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Rationality and value freedom: three studies in social action

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Rationality and value freedom: Three studies in social action

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Rationality and value freedom: three studies in social action

by

Debra Clements Lemke

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1. THE PROBLEM

The thesis has been advanced that objectivity has historically been used to exclude women from the university, and value freedom to exclude socialists from the university (Proctor, 1991). In fact, Georg Simmel argued that science and objectivity are defined so as to exclude women. Simmel felt:

. . . that science itself is masculine, that objectivity and neutrality are attitudes of the male spirit, and that women tend to identify too much with their surroundings to allow them to develop an objective attitude toward the natural world (Proctor, 1991:116).

Men are thus seen as objective, while women are seen as subjective with the more positive value being placed on the objective.

Value neutrality can be used in the same way to distance sociology from socialism and from attempts to politicize social theory (Gouldner, 1970; Proctor, 1991). It is the “password” or “gentleman’s promise that boats will not be rocked” (Gouldner, 1970:66). Proctor (1991), in his insightful analysis of German social science in the first decade of the twentieth century, argues that the concept first began to enter philosophical debate at a time when socialism was emerging in Europe. He writes that:

Value-neutrality served two different, but related, functions. On the one hand, sociologists used value-neutrality as a tool to refute attempts on
the part of Marxists to politicize social theory. "Scientific socialism" becomes one of the most common targets of the charge of "non-neutral" or "biased" social science. Sociology was also declared neutral in order to avoid the charge that sociology was simply another word for socialism (Proctor, 1991:104).

Whether or not one agrees with the particulars of the above arguments, the point can be made that modern life is dominated by an ideology of rational, objective, value-free science, and that institutionalized science has used this ideology as a gatekeeping device to exclude undesirables. Those deemed nonrational or irrational, subjective, or value laden are devalued, and placed clearly outside the domain of science. Yet as Thomas Kuhn (1962) pointed out, such a dominant ideology only serves to blind one to the possibility of other points of view.

As science became more institutionalized and more tied to government patronage, there arose the need to differentiate "good" science from "bad" science. Universities began to grant science degrees and to screen those aspiring to the status of scientist. Through the ages, this system has used the ideology of rational, value-free science in its screening process; for as Simmel points out:

. . . systems of domination have always sought to clothe themselves in the guise of neutral and objective legality—so that power appears as justice, force as law (Proctor, 1991:117).

Simmel's analysis seems appropriate, especially when applied to the concept of rationality. As will be further detailed in this volume, the concept of rationality has come to connote means-ends rationality to the exclusion of all other previously understood meanings. This allowed for the convenient discrimination between "good" and "bad" scientists.
Weber, in his analysis of the concept of rationality delineates two different types of rationality: value-rationality and means-ends rationality. In the modern world, as Weber predicted, rationality has come to connote means-ends rationality only. This, in part, stems from the transformation of value being defined in reference to God or nature, as it was in the ancient world, to value being defined as "value in the eyes of man: value in use, value in exchange" (Proctor, 1991:21). It is the purpose of these papers is to reclaim the broader meanings of "rationality" and to uncover the value orientations inherent in the concept of value-freedom.
2. THE IDEOLOGY

Any discussion of modern science carries with it assumptions about the meaning of rationality and value freedom. These assumptions and their implications are rarely scrutinized by scientists as they go about their everyday research activities, yet are fundamental to the way they do science.

Deep within Western philosophical tradition is an appreciation of the free and unhampered pursuit of knowledge, a freedom based on a distinction between the ideal of theory, on the one hand, and the pursuit of personal gain or social need, on the other (Proctor, 1991:5).

This sets up the distinction between basic and applied science which has fueled debate over the role of science in society. One side sees science as an appropriate instrument for the facilitation of social change, while the other feels science should be detached from the contamination of the world (Coleman, 1978). Both sides embrace the ideology of value-freedom without fully considering the hidden contradictions and dilemmas.

Science is forced on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, there are calls for scientific freedom, born of fears for the survival of science in the face of political tyranny. On the other hand, there are calls for accountability in science, for sciences more in tune with practical human needs and desires. There is the sense that science is objective, that objectivity is an essential quality of science; yet there is also the growing sense that science serves specific social interests (Proctor, 1991:5).
Those who call for science to serve practical human needs must recognize the benefits and problems associated with doing research that is attractive to interest groups. The benefits are that interest groups will fund the research. The problems, at least from the standpoint of the ideology of value-freedom, are that those who pay will seek to control. Scholars who demand that science remain aloof from interest groups must see that that position itself is a value judgement, and must contend with diminished funding.

As never before, it is important for social science to scrutinize the assumptions associated with the modern formulations of value freedom and rationality. In an age when the human gene can be manipulated and wars fought with computers, simple means-ends rationality and an ideology of value-freedom should be questioned as the organizing principles of science and society. The values inherent in the choices society makes must be unearthed. These papers seek to help the scholar recognize the value orientation inherent in modern science.
3. THE ANALYSIS

The major portion of this work concerns the writings of Max Weber. This is in large part due to the attention Weber pays to rationality and value freedom in his writings, and to the centrality of Weber's role in the study of science and social science. It is also due to what the author feels are two misconception concerning Weber's treatment of these subjects.

Weber is often considered a proponent of: (1) bureaucracy, and through it the (2) rationalization of modern life, and of (3) value freedom in science. While the latter is correct in a limited sense, the former two are false. Weber was quite pessimistic about the effect of bureaucracy and rationalization on modern life, as his writings on administrative violence attest. As will be discussed in detail in the first paper, Weber saw rational action as only a portion of human action. Of the four types of action defined by Weber (traditional, affectual, wertrational, and zweckrational) only two types are rational (Runciman, 1978). Weber also understood that rational action itself could be broken down into four distinctly different parts depending upon whether the evaluation of the action is from the point of view of the actor or the observer. Weber felt that ethical difficulties arise when science fails to honor the distinction between value rational action and means-ends rational action. It is in this context that Weber discusses value-freedom.
Weber's stand on value freedom is also complex. It is discussed at length in the last two papers. In general, however, Weber felt that value freedom is an ideal that the teacher should adhere to. He felt that teachers must avoid dressing their opinions in the guise of scientific fact. However, he was quick to point out that this is purely a value judgement (Weber, 1949). Weber also felt that scientists should attempt to eliminate value judgements from their work. Yet, he questioned whether this is truly possible.

To approach the ideal of value freedom, both the researcher and the teacher must understand that values influence their work. Because of this, Weber saw value orientations themselves as an appropriate subject of study for the social scientist.

Given his extensive writings on the subject and the popular misconceptions about his views, the author seems justified in writing yet another thesis on Max Weber.
4. THE PAPERS

The three papers in this volume explore the transformation of the concepts of value freedom and rationality in social sciences as it applies to sociological theory and practice. The intent is to lay bare the implicit assumptions within these concepts so as to acquaint the modern social scientist with the dilemmas hidden there.

The first paper: *The Concept of Rationality in Social Theory: Its Origins in Comte, Weber, and Durkheim* was co-authored with Drs. Woodman, and Hollinger. This paper was presented at the Midwest Sociological Society Meetings in Des Moines, Iowa in April of 1991 and was well received. It explores the various theoretical meanings of the concept of rationality and their implications for social science.

Weber's concept of rationality centers on the idea of value orientation and calls into question our modern conception of science. This leads into the second paper: *Setting the Record Straight: Weber on Value Freedom and Policy Analysis* which was presented before the Midwest Sociological Society Meetings in Kansas City, Kansas in April 1992. This paper addresses the popular conception of Weber's stance on value freedom and its implications for policy analysis in light of Weber's actual writings on the subject. The basic conclusions drawn are that the social sciences hold a conveniently simplistic view of value freedom that is not consistent with Weber's writings, a view which allows us to overlook value laden behavior in the scientific
enterprise.

The third paper, *Scholars in the Iron Cage* was co-authored with Drs. Woodman and Hollinger. This work deals with the implications of a one-dimensional view of rationality and the ideology of value freedom in the university. It was also presented to a session of the Midwest Sociological Society Meetings in April of 1992.
5. THE FORMAT

This dissertation consists of three publishable papers written on a topic of interest to sociology which are preceded by a general introduction and followed by a general summary. All three paper concepts were developed by the candidate. The Concept of Rationality in Social Theory: Its Origins in Comte, Weber, and Durkheim and Scholars in the Iron Cage were both co-authored by the candidate and Drs. Woodman and Hollinger. The candidate was responsible for the portions on Weber, rationality, value freedom, and value blindness, as well as for editing and linking the contributions of the co-authors. Setting the Record Straight: Weber on Value Freedom and Policy Analysis was solely authored by the candidate.
PART I.

THE CONCEPT OF RATIONALITY IN SOCIAL THEORY: ITS ORIGINS IN COMTE, WEBER, AND DURKHEIM
1. ABSTRACT

The concept of rationality has gone through a number of changes during the course of human history, at one point or another having the meanings of: reasons given for an action, maximization of self-interest, reason as the discoverer and source of knowledge, reason as the source of all moral good, and reason as the mainspring of human history. These changes have resulted in confusions which have had a great impact upon the social sciences, for the obvious reason that human behavior and its motivations constitute the subject matter of the social sciences. Some of the far-reaching effects of this problem can be seen in the writings of three prominent social theorists. In this paper we propose to examine the origins of the concept of rationality in the social sciences and conjecture as to the significance of new evolutions in its use and meanings.
2. BACKGROUND

Although the concept of Rationality is at least as old as Aristotle, whose statement "Man is a rational animal" gives the notion its canonical form in the West, it was not made thematic until the time of Machiavelli and Hobbes. Until then "Reason" was the operative concept. Reason was basically a functionalist notion (i.e. each type of thing, including the human species, has its peculiar "function" or good, which required that type of being to tune into the forces of the cosmos in order to realize its good). Since human beings are essentially rational, finding the human good was necessary in order to live the truly human life. The notion of irrationality was only to be recognized in order to be set aside. The surd is not capable of being discussed; there is no form of the mud, as Plato puts it in the Parmenides. Modern theorists do the same by defining outside their theoretical purview as "irrational" all behavior they cannot explain.

