in the fall of 1917. Some schools probably did not open at all that year, but various special measures relieved the emergency—undoubtedly at the cost of efficiency. Although many people proposed combining schools, little of this occurred. Teachers' colleges shortened courses so that students would be available for positions sooner. The main recourse apparently was to call back retired teachers and those who had married and to relax the standards for requirements of teachers. Special exceptions in favor of war brides were common.

This picture of the interlocking of the schools with the whole war effort is not complete without considering the great variety of school activities whose main function was to build up patriotism in the whole community or to further some civic campaign. A simple example was the general use of school buildings for meetings of every type and of school yards for gardens.

Patriotic rituals and ceremonies, as opening school each day with a flag raising or the singing of the Star Spangled Banner, multiplied rapidly. Holidays received new and increased attention. Classrooms were organized on a military plan in some schools. Every school was expected to fly a flag.

Symbolic actions of many kinds increased. These ranged
from discharging "disloyal" teachers to burning German books or tearing German songs out of the songbooks. Discipline in some schools acquired a new and disturbing aspect; cases were recorded of recalcitrant pupils or indignant parents allegedly accusing teachers of pro-Germanism because a child had been punished for some offense or had been given low marks. Proposals—apparently none of them carried out—to clothe girls in uniforms as a measure of thrift and a gesture of democracy were essentially symbolic in character. Some fraternities were temporarily disbanded. Particularly interesting examples of the psychological effects of patriotism were the drives to raise endowment funds for colleges as aids to democracy.

The use of school pupils to aid wartime campaigns would include the taking of the pig census, organizing Junior Red Cross chapters, knitting during recess or after school hours as well as in school time, staging benefits for various war funds, organizing On-to-Berlin Savings Stamp Clubs, collecting "smokes for soldiers," or cooperative buying of bonds. Public interest in campaigns was stimulated by essay contests on conservation or patriotism, and by junior 4-minute speaking competitions.

One deplorable feature recorded for the war period was the occasional use of children to report on the loyalty of teachers and in at least one case to scurry through the community to ferret out or investigate suspected slackers. Of the same nature was the persecution by children of their fellow pupils who were so unfortunate as to be the children of allegedly unpatriotic parents. That a teacher would use such pupils as object lessons in the classroom was perhaps the best example of the penetration of emotionalism into every phase of life.

The many patriotic ceremonies and activities of the last war unquestionably harmed the schools' educational effectiveness. Should children in the lower grades be learning lessons instead of soliciting for money, learning patriotic rituals only to be forgotten when war ends, taught conservation practices adapted to war economy—when their knowledge is primarily for future, not for immediate, use? Are we justified in excusing children from school to work
in the fields because of threatened labor shortage? Are we justified in making wholesale modifications in lower grade curricula due to war interests? These questions are not to be answered by sociologists; they must be answered by citizens. Unfortunately the questions are seldom posed, and once in the war situation it is all too easy to forget non-
war values in organizational functioning. We must ask ourselves how far we may wish to go in harming the normal education of children in the process of building war morale and action.

Winning the war, we must all agree, is the number one task of a nation at war. But at the same time there persist from normal days additional objectives which cannot be completely sacrificed toward the war goal. (If all other objectives are sacrificed a nation cannot but be defeated by its own success—the reason for fighting the war disappears.) Many organizations perform tasks that cannot be forgotten even in time of war. So, while at first the problem is to get more war activities into more organization programs—as we have pointed out—soon the problem becomes one of deciding which organizations or which activities to insulate from the disruptions and emotionalism of war.

RISE OF NEW ORGANIZATIONS

New Local Branches of Existing National Organizations

The expansion of the Red Cross to meet war needs was very rapid and very dramatic. While this organization was not unknown to Iowans before the war, the fact is that there were only nine Red Cross Chapters in Iowa in 1916. However, a month after war was declared (May) there were 24 chapters; one month later (June) there were 75, and by October, 167. Red Cross auxiliaries and branches were also organized in conjunction with these official chapters. On the first of August, 1917, there were 430 such branches, and at the close of the war over 1,200. In addition, training schools were established for home relief service, making surgical dressings and other activities. In Des Moines new Red Cross organizations appeared very rapidly just after the declaration of war, but few were formed during the following summer. In the fall of 1917 organizing grew again but dwindled until the great campaign month of May, 1918. At no time did new Red Cross organizations appear as rapidly, however, as in 2 months following our entrance into the war.

These figures reveal very inadequately how deeply this
new organization penetrated into Iowa with ever increasing thoroughness, forming a new grouping within virtually every rural community and linking each community with others throughout the nation. There were reported for Scott County 21,000 Red Cross members in 15 divisions in addition to the members of 20 rural branches throughout the county. Auxiliaries were found also in public and parochial schools, churches and other affiliated organizations.

While there were few other single expansions so dramatic as the Red Cross, the cumulative effect of the expansions of other groups was tremendous. The Federated Women’s Clubs, the Business Clubs, United Commercial Travelers, W.C.T.U., and Women’s Relief Corps extended their local activities and set up many new branches. Children as well as adults were mobilized for the emergency. Junior Red Cross societies appeared in the majority of schools, new Boy or Girl Scout troops were formed, both new and old troops doing notable work in many communities as messengers and clean-up squads in various drives. The Y.M.C.A. and the Y.W.C.A. expanded their work.

One of the proudest chapters in Iowa’s history is the rise of farmers to the war crisis. Through the Extension Service and the farm bureaus farmers organized to meet the challenge that “Food will win the war.” When war was declared 27 counties had organized farm bureaus and employed county agents. In less than a year every county in the state had at least one farm bureau. By July 1, 1918, 33,187 farmers belonged to the farm bureaus. In addition the wives of these men and nearly 5,000 additional women were working with home demonstration agents. The program was brought to the actual farmers through the 14,000 farm cooperators, one for each 4 square miles. Through this vast organization the federal government through the Agricultural Extension Service was able to reach the farmers of the state. And through it, too, farmers were able to meet successfully the enormous demands for food, the serious seed corn situation, the ravages of cholera, and the placement of farm laborers.
New National Organizations Create Local Units

To meet some of the special demands arising from the emergency, new national organizations were formed which then established local units throughout the nation. The variety of these was noteworthy. Several organizations attempted to coordinate women’s activities: National league for Women’s Service, Women’s Committee for National Defense, Women’s Volunteer Aid, Camp Mothers’ Association, and War Mothers of America. The Victory Boys and Girls Clubs, the Boys Working Reserve, Little Brothers of Soldiers, Girls Volunteer Aid organized the children. The War Camp Community Service established branches to provide recreation for soldiers. Doctors organized in Volunteer Medical Service Corps, and dentists joined forces in the Preparedness League of American Dentists. Loyal citizens of Teutonic origin affirmed their loyalty through the German-American Patriotic Association.

The National Food Administration permeated each community, and nearly every group, as thoroughly as the Red Cross. Each county was expected to set up a committee under the State Food Administration, usually affiliated with the county Council of National Defense. It was the function of this administration to reach every single home and bring to every family a realization of the crisis in order to gain the cooperation of every producer and housewife. This new organization probably extended itself into more homes in every community than any other board. The fact that there were about seven separate divisions of the Food Administration whose sole concern was reaching the public gives some indication of the program’s scope.

Spontaneous New Local Groups

Many groups sprang up locally. Some of these grew out of the effort to put across a campaign. Liberty Loan campaigns, for example, necessitated organizations on a community level. These were often complex groups with city teams, township teams and coordinating officers on city and county level. Each of the five campaigns necessitated such organizations, although many of the staffs held steady throughout all campaigns. Liberty Loan and “slacker”
courts were called into being to decide problems in the justice of assessments on different individuals. Societies for the singing of patriotic music appeared. Groups formed to give dances, smokers, games, dinners for soldiers. Public libraries offered new services and even organized children’s clubs to aid.

One could name organizations at length, groups varying in size, scope, importance and efficiency. Naturally, not all of these were to be found in any one community, unless in Des Moines, but a large number arose and flourished and perhaps died out in every county.

COORDINATION OF WAR WORK IN THE COMMUNITY

When war came each group tried to contribute, at first by independent work and by paralleling the same program with many other groups. Gradually each organization tended to do the job it was best suited for, and this division of labor was stimulated and guided by major programs like the Red Cross.

Not only were objectives and programs greatly modified, but unlike the individualism of organizational life in peacetime, organizations, clubs, societies and churches were integrated, and in some communities we could almost say amalgamated into a functioning whole. Each group was not pursuing its course alone; it was united and integrated with all other organizations of the community, thus welding them into a single machine with many functioning parts. While this was not true everywhere it was definitely the type of community life toward which Iowa was going. This integration was brought about by a number of agencies such as the Red Cross, Federated Women’s Clubs and the Food Administration. Around even these integrating agencies were the county defense councils which sought to integrate the integrators.

In August, 1917, the Food Administration was established, and shortly thereafter it too began to function both through existing organizations and through the formation of county food administrations. Commencement addresses in the schools emphasized conservation—not future careers; college home economics advisors distributed literature on
food conservation; school children left their books to serve in a variety of ways. The Chautauquas were quickly converted from their semi-religious recreational functions into powerful units for making people food conscious. Food conservation became a new cardinal point in the objectives of virtually every organization, and as time went on often outshadowed their previous peacetime objectives. Over 12,000 organizations in Iowa are known to have been affiliated with the Food Administration in putting the program across. These included 2,870 church congregations in 12 different denominations, 7,100 lodges representing 19 different fraternal orders; 617 units of five associations of traveling men and nearly as many women’s clubs. “The principal work of the home demonstration agents during the war was to organize the housewives of the state in order to carry out the appeals of the national government for food conservation ...”

