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Critical Analysis of Case Law: Are Partnering Charters Binding?

Milagros Pinto Nunez
University of Panama

Douglas D. Gransberg
Iowa State University, dgran@iastate.edu

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Critical Analysis of Case Law: Are Partnering Charters Binding?

Abstract

Construction project partnering in the United States has been used successfully for nearly 30 years in reducing disputes. Most partnered projects are characterized by the joint development of a nonbinding partnering charter between the owner and the contractor, which encapsulates the project's goals and lays out the desired process for resolving issues at the lowest level. This paper explores the outcomes when partnered projects fail and the parties involved must turn to the courts to settle their disputes. The paper evaluates the case law for 16 partnered projects through content analysis and cross-case comparison. The paper explores the question of whether the *good faith and fair dealing* (GFFD) doctrine applies to partnering charters, potentially rendering them binding. The paper finds that while the courts have not yet directly applied GFFD to make a charter binding, there is sufficient cause to consider giving it the force of the contract.

Keywords

Partnering, claims, alliancing, disputes

Disciplines

Construction Engineering and Management | Construction Law

Comments

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23 INTRODUCTION

24 The literature touts partnering as remedy for disputes and claims (CII 1991; Weston and Gibson
25 1993; Ernzen et al. 2000; Eriksson 2010), and while it also shows that partnering indeed reduces
26 the number of disputes that find themselves into the legal system for resolution (Gransberg et al.
27 1999), it is not a remedy for issues that transcend the impact of interpersonal and interinstitutional
28 relationships. As will be seen in this paper, unresolved disputes on partnered projects do end up in
29 court. Project specific aspects such as differing site conditions, design errors and omissions, and
30 *force majeure* events are to be expected on most construction projects in varying degrees of impact
31 (West et al. 2012). Partnering, by definition, is a tool for developing a mutually agreed approach
32 to how each party in the construction contract will act/react when things do not go according to
33 plan (Nyström 2008). The inclusion of alternative dispute resolution methods in design, design-
34 build, and construction contracts are intended to provide a mechanism for extralegal resolution
35 and a means to elevate the disagreement off the project to a level where a business decision can be
36 made by those vested with the authority to do so (CII 1991). When all these efforts fail, a
37 disagreement becomes a formal dispute as the contractor files a claim for additional compensation
38 and/or time to make itself whole from damages suffered as a result of the disputed issue (Eriksson
39 2010).

40 Once litigation is initiated, the situation leaves the control of the parties to the contract and
41 proceeds through the stages of litigation. After the suit has been filed and the defendant has
42 responded, the discovery phase begins for both sides. The discovery phase’s purpose is “to
43 preserve evidence of witnesses who may not be available at trial; to reveal facts; and, to aid in
44 formulating the issues to be litigated; ... obtain access to documents and other items not in their
45 possession.” (FindLaw 2017). One of the documents that can be found during discovery is the

46 owner-contractor partnering charter (hereafter referred to as the OCPC). A typical OCPC will carry
47 the term “nonbinding” in its heading in accordance current partnering practice (AASHTO 2005,
48 Dyer 2011) and will memorialize the project-specific mutual agreements made by the parties to
49 the project’s contract. While the document is not intended to modify the terms of the underlying
50 contract, OCPCs have been included in construction litigation and purported to be written evidence
51 of an agreement by the parties to deal with each other fairly and in good faith.

52 Much reliance by partnering facilitators and institutions that promote partnering is placed
53 on the term nonbinding as a means to develop voluntary adherence to the project goals expressed
54 in the OCPC and to avoid the legalistic wrangling that is assumed to accompany a similar binding
55 document. According to Cowan et al. (1992): “The symbolic act of signing the charter represents
56 an oath of allegiance to the principles of partnering. This public gesture reinforces individual
57 commitment as well as providing a superordinate goal for all the parties involved.” Furthermore,
58 the Construction Industry Council (2010) maintains that the charter “does not change the terms of
59 contract or the contractual relationships between the parties... The partnering charter and
60 commitments to it evidence a moral commitment by all parties to act in the best interests of the
61 project and work together to meet the goal and objectives of the project without dispute.” (CIC
62 2010). Lastly Phillips (2008) posits that achieving the objectives cited in the OCPC “depends on
63 all those involved in the project team; hence a consensus agreement on the project objectives is of
64 vital significance.”

