

2011

# Connecting strength of state-based identity to globalization: Case studies of post-Soviet Estonia and Moldova

Rachael Anne Voas  
*Iowa State University*

Follow this and additional works at: <https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd>

 Part of the [Political Science Commons](#)

---

## Recommended Citation

Voas, Rachael Anne, "Connecting strength of state-based identity to globalization: Case studies of post-Soviet Estonia and Moldova" (2011). *Graduate Theses and Dissertations*. 10265.  
<https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/10265>

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [digirep@iastate.edu](mailto:digirep@iastate.edu).

**Connecting strength of state-based identity to globalization: Case studies of post-Soviet**

**Estonia and Moldova**

by

**Rachael Anne Voas**

A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS**

Major: Political Science

Program of Study Committee:  
Richard W. Mansbach, Major Professor  
Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham  
Robert Urbatsch

Iowa State University

Ames, Iowa

2011

Copyright © Rachael Anne Voas, 2011. All Rights Reserved

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES	iv
LIST OF TABLES	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	vi
ABSTRACT	viii
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 2. OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE	5
What is Globalization?	5
Skeptics	8
Hyperglobalizers	9
Transformationalists	9
What is Identity?	10
Collective Identity under Globalization	11
Relationship between globalization and the nationality principle	12
Proliferation of different kinds of national projects	14
Globalization and non-territorial identity	16
Hybridization of identities	17
Globalization and State-based Identity	19
CHAPTER 3. THEORY AND RESEARCH QUESTION	21
State-based Identity Theory	22
Promulgation through Socialization	24
State-based Identity and Globalization	28
Research Question	29
CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY	30
Dimensions of Globalization	31
2011 KOF Index of Globalization	31
Economic Globalization	32
Political Globalization	33
Social Globalization	33
Discussion of Case Selection	34
Factors to Account for in Case Studies	36

CHAPTER 5. ESTONIA	41
History of the State	41
Forging a Nation	44
Language	46
Identity and Language	46
Globalization and Language	47
State Policies	48
Education	48
Becoming a Citizen	49
Global or Local? Estonian Cyber-attacks	50
Globalization in Estonia	52
Conclusion	55
CHAPTER 6. MOLDOVA	57
History of the State	57
Forging a Nation – or National Forgery?	59
Language	61
Identity and Language	61
Globalization and Language	62
State Policies	63
Education	63
Becoming a Citizen	64
Global or Local? Local identity prioritized in the Transnistrian conflict	65
Globalization in Moldova	66
Conclusion	68
CHAPTER 7. CASE COMPARISON	70
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION	74
Future Study and Alternative Approach	74
Conclusion	75
APPENDIX. KOF INDEX OF GLOBALIZATION	78
REFERENCES	79

**LIST OF FIGURES**

Figure 1.	Globalization in Estonia	52
Figure 2.	Globalization in Moldova	66

**LIST OF TABLES**

Table one.	Conceptualizing globalization: three tendencies	8
------------	---	---

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A thesis does not write itself. I know—I tried.

I would like to take a moment to say thank you to all the wonderful people who went out of their way to help me throughout this creative endeavour. I offer my deepest gratitude to my major professor, Dr. Richard Mansbach. Throughout my undergraduate and graduate career he has been an inspiration, opening my mind to the wondrous web of politics and culture. Dr. Kathleen Cunningham, a treasure trove of advice (and helpful metaphors), was always generous with her encouragement. Her uncanny ability to narrow my general wonderings into an actionable to-do-list is appreciated tremendously. I already miss our weekly Starbucks meetings. Dr. Robert Urbatsch has offered much support even during the numerous times he considered my ideas completely off the wall. He has only thrown me out of his office once. For his patience, munificent comments on the thesis, and for taking the time to answer my unending list of questions, I thank him.

I offer my thanks to Dr. Mack Shelley, for fighting the zombies of graduate school life on our behalf. We students are lucky to have you. Dr. Anca Turcu, so very appreciated for her faith and friendship. Dr. Dirk Deam, many thanks for bringing heroes back into my life – and for teaching a class that was so spectacular that Thursday evenings have felt empty since. Dr. Jason Chrystal, not just a natty dresser but also a fine conversationalist – I shall miss being his neighbour.

My office-mates have been fantastic. Megan Fiddelke, from conference-buddy to office-mate, to thesis soul-mate, her clarity of thought, humour, and overarching

wonderfulness will always be treasured. Sean Bachman, my rock – quietly, confidently, and with humour managed to get me through the frustrations and the inexplicably regular crises associated with graduate life. Nathan Combes, always up for a challenge or two, I appreciate all that we went through. Sarabeth was always a fresh apparition in the office! I also thank my honorary office-mates: Michael Kostboth – the first person to call for leading any rebellion, and Liz Leuthauser – thanks for everything.

Bowon Chang shared her perspective in ways that helped to shape the way I view the world. Mark Nieman and Narren Brown revealed little of what I was getting myself into, and for that, amongst many other reasons, I thank you! Joyce Wray, Darlene Brace, and Sandy Foltz held up the walls of Ross Hall during the course of my studies with superb managing ability. For always knowing how to fix the plethora of issues that I brought into the office you deserve so much thanks and appreciation. Finally to my family – thank you for instilling in me a complete inability to bite off only what I can chew. My life is more interesting because of it.

Brian, Tyler, and Morgan. Thank you.

## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis is an exploratory look into the relationship between the strength of state-based identities and globalization. I argue that the differences in the state-based identity of Estonia and Moldova help explain their relative openness towards globalization. State-based identity strength is indicated by three factors: First, common culture – a solid collective memory that ties past, current, and future identity to the state. Second, language – indigenous language reinforces state-based identity, whereas vestiges of empire and a language foisted on the people by outsiders indicates a weaker state-based identity. Thirdly, state policies – education, citizenship requirements, and public holidays are used to illustrate how the state communicates identity to the population and molds loyalty of the collective. I find Estonia has a stronger state-based identity and engages with globalizing influences, whilst the weaker state-based identity of Moldova epitomizes the defensive perception of global influences leading to undermining state-based loyalties, therefore Moldova concentrates on internal issues, and is less engaging with globalization.

## CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

### *Introduction*

As globalization becomes more prevalent, a proliferation of collective identities emerge. These new identities are often compared directly or implicitly against the benchmark of state-based identity – the most salient and generalizable identity of the recent past (Kennedy and Danks 2001). Although used as a benchmark, there is a lack of investigation into variations in the strength of state-based identities. The history and contextual struggle of formation of state-based identities differs, as does their level of influence on collective identity today, thereby making the strength of state-based identities relevant to discussions of identity changes and challenges (Miller 1995, O’Byrne 2001). Of particular interest to scholars of both identity and globalization are the post-Soviet states of Eastern Europe. Those states were all stripped of the collective identity they had shared under Soviet rule and were “reborn” to the global stage at the implosion of the Soviet Union. Since then, the strength of their state-based identities and their engagement with globalization has varied.

The relationship between state-based identities and globalization is under-theorized. As explained below, I suggest in this thesis that variations in the strength of state-based identity changes the perceived threat level of globalization, explaining states’ engagement with, or attempts to inhibit globalizing influences. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and its political identity as leader of international communism, political mobilization in these states has changed. Are these relatively recently autonomous states welcoming of globalizing norms or threatened by a perceived erosion of state-based loyalties as the economic, social, and cultural influences of globalization potentially disconnect people within their borders

from their state-based identity? Do the contradictory yet concurrent forces of globalization and localization subvert or reinforce state-based identity? In pursuing the answers to these questions, my research offers support to my contention that the strength of state-based identity reveals important factors for understanding states' embrace of or discontent with globalization, and explores the consequences of political loyalties extending beyond the limits of the state in Eastern Europe.

In this thesis I will utilize a nuanced definition of globalization, focusing on interactions relevant to the socio-cultural dimensions of globalization.<sup>1</sup> Through two case studies focusing on Estonia and Moldova, I will assess the under-studied connection between the strength of state-based identity and the process and acceptance of globalization, and investigate the accompanying changes of collective identities at the state level. This leads to developing identity constructs that are transformative and uncertain, neither primordial nor unidirectional. Globalization has increased the level of agency available in the formation of collective identities, which are no longer dominated by sovereign state borders.<sup>2</sup> Which aspects of globalization are internalized to become norms, to become part of the identifying "we-ness," and which are rejected as being part of the global "other" are among the most interesting questions in International Relations (IR) today.

---

<sup>1</sup> As defined in the A.T. Kearney and KOF indices of globalization. The other dimensions are Economic and Political.

<sup>2</sup> Of course, there have always been alternatives to state-based identities; families, clans, and tribes have also held preeminence in earlier times, historically, these were commonly bounded by geography as well. The reduced capacity of state control over the internal face of sovereignty is what seems to be changing under non-territorial globalizing influences today. For a detailed view of the conflicting realities of the dominant strength of sovereign state-borders, see Krasner, Stephen D. 1999. *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

My research is focused on the relationship between globalization and state-based identity. I will delve into the historical development of state-based identity in Estonia and Moldova, the watershed ending of the Soviet control over their collective identity, and the response to globalization vis-à-vis its relationship to the strength of their state-based identity. The research presented below reveals a counter-intuitive result: I find that states with strong state-based identities are readily engaged with globalizing forces, embracing novel values and norms of the exogenous cultural influences, whilst implementing strong actions to preserve the values, traditions, and beliefs of the pre-existing cultural identity; because of there being a strong collective sense of identity they are open to the new experiences offered by the “other”. Conversely, I find states with weaker state-based identities to be more limited in their enactment of policies of cultural protectionism, and having a more limited engagement with globalizing influences, attempting to avoid floundering in the unknown by minimizing exposure to exogenous cultural influence. The cases chosen will offer insight into the Eastern European region, and the results of this research may prove useful when extrapolated to other areas of the world.

In Chapter One I have introduced my thesis and posited that the strength of state-based identity is linked to state reactions to globalization. The rest of this thesis will unfold in the following way: In Chapter Two I guide the reader through the globalization and identity literature, including looking at the theoretical side of globalization vis-à-vis the Held and McGrew typology of globalization: dividing globalization scholars into one of three categories, Hyperglobalists, Skeptics, or Transformationalists. This thesis builds from the transformationalist school as I move into the literature on collective identity. I review literature that fits into my four divisions of collective identity based on their relationship

between agency and territory. Chapter Three presents the state-based identity theory and discusses identity inculcation through socialization as a form of cultural protection.

In Chapter Four I present the methodology of the thesis, explaining my choice to use the KOF globalization index to measure globalization, discuss the case study selection and the structure of the upcoming case studies. The next chapters, Five and Six, apply my theory to the real world through two case studies – Estonia and Moldova – by looking at the history, language, education and collective-identity within each state and how that affects their reaction to globalization (measured by the KOF index). Comparing the theory to the cases, I will assess the viability of the connection proffered as a link, highlight similarities and differences in the cases and their implications, and recommend future paths of study. In the conclusion I return to the major points and offer my final thoughts.

## CHAPTER 2. OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE

### *What is Globalization?*

As is the case of so many social science concepts, there remains a lack of agreement in scholarly discourse about how to define globalization. That globalization cannot be measured by a common unit makes comparisons difficult; proxy measurements must be used as heuristics and are therefore open to subjective interpretations. There are many conceptualizations of globalization used by scholars looking at a variety of questions that add to the complexity of debate and even foster discord. On one extreme, Anthony McGrew presents *Schicksalsgemeinschaft* – a shared destiny of humanity united in one global community – is a “feel-good” way to view globalization.<sup>3</sup> At the other extreme, according to Susan Strange, since the globalization label may be universally applied as much to the Internet as to a hamburger, critics maintain that the very lack of a standard definition of globalization means that there is no point in studying it (Strange 1996).

Many definitions equate globalization with economic interdependence. These assess globalization solely by using economic measures. More encompassing conceptualizations, identifying globalization as a series of social as well as economic flows, incorporating the spread of people, goods, information and ideas – at a greater velocity, intensity, extensity, impact, and social-level saturation than the planet has ever experienced before – provide space for investigations not limited to economic boundaries (Blum 2007, Held and McGrew 1999, 2008).

---

<sup>3</sup> McGrew, A. (2008) p.16

However, defining globalization in terms of flows is not enough because it concentrates on an approach that moves from the “global” to the “local” and omits the give and take of local influences within the process. For this thesis, I conceptualize globalization as a dynamic process of interactions, constrained by neither physical borders nor psychological boundaries at the global, regional, and local levels of society. Paradoxically, actors must deal with these interactions even though, to a large extent, they cannot control them; globalization must be responded to directly at each level of society as part of the transformative process (Keohane and Nye 2000, Rosenau 2003, Ferguson and Mansbach 2004, Blum 2007, Nederveen Pieterse 2009). Not being limited to economic integration or to flows occurring at the system level, my definition notes a fundamental yet understudied aspect of globalization – that it cannot be assessed solely at the structural level and that the relationships formed are not always positive and linear as there may be contradictory interactions taking place.

Localization is one of the contradictory interactions, seemingly a freestanding concept, but actually fundamental to the understanding of the implementation of globalizing influences. Localization is assiduously pushing local norms, habits, beliefs, and traditions to the forefront of societal interactions, even at the expense of something potentially more “efficient” but which is regarded as having come from outside the cultural or historical psychological and physical space of the polity. This may be seen as a backlash to globalization (Rosenau 2003, Blum 2007). However, localization is not merely outright rejection: it is part of the on-going process of negotiating and renegotiating a newly constructed, and constantly changing intersubjective consensus of what is the appropriate

course to take to ensure the local culture and identity thrive in a multidimensional global political space.

Rather than following the presumptive “normal” flow of globalization affecting people locally, we can also look at theorizing how the local contributes to the global: after all, every influence that is classed as “globalizing” has nascent roots in territorial locations that are somebody’s “local”. Take for example, the “international popularity of Irish music, dance, film and pubs” leading some to claim a “Celtic culture revival.”<sup>4</sup> Rather than being steamrolled by globalization, Celtic national identity seems to be gathering global steam as the world-wide popularity of such spectacles as “Riverdance” suggests (Fagan 2001). By taking a multidimensional stance we can also highlight the multigenerational effects that globalization may have on people.