To be sure, the idea of giving reasons for behavior, in the form of causal or teleological explanations was common practice. Actions could be judged to be rational or irrational depending upon the reasons given and the ends aimed at. But "rationality" and "irrationality" as modern modes of acting and understanding did not arise until much later. It was only with the rise of modern individualism and the scientific revolution that these notions came to take center stage.
By way of dating this change, it can be noted that rationality as a maximizing principle is often linked to Hobbes. The rational egoism of Hobbes requires one to distinguish between rational and irrational ways of maximizing self-interest. When actions do not maximize utility functions (or serve the self-interests of the actor), the action (or at least the chosen means) is, by definition, irrational. When it does maximize self interest, the actor is said to be a rational agent.

The development of the modern scientific method under the impetus of Galileo and Descartes generated the need for a procedure which guaranteed objective truth. This began the tendency to see reason as a method to obtain knowledge. Such procedures are rational since they allow objective truth to be discovered. Other methods, e.g., “subjective” methods, do not achieve, but rather block the quest for objective truth.

Jumping forward to the present we see that modern philosophy makes new use of the concept of Reason in its view that “reason”, not experience, is the ultimate source and justification of knowledge, and indeed is the source of a priori absolute knowledge. The mind, in this view, is essentially a computer, which can solve all problems through calculation, but only if it is purified of all irrational “subjective” elements, which in effect means everything except the raw data of experience that presses itself into the pure ego, together with the calculating power of pure reason/logic.

The French Enlightenment developed a utopian program for eliminating human misery, which was based upon the assumption that ignorance and superstition, e.g., religion and myth, are the sources of all misery. Knowledge, reason, and rationality would, Enlightenment thinkers asserted, eliminate misery and promote what Francis Bacon called “the relief of the human estate.” In doing so, they added to the already
cumbersome baggage of the concept of reason as the source of moral rightness. The idea of a scientific civilization, first elaborated by Bacon, was to become the goal of the Enlightenment. Scientific knowledge about human behavior, in their view, must be used to transform all of society and human life into utopia. By a process of residual definition, all behavior not based upon scientific knowledge, or utilitarian calculation came to be defined as both irrational and morally bad.

Hegel and the German Idealists were to temper this Enlightenment version of Positivism by invoking the ancient Platonic notion of Reason as comprehensive understanding, and subsuming the modern notion of rationality as scientific procedure and calculation under the category of Reason. In so doing, Hegel tried to overcome the Enlightenment's one sided notions of rationality, reason and abstract moral universalism by infusing elements of romanticism into his wider notion of reason as comprehensive understanding of the world and its processes of development. But for Hegel reason could only comprehend the world after the fact; after the Owl of Minerva had painted its grey on grey. So reason had to become retrodictive; it could only comprehend what has already happened by understanding its own time in thought. This apparently left little role for prediction, planned social change, or radical criticism (the point at which Marx would later enter the picture).

For Hegel, individuals were seen to act rationally, but they do so partly because the dialectics of human history demands that human actions serve the forces of reason that characterize human history. The cunning of reason, like Adam Smith's invisible hand, introduced the notion of the unintended consequences of intentional, rational action, into the realm of human action and history. By the same token, social phenomena (what Hegel called "the realm of objective spirit," and what Durkheim
called "social facts" and laws) must be taken into account in order to understand human behavior. Said another way, Hegel introduced the organic model of society, which would result in functionalism and systems analysis, the dominant organizing principles of modern social science.

Meanwhile, Auguste Comte, and later Saint Simon, would, in effect, combine the Baconian ideas of Enlightenment Positivism with Hegel's notion of reason, to create the idea of the Religion of Reason. These French Utopian thinkers (whom Marx criticized as "utopian socialists") envisioned a modern Gemeineschaft that would be created and sustained by the systematic study of human behavior and society. The "moral sciences", as Hume and Mill called them, were to serve progressive forces by transforming society into a rational and functional organic unity. Durkheim, who was a vociferous enemy of Hegel, was nevertheless influenced by these developments, as we will make clear later.

Saint Simon's idea of a rational progressive society envisioned a top-down enlightened despotism of and by a knowledge elite. Such an idea was to pave the way for the 20th Century managerial elite, and of the ideology of a post-industrial society as described by writers such as Daniel Bell (1962). Such a view was not to take hold in the United States until the advent of the Progressivist Movement, and appeared in the writings of both Thorstein Veblen (1934) and Frederick W. Taylor (1911).
Comte's vision of a rational organic society, which Durkheim was to develop most completely, takes its point of departure from a biological-organic model of society as well as an evolutionary view of human development. The so-called "Law of the Three Stages" asserts that science is more rational than myth and religion/philosophy, and hence it is science which is to provide the most rational way of dealing with all social and human problems. The organic analogy is, in effect, the first sociological excursion into structural-functionalism and into systems analysis.

From this perspective, each "organ" of the social whole functions optimally so as to maximize the organic well being of the entity; thus it can be said to be rational. Comte's new "Religion of Humanity" was to make sociology and the Positive Laws it discovered the culmination and linch-pin of a new secular order. "Rationality" and "irrationality" were redefined with functional and social meanings.

In Comte's view, in fact, either psychology is ultimately reduced to physiology (and thus constitutes a natural science) or the behavior of the individual must be explained in a social context. It is not clear that individual rationality can have any other meaning in Comte's system.

Comte's optimism about the role of rationality in human society was criticized as naive by Marx. But it was Weber's analysis of modern society and the types
of rationality that finally sunders the Enlightenment view of society in two. In his writings Weber succeeded in severing utterly the connection between rational action and scientific progress. While this is not to say that Comte's vision is not still tremendously influential, many of those who accept Comte's vision fail to realize that his Positivism was infused from the ground up with Hegel's vision of social and human progress. Even Durkheim, not to mention other Positivists, could not (or at least did not) see this connection.
4. EMILE DURKHEIM

Durkheim's theory of rationality is much less developed but in many ways has had a greater influence on sociology than Weber's. Durkheim follows the Enlightenment faith in reason as the salvation of society. Durkheim even claims in his essay "Rules for the Distinction of Normal from Pathological" (Durkheim, 1982), that science can guide the individual in the selection of higher ends.

Durkheim's conception of reason refers to instrumental rationality: "(it) is not my reason nor yours; it is the impersonal human reason, only truly realized in science" (cited in Hearn, 1985).

Indeed our main objective is to extend the scope of scientific rationalism to cover human behaviour by demonstrating that, in light of the past, it is capable of being reduced to relationships of cause and effect, which, by an operation no less rational, can then be transformed into rules of action for the future. What has been termed our positivism is merely a consequence of this rationalism (Durkheim, 1982:33).

For Durkheim, man is basically an untempered bundle of desires and passions that must be harnessed by society if social order is to be maintained (Hearn, 1985). This harnessing of the nature of man is reason, and for Durkheim, reason has a social origin (Hawthorne, 1976).
The science of moral facts, . . . is simply this: the application of human reason to the moral order, first of all to understand it, and finally to direct its changes. I am not concerned with 'the literal meaning of reason'. On the contrary, this methodical application of the reason has, as its principal task, our release from the suggestions of 'reason' thus understood, in order to allow the things themselves to speak; the things in this case being the present condition of moral opinion in its relation to the social reality which it should express . . . (Durkheim, 1953:66).

Reason, then exists outside the individual in reality. Durkheim maintained that the individual's ability to reason and his moral sense are both social products and are part of the collective consciousness. Durkheim also claimed science is a social fact.

I reply that society arrives at this fuller [collective] consciousness only by science; and science is not an individual; it is a social thing, pre-eminently impersonal (Durkheim, 1953:66).

So far it would seem that Durkheim sees reason as some form of normative, moral, instrumental rationality. Durkheim's hopes for social order in modern society rests in the replacement of subjective sentiment with reason.

The reason to which I make my appeal is reason applying itself to a given matter in a methodical manner in order to understand the nature of past and present morality, and which draws from this theoretical study its practical consequences. Reason thus understood is simply science, the science of morality. My major concern is to free morality from sentimental subjectivism, which hinders its progress and is a form either of empiricism or mysticism, two closely linked ways of thinking (Durkheim, 1953:66-67).

As science is a social fact and reason is science, then reason must also be a social fact. The control made possible by reason is a condition of freedom in modern society
(Hearn, 1985). Science, or better, the science of morality (sociology) is for Durkheim the instrument of individual adaptation and submission to society.

One of the most direct of Durkheim’s discussions of rationality occurs in a fragmentary collection published in 1924 under the title Sociologie et Philosophie. Durkheim is responding to a “M. Darlu” who had apparently written to the author with an observation. Given that the original letter is lost, we can only deduce that Monsieur Darlu wrote about the connection between individual reason and morality and how free from social constraints a person might be, for Durkheim deals with the question at length. Specifically, Durkheim (1953:65) argues that while the individual is free to rebel against society, particularly when the true nature of society is not reflected in the rules of behavior, the key is that,

In the sphere of morality, as in the other spheres of nature, individual reason has no particular prestige as such. The only reason for which one can claim the right of intervention, and of rising above historical moral reality in order to reform it, is not my reason nor yours; it is the impersonal human reason, only truly realized in science.