Another interesting example of integration of activities was the work of the War Camp Community Service. This agency also organized new local units and utilized existing groups to provide entertainment and various welfare programs for soldiers.

The County Councils of National Defense had their beginning soon after war was declared and were devised as clearing houses for all war activities and frequently for other specific purposes as the suppression of sedition, investigating violations of war laws and orders, providing education on the war, stimulating and organizing patriotic meetings, etc.

In addition to the county councils there were also Women’s Committees for National Defense which coordinated women’s groups in promoting various war drives. These committees cut across the Food Administration and the Red Cross, and they quickly became articulated with the defense councils. To these organizations was given the tremendous task of integrating civilian war effort locally. Perhaps more frequently they served as all-purpose assisters rather than integrators.

An important feature of this spurt of organizing and coordinating, and one which has had enduring significance
for rural life, was an offshoot of the centralizing tendencies inherent in the national war effort. Certain agencies became leaders, and the others were arrayed below in various levels according to presumed or proved efficiency, the importance of the job being done, or enjoyment of semi-official status, as in the organization of an army. This tendency was fostered also by the set-up of some organizations embracing national, regional, state, district, county, township, municipal, and precinct and block staffs. Two interesting examples of the development of such a hierarchy were the assumptions by women's groups of guidance over girl's groups and by chambers of commerce over subordinate agencies set up to assist business men.

Thus we have a picture of the development of more social participation by Iowans than they had ever known before. More and more people were joining more and more organizations; there were more calls upon time by organizations, more working with other people, and, most important of all, more coordinated working between groups. In a sometimes rambling and often ill-defined manner, nearly all the old organizations and all of the new ones were on the way to becoming a part of the war effort. This unification and for the most part voluntary loss of group autonomy in war time is clearly evident both from newspaper accounts and from war histories of organizations and of counties. The new national organizations supplied objectives, programs, and through their local associations were integrating virtually all other groups around these various plans. Never before in Iowa's history had the community changed from a miscellaneous collection of independent organizations to anything approaching such a cohesive unity. In fact, the idea of community councils was invented or adopted widely during the war and has remained a permanent part of community life in many places. Through such procedures separate group programs could be more carefully delimited, unattended needs assigned, and a spirit of joint accomplishment fostered.

This surge of collective action stands in sharp contrast to the easy going "participate or not" attitude of peacetime.
in sharp contrast also to the individualization and self centered activities of peacetime, and to the great variety of group purposes and programs of peacetime. The war had broadened participation, narrowed the focuses of interest, and integrated organizations around national and state drives, campaigns and patriotic programs.

LAGS AND GAPS IN WAR PROGRAMS

Difficulty in Integrating Activities

We must realize, however, that these changes did not come over night nor was the transition equally swift in different communities. The first public reaction to the coming of war was expressed in the patriotic rallies and “hooplas,” in reactions against disloyal remarks, and in similar non-specific ways. Very quickly groups and individuals expressed their determination to help the nation to the limit of their abilities. Actual service, however, was slower to appear. Just as in any crisis, people milled around asking how they might serve. Thus soon after war started the Des Moines . . . Clubs, announced that they were waiting to find the biggest thing they could do for soldiers.

America is not organized on a war basis in peacetime, and it is only natural that the appearance of war would find us unprepared for utilizing civilians most efficiently. Lacking proper integration, the Osiris Club and the Morning Helpers were both making soldier kits but no one was making bandages so to speak. Many desirable tasks were begun late because sewing was “the rage.”

Conflicts and Disputes

Rivalry between organizations or communities was a powerful incentive to energetic labor, but too frequently rivalry became conflict. In rivalry the objective of each contestant is to outdo the other in reaching a common goal; in conflict one contestant strives for a goal at the expense of his “rival.” When people become highly emotionalized over the goals they are seeking, patriotism itself can be perverted into a fallacious desire to monopolize contributions of
a certain type.4

Probably the most serious handicap to Red Cross organizing in Iowa grew out of too frequent disputes between different towns within a county as to which would have the chartered county headquarters and which would be branch organizations. This may sound trivial, but in many communities this conflict seriously impeded the work. In part it was an outcome of the attempt made by the Red Cross to keep only one chartered central agency in a county, and indeed from the standpoint of organization integration it is understandable that each neighborhood and village group could not deal directly with the National or State Red Cross headquarters. Civic loyalty and pride which might have been turned toward the benefit of the organization by advance planning resulted very frequently not in healthy competition but in bitter disputes and occasionally in attempts to sabotage the work of other chapters.

A similar situation arose within communities where cliques attempted to "corner" particular drives and programs as the private program of their groups. In one community, for example, a small clique obtained the Red Cross charter to the great dissatisfaction of many citizens who wanted to participate. A public meeting was called at which the "clique" agreed to surrender its charter to a truly representative community organization. After the meeting the clique refused to surrender, and at a late date this community got the Red Cross into action only by virtue of having the state headquarters cancel the original charter. In another community an independent society was organized apart from and in competition with the Red Cross. The situation became so bitter and harmful that the district attorney ordered the malcontents to cease operations.

Efficiency Versus Enthusiasm

Many organizations also had to deal with innumerable instances of simple inefficiency. Let us quote from the Central Red Cross Division Bulletin:

"Will Chapters kindly inspect their shipments a little more

4 Here, as at many other points, study of the faults or the lost motion of Iowa communities is not to be interpreted as a denial of the overwhelming patriotism and usually sane behavior.
thoroughly before sending to us? We find many trousers of the pajamas without drawstrings, and jackets without any buttons or buttonholes ... In one shipment recently received there were sixty pairs of bed socks, all too short to go on a man's foot ..."

Poor instructions and lack of integration between headquarters and branches partly explain this situation, but we would point out another factor which improved integration was powerless to overcome. The intense patriotism of the women working was, in fact, indirectly responsible for many blunders when it developed into the attitude expressed as "Ten stitches with love are worth 100 stitches with unconcern." In the zeal for service people tended to exaggerate the importance of "good intentions" in comparison to utility. Thus in a report of one county's Red Cross organization we find the statement:

"These articles were the products of women's hands, and by the same token, infinitely more precious than could have been the output of factories or machines."

However true such a statement may be, the attitude behind it led to sentimentalizing rather than knitting good socks. Sentiment was essential, but in war it can not substitute for adequate and sufficient production. Two pair of machine-made socks kept more feet warm than one handmade. It was a handicap to become so blinded by emotionalism as to fail to strive for the most efficient as well as inspired means of serving.

The burst of war enthusiasm and effort and the multiplying of war programs with inadequate planning created a mixed situation in which it was often difficult to decide whether a particular activity was really accomplishing tangible results. Was it also or instead educating and propagandizing citizens on war aims and needs and building up a spirit of service and unity? Or was it merely developing and releasing a gush of emotion, which perhaps also ran riot in mob violence?

**Difficulties in Securing Sustained Work**

This question of efficiency was closely linked to a related problem—securing sustained effort from citizens. Often a program would be launched with enthusiasm and the ac-
tive help of a large part of the community, but as time passed work devolved upon fewer and fewer people.

The conflict between the desire to help or the demands for service and actual conduct was very real. Thus a speaker at the Des Moines Women's Club asserted that “any club not on a war basis is pro-German.” Yet in the week of highest activity for war work, only one-third of the club notices mentioned war activities.

The calls for time to sew for the Red Cross, to collect food pledge cards, and for similar work probably bore most heavily on the majority of women who cared for their homes without servants and who had large families. The news items give the impression that “society women” were doing most of the work, yet personal reports to us together with occasional statements in the press would indicate that in fact the “leisure class” was more important in launching and supervising these activities than it was in doing the work.

The comments of the society editor were revealing. Many times she said in effect, “Social festivities are almost at a standstill, society maids and matrons having become so interested in war work that social functions are tabooed—”, “women to take no vacation.” But an inspection of the club notices shows less evidence of such single-minded devotion. Moreover, the society items from the summer resorts do not refer to Red Cross sewing or knitting at all in 1917 and seldom in 1918. That there was some bad conscience might be inferred from an extended statement by the society editor defending social affairs as healthful in times of strain. Many times there were appeals for more workers, complaints that Red Cross quotas were overdue and that women, “especially women of leisure,” were not keeping their work schedules. The undoubted preeminence of upper-class women in launching new programs had its disadvantages as shown by the apparent meaning of this news item: “Mrs._____, chairman of the______, has just returned from several weeks sojourn in (a southern winter resort) and is issuing a call through the press for more volunteers for the motor corps.”
Leadership

Leadership always becomes more important in a crisis than when affairs are running smoothly. But in wartime leaders are lost from the community. Doctors and dentists leave for military service; over 800 Iowa physicians served in the last war. Other doctors found their time absorbed in caring for the patients of doctors who left and in examining draftees. Ministers, bankers, school teachers and other
leaders in community life departed to serve in larger enterprises. Communities had to get along with less leadership or with new leaders.

With the entrance into the community of new organizations under national and state auspices, new officials, organizers, speakers and leaders arrived. Some of these newcomers supplemented the work of local leaders, some replaced the local ones. Here was a situation requiring delicate handling, for the status and privileges of the local leadership are likely to be guarded jealously. The centralizing tendencies connected with the pressure for urgent action ran counter to our traditions of local independence. In so far as “outsiders” remained behind the scenes much friction was avoided, but when even though it was in appearance only they took over the functions of community organizers, difficulties were not far off. Organizations and communities in America cannot be led by fiat or decree; leaders arise only on the basis of community confidence. Farmers especially want leaders whom they know personally as men as well as officials or agents. This suspiciousness of outside “efficiency experts” was connected also with some of the problems of insuring high standard surgical dressings, as well as contests between local “mob rule” and pleas for moderation by central officials.