65 Without rejecting all the reasons cited above for a nonbinding OCPC, one must ask the
66 following rhetorical questions:

- 67 • If the parties to the OCPC are willing to sign the document when its contents are thought
68 to be noncontractual, why would they not be willing bind themselves to the objectives and
69 behaviors codified in the OCPC?
- 70 • Additionally, if partnering fails and the two parties must face each other in court, does the
71 fact that they signed a document promising to partner create the potential for a party to
72 raise claims of bad faith or unfair dealing if the circumstances warrant it?

73 The objective of this paper is to answer both of the above questions based on an analysis
74 of partnered project failures found in the US construction contract case law. Its primary
75 contribution is to highlight for the first time the potential legal issue that a nonbinding OCPC has
76 may be used to support a breach of the legal principal of “good faith and fair dealing” (GFFD),
77 essentially rendering the document as binding to some degree, regardless of the intent of the parties
78 that drafted and signed it. It will also argue that given the success reported about international
79 contractual partnering agreements and the advent of relational contract instruments, such as
80 integrated project delivery (IPD) and alliancing, that the US industry may benefit by codifying a
81 project’s OCPC as binding on both parties.

82

83 **Partnering Background**

84 The US partnering program originated “as a means to avoid disputes and, consequently, reduce
85 the ultimate cost of delivering public facilities” (Gransberg et al. 1999) and remains a management
86 practice to build teams, facilitate communications, and avoid disputes by seeking to increase the
87 level of trust between the owner and its construction contractors (Weston and Gibson 1993;
88 Murdough et al. 2007). The Construction Industry Institute maintains that partnering is an
89 *enhanced business process* that promotes collaboration by mutual agreement to achieve “common

90 objectives on the basis of trust and the understanding of each other’s values and expectations” (CII
91 1991). On the other hand, owners in the United Kingdom (UK), Denmark, Australia, and New
92 Zealand, to name a few, have treated partnering as contractual relationship rather than a business
93 management process (Tvarnø 2015). A standard contract form was developed in the UK called
94 PPC2000 that details the terms of the partnership in order to regulate the relationships between
95 contracting parties through “express good faith” contract clauses (Lahdenperä 2012).

96 PPC2000 is described as a “conditional two stage contract” (Mosey 2009) in which
97 partnering is defined as a “strategic alliance in which the partners recognize the potential benefits
98 for the project of developing a strategic alliance relationship and pursuing joint initiatives” (Tvarnø
99 2015). Its ultimate goal is to transform the conventional contractual relationship of two individual
100 parties into a true partnership through a “binding legal framework that aims to optimize the
101 transactions among the parties as a whole, instead of having two parties aiming to optimize their
102 own utility” (Tvarnø 2015). The notion that the relationship is changed and then made binding is
103 important to understanding the fundamental theoretical basis of international relational contracts.
104 In the words of the Danish Construction Authority (2002), a partnering contract “focuses on the
105 parties’ transformation from a self-centered, ‘contract based’ attitude to a relation-based, joint
106 optimization and collaboration.”

