

## Research Note

### **Politics and Bipartisanship at the Water's Edge: A Note on Bush and Clinton\***

---

James M. McCormick, *Iowa State University*  
Eugene R. Wittkopf, *Louisiana State University*  
David M. Danna, *Louisiana State University*

*This research extends an earlier study of the bipartisan and political perspectives for evaluating congressional-executive relations on foreign policy to cover the Bush administration and the first Clinton term. As expected, the end of the Cold War accelerated the decline of bipartisanship and accentuated the continuing relevance of the political perspective. The level of bipartisan accord was relatively low during both administrations, particularly compared with other administrations since 1947. Ideological and partisan divisions occurred during both presidencies, with the former more pronounced under Bush and the latter under Clinton. Whether control of the presidency and Congress was divided or unified also bears on our findings, as each eroded bipartisanship in different ways. Divided government undermined bipartisanship by heightening ideological differences, while unified government contributed to its erosion by fostering partisan divisions.*

*James M. McCormick is Professor of Political Science at Iowa State University and author of the forthcoming third edition of American Foreign Policy and Process.*

*Eugene R. Wittkopf is R. Downs Poindexter Professor of Political Science at Louisiana State University and author of Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (1990), among other works.*

*David M. Danna is a doctoral candidate in Political Science at Louisiana State University.*

\*The authors thank Diane D. Lenoir and the staff of the Text Processing Center in the College of Arts and Sciences at Louisiana State University for their assistance in data preparation. Data and documentation necessary to reproduce the results are available from the authors.

In earlier research, we outlined two competing perspectives for evaluating congressional-executive relations on foreign policy.<sup>1</sup> According to the bipartisan perspective, congressional-executive relations would be relatively harmonious: policymaking would generally be the product of cooperation and accord between Congress and the president and would exhibit a high degree of agreement, largely consistent with the president's wishes. According to the political perspective, relations between the legislative and executive branches would be relatively conflictual: foreign policy would be subject to partisan and ideological divisions, and the outcome less often consistent with the president's wishes. From the former perspective, politics stops at the water's edge; from the latter, it does not.

Our analysis of congressional foreign policy voting from 1947 through 1988 revealed that the political perspective generally applied throughout the period, while the bipartisan perspective was applicable principally during the first two decades following World War II. We also found that the Vietnam conflict—widely believed to have exacerbated political divisions on foreign policy—did somewhat reduce the degree of bipartisanship but was not “a watershed in postwar American bipartisanship.”<sup>2</sup> In combination with other changes at home, particularly within the Congress itself, Vietnam did, however, contribute to a further shift from bipartisanship to partisan and ideological divisions on foreign policy, which persisted into the 1980s.<sup>3</sup>

This note extends our earlier research to include the Bush and Clinton administrations, asking whether congressional-executive bipartisanship has continued to decline and partisan and ideological rancor to increase with the end of the Cold War. We also ask whether the (apparently temporary) end of divided government in 1993-1994 raises new questions about the applicability of these competing models.

## **I. After the Cold War: Increased Partisan and Ideological Rancor?**

For several complementary reasons we expect even greater support for the political perspective during the Bush and Clinton administrations.

1. James M. McCormick and Eugene R. Wittkopf, “Bipartisanship, Partisanship, and Ideology in Congressional-Executive Foreign Policy Relations, 1947-1988,” *Journal of Politics*, 52 (1990): 1077-1100.

2. McCormick and Wittkopf, “Bipartisanship, Partisanship, and Ideology,” p. 1097.

3. Cf. James Meernik, “Presidential Support in Congress: Conflict and Consensus on Foreign and Defense Policy,” *Journal of Politics*, 55 (1993): 569-87.