Conceptualizing globalization, Held and McGrew provide a typology that forms the standard for differentiation of scholarly views in globalization discourse – the three types are: Hyperglobalists, Skeptics, and Transformationalists (Held and McGrew 1999).

---

<sup>4</sup> Fagan (2001)

**Table one: Conceptualizing globalization: three tendencies**

	Hyperglobalization	Skeptics	Transformationalists
What's new	A global age	Trading blocs, weaker geogovernance than in earlier periods	Historically unprecedented levels of global interconnectedness
Dominant features	Global capitalism, global governance, global civil society	World less interdependent than in the 1890s	"Thick" (intensive and extensive) globalization
Power of national governments	Declining or eroding	Reinforced or enhanced	Reconstituted, restructured
Driving forces of globalization	Capitalism and technology	States and markets	Combined forces of modernity
Pattern of stratification	Erosion of old hierarchies	Increased marginalization of South	New architecture of world order
Dominant motif	McDonald's, Madonna, etc.	National interest	Transformation of political community
Conceptualization of globalization	As a reordering of the framework of human action	As internationalization and regionalization	As the reordering of interregional relations and action at a distance
Historical trajectory	Global civilization	Regional blocs/clash of civilizations	Indeterminate; global integration and fragmentation
Summary argument	The end of the nation-state	Internationalization depends on state acquiescence and support	Globalization transforming state power and world politics

Source: Mansbach, Richard W. and Kirsten L. Rafferty. 2008. Introduction to Global Politics. p. 747. NY: Routledge.

### *Skeptics*

Skeptics focus on the economic dimension of globalization. Skeptics minimize the notion of global culture or global governance in future, instead being of the view that states will maintain status as the primary actors in global interactions (Krasner 1995), with a strong tendency towards regionalism with world trade dividing into three main trading blocs:

Europe, Asia-Pacific, and North America (Held and McGrew 1999). Skeptics such as Niall Ferguson claim that globalization is not a new concept; indeed, he argues that from 1870 until World War I the interconnectedness of the world's economies looked much like it does today (Ferguson 2005).

### *Hyperglobalists*

Hyperglobalists, like skeptics, also focus on the economic dimension of globalization. Significantly different from skeptics, however, globalization is viewed as a new phenomenon to the hyperglobalizer, and the outcome is certain: with the retreat of the state (Strange 1996), a single world market is emerging. A borderless economy will replace the state-limited and regulated trade of today as national governments are undermined and begin to be unable to provide an authoritative allocation of values and resources to their citizens (Held and McGrew 1999).

### *Transformationalists*

Transformationalists do not identify a single cause/mechanism for globalization; that is, they look not just at the economic connections but are also drawn to the political and social dimensions of globalization. The outcome for society is unknown – change could be good or bad for societies or good for some and bad for others. States are evolving, redefining powers and legitimacy, but these changes are not viewed in the strictly negative decline the hyperglobalists envision. Concerned with cultural changes and the intersubjective nature of community, transformationalists such as James Rosenau investigate normative and identity

changes as ideas, communication, and agency are constructed much differently today than during past epochs (Rosenau 1997, 2003). I build my thesis on this theoretical foundation.

The theoretical framework of the transformationalists is based in constructivism, in that identity is socially constructed and has no meaning outside of response to the question all people both ask and answer: “Who are you – do we share attributes or not?” The factors that are taken into account to answer this question change due to outside forces, are non-discrete, complicated, and not always rational; but these characteristics are not epiphenomenal and can be subjectively assessed. This makes identity hard to study, yet of paramount importance to attempt to understand.

### *What is Identity?*

Identities are how we describe ourselves to the world. They are the key factors by which we communicate to others how we are similar to or different from them. Identity at the individual level is only relative to this paper insofar as a collective identity is representative of many persons who perceive that they share the same bonds and obligations to other members of the polity with which they individually identify (Scholte 2005, Anderson 2006). The traditional notion that the state attracts the most loyalty of citizens as the foremost way of identifying oneself may be subordinated under globalizing influences. As people no longer have a strict association between their own welfare and that of their territorial community, social space (and therefore political space) becomes deterritorialized (Rosenau 2003: 176).

The pluralistic identities that emerge must be investigated to find how political entrepreneurs can manipulate them to coordinate and mobilize their followers. Who we consider ourselves to be (and to whom we feel ourselves bonded) directly affects our political reasoning and loyalties. In fact, state-based identity remains of great importance to the global system, relevant to all international interactions, and central to discussions of cultural and collective identity (Kennedy 2001).

During the communist era of the Soviet Union, the collective identity of citizens was shackled to the state. Post-Soviet polities released a wave of options, actively competing for loyalty in Eastern European states. The bewildering selection of identities may indeed have had individuals facing their own version of “Pinocchio’s problem,” as freedom from the tethering strings of communism placed the decision of identity, along with the corresponding loyalties, firmly into individuals’ own hands (Strange 1996:198-199). Set free from the Soviet era, collective identity options then included influences of globalization.

### *Collective Identity Under Globalization*

To assess the collective identity under globalization, I divide collective identities into four categories. The four categories each address two major concepts relating to the formation of identity: Agency and territory.

1. Relationship between globalization and the nationality principle
2. Proliferation of different kinds of national projects: micro-nations, region-nations, transworld nations

3. Globalization and non-territorial identity: youth, sexual orientation, race, gender, religion, and so forth
4. Hybridization of identities

### ***1. Relationship between globalization and the nationality principle***

The collective identities debated in this section are geographically based, and the two positions that will be put forth have very different answers to the question of whether globalization heralds the end of nationalism. Nationalism has a basis in territory (even if different nations argue over the same territory), but the role of the territory in identity formation is debatable.

The role of the state has always been important to discussions of nationalism, and the link between the state and the role of the nationality principle under globalization is much debated. Approaching the discussion from the perspective that the nationality principle is still important, some authors suggest that the state remains central to arguments claiming nationality is still a vibrant factor in international relations, these authors find that the role of the state may be changing, but is important to collective identity. Saskia Sassen epitomizes this perspective which finds a large continuing role for the state. Sassen finds that far from being removed from the equation the state is one of the critical “institutional domains” where developing globalization takes place. This view puts functionality and decision-making about globalization directly into the hands of the state, following a central command style of worldwide networks (Sassen 2008: 85).

For his part, David Miller argues that nations are anchored in states, that it is important for people to have a link with the past, their ancestry as they seek to find their place in the world as members of a collective (Miller 1995). State-based identity is an engaged process, maintained through collective will (Miller 1995). Feelings of state-based identity assume a “pivotal axis” for collectivities to claim cultural and collective identity (Kennedy 2001). Small nations, like Scotland, may even be reinvigorated by globalization as they can “assert a cultural identity” centering their argument on having been a past independent state, whilst prospering as part of a globalized economy (Books 2001: 216). These authors have all concluded that nationalism, connected directly to the state, is not disappearing.

In contrast to those like Sassen and Miller, other authors, such as Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Robin Brown, and Anthony Giddens, argue that the national project is over; they view a state-based national identity as a “European exception” that merely represents a shared history and a claim of space (Guéhenno 1995: 4). A litany of state failures, from provision of public goods equally available to inhabitants to the liberation of the economy from geographic demarcations, these authors argue, leads to state-based identity becoming less relevant as states’ capacities weaken. Arguing that we are in the age of information, access to networks trumps connections to the nation-state (Guéhenno 1995). Consequently the loyalty of collectives will shift to other polities that can provide more of David Easton’s authoritative allocation of values, as conflicting loyalties will have to juggle “the coexistence of a territorially based political system with an economic system that is increasingly global in scope” (Brown 1995:58).

State-based identity is being brushed aside as political decision-making moves into the realm of global interdependence and reflections on identity move to non-territorially based dimensions such as students' and women's movements (Giddens 1991). Members of polities identify themselves through "life politics" rather than as citizens of particular states. Primordial identities which are "intuitive rather than rational, and [are] predicated upon a sense of consanguinity" will take precedence over loyalty to a state which is merely a sociopolitical concept (Conner 2004:24).

## ***2. Proliferation of different kinds of national projects: micro-nations, region-nations, transworld nations***

There are some theorists, like Samuel P. Huntington, who believe that collective identities, while geographically anchored, do not necessarily require a state focus. These theorists range from those who see identity in larger civilizational contexts to those who view identity as anchored in smaller micro-nations or self-determination groups. Samuel P. Huntington epitomizes the first view of overarching identity. He argues that the interactions of the world are not effectively conceptualized by breaking relations down into states, rather, he divides the world into eight culturally determined civilizations with state-based cores. Identity is developed by factors of "blood and belief, faith and family" (Huntington 1996:126). The borders of civilizations are where conflict is most likely to occur and, because of the locations of the case studies in this thesis – bordering states potentially clashing at the edge of Orthodox and Western civilizations – Huntington's argument must be taken into account. Huntington projected that Moldova, as part of the Orthodox civilization, would be an unlikely partner to Western civilization, that is, unlikely to join the European

Union (EU), while also noting that the Baltic states would fit Western civilization better than they did the Soviet-imposed Orthodox civilization (Huntington 1996: 162).

Modernization does not imply agreement with Western values and Huntington's civilizations spread across larger regions than a single state – with the exception of Japan – though core states matter in each civilization (Huntington 96). Religion is a major factor in what constitutes a civilization for Huntington. He sees the clashes coming where two sides with different ideas of what is right and just meet, with the potential for violence at those points where civilizations encounter each other.

However, far from universal practices and overarching civilization-level identities, there have been, since the end of World War II, an explosion of smaller nation-projects, micro-nations, and self-determination groups, all territorially based but on a smaller scale than traditional states. The collective identities and demands of these groups are important to any discourse in international relations, as these actors have regularly affected the international as well as their local systems. The Republic of South Sudan represents the most recent separatist group to have successfully challenged the status quo of the international system and has won recognition as an independent sovereign state.<sup>5</sup> With over 70 self-determination groups reaching the level of armed conflict since WWII, stateless nations will continue to fight for greater autonomy even when independence cannot be achieved (Cunningham, n.d.).

---

<sup>5</sup> Gettleman, Jeffrey. 2011. "After Years of Struggle, South Sudan Becomes a New Nation." July 9. *New York Times*.

### ***3. Globalization and non-territorial identity***

Nicholas Negroponte claims that identity is no longer tied to a physical address, “that place without space” is a more apt description for living in the digital world. Concepts like ‘addresses’ have new meanings, for example, co-workers may be reachable only through email addresses rather than having specific office designations in a physical building (Negroponte 1995: 165). Forging identity bonds regardless of where members of an epistemic community are physically located means that territorial obligations are not necessary. For instance, people today reflect on their own biological narrative and make choices that are unlike the geographical and class-based ties of the past. Allowing for profound changes to the organization of time and space, polities are now recombining social relations into new collective identities (Giddens 1991, Haas 1992).

Efforts to form new collective identities under globalization allow a community to ignore territorial constraints of physical space and find common psychological space<sup>6</sup> online, whether accessing from Auckland New Zealand, Braşov Romania, or even from practically undetermined locations somewhere in Canada. Though contact through traditional letter-writing has inspired epistemic communities for hundreds of years, the new communities formed online are not limited to élites, globalization permeates through to the masses and to places, such as the remote village of Entasopia in Africa, that have never played a part in past global communities.<sup>7</sup>

In effect, these “electronic tribes” may generate a groundswell of political mobilization without ever having to set foot in a geographic place, instead congregating *en*

---

<sup>6</sup> See Ferguson and Mansbach (2004) for a discussion of psychological distance as “the degree of dissimilarity between cognitive frameworks or ways of looking at, assigning meaning to, and coping with the world” p. 69.

<sup>7</sup> Nicholson, Chris. 2009. “Bringing the Internet to Remote African Villages.” February 2. *New York Times*.

*masse* for virtual protests and electric (in both senses) public discourse. Examples of these political mobilizations are found with regard to gender debates, race relations, sexual orientation rights, secessionist movements and youth perspectives. Even the highly effective international efforts of Amnesty International require no paper trail for the community of rights activists. Using social media pressure on Azerbaijani President Aliyev's Twitter account – over 800 tweets in one day – led to the release of Eynulla Fatullayev, a newspaper editor named a prisoner of conscience in Azerbaijan, in May 2011 (Amnesty International).

#### ***4. Hybridization of identities***

Collective identities are combinations of multiple state-based, regional, partial-cosmopolitan, and cyber identities that exist and conflict within the same self. One way to assess these multiple identities is to view them as “nested polities,” a condition in which relevant identities wax and wane depending on the salience of specific issues confronting an individual<sup>8</sup> (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004). The conundrum is that the identities salient to an individual are not always unified into one incontrovertible whole – conflicting identities may emerge atavistically or fall into dormancy, depending on the issue area being faced at any one time. This view of multiple identities is excellent when issues are changing and clear-cut. However, nesting assumes salient identities remain separately defined as differing issues come to the fore, and does not account for merging the identities into something new.

---

<sup>8</sup> Ferguson and Mansbach define “polities” as “collectivities with a measure of identity, hierarchy, and capacity to mobilize followers for political purposes,” p. 24, and “nesting,” as “the ingestion of one polity by another without the disappearance of either.” Ferguson, Y. and R.W. Mansbach (2004: 170)

A second way to focus on identity formation is to investigate hybridization of national identity; the co-mingling of traditional norms with global norms, creating a blend of local and national culture and traditions with key features of globalization mixed in. There is no nesting in these cases; the hybrid identity cannot be broken back down into parts that are able to stand separately. Instead, it is a genuinely new identity.

Those critics who dislike the nebulosity of “globalization” may cringe at the amorphous notion of “hybridity,” but it is in the nuances of the changes at the collective level that globalization is most fascinating. This new form of identity is established in local contexts, by breaking hybridization into three elements: “selective absorption, selective rejection, and the assertion of something quintessentially ‘national’” (Blum 2007, 15).