He goes on to argue that as the natural and physical sciences permit the manipulation of the material they study, the “science of moral facts” lets us control the study of morality in a dispassionate way. The goal of which “Has as its end,” Durkheim (1953:65) adds, “not the substitution of an individual ideal for the collective, but the substitution of an equally collective ideal which expresses not a particular personality but the collective itself more clearly understood.” The interesting methodological implication of this observation is seen in Durkheim’s (1953:64) assertion that,
To science alone belongs the task of discovering the reality itself and of expressing it. It is on the reality, thus understood, that the scientist should base his judgements of future developments.

Clearly, Durkheim either sees reality as either too elusive for individuals or individuals as insufficiently rational to apprehend it. In either case the intimation is that any method of research which fails to substitute scientifically derived data for individual perceptions of reality should be seen as suspect. In addressing his correspondent, Durkheim (1953:66) responds to the charge that the individual morality is superior to that of society and that the moral individual would thus be more rational to rebel against society.

If it is argued that this fuller and higher consciousness of itself is only expressed in and through an individual intellect, I reply that society arrives at this fuller consciousness only by science; and science is not an individual; it is a social thing, pre-eminently impersonal.

While the present century has provided us with many examples of collectively derived consciousness which are unscientific and even hostile to Western rationality, it is clear that for Durkheim there is only one rationality and that he equates it with the positivistic model of scientific knowledge (Hawthorne, 1976), for Durkheim gave the rational opinion of experts the supreme authority in moral arguments (Hawthorne, 1976).

It would seem that it is from Durkheim that modern sociology takes its dominant view of rationality, seeing it as not an individual product, but as part of the collective consciousness, and by that fact available to all normally functioning individuals of a society. Rationality carries with it the moral conviction of society and therefore can
define the appropriate form of action. This is because both morality and reason are social products and are subject to the rigors of the scientific method. Since reason is a social fact, and is observable in reality, the sociologist must only devise ways of measuring it. Once it can be measured and studied, it can then be harnessed to serve as a solution to social problems.

This view of rationality is consistent with the overall reformist tone of most of Durkheim's sociology and has had long term effects on the discipline of sociology. It has formed a way of doing research that gives credibility only to hard data and to empirical research methods and has also informed the perceptions of the role of sociology in society, thereby setting up the expectation that sociology can, in fact, define solutions to the question of what ought to be in society.
5. MAX WEBER

In much the same way as Durkheim was to influence the fields of anthropology and history, the views of Max Weber on both the methods and substance of sociology would disproportionately affect the views of historians, anthropologists, and political scientists.

Weber's thinking on rationality is the most elaborate of any social theorist. In fact, rationality is an underlying theme in almost all of his writings. While a small part of his thinking has had an impact on the field of sociology, his major theme - the perspective of rationality - has received much less attention than other aspects of his theories.

Weber did not merely continue in the Enlightenment tradition of optimistic faith in the rationalization of the world (Brubaker, 1984), saying,

It is important to clear up this misunderstanding as to correct the mistaken view that the fact that concept formation takes a more or less rationalistic form implies that rational motives should be held always to predominate or, indeed, any kind of positive valuation of 'rationalism' (Runciman, 1978:21).

He saw this irresistible force as "an abomination to every system of fraternal ethics" (cited in Brubaker, 1984:3). As a consequence, Weber makes a highly detailed analysis of rationality in which he teases out many finely put and critical
distinctions within the general concept. For Weber, rationality was not one concept but a multiplicity of concepts (Levine, 1981). This analysis is summarized in several places (Kalberg, 1980; Levine, 1981; and Brubaker, 1984).

Weber first makes the distinction between formal and substantive rationality. He is clarifying what are two distinctly different orientations of rationality. Formal rationality is basically a matter of fact. It refers to the calculability of means and procedures (Brubaker, 1984); a methodical ordering through the establishment of fixed rules and routines. This form of rationality is oriented around maximizing the predictability of activities and norms, and minimizing the influence of personal ties and social sentiments (Levine, 1981). Spheres of action that are highly rational from the formal viewpoint include: capitalism, science, technology, and the modern legal and administration systems (Brubaker, 1984). While there is no direct correspondence, Weber's formal rationality fits somewhat well into to Durkheim's view of rationality.

Substantive rationality, on the other hand, is a matter of value. It is oriented toward the values of ends or results (Brubaker, 1984). Substantive rationality gives predominance to ethical imperatives, utilitarian rules, or political maxims (Levine, 1981). It is the process of establishing sets of valuative standards against which the empirically given can be assessed. The example Weber most often gives of substantive rationality is religion.

What is rational in the formal sense is irrational in the substantive sense. The reason for this being that formal and substantive rationality are oriented toward two very different standards. Substantive rationality is oriented toward some overarching value and the desire to achieve motivational integrity (Levine, 1981). Formal rationality is oriented toward clearly stipulated procedures; the wish to act within a
calculable order to achieve a given end (Levine, 1981).

The clearest example Weber uses is of the Puritan working and obtaining wealth in a calling. This action is formally rational because the Puritan has established a way of life based on fixed rules and routines in order to determine whether or not each individual was one of God's chosen. The only sign of this chosen status is to be successful in one's calling, therefore the Puritan will live in a calculated fashion in order to obtain wealth and thereby a sign of chosen status. This action is irrational from a substantive point of view because it does not embody any ethic or value, but is in fact self-serving.

Weber felt that the distinction between substantive and formal rationality was important for several reasons, but primarily because there is constant tension between substantive and formal rationality. What is rational from one point of view is irrational from the other. This conflict is primarily over values: calculability, efficiency, and impersonality on the one hand; and fraternity, equality and brotherly-love on the other (Brubaker, 1984). Weber viewed this conflict as one source of social problems.

According to Weber, social life is marked by perennial, indeed intensifying conflict over ends (especially ultimate ends) and beliefs (especially life-orienting metaphysical beliefs) – conflict that cannot be resolved through any neutral procedure (Brubaker, 1984: 4).

This conflict over ends and beliefs brings to mind the functionalist view that poverty is functional for society. While this is a perfectly rational way of viewing poverty from a formal standpoint, from the substantive standpoint, it is inhumane.

For Weber, this irreconcilability of judgements spelled out the limits of rationality as an organizing principle of social life, thereby dismissing the Enlightenment
hope in reason. Weber rejected the idea that science can determine what ought to be in society. Science can determine what is, but does not have the capacity to inform value judgements. There is no scientific way to choose one value over another.

It is now helpful to consider the four types of social action that Weber discussed: traditional, affectual, wertrational, and zweckrational (Runciman, 1978). It must be pointed out that Weber did not see most social action as rational (Runciman, 1978). Weber only defined two of the four types of action he discusses as rational: wertrational and zweckrational. Action is rational for Weber only when individuals are the self-conscious, deliberate authors of their acts (Brubaker, 1981).

Traditional action is action dictated by habits or custom. Affectual action is action determined by strong feelings or emotions such as revenge, pleasure or release of emotional impulses (Runciman, 1978). Wertrational action is action guided by a conscious belief in the intrinsic value in a certain way of acting regardless of the consequences (Brubaker, 1984). Action taken out of “conviction based on duty, honour, beauty, religious doctrine, piety, or the importance of any kind of ‘cause’” (Runciman, 1978:29). Put another way, wertrational action is oriented toward consistency with some value believed inherent in certain ways of acting.

Zweckrational action is action directed by a conscious calculation to achieve some desired ends with appropriate means. It is oriented toward anticipated and intended consequences.

A person acts rationally in the ‘means-ends’ sense when his action is guided by considerations of ends, means and secondary consequences; when in action, he rationally assesses means in relation to ends, ends in relation to secondary consequences, and finally, the various possible ends in relation to each other (Runciman, 1978:30).
Both of the rational forms of action can have either substantive or formal orientations.

Weber then makes a third distinction about rationality that applies specifically to \textit{wertrational} and \textit{zweckrational} social action. This distinction refers to judgements made about rationality. Both \textit{wertrational} and \textit{zweckrational} are defined from the point of view of the actor – subjectively. An action is \textit{wertrational} because of the actor's subjective belief in the intrinsic value of a particular way of acting (Brubaker, 1984).

An action is \textit{zweckrational} because of the actor's expectations about the consequences of his acts and because of his conscious efforts to bring about these consequences. The objective correctness of the belief or the expectations is irrelevant to the subjective rationality of his action (Brubaker, 1984). The point is that the judgement about whether the action is rational or not is made by the actor.

Weber then points out what he refers to as objectively correct rationality. Objective rationality refers to 'correctness' from a technical point of view (Brubaker, 1984): whether the actor uses the technically correct means according to scientific knowledge or to some process of systematization (Levine, 1981). The point here is that the judgement of rationality is made by an observer.

Both subjective and objective rationality imply the "exact calculation of appropriate means for efficient and methodical acquisition of a given end." (Hearn, 1985:75). Only \textit{zweckrational} action can be subjectively and objectively rational. It is subjective when the actor makes conscious and deliberate calculations to achieve some given end. It is objective when the calculations of the actor are correct.

To summarize Weber's theory thus far, Weber felt that rationality could be either
formally or substantively oriented. Social action could be rational or non-rational. There are two varieties of rational action: *wertrational* and *zweckrational*. While *wertrational* action can only be subjectively evaluated, *zweckrational* action be either subjectively or objectively evaluated.

The distinction between objective and subjective rationality allows Weber to get at what he considers a major concern with the Enlightenment Project. While the selection of means can be objectively assessed, the selection of values cannot.