First, the end of the Cold War removed the ready guide for responding to events that had promoted bipartisanship, affording members of Congress and presidents alike a wider latitude in considering foreign policy options, including a more careful consideration of their domestic ramifications. Second, the Cold War's end meant that issues other than the previously dominant security matters now crowded the agenda. These issues—including economics, the environment, and social-cultural concerns—rarely lend themselves to a unified domestic position. Even the security issues that remain on the agenda (e.g., the dangers posed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction or the emergence of ethnopolitical conflicts) do not easily evoke a common domestic response when compared with the Cold War era. Third, domestic political changes have reinforced partisan and ideological differences on foreign policy. Conservative Republicans are replacing conservative Democrats in the South, some Democrats have switched parties to enjoy a closer alignment between their political preferences and party affiliation, and moderates in both parties are seemingly fewer in number, as contentious issues increasingly polarize the parties. Without the cross-pressures between ideology and party operating on some members of Congress and without accommodative members in the middle, the prospect for bipartisanship diminishes.<sup>4</sup>

Interactions between periods of divided and unified government with the end of the Cold War confound efforts to determine the impact of the Cold War's demise on partisan and ideological rancor. Thus, we are encouraged to ask whether differences in party control of Congress and the presidency, rather than changes in the international environment, affect recent developments in congressional foreign policy voting. The Bush and first Clinton administrations encompass three distinct periods of governance: (1) From 1989 through 1992, a Republican president faced a Democratic Congress (divided government and the demise of the

4. For further discussion and analysis of the impact of the end of the Cold War, see, for example, James M. Lindsay, "Congress and Foreign Policy: Avenues of Influence," in *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed., ed. Eugene R. Wittkopf (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 191-207, esp. pp. 205-06; Jeremy D. Rosner, *The New Tug-of-War: Congress, the Executive Branch, and National Security* (Washington, DC: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995); Edward A. Kolodziej, "Foreign and Security Dimensions of the New World Order: A Challenge to American Policy," in *Post-Cold War Policy: The International Context*, ed. William Crotty (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1995), pp. 113-30; Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," *Foreign Affairs*, 75 (1996): 16-32; and Stanley Hoffmann, "In Defense of Mother Teresa: Morality in Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, 75 (1996): 172-75.

Cold War);<sup>5</sup> (2) from 1993 through 1994, a Democratic president faced a Democratic Congress (unified government and the onset of the post-Cold War era); and (3) from 1995 through 1996, a Democratic president faced a Republican Congress (a return to divided government during the post-Cold War era).

Although considerable literature exists on the domestic policy effects of divided government, little or no work specifically evaluates its impact on congressional foreign policy voting. Nonetheless, we can identify some general propositions and seek to extend them to foreign policy voting. David Mayhew contends that whether the government was divided or unified did not make much difference in foreign policy behavior during the Cold War.<sup>6</sup> Extending this view to foreign policy voting, then, the interinstitutional arrangements of governance would likely have no effect. Morris Fiorina, however, concludes differently; in his view divided government will likely lead to more partisan conflict in Congress. Drawing upon roll call analyses by Sean Kelly, Fiorina suggests that “policy agreement between the president and congressional majorities is more than 20 percent lower when the institutions are controlled by different parties,” and explains this by arguing that “under divided government, congressional majorities are loath to do anything that would enhance the president’s standing.”<sup>7</sup> Gary Cox and Samuel Kernell, too, contend that divided government has some effect, albeit a limited one. Based on their statistical analyses of congressional voting from 1933 through 1988, they conclude that divided government affects party cohesion: “House Republicans have been significantly less cohesive when their man is in the White House,” while House Democrats “do not experience a significant decline in cohesion when there is a Democratic president.”<sup>8</sup> Since the insights of Mayhew, Fiorina, and Cox and Kernell have not been directly tested for congressional foreign policy voting, we have an opportunity to probe these arguments for the differing periods of unified and divided government during the Bush and Clinton administrations.

5. Rosner, *The New Tug-of-War*, p. 6, views the years from 1989 through 1991 as “a transitional period” with the post-Cold War era beginning in January, 1992.

6. David R. Mayhew, *Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-1990* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 195-96. Mayhew reached this same conclusion for all policy areas, not just foreign affairs (p. 198). For a similar conclusion on the impact of divided government, see Charles O. Jones, *The Presidency in a Separated System* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994).

7. Morris Fiorina, *Divided Government*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1996), pp. 166-67.

8. Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell, eds., in the “Conclusions” of their *The Politics of Divided Government* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 244-45.