There was rivalry among local leaders as well as with outsiders. In truth, much of the slowness with which war work got under way and a large part of the conflicts between organizations reflected contests for power between leaders as much or more than they reflected hostility between the ordinary group members. And there was jockeying for the key positions in the local coordinating groups which supervised the whole community’s war work.

The very novelty of many wartime programs offered scope for new talents and ideas, and new persons strove to establish themselves as leaders. Nevertheless, few communities tried systematically to discover and utilize potential new leaders. As a result, existing leaders were much overworked, and many campaigns were retarded by the lack of executive skill.
CAMPAIGNS, RALLIES AND CEREMONIES

In March, 1918, the city of Des Moines had 30 different campaigns to put across specific war needs. With these campaigns came all the rallies, conclaves, demonstrations and orations believed to be necessary in putting over drives. Des Moines we choose merely as an example. All Iowa heard and felt the emotions, the pleas, the martial music of campaigns, one crowding close at the heels of another from the beginning of the war until its end. (See fig. 3.)

When a new program had to be put across, newspaper advertisements wouldn't do, pulpit or classroom announcements were insufficient; the whole paraphernalia of house
to house visits, seasoned orators, flags, buntings, contests and rallies was brought into full play. It was no joke when someone in 1918 wrote that "nearly every person in the state urged some one else to buy a bond."

How easy it is to forget with the passing years what stores of energy and emotion were expended upon numberless drives and campaigns to satisfy war needs. Many of the most fevered and enthusiastic demonstrations needed attachment to no specific campaign program. Rallies simply for the sake of rallying, were numerous. Finally, a variety of rituals and ceremonies gave dignity and spiritual comfort in certain crisis situations which inevitably accompany war.

**CAMPAIGNS FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSES**

**Organization and Time-Pattern of Specific Campaigns**

Before 1917 bond buying was not a familiar activity among Iowans, but Iowa citizens purchased over $500 million of United States Government bonds during the war. Five separate campaigns wrought this change, four "Liberty Loan" drives and one Victory Loan after the war. No matter how small, most Iowa communities strained to the utmost to oversubscribe their quotas in the later campaigns. Iowa got off to a slow start in bond buying, failing miserably in the first loan. This was due to a number of conditions, but most important were the lack of knowledge both of bonds and of the current program, lack of organization, and lack of interest. It did not take long for this situation to change, and in the later loans Iowa went well over its mark.

Whenever the new "war community" developed, bond sales were promoted by virtually every active organization. Sermons were devoted to their sale, fetes were held to advertise them, church bells were rung for them, Sousa's band toured them into prominence. In the schools essays were written about them, factory owners impelled workmen to subscribe, and no holiday passed which was not used to stir patriotism for war bonds. Every person, young and old, felt the impact of words, music and writing, all insisting upon subscription. Almost every public meeting held up
the necessity. The reluctant customer felt the hostile gaze of his community and perhaps the scrutiny of a "loyalty court." Judging by the number of war news items reported, the 2 most active weeks of the war in Iowa were during the first and third Liberty Loan campaigns.

Another way these campaigns affected community life was in the creation of elaborate organizations to publicize the bonds and collect the maximum number of subscriptions. These organizations scheduled the innumerable public meetings, invited ministers to preach sermons for them, arranged stunts, airplane tours, exhibits and prizes, and captained the teams of solicitors as well. State, county, and city and precinct committees were placed in charge of solicitations.

Closely allied with the sale of bonds was the War Savings Stamp campaign. This movement lasted the entire second year of the war, but many special drives occurred from time to time. One Iowa county had 70 war savings societies. Public meetings were held in country school houses and community centers, and the cooperation of varieties of organizations was secured. In this as in the sale of bonds each community worked to exceed its quota.

The Red Cross through its vast penetration of community organizations also stimulated campaigns of gigantic dimensions. Associated with the creation of new branches were drives for general increases of membership. As the first membership drive went into June, reaching every Iowa county, there were more than 100,000 subscriptions; by September there were 200,000. At Christmas a new membership drive appeared and we find 800,000 Iowans belonging to the Red Cross on January first. By July, 1918, the million mark had been passed. Needless to say the citizens of every single Iowa community knew that the Red Cross campaign had reached their homes. Posters and cards, service flags, church sermons, honor rolls, parades all heralded the entrance of the membership drives into Iowa communities. "Will you be wearing your Red Cross button when the boys come home?" was the question on a million lips. "All you need is a heart and a dollar" was shouted from a million placards, billboards and pay envelopes.
But membership was not all that the Red Cross strove for. Old clothing drives for refugees in Europe, junk collections, banquets without food, corn husking bees, auctions, all were common throughout the state. The Junior Red Cross campaigned for clothes, for funds, for gardens and to get reading matter for soldiers. Auctions and benefits were frequent during the entire war but especially in connection with the first two drives.

The Y.M.C.A., the American Library Association, and the Salvation Army were actively campaigning. The Y (with the YW) had two major drives during which many war-conscious towns held meetings and auctions, each trying to reach its quota early. Many other organizations such as the Smokes for Soldiers Club, War Camp Community Service, Knights of Columbus, and County Farmers Associations conducted separate drives in the course of which they enlisted the support of all kinds of groups.

Mainly through the Extension Service of Iowa State College innumerable campaigns were conducted toward increased production. The scope of these movements may be illustrated by the “September Picking Campaign” to gather seed corn early. Sixty men reached nearly 40,000 people personally and distributed 200,000 seed corn reminder cards and 100,000 information cards. More than 1,400 demonstrations were held, and every county in the state was reached, with striking quantities of seed corn preserved. Campaigns to save corn fodder, to increase pork production, to stimulate planting of war gardens, to increase wheat acreage all impressed themselves upon Iowa farmers and were instrumental in putting across the great expansion in production demanded by the war.

From beginning to end the Food Administration besieged the state with campaigns which in their extent dwarfed even the Liberty Loan drives. Beginning with a program which was not very definite in details, except on the production side, the food administration tried strenuously to bring the reality of the war into every home as a motive for the conservation of foodstuffs and for controlling the production and distribution of food. In many of its varied aspects it worked on the drive principle, the formal
organization being only the starting point for throwing communities into action. Like the Red Cross, but with even greater official pressure, the Food Administration initiated a tremendous publicity campaign through churches, lodges, women's organizations, civic societies, traveling men's organizations, the schools, and, rather ineffectively, the moving pictures. As we have shown, the various associations of farmers, with the Extension Service, were successful in enlisting the cooperation of farm people.

A barrage of appeals and regulations appealed to every group of citizens, and an increasingly complex system of regulations directed the movement of food supplies through wholesale and retail channels. We have told how school classes and commencement addresses stressed the duty of food conservation. The county and state fairs became glorified food conservation schools. Four-minute speakers sought an audience at every public gathering; in one tour of speakers 100,000 Iowans heard the message in 111 special meetings.
In the midst of this high-powered publicity drive came the first important specific food conservation drive. Although food was a red thread through the whole pattern of war activities, the Food Pledge campaign, launched in the fall of 1917, was the main effort. Women’s groups took as their purpose the reaching of every home in Iowa. No public gathering was too small to be capitalized upon in order to gain pledges. This mass drive shook the public into the realization that “food will win the war.” How thorough the campaign was is told by the fact that 91 percent of Iowa’s people signed pledge-cards—as against only 47 percent for the whole nation.

The Food Administration launched one specific campaign after another, though in many cases these lesser drives were not well carried through by county administrators. Threshermen’s committees checked upon the efficiency of machines—enforcing efficiency now and again by extra-legal methods. A whole series of drives were directed toward saving particular foodstuffs or scarce substances: sugar, wheat and flour, potatoes, fats, garbage, ammonia and ice. Excess stocks of flour and wheat were gathered in, potatoes substituted for wheat, other wheat substitutes forced into use, fish publicized as a substitute for meat, fire prevention measures organized, and more efficient routing of grain cars arranged. Under the supervision of the Extension Service there were campaigns to increase wheat seedings, to take a livestock census, to increase honey production, to repair farm implements. In all we have counted 26 special weeks and campaigns sponsored by the Food Administration in addition to the regular duties of actually regulating the sale and use of many commodities.

A double-barrelled gardening and canning campaign sought to put into practice these pledges to conserve food. The drive for gardens was concentrated in the two spring seasons. A few schools plowed up playgrounds, some country clubs gardened where they had golfed, railroads loaned the right of way to any users, and many business firms loaned or gave garden tools to employees. In some cities the vacant lots were card-indexed and plowed at the expense of the owner if he was negligent. Then the canning demon-
strators moved onto the scene to aid all who would preserve the plentiful supply of fresh foods. Garden clubs and canning clubs expressed this thrift interest in organizational form.

Food Conservation was clearly one of the main themes of community service. As for the actual saving of food—the controls over distributors and dealers really got results by keeping foods out of consumers’ kitchens. The principal gain from appeals to consumers was the awakening of nearly every household in every community to the realization that in the modern world, war means total war. It livened the imagination of citizens to the meaning of the war and to their obligations in wartime. The need for food conservation offered many people their first and most tangible opportunity for service and sacrifice.