... in the area of practical political value-judgements, (especially in the fields of economics and social policy), as soon as guidance for a valued course of action is to be sought, all that an empirical discipline with the means at its disposal can show is (i) the unavoidable means; (ii) the unavoidable side-effects; (iii) the resulting conflict of several possible value-judgements with each other in their practical consequences ... All are entirely matters of choice or of compromise. There is no scientific procedure, either rational or empirical, of any kind which could provide a decision in such cases. Least of all can our strictly empirical science presume to spare the individual the necessity of making this choice, and so it should not even give the impression of being able to do so (Runciman, 1978:85).

It is at this point that the direction of Weber's thinking becomes clearer. *Zweckrational* action can either be evaluated by the actors or by the observer. Just as there is an inherent conflict between substantive and formal rational orientation, there is inherent conflict between subjectively and objectively evaluated rationality. What is subjectively rational from the actor's view point may be objectively irrational from the observer's. This for Weber, points out the limits of science as the objective arbiter of rational action (Brubaker, 1984).
Scientific knowledge can determine 'what is to be done' only when an unambiguous end is given and when there is an unambiguous way of comparing the rationality of alternative means of achieving the given end (Brubaker, 1984:59).

This limitation is largely ignored by sociology today. Much of our research follows in the Enlightenment tradition and goes about selecting the right ends for society to pursue. Examples include studies that define "functional families", "healthy organizations", or "developed nations".

The value-judgements made by researchers in the research itself are clothed in the mantel of zweckrational science as they go about studying "the most efficient", "the most cost effective", "the least disruptive". While it is clear that these superlatives imply some standard by which the alternative is assessed, the mantel of "science" creates an air of irrefutability.

Weber warned against just such misuse of rationality: "That there is always a risk of rationalistic interpretations being proposed in the wrong places is admittedly undeniable. All experience, unfortunately, confirms this" (Runciman, 1978:10).

For Weber, science is equipped to inform the selection process between various ends and to assess progress towards those ends, but the criteria used in selecting ends is strictly a value-judgement and cannot be made by science.
6. ANALYSIS

One of the major differences between Weber's and Durkheim's theories rests in their views on the origin of rationality. For Weber, reason is an inherent characteristic of humans. Humans have an innate capacity for rational action (Kalberg, 1980).

Durkheim combines individuals' ability to reason with their moral sense and declares them both to be social products. Durkheim also sees morality, science, and rationality as one concept. For Weber, it is clear that rationality is in fact many concepts.

For Durkheim, rationality was simply assumed. Rationality was not to be questioned; it was a fact, just as real as any other social fact. For this reason, it is almost unfair to discuss Durkheim's view of rationality in the same light as Weber's. It's fatal weakness stems from the fact that it is not a theory at all. It is merely an assumption. With it, Durkheim did not seek to explain or predict. For him, there is no role for values, because there is only one set of valid values for society— the collective consciousness. That is why it is truly ironic that it is Durkheim's conception of rationality that most often informs empirical research in sociology.

Most sociologists today believe, as did Comte and Durkheim, that science can provide answers to social problems. From this positivists frame of reference, we number, count, analyze, and decide, truly believing that science can provide answers.
This is the point where the strength of Weber's theory shines through.

Weber made only one assumption about rationality: namely that humans are capable of reason. He clearly pointed out the value-laden nature of the concept with the distinction between formal and substantive rationality. This distinction has had a lasting effect on sociological empirical research. By making a clear separation between rationality based on rules, and rationality based on values, Weber opened the door for the notion of value-neutrality. Sociologists are well acquainted with this Weberian notion, but it would seem that few bother to read past his mandate for value-free research.

Those that do discover that the distinction also points to the explorations of tensions inherent in the modern order. What is formally rational may be substantively irrational. As Brubaker (1984:38) points out, the "formal rationality of the modern economic order rests on institutional foundations that are morally and politically problematic". Here again the example of poverty being functional for the system and inhumane for people comes to mind.

To the extent actors share ends and beliefs, there can be agreement in their judgements of rationality. However, if these ends and beliefs are not held in common, there will be no agreement over rationality.

Weber did not believe that science can dictate a 'solution' to problems of social policy (Brubaker, 1984).

Even such simple questions as the extent to which an end should sanction unavoidable means, or the extent to which undesired repercussions should be taken into consideration... are entirely matters of choice or compromise. There is no (rational or empirical) scientific procedure of any kind whatsoever which can provide us with a decision here (cited in
Matters of fact (formal rationality) can inform the decision making process, but cannot decide matters of value (substantive rationality).

While Weber does not seek to predict using his schema, the explanation he provides for rational action is unsurpassed. He assigns a decisive role to values and provides insight as to why verstehen is so crucial for his sociology. Subjective rationality points out that the meaning of actions to actors is primarily important because it is the actor who defines what is rational. This dictates the need for the use of qualitative methods in sociology to uncover these actor generated meanings.

The application of Weber's theory to empirical research can be helpful in several ways. First, it would cause sociology to focus on what it can do: identify affected interest groups and their interests, define means to achieve various ends, and identify unintended consequences of the various ends and means. Second, it would free us from the unrewarding role of social prophet. A sociology that claims to be able to select scientifically the ends to which society should strive is one that is poorly equipped for its task. This has led sociology to many misdirected and fuzzy recommendations to policy makers. As a result, the discipline as a whole is overshadowed in policy circles by the other social sciences because of our past failed prophecy. Finally, it opens up to scientific exploration the connection between human action and values. This was a fascination for Weber as his study on the Protestant Ethic illustrates. Instead of excluding values from the study of sociology, we should be studying the impact of various value orientations on everyday life.
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PART II.

SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT: WEBER ON VALUE

FREEDOM AND POLICY ANALYSIS
1. ABSTRACT

Value freedom is a central concept in policy analysis. This concept was given to the social sciences by Max Weber. Popular conceptions of the term have long reaching implications for the policy sciences. These popular conceptions, however, do not accurately reflect Weber's use of value freedom. This paper explores these popular conceptions in light of Weber's writings.
2. SCIENCE AND VALUE FREEDOM

Nowhere is the concept of value free science more prominent than in social policy analysis. The assumption is made that politics is value laden but science is value free. This assumption leads to other related assumptions that have a great impact on the field.

These theoretical and philosophical assumptions that underpin current social policy research should bear closer scrutiny. It will also be fruitful to consult the source of value freedom, Max Weber, to assess how accurately this concept is applied.

In a discussion of sociological analysis and social policy, Coleman (1978) describes the widely accepted two worlds dichotomy. According to this schema, the world of the discipline and the world of action are two totally different spheres of existence.

The world of action consists of a sequence of actions and responses among a variety of parties. As such, it has two properties not shared by the world of the discipline: interested parties, whose interests in a given action differ, and sometime conflict; and time, since the actions are embedded in a sequence, with those later in the sequence dependent on those earlier. . .

The world of action tolerates secrecy, privacy, pursuit of interests, and diversity of values (Coleman, 1978; p 687)

The world of the discipline is of another character.
The disciplinary world is a world of knowledge abstracted from the world of action, but having a separate existence and a separate structure. The norms or values of the discipline favor disinterested inquiry, a search for truth, and full communication of information (Coleman, 1978:687).

Coleman states that this distinction stems from the fact that problems arise in the world of action but sociological analysis of policy is performed in the world of the discipline (Coleman, 1978). The information obtained from this analysis is then returned to the world of action. From this standpoint, the policy researcher plays one of three roles:

- An agent of the party whose policy is studied.
- An agent of a "third party" who represents persons whom the policy affects.
- An independent researcher.

It is clear from Coleman's dichotomy, the two worlds hypothesis (1978), and the roles assigned the policy analyst that the area of policy analysis makes several assumptions:

- Scientists are value free.
- Science itself is value free.
- Science uncovers truth.
- The discipline is isolated from the world of action.
- That science can and should provide answers to policy questions.

Each of these will be dealt with in turn. Before proceeding, however, it is important to understand exactly what is meant by value freedom and for that we must turn to Max Weber.
3. THE POLICY LITERATURE

There seems to be much confusion in the area of policy analysis as to Weber's conceptualization of value freedom and its role in policy analysis and social change. Coleman states that Max Weber did not address how sociological analysis might become an element in social change, or allow a role for sociological analysis (Coleman, 1978). This assessment is puzzling given the striking similarities between Coleman's two worlds thesis and Weber's pronouncements in *The Methodology of the Social Sciences* (1949). In these three essays: *The Meaning of "Ethical Neutrality" in Sociology and Economics*, "Objectivity" in *Social Science and Social Policy*, and *Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences*, Weber makes many pronouncements about the role of the social sciences in social change. Most of these pronouncements center around the concept of value freedom.

Hawkesworth (1988) in a later article describes several models of policy analysis, one of which he labels "Weberian". He describes his "Weberian" model as "promising rationality, objectivity, and certitude (Hawkesworth, 1988:21). Neither Hawkesworth or Coleman accurately embody the wealth of Weber's pronouncements on social policy analysis. The purpose of this paper is to explore Weberian sociology's pronouncements on public policy in the light of these two popular conceptions of it.
4. WEBER ON VALUE FREEDOM

A closer examination of Weber's writing reveals important distinctions that the policy analyst would do well to remember. Most sociologists today are familiar with Weber's prescription for value free research. But it is important to stress that for Weber, value freedom was not a property of science or a characteristic of the scientist as it appears to be for Coleman. Value freedom is an ideal that the scientist should strive for, and Weber makes it clear that this is not a task to take lightly.

To better understand his position, it is necessary to understand the distinction Weber makes between value judgement and value relevance. He credits this distinction to the German philosopher Heinrich Richert (Weber, 1949).