107 Tvarnø (2015) proposes a game theory analogy to describe the desired transformation when
108 a partnering agreement is negotiated. The “Prisoner’s Dilemma” game offers players (analogous
109 to the parties in a construction contract) an option to either cooperate to achieve a joint gain or
110 refuse to cooperate with the chance of a larger individual gain (Rapoport and Chammah 1965).
111 The essence of the dilemma revolves around human nature, self-interest, and the risk that if one
112 side agrees to cooperate the other will not and therefore undeservedly profit at the expense of the

113 cooperator. Thus, given a voluntary choice between individual or joint action, the choice will
114 always be self-interested out of fear that the other party will take advantage of the first one (Cooter
115 and Ulen, 2011). Tvarnø (2015) uses this outcome to argue that partnering agreements should be
116 binding because a nonbinding agreement is susceptible to the self-centered outcomes of the
117 Prisoner’s Dilemma. This author posits that “the partnering contract must on one side make the
118 parties prefer to cooperate instead of self-optimize, while on the other hand, bind the parties to
119 joint-optimize through cooperation.” The paper also makes a convincing case that the partnering
120 contract should include incentives for collaboration and share in the benefits achieved through
121 collaboration.

122 Alliance contracting as practiced in Australia and New Zealand takes the concept of
123 binding collaboration to another level by including “painshare/gainshare” schemes to create the
124 incentives and a clause that forbids taking disputes to the courts (Tamburro and Wood 2014;
125 Gransberg and Scheepbouwer 2015). “Project alliancing can be considered a highly evolved form
126 of partnering which is enshrined in a contract” (Manley 2002). The research on alliance contract
127 performance shows truly impressive results. According to Wood and Duffield (2009), the 324
128 alliances included in the study involved delivering over AUS\$60 billion worth of infrastructure in
129 Australia and New Zealand with an average cost savings of 3.5% and time savings that ranged
130 between 2% and 7%. While those outcomes are certainly desirable, the fact that only one of the
131 324 alliances failed to resolve all disputes internally is the key take-away with regard to whether
132 or not partnering agreements should be binding. In Tvarnø’s words (2015), the partnering contract
133 “must change the parties’ behavior by creating incentives through a written and explicit contract,
134 which oblige the parties to reward collaboration in the interest of both parties.”

135 Given the above discussion, the assertion that a nonbinding OCPC is necessary to
136 demonstrate “a moral commitment by all parties to act in the best interests of the project” is called
137 into question. Therefore, turning from the theoretical to the practical, the remainder of the paper
138 will explore the more pragmatic aspects of the US partnering program and determine whether or
139 not the nonbinding OCPC is truly nonbinding when the partnering effort fails and the parties to
140 the construction contract face each other in court. The salient issue is whether the OCPC constitutes
141 an express covenant, versus what might otherwise be an implied covenant, to deal fairly and in
142 good faith.

143

144 **Good Faith and Fair Dealing Doctrine**

145 GFFD is a well-known principle of contract law, which is intended to protect a party to a
146 contract from being damaged actions of the other party in the contract that are either unfair or in
147 bad faith. In US law, binding contracts can be either written or oral (Hill and Hill 2007). In
148 layman’s terms, the principle is “a general assumption of the law of contracts, that people will
149 act in good faith and deal fairly without breaking their word, using shifty means to avoid
150 obligations or denying what the other party obviously understood” (Hill and Hill 2007).
151 According to MacMahon (2014), in all contracts each party has a duty to act in good faith and
152 deal fairly in its performance and its enforcement on the terms of the contract. “The duty of good
153 faith and fair dealing is well established in most American jurisdictions” (MacMahon 2014).

154

155 Some contracts expressly call for the parties to deal with each other in good faith.
156 However, for those contracts that are silent on this subject, courts have long read the duty into
157 contract relationship, creating implied obligations of the parties to treat each other fairly and in

158 good faith. Unfortunately, there are no precise definitions of the terms good faith and fair
159 dealing, leaving the courts to develop their own definitions on a case-by-case basis (White 2001).
160 Typical construction partnering processes result in the drafting of the OCPC at the end of
161 the partnering workshop. In most cases, all workshop participants sign that document indicating
162 their commitment to abide by the document’s contents. The charter’s contents often describe how
163 the owner and the contractor will collaborate during the project and sometimes even specify the
164 remedy if an irresolvable disagreement arises at the project-level. This remedy is commonly called
165 a “dispute resolution ladder” (Ernzen et al. 2000). Hence, in spite of the use of the term
166 “nonbinding” in the charter’s title, the fact that the GFFD principle does not require a written
167 agreement to be enforceable makes the charter appear to be written evidence of an agreement upon
168 which both parties intended to rely during the execution of the project. As a result, it seems prudent
169 to attempt to verify if this is how the US courts are ruling in disputes involving partnered
170 construction contracts.