In this food program we see again very clearly a serious type of confusion which cropped up in many places and many forms, the confusion between enthusiasm and efficiency. Great amounts of time and energy were expended in mass meetings and rallies. The indirect effects of these upon work by increasing morale were impressive, and it is not our purpose to underestimate the utility of these devices for creating and expressing patriotic emotion. Nevertheless, the drain of these meetings upon the participants, and particularly upon leaders, raised the serious problem of making sure that the enthusiasm produced resulted in tangible contribution. This skillfully organized agency, involving countless man hours of work and great cost, was described to the public as a movement of direct utility in winning the war, and yet the food conservation achieved was perhaps of less importance than making people realize a war was going on. This indirect contribution of conservation campaigns is clearly stated in the following quotation from the state executive secretary in a letter written in November 1918.

"To my mind the Food Administration, at least in this state, has been the most important bulwark of government propaganda, because we have always given the people something to do. Let the people work at something—and they will be fairly happy or at least indisposed toward quarrel-
ing and fighting. This looks like tossing bouquets at ourselves but we have reached into every home, have kept everlastingly at it and made the people know that something was going on, thus placing them in a receptive mood for most anything."

The ceaseless succession and overlapping of campaigns reveal the crusading character of war effort. Sometimes so many drives were in progress that some of them had to be postponed to permit public attention to be effectively focused on the major project.

If space permitted we could continue listing campaigns and drives almost without end. There were the comparatively small drives such as recruiting campaigns for volunteers, drives to enlist the support of bankers in war loans, campaigns to collect peach pits for use in gas masks, drives to help the Armenians or the Belgians, financial drives for the County Councils of National Defense, spontaneous drives by multitudes of organizations who in this way would do their bit.

**Campaigns and the Business Man**

Campaigns were specific activities directed at specific individuals and groups. In order to make this fact concrete it may be profitable to look briefly at the effects upon the plans and responsibilities of one group in the community. The extended discussion just completed on the food campaigns makes it appropriate to use business men for an illustration.

Business men throughout the nation were called upon to take time from their businesses to assist other citizens in promoting campaigns. They were asked to devote store space for displays and work rooms for Red Cross sewing. Their service was great. But they were impelled by public opinion, sometimes beyond their own inclination, to show the signs that they had participated and contributed to each of the campaigns and drives, that they had bought bonds, joined the Red Cross, the Y.M.C.A., etc. And in many communities some citizens asserted that the business men should contribute most since they profited most by rising prices. As is true in normal days, the public expected the business man to join in every "worthy cause;" every cam-
campaign was his campaign from the beginning of the war. We may suspect that his spirit of charity was dampened by his being made "the goat" by citizens for the restrictions of consumption and the price rises. That all this cooperation was not entirely happy is evidenced in newspaper reports showing how some industries attempted to evade their responsibilities. Just as today, some firms tried to avoid accepting government contracts which were less profitable than private ones. Other indications of the effect of complexity of rules, ignorance and cupidity show up in the reports of hoarding and particularly profiteering. Naturally these offenses increased in number in 1918 as conditions became more stringent and rules multiplied.

Certainly it is true that readjustments were many. Unquestionably the most important source of difficulty and of new conditions of business operation growing out of the war were those occasioned by the endless Food Administration appeals, codes and decisions. Rules for restaurants, rationing of sugar, restriction on size of stocks, profit restrictions, all types of regulation necessitated care on the part of local business men. Simply an enumeration of the different divisions of the Food Administration brings home the penetration of these regulations into the business life of every community. Several different divisions of the Food Administration came in contact with individual merchants, often with imprecise or conflicting requests. New divisions were continually being set up and each issued new rules.

The difficulties of the local business man in many localities were magnified by the frequent failure of county food administrators to understand the rules or to bother with interpreting them. And in several counties the local administration existed on paper only. Good intentions to conform to the rules failed of execution sometimes because of threats and boycotts by citizens who were more stubborn than loyal.

When the dealer did fail to please local opinion, for any

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*Divisions of Iowa Food Administration: Sugar, Flour, Merchants, Milk and Ice, Hotel and Restaurant, Enforcement, Milling, Education, Propaganda, Bakery, Threshing, Perishables, Baker's Service Committee, Negroes, Movies, Price Interpreting, Retail Service, Women's Committees, Volunteer's, College Women Workers, Library.*
reason, he received unfavorable publicity, was fined, or had his license suspended. Or he might be summoned to judgment by a kangaroo court. Just as farmers' experience did not prepare them to see the need for Liberty Bonds, business men were sometimes reluctant or unable to abide by the sometimes chaotic controls of the Food Administration. In any event, the small merchant had hectic days.

**The Merging of Campaigns**

One can appreciate the volume of these pleas and urgings to which citizens were subjected by looking at fig. 3 which sums up all campaign items. There were two high peaks in the springs, two lesser peaks in the falls, slumps in each summer, and a minor drop during winter. In contrast to the whole pattern of activities of all types (fig. 1), 1918 was not a more active campaign year than 1917.

One reason for the failure of 1918 to exceed 1917 in campaign activity was the merging of efforts. Citizens and leaders alike realized that too much time and energy were going into the successive drives, each of which required extensive planning and proved an unfair burden on the limited number of experienced leaders. At first informally, late in 1917, two or more campaigning organizations combined efforts. Several counties and many communities formed Service Leagues, War Chests, or Welfare Bureaus to cut down the number of calls for money and to simplify and coordinate other types of public appeals. Late in 1918 on a national scale the seven principal welfare agencies finally merged into the United War Work Campaign, but the war was over before their drive was launched.

**Increasing Pressure to Contribute**

The sincerity of public response to the many appeals for money and service is unquestioned. The flowering of rallies at the beginning of the war proves this. So does the huge sum of money contributed over the whole period of the war. Nevertheless, giving became more and more of a burden. The need for making sure that no one was avoid-

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*This picture is not really complete, since news items referring to campaigns were sometimes grouped under rallies or meetings. But the picture is accurate so far as concerns the time fluctuations.*
ing his responsibility and that every community came up to its quota soon led to new plans for handling campaigns. The changes in attitudes connected with the new arrangements will be discussed later, but one reason has already been pointed out—the necessity to spend less time and energy in campaigning.

Voluntary giving became "taxation" giving. At first war funds were raised just like any charity funds, by asking people to give. Some did and some did not, and each gave what he wished. The next step was to insist that everyone give something. Then a quota was assigned each person, and he was asked to please give this amount. Finally, unofficial taxation unfolded in complete detail; everyone had a quota and he had to give that amount or prove that his quota was unfair. Slowness or refusal to meet his quota frequently resulted in a summons to a "slacker court" and the assessment of a "fine" in addition to the quota. This taxation caused much resentment and was the source of much community conflict, but it was a logical development of the wartime needs for huge funds for many purposes.

**RALLIES, MASS MEETINGS AND DEMONSTRATIONS**

War is group action. Modern war requires everyone to work for victory. In such a collective crisis people experience strong emotions. They come together to express their determination, to show their loyalty to the cause, and to calm their fears. From an emotional standpoint these assemblages were probably the high points of most individuals' wartime experiences.

There were two general types of these meetings. One occurred as a direct means to the successful carrying on of some specific campaign or program. Major examples of this type were Red Cross rallies or Liberty Loan rallies. The other type had a less specific focus and mainly served to affirm community loyalty, support of the soldiers, resentment at disloyalty, or "to let off steam."

**Campaign Rallies**

Naturally the first type of rallies occurred along with campaigns for the most part. The second, more general
rallies were sporadic in occurrence, with considerable concentration at the beginning of the war before communities had learned specific ways to contribute to the war programs. The pattern of these rallies lacked the seasonal fluctuations previously observed in campaigns (fig. 3), Red Cross activities (fig. 2), or all activities (fig. 1).

Every community participated in numerous mass meetings, parades, or demonstrations in which enthusiasm was stirred for particular war enterprises. In almost every county women’s organizations had a patriotic meetings committee in which thousands of Iowa women were reached by speakers for each of the various campaigns. In many counties food conservation meetings were held in every school house. Parades were common with the campaigns, and auctions appealed particularly to the rural population as a means of raising money. In each of the drives we find organizations reaching out to thousands through mass meetings of all types. In addition to the assemblages brought together by the plans of campaign committees, audiences nominally assembled for a variety of purposes were turned into enthusiastic campaign crowds. Thus a full thousand 4-minute speakers roused Iowa’s movie audiences, church congregations, school assemblies; chautauquas drew people bent upon entertainment and enthused them for the Red Cross and Food Conservation. People not only belonged to the new organizations, financed them and attended their meetings, but they also gathered with fellow citizens en masse to cheer their work and hear of their progress. During a single Liberty Loan campaign in Sioux City, for example, 122 audiences totaling over 42,000 listeners were brought together. In Keokuk County one man made 200 war speeches and addresses. In many communities a relic train (equipped with war weapons) drew thousands of patriotic spectators who were addressed by a corps of most effective speakers. Every holiday festival became the scene for campaign promotion, and holiday festivals themselves became more widely celebrated than ever before.

Few weeks passed in which there was no mass meeting
of campaigners reported, although in general long periods of comparative inactivity were broken by weeks having great numbers of meetings. During summer months both in 1917 and 1918 campaign meetings were at the lowest ebb, following the great enthusiasm of early spring.

**General Demonstrations**

Most of these mass meetings and demonstrations were obviously a part of what we have described as "campaigning," but in fact these formed only a part of the enthusiastic get-togethers inspired by the war spirit.

There were large numbers of general patriotic rallies and demonstrations, not to further any campaign but simply to express patriotic emotion and enthusiasm. The early weeks of the war constituted a period of tremendous diffuse enthusiasm, unequalled in later months. In the first month of the war about 55 such demonstrations were reported. Not again during the course of the war did any month compare to this, and from June, 1917, until February, 1918, less than 20 were reported.