## II. Methods and Findings

We measure bipartisanship in two ways: (1) as the percentage of foreign-policy votes on which a majority of Democrats and Republicans agree with the president's position (Congress Index); and (2) as the percentage of agreement for each member of the House and Senate with the president's position across all foreign-policy issues in a given session of a Congress (Member Index). The Member Index (MI) differs from the Congress Index (CI) in that the unit of analysis in the former is the individual member of Congress and in the latter, Congress as a whole. These two measures of bipartisanship enable us to tap different aspects of congressional-executive relations; the MI, in particular, allows us to assess the impact of partisanship and ideology on foreign policy voting.<sup>9</sup>

As in our earlier work on bipartisanship, we examine all foreign policy votes in the Congress to assess this phenomenon. Thus, we give equal weight to all votes and do not attempt to assess the relative importance of some votes over others. We believe this is appropriate because we are interested in assessing the whole range of bipartisanship and not just some components of it (e.g., conflictual votes only).<sup>10</sup> We included all votes on foreign-policy issues in the House and Senate on which the president took a position. The presidents' positions are those reported in relevant issues of *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* or *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*. Foreign-policy issues were broadly defined to include relations with other nations, national security, foreign aid, trade, and immigration. Both authorization and appropriation votes were included. The voting data are from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) for 1989-1990, and the *Congres-*

9. We recognize that our methodology cannot capture the entire scope of congressional-executive interactions on foreign policy. On occasion, the state of these relations may instead be best captured by what is not taken up by Congress (e.g., the refusal to consider ambassadorial appointments or arms control treaties) or when the president refuses to present an issue to Congress (e.g., the use of troops in Haiti). Other methodologies would be needed to capture these dimensions. For doubts about the utility of relying solely on roll-call votes for evaluating congressional-executive relations, see James M. Lindsay and Wayne P. Steger, "The 'Two Presidencies' in Future Research: Moving Beyond Roll-Call Analysis," *Congress & the Presidency*, 20 (1993): 103-17. For a contrary viewpoint, see Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, *The President in the Legislative Arena* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 66-71.

10. One may also confine attention to different issue-areas. In James M. McCormick and Eugene R. Wittkopf, "At the Water's Edge: The Effects of Party, Ideology, and Issues on Congressional Foreign Policy Voting, 1947-1988," *American Politics Quarterly*, 20 (1992): 26-53, we found that there is comparatively little difference across dimensions of issue-voting.

*sional Quarterly Almanac*, and *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports* for the other years. (Neither the ICPSR nor the other sources bears any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations reported here, but we are grateful to each one for these data.)


Partisanship is simply whether a member of Congress is a Republican or a Democrat. Third-party members are excluded from the analysis, since there was only one member of the House (Bernard Sanders) listed as an Independent. We determined a member's ideology by grouping each member of Congress into one of three categories—conservative, moderate, or liberal—on the basis of his or her voting record as rated by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). We categorized members in relation to the mean ADA score of each chamber during each Congress. Members having ADA scores more than half a standard deviation below the mean are defined as conservatives, members having ADA scores equal to or within half a standard deviation above or below the mean are defined as moderates, and members having ADA scores more than half a standard deviation above the mean are liberals. While there is a slight overlap in our foreign policy dataset with the votes used to calculate members' ratings, our extensive recalculation of ADA scores for the 1947-1988 period reveals that the overlaps did not affect the pattern of findings.<sup>11</sup>

### *A Continuing Bipartisan Decline?*

Figure 1 shows the CI measure of bipartisanship for the Bush administration and the first Clinton term. (Tables A1-A3 in the Appendix portray the data for the figures as well as the Congress-by-Congress results for the two administrations.) Bush gained bipartisan support on 19 percent