The hybridization of culture, whilst enriching culture with flavors, ideas, and beliefs from outside, and choosing which to adopt into hybridized new identities that develop a modern collective state-based identity, is more than “an immense global urban intercultural festival” (Jameson 1998: 66). It is less clear whether the capacity to construct a hybrid identity reaches the point where globalization really leads to the superficial “identity surfing” described by Lothar Brock, where options abound and identities are not hybridized as much as becoming disposable, loyalties a thing of the past (Scholte 2005).

### *Globalization and State-Based Identity*

State-based identities are created by people at different moments in history. Élités construct symbols “to cement their identity and often testify to some ancestral indigenous claim.” (Gourgouris 1994). The identities created are “mutable, multiple, overlapping and often inconsistent” (King 2000:1).

Crucial to the state-based identities are art, popular culture and media to relate the “imagined community” into something more tangible, as a cultural touchstone illustrating traditions, turning-points of nation forging,<sup>9</sup> glories – of war or literary accomplishments, joining the populace into a common “we-ness” and rejecting all outsiders as “others” (Kennedy 2001). The new alphabets, literary languages, and national symbols that buttress cultural changes are important to culture-building, passing to the next generation the elements of the society that enjoy parental loyalty.

Children internalize and naturalize globalized norms that were perhaps new and strange to their parents, which have the double-edged potential to reinforce state-based connections on the one side (“we” versus the rest of the world), yet on the other, to produce collective identity constructs that do not include a strict concept of state-based citizenship as a primary identity. The agency involved with the formation of identity constructs are not only limited by structure, but new forms of structure may also provide some with new opportunities for identity formation.

---

<sup>9</sup> For example, Australia and New Zealand forged their state-based identities during the WWI Gallipoli campaign.

This process is occurring all over the globe. By focusing on the variation in the strength of state-based identity in one region, post-Soviet European states, relevant specifics and contradictions may be brought to light that could be overlooked in a desire to "package" the spread and acceptance or rejection of globalization across the world.

### CHAPTER 3. THEORY AND RESEARCH QUESTION

The theory that follows is based on a number of critical assumptions regarding identity and globalization. To begin with, national identity – state-based identity – is a valid and accepted answer to the question “who are you?” An answer such as: “I am Irish” or “I am American” is a legitimate way to communicate who you are and how you feel you fit into the world (Miller 1995:10-11). Identity – whilst being a social construct – is not fictitious. Following from that assumption, I also understand that state-based identity, whilst being tangible in that it is connected directly with borders drawn on a map, also has an intangible “moral community” aspect, where those within the community feel a different set of moral obligations to those who are members compared to those outside (Anderson 1983/2006, Miller 1995:11). In addition to the intangible, state-based identity also has real political claims. Mobilization as a member of the state, whether in a democratic regime or not, means that there are political realities (rights and obligations and practical demands) associated with being a citizen.

I also make some assumptions regarding globalization. Globalization is happening right now. It is a process, not a goal necessarily, multi-dimensional and reversible. Globalization spreads culture and values, those commonly noted include: democratic liberal institutionalism, individualism, capitalism, English as a common language for trade, technology, and education; global civil society with a focus on a multitude of issues that cannot usually be conquered one state at a time, for example, human rights, eradication of extreme poverty, the environment, and female equality issues. Globalization is spread by the microelectronic revolution, and because of this, I assume our current globalizing influences

are substantively different from internationalism and primarily elite-level spread of normative changes of earlier interdependent epochs, as many more people, from all levels of society, participate in the interactions today than they did in the past. The reality of globalization does not alter that there are powerful localizing tendencies and I assume that it is possible to limit globalization.

### *State-based Identity Theory*

Identity is mixed, constructed from a multiplicity of sources from ethnicity to gender, religion to favorite sports team, sexual orientation to hair color. As long as a person can identify something that is the same or different about their relationship to others, it can become a source of identity. “All identity construction requires the summoning of difference, the relativization of the self as against the ‘other’ imagined as separate outside” (Kennedy 2001:3).

Identity is not inherently empowering, identities only become empowering when they are politicized. Having a Muslim identity in France, for example, is highly politicized, having an Irish-American identity in America, is not (Kostboth 2011). They become politicized by relating in a direct manner to external power structures (O’Byrne 2001), such as belonging to a state in the international system. Therefore citizenship – a state-based identity – remains a powerful identity even as globalization spreads across the globe. State-based identity remains salient for most people. Passports are issued by states. No matter how postinternational their individual global concerns are, in most cases to travel to a meeting

outside of local, individuals must show proof of their state-based identity.<sup>10</sup> Travel requirements, visas, and accompanying paraphernalia are designated by one's state-based identity.<sup>11</sup>

“Identity is not only socially constructed – it is pragmatically socially constructed” (O’Byrne 2001:141).<sup>12</sup> State-based identities are formed out of general factors: common language, historical heritage, ethnic origins and geographic location (Kennedy 2001:2). State-based collective identities in the form of nationalism provide “a common culture against whose background people can make more individual decisions about how to lead their lives” pursue social justice, or foster understanding of the rules of the game (Miller 1995:185).

State-based identity is regularly assumed to be of equivalent strength in many approaches to understanding the link between globalization and identity. Regarding globalization, the nexus of economics and politics has been focused on to the detriment of culture. State-based identity has been left as a hypothetical constant – part of “*ceteris paribus*” for most authors studying globalization.<sup>13</sup>

It is critical to note that state-based identity is not equally strong across nation-states. “There are great variations between societies, both in strength of their national allegiances

---

<sup>10</sup> Certain areas, such as the EU’s Schengen zone may waive this requirement – but only because state-based identity has been proven in order to enter the zone to begin with.

<sup>11</sup> Susan Strange (1994) refers to “transnational managerial class”(p. 138), and Scholte notes: “Commonalities of the group include global English, degrees from Northern universities, global professional attire, frequent flyer programmes, global job marketing, investments in global financial instruments, multiple citizenships, and children educated in international schools” (Scholte p. 246) – of course this just proves the point – multiple citizenships and frequent flyers are passports – links to the state-based identity no matter how alike their clothing, tastes and preference for educating their children are.

<sup>12</sup> Emphasis in original

<sup>13</sup> Lieber and Weisberg (2002) note that the impact of globalization on culture is usually viewed as a “side effect”. (p.274)

and in the content of those allegiances” (Miller 1995:13).<sup>14</sup> The historical development of states influences the strength of state-based identity today, and “the depth and exclusivity of national identities varies greatly” (Wendt 1994: 387). States that have had their state-based identity subjugated to others through domination by an empire are particularly important to study because state-based identity may have been preempted by an imperial identity.<sup>15</sup>

The consequences of being subjugated by an empire may include being socialized against the indigenous identity – as maintaining a separate identity would seem to encourage adding wood to a nationalistic bonfire that could become inflamed against the imperial force. Therefore, the usual course undertaken by the dominant empire would be to make the indigenous identity appear backwards and weak – two characteristics emphasized during the modernization of the Soviet Union and the extension of Soviet power.

### *Promulgation Through Socialization*

The first indicator of strength of state-based identity is to look at common culture – in terms of common sets of norms and values that are introduced to members of society through processes of socialization. Socialization occurs through repeated exposure to customs, language, symbols and traditions that the collective deems necessary (though not specifically consciously) to pass to the next generation the acceptable ways of looking at the world. At the collective level of state-based identity, this incorporates symbols of nationalism that link

---

<sup>14</sup> Emphasis in original

<sup>15</sup> Empires do differ in this respect. Ancient Rome and the Ottoman Empire, for example, tolerated greater local identities than did the Soviet Union.

events of today with the collective memory of the past. This linkage is put into action in both symbolic and substantive ways.

Symbolic efforts include public holidays and festivals, celebrations of distinct literary or art traditions such as Japanese Haiku, or Korean pottery. Substantive efforts are made with government legislation and education. These efforts are accomplished through socialization, with contributions from both familial sources such as grandparents and non-personal media references, and are deepened by the formal education system – teaching cultural touchstones to students in the form of “civics” or “history” classes.

Parades, for example, straddle the line between symbolic and substantive. In some cases, the military may be displayed as a strong point of national pride. Others may be more celebratory, non-military, parades akin to American Fourth of July festivities. A short walk along the Thames in central London shows how statues, prominently displayed in central locations, can provide semi-permanent reminders of important people and events that constitute past glories associated with the state. Modes of unique heritage dress, perhaps not for the everyday, but for holiday events or special ceremonies such as wearing bunad to a traditional Norwegian wedding, also reinforce the way in which the collective asserts its specialness, socializing individuals to becoming members of the community.

Language is second indicator of the strength of state-based identity. Is the language of indigenous or the vestiges of empire, a language forcibly imported through imperialism or invasion? Language is an indicator of who belongs to our communities. Unlike identity based on inherited consanguinity, having command of a language is earned through effort, and subject to a much more felicitous determination of belonging (Dirks 1995).

An individual who speaks English, for example, can lay some claim to being understood by the nationals of countries all over the world where English is an official language and mother tongue. Even within the context of speaking English, however, there are definite determinations of whether one is a member of a community that is local, or “other”. A native English speaker from New Zealand, for example, will be generally understood in the United States, but will clearly be regarded as an outsider due to exhibiting a “funny” accent, and woe be to the traveler who orders a cup of tea and is presented with dark liquid in a tall glass, swirling with ice cubes. Communication may be possible, but language differences do change the very way people think, and with that, their world.<sup>16</sup> The question of who belongs in one’s moral community may not boil down to the temperature of their tea, but tea may serve as an indicator, very quickly, of those who do not. Language is not the only determinant however; collective identity is also molded through direct policies of the state.

The third indicator of strength of state-based identity is state policies. These can be shaped directly by the political élites through education, cultural policy, and state interventions such as national holidays to reimagine collective identity. State policies by post-Soviet European states are enacted to encourage the general populace to abjure the identities foisted on them by the Soviets and to promote a sense of nationalism – a collective state-based identity. “State-sponsored educational systems, the media, and élite-driven political ideologies communicate all these formal accoutrements of nationhood back to the people themselves” (King 2000:2).

---

<sup>16</sup> See Karl Deutch. 1969. *Nationalism and its Alternatives* New York: Random House for further elucidation on perception change through language.

Children learn about their state through education programming that reflects the identity constructs that the political élites wish to socialize the children into internalizing. To illustrate by dipping into material relevant to my forthcoming case studies, a Transnistrian textbook from 1997 describes the break-away republic's "liberation" from Moldova:

The traitorous, barbaric, and unprovoked invasion of Bender [by the Moldovan authorities] had a single goal: to frighten and bring to their knees the inhabitants of the Dnestr Republic, to make them shudder with terror. However, the people's bravery, steadfastness, and love of liberty saved the Dnestr Republic. The defense of Bender against the overwhelming forces of the enemy closed a heroic page in the history of our young republic. The best sons and daughters of the people sacrificed their lives for peace and liberty in our land.<sup>17</sup>

Absorbing state history through education is one of the most socializing forces of identity formation within a polity. Through the process of being taught, students learn what it means to call themselves citizens of the state, and the imagined characteristics of the polity to which they should aspire. As can be imagined, the Moldovan textbooks would reflect wildly differing accounts and emotive language regarding the rebels and their efforts that included taking arms against the government.

---

<sup>17</sup> N.V. Babilunga and V.G. Bomeshko, *Pagini din istoria plaiului natal* (Tiraspol: Transnistrian Institute of Continuing Education, 1997, p. 98) in King 2000.

### *State-based Identity and Globalization*

As globalization meets traditional cultural values in post-Soviet states, there occurs some hybridization of identities and cultures to meet the needs of the population. Must globalization always lead to distress for national culture or can government policies thwart the problems? I suggest a counter-intuitive relationship between fighting to maintain national culture and globalization – that states with strong cultural protection measures supporting state-based identities will embrace globalization more than states without substantive cultural protection measures, as a weak state-based identity may lead to perception of “global forces” as a threat. To determine the strength of state-based identity I will subjectively assess the cultural protections identified above – a strong common culture, language differentiation, and state policies designed to reinforce collective loyalty at the state level. These three indicators of state-based identity together form a set of cultural protection measures by which a comparison can be made between states to judge the strength of their state-based identities.

The circumstances under which these measures apply in this thesis will be limited to investigating cultural protections of states that had been under the domination of the Soviet empire to come up with the strength of state-based identity. These circumstances are by definition only relevant to the 15 states that were a part of the Soviet Union, but are appropriate for a case comparison to investigate whether the theory is sound. The theoretical linking of a strong state-based identity to increased engagement with globalization may be extrapolated beyond the sphere of the Soviet Union in future studies.

By investigating this relationship I will add to the discourse by explaining what other studies have not – the strength of state-based identity can help us understand states' response to globalization and their choice to embrace or inhibit globalization. This leads to my central question:

*Does a state with a stronger state-based identity embrace globalization more than a state with a weaker state-based identity?*

## CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY

This thesis is a qualitative assessment through structured and focused case comparison. It is an exploration into how the strength of state-based identity affects the reaction to the contradictory yet concurrent forces of globalization and localization in post-Soviet European states in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union. I utilize the KOF globalization index as a way of comparing the process of globalization in regards to individual states. The index provides an overall globalization ranking, breaking down the analysis into three different dimensions of globalization – Social, Economic, and Political.<sup>18</sup> I provide a figure illustrating globalization score trends with the case-study sections of the paper as a ready reference to see how each state has been progressing towards a more globalized outlook since the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991.

I selected post-Soviet European states because the collapse of the Soviet Union affords a rare opportunity to assess identity with a concrete date of change that can be associated with multiple countries at once to begin a case comparison. Most social science experiment-by-observation-by-country cases only occur one at a time, so having all the countries in the study becoming masters of their own fate at the same time holds many factors constant. Although the scope of this research is geographically limited, it will add to the literature on state-based identity formation and will contribute to the understanding of the human reaction to globalization.