Much the same situation existed for parades, which appeared with some frequency in the early stages of the war but rapidly dropped from sight until near the end. The irregular appearance of these rallies is notable. Following the great surge of patriotism in the early weeks of the war very few demonstrations were reported until 1918. In 1918 rallies occurred at odd intervals, but they did not reach the same heights as just after the declaration.

As the war progressed virtually every Iowa community had send-off parades, banquets and mass meetings when the boys left for camp. These were not half-hearted affairs. Businesses closed, towns of a few hundred persons had literally thousands of individuals lining the streets and crammed into halls, listening to patriotic music and addresses dedicated to the departing soldiers and stimulating patriotic emotions in the hearts of youth not yet called. In about the first month of the war over 20 "send-offs" of volunteers were reported, probably a small fraction of the total number held. Following this early enthusiasm it was not until the spring of 1918 that farewells enjoyed a strong revival.
(except for the first registration week Sept. 2, 1917); in July, 1918, nearly 30 were reported in a single week.

These demonstrations had no direct utilitarian purpose. They were devoted wholeheartedly to expressing and arousing patriotic sentiments. As we have seen, it was no small part of the purpose of specific campaign rallies to inspire patriotism and sentiment as well as to attain specific purposes. But demonstrations were primarily "sentiment stimulators."

In addition to community-wide rallies and patriotic meetings, there were in every community numerous patriotic programs by and for groups smaller than the community itself. Churches, lodges, women's drill clubs, public schools and a host of others put on their own private rallies and pageants.

We have now added another group of activities to the filling picture of community effort. It becomes even more evident how widely these activities ramified throughout the community. There was sufficient opportunity for everyone to serve, sacrifice, or save for the welfare of the nation.

One who reviews the chronicle of the last war will inquire how much activity was justified, the only aim of which was to raise morale and produce patriotic sentiments? At first thought one might say that any amount of activity was justified if it united us in action, but is such an answer complete? In the last war huge sums were expended and much labor used simply to bring the war home to the people. This was a necessary task. Yet there was a difference between time and money expended directly in winning the war and money or time spent indirectly enthusing people to the work. Thus we have seen that the food pledge campaign of World War I consumed energy in making people war conscious and offering to all the belief that they were contributing. But may we ask if other programs might not have been substituted which would still have brought the war home to the community and have provided more tangible services directly toward the war effort? Certainly the same question should be faced in reference to the more emotional demonstrations without specific and tangi-
ble purpose. Time and energy are scarce commodities. In wartime they are worth budgeting. The fundamental problem is, cannot morale be built upon productive enthusiasm as well as upon random enthusiasm?

CEREMONIES, RITUALS AND SYMBOLS

The tense fervent emotions of wartime gave patriotic holidays new and greater significance, and they were observed in greater number and with more warmth of feeling. In addition to Memorial Day, Fourth of July, Flag Day, Lincoln's and Washington's birthdays, new days were added: Pershing's birthday, Liberty Day, Thrift Day. All were made occasions for affirming the purposes of the war, the sense of unity with the whole nation and its allies. They recalled the past achievements of the community and the nation. Their solemnity spiritualized the war efforts and dulled the weariness and heartache of the conflict. Common performance of patriotic rituals helped to calm feuds and bitterness where any existed within the community.

Group gatherings of all kinds, by their emotional heightening and the seriousness of their occasioning, became ceremonials. Every big campaign was launched with fêtes or a parade. National days, as Flag Day or Columbus Day, were chosen to open or close drives. Band concerts were more frequent. In short, activities and their purposes received emphasis and greater significance through becoming community ceremonies.

Symbols are the focal points of ceremonies or rituals and reminders of collective emotions. During the war traditional symbols were "polished up" and new ones created. The national flag received more reverence, and Iowa adopted a state flag. Irreverent treatment of the flag, which in peacetime might be dismissed with a warning, became a major offense. Symbols were taking on greater meaning, and reverence to them became a touchstone of loyalty. Being forced to kiss the flag was not an uncommon penalty for many real or imagined acts of disloyalty. The growing use of the flag as a rallying point for collective sentiment was evidenced in the numerous presentations of
flags to communities by loyal groups and by the phenomenal increase in the sale of flags. During a period of a week or two in April, 1917, 25,000 flags were sold in Waterloo alone, and the merchants in many towns could not meet the demand.

The national anthem shared this new status. No longer was its singing reserved for a few holidays. It became an ever present influence, awakening people to their bond of citizenship. Very early it was decreed that every school should open each day's work with the Star Spangled Banner. At the same time as the singing of the national anthem became a ritual, the singing of German songs became taboo.

Patriotic monuments, especially memorials to veterans of previous wars, became community shrines to be visited in ceremonial fashion on days of determination as well as on the one day of remembrance. By association with the sentiments of Memorial Day the flags of North and South became joint national symbols.

Other new symbols were created. Communities set up scoreboards to mark their progress in selling bonds, recruiting members for the Red Cross, collecting junk, or making bandages. Even the "slacker monuments" bearing the names of families accused of disloyalty were, by reverse symbolism, marks of pride to the other members of the community. Those communities which were unusually successful in various campaigns won honor flags.

Even the humblest citizen, when in uniform, could represent the whole community to itself. Returned wounded soldiers impressed the folks at home with the need for renewed effort and greater sacrifice. Welcoming these men home became a new ceremonial occasion.

Public leaders received greater deference as political party lines were minimized. Demands for loyalty led to many charges of making statements derogatory to the president, the army, or our Allies.

Enjoying reflected prestige from its association with the national emblem, the service flag also stood high in its own right within the group of patriotic symbols. Soon after men began leaving their homes in large numbers the service
flag began to appear in homes, churches, businesses and schools. A star for every soldier, with other symbols for nurses and welfare workers, symbolized the bodily sharing of that family or group in the dangers of war. These flags were dedicated with all the pageantry of religion and patriotism. Their poignancy increased as blue stars became gold, and as the casualty lists lengthened, memorial services became an increasingly important ritual of community life. The role of such ceremonies in softening the bereavement of families can hardly be overestimated.

Finally, among the symbols and ritual acts should be included the insistence upon the use of English and resentment at any use of foreign speech. The common traditional language was inevitably affirmed as a necessity for loyalty. Not merely German, but also the language of our “foreign speaking” Allies was tabooed. Communities with names like “Berlin” or “Little Germany” changed overnight into “Lincolns” or “Liberty Corners.” Families of “Stagewalds and Petzelhoffers became “Stags” and “Huffs.”

No one could deny that these rituals were of profound importance in building community and national spirit; and it would involve many pages to complete the list of slogans, signs, songs and symbols which emerged—all focusing upon national unity and awakening pride in our country’s achievements and honor. Not all of these symbols, however, stimulated unity through pride of country; some of them turned upon hatred of our enemies. The pictures of tortured children became symbols of a German mentality and served to unify us by hate just as the glorious symbols of America unified us in love and sacrifice. All these symbols and slogans stirring our emotions of pride, fear, hatred and loyalty combined with the unceasing campaigns and the huge rallies to bring out the contributions upon which winning the war so closely depended.

ATTITUDES AND SENTIMENTS IN THE COMMUNITY IN WARTIME

No people, however Spartan, could be expected to send their sons to battlefields, their daughters to distant factories, their life savings into armaments with utter coolness,
without tinges of regret, fear, and perhaps hate. War situations are inevitably emotional because they reach into those basic spheres of our lives and our community relations which are the dearest and about which we center our strongest hopes. Behind and within external affairs, as well as growing out of the community events, were attitudes and sentiments. Moreover, many of the regretted happenings of wartime, as persecution of “pro-Germans,” arose from confusion of attitudes with objective actions. We must understand both of these sides of life, the external and the internal, if we would understand the community in wartime and profit from the lessons of 1917-18.

**THE FOCUS OF ATTITUDES AND ATTENTION UPON THE WAR**

To say that all attention turned to war, threatened or actual, seems too obvious perhaps to mention. Its importance, however, warrants description in abundant detail. This shift of focus occurred slowly and had been underway during the pre-war period of tension. Only gradually did people realize how pervasive the war’s effects could be, how comprehensive the changes in daily life must be. The war-orientation of thought and feeling went on more quickly in some groups or communities or spheres of living than in others. But the dominant motive of “win the war” became the measure for judging private lives, public programs and all activities in the community.

The readjustment of attitudes and ideals took place both individually and collectively. Individuals reflected on whether they or some member of their family must join the army, whether their business might profit or suffer, whether they should still plan to marry, how to adjust their peaceful religious or ethical standards to approve or tolerate war, what topics of conversation could be pursued without alienating or grieving friends, and how to show sufficient patriotism.

Every group also re-evaluated its goals and activities in the light of new demands, as we have shown. That all these reflections and attitudes did not exist in a vacuum should be sufficiently evident from the facts already discussed.

Gradually the feeling of being hypnotized by the magni-
tude and significance of the war separated into many particular objects of attention and into a corresponding complexity of attitudes.

**THE SPIRIT OF SACRIFICE**

One of the most clear-cut attitudes focused upon "the spirit of sacrifice." While in normal times people were not lacking in a social sense or civic responsibility, nonetheless it was accepted as proper that each family lived for its own ends for the most part. In war they were forced and also willingly admitted the need for sacrifice. In varying degrees people renounced private indulgences and conceded the necessity of giving up anything required to win the war. Not all saw this urgency equally clearly or as quickly as others. Some tried to evade the responsibility society imposed. This variation in quickness of response frequently created a tendency to be more critical of others' sacrifices than of one's own. Of course this submergence of individual and personal goals to public necessity did not come, as is sometimes supposed, automatically with the declaration of war. It came by dint of building, by participating in rallies and campaigns, and out of the very sacrifices and services themselves.