11. For details on this recalculation of ADA scores, see McCormick and Wittkopf, "Bipartisanship, Partisanship, and Ideology," pp. 1083, 1094, and 1097. Though relying on ADA scores to measure ideology has been criticized, other studies have found that alternate measures are highly correlated with this one. See, for example, the discussion in Robert A. Bernstein, *Elections, Representation, and Congressional Voting Behavior* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1989), pp. 17-18, 65-66, 70-71, or his earlier analysis: Robert A. Bernstein and Stephen R. Horn, "Explaining House Voting on Energy Policy: Ideology and the Conditional Effects of Party and District Economic Interests," *Western Political Quarterly*, 34 (1981): 240. Also see the analysis by Eric R. A. N. Smith, Richard Herrera, and Cheryl L. Herrera, "The Measurement Characteristics of Congressional Roll-Call Indexes," *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 15 (1990): 283-95, which examines the reliability and validity of indices of ideology. Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, "Patterns of Congressional Voting," *American Journal of Political Science*, 35 (1991): 228-78, also reveal the partisan and ideological dimensions underlying congressional voting patterns.

**Figure 1.** Bipartisan Foreign-Policy Voting in the House and Senate, Bush and Clinton Administrations, 1989-96



of the foreign policy votes in the House and 29 percent in the Senate, while Clinton enjoyed bipartisan support on 27 percent in the House and 32 percent in the Senate. The scores for both administrations are substantially lower than for the presidencies of Truman through Nixon, when the average level of bipartisanship was over 40 percent in the House and usually at least 50 to 60 percent in the Senate. Further, Bush's bipartisan support in both chambers was lower than that of the other post-Vietnam administrations (Ford, Carter, and Reagan). In contrast, Clinton's bipartisan support in the House was slightly higher than that of Ford, Carter, and Reagan, but his bipartisan support in the Senate was lower than these three administrations. The CI index thus supports the contention that the bipartisan perspective has continued to recede with the Cold War's demise.

**Figure 2.** Partisan Gap in the House and Senate, Bush and Clinton Administrations, 1989-96




*A Continuing Partisan Gap?*

Figure 2 portrays the MI for the president’s party and the opposition party in the House and the Senate. The data generally reveal wider partisan differences than prevailed during the Cold War. For the Bush administration, differences between Republicans and Democrats in both chambers were nearly identical, at 34 percent and 35 percent, considerably larger than the average (20 percent) we found across all administrations from 1947 to 1988.<sup>12</sup> Still, the gaps for Bush are generally consistent with the partisan differences evident in the Reagan administration. For the Clinton administration, the partisan gap is slightly narrower in the House (22 percent) than in the Senate (34 percent). The latter gap is thus generally in line with the Bush results, but the former is closer to the

12. McCormick and Wittkopf, “Bipartisanship, Partisanship, and Ideology,” p. 1089.

**Figure 3.** Partisanship and Ideology in the House and Senate, Bush and Clinton Administrations, 1989-96



average gap across the Truman through Reagan administrations.<sup>13</sup> On balance, these results suggest that partisan loyalties have remained intact as we have entered the post-Cold War era, ensuring that partisan divisions remain wide as well.

*Waning Ideological Divisions?*

Figure 3 shows the ideological breakdown on the Member Index for conservatives, moderates, and liberals, controlling for the president's party

13. These gaps remain about the same for each of the two Bush Congresses, although the 102nd Senate has a partisan gap of 41 percent. For the two Clinton Congresses, the gaps are

and the opposition party. What is striking is how much ideology matters in accounting for foreign policy voting patterns during the Bush administration, but how little it explains in Clinton's.

Bush received most of his support from conservatives, less support from moderates, and the least support from liberals across both parties and in both chambers, ideological patterns consistent with the Cold War years. The Clinton administration displays ideological patterns only in the Senate. Conservatives, moderates, and liberals among House Democrats provided roughly equal levels of support. Among Republicans, conservatives and moderates provided roughly the same levels of support, but those levels were lower (by more than 20 percent) than among Democrats with similar ideological labels. (No liberal Republicans were identified by our coding method.) In the Senate, the patterns of ideological support and opposition are more identifiable. Liberals in both parties provide the most support and conservatives the least. The effects of party can be detected in that the magnitude of difference between the comparable ideological groups in each party ranges from 7 percent among liberals to 31 percent among conservatives (see Table A-3). Thus, the ideological disposition of the Republican members of Congress affected their foreign policy voting during the Clinton administration, but ideological differences among Democrats did not alter their comparatively sustained foreign policy support.