---

<sup>18</sup> Summary of KOF globalization indices and variables weights is included in the appendix

### *Dimensions of Globalization*

In assessing globalization there are three indices that are benchmarks for country comparisons: The A. T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Index, the Swiss think tank KOF, and CSGR (Warwick University). Each of these provides an overall globalization ranking or score, and breaks down the analysis into three different dimensions of globalization – “Social,” “Economic,” and “Political.”<sup>19</sup> I find the KOF Index to be of the most use in this analysis overall, for the depth of information and the ability to translate it into cultural applications. A quick overview from KOF is necessary to understand what is being measured and how the index is calculated:

#### **2011 KOF Index of Globalization**

The KOF Index of Globalization ... defines globalization to be the process of creating networks of connections among actors at multi-continental distances, mediated through a variety of flows including people, information and ideas, capital and goods. Globalization is conceptualized as a process that erodes national boundaries, integrates national economies, cultures, technologies and governance and produces complex relations of mutual interdependence.

---

<sup>19</sup> The Kearney index has four dimensions, Economic, Political, Personal and Technology, but “Personal” and “Technology” are best viewed in combination to better compare with the equivalent measures of “social” in the other two indices.

### *Method of Calculation*

In constructing the indices of globalization, each of the variables [are] transformed to an index on a scale of one to hundred, where hundred is the maximum value for a specific variable over the period 1970 to 2007 and one is the minimum value. Higher values denote greater globalization. The data is transformed according to the percentiles of the original distribution...Data are calculated on a yearly basis...The indices on economic, social and political globalization as well as the overall index are calculated employing the weighted individual data series.<sup>20</sup>

The dimensions are discussed individually in the next three sub-sections.

### *Economic Globalization*

The KOF index defines economic globalization as “long distance flows of goods, capital and services as well as information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges.”<sup>21</sup>

Globalization is often thought of solely as an economic process: “The globalization of finance, demand, supply, and competition form a series of interlocking currents of global circulation of information.”<sup>22</sup> Economic globalization is 37% of a country’s overall score as measured by the KOF index, with varying weights being applied to both the actual flows of

---

<sup>20</sup> KOF [http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/method\\_2010.pdf](http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/method_2010.pdf) (A more detailed breakdown of the variables may be located in the appendix)

<sup>21</sup> KOF [http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/method\\_2010.pdf](http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/method_2010.pdf)

<sup>22</sup> Nederveen Pieterse, J. (2009) p.9

trade, FDI, portfolio investment, income, and the restrictions of hidden import barriers, mean tariff rates, taxes on international trade and capital account restrictions.

### ***Political Globalization***

Political globalization accounts for 25% of a country's overall KOF score. It is measured in the KOF Index by recording the number of embassies in country, membership in international organizations, participation in UN Security Council Missions and the number of international treaties signed by the country since 1945.

### ***Social Globalization***

Manfred Steger notes that “globalization is also a linguistic and ideological practice,”<sup>23</sup> as opposed to finding globalization as “merely a set of material processes anchored in economics and technology. It is also reflected in conflicting systems of ideas and claims...that define, describe, and evaluate the process.”<sup>24</sup> Ideas spread through social contacts. The KOF index defines social globalization as the spread of ideas, information, images, and people.<sup>25</sup>

Social globalization index scores add up to 38% of overall globalization score and take into account measures that include, tourists, phone calls, internet users, trade in books and newspapers, international mail, and also includes the per capita number of IKEA stores and McDonald's restaurants. While one can measure directly the cost of a Big Mac in these countries and count how many are purchased, there is the shared universal experience of

---

<sup>23</sup> Steger, M. (2009) p.18

<sup>24</sup> Steger, M. (2009) p.ix

<sup>25</sup> KOF [http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/method\\_2010.pdf](http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/method_2010.pdf)

eating at a McDonald's that is harder to both qualify and quantify as a driver of globalization. Likewise, does one purchase a coffee table at IKEA because the prices are so reasonable, or does having Swedish furniture make one feel more cosmopolitan?

### *Discussion of Case Selection*

To decide on the case selection I began with the 15 post-Soviet states as these states were all thrust onto the global stage at the same time at the end of the Soviet Union. This makes them ripe for analysis as a set of cases that would be developing the identity and globalization levels that I am concerned with, in a comparable way. This is not to say that all the cases would be starting from the exact same base, but they would be broadly comparable, having shared the experience of being a part of the Soviet Union. I further narrowed the cases by geographic region, choosing to assess cases that border Europe, as globalizing influences would be less comparable given infrastructure differences and the physical separation of more removed states.

Cases for a more controlled comparison must have some similarities and some differences to test my theory, the remaining states could be divided into two groups: Baltic states and non-Baltic states.

#### Baltic states

Estonia

Latvia

Lithuania

#### Non-Baltic states

Belarus

Moldova

Ukraine

Small states are relevant to identity constructs because smaller states may demonstrate a more homogenous identity rather than an existing melting pot of differences a larger state may present which would give significant advantages in maintaining social cohesion to smaller states. To be clear in the comparisons of state-based identity then, the implicit heterogeneity should be controlled by the states in the comparison being either both geographically large or both small. To decide this question of size I turned to traditional globalization discourse which sets the likelihood of geographically small countries to be more globalized than large countries. Holding size constant will help the case comparison. By choosing to focus on small states for their relevance to both of my variables of interest, I removed the two larger states, Belarus, with a land area of 207,600 km<sup>2</sup>, and Ukraine at 603,00km<sup>2</sup>. Additionally, Belarus and Ukraine were also founding members of the USSR, which would have made them identity providers of the Soviet-style identity rather than the other states bordering Europe who had Soviet-style identity foisted on them.

The states that remained were all small states with a territory of less than 50,000km<sup>2</sup> with the 1991 borders. They were all victims of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which gave them an entry point into the Soviet identity sphere at the same time. Moldova was the only non-Baltic state left so it was selected to work as a point of comparison to a Baltic state. Estonia was selected as the Baltic state because, like Moldova, the transition to independence was non-violent and a violent uprising would have had very different identity ramifications that are outside the scope of this study.

With the cases selected, I then move on to describe the factors that will be assessed in the case studies. These factors are not an exhaustive list, but represent what I perceive to be the most salient points at this initial stage of investigation. Several minor factors are

implicitly taken into account through case selection. Other factors may be of importance to globalization or to identity – but not to both – in these instances I leave those factors for other studies to focus on my central case.

### ***Factors to Account for in Case Studies***

Each of the case studies will be structured in the same way to encourage clarity of comparison. The factors are divided under the following subheadings:

#### ***History of the state***

A historical narrative is necessary for both these cases to place the state-based identity development in context. Variation is expected across the cases in the historical development of their state, and corresponding state-based identity. The history of each state –including years as an independent state – gives the reader a good idea of how much of an independent state-based identity existed before Russian/Soviet domination of state and identity.

#### ***Forging a nation***

Striking a balance between the historical narratives and developing the theoretical connections is best accomplished by separately looking at factors that blend historical detail with analysis relevant analysis to identity or globalization and then to how they both are

connected. Keeping in mind the nature of predominant society values and thinking in terms of perceptions, goals, strategies and values. This section will also review the number of local (state) holiday celebrations as nationalistic celebrations such as public holidays and other “contrived displays of national solidarity” (Miller 1995:15) are important to get a feel for what the collective values at the state level.

### *Language*

Language is an excellent determination of who belongs and who is an outsider to our communities. If language laws are in effect in a state, there is national identity fighting to against an outside “other” and it will be interesting to find out if there is a connection between a state’s level of embracing globalization and the cultural protectionism of official language laws. I would also expect that a strict adherence to national language leads to a strong state-based identity as a salient identity. The language sections are additionally divided into two sub-sections: Identity and Language, and Globalization and Language.

### *Education*

Education is important to investigations into both identity and globalization.

For identity: According to Steven D. Roper, one of the most important factors in identity formation is education (Roper 2005: 503). The education system socializes group identity, during the Russification of Soviet-controlled states, the education system was used to inhibit

indigenous identities and promote Russian language and Soviet ideology and ideals through socialization.

For Globalization: If English is assumed to be the “Lingua Global”, to what level has this permeated the education system (following my expectation of a country where 10% speak English will be less engaged with globalization than a country where 50% speak English). According to Robert McCrum, “Globish,” a neutral and intelligible form of English is the language of the global community (McCrum 2010).

In 1987 Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore, continuing his “English First” program took the additional step from encouraging students to learn English to requiring all students to take English classes, English – or the Singaporean version known as “Singlish” (McCrum 2010: 273) became a common language to the students no matter if at home they spoke Chinese, Malay, or Indian. The accessibility of English will indicate tendencies towards a global outlook, a lack of English education will indicate that joining the world stage is less important to state policies at this time.

### ***State policy choices***

Does the state favor globalization or not? What are the policies followed (or even as interesting – not followed), and are there local backlashes – localization? I expect to find globalization-favoring policies in states with a stronger pre-existing state-based identity as they will not feel threatened by globalizing forces. We must keep in mind, however, that “as

people and organizations experience the losses of autonomy and authority that accompany globalization, so do they seek to protect their interests and achieve psychic comfort by reverting to the more close-at-hand groups with which they are affiliated.”<sup>26</sup> This will lead to noticeable localizations that will influence identity formation within the state.

### ***Global or Local? Contextual Analysis of a Key Issue***

Each case study will also delve into a specific issue. For Estonia, looking at the 2007 cyber attack as an example of a contextual issue of embracing globalization, and for Moldova, looking at the Transnistrian internal strife, ongoing since the early 1990s as an issue of localization. These specific issues shed light on the context by which these cases need to be considered as they illustrate the state-based identity of each state and the direction of concern of state policies – external embrace of globalizing influences in the case of Estonia, and a powerful localizing issue in the case of Moldova. Both of these in depth analyses connect to the level of state-based identity and to the level of globalization engaged by the state.

### ***Globalization ranking and discussion***

The research in these sections will be reporting the globalization rankings and changes in rankings since 1991. I will seek any potential connection between a stronger state-based identity (local influence) and level of globalization (global influence), as

---

<sup>26</sup> Rosenau, J. N.(1997), p. 112

documented in the state rankings of the KOF Globalization index in each of the three dimensions (economic, social, and political).

### *Conclusion*

The conclusion for each case will provide a recapitulation of pertinent factors that need to be assessed for state-based identity and globalization.

## CHAPTER 5. ESTONIA

### *History of the State*<sup>27</sup>

Since the thirteenth century Estonians have been rallying around their national identity in opposition to having been conquered by Denmark, Germany, Poland, Sweden, and finally Russia. Each subjugating force influenced the development of Estonia, and vestiges of the past are incorporated into the present – Capital city Tallinn, for example, derives its name from *Taani linn*, which means “Danish city” in Estonian, the Danes having conquered in 1219. German rule from the fourteenth century ended with the Ivan IV the Terrible attacking in 1558, wars and control by Polish and Swedish forces followed with the short lived Swedish rule (1629-1721) significantly improving education opportunities and securing other rights for peasants. Russian control after 1721 included the implementation of serfdom as part of the social order, and their nominal emancipation in 1816 changed very little of their lives.

From 1860-1885 Estonian national identity was actively shaped through the establishment of cultural traditions – such as song festivals – and literary traditions began to develop. Uniting characteristics that were distinctly different from their rulers of the past, the “Time of National Awakening,” *Ärkamisaeg*,<sup>28</sup> forged the bonds of Estonian state-based identity highlighting cultural touchstones that were important to the people regardless of the titular rulers of the state – from the past, present, and importantly, the future. The Russification campaign that commenced in 1885 severely constrained national identity

---

<sup>27</sup> Information for this section compiled from CIA World Fact Book, US Department of State, Sillaste 1995, Dirks 1995.

<sup>28</sup> Sillaste, 1995. p.120

formation across Russian-controlled areas including Estonia. From the end of the Russification period at the turn of the century through the collapse of the Russian empire during World War I, a small seed of national sentiment again began to grow.

Estonia became an independent democratic republic on February 24, 1918. With the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty, Soviet Russia renounced authority over the lands of Estonia and the people within. After subjugation by outsiders for so long, Estonians determined to allow cultural differences to be respected, thus granted autonomy to all minorities of over 3000 individuals, including the Jewish population, in a move that was unique in Western Europe. Politically, stability was harder to come by, with three constitutions being adopted before World War II switched the focus of politics from within to without. The political situation, unfortunately, would not be decided domestically. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 gave control of Estonia to the Soviet Union in return for German control over most of Poland. In August 1940, the U.S.S.R. proclaimed Estonia a part of the Soviet Union. This annexation was never formally recognized by the western powers; nonetheless, Estonian nationalism was without a voice for almost 50 years.

In the years 1987 to 1991, thousands of Estonians sang banned national songs in vociferous public gatherings during the “Singing Revolution.” This reassertion of state-based identity through the display of cultural sovereignty in Estonia reverberated through the population, with students and faculty at the fore. The subject of history had become “one of the first battlefields for the liberation movement” (Laar 2004:227), and students began meeting regularly in Tallinn as members of the Estonian Heritage Society – reusing methods and slogans from the first period of independence during the interwar years as a link to the goals of independence once more. State-based identity was being heralded even before

Estonia became independent again as articles published by Mati Hint, in defense of the Estonian language, invigorated national sentiment of Estonians. In the spring of 1987, the History and Law faculty at Tartu University met to discuss proposed Soviet expansion of the phosphorous mine in Estonia. The “*aula* meeting” (*aula* meaning “main hall”) led to traditional demonstrations on 1 May 1987 with yellow t-shirts proclaiming “Phosphorite – No Thanks” becoming very popular (Laar 2004). Mart Laar, who went on to become Prime Minister of Estonia years later, describes the scene in Tartu on the night of 15 April 1988, as a member of the Estonian Students Society:

In front of the university, the torches were already burning. And then I saw the flags. Or rather, they were not really flags but strips of blue, black and white cloth which had been sewn together and from which pieces were then cut and given to everyone who wanted one. And suddenly everywhere was full of blue, black and white.<sup>29</sup>

The electricity that charged the students and crowds around Mart Laar that evening did not dim in the coming months. By June the Singing Revolution had connected young Estonians to the patriotic songs of their past and to each other in a movement that continued to shine a light on independence – culminating with a rally of 300,000 people gathering at the Festival Grounds in Tallinn to sing the “Songs of Estonia” on September 11, 1988.