The Federal Government and, in turn, the separate communities invented ways to equalize sacrifice and to convince each person that all were sharing the privations. Among the methods of demonstrations used were publication of retail and wholesale prices, so that consumers could see that their grocers were not profiteering, and the use of quotas limiting the amount of sugar or white flour anyone could buy.

Sacrifices generally reflected an attitude of almost light-hearted generosity and willingness. "In a small county neighborhood in Linn County a Red Cross auction was in process when the auctioneer, pausing at the end of a 'knock-down' happened to glance upward and see a flock of wild ducks flying overhead. Before the ducks were out of sight they had been sold for $345. [The Red Cross] stated its expectation of hearing that clouds and square yards of blue sky were being sold for the Red Cross in Iowa." But as campaign followed campaign many communities felt at-
attitudes of "obligation" or fear of public opinion or other
more somber moods coming into view. The evolution of
the spirit of sacrifice into a demand that sacrifice be uni-
versal and equal (relative to ability to contribute) was well
illustrated by the shift in giving to the Welfare Campaigns
or subscribing to Liberty Loans from a haphazard, volun-
tary basis to one resembling compulsory taxation.

"Taxation giving" with its quotas, assessments, "slacker
courts" and the publicity devices such as Red Cross 100 per-
cent flags were expressions of the determination to be sure
everyone gave, and to assure everyone that his neighbors
also had "done their bit." This plan achieved its purpose
in general, though many resented the compulsion and the
undermining of the generosity motive. How to equate
families having sons in the army with those not so directly
touched by war demands was a serious problem.

But all the sincere efforts to set the demands at a level
fair to each group in society did not prevent some inequl-
ities in effect, however equal quotas might appear on paper.
In part the trouble was that the minimum limits of giving
were set too high. The requirement, which was apparently
general, that every family buy at least one $50 bond im-
posed a disproportionate burden on the majority of laborers
whose incomes were being depleted by rising prices faster
than they grew from wage increases. Even when these
subscriptions were wholly voluntary, they were frequently
too heavy. In addition the small subscriptions to the Red
Cross or benefits of various kinds made the total still larger.
Finally, the Victory Boy and Girl organizations and the
War Savings Stamp assessments on children were an acute
embarrassment to large numbers of children and families.
The reports of charity societies reiterate the plea to relax
these drafts on low incomes, since they forced welfare
agencies to increase family allotments, as well as forcing
families onto relief.

There was remarkably little complaint over the inequali-
ties, although the rising level of demands as war continued
did push some people close to the point of rebellion. This
feeling came to the surface in the fifth or Victory Loan
drive in 1919.
"In this (fifth) campaign the excuse, 'I have already done my share and more in the first four loans,' was frequently heard. . . Solicitors more frequently encountered such excuses as, 'Let the rich buy the bonds, they are the ones who have profited by the war; the wage earners and the poor have been the chief sufferers in this war...!""

But in general the desire and the necessity to serve converged in a tremendous effort of public devotion and service. The very omnipresence of service gave new significance and savor to innumerable details of daily life. Those spheres of privacy untouched also became more relished. Food habits, recreation, school attendance, temperance, preservation of health, criticism or loyalty to fellow citizens—all were defended on the basis of helping win the war.

INSISTENCE UPON UNANIMITY

It can be clearly seen that not merely did individuals or communities quite generally devote loyalty, time, energy and money to the war; they also insisted that all must affirm and demonstrate enthusiasm for national purposes. Disloyalty in deed, work, or suspected attitude was forbidden. Passive support, resigned participation, or quiet service was not enough. Outspoken assertions of faith, uninhibited enthusiasm and ostracism of any who seemed lukewarm were expected also.

Even when there was wholehearted agreement on war aims and pledged faith in the nation's leaders, it took courage to disagree honestly on the best means to use in reaching the agreed-upon goals. The need for ingenuity in efficient work and for original plans for community organization was often forgotten amidst the clamor for unity.

The decision to fight had crystallized public opinion in a rigid pattern. And the anxieties of wartime tolerated little quibbling or hesitating. As war emotion rose, the demand increased for a common front. And from intolerance arose propaganda, coercion and persecution as well as unity in feeling and striving.

The cries of loyalty sometimes became shrill. There were demands for punishment of reluctant givers or for making an example of those who spoke German or perhaps voiced their suspicions that some welfare agency was inefficiently
managed. One Iowa official demanded a 20-year prison term for anyone not supporting the war program. These lusty cries for vengeance or heated protestations of patriotism sometimes reached such a pitch that they were hysterical.

**DISLOYALTY**

*The Time-Pattern of Disloyalty*

We have given the impression in our narration up to this point, that community solidarity increased with the increase in war work. But it would not be correct to assume that in loyal Iowa communities there were no conflicts of wills and beliefs.

While there were relatively few actual cases of genuine disloyalty, the accusations were legion. Many such charges grew out of spite feuds, misunderstood remarks by persons of German descent, and carping criticisms by temperamental rebels who in deed if not in word were wholly loyal.

The conflicts of individuals and minority groups with their communities were shown in two principal ways: (1) by symbolic acts affronting the honor of national symbols, such as flags, or insults to leaders; and (2) by actions or inertia not consistent with what the community expected as full cooperation in war programs.

While the symbolic acts were dramatic and linger in our minds, these were relatively few in Iowa. We have, of course, numerous accounts of German sympathisers tearing down flags or failing to stand to the national anthem, but most of these occurred soon after war was declared, and comparatively few such cases arose later in the war period. External conformity came rather quickly. Verbal insults included not only such statements as “wishing the president were dead” and jokes about the appearance of parading troops but also any criticisms of leaders or policies which were resented by the community. These offenses occurred rather steadily throughout the war.

Opposition to the war or to the draft was a type of offense sometimes consisting only of grumblings, at other

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* A sidelight on this attitude toward flags is to be found in the complaint in one city several months after the war began that most of the flags visible around town were tattered and neglected.
times actual speeches or organized criticism. This kind of disloyalty also was a persistent event over the whole period. The few desertions and individual draft evaders are not included in the data.

Spy cases were negligible in number in Iowa, as were cases of sabotage. But open pro-Germanism, organizing meetings to support Germany or to help persons loyal to Germany, were reported almost every week. Most of the accusations were probably false, but some outspoken expressions of unwillingness to help America fight Germany did occur. Significantly, these more direct cases (or charges) of aid to the enemy increased after the first surge of rallies at the opening of the war and after the early campaigns of 1918. This problem was certainly of no less magnitude in 1918 than in 1917.

More serious than insults or open sympathy with the enemy, if we may measure seriousness by frequency of newspaper items, were conflicting sentiments over participation in various patriotic programs. Those persons who failed to buy their share of Liberty Bonds, those who did not join the Red Cross, those who hoarded sugar or flour, and the profiteers were the people who brought forth most of the bitter accusations in Iowa. No one can say how many of these disloyal acts were disloyal in intent and how many were due to ignorance or were merely selfish. It is noteworthy that these kinds of offenses were almost lacking in 1917 but increased in 1918.

The enforcement division of the Iowa Food Administration handled about 2,000 cases, but in only 500 cases were the offenders found at fault. In addition many hundreds, probably thousands, of other violations or accusations were disposed of at the county level. How frequently personal grudges, or jealous competitors, rather than bonafide misdeeds brought public censure upon the heads of innocents no one can ever know. But we do know that the mere suggestion of disloyalty could be a dangerous weapon in a war-conscious community.

Not only offenses against the numerous food regulations but also refusals to contribute to national campaigns became greater in number—or at least people become more
conscious of them—as the war progressed. During the first 6 months of the war, only one refusal to give in a campaign was reported; in the second 6 months the number increased to more than 50, and in the final 7 months there were about 125 cases reported. While these reports are in no sense complete enumerations, they certainly indicate no complete unanimity as the war progressed. In part at least the increase in refusals to contribute reflected the heightened demand for more contributions. The wider adoption of forced contributions certainly produced some of this increase. More refusals might well have been expected as the drives reached more and more people. This does not account entirely for the increasing number of refusals, since the last month of the war did not have an outstanding number of campaigns, yet it had the largest number of refusals to contribute. Even though total contributions grew tremendously as the war progressed, dissatisfaction and refusal to sacrifice also became more evident, or at least became increasingly serious in the eyes of most citizens so as to warrant increasing publicity.

Suppression of Disloyalty

Sedition cases increased with the passing of time. But anti-sedition activities remained at about the same level in both years. Disloyal acts were met by defensive acts by citizens and officials. Sometimes, however, the fear of disloyalty led to loyalty crusades and to accusations of disloyalty. In August, 1917, for example, a United States marshall visited 20 towns and issued mass warnings to the citizens.

Publicity, with fear of public opinion, was the chief weapon for insuring conformity among the wavering, and for enforcing regulations. This fact evidenced the strength of public sentiment. The mere possibility of having one's business ruined or one's children mistreated was a real check to some who honestly believed they knew a better policy as well as to the outright pro-Germans.

The destruction of German books and the prohibition of the use of German in public or its teaching in the schools were widely regarded as essential to national unity and ef-
fective prosecution of the war. Yet it is surprising to notice that these three defensive policies were not used to any great extent before 1918 with the partial exception of disapproval of the use of German in public. This taboo on foreign languages worked much hardship on older people who had learned no English and on church congregations whose pastors could not preach in English. Many parochial schools were closed by necessity or as a precaution. There were occasional purgings of school and public libraries.