Weber defined value judgements as:

practical evaluations regarding the desirability or undesirability of social facts from ethical, cultural or other points of view (Weber, 1949; p 10).

An actual "value-judgement" ... does not imply that I subsume them under a certain class-concept. ... Rather, the "value-judgement" involves my "taking an attitude" in a certain concrete way to the object in its concrete individuality; the subjective sources of this attitude of mine, of my "value-standpoint" ... (are) thoroughly concrete, highly individually structured and constituted "feelings" and "preference" (Weber, 1949:150)

It was Weber's position that value judgements should be excluded from teaching and empirical investigation, thereby giving science a value free position. This
is because the position of teacher, or scientist carries with it authority. Those ex­pounding opinions from positions of authority without making it clear that these are opinions, give their opinions the weight of facts (Weber, 1949). Weber found this untenable.

The position Weber takes on value judgements anticipates the criticism of policy analysis made by Weaver that

. . . the aura of realism exuded by quantitative measures undermines non-experts’ critical responses ("they can’t argue with the ‘facts’") while simultaneously validating highly implausible claims (Hawkesworth, 1988: 26);

and the criticism by Tribe that there are

. . . multiple means by which policy analysis merges with a technical rhetoric in which “passion learns to pose as reason” by proclaiming its strategies for formulating questions, organizing information, and developing answers to be value-free, despite their commitments to substantive conclusions (Hawkesworth, 1988:26).

It is clear from his writings that freedom from value judgements (value freedom) is not something that Weber assumes exists, either in the scientist or in science itself. Rather it is a prescription Weber gives to scientists and teachers as something that they must strive for. As will become clear later in this discussion, the concept of “interests” plays a larger role in Weber's conceptualization of social science and is not excluded from the world of the discipline as in the two worlds dichotomy, or in Hawkesworth's “Weberian” model of policy analysis.
Because "interests" direct science and the scientist, this interferes with value freedom. Exclusion of "interests" is the consistent labor of the scholar doing empirical work. Yet, Weber did not underestimate the size of this task:

Nor need I discuss further whether the distinction between empirical statements of fact and value-judgements is 'difficult' to make. It is. All of us ... encounter the subject time and again (Weber, 1949:9).

For Weber "interests" are more than simple individual prejudices made by an individual or a society, they are what separates what is knowledge from what is not. For this, Weber uses Richert's term value relevance.

Value relevance is defined by Weber as:

the philosophical interpretation of that specifically scientific 'interest' which determines the selection of a given subject-matter and the problems of an empirical analysis (Weber, 1949:22).

If it is not clear from this definition that Weber saw science as less than presuppositionless, the following passage should clear up any confusion:

The problems of the empirical disciplines are ... to be solved 'nonevaluatively'. They are not problems of evaluation. But the problems of the social sciences are selected by the value-relevance of the phenomena treated ... In empirical investigation, no 'practical evaluations' are legitimated by this strictly logical fact. But together with historical experience, it shows that cultural (i.e. evaluative) interests give purely empirical scientific work its direction (Weber, 1949:21-22).

Weber goes farther and states that all that we know about society is shaped by value judgements.
All knowledge of cultural reality... is knowledge from particular points of view. If the notion that those standpoints can be derived from the “facts themselves” continually recurs, it is due to the naive self-deception of the specialist who is unaware that it is due to the evaluative ideas with which he unconsciously approaches his subject matter, that he has selected from an absolute infinity a tiny portion with the study of which he concerns himself (Weber, 1977:31-32)

In Weber’s view, the “facts themselves” are only available to science if they fit into the value relevant schema of that science, scientist, and epoch. Facts that fall outside the scope of this world view do not “exit”.

Further, science itself is merely one valued activity among many. Western society values science as the arbitrator of truth, but that is a social convention and not inherent in “reality”. Even though it is considered by Western society as the best, it is not the ultimate or only tool for uncovering facts. For Weber, science itself is a social construction.

. . . hair-line which separates science from faith . . . The objective validity of all empirical knowledge rests exclusively upon the ordering of the given reality according to categories which are subjective in a specific sense, namely, in that they present the presuppositions of our knowledge and are based on the presupposition of the value of those truths which empirical knowledge alone is able to give us. The means available to our science offer nothing to those persons to whom this truth is of no value. It should be remembered that the belief in the value of scientific truth is the product of certain cultures and is not a product of man’s original nature (Weber, 1977:36).

Weber uses the term “truth” very loosely. He did not see science as uncovering truth in its absolutist sense. Truth is in the eye of the beholder.
For scientific truth is precisely what is valid for all who seek the truth (Weber, 1977:33).

Science, then, is a tool we use to make sense of the world as it is perceived by us. It is a method of categorizing and understanding the world. Empirical data are always seen through value laden categories. Pure "objectivity" is not possible.

In the empirical social sciences . . . the possibility of meaningful knowledge of what is essential for us in the infinite richness of events is bound up with the unremitting application of viewpoints of a specifically particularized character, which, in the last analysis, are oriented on the basis of evaluative ideas. These evaluative ideas are for their part empirically discoverable and analyzable as elements of meaningful human conduct, but their validity can not be deduced from empirical data as such. The "objectivity" of the social sciences depends rather on the fact that the empirical data are always related to those evaluative ideas which alone make them worth knowing and the significance of the empirical data is derived from these evaluative ideas (Weber, 1977:36-37)

The essence of "science as a tool" or social convention can be seen in a lengthy discussion of the multiplication table. Weber states that:

For the purposes of empirical, sociological or historical analysis, our multiplication table, as the object of such an analysis, is a maxim of practical conduct which is valid according to the conventions of a given culture and which is adhered to more or less closely. It is nothing more than this (Weber, 1949:39).

He goes on to say:

This transformation of normatively valid truths into conventionally valid opinions, to which all intellectual activities, including even logic or mathematics, are subject whenever they become the objects of empirical analysis is completely independent of the fact that the normative validity of
logical and mathematical propositions is at the same time that *a priori* basis of all empirical science. . . . one must guard one's self against the belief that . . . what is normatively correct has, from the point of view of logic, the same function as it has in its general position as the *a priori* of all scientific investigation. . . . The means employed by the method of "understanding explanation" are not *normative* correctness, but rather, . . . the conventional habits of the investigator and teacher in thinking in a particular way (Weber, 1949:40-41).

Therefore, while we use science as the measure of truth, it is not truth in the absolutist sense. It is the *means* we use to make sense of society. The danger for policy analysis in seeing science as uncovering truth lies in the fact that this view fails to see that there exists other "truths" that are equally valid. The "truth" of minority poor could be extremely different from the "truth" as perceived by white university educated researchers.

Weber's views on science seem to have more in common with what Hawkesworth terms depoliticizing scientism than with the strictly cost-benefit analysis model he labels "Weberian". This view uncovers science as an ideology and is critical of value judgements posing as "facts". Value freedom when applied to Weber's ideas is itself a misnomer, for it is clear that he could not have felt that any meaningful human activity can be truly value free. Value honesty is perhaps a better term, for Weber surely felt that the teacher and scientist should make clear the value judgements embodied in their work.

It is also clear that Weber did not see the discipline as isolated from the world of action. He rejects the idea of abstract laws of human behavior. The world of action informs and defines the world of the discipline.

. . . an "objective" analysis of cultural events, which proceeds according
to the thesis that the ideal of science is the reduction of empirical reality of "laws" is meaningless. It is not meaningless ... because cultural or psychic events for instance are "objectively" less governed by laws. It is meaningless for a number of other reasons. Firstly, because the knowledge of social laws is not knowledge of social reality but is rather one of the various aids used by our minds for attaining this end; secondly, because knowledge of cultural events is inconceivable except on a basis of the significance which the concrete constellations of reality have for use in certain individual concrete situations. ... "Culture" is a finite segment of the meaningless infinity of the world process, a segment on which human beings confer meaning and significance (Weber, 1977:30-31).

Social science is inconceivable when separated from social action. The world of action gives meaning to the world of the discipline. This is more than saying that the world of action defines the problems that the discipline studies. Though Weber certainly felt that that is also true, it means that separate from the world of action, the world of the discipline does not exist in any meaningful way. This dismisses the notion of research occurring in an "ivory tower". For even inside such a tower, influences from the "tainted" world at large permeate. Those who are skeptical of this fact are advised to attempt to fund research for which no outside grant agency has a vested interest.

Hawkesworth describes his "Weberian" model as:

Policy-making develops from a process dominated by politics to a process in which expertise plays an increasingly significant role ... society becomes more fully rationalized, partisan politics gives way to scientific investigation of the most efficient means to realize policy objectives (Hawkesworth, 1988:17).

This increasing "rationalization" of society and the displacement of politics by science is something that Weber decries. Weber describes two types of rationality,
one based on means-ends calculations and another based on consistency with values (Weber, 1978). The increasing "rationalization" of society is simply the replacement of value rational action by means-ends rational action. In fact, Weber saw this trend as "an abomination to every system of fraternal ethics" (Brubaker, 1984:3). Weber evaluates a "rational" society harshly:

Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved (Weber, 1989:182).

Given these views of Weber's it is unclear how Hawkesworth can credit him with such a scientistic model. Weber clearly states that:

... in the area of practical political value-judgements, (especially in the fields of economics and social policy), as soon as guidance for a valued course of action is to be sought, all that an empirical discipline with the means at its disposal can show is (i) the unavoidable means; (ii) the unavoidable side-effects; (iii) the resulting conflict of several possible value-judgments with each other in their practical consequences. ... All are entirely matters of choice or of compromise. There is no scientific procedure, either rational or empirical, of any kind which could provide a decision in such cases. Least of all can our strictly empirical science presume to spare the individual the necessity of making this choice, and so it should not even give the impression of being able to do so (Weber, 1978:85).