The Singing Revolution was followed by “The Baltic Chain.” The Baltic Chain, though not limited to Estonians, was a well-organized human chain, comprised of approximately two million individuals holding hands over a distance of 330 miles from Tallinn Estonia, through Riga, the capital of Latvia, and onto Vilnius Lithuania on August

---

<sup>29</sup> Laar, Mart. 2004: 231

23, 1989, in a peaceful but striking protest for independence for all three of the Baltic States.<sup>30</sup> Independent Estonia was recognized on September 6, 1991.

### *Forging a Nation*

Recognition of a collective identity of the Estonians has been affirmed since Johann Gottfried Herder, a German philosopher, poet, and Lutheran minister who visited Riga from 1764 to 1769, noted that the peasants celebrated an oral tradition that was different from the land-owning classes. He believed that the oral traditions revealed national spirits, and was one of the first theorists to link language to thought. Herder focused on language and cultural traditions, and inspired others to do the same. By 1839 oral traditions were being recorded and promoted in the form of epic poetry, with Friedrich Faehlmann and Friedrich Kreutzwald attempting to rebuild remnants of heroic poems into one grand epic *Kalevipoeg* through 1861.

The veracity of *Kalevipoeg* as a legitimate literary heritage of Estonia has been questioned, but *Kalevipoeg* inspired intellectual dedication to the ideal of nationalism and identity based on language that is more central to Estonian identity than descent, religion, or place of birth (Dirks 1995). Russification efforts during both periods of rule attempted to

---

<sup>30</sup> Fast thinkers may note that two million people over 330 miles works out to more than one person per foot. This seems like a mistakenly high number (perhaps for publicity?) until one realizes that the “chain” was not one person deep across the three states. There were places where crowds gathered and were counted as participants even if they made the chain “lumpy” rather than a clean line at times. *LexisNexis* searches revealed most news sources agree that there were over a million participants. At either extreme of estimates were *The Times (London)* noting “more than two million people” and the *New York Times* reporting “nearly a million.”

thwart national sentiments by requiring the language of both education and government be conducted solely in Russian (Sillaste 1995), which may explain why language is so symbolic of state-based identity in Estonia today. Other symbols of state-based identity are used in forging a nation. Physical objects like flags (as noted by Mart Laar's reminiscences above), national monuments, and uniforms can inspire loyalty for what they represent. Non-tangible efforts can also buttress the sentiment of the public towards the state. Public holidays (a partial list follows), combine a sense of legitimacy with celebration, reaffirming the sense of identity being tied to the development of the state.

### **National celebrations/Public Holidays in Estonia<sup>31</sup>**

#### *Publicly celebrated holidays with history and/or descriptions (Day off)*

Jan 1	New Year's Day
Feb 24	Independence Day: Celebrates declaration of independence in 1918
June 23	Victory Day: Celebrates victory in the Battle of Võnnu during the Estonian war of Independence (1918-1920).
June 24	St. John's Day/Midsummer Day
August 20	Day of Restoration of Independence: Celebrates Estonia's restoration of independence in 1991

#### *National holidays (no day off)*

Feb 2	Anniversary of the Tartu Peace Treaty: Treaty that ended Estonian War of
-------	--

---

<sup>31</sup> Holiday list from Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: <http://www.vm.ee/en/node/5753>

	Independence
March 14	Native Language Day
June 4	National Flag Day: Flag of Estonia first consecrated 1884
June 14	Day of Mourning and Commemoration: Commemorates victims of Soviet deportations in 1941 and 1949
September 22	Resistance Fighting Day: 1944 Occupation by Soviet troops
November 16	Day of Declaration of Sovereignty: Estonian declaration of sovereignty, 1988

State-based identity is reinforced through the many important dates that have special meaning to Estonians; rather than having just one day on which being an independent state is trumpeted, Estonia celebrates contributions to independence six days each year. However, just because a celebratory date is marked on a calendar does not necessarily translate as a measure of popular support of the state.<sup>32</sup> Nonetheless, it does show a commitment by the state to reinforcing identity, and is used as a socialization tool by the state.

## *Language*

### *Identity and Language*

Culture and identity are preserved through language (Küün 2010). Language is the factor that holds the most importance for state-based identity in Estonia. Article 3 of the Language Act stipulates Estonian to be the only official language of government. Russian,

---

<sup>32</sup> After all, just because it is an official date on the calendar, Americans do not stop work every June 7th to celebrate National Chocolate Ice Cream Day, for example, but do celebrate Independence Day on July 4th commemorating their sovereign independence – an enthusiastically supported holiday that reinforces state-based identity as a salient feature of Americans' collective identity.

the second most commonly used language, does not have official status, and requests since the mid-1990s for special permission to use it to be able to communicate efficiently with local people in Narva and Sillamäe (where Estonian speakers make up only 4.9% and 4.3% of the population respectively) have not been granted (Euromosaic). The 2000 census had 67% of the population speaking Estonian as their first language, with Russian speakers accounting for 30%.<sup>33</sup> Language is so important to the state-based identity of Estonians that it weaves through each of the other sections in this case study.

### *Globalization and Language*

Lorenza Fonzari posits that for Estonians, learning English is more than just a way to communicate at the global level. English has taken on a symbolic value and represents “freedom” – the voices of freedom heard on the radio during the years as part of the Soviet empire (Fonzari 1999: 40). There is also a willingness to communicate with Russian members of society (and of Russians wanting to communicate with Estonians) where speaking in the language of the other is so politically baggage-laden that choosing to speak English to each other facilitates getting things done even at the local level. Results from a survey of schoolchildren in Estonia showed 85.4% desiring to learn more English as a tool to communicate in travels and because it was seen as necessary in order to enjoy the global entertainment industry.

Because of the links to psychological identity constructs, learning English is not seen as threatening to Estonian identity – it is viewed in a way that reinforces Estonia’s

---

<sup>33</sup> Minority Rights in Estonia Report (2009) available from the Legal Information Centre for Human Rights: <http://www.lichr.ee>

independence. In other areas of the world as well, not just post-Soviet states English language skills are a tool of globalization and not a threat to state-based identity. In Korea, for example, the students of the Korean Minjok Leadership Academy (KMLA), a school that “aspires to be Korea’s version of Eton”<sup>34</sup> all classes except Korean language and history are taught in English to better prepare the students for global leadership. The school also strongly emphasizes Korean state-based identity through policies that include students being required to learn at least one traditional music or sport (Shin 2003). Like Korean students, learning English in Estonia is a tool in the tool-box for engaging globalizing forces – not a threat to the state-based identity of Estonians.

### *State Policies*

#### *Education*

The education system in Estonia is intertwined with language regulation. A strong factor in Estonia’s state-based identity, socialization through education not only focuses on the content of schoolwork but also in the language used for education. In 1997, The Law on Basic and Secondary Schools designated Estonian as the only language of secondary school classrooms. Objections by international monitors led to an amendment in 2000 to be implemented by 2007, that all secondary schools will be considered “Estonian language institutions” where 60% of classes must be taught in Estonian, and the other 40% given, if necessary, to instruction in other languages.<sup>35</sup>

---

<sup>34</sup> Shin (2003 :5)

<sup>35</sup> Law on Primary Schools and Secondary Schools, Article 52.2, Amendment to the Law on Basic School and Gymnasium, RT I 1997, 69, 1111

### ***Becoming a Citizen***

Becoming a citizen of Estonia at independence was revealing of the importance held by the use of language in identity politics and the primacy of language to the state-based identity. Estonia's "most pointed response to what Stalin wrought" (Levy 2010) resulted in approximately 75,000 stateless people living in Estonia, some of them born and raised there, that did not meet the requirement for citizenship – granted mostly to those who had it before the Soviet takeover and their descendents (Feldman 2005). Ethnic Russians who moved to Estonia (or whose parents moved to Estonia before they were born) are victims of de-Russification, so much so that they could not be classed as minorities in Estonia. By 1992, the law defined minorities in terms of citizens; in this case it meant that if an individual was not a citizen, then they had no minority rights. 84.2 percent of the population in Estonia are citizens and 12.9 percent are Russian citizens. Since 2000, in order to become a citizen, applicants must take the Estonian Language Examination. Regarded by many as one of the more difficult languages to learn (having 14 cases for example), this is a restrictive enough barrier that it has become an issue between Estonia and the EU with Estonia not ratifying the Charter for Minority Languages. Dual citizenship is not permitted in Estonia. The Estonian Integration Strategy specifies the "strengthening of the state identity" as one of its core principles.<sup>36</sup>

---

<sup>36</sup> Estonian Integration Strategy 2008-2013. (Unofficial translation)  
[http://www.kul.ee/webeditor/files/integratsioon/Loimumiskava\\_2008\\_2013\\_ENG.pdf](http://www.kul.ee/webeditor/files/integratsioon/Loimumiskava_2008_2013_ENG.pdf)

## *Global or Local?*

### *Estonian Cyber-attacks*

The in-depth analysis offered in this case shows that Estonia is focused on globalizing, outside forces, rather than internal divisions like Moldova – the second case study. The technological revolution is often seen as specifically globalizing, and so technology is where the focus shall be for this section. Estonia is a leader in internet connectivity at both the individual and state levels. With 93 percent of EU companies and 51 percent of Europeans using the internet in 2007,<sup>37</sup> a comparatively high 99 percent of Estonians participate in online banking (Evron, Aarelaid 2008). Even elections for parliament had over 30,000 people voting from home via the internet (Evron, 2008). More than 85 percent of Estonians file their tax returns online (Tighe 2007). Estonia ranks 155th in terms of population, yet is so tech-savvy that it ranks 48th for internet hosts.<sup>38</sup> The state website proudly notes under “five surprising facts about Estonia” that “Skype” was invented there.<sup>39</sup>

Estonia came under cyber-attack beginning 26 April 2007 and experienced “one of the most serious large-scale cyber-attacks against sovereign states” (EU Ministerial Conference 2009). Beginning at 10:00 pm and “fueled with step-by-step instructions so simple that any Internet user could follow” (Evron 2008:123) the attack commenced. Through 18 May more than 120 attacks were recorded in Estonia. The DDoS (distributed

---

<sup>37</sup> Commission acts to protect Europe from cyber-attacks and disruptions  
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/494&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>

<sup>38</sup> CIA World Fact Book

<sup>39</sup> <http://visitestonia.com>

denial of service) attacks were launched by botnets – computers that had been hijacked by a malicious code to become zombie machines under the control of a remote user.<sup>40</sup> Resulting, *inter alia*, in bringing down the internet connection to the biggest bank in Estonia, “Hansapank,” people were unable to pay by bankcard for approximately 95 minutes; a societal disaster in a state where everything, including “gasoline, milk and bread,” is usually paid for by bankcard (Lobjakas 2008). The Estonian parliament was without email for four days (Landler and Markoff 2007), as the machines were overloaded with 100 to 1000 times the usual traffic (Evron, Aarelaid 2008).

Adam Lebor, reporting for *The Times* (London), said, “It was only a few years ago that political disputes in eastern Europe were settled by bullets ... and cyberwar by YouTube is much safer than the real thing.”<sup>41</sup> Yet his statement should be reassessed in the light of the attack on Estonia, as while bullets did not fly through the streets of Tallinn, the impact of the attacks was significantly disruptive to the lives of the individuals in the state. Cyber-attacks by “hacktivists”<sup>42</sup> may be of greater concern now that the ability of hackers to do real damage, albeit temporarily, to the e-infrastructure of a state has been revealed. For Estonia, their infrastructure was helped by the fact that they could block their external servers quickly— though this could only happen in a linguistically specific country – they simply blocked servers to any language other than Estonian.<sup>43</sup> Localization in this case was a very

---

<sup>40</sup> BBC online 24 June 2009, and 7 August 2009

<sup>41</sup> *The Times* (London) September 21, 2006

<sup>42</sup> “Hacktivists,” are technical experts who act independently from governments and are usually not primarily motivated by money. This makes them an entirely different group than organized crime, who target data for profit (Landler and Markoff 2007, *The Economist* June 16 2011). Both of these groups, however, are important to look at as globalizing influences spread not just ideals of democracy but mischievousness and crime, as well.

<sup>43</sup> *BBC news online*. “The Cyber Raiders Hitting Estonia.” 17 May 2007

important defense against a globalized cyberspace strike, Estonian language supporting a very real victory for the state.

### *Globalization in Estonia*




Figure 1. Globalization in Estonia.

The KOF index scores, displayed in the table above, show that Estonia is a globalized state in all dimensions. To give some context to the numbers, of 156 countries ranked, Estonia ranks 8th in economic globalization, 31st for social globalization, 78th for political globalization and has an overall globalization ranking of 24th. The KOF score changes from 1991 to 2008 are striking. In economic globalization, Estonia transformed from a score of 58 in 1991 to 89.2 in 2008. In social globalization, Estonia started in 1991 at a score of 48.7 and moved up to 75.2 by 2008. The grandest change was in the political globalization score,

Estonia began with a score of only 12.6 and in 2008 had reached 75 – with the score potential ranging from 0-100 potential this increase means that Estonia’s changes in this section are astounding. As discussed in the previous section, Estonia is very active globally in cyber-security as a result of being the victim of the first major cyber-attack on any sovereign state. Estonia now takes a global lead in the fight for e-infrastructure preparedness. The most successful step forward as a result of the Estonian attack has been the EU declaring the internet as critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure protection is necessary, as increased connectivity is important to any discussion of globalization (Nederveen Pieterse 2009). In Estonia 72.3 out of every 100 people are internet users (World Bank), helping to boost their KOF social globalization index score to 31 in the world rankings, making them the highest ranked post-Soviet state. Being a post-Soviet state is fundamental to the approach Estonia takes to globalization – open and welcoming to the West – with strong cultural protections in place to ensure state-based identity remains strong.

In 2004, Estonian diplomat Jüri Luik, ambassador to NATO, Belgium, and the U.S.A., Jean-Jacques Subrenat, French ambassador to Estonia (1998-2002) and Harri Tiido, ambassador to NATO, discussed the relationship of globalization to national identity.<sup>44</sup> They identify globalization as a benefit to Estonians because the global exchange of information leads to the heightened awareness of Estonia on the world stage. This is perceived through two lenses immediately, first that Estonians have more opportunity to become successful business people through contacts with the global market which is considered advantageous to the state as a whole. Secondly, the global exchange of information is seen as a boon to their

---

<sup>44</sup> “Globalisation, Integration into Economic Structures and Their Effect on National Identity and Culture.” In *Estonia: Identity and Independence*.

security interests, safety being implied by the fact that if a country was to invade Estonia no country could claim, “unfortunately we were not aware of what was going on” (Luik et al. 2004: 281).

