The purpose of this paper is to understand whether interjurisdictional property rights discrimination may be an impetus for civil war. I begin with an overview of literature on property rights, property rights regimes, and property rights discrimination. I then discuss the concepts of interjurisdictional and intrajurisdictional property rights discrimination. I suggest my theory that interjurisdictional property rights discrimination creates costs for discrimination losers from other jurisdictions. These costs affect expectations regarding relative gains, which may lead to discontent and transjurisdictional political violence.

For empirical analysis, I analyze the jurisdictionally bifurcated property rights regime regarding slavery that existed between free and slave states in antebellum America. I assess the importance of the labor resource (slaves) to the Southern economy, the nature and costs of the jurisdictionally bifurcated property rights regime that developed regarding property rights in that resource, and how conflict over property rights in slaves spilled into secession and civil war. I conclude by drawing together the main points and the mechanism by which interjurisdictional property rights discrimination may serve as an impetus for civil war.