### **The Relative Impact of Party and Ideology**

Analysis of variance (ANOVA) techniques enable us to complete a more thorough-going test of the political perspective.<sup>14</sup> Using the Member Index as the dependent variable and party and ideology as predictors, we find that, with one exception, both explanatory variables are statistically significant (see Table I). The House during the Clinton administration is the exception, as ideology is not significant. The explanatory power of the two predictors is substantial, with 73 to 81 percent of the variance

---

wider in the 104th Congress (36 and 39 in the House and Senate, respectively), but narrower in the 103rd Congress (8 and 28, respectively).

14. Since the intercorrelations between partisanship and ideology (using the ADA scores, not the three-part classifications) for both administrations are quite high (.8 or better), we ran regressions to determine the separate impact of party and ideology. The results generally mirror those reported in the ANOVA with both predictors in the analysis. The separate ideology regressions explain more variance than the party regressions for the Bush administration. For the Clinton administration, the separate party regressions explain more variance than the separate ideology regressions in the House, but the two are nearly identical in the Senate (ideology  $R^2 = .72$ , party  $R^2 = .69$ ).

accounted for in three of the four analyses (but only 37 percent in the other).

The results in Table I reveal somewhat different patterns in the two administrations. During the Bush administration, party and ideology are statistically significant in both the House and the Senate, but the relative impact of ideology is greater (evidenced by the beta for ideology, which is more than twice as large as the party beta). These results also confirm

**Table I.** Multivariate ANOVA and Multiple Classification Analyses of the Relationship Between Congressional Foreign-Policy Voting, Partisanship, and Ideology for the Bush and Carter Administrations

ADMINISTRATION/ SOURCE OF VARIATION	HOUSE		SENATE	
	N	MEAN (BETA)	N	MEAN (BETA)
<i>Bush Administration</i>				
Party (P)				
Republican	332	54	88	65
Democrat	514	43	109	53
		(.25) <sup>a</sup>		(.27) <sup>a</sup>
Ideology (I)				
Conservative	326	64	75	74
Moderate	184	48	47	61
Liberal	336	31	75	42
		(.70) <sup>a</sup>		(.65) <sup>a</sup>
P × I significant at:	not sig.		not sig.	
R-square:	.81		.78	
<i>Clinton Administration</i>				
Party (P)				
Republican	402	42	94	48
Democrat	446	64	102	69
		(.61) <sup>a</sup>		(.49) <sup>a</sup>
Ideology (I)				
Conservative	379	51	82	50
Moderate	143	52	30	62
Liberal	326	55	84	67
		(.02)		(.40) <sup>a</sup>
P × I significant at:	not sig.		sig. <sup>b</sup>	
R-square:	.37		.73	
<sup>a</sup> Significant at the .01 level.				
<sup>b</sup> Significant at the .05 level.				

that conservatives provided Bush his most support and liberals his least. For the Clinton administration, the results are much different than would be expected from the historical record, with party affiliation proving to be more important than ideology. In the House the party variable is statistically significant, but ideology is not. Furthermore, other factors exogenous to our model also seem to be crucial, as only about a third of the variance is explained. In the Senate, both predictor variables are once again significant, but the relative impact of party is greater than ideology, as indicated by the betas. While liberals and moderates gave Clinton more support than conservatives, party, not ideological disposition, remained the more potent variable.

In sum, party and ideology remain key explanations of congressional foreign policy voting with the passing of the Cold War, providing continuing support for the political perspective. These results are consistent with the more general analysis of congressional-executive relations reported by Bond and Fleisher for the 1953-1984 period. Their findings “indicate that members of Congress provide levels of support for the president that are generally consistent with their partisan and ideological predispositions.”<sup>15</sup> Hence, this “Congress-centered thesis” proves to be a better explanation than their “Presidency-centered” one, which focuses primarily on presidential leadership. By analogy, our political perspective, which emphasizes party and ideology, does much better than the bipartisan perspective, which emphasizes the importance of the president in defining the agenda and shaping the debate.