171

172 **METHODOLOGY**

173 As a result of the above, a review of the state and federal case law related to partnering conducted.
174 The search was conducted using the Google Scholar® case law search engine with search terms
175 such as partnering, construction, charter, etc. found in the coding structure used for the technical
176 literature review. A content analysis was then conducted to ferret out the elements of each case
177 that related to the partnering process, regardless if it was formal or informal.

178 Table 1 lists the information on the 20 construction cases between 1997 and 2014 found
179 the review. Each referenced some form of partnering in their textual content. The cases came from
180 16 different states and involved 10 state departments of transportation (DOT), 6 federal agencies,

181 4 municipalities, and 2 non-transportation state agencies. Fourteen of the cases involved heavy
 182 civil or transportation projects. One was a DB project. Each of the 20 cases referenced in some
 183 fashion a formal or informal agreement to collaborate during the delivery of a design and/or
 184 construction project in accordance with the “principles of partnering” (CII 1991). The cases were
 185 categorized into the following four types:

- 186 • Change order/delay claim: 9 cases.
- 187 • Personal injury: 5 cases.
- 188 • Right of way/environmental/permitting issues: 4 cases.
- 189 • Breach of an implied covenant: 2 cases.

190

191

Table 1: Summary of Legal Case Law Review

Year	Case	State	Agency
1997	Lakes Regional Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Slater, 986 F. Sl.pp. 1169- Dist. Court, ND Iowa	IA	Iowa DOT
2000	ABT Associates, Inc. v. JH Piego Corp., 104 F. Supp. 2d 523- Dist Court, D. Maryland	MD	US Agency for International Development
2000	Holy Cross Neighborhood Assn v. Julich, 106 F. Supp. 2d 876- Dist. Court, ED LA	LA	US Army Corps of Engineers
2001	Tosco Corp. v. Dept. of Transp., 766 A 2d 831- NJ: Appl. Div.	NJ	New Jersey DOT
2002	Sierra Club v. US Army Corps of Engineers, 295 F. 3d 1209- Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit	FL	US Army Corps of Engineers - Florida DOT
2005	LaChance v. Michael Baker Corp., 869 A 2d 1054- PA: Commonwealth Court	PA	Pennsylvania DOT
2007	Hubbard v. Pike, 962 So. 2d 1094 - La: Court of Appeals, 2 nd Circuit	LA	US Army Corps of Engineers
2007	King v. US, 491 F. Supp. 2d 286 - Dist. Court, D. Connecticut	CT	Naval Facility Engineering Command
2008	Koch Industries, Inc. And Subsidiaries v. US, 564 F. Supp. 2d 1276- Dist. Court, D. Kansas	NM	Federal Highway Administration -New Mexico DOT
2009	Fisher v. Elmo Greer And Sons, LLC., Dist Court, ED Kentucky	KY	Kentucky Transportation Cabinet
2010	Austin Traffic Signal Construction Co., LP. V. Transdyn Controls, Inc., Tex: Court of Appeals, 3rd Dist.	TX	City of Austin
2011	Bell v. US, Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit	NH	Federal Bureau of Prisons
2011	Costello Industries, Inc. V. Eagle Grooving, 707 SE 2d 168- Ga: Court of Appeals	SC	South Carolina DOT
2011	Fahs Constr. Group, Inc. v. Gray, Dist. Court, ND NY	NY	New York State DOT