In the course of this debate, the EU was assumed to be a mechanism of globalization, continuing the theoretical link to the transformationalist school discussed in chapter two of this thesis (recall that skeptics would not consider regional institutions part of globalization). As an instrument of globalization, debate of the relationship between the EU and state-based identities is an important consideration to the argument presented in this thesis on the link between state-based identity and the embrace of globalization. The EU is a political entity made up of Member States with specific considerations in place for cultural, economic, and social issues.

When questioned about EU collective identity “leaving its mark” on small states like Estonia, Luik concludes that it is likely that through foreign exposure young people may find it harder to arouse patriotism than older generations have in the past. Nevertheless, that does not mean they are any less Estonian, he goes on to note. On the other hand, Subrenat finds the EU to be reinforcing of state identities, especially the “psychologically important” ability for states to enter EU agreements in its own mother tongue. He emphasizes that this maintains language as an important part of national identity (Luik et al. 2004: 286). When asked if he felt more like a European or a former Soviet, Luik states that he is Estonian. Subrenat goes even further – he claims the idea of a European Union identity is fallacious – that state identities make up the EU and will continue to keep their separate identities as long as Member States place a high level of importance to preserving their own cultural and linguistic identity. The EU is not the only International Governmental Organization (IGO)

with geographic salience for Estonia and which it is a member, the other highly significant membership is in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

NATO is a security concern, set up to protect territory and democracy. There are no sections of the treaty relating to cultural integration, or social issues of identity in NATO. Whilst there may be connections to globalization with NATO, the connection to identity is tenuous; at best, NATO is a tool to protect identity, but it is not involved in the creation of identity (Luik et al. 2004: 289). Looking at NATO from a philosophical standpoint however, Tiido points out that questions of identity are defended and preserved by a safe and secure state, so that in some sense NATO and the defense of the state that being a member to the treaty envisions, really does connect to identity (Tiido, in Luik et al. 2004: 290).

The European Monitoring Centre on Change reports in “Perceptions of globalization: attitudes and responses in the EU” from March 2008, that Estonian mid – to upper-level management individuals feel positive towards policies that welcome globalization: giving a 5.3 rating (with 1 being the most negative and 6 being the most positive feeling), to regulations that allow foreign ownership of domestic companies, with Estonian government support of foreign investors rated at 5.06. The overall attitude towards globalization was rated at 4.10, attenuated by the perceived threat of relocation of industries, R&D, and services.

### *Conclusion*

Continuity is important for identity formation to hold up over the *longue durée*. No matter who maintained political control over them, from Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and finally Russia, Estonians have celebrated their state-based identity, exemplified through their

prioritization of their language as their most salient national characteristic. This case study has shown that Estonia's cultural protections are high: all three factors that determine state-based identity are strong. Firstly, Estonia celebrates a common culture, focused on song festivals and literary traditions. Secondly, the Estonian language is differentiated from all others, not imposed on the population and is the fundamental backbone to answering what it means to be Estonian. State policies, the third factor, reinforce language through mandating 60% of classes be taught in Estonian. Becoming a citizen of Estonia is very difficult and is, once again, reinforced through language requirements. Through these cultural protections I conclude that Estonia has a strong state-based identity.

Turning then to globalization, I find Estonia, as expected, to be welcoming of globalizing influences. Estonia's political globalization ranking is fourth out of other post-Soviet states. Estonia ranks the highest in economic, social, and overall globalization levels out of all the former states of the Soviet Union in the KOF Globalization Index. With favorable ratings for being a Member State of the EU, 52 % in favor (Eurobarometre 73, Spring 2010), embracing globalization through the EU is confidently approached by Estonia, trust levels reported of the EU is high at 68%, especially when the average EU Member State trusts the EU only 42%. Even after coming under a cyber-attack, Estonia looks outward to the world. I find Estonia to have a strong state-based identity and because of that to be very willing to engage with the processes of globalization.

## CHAPTER 6. MOLDOVA

### *History of the State*<sup>45</sup>

Moldova is located in a well-worn corridor that conquerors have passed through for centuries. Romans, Huns, Bulgars, and the Mongols all laid claims to the region from the 1st to the 14th centuries. Dimitrie Cantemir provides a description (ca. 1714)<sup>46</sup> of how Moldova came to be named: Dragoș, a Romanian prince, lost his favourite dog “Molda” who, during a fight with an auroch (a wild European bison), drowned in a river. The river and surrounding lands were named after the dog and Dragoș took the auroch’s likeness for his personal crest. The auroch-head remains a symbol on the seals of both Romania and Moldova today, an example of a shared history that we will see hinders the development of state-based identity for Moldova today. During the 15th century Ștefan cel Mare (the Great) held off the Ottoman Empire’s advances and attacks – efforts that led to his canonization by the Romanian Orthodox Church in the 20th century. Ștefan died in 1504, by 1513 Moldova had become a tributary state of the Ottoman Empire.

From the 16th to the 18th century the culture and identity of Moldova changed substantially. Following the adage that pictures are worth a thousand words, Charles King notes that the changing portraiture of the rulers of Moldova has quite descriptive power: “Portraits of Ștefan the Great show a typical medieval knight indistinguishable from his contemporaries in England or France, but portraits of his successors two centuries later depict rulers clad in the flowing robes and elaborate turbans of Turkish pashas.”(King 2000:16).

---

<sup>45</sup> Section developed through information at CIA World Fact Book, US Department of State, King 2000, Uppsala.

<sup>46</sup> *Descriptio Moldaviae*, cited in King 2000: 13.

Wars between the Austrians, Russians, and Ottomans through the 18th century culminated in Moldova coming under Russian rule from 1812-1918. With the fall of the Tsar, and the Bolshevik Revolution, the Moldovan Democratic Republic of Bessarabia declared a short-lived independence January 24, 1918. By March 27 that same year, however, Moldova was united with Romania. Greater Romania existed until the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, signed by the Russians and the Germans in August 1939, were exposed by their enactment – the Soviets seized Moldova, June 26-28, 1940, and the borders for the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) were settled between August and November 1940.

Fifty years of Soviet rule came to an end on May 23, 1991 when the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova declared Moldovan independence from the U.S.S.R. However, Moldova had a rough transition to democracy due to factors that included an ineffective Parliament, the lack of a new constitution, and two internal conflicts: a separatist movement that declared a "Transnistrian Moldovan Republic" in September 1990 based on territorially-based factors, and an ethnic conflict with the Gagauz minority. The Gagauz were granted local autonomy in 1994.<sup>47</sup> The Transnistria conflict (covered later in this thesis in more detail) remains unresolved today, though the violence that characterized the conflict in the early 1990s has subsided.

---

<sup>47</sup> <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5357.htm>

*Forging a Nation – or National Forgery?*<sup>48</sup>

While the other case study in this thesis – Estonia – was rousing long-dormant identities that had been smothered by the communist identity of the Soviet Union, atavistic nationalism did not awaken naturally from its Soviet-enforced slumber in Moldova. “It was a republic that had no clear historical antecedent within the same borders” (King 2000:224). Following a different path than most post-Soviet states, rather than political mobilization by calling forth symbols indigenous to the people with unique Moldovan attributes, the primary political focus was to grab a hold of the characteristics and symbols of their neighboring nation – Romania. Already speaking the same language as Romania, the written form was changed from Cyrillic script to the Latin script of their western neighbor in 1989, and with independence in 1991 Moldova adopted the flag and national anthem of Romania. Moldova was the only republic of the Soviet Union to have a population that was culturally bound to its neighbor, with truly irredential potential. Although political calls for unification with Romania were heard from many places, eventually an existence as a separate state became more enticing to the political élites than “going home” to Romanian control.

---

<sup>48</sup> I owe this heading to Charles King, who asks: “how far can ethnic identities be forged without their appearing a forgery”? (King 2000: 5)

### **National celebrations/Public Holidays in Moldova**

Jan 1	New Year's Day
Jan 7	Orthodox Christmas
Mar 8	International Women's Day
April 25	Easter Monday (Orthodox)
May 1	Labour Day
May 9	Victory and Commemoration Day
Aug 27	Independence Day
Aug 31	Limba Noastră (National Language Day)

Compared to Estonia, there are very few celebratory days that reinforce cultural associations that are unique to Moldova. In fact, there are two: Independence Day, marked by fireworks, parades and concerts. The second is National Language Day. This reflects a weaker state-based identity than found in Estonia, where celebrations litter the calendar, reminding the community that they have a strong identity as “Estonians”. The Moldovan people, it would seem, do not celebrate state-based identity through public holidays. The literary culture in Moldova likewise shies away from paeans to the state, the following poem from 1926 reveals much of the perceived psychological moorings of the people of Moldova:

“Norod moldovenesc” (The Moldovan people).

You have passed an entire century  
In heavy chains tormented;  
Made victims by your foes,  
You have never known the sun.

For the nobleman and the landlord  
You have slaved for years on end;  
Born in toil and need,  
You were a wretch and a pauper.

Subjugated and nameless,  
Without right to be human,  
For centuries forgotten by the world,  
You were condemned to slavery.

Dimitrii Milev, 1926.<sup>49</sup>

### *Language*

#### *Identity and Language*

Language in Moldova speaks volumes of the conundrum this state faces in developing its state-based identity. In spoken form, the language is the product of one empire, in written form another. Moldovan is the same language as Romanian, allowing for dialect/regional distinctions that amount to no more than the English equivalents of “tomato-tomato, potato-potato” pronunciation differences, and occasional word selection choices, akin to calling “a guy a lad, and a gal a lass.”<sup>50</sup> However, the first grammar and dictionary in the 1920s for Moldova varied very little from spoken Romanian, but was written in the Cyrillic alphabet. In 1929 the dictionary was purged of “fancy” foreign words as Romanian

---

<sup>49</sup> King 2000 p. 66

<sup>50</sup> Thanks to Anca Turcu for the descriptive comparisons of Romanian and Moldovan language, personal correspondence from Romania. 8 July 2011.

had a “predilection for bourgeois Gallicisms” and concentrated on rural speech and Soviet literary language to establish rules of grammar (King 2000:68).

Language is a part of the state-based identity, but it is only one part. The Moldovan language debate is consistent with debates over historical allegiance but not of such singular importance as it is in the Estonian case. After all, as Christian Rakovsky, in the 1920s pointed out, “we know that a majority of the population of Switzerland speaks German, and that a part speaks French, but no one therefore suggests that the German-speaking cantons should be joined to Germany and the French-speaking to the French” (Rakovsky in King 2000: 56). Moldova changed the written form of language to the Latin alphabet as a matter of post-Soviet reforms in the early 1990s. However, this change was not accepted throughout Moldova; in Transnistria language may be spoken in Russian or Moldovan, and is still written in Cyrillic.

### *Globalization and Language*

English is not spoken or taught in Moldova to the extent that could even come close to the notions posited by McCrum in “Globish” or even the politically neutral English used in Estonia. English is taught rather as “linguistic opportunism,”<sup>51</sup> which means that there is both a lack of native speakers and effective instruction (Ciscel 2002). Motivation appears to be increasing, but English is not accessible to many students and this can be interpreted as further inference that Moldova is focused on internal, rather than global priorities.

---

<sup>51</sup> Ciscel (2002: 403)

## *State Policies*

### *Education*

Within Moldova, the education system is illustrative of political cleavages in society that weaken state-based identity. The Law on Education and the Law on Functioning of Languages Spoken in Moldova stipulates that the state choose the language of instruction for all levels of the education process.<sup>52</sup> However, Transnistrian schools teach in Russian, or in Moldovan written in Cyrillic. Educators teach that Moldovans are “outsiders” to their moral community. The level of animosity reached such a peak in 2004 that schools in the region teaching in Moldovan/Latinized language were closed. Discomfit with Transnistria’s looking East by using the Cyrillic alphabet and teaching primarily Russian history does not imply that the Moldovan education system looks West to Romania with any more hope. Identity issues are of such delicate nature that as part of a program by the Moldovan government to develop Moldovan identity, in 2002 no scholarships were accepted by Moldova that were offered by the Romanian government for attending Romanian schools and universities. This was due to the concern over the weakness of state-based Moldovan identity, the scholarships were perceived as threatening in that students would come to reject a distinction between Romania and Moldova (Roper 2005).

The struggle with separation of Romanian and Moldovan identity is fought within the education system through curriculum choices especially when it comes to history. In 2003, “History of Moldova” courses were introduced into schools through the efforts of Valentin Beniuc – Minister of Education – the debate was strong over whether this course should be

---

<sup>52</sup> Article 8, Law of Education, Law of Functioning Languages, Articles 18, 19 and 20. World Congress on Language Policies, Barcelona, April 16-20, 2002. “National Minorities Education in Moldova: The Legal Framework and Practice” A. Stoianova.

offered instead of, or as well as, “History of Romania” (Roper 2005). Given that the two states have been joined at various parts of their history the state-based identity of Moldova could be strengthened or weakened depending on how each class is taught. The education system is split on identity – should the students’ education highlight Moldova’s historical connections to Europe or Russia? Moldova has been dominated by both, the education system is struggling to find an independent state-based identity to exalt without disavowing connections to its past. The education system is not the only part of Moldova that struggles with the identity pull between Romanian and Russian allegiance. The geographically separate Transnistrians are highlighted in the next section as an example of localized identity at war with state-based identity.

### ***Becoming a Citizen***

Citizenship laws enacted by Moldova were very liberal compared to others in Eastern Europe: all persons residing within the bounds of the territory on June 23, 1990 (the date of the sovereign declaration) became citizens, regardless of any other criteria relating to birth, ethnicity, language, and so forth. However, dual citizenship was illegal in Moldova from independence until November 2003.