### *Partisanship, Ideology, and Divided Government*

This support for the political perspective says nothing about how divided and unified governments affected foreign policy voting during these transitional years. Expectations are quite mixed: Mayhew contends that the presence or absence of divided government did not seem to matter. Fiorina suggests that divided government should exacerbate conflict on congressional voting between the branches, while Cox and Kernell find that unified government will not necessarily result in party cohesion in congressional voting, especially among House Republicans.

Our results point to greater conflict (less bipartisanship) during periods of divided government. During the Bush administration’s period of divided government (Period 1), the CI in the House is about the same as the CI during the Clinton administration’s period of divided govern-

15. Bond and Fleisher, *The President in the Legislative Arena*, p. 223.

ment (Period 3), at 19 percent and 22 percent, respectively. For the two comparable periods in the Senate, the Bush administration's CI is 29 percent versus the Clinton administration's 31 percent. If we were to confine the comparable period of the Bush administration to the 102nd Congress only—after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany—the results are even closer to the 104th Congress. It appears that divided government interacted with the end of the Cold War to lower the level of bipartisan accord, especially in the House.

By contrast, during the Clinton period of unified government (1993-1994), the CIs are higher in both chambers than during the periods of divided government. Yet, it is noteworthy that the levels are no higher than those for the Reagan administration, which faced a divided governmental structure throughout its tenure. These findings suggest the end of the Cold War had an effect even in the face of unified government, by inviting greater partisan and ideological discord than might have otherwise been expected.

The argument about party cohesion and divided government is admittedly more complex than we can test here. However, if we compare congressional loyalty to the party's president across the periods analyzed with our ANOVA procedures, we can gain some insight into the impact of divided government on the foreign policy process. Our analyses show that divided government did not lead to more partisan voting, but, unexpectedly, to more ideological voting.<sup>16</sup> Ideology proved to be a better predictor than party during the Bush administration, and ideology was more important in the House (but not the Senate) during the Clinton administration's experience with divided government (104th Congress). By contrast, unified government (103rd Congress) generated more partisan voting in the House, while ideology remained prominent in the Senate. Overall, the results are consistent with what Cox and Kernell contend as applied to the House, but their argument appears not to extend to the Senate.

16. Separate ANOVA analyses for the Congresses were computed within each administration. For both Congresses and chambers in the Bush administration, the betas for ideology were at least twice the size of the betas for party. For the Clinton administration, the picture is more mixed. The party beta (.58) is larger than the ideology beta (.46) in the 103rd House, but the ideology beta (.59) is less than twice as large as the party beta (.35) in the 104th House. In the 103rd Senate, the ideology beta (.48) is larger than the party beta (.34), while in the 104th Senate, the party beta (.71) is about three times as large as the ideology beta (.24).

Since the intercorrelations between partisanship and ideology for each chamber in the four Congresses were large, ranging from .78 in the 101st House to .95 in the 104th Senate, we also ran separate regressions for party and ideology for each one, but they do not alter the interpretations based on the ANOVA analyses.

### III. Conclusion

Our analyses confirm that bipartisanship has continued to wane in the post-Cold War era and that the political perspective is an increasingly powerful interpretation of congressional-executive relations in foreign policymaking. The level of bipartisan accord between Congress and the president reached new lows during the Bush and the first Clinton presidencies. In the Senate, the level of bipartisanship is lower for Bush and Clinton than for any president since 1947. In the House, bipartisanship rivals historical lows, with Bush experiencing a lower level than any other president's and Clinton's looking remarkably similar to the post-Vietnam Ford, Carter, and Reagan presidencies. While bipartisan cooperation arguably provides a floor undergirding American foreign policymaking, it apparently is a very low one—and has been for some time.

By contrast, the political perspective remains the predominant interpretation of foreign policy voting. Any change in the power of this perspective compared with the Cold War era is more one of degree than kind. The partisan gap on foreign policy votes remained very wide during the Bush and Clinton administrations. Ideological divisions also remained pronounced on foreign policy votes, especially during the Bush administration.