Weber states in many places that science cannot and should not attempt to provide answers to policy questions.
Each new fact may necessitate the re-adjustment of the relations between end and indispensable means, between desired goals and unavoidable subsidiary consequences. But whether this readjustment should be the practical conclusions to be drawn therefrom is not answerable by empirical science... (Weber, 1949:23).

Science explains relationships between means and ends, and between goals and consequences, but cannot give guidance as to what society should do.

Science should especially avoid legitimating any one pattern of behavior over any other. In a discussion on whether people behave in certain ways in order to "succeed", Weber agreed that that seemed to be a trend, but that science should not advocate this behavior as "correct".

In any case, it is not easily intelligible why the practitioners of an empirical science should feel the need of furthering this kind of behavior by providing their salute of approval for existing "trends". Nor do we see why empirical scientists should transform the adaptation to these "trends" from an ultimate value-problem, to be solved only by the individual as his conscience dictates with reference to each particular situation, into a principle ostensibly based on the authority of a "science" (Weber, 1949:23).

... even indisputably "technically correct" economic actions are not validated through this quality alone (Weber, 1949:38).

Social actions can be judged both by how well they achieve a desired goal or by how consistent they are with a given value orientation. Both evaluations are valid. Only a value judgement can decide which evaluation is "best":

... actions are to be judged not merely by their instrumental value but by their intrinsic value as well. In any case, the failure to recognize this fact impedes our understanding of reality (Weber, 1949:24).
“Correct” in an empirical sense does not equal “correct” in the social context. Weber states that there are three things that social science can offer to policy analysis: unavoidable means, unavoidable side-effects, and the resulting conflict between several value judgements. Beyond this, science does not employ the means to settle policy questions, for there one enters the realm of value judgements.

Only in the case of an unambiguous end can science attempt to provide answer to policy questions

Strictly and exclusively empirical analysis can provide a solution only where it is a question of a means adequate to the realization of an absolute unambiguously given end (Weber, 1949:26.)

Weber's definition of "unambiguous" makes clear that these types of ends are a luxury not afforded to policy analysis:

The evaluations are unambiguous only when the economic end and the social context are definitely given and all that remains is to choose between several economic means, when these differ only with respect to their certainty, rapidity, and quantitative productiveness, and are completely identical in every other value-relevant aspect (Weber, 1949:37-38).

Weber felt that social science should study values. It is only through comprehensive study of values and value orientations that science can hope to accomplish its task in an ethically neutral fashion. By uncovering the cultural and personal baggage carried by the social scientist, science can step closer to value freedom. But one should be careful to remember that like ideal types, true value freedom does not exist in reality (Weber, 1949).
We are far removed, then, from the view that the demand for the exclusion of value-judgements in empirical analysis implies that discussions of evaluations are sterile or meaningless. ... Such discussions assume an insight into the possibility of, in principle, unbridgeably divergent ultimate evaluations. ... First, we should reject Schmoller's implication that ethical imperatives are identical with "cultural values"—even the highest of them. For, from a certain standpoint, "cultural values" are "obligatory"—even where they are in inevitable and irreconcilable conflict with every sort of ethics (Weber, 1949:14-15).

Value judgements themselves point out fruitful soil for research. A good example of such research is Weber's *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (Weber, 1989).

The utility of a discussion of practical evaluations... can be extremely valuable for empirical research in the sense that it provides it with problems for investigation (Weber, 1949:21).

Weber saw Sociology itself as primarily concerned with interpretive understanding of social action.

Sociology is a science concerning itself with the interpretive understanding of social action and thereby with a causal explanation of its course and consequences. We shall speak of "action" insofar as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to his behavior—be it overt or covert. Action is "social" insofar as its subjective meaning takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course (Weber, 1977:38).

Understanding social action entails not only the exploration of causal linkages but also an understanding of motive, values, and how value orientations motivate individuals to act. Weber did not assume that all human behavior was empirically
rational. Much behavior is value oriented and this too must be the subject of Sociology. Value free science alone cannot perform this task.

We cannot discover, however, what is meaningful to us by means of a "presuppositionless" investigation of empirical data. Rather perception of its meaningfulness to us is the presupposition of its becoming an object of investigation (Weber, 1977:28).
5. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The policy analyst then should study how value orientation influences action and leave value judgements to politics:

... the view which must be opposed most decisively of all is the frequently found idea that the way to achieve scientific 'objectivity' is to balance the various value-judgements against each other and thus arrive at a 'statesman-like' compromise between them. ... It does not belong in the lecture hall, but in the political programme, the government department and the parliament. The sciences, both normative and empirical, can perform only one invaluable service for the politicians and the opposing parties, and that is to say to them: (i) there are such and such conceivable 'ultimate' positions to be taken on this practical problem; (ii) such and such are the facts which you must take account of in choosing between these positions (Weber, 1978:77).

This repudiates Hawkesworth's claim that Weber advocated scientists take over for politicians.

The value relevance of phenomena must be included in any study. As a policy analyst in the Weberian tradition then, it is important to explore why an issue is important, not only to the researcher and various interest groups, but to society in general, and not to get side-tracked in the pursuit of empirical "laws". These are not questions answerable by "science".
We have designated as "cultural sciences" those disciplines which analyze the phenomena of life in terms of their cultural significance. The significance of a configuration of cultural phenomena and the basis of this significance cannot however be derived and rendered intelligible by a system of analytical laws . . . (Weber, 1977:27).

The explication of causal laws are only the means of an investigation (Weber, 1977). The fact that Puritans would choose to maximize their earthly wealth is not as interesting as why they chose to do so. Therefore knowing that welfare payments are an ineffective means of eliminating poverty is not as important as knowing the mechanism at work that causes this to be the case.

For Weber, "to predict in order to control" is not the mandate as it is for Durkheim. Weber was much more interested in explaining in order to understand. To do this, he did not find general laws of behavior very useful.

The focus of attention on reality under the guidance of values which lend it significance and the selection and ordering of phenomena which are thus affected in the light of their cultural significance is entirely different from the analysis of reality in terms of laws and general concepts . . . Wherever the causal explanation of a "cultural phenomenon" . . . is under consideration, the knowledge of causal laws is not the end of the investigation but only a means. It facilitates and renders possible the causal imputation to their concrete causes of those components of a phenomenon the individuality of which is culturally significant. . . . And the more "general", i.e., the more abstract the laws, the less they can contribute to the causal imputation of individual phenomena, and more indirectly, to the understanding of the significance of cultural events (Weber, 1977:28-29).

In summary:
In the empirical social sciences, . . . the possibility of meaningful knowledge of what is essential for use in the infinite richness of events is bound up with the unremitting application of viewpoints of a specifically particularized character, which, in the last analysis, are oriented on the basis of evaluative ideas. These evaluative ideas are for their part empirically discoverable and analyzable as elements of meaningful human conduct, but their validity cannot be deduced from empirical data as such. The "objectivity" of the social sciences depends rather on the fact that the empirical data are always related to those evaluative ideas which alone make them worth knowing and the significance of the empirical data is derived from these evaluative ideas (Weber, 1977:36-37).

From this point of view, it is more important for the policy analyst to study the value judgements involved in following various public policy decisions than to simply advocate the adoption of the most "effective" policy.

Popular conceptions of Weber as the champion of "value freedom" (as it is commonly understood) or as mute on the question of the role of sociology in social change are ill conceived. Weber sets up value freedom as an unreachable ideal type for the scientist to strive for and to use in a critical assessment of science. Policy analysts should, from Weber's point of view, continually study not only causal linkages but more importantly the value judgements embodied in the study of these linkages. In fact, Weber saw the discovery of causal linkages as a means to the better understanding of value orientations.

We do not study phenomena presuppositionlessly because all social phenomena is charged with meaning. Rather we choose to study phenomena and choose to explore various causal linkages based on what is of value to ourselves and society.

Regardless of how one conceives of the "validity of the values is in any case something which is an empirical truth, even if both should in the
last analysis also be conceived of philosophically as normatively bound. The "points of view", which are oriented towards "values", from which we consider cultural objects and from which they become "objects" of historical research, change (Weber, 1949:159)
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PART III.

SCHOLARS IN THE IRON CAGE
1. ABSTRACT

The ideology of value freedom and the inherent mythology of academic freedom has led to an epidemic of value blindness in academics. This value blindness creates serious dilemmas for modern academics. This paper discusses the historical context of the concept of value freedom with particular attention being given to the writings of Max Weber. The relationship between value freedom and academic freedom, and its implications for modern academics are outlined.
2. INTRODUCTION

Our society is preoccupied with a form of cold, calculating, means-ends rationality. It has led to the reification of an ideology of “value-freedom” in academic institutions, and has been facilitated to some degree by the exclusion of value oriented rationality from scholarly thought and writing. The current usage of the term rationality only incorporates the search for the appropriate means to a given end, with both evaluated from the point of view of the observer and not the actor. The exclusion of values from the application of rationality leads to the exclusion of values in science, for values are not required for means-ends judgements. Therefore, science has come to be seen as valid if it is value-free.

However, the error in this conclusion arises in that the first premise is flawed, for rational action can be value oriented. This point is beautifully made by Weber when he points out that science cannot be truly value-free because the “facts” we choose to study are chosen from a value laden context. Some “things” and not others are of interest to science only because they hold some value for the scientist or for society. Ignorance of this point of view has led modern academics into a state of value blindness, for in the guise of being value-free, we have turned a blind eye to the values embedded in our research and in the whole academic process. This has lulled the academic into a false sense of security that often masquerades as "academic
"freedom". The truth is often far uglier.
3. HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT

It will perhaps be of some interest to find the origins of the thesis of value freedom. The first point to make concerns the so-called “Is-Ought”, “Fact-Value” or “Descriptive-Prescriptive” distinction, which serves as the core concept underlying many versions of the value neutrality thesis.