2011	Meadow Valley Contractors v. state, 266 P. 3d 671 - Utah Supreme Court	UT	Utah DOT
2011	Metcalf Construction Co., Inc. v. US, Court of Federal Claims	HI	Naval Facility Engineering Command
2012	J&H Reinforcing & Structural Erectors, Inc. V. Ohio School Facilities Comm., 2012 Ohio 5298 - Ohio: Court of Claims	OH	Ohio School Facility Commission
2012	Stanley Miller Constr. Co. v. Ohio School Facilities Comm., 2012 Ohio 3995- Ohio: Court of Claims	OH	Ohio School Facility Commission
2014	Ginsberg v. City of Ithaca, Dist. Court, ND New York	NY	City of Ithaca
2014	Nertavich v. PPL Elec. Utilities, 100A. 3d 221- Pa: Superior Court	PA	Pennsylvania DOT

192

193 *Breach of Implied Covenant*

194 The “breach of implied covenant” cases will be discussed first because they directly address a
 195 breakdown in one of the major principles of partnering: mutual trust (Weston and Gibson 1993).
 196 It must be noted that the “breach of implied covenant” category was found in two cases as the
 197 primary grounds for the claim. However, breach of an implied covenant was also asserted in two
 198 of the change order/delay claim cases as a secondary allegation. Breach of an implied covenant is
 199 the essence of GFFD, which protects a party to a construction contract from being damaged by the
 200 bad faith or unfair conduct of the other party.

201 There were two cases (ABT and Hubbard) in which a “breach of an implied covenant” was
 202 directly alleged as the primary cause for the claim. Both were initiated by subcontractors against
 203 a general contractor for failure to award it the work it had been promised in an oral or written
 204 “partnering or teaming agreement.” In both cases, the plaintiff subcontractor failed to prove that
 205 a binding contract had been formed before the implied covenant was made, and as such their claims
 206 were denied. Both involved a promise (one written and one oral) allegedly made by the GC to its
 207 subcontractors who were subsequently damaged. Since neither of the two cases cited an OCPC,
 208 the cases are not directly applicable to the topic at hand. However, they do illustrate the fact that
 209 GFFD can be asserted with regard to a partnering charter if a binding contract has been

210 consummated prior to the promises made during a formal partnering workshop, which will
211 generally be the case in a public project.

212 In one of the change order/delay claim cases (Bell), the “breach of implied covenant”
213 allegation was made as part of the primary assertion of contract changes that justified additional
214 compensation/time, relying on express assurances made by the Federal Bureau of Prisons during
215 the partnering meeting that it would be “treated fairly with respect to extra work” related to the
216 administration of a specific permit required by a state environmental agency. When the Federal
217 Bureau of Prisons ultimately rejected the claim, the design-builder sued on, among other theories,
218 breach of the GFFD covenant. The design-builder lost, as both the trial and appellate courts
219 concluded that GFFD claims could not override the express terms of a contract imposing permit
220 risks on the design-builder. The courts did not discuss the liability that could be imposed from the
221 partnering relationship.

222 These cases stand as cautionary points that should be considered when the owner develops
223 an OCPC as the product of a formal partnering workshop. In laymen’s terms, the owner should
224 not make assurances it ultimately cannot keep in the “spirit of partnering,” a term that was
225 explicitly found in all of the three above cited cases and which appears to have taken on a legal
226 definition which can and will be referenced as unresolved disputes enter the courts.

227

228 *Change Order/Delay Claims*

229 This category involves the cases that relate to the classic definition of partnering as a “claims
230 avoidance” tool. All nine cases (Austin, Bell, Costello, Fahs, J&H, Koch, Meadow, Metcalf, and
231 Stanley) arose as a result of an unresolved dispute over conditions that triggered a contractor to
232 request additional compensation and/or a contract time extension and contained direct reference

233 to an OCPC. One case (Austin) involved a subcontractor’s material supplier versus the
234 subcontractor and its GC. The claim used a milestone schedule that was agreed during a
235 “partnering meeting” hosted by the owner as evidence that a delayed payment caused damage to
236 the supplier. That claim was upheld by the court, which subsequently computed the damages based
237 on the milestone schedule. The public agency was not a party to the litigation. However, the
238 partnering clause in the construction contract was cited as evidence that the GC had a duty to abide
239 by the OCPC milestone schedule and that duty trickled down to its subcontractors with respect to
240 timely payments.