The presence or absence of divided government also matters. Divided government contributed to the decline in bipartisanship by accentuating the rise of ideological differences. Witness the strength of ideology in the two Congresses during the Bush administration and in the House during the 104th Congress of the Clinton administration. Unified government contributes to bipartisan decline in a different way, by fostering partisan divisions, especially as the experience of the Clinton administration in the House during the 103rd Congress reveals.

Finally, our analysis underscores that the realignment of partisan loyalties in the House and the Senate has also contributed to the decline in bipartisanship. As the center of the political spectrum disappears and as partisanship and ideology among members become increasingly aligned with one another, we are witnessing a withering of the difference between these two concepts. The realignment of party politics, widely discussed by experts in American domestic politics, bears strongly on the erosion of the bipartisan perspective and the increased saliency of the political perspective. Realignment is encouraged further by the divisiveness of the new economic, environmental, and socio-cultural concerns of United States foreign policy and the continuing arguments over traditional national security issues and America's appropriate role in the world. These issues and debates only exacerbate partisan and ideological divisions, overwhelming the impulses for bipartisanship at the water's edge.

## APPENDIX

**Table A-1.** Bipartisan Foreign-Policy Voting in the House and Senate, Bush and Clinton Administrations

		101st Congress	102nd Congress
<b>I. Bush Administration</b>	Overall		
House	18.7 <sup>a</sup>	17.2	19.7
Senate	28.9	28.4	29.6
<b>II. Clinton Administration</b>	Overall	103rd Congress	104th Congress
House	26.6	32.7	21.5
Senate	32.1	33.3	31.0

<sup>a</sup>Percent of foreign policy votes on which there was bipartisan support.

**Table A-2.** Partisan Gaps in the House and Senate on Foreign-Policy Voting, Bush and Clinton Administrations (in percent)

<i>Bush Administration, 1989-1992</i>			
	Overall	101st Congress	102nd Congress
<b>House</b>			
President's Party	67.8	70.7	64.8
Opposition Party	34.1	34.9	33.3
<b>Senate</b>			
President's Party	78.1	75.2	81.8
Opposition Party	43.3	45.5	41.2
<i>Clinton Administration, 1993-1996</i>			
	Overall	103rd Congress	104th Congress
<b>House</b>			
President's Party	63.9	60.9	67.7
Opposition Party	41.7	53.4	32.0
<b>Senate</b>			
President's Party	75.2	74.6	76.0
Opposition Party	41.2	46.8	36.5

**Table A-3. Partisanship and Ideology on Foreign-Policy Voting in the House and the Senate, Bush and Clinton Administrations (in percent)**

HOUSE			
<i>Bush Administration, 1989-1992</i>			
	Overall	101st Congress	102nd Congress
President's Party			
Conservative	70.2	74.2	66.4
Moderate	54.9	55.5	53.8
Liberal	40.6	40.7	40.4
Opposition Party			
Conservative	61.3	64.6	56.9
Moderate	43.3	47.0	40.4
Liberal	26.7	26.0	27.4
<i>Clinton Administration, 1993-1996</i>			
	Overall	103rd Congress	104th Congress
President's Party			
Conservative	65.1	69.3	44.1
Moderate	64.3	67.6	55.3
Liberal	63.7	57.1	70.2
Opposition Party			
Conservative	41.6	55.1	30.8
Moderate	42.9	46.5	41.0
Liberal	—	—	—
SENATE			
<i>Bush Administration, 1989-1992</i>			
	Overall	101st Congress	102nd Congress
President's Party			
Conservative	80.7	77.0	84.8
Moderate	67.5	70.9	63.6
Liberal	50.0	50.0	—
Opposition Party			
Conservative	67.1	60.8	79.6
Moderate	56.3	59.9	52.6
Liberal	36.7	37.7	35.9

TABLE A-3. (continued)

SENATE			
<i>Clinton Administration, 1993-1996</i>			
	Overall	103rd Congress	104th Congress
<b>President's Party</b>			
Conservative	69.4	58.3	75.0
Moderate	71.3	72.0	69.0
Liberal	76.2	75.7	76.8
<b>Opposition Party</b>			
Conservative	38.7	43.4	35.2
Moderate	52.0	57.1	46.0
Liberal	69.4	69.4	—