David Hume (Hume, 1975) made the point that logic can never allow us to derive an “ought” from an “is”. That is, no statement of value can be logically derived from factual premises alone. While this may be true enough, what does it prove? For one thing, Hume assumes that only deductive justifications are possible. But if there are other ways of justifying assertions, then Hume’s argument only shows that any attempt to justify value judgements by deductive syllogisms with only factual premises will fail. That is about all that this point by Hume proves.

However, Hume has another argument, which has a bearing on the idea of value freedom. For Hume, inductive or empirical reasoning is always seen as circular, and hence invalid, both in science and elsewhere (Hume, 1955). It follows from this, and from Hume’s arguments, that deduction cannot increase empirical—including scientific—knowledge which is based on habit, psychology and custom, and is thus not rational (Hume, 1975).

Hume did not believe, however, that value judgements are any more (or less) ir-
rational than scientific judgements. Moreover Hume had a "naturalistic" view about values; that is, value judgements are rooted in universal human facts regarding sympathy: this is a view he shared with the British Moralists such as Adam Smith, and the writers of the Scottish Enlightenment (Hume, 1975). Consequently value judgements, though different from factual, are not inferior to them.

Hume (1957), indeed, can be seen as the first modern thinker to spell out the idea of value relevance. Specifically, according to Hume (1957), all our beliefs, scientific and otherwise, are rooted in, and colored by, human nature, including feelings and psychological mechanisms; Custom is king; and habit and instincts serve this ruler as the only guides in life. All our beliefs, including science, logic, and mathematics are rooted in and colored by facts about human nature.

Emmanuel Kant, who wanted to refute Hume's sceptical conclusions, divided reason into three mutually independent but complimentary spheres: science, morality, and aesthetics. This is a view Weber made use of in defending his thesis of value neutrality. For Kant, then, each type of claim has its legitimate uses and limits and they are, moreover, complementary, for science leaves off where morality begins. The two do not conflict; nor do they have any relations with each other (Kant, 1965). The crux of the matter is that facts and values belong to different spheres.

In addition, Kant's (1964) "Copernican revolution in philosophy" developed the idea that experience is always categorized and structured by built in cognitive-interpretive principles of the human mind, and that reality for us is, therefore, always human reality. This is supposed to limit knowledge to save religion and morality but it does so at a cost: Moral judgements are not knowledge, and can only be "proved" on pragmatic grounds and formal criteria of consistency. Further, for Kant, objectiv-
ity refers to the object of possible experience or knowledge, which implies the same result: moral judgements are not objects of knowledge, for only science yields knowledge (of objects of experience). There were many writers after Kant, notably Hegel, on the one hand, and Positivists, on the other, who modified the views of Kant and Hume, in various ways, which cannot be detailed here. Briefly, Hegel historicized knowledge and the categories, whereas the Positivists rendered value judgements as either subjective or as naturalized data, reducible to science.
4. RELATED ISSUES

In this regard, there are several other background developments which deserve mention. The first is Nietzsche’s view of the world as a Heracleitian flux that can only be understood as an aesthetic phenomenon. There is no fixed, objective, determinate reality to discover; no properties or structures that constitute “the truth”. Everything is an interpretation, rooted in the values and perspectives of the knower and culture, which in turn are outgrowths of the conditions required for each type of person and culture to enhance their lives. Truth, according to Nietzsche, are those kinds of errors, falsifications and simplifications which are necessary for a type of life.

Nietzsche’s perspectivism, which casts doubt on the ideas of objectivity, truth, knowledge, reality, and connects inquiry with interpretation and values, influences the Neo-Kantians, and especially Weber, whose thesis of value relevance is a direct application of Nietzsche’s ideas. There are many perspectives, interests, values; all are limited and incomplete, require interpretation (ideal types), and preclude the sort of methods which talk of objective, disinterested ways of absorbing hard facts. Yet the idea of value freedom requires that a certain amount of objectivity (in the form of meaning and causal adequacy) is both desirable and achievable.

In the second issue, the development of the German idea of Geisteswissenschaften or human sciences, as an attack on Positivism, which was influenced by Romanti-
cism and late 19th century Historicism (Dilthey), rejected the fact-value distinction and argued that all knowledge of culture must be both interpretive and inextricably value-laden. In this view, all spheres of culture and life are interconnected in an Hegelian fashion. It is this movement which gave rise to a crisis in methodology which culminated in Weber's many writings on the subject of methodology (Proctor, 1991; Bryant, 1985; Brunn, 1972; and Oakes, 1988).

Writers such as Dilthey seemed to historicize all human knowledge and categories, and thus appeared to defend historical and value relativism. His work had a major influence on the Neo-Kantian movements that form the immediate background for Weber. Windleband, Rickert and other members of the so-called Southwestern School (Oakes and Bergner, 1981; Kohnke, 1991; Aaron, 1978; and Liebersohn, 1988) grappled with questions about nature and history, the natural sciences and the cultural sciences, the role of values in methodology, choice of perspective and judgement. In addition, the Methodenstreit — could Economics be a positive science or only an historical discipline — played a major role in these developments (Bryant, 1985).

Weber, a student of Rickert, attempted to solve these controversies by reconciling the various positions on the methodological questions about the human sciences by combining the concepts of "meaning adequacy" and "causal adequacy". His method of "ideal types" addresses the problems of Nietzsche's perspectivism that is, how to take one point of view and still achieve some kind of "objective" results. Contrary to Rickert, the values from which we take our bearings in research are not that of the individual, which are subjective values, but rather those of the culture, and the cultural significance of historical and social phenomena tends to determine our research perspective. These are values that are real from a cultural point of view. We
can overcome Rickert's *hiatus irrationalis* (the metaphysical gap between the "ought" and the "is" and, the world of repeatable, general laws and the unique individual) only in this way (Oakes, 1986; Oakes, 1988; Burger, 1976; and Huff, 1984).
5. IDEOLOGY OF VALUE FREEDOM

While in the field of sociology the mandate for value free research is most often credited to Max Weber, his conceptualization of the term was more complex than its current usage. Weber made use of two concepts in his writings on the methodology of the social sciences that bear on this discussion: "value judgements" and "value relevance". Weber (1949:10) defined value judgements as: "practical evaluations regarding the desirability or undesirability of social facts from ethical, cultural or other points of view". Value relevance is defined by Weber (1949:22) as:

the philosophical interpretation of that specifically scientific 'interest' which determines the selection of a given subject-matter and the problems of an empirical analysis.

These two concepts relate to value freedom in that value judgements refer to the positive or negative evaluations given a thing, while value relevance refers to the interest taken in a thing. An example can be made in the case of Sociology's historic lack of study of women's lives. To say that this occurred because women's lives are less interesting than the lives of men is clearly a value judgement. To say that it occurred because to date most sociologist have been men, and therefore did not perceive women's lives as distinct subjects of study, exposes the value relevance of the decision. The first is a conscious decision on the part of the actor, while the
second represents a blind spot in a particular world view.

Weber’s view on value freedom stemmed from his transformation of values into subjective preferences (thus rejecting Hume’s naturalism), which he said are privatized in the interests of defending Luther’s notion of the “calling”: ultimate value judgements, including the (Kantian) values of Liberalism and Humanism, express the person’s life choices in the iron cage. Science cannot and should not prove or disprove ultimate value judgements: as this would limit the individual’s freedom, and destroy the last vestige of the kind of ultimate values that Kant wanted to defend against scientific encroachment.

For Weber, the iron cage is constructed by the emphasis modern culture places on means-ends rational conduct (Weber, 1989). This process of rationalization constrains the individual by excluding from legitimate behavior that which is value rational, non-rational, or irrational. For Weber this is a tragedy only escapable, if at all, through ultimate value judgements made by the individual.

The scholar must adopt a harsh ethic of responsibility and self-control, and divide his or her life in just the way modern culture is divided into spheres of existence. One can, therefore, only save values by privatizing them, and making value judgements matters of personal choice (Lassman and Velody, 1989). One can, in keeping with the thesis of value relevance, take certain values as given without endorsing them, for research purposes. But value judgements, as terms of approval, disapproval and appraisal, must be kept private and outside the sphere of professional work. This was Weber’s response to the political and moral controversies surrounding the Verein fur Sozialpolitik (Proctor, 1987), which are most clearly worked out in his two great lectures, “Science as a Vocation” and “Politics as a Vocation” (Gerth and Mills, 1946;
Science, because it is limited, can only give us empirical knowledge and conversely, value judgements can never be proven or disproven because they lie outside the realm of science, even though (contrary to Kant) science is ethically relevant to responsible individuals who recognize the need to consider the consequences of their private judgements and values/ideals in the modern world of the iron cage.

Weber's (1949) main objection to value judgements came about because of his objection to some teachers of his day posing their political opinions as scientific facts. In his essay, "The Meaning of "Ethical Neutrality" in Sociology and Economics", Weber (1949:1) states that the problem of value freedom in science is not equivalent to, "whether in teaching one should declare one's acceptance of practical value-judgements. . . ". Thus, whether or not science is value free is not the same issue as whether a teacher has the right to disguise value judgements as scientific fact.