The minute-man tradition of an American citizen militia expressed itself in the organization of men's drill corps which were frequently used to patrol towns, protecting them from sabotage. At irregular intervals local home guards were organized to replace the militia called into federal service. Women in some communities also organized in military companies, probably more as a gesture.

Sentiment and public opinion were sufficiently powerful in most communities to bring into line nearly all the persons who were disloyal in feeling as well as those who did not serve or sacrifice as generously as the community desired. But wartime emotion was impatient. Not every community relied on neighborhood gossip to check up on the loyalty of citizens. In one city the Liberty Riders were a self-appointed secret group to spy out the seditious. All were warned in these terms: "The Liberty Riders are scattered in all parts of the city. Your next door neighbor might be one." Such procedures for dealing with the problem hardly conformed to the American standards of legality and freedom of speech.

Feeling was sufficiently strong in many communities to cause extra-legal "courts" to be set up and their decisions carried out on those found guilty of not doing their share—or what the "court" decided should be their share. In some communities wise leaders foresaw the problems and established the courts or service appeal boards deliberately to head off mob action. There were numerous genuinely heroic acts by conscientious leaders trying to preserve democratic ways of acting. Where these courts were well planned and fairly administered few citizens long resented the decisions rendered, and irresponsible mob action was
prevented. In other communities local tyrants or overly zealous patriots operated their "courts" in less humane fashion and created community factions which are reported to persist today as obstacles to public cooperation. That some of these "courts" departed far from the rules of justice is indicated by the story of a county bar association resolving to defend no one accused of sedition. Communities became more sensitive to the presence of non-cooperators as the war continued.

The operation of these "courts" was closely linked to the development of compulsory donation, which has been described already. Many communities set up card files of all residents in which were recorded each individual's wealth, income, previous donations and current quota. If anyone refused to give, his name was entered on a pink card, and he received a summons to the "court." By contrast, a reported 20,000 income tax evaders received scant attention.

Houses were painted yellow to warn their owners to be more patriotic. Stores were treated similarly. Flags were nailed to suspected homes or churches. A few houses and barns and at least one church were burned as extreme marks of community displeasure. Men were doused with yellow paint. A few ministers of the gospel were forbidden to leave their homes or to preach without the express permission of the local defense committee.

The publishing of names of non-contributors and the building of "slacker monuments"—yellow obelisks with the names of the disloyal—in the town square were more concrete expressions of the determination to enforce the community's will on all. More such terroristic incidents would

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8 For those individuals who may think we have exaggerated the emotional mass persecutions of the war period, let us cite a few specific cases: An 82-year-old man arrested for criticizing the Red Cross; the home of an elderly war veteran painted yellow for refusing contributions to Y.M.C.A. and failure to purchase bonds; German owned store in . . . painted yellow and as owner washed off paint crowds (including mayor of city) jeered; school children forced Lutheran preacher to salute flag; high school teacher's body painted yellow because he refused to buy Savings Stamps; attorney convicted under espionage act because he stated the United States would be better off if troops had been kept at home; rural teacher fired because he could not buy bonds; postmaster's house in . . . painted yellow; Civil War veteran ejected and dismissed from soldiers' home for utterances; county sheriff unable to purchase another bond and dismissed from draft board; woman jailed for saying the government could not have her food; nine alleged pro-Germans attacked by draftees; two men injured and threatened with hanging—one gave $1000 to Red Cross and left town; town of A . . . invaded by mob from M . . . after the A . . . town hall had been refused for a loan meeting. Invaders closed all stores and forced citizens to attend a loan meeting and subscribe quota. Note that no mention has been made in this list of the innumerable cases judged and sentenced by the extra-legal "slacker courts."
have occurred but for diligent work by level-headed peace officials. In times of crisis, however, these problems usually were solved at the local level with whatever resources of leadership and objectivity were available there.

These direct procedures were defended by one outstanding patriot in these terms:

"... the American people have a power—a God-given power, a power higher and greater than the Constitution or law, the power from which the law derives its being, and the patriotic people of America have the courage to exercise that power to save the government, to save the Flag, and to save the law itself from destruction at home as well as abroad."

Such sentiments, as most citizens decided in later and calmer years, were exactly the terms always used to justify lynch-law—even if few people in 1917 would have approved using such extreme measures with less patriotic fellow citizens. But the widespread approval at the time of similar feelings and the frequent occurrence of illegal treatment of slackers does show how formidable a problem responsible leaders faced. Many leaders recognized quite clearly that the preservation of the things we were fighting for depended upon moderation and the preservation of respect for judicial procedures.

As the numerous county councils of defense became organized they tended to take over this policing function. Wider use of the county council, card index files and "courts" all were parts of an increasingly efficient and centralized local organization for civilian war work.

**OTHER TYPES OF EMOTIONALISM**

Still another characteristic result of emotionalism in World War I was increased suggestibility. In those times of tension rumors spread like fire, people wanted to know something definite, to believe something specific, instead of waiting upon the course of events. Rumor and even panic could spread with great rapidity. In part this type of mentality was purposely created in the last war "thus

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*Some readers may wish to argue that the instances of irresponsible mob action which occurred during the war were merely temporary flare-ups with no long-run significance. Aside from their importance in themselves, these wartime actions probably were not unrelated to the Ku Klux Klan episodes in the early 20's.*
placing them in a receptive mood for most anything,” in part it was a product of the waiting and the tenison itself, for the people back home had to struggle with their hopes and fears as the soldiers battled in physical combat. Thus in Iowa the rumor that draft numbers had been chosen (a rumor abroad sometime before the lottery occurred) brought within a space of minutes great crowds on the streets of Des Moines. From the moment the rumor originated it spread through the city and through the state as fast as the modern radio could have carried the word. People wanted to stop waiting—because they wanted to know, they believed too easily.

Many citizens sincerely believed that most of the severe fires were set by enemy agents and that doctors were inoculating soldiers with flu germs. Woman after woman reported finding ground glass in canned food. The fact that chemists proved the ground glass was only sugar or salt did not keep the rumor from springing up again and again. Itinerant peddlars were arrested for selling “poisoned” medicine. The atmosphere of war bred suspicion, superstition and legend, and a significant part of leaders’ time was devoted to persuading people to return to calmer paths of steady work and saner thinking.

This problem of leadership in the sphere of sentiment was indeed large. To fight modern wars requires the cultivation of fervent patriotism and—some would argue—even hatred of the enemy. But when these strong emotions “spill over” they create community feuds, and they are distorted into persecution of innocent citizens. They lead to innumerable distractions from the real tasks of war activity. This situation also gives license to irresponsible persons to start attacks on disliked officials, group leaders or neighbors. The very emotionalism of war festers many existing points of tension in community life and prevents wholehearted cooperation.

The programs of German hatred launched in many communities through atrocity stories, cartoons and “photographs” held implications unseen by their promoters. Hatred may inspire winning armies, but it also inspires demands for retribution at the cost of world order.
THE GROWTH OF COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY

Increasing community solidarity was not an accident but an achievement. There were serious obstacles in Iowa to obtaining the kind of results demanded by modern war. Iowa had a large German population, some of whom were not sympathetic to the war. The state was located far from the East with its ties to Europe and its alarms of attack from the sea. It also had a scattered, rural population unaccustomed to campaigns and centralized organization. And farmers by long tradition viewed bonds as poor investments.

There is no way of testing whether more or fewer people disliked the war and all it involved as time passed, or whether the average degree of loyalty increased or decreased. The growing number of violations of food regulations might indicate either less loyalty or the increased number of regulations and a greater determination to enforce them evenly. The increase in accusations of disloyal acts of many kinds was probably in large part a reflection of the rising temper of opinion. More refusals to contribute to campaigns surely reflected higher quotas and better organization for soliciting everyone at least as much as they reflected greater reluctance. In short, community opinion was becoming strong enough to overwhelm those who would object.

New organizations and more work done by more organizations as described earlier are evidence of the Iowa community's growing results. If we take a measure of accomplishment the things Iowans could best do by training and situation, there certainly was a great increase in food production and at least some in food conservation. The Extension Service did notable work in bringing Iowa farmers to reach the high production goals set by the Food Administration. In spite of the fact that 50,000 farm men were called for military service, farm production was increased a full 25 percent above preceding years. It is estimated that home demonstration agents led to the canning of more than 15 million additional quarts of fruit and vegetables.

If the test of solidarity was results, then the rising total of campaign subscriptions showed that Iowa communities
were learning to work together to help win the war. Only 60,000 Iowans bought bonds of the first loan, but state pride and better organization enrolled 288,000 subscribers to the second, and 660,000 for the third loan. For the fourth 648,000 persons subscribed. Out of 99 counties, only 12 reached their quotas in the first drive, 48 in the second, 99 in the third, but only 87 in the fourth. Increases of four- and five-fold in the amounts subscribed were not unusual between early and later drives. One county raised 12 percent of its quota in the first, 26 percent in the second, and 412 percent in the third loan drive. The failures in early campaigns often gave the needed incentive for achieving the needed intensification and coordination of effort.

In countless other ways the rising tide of community spirit and loyalty were evidenced. Iowa communities vied for the honor of sending the most recruits to the services, they disputed over the number of gardens their citizens maintained and over successes in various war campaigns. Indictment of a community as disloyal brought forth strong assertions of its united patriotism. Community pride took on new importance.

But this sensitiveness to disloyalty had the effect also of suppressing originality. When in a war situation programs and activities are not to be criticized, a community may easily thwart original thinking which might have merit and usefulness. It is conceivable that had Iowa communities not been so intolerant of those who repudiated certain campaigns we might more quickly have learned better procedures. But if the community can hear no word of criticism, constructive thinking is as dangerous to the thinker as destructive thinking. War demands new ideas in community life as well as in armaments, and by availing ourselves of strong arm methods of suppression we lost some of the all-important power of adaptability.10 When the community sentiment became so strong that critical discussion of means of reaching our goals was taboo and “un-American,” we sacrificed some of our possibilities of increased efficiency.