***Global or Local?  
Local identity prioritized in the Transnistrian Conflict***<sup>53</sup>

The in-depth analysis for Moldova looks specifically into their internal conflict, globalization taking less priority in a torn state. In 1990 the Slavic minority on the east side of the river Dnestr chose not to recognize the new parliament in Moldova, comprised of a majority of ethnic Moldovans (Uppsala) and a congress of local leadership declared a separate Dnestr Moldovan Republic (DMR) on 2 September 1990. At less than 30 kilometers wide and just over 4,000 square kilometers in area (King 2000:178), nonetheless this sliver of borderland functioned independently from Moldova from that point on and even voted to join the U.S.S.R. after Moldova's declaration of independence in 1991. The implosion of the Soviet Union did not bring Transnistria back in the Moldovan fold however, and the DMR took over police, media and other institutional outlets (Uppsala), eventually functioning as a *de facto* state. DMR and Moldova took to arms on the 13 December 1991 and by 17 March 1992 the conflict had reached the level of 25 battle-related deaths to count as intrastate conflict in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program database (Uppsala). There has been no armed conflict between the sides since the 1992 ceasefire, and a peace agreement, the Memorandum on the Basis for Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transdnistria was signed 8 May 1997.

A state, even one whose internal divisions are political and not as physically ruinous as those torn asunder through years of civil war, still has a weak state-based identity when questions of "who are you" are answered with local saliency dominating the state identity

---

<sup>53</sup> Information in this section compiled from King (2000), and Uppsala online.

even to outsiders. The DMR hostilities may have ended, but the area has not become a part of the state of Moldova. The symbols of national identity that have been discussed throughout this thesis reinforce the internal divisions within the recognized borders of the sovereign state of Moldova – the DMR has its own flag, constitution, anthem and currency, armed forces and elected political officials (King 2000: 205). As illustrated in the theory section of this thesis, even textbooks in the DMR promulgate the legitimacy of the regime, and they do it in the Cyrillic alphabet, which the DMR now uses to differentiate their language from Moldovans.

### *Globalization in Moldova*




Figure 2. Globalization in Moldova.

As the figure on the previous page shows, Moldova has increased in measures of globalization from independence through 2008 with a slight drop off consistently from 2007 to 2008. Because this drop-off is at the end of the time frame, whether it is a blip or the beginning of a turn away from globalization is undefined. Specifically, in the 2011 KOF index, Moldova ranks 54th in economic globalization, 68th in social globalization, and 130th in political globalization for an overall globalization ranking of 63rd. Like Estonia, the greatest change in KOF score between 1991 and 2008 is in the political globalization score, moving from 6.6 in 1991 to 56.7 in 2008, but this change still leaves Moldova near the lower ranking for political globalization (130th out of 156 countries). Economic globalization in Estonia in 1991 was 42.5 and had increased to a score of 69.5 in 2008. Social globalization, the most important focus for the link between state-based identity and globalization increased as well, from 36.4 in 1991 to a score of 59 in 2008.

What can be determined comparatively from all these numbers is that Moldova remains less globalized than Estonia. Measuring concepts like “culture” and “social” are tricky, proxies must be used as heuristics to help us understand the general by measuring specifics that we think relate to the general. This thesis is concerned primarily with the social aspects of globalization. Digging into the numbers that are compiled for the scores given in Figure 2 reveals a significant difference in the globalization of Moldova and Estonia. Data from the World Bank (the source for many of the measurements used for development of KOF rankings) show that in 1991 there was an average of zero internet users per 100 people in Moldova and 0.1 in Estonia. By 2009, the latest date information is available for, Moldova had increased to 35.9 users per 100 people, yet Estonia had 72.3

users. These numbers reflect a telling difference of the level of exposure to globalizing influences of the general public in each state.

### *Conclusion*

According to Theda Skocpol, the division of power from the political center of a state to autonomous regions, either willingly through political federalism or unwillingly by civil conflict, is indicative of a weak state (Skocpol 1985). The reflective focus of collective identity in Moldova, where identity is internally focused on domestic cleavages rather than state-level concerns, undermines state-based identity.

Even the national anthem – a quintessential symbol of the state – undermines state-based identity in Moldova. Upon independence from the Soviet Union, Moldova used Romania’s national anthem: “Romanian, Awake!” This was changed by the government to the (perhaps ironically named) “*Limba noastră*” (Our Language), to show that Moldova has a state-based identity independent from Romania, despite the fact that the poem by Alexi Mateevici, on which the anthem is based, is not explicit as to whether ‘our language’ refers to Moldovan or Romanian, further clouding the debate (King 2000:159).

The public opinion in the DMR combined with strategic and economic interests led political élites to favor ties with Russia (Huntington 1996:165). When compared to the Moldovan government policies actively making ties with the EU, it looks like a unified vision of the future will not be shared internally in Moldova any time soon. The internal diffusion of power, and the indecision on whether to orient a state-based identity toward European or Russian historical roots shows a lack of unity that is highlighted by the

inconsistency of the state control over education in both language and content. I conclude that Moldova is a state with a weak state-based identity with globalizing influences permeating only slowly.

## CHAPTER 7. CASE COMPARISON

Estonia and Moldova share the similar geographic distinction of having been Eastern-European border lands to the Soviet Union; the history of the states are in some ways alike and in some ways different. Both Estonia and Moldova have been conquered by subjugating forces throughout their history. The outside rule of these forces reflects differences in forming the *mentalité* of collective memory. In Estonia, for example, German and Scandinavian domination led to developing trade structure and cities as part of the Hanseatic league. Swedish rule in the 17th century included tenets of basic human rights, peasants were “people too” and education opportunities increased. On the other hand, Moldova has a collective memory that is bound to the land, and as reflected in the poetry of Dimitrii Milev, was “condemned to slavery” and has been treated as a resource tributary throughout its history.

By the 19th century both states were under the rule of the Russian Empire, but in Estonia national identity was becoming a cultural force, with singing festivals and literary efforts sharing their stories. The 20th century brought an independence from outsider rule for both states. Estonia became an independent republic for the 20 years of the interwar period. Moldova was independent for two months before becoming a part of Greater Romania. Both states were handed back to Russian rule when the Soviet Union and Germany packaged out spheres of rule in the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.

During the 50 years of rule under the Soviet yoke, communist values such as collectivism, authoritarianism, public (over private), were held constant for both Estonia and Moldova. Likewise, the empire stipulated identity of the people rather than allowing choice.

Russification of language, culture, and education systems overshadowed national heritage movements and communism was, at least nominally, the dominant political belief.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Manfred Steger finds that Western commentators “argued that all political belief systems had converged in a single vision: liberal capitalism.”<sup>54</sup> Values associated with globalization, universal human rights, spread of “right and proper” governing systems (democracy if viewed through western eyes), women’s equality, and universal education were hailed by the ardent supporters of globalization. Those who were less favorably inclined to globalizing influences warned of the threat that could steamroll nationalities, stamping out esoteric cultural knowledge and history of any culture not of European or western descent.

After the fall of the Soviet empire, Estonia and Moldova were left with different state structures and focus. Estonia became the first post-Soviet republic to adopt a new constitution and hold democratic elections, electing 101 members to a unicameral parliament – The Riigikogu – which appoints the prime minister and elects the president, and by September 1992 the prime minister was Mart Laar (b. 1960) and had no connections to the communist past (Raun 2001). Post-Soviet Moldova has democratic elections also, but has maintained ties and reelected communist party members to Parliament, which went on to elect several Presidents from the communist party.

Globalization “involves human integration, but this is a long-term, uneven, and paradoxical process.”<sup>55</sup> It also “involves the role of local reception of western culture”<sup>56</sup> and, as opposed to Huntington’s notion of clashing civilizations (based fundamentally on

---

<sup>54</sup> Steger, M. *Globalisms* p.1

<sup>55</sup> Nederveen Pieterse, J. (2009) p.40

<sup>56</sup> Nederveen Pieterse, J. (2009) p.75

religious differentiation), J. Nederveen Pieterse finds that there exists in social globalization a notion of “syncretism, the fusion of religious forms.”<sup>57</sup>

Fusion of cultures is sometimes rejected outright. Moldova switched the written form of its language from Cyrillic to Latinized form by way of rejecting Russification of the past. Other states, at other times, have taken substantial measures to eliminate symbols of outside thoughts, values, and ways (culture!). The Taleban, for example, 2001’s destruction of the 5-7th Century Buddha’s (a World Historic Monument) brought home the tangible threat that symbols can have to those attempting to maintain alienation from the outside influences. The Estonian removal of the “Bronze Soldier of Tallinn” a Soviet World War II memorial was perceived as a symbolic retribution to Sovietization. The removal led tensions between ethnic Russians and Estonians to overheat into “Bronze Night” which was actually two days of riots in Tallinn, and triggered the 2007 cyber-attacks on Estonia.

Shared commonality is reinforced by the very fact that it leads to strong “discontinuities” in culture and language from others. Estonia has this shared concept of what it means to be Estonian, to speak the language, to hold onto a literary history that includes epic heroic poetry of *Kalevipoeg* that passes consistently through generations, and builds a strong state-based identity that defines Estonians from all Others. Moldova on the other hand, as a bricolage of Romanian and Soviet language and cultural ties, does not build its state-based identity on one solid and continuous foundation, discontinuities chip at its identity from within, weakening the state-based identity of Moldova.

Cultural influence is more difficult to measure than economic or military values. There is not an objective starting value, no mathematical constant that allows us to add one

---

<sup>57</sup> Nederveen Pieterse, J. (2009) p.78 (emphasis in original)

more part cultural influence to get one more point of change in a globalization variable. Even the KOF scores are based on proxies, using heuristics to figure a “best guess” of cultural influence. This means that exploring culture is subjective, a continuing discussion rather than a controlled experiment, and conclusions drawn are interpretive projections at best.

Globalization inherently leads to some losses along with general gains; most states will experience greater inequality and even, as illustrated by the cyber-attacks on Estonia in April 2007, new forms of warfare. It is interesting that the gains and losses may amount to differing perceptions accredited to the same end result. Both Moldova and Estonia acknowledge that young people may lose some feelings of nationalism when exposed to global influences. The same feeling that Jüri Luik notes that young people exposed to foreigners through travel may show less patriotism towards their state-based identity, is reflected by the Moldovan case of trepidation regarding Romanian scholarships. Both fear that it will erode state-based identity slightly – but that is enough for Moldova to refuse scholarships because having a weak state-based identity means that the threat perceived by any loss by globalizing forces is bad. Estonians on the other hand welcome the global influences, and feel less threatened by it.

In sum, the cases illustrate through a historically grounded comparison that Estonia and Moldova have different state-based identity levels, and their embrace of globalization – as reflected in their KOF globalization index scores – differs as expected in accordance with their strength of state-based identity. In Estonia, the state-based identity is relatively strong, and in Moldova, it is relatively weak. This difference is reflected in state policy attempts to encourage or inhibit globalizing influences within the state.

## CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION

### *Future Study and Alternative Approach*

This thesis is a work of an exploratory nature, “proximal evidence”<sup>58</sup> has been brought forth, and descriptive inferences were made. The connections inferred regarding these two cases would benefit from future large-n studies to test the relationship through a cross-unit approach. Though generally supported at the “eye-ball test” level – to glance through the 2011 KOF index and confirm that states with intuitively stronger state-based identities (according to my three factors of culture, language, and state policies that embrace globalizing influences) do place higher on the index than those states that seem to lack strength in one or more of the factors. However, it is disconcerting to see Belgium, divided by two identities clamoring for primacy at the state level, to be so high on the globalization index, and the Republic of Korea, a state that would receive a strong state-based identity endorsement, barely making it to the top third of countries for the KOF globalization rankings.

The most likely alternate explanation for my results should be reviewed in the course of investigating the connections that I have proffered in this thesis:

*More economically developed states are more open to globalization.*

Can these results be explained away merely by economic development level? The answer to this question is yes and no. The level of economic development is absolutely a factor in rising rankings in the KOF globalization index. Not just for the economic index, but also for the social index as so many of the measures in the social can be attributed also to a developed

---

<sup>58</sup> Gerring (2004)

economy – internet servers and international phone calls, for example. Economic level can be co-determinate without replacing the value of this work, as the cultural side of collective identity formation is highlighted here, a shared history, development of norms and socialization to the state that cannot be differentiated if looking solely at economic measures.

### *Conclusion*

It is not enough to see states interacting in the global arena as merely economic units. Politics is about people, collectives that are motivated and mobilized by factors that economics alone cannot explain, this research sheds light through investigating the historical antecedents of state-based identity to shed light on their response to globalization. In forging a state-based identity these countries are not the only ones facing a way of identifying themselves internally and externally – other nation-states, such as Ireland project a state-based identity to the outside that is to some extent manufactured. “Riverdance does not spring from the eternal well of the Irish soul; rather, it is manufactured by the global cultural industry” (Fagan 2001:123).

James Rosenau claims that political space is no longer solely defined in terms of territory; people no longer have a strict association between their own welfare and that of their territorial community.<sup>59</sup> Yet states still exist as actors in the international structure, populated by people who are identified across the globe by their state-based identity. We carry passports that proclaim our identities as citizens for traveling outside of our state, yet Jan Aart Scholte tells us that we have moved beyond the “monochrome fixation on...state-

---

<sup>59</sup> See Rosenau, J. N. (2003) p.66 for a more detailed description

centered nationhood” and now identify ourselves in a more pluralistic, hybridized manner – faith, class, gender, race, age, etc...mixed in with a still healthy-sized dose of nationality. It is in the variations of that “dose of nationality” that this thesis has focused, finding that states with stronger or weaker state-based identities react differently to globalizing influences. The link between state-based identity and globalization is revealing as post-Soviet European states interact on the global scale.

State-based identity strength, I have claimed in this thesis, is indicated by these three factors: First, common culture – a solid collective memory that ties past, current, and future identity to the state. Second, language – indigenous language reinforces state-based identity, whereas vestiges of empire and a language foisted on the people by outsiders indicates a weaker state-based identity. Thirdly, state policies – education, citizenship requirements, and public holidays are used to illustrate how the state communicates identity to the population and molds loyalty of the collective.