241 The courts found in favor of the contractor in 5 (Costello, Fahs, J&H, Metcalf, and Stanley)
242 of the remaining 8 cases with one case (Stanley) resulting in a split decision affirming the owner’s
243 arguments in some aspects and the contractors in all others. The Stanley claim alleged that the
244 owner (State of Ohio) interfered with the contractor’s means and methods, which had the result of
245 making the work package milestone schedule unrealistic. The owner’s defense was that the claim
246 was made outside the contractual notice period specified in the changes clauses. One of the issues
247 that complicated that defense was a letter from the owner that stated: "Stanley Miller is out of their
248 claim right for this issue; however, *in the spirit of partnering* I will submit this request to the
249 Commission." (Italics added by author). The contract contained a clause that permitted a “Field
250 Change Order” to be unilaterally directed for work not expected to cost more than \$10,000 with
251 the cost being negotiated at a later date. The court went on to comment that “The evidence clearly
252 demonstrates that time was of the essence on this project and that, on many occasions, the parties
253 agreed that Stanley Miller would perform certain work and that either a change order or agreed
254 adjustment to the contract price would be negotiated at a later date. The parties referred to the later
255 practice as partnering." However, court found that neither a field change order clause nor the

256 partnering agreement supported the assertion that the owner waived the notice period specified in
257 the changes clause. Hence, on the timely notice point, the court found for the owner.

258 The Stanley contract also contained a clause that required the owner’s construction
259 manager to convene a meeting within 30 days of receipt of a potential claim to “implement the job
260 site dispute resolution procedures the parties agreed to implement as a result of the partnering
261 arrangement." The owner failed to do so, apparently believing that since the notice of claim was
262 untimely that there was no need to follow the procedures that were agreed in the partnering
263 document. The court disagreed and found for Stanley allowing it to recover delay-related damages
264 associated with the work package designated in the claim. Thus, it appears that while a partnering
265 document does not override provisions contained in the contract for which it was developed, it
266 may, under certain conditions, be considered as supplementing the contract by adding specificity
267 to it.

268

269 *Right Of Way/Environmental/Permitting Issues*

270 The 4 cases (Holy Cross, Lakes, Sierra, and Tosco) found in this category do not refer to an OCPC,
271 but rather to an interagency partnering agreement developed during the early phases of project
272 development and preliminary engineering. It is unclear from reading the cases whether or not these
273 arrangements are considered binding by the courts, but since they are referenced in conjunction
274 with litigation, it is of value to mention them as a result of recent emphasis being given to
275 stakeholder partnering during the environmental permitting process by the Federal Highway
276 Administration’s *Every Day Counts* program (FHWA 2014), as well as the increased use of inter-
277 agency agreements as tools to better manage complex projects involving multiple public
278 stakeholders (Gransberg et al. 2013).

279 Of the four, the court only ruled against the owner in Tosco. The Tosco case is incredibly
280 convoluted but essentially deals with the process used to determine the required right of way
281 (ROW) for a New Jersey DOT overpass and ramp project. Tosco owned a gas station and
282 convenience store to which public access was substantially changed by the final configuration of
283 the NJDOT project. The property in question had two points of access from public roads and as a
284 result of the project was alleged to be rendered unusable, as both access points were eliminated by
285 the ramp. A partnering agreement was consummated by the NJDOT with West Windsor Township,
286 the municipality where Tosco was located. Tosco protested the proposed design to both the DOT
287 and the township and followed up by proposing several design alternatives that allowed it to retain
288 one entry point to its property. All eliminated a “perimeter loop road” located on an adjoining
289 property and required the DOT to acquire ROW from that property owner. The Township engineer
290 provided testimony that eliminating the perimeter loop road would be contrary to the
291 municipality’s policy which encourages this design approach to control traffic on commercial
292 properties like the shopping center on the adjoining property. Without getting into the rest of the
293 details, the court eventually found that NJDOT and the Township had deprived Tosco of its right
294 to a hearing and remanded the decision back to the trial court.