However adamant Weber (1949) was that the professor has no right to impose value judgements on students in the lecture hall, he feels that this is a value judgement and is distinct from the question of value judgements in the social sciences. His reasoning, in making this distinction, is made clear with the second concept "value relevance". This philosophical interpretation determines the selection of problems for empirical analysis (Weber, 1949). As Weber (1977:36-37) put it,

In the empirical social sciences . . . the possibility of meaningful knowledge of what is essential for us in the infinite richness of events is bound up with the unremitting application of viewpoints of a specifically particularized character, which, in the last analysis, are oriented on the basis of evaluative ideas. These evaluative ideas are for their part empirically
discoverable and analyzable as elements of meaningful human conduct, but their validity cannot be deduced from empirical data as such. The “objectivity” of the social sciences depends rather on the fact that the empirical data are always related to those evaluative ideas which alone make them worth knowing and the significance of the empirical data is derived from these evaluative ideas.

The value a thing holds for society is what makes it of interest to science. Yet we must not deceive ourselves that science uncovers “objective” truth, for the “facts themselves” are only available to science if they fit into the value relevant schema of the scientist. “Truth”, therefore, is only true from a particular viewpoint. Weber (1977:31-32) adds that

All knowledge of cultural reality... is knowledge from particular points of view... If the notion that those standpoints can be derived from the “facts themselves” continually recurs, it is due to the naive self-deception of the specialist who is unaware that it is due to the evaluative ideas with which he unconsciously approaches his subject matter, that he has selected from an absolute infinity a tiny portion with the study of which he concerns himself.

Weber saw science as a value-laden enterprise precisely because it is bound up in culture. It was Weber’s (1977:36-37) position that the contribution of a social science lay in exposing these value orientations, adding that,

The “objectivity” of the social sciences depends rather on the fact that the empirical data are always related to those evaluative ideas which alone make them worth knowing and the significance of the empirical data is derived from these evaluative ideas.

It is clear from his writings that Weber does not assume value freedom is invested either in the university or in science, therefore, the use of “value freedom” as a
justification for ignoring the values embedded in the scientific enterprise makes a mockery of the true nature of the concept of "value freedom". Weber's intention was for science to make explicate its value orientation thereby freeing itself to scrutinize those values. The current usage of the concept of "value freedom" used as an ideology merely obscures value orientations.

The dangers of such an ideology of value freedom can be seen in university research. With a few exceptions, research in today's university tends to be carried out only because someone, somewhere, has both a vested interest in the outcome and the means to pay for it, and rarely are the value assumptions of the buyer or the researcher scrutinized. Research without a buyer must be conducted in a scholar's spare-time and without financial support. This situation sets up a dichotomy between research conducted for vested interests and research conducted purely for the purpose of discovery and extension of knowledge, which is often discussed in the academic debate over "applied" verses "basic" research.

"Applied" research is often that research which someone is willing to pay for, and "basic" research is that for which no immediate market use has been found. The result of this problem is that the myth of value freedom allows the scholar to ignore the extent to which the university has been transformed into a profit-seeking rather than a knowledge-seeking institution. Scholars can pretend to be pursuing knowledge in their fields irrespective of the use to which others put this knowledge. This ideology creates an epidemic of value blindness.

Many researchers at land-grant institutions are currently working on problems surrounding biotechnology areas such as gene splicing, transgenis and the expression of specific traits in a plant. In many cases the researchers argue that they are doing
very basic science, often at the cutting edge of high technology questions. However, this represents an act of self-deception, for without corporate/governmental/foundation funding it is unlikely that scientists would be attempting to create herbicide resistant food crops, cows who produce more milk, or beef that is palatable to the Japanese. Indeed, as many observers (Blumenthal et. al., 1986a,b) have noted, this profit-driven activity has come to be the "tail that wags the dog," as research money from external sources has come to be increasingly central to the budgets of large research universities.
6. VALUE FREEDOM OR VALUE BLINDNESS?

The world view of rational science carries with it the assumption that science is value free. Simply put, this means that the methods of science and the training of the scientist remove from science all value judgements. Scientists, this view holds, should not concern themselves with values because the rational methods of science and the objective eye of the scientist will surely ensure the exclusion of value judgements. Yet, the choosing of a subject to study and the categories used to study it are always value laden steps. Science must be understood to constitute merely one point of view among many, for as Weber (1977:36) pointed out there is a:

... hair-line which separates science from faith ... The objective validity of all empirical knowledge rests exclusively upon the ordering of the given reality according to categories which are subjective in a specific sense, namely, in that they present the presuppositions of our knowledge and are based on the presupposition of the value of those truths which empirical knowledge alone is able to give us. The means available to our science offer nothing to those persons to whom this truth is of no value. It should be remembered that the belief in the value of scientific truth is the product of certain cultures and is not a product of man's original nature.

Scientists should never overlook the values embedded in scientific work, for science is an agreed-upon means of viewing our world, nothing more. While it should be a concern of all scientists, those doing research "for hire" must especially understand
that they cannot assume the "facts" they find are untainted simply because they adhere to the strictures of the scientific method.

Ignoring the values embedded in their work permits scholars to safely overlook the fact that they may have chosen their research topics based on the availability of funding provided by vested interest groups who may control the topic, the extent of the research, its duration, the data collected, and the publication and dissemination of findings. Scholars in recent years have demonstrated a well-developed ability to ignore the difficulty and ethics of reaching findings that are unpleasant to the sponsors of research. This may well be due, in part, to the myth of academic freedom in the university.
7. VALUE FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM

It is necessary to separate the concept of "value freedom" from that of "academic freedom". While "value freedom" refers to the supposed absence of values from a true scientific enterprise, "academic freedom" refers to the freedom of the academic to pursue topics free from constraints imposed by institutional or external forces (Tight, 1988). In the case of "academic freedom," the institution promises to shield the academic from all interference with their work other than that of peer review, and thus the academic should be free to pursue and report any line of research so long as the quality standards of the discipline are met. In practice this is far from the case, for there are many constraints placed on academic research that interfere with academic freedom. Some of these constraints are discussed below:

(1) Funding Issues: First of all, there is the constraint imposed by funding. Due to current budget constraints, much university research today must be carried out at the largess of an external grantor. The grantor is usually very specific about the nature, duration, and use of the research for which they are willing to pay. These constraints can often be in conflict with the interests of extending knowledge in the academic area. Thus, not only is the topic defined from outside of the discipline, the length of the study is predetermined and is often much shorter than most academics would prefer. Also, very little follow-up or replication research is funded. Reporting of
the findings for academic purposes should be detailed and timely, two characteristics that may not promote the interests of the grantor. The grantor may ask that the findings of research commissioned to create a competitive edge for the grantor be suppressed or only partially reported. If the findings of the research are unfavorable to the grantor, they may refuse to allow the publication of the findings.

(2) Applied/Basic: A second constraint on academic freedom is self-imposed and relates to value relevance. Most academic disciplines in the university succumb to some form of the “applied” verses “basic” debate, where “applied” research is often granted the higher status because it brings more money into the university. It is seen as better for a scientist’s career to do “applied” research than to be engaged in the more esoteric “basic” research, and graduate students are encouraged to pursue more “applied” aspects of their fields of study. In sociology, this phenomenon manifests itself in the proliferation of statistic and methodology courses in graduate curricula and the disappearance of theory courses.

Academics, therefore, end up spending a considerable amount of their time seeking clients and “real” problems rather than purely trying to extend the frontiers of knowledge. Thus, a considerable portion of available research topics have been excluded from the perception of scholars.

The plight of the scholar parallels the lot of modern humanity as described by Weber, for while the Puritan wanted to work in a calling, we are forced to do so. Since the turn of the century, many reformist minded scholars sought to apply their knowledge to concrete problems and served as consultants to business and government. Yet this desire on the part of some has become an iron cage that imprisons us all.
The over abundance of research done for clients having narrow, utilitarian interests is not, in and of itself, an evil, but it does point to a disproportionate allocation of resources to these parts of the university which generate profits in the form of research funding. What this does, most importantly, is to transform the university from its commonly understood role in knowledge production and distribution.

The university as an institution, which appeared in Western societies in the Middle Ages, was classically defined as an entity apart from the mainstream of commerce and politics. In this role the university has served scientifically oriented societies as an honest broker of information and an unbiased tester of products and ideas. For example, during the early part of this century, American land-grant universities began to objectively test products such as farm equipment, (at the University of Nebraska) and many others.

These university trials were seen as a cold, objective tests by uninvolved scientists. This role is at risk because modern universities are rapidly becoming not materially different from for-profit corporate research-and-development companies. In many situations today, researchers at universities operate as if they are employees of for-profit corporations, in that their research topics, methods, materials and approaches may be dictated by the purchaser of the services.

In further violation of the traditional free flow of information, these research contracts may specify that results or products of the research become the property of the funding agency. Findings must often be vetted through funders before they can be published. In light of these kinds of developments, some have raised troubling issues for universities, such as whether universities should retain a tax exemption when it is little more than a publicly supported private enterprise.
These unsettling facts are obscured by the ideology of "value freedom". Behind this veil of mythological value freedom hides the truth that American academics sell knowledge production to the highest bidder.
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Defining rationality in a purely means-ends context allows science to pretend to be able to prescribe what course society ought take. This places science in the role of social prophet. Science in turn must take on the mantel of value freedom so that it will not appear to be directed by specific interests. Science must also invent the myth of academic freedom in order that scholars may remain blissfully blind to the interests inherent in their research. What these papers strive to show is that Weber clearly understood these difficulties and that he prescribed a remedy. Values and value orientations should be central to the study of society. One cannot proclaim that one value orientation is superior to another through science, but science can explore how values influence behavior. Such study of values would be beneficial not only to science in exposing the values inherent to it, but also to society in making clear the values underlying policy decisions.
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