10 Perhaps one could say that if the non-Partisan League had not been suppressed in Iowa during the war and if its proposals had been accepted for modification by the leaders of Iowa agriculture, the adjustments during the 20’s and early 30’s could have been attained more easily and at less social cost.
THE CONVERGENCE OF THE SEPARATE THEMES

Gradually, with time and struggle and organization and success, the threads of community life were becoming knit together into a clearer pattern of organization, sentiment, unity in service and sacrifice—the community in wartime. All the organizational programs and efforts to serve, the rallies and campaigns and ceremonies, the attitudes of devotion to the nation, the insistent pleas and demands for equality of sacrifice, all the pressures of public opinion and the devices for overpowering the weakly patriotic—all phases of service, sentiment and sacrifice which have been portrayed in this study moved spasmodically but certainly toward a unified plan of organization and a unity of feeling.

One of the most important results of this tendency was that many American communities came to look upon themselves for the first time as real, coherent, total communities, no longer little more than an aggregate of individuals and special groups. Every community became more conscious of itself. The community saw itself in the mirror of the nation's striving as a cooperating group, living together, and destined to a common fate, privileged as well as obliged to work together for a common goal.

PREPARING THE IOWA COMMUNITY FOR THE WAR EMERGENCY

RECOMMENDATIONS TO IOWA COMMUNITIES

From the experiences of participation in the war of 1917-18 it is possible to draw out many suggestions to guide community leaders and citizens in the present effort. Each reader may see for himself many lessons implied in the picture presented in preceding pages. The authors, with their detailed knowledge of the materials, believe the usefulness of this review will be greater if they also indicate the main conclusions which they obtain from the facts presented.

It is recognized that the following general recommendations would have to be modified when applied to any particular community. Not every suggestion would be equally important in each case. But the following general lines of action impress us as being feasible for consideration now.
Additional policies will be developed as the situation unfolds. The new circumstances and public agencies which have developed since the last war will modify the specific application of the program set forth. But these modifications do not invalidate the practical appropriateness of these recommendations. Special arrangements would be called for in communities affected by the presence of camps or munitions plants.

1. **Review the Work of the Particular Community in the Last War.**

   Historical records, newspaper files, organization reports, letters and memoirs of persons who served as leaders are sources of material for this purpose. The story of outstanding achievements will show how much can be accomplished with unified effort. It is also especially important, in approaching the new crisis, to be informed of the weak spots of former programs in order to plan effective means of avoiding similar difficulties and errors. Leaders may thus foresee many of the special problems which their community will face in the present crisis.

2. **Organize a Local Integrating Council on a Community Basis.**

   Intelligent coordination is the key to strong programs. The local committee should be truly representative of the community with all its important groups and organizations. Not merely towns, not farmers only, not just a few special interest groups enjoying high prestige or power should make up this committee. All of the areas and activities in which people participate in the life of the community should be brought together.

   On the evidence of our study we suggest that this committee should differ in structure and function from many of the county councils of defense set up for the last war.

   (a) The body should directly represent local organizations and not have its leadership depend upon outside appointments.

   (b) It should be set up as far as possible on a genuine community basis in addition to the usual county basis. Necessarily, there will be linkages with county civilian defense boards.
(c) This integrating group should not be responsible directly for campaigns, but rather for coordinating them.

(d) In order to avoid overlapping and scattering of energies, this committee should maintain a calendar of local civilian war activities. Thus it can be possible to stop, postpone, or initiate campaigns and projects to prevent overlapping and ineffective utilization of time and resources.

(e) It should serve as an effective clearing house and regulatory and advisory bureau for all civilian war activities carried on locally. Outside organizers and agencies should operate with the express recognition and counsel of this board.

(f) It would be advisable for this council to seek and accept the advice and services of professional consultants working on county, state, or national levels. These specialists in organization and personnel problems are available in the Extension Service, government bureaus, state colleges and special organizations, as the Red Cross.

3. Special Sub-Committees Should Be Set up as Branches of the Council to Handle Those Problems Which Will Certainly Be Troublesome in the Coming Crisis.

(a) Committee on equitable assessments and contributions.

We may expect that a new war will bring with it the necessity of large-scale voluntary contribution to campaigns and programs. Community quotas, and perhaps individual quotas, will probably appear. If a contribution or assessment policy, adapted to the particular community, can be devised before the war campaigns appear, many of the inequalities and unfortunate pressures exerted on loyal citizens may be avoided. This committee would not be an enforcing agency, but rather a device for orderly and equitable collection of funds whatever the specific program.

(b) Committee on disloyal behavior.

This group would have as its function the prevention and treatment of non-criminal charges of seditious or disloyal behavior; it would hear complaints against citizens and would cooperate with peace officers in cases of serious consequence. No other extra-legal court, vigilante, or protective associations should be tolerated. It is suggested
that several members of this committee be elderly, well-known and respected residents of the community who might explain situations to ill-informed objectors. Unquestionably, ignorance rather than malice was at the root of a large proportion of "sedition" charges in 1917-18 and also unpatriotic acts themselves. Kindly explanations would in the long run gain more lasting cooperation among the misinformed or suspicious than immediate publication and branding as "slackers." Even in time of war "secret police" and "mob courts" are extremely disruptive methods of controlling a democratic community.

It is further suggested that this committee, if the situation warrants it, have in its membership "ambassadors" to send to nearby communities which are allegedly disloyal. If such emissaries could themselves be loyal German-American Iowans they might even better instill patriotism into the hearts of doubters. Certainly the dispatching of "real folks" into such areas of potential difficulty to counsel, suggest and assist, would be far superior, in nearly every instance, to tactless mass warnings by the secret service or U. S. marshalls. It should be understood that local and state peace officers would transfer all complaints, except those of criminal nature, to this committee.

(c) Committee on public forums.

This group would organize, plan and publicize community forums and discussions on topics relating to defense or the war, and the kind of peace "this" community would like to see. Such an organization might assist notably in the prevention of mass hysterics and in stimulating critical thinking and post-war planning at a time when these are most difficult and most needed. This committee also might well act as an intermediary through which citizens would feel free to criticize constructively specific aspects of both local and national programs.

(d) Committee on standards.

This committee would cooperate with national programs, such as the Red Cross, involving work by local persons, although it would in no sense replace the enforcement of standards by those organizations. It would serve as a stimulator of quality by offering rewards or honors as well as
the usual emblems for quantity. It would interpret and help maintain the specific requirements of different programs in the local community.

4. **Survey Local Leadership.**

A canvas of present and previous leaders, professional and specialist help available, and particularly of individuals who have not but could serve as leaders, would be of great value. We may expect again that leaders will be attracted out of local communities, and it is desirable to begin recruiting new leadership. Medical service, especially, should be studied in order to plan new arrangements to utilize the remaining doctors and nurses most efficiently.

5. **List Local Organizations Available for Civilian War Work.**

A census of organizations and groups should be made and their special qualifications for service tabulated in order that new programs or activities may be allocated quickly and the various organizational resources most effectively utilized. Existing organizations, properly integrated, are more effective than the creation of new organizations with each war program.

6. **Prepare Plans to Minimize Slumps in War Work.**

Spurts of enthusiasm and periods of low activity should be expected in local war work. Special planning to forestall vacation slumps should be made, adapted to the character of each community. It should also be recognized that the enthusiasm of "society" leaders as initiators of activity will likely subside into ineffectiveness unless programs they begin are taken up by the community.

7. **Protect Necessary Regular Peacetime Programs Against Unnecessary Interruptions from War Work.**

We should recognize that some institutions and organizations have essential functions apart from "winning the war." Let us remember that education, for example, must be continued in spite of the need for "peach pit collections," or farm labor. Of special danger is the introduction of emotionalism into the school system. The fleeting emotions and suspicion of wartime may well leave life-long impressions upon the child who is, we trust, preparing for a life of more normal thoughts and actions.
8. Attempt to Keep Emotionalism Within Bounds.

Everyone recognizes that morale must be built and sustained. But it is advisable to scrutinize the methods used to arouse enthusiasm. We can have campaigns which put people into the mood to accept anything; but the success of such unrestrained efforts would also create greater susceptibility to false rumor, vicious gossip and mob violence. These acts take away the life breath of democracy and prevent constructive thinking in the community. We can arouse enthusiasm by methods which build on love for country and community as well as by hatred of the foe. Morale may be built upon symbols of hate or symbols of patriotism and wider loyalty. We should have learned that use of hate prevents wise planning for the new period of peace.


Consideration should be given to a Red Cross organization plan utilized so successfully in one county that intercommunity jealousies were practically eliminated. Instead of permitting one town in the county to hold the Red Cross charter for the area—thus making other communities subsidiary to it—this plan called for a chartered county-wide committee to which all towns were subsidiaries. This plan would be equally usable for other organizations.

In contests between organizations and communities for achievement, let public stimulants be directed toward the goal and its achievement rather than toward outdoing others. The emphasis given by leaders can do much to foster or prevent the emergence of conflict out of wholesome competition or rivalry.


While circumstances will undoubtedly necessitate many modifications, there are distinct advantages in advance “blue prints.” Tensions are psychologically unfavorable to comprehensive planning. The crisis necessitates immediate action, and time which ought to be spent on planning is then needed for direct service. Plans, objectives and war aims reached under calmer circumstances may later provide a sober measuring rod for new policies and actions dictated by later war emotions.