This thesis studied two cases: Estonia and Moldova. The states are similar in that they border Europe, and were traded to the authority of the Soviet Union at the same time by the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939, which bound their identities to the Soviet Union for most of the last century, and they were released in the same wave of independence. Nonetheless, the differences are striking between the state-based identity of each state. Estonians have a common culture, a unique language, and celebrate many public holidays heralding their existence as an individual state. Moldovans, on the other hand, are internally divided as to whether they are culturally European or Orthodox. They speak the language of one neighboring state and yet some still write in the alphabet of a different neighboring state, and celebrate just two public holidays a year that proclaim state-based

identity. Facing the same challenge to stand on their own after years yoked to the Soviet Union, Estonia and Moldova interact with the many and varied processes of globalization to differing degrees, and those differences may be accounted for partially by their differing levels of state-based identity.

This thesis has been an exploratory look into the relationship between the strength of state-based identities and globalization. I have argued that the differences in the state-based identity of Estonia and Moldova help explain their relative openness towards globalization. I have shown that Estonia has a stronger state-based identity and engages with globalizing influences and policies as I expected, whilst the weaker state-based identity of Moldova epitomizes the defensive positioning that is associated with the perception of global influences being seen as undermining of state-based loyalties, leading Moldova to concentrate on internal issues, and is less able to engage with globalization.

## APPENDIX

### 2010 KOF Index of Globalization Indices and Variables Weights

#### A. Economic Globalization [37%]

- i) Actual Flows (50%)
  - Trade (percent of GDP) (19%)
  - Foreign Direct Investment, flows (percent of GDP) (20%)
  - Foreign Direct Investment, stocks (percent of GDP) (24%)
  - Portfolio Investment (percent of GDP) (17%)
  - Income Payments to Foreign Nationals (percent of GDP) (20%)
- ii) Restrictions (50%)
  - Hidden Import Barriers (22%)
  - Mean Tariff Rate (28%)
  - Taxes on International Trade (percent of current revenue) (27%)
  - Capital Account Restrictions (22%)

#### B. Social Globalization [39%]

- i) Data on Personal Contact (33%)
  - Telephone Traffic (26%)
  - Transfers (percent of GDP) (3%)
  - International Tourism (26%)
  - Foreign Population (percent of total population) (20%)
  - International letters (per capita) (25%)
- ii) Data on Information Flows (36%)
  - Internet Users (per 1000 people) (36%)
  - Television (per 1000 people) (36%)
  - Trade in Newspapers (percent of GDP) (28%)
- iii) Data on Cultural Proximity (31%)
  - Number of McDonald's Restaurants (per capita) (43%)
  - Number of Ikea (per capita) (44%)
  - Trade in books (percent of GDP) (12%)

#### C. Political Globalization [25%]

- Embassies in Country (25%)
- Membership in International Organizations (28%)
- Participation in U.N. Security Council Missions (22%)
- International Treaties (25%)

Source:

Dreher, Axel, 2006, "Does Globalization Affect Growth? Empirical Evidence from a new Index," *Applied Economics* 38, 10: 1091-1110.

## REFERENCES

Amnesty International: <http://www.amnestyusa.org/>

Anderson, Benedict. 2006. *Imagined Communities*. London: Verso.

Blum, Douglas. 2007. *National Identity and Globalization: Youth, State, and Society in Post-Soviet Eurasia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Books, John W. 2001. "Globalization and Alternative Approaches to the Transformation of Nation-States." In *Globalization and National Identities*, edited by Paul Kennedy and Catherine J. Danks, 210-223. New York: Palgrave.

Brown, Chris. 2002. *Sovereignty, Rights and Justice: International Political Theory Today*. Malden, MA: Polity Press.

Brown, Robin. 1995. "Globalization and the End of the National Project." In *Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International Relations*, edited by John MacMillan and Andrew Linklater, 54-68. London: Pinter Publishers.

Ciscel, Matthew H. 2002. "Linguistic Opportunism and English in Moldova." *World Englishes*. 21 (3): 403-419.

Conner, Walker. 2004. "A Few Cautionary Notes on the History and Future of Ethnonational Conflicts." In *Facing Ethnic Conflicts*, edited by Andreas Wimmer, Richard J. Goldstone, Donald L. Horowitz, Ulrike Jones, and Conrad Schetter, 23-33. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.

Council of Europe. 1992. European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. 1992. <http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/148.htm>

Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher. n.d. *Inside the Politics of Self-Determination*. Working manuscript.

Dirks, Robert. 1995. "Estonian Folklore, Language, and Identity." *World Affairs*. 157 (Winter): 149-153.

### KOF INDEX OF GLOBALIZATION:

Dreher, Axel (2006): Does Globalization Affect Growth? Evidence from a new Index of Globalization, *Applied Economics* 38, 10: 1091-1110. Updated in:

Dreher, Axel, Noel Gaston and Pim Martens. 2008. *Measuring Globalisation: Gauging its Consequences*. New York: Springer.

*The Economist*. 2011. "Hackers Hit Big Companies, the IMF and the Headlines." June 16. International.

Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: <http://www.vm.ee/en/node/5753>

Euromosaic study: European Commission support for measures safeguarding regional and minority languages:

[http://ec.europa.eu/education/languages/euromosaic/doc4447\\_en.htm#13](http://ec.europa.eu/education/languages/euromosaic/doc4447_en.htm#13)

[http://ec.europa.eu/education/languages/languages-of-europe/doc145\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/education/languages/languages-of-europe/doc145_en.htm)

[http://ec.europa.eu/education/languages/euromosaic/et\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/education/languages/euromosaic/et_en.pdf)

European Monitoring Centre on Change: survey results on perceptions of globalization:

European Union Ministerial Conference on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection, Tallinn, 27-28 April 2009:

- Discussion Paper:

[http://www.tallinnciip.eu/doc/discussion\\_paper\\_-\\_tallinn\\_ciip\\_conference.pdf](http://www.tallinnciip.eu/doc/discussion_paper_-_tallinn_ciip_conference.pdf)

- About the conference:

[http://www.tallinnciip.eu/doc/about\\_the\\_conference.pdf](http://www.tallinnciip.eu/doc/about_the_conference.pdf)

Europa Press Release

“Commission acts to protect Europe from cyber-attacks and disruptions.”

<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/494&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>

Evans, Peter B., Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. 1985. “On the Road Toward a More Adequate Understanding of the State.” In *Bringing the State Back In*, edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, 347-.366. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Evron, Gadi. 2008. “Battling Botnets and Online Mobs: Estonia’s Defense Efforts during the Internet War.” *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* (Winter/Spring):121-126.

Evron, Gadi, H. Aarelaid 2008. “Estonia: Information Warfare and Lessons Learned” [Power Point Presentation] Presented at EU Commission Workshop on Learning from Large Scale Attacks on the Internet – Policy Implications Brussels. 17 January.

[http://ec.europa.eu/information\\_society/policy/nis/docs/largescaleattacksdocs/s5\\_gadi\\_evron.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/nis/docs/largescaleattacksdocs/s5_gadi_evron.pdf)

Fagan, G. Honor. 2001. “Globalization, Identity and ‘Ireland’.” In *Globalization and National Identities*, edited by Paul Kennedy and Catherine J. Danks, 113-123. New York: Palgrave.

Feldman, Gregory. 2005. “Culture, state, and security in Europe: The case of citizenship and integration policy in Estonia.” *American Ethnologist*. 32 (4):676-694.

- Ferguson, Niall. 2005. "Sinking Globalization." *Foreign Affairs*. 84 (March-April): 64-77.
- Ferguson, Y. and R.W. Mansbach. 2004. *Remapping Global Politics: History's Revenge and Future Shock*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fonzari, Lorenza. 1999. "English in the Estonian Multicultural Society." *World Englishes*. 18 (1): 39-48.
- George, A. and A. Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- George, Alexander. 1979. "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison." In *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy*, edited by P.G. Lauren, 43-68. New York: The Free Press, a division of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc
- Gerring, John. 2004. "What is a Case Study and What is it Good For?" *American Political Science Review*. 98 (2): 341-354.
- Giddens, Anthony. 1991. *Modernity and Self-Identity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Gourgouris, Stathis. 1994. "The Macedonian Issue Has a Sorry Past." *New York Times*. May 9.
- Guéhenno, Jean-Marie. 1995. *The End of the Nation-State*. Translated by Victoria Elliot. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Haas, Peter M. 1992. "Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination." *International Organization*. 46 (Winter): 1-35.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Jameson, Fredric. 1998. "Globalization as a Philosophical Issue." In *The Cultures of Globalization*, edited by Fredric Jameson and Masao Miyoshi, 54-77. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Jones, Adam. 2004. "Wired World: Communications Technology, Governance and the Democratic Uprising." In *The Global Political Economy of Communication*, edited by Edward A. Comor, 145-164.
- Keohane, Robert O., Joseph S. Nye Jr. 2000. "Globalization: What's New? What's Not? (And So What?)." *Foreign Policy*. 118 (Spring): 104-119.

- Kennedy, Paul. 2001. "Globalization and the Crisis of Identities?" In *Globalization and National Identities*, edited by Paul Kennedy and Catherine J. Danks, 1-28. New York: Palgrave.
- King, Charles. 2000. *The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture*. Stanford, CA: Hoover University Press.
- Kostboth, Michael. 2011. "Jihad or McWorld? Do Ethnic Minorities Actually Fight to Stop Globalization?" Poster presented at the 69th Annual National Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association.
- Küün, Elvira. 2010. "Development perspectives for minority languages in Estonian separated language environments." *Trames*. 14 (64/59): 141-179.
- Laar, Mart. 2004. "The Restoration of Independence in Estonia." In *Estonia: Identity and Independence*. Edited by Jena-Jacques Subrenat. Translated by David Cousins, Eric Dickens, Alexander Harding and Richard C. Waterhouse, 225-238. New York: Rodopi
- Landler, Mark, and John Markoff. 2007. "Digital Fears Emerge After Data Siege in Estonia." *New York Times*. May 29.
- LeBor, Adam. 2006. "Hungary? Why, It's Only the Hors D'Oeuvres." *The Times (London)*. September 21. (Lexis Nexis).
- Levy, Clifford. 2010. "Soviet Legacy Lingers as Estonia Defines Its People." *New York Times*. August 15.
- Library of Congress Country Studies: Moldova
- Lieber, Robert J., Ruth E. Weisberg. 2002. "Globalization, Culture, and Identities in Crisis." *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*. 16 (Winter): 273-296.
- Linklater, Andrew. 1998. *The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Lobjakas, Ahto. 2008. "News Analysis: How Vulnerable Are Countries To Cyberattacks? Ask Estonia!" *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*. April 29.  
<http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1109653.html>
- Mansbach, Richard W. and Kirsten L. Rafferty. 2008. *Introduction to Global Politics*. NY: Routledge.
- McCrum, Robert. 2010. *Globish*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.

McEwen, Andrew. 1989. "Human chain in 370 mile protest; Protest against the Soviet-German pact of 1939." August 24. *The Times (London)*.

Miller, David. 1995. *On Nationality*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Nederveen Pieterse, Jan. 1995. "Globalization as Hybridization." In *Global Modernities*, edited by Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash, and Roland Robertson, 45-68. London: Sage Publications.

Nederveen Pieterse, Jan. 2009. *Globalization & Culture: Global M lange*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Negroponce, Nicholas. 1995. *Being Digital*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Nicholson, Chris. 2009. "Bringing the Internet to Remote African Villages." February 2. *New York Times*.

O'Byrne, Darren J. 2001. "On the Construction of Political Identity: Negotiations and Strategies Beyond the Nation-State." In *Globalization and National Identities*, edited by Paul Kennedy and Catherine J. Danks, 139-157. New York: Palgrave.

Raun, Toivo U. 2001. *Estonia and the Estonians*. Stanford CA: Hoover Institution Press.

Roper, Steven D. 2005. "The Politicization of Education: Identity Formation in Moldova and Transnistria." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*. 38: 501-514.

Rosenau, J. N. 1997. *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Roseanu, J. N. 2003. *Distant Proximities: Dynamics beyond Globalization*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Rosen, James. 1989. "Soviets send troops to Moldavia; Estonia casts defiant vote." November 13. *United Press International*. LexisNexis Academic.

Sassen, Saskia. 2008. "Places and Spaces of the Global." In *Globalization Theory: Approaches and Controversies*. Edited by David Held and Anthony McGrew, 79-105. Cambridge: Polity.

Schmidt, Eric, and Jared Cohen. 2010. "The Digital Disruption: Connectivity and the Diffusion of Power." *Foreign Affairs*. (November/December): 75-85.

Scholte, Jan Aart. 2005. *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*. Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

Shin, Gi-Wook. 2003. "The Paradox of Korean Globalization." Asia/Pacific Research Center: Stanford University. Working paper.

Sillaste, Kyllike. 1995. "Conquest and Survival: An Outline of Estonian History." *World Affairs*. 157 (Winter): 119-123.

Skocpol, Theda. 1985. "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research." In *Bringing the State Back In*, edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, 3-43. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, Antony. 1990. "Towards a Global Culture?" In *Global Culture*, edited by Mike Featherstone, 171-191. London: Sage Publications.

Strange, Susan. 1994. *States and Markets*. 2nd edition. London: Pinter Publishers.

Strange, Susan. 1996. *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tighe, Mark. 2007. "Irish banks told to prepare for devastating cyber attack." *The Sunday Times (London)*. October 7. (Lexis Nexis).

Uppsala Conflict Data Program. UCDP Database: [www.ucdp.uu.se/database](http://www.ucdp.uu.se/database), Uppsala University.

Van Elsuwege, Peter. 2004. "Russian-Speaking Minorities in Estonia and Latvia: Problems of Integration at the Threshold of the European Union." ECMI working paper # 20. European Centre for Minority Issues.  
[http://www.ecmi.de/uploads/tx\\_lfpubdb/working\\_paper\\_20.pdf](http://www.ecmi.de/uploads/tx_lfpubdb/working_paper_20.pdf)

Wendt, Alexander. 1994. "Collective Identity Formation and the International State." *American Political Science Review*. 88 (June): 384-396.

World Bank. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2>