295 The lesson learned in this case is that the DOT agreed in its partnering agreement with the
296 Township to endeavor to abide by the Township’s policies and regulations regarding access to
297 properties from state highways. As a result, the partnering agreement put the DOT in a position
298 where it was forced to decide between irreparably impacting a commercial enterprise or living up
299 to the commitments it made in the interagency partnering agreement. In the remaining three cases,
300 the agency prevailed. However, the issues brought to the courts were similar to Tosco: alleged
301 failure to comply with commitments made in the interagency partnering agreement.

302

303 *Personal Injury*

304 This category is perhaps the most disturbing of the four types. It came as a surprise to the authors
305 that an OCPC would factor into a personal injury law suit. However, the five cases (Fisher,
306 Ginsberg, King, LaChance, and Nertavich) all directly referenced an OCPC as if it were a binding
307 clause in the construction contract. In two cases (Fisher and Ginsberg), the suit named the GC and
308 the owner as co-defendants, and in the Nertavich case, the court referred to the LaChance case, in
309 which the OCPC was cited as evidence that the Pennsylvania DOT “placed all responsibility for
310 job site safety upon the contractor.” LaChance is also potentially a legal precedent as seen by the
311 reference to it in Nertavich, with regard to an OCPC’s enforceability with respect to the
312 construction contract as follows:

313 “The Estate [the plaintiff, i.e. LaChance] places undue emphasis upon this provision [the
314 partnering clause in the contract]. First, it fails to account for the stated and limited purpose of
315 the partnership, which is contract performance. Second, the contract itself provides that the
316 *establishment of a partnership charter on this project will not change the legal relationship of*
317 *the parties to the contract* nor relieve either party of responsibility for any of the terms of the
318 contract. Regardless of the "partnership" description, the relationship of Baker and Penn DOT
319 was that of parties to a contract, each with separate contractual obligations. One of Baker’s
320 express contractual obligations was the assumption of responsibility for project safety through
321 compliance.”

322 Hence, the court in the LaChance case did not see the OCPC as a modification to the
323 underlying contract that required formal partnering. In Fisher, the plaintiff argued that the
324 construction contract’s partnering clause was breached because the owner and the GC failed to

325 undertake a formal partnering workshop and hold follow-up meetings, which allegedly would have
326 caused a change in the project’s traffic control plan. Responsibility for the injury in question
327 revolved around whether or not a truck-mounted changeable message sign should have been
328 installed prior to the crash in which the injuries occurred. The plaintiff alleged that the partnering
329 workshop with the follow-up meetings between the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet personnel
330 and the GC would have identified that the traffic control plan was faulty leading to the additional
331 changeable message sign. This seems to the researcher to be a tenuous argument, but not as tenuous
332 as the charge in Ginsberg that the proper execution of the project partnering agreement would have
333 prevented a suicide that leapt from the bridge that was under construction.

334

335 **SUMMARY**

336 The major take-away from this review is that owners must ensure that they do not take the drafting
337 of an OCPC at the end of a formal partnering workshop lightly. Regardless of the fact that the
338 document includes the term “nonbinding” in the title, it is an official part of the contract’s record
339 and as a result, is discoverable in the legal claims process. As can be seen by the personal injury
340 claims which attempted to create an obligation on the part of the parties to the OCPC, the
341 document’s content can and probably will be used against its signatory parties in the event of a
342 court action. The GFFD theory does not even require that a document memorializing the
343 commitment exist, making the dialog that occurred during formal or informal partnering subject
344 to a potential claim of breach of implied covenant. Lastly, the increased use of interagency
345 partnering agreements during the NEPA process should also be scrutinized to ensure that the public
346 owner does not unintentionally create obligations that it cannot meet.

347 The above discussion does lead to one observation. The majority of the case law reviewed
348 appear to support the notion that a partnering document of any sort is probably not binding and
349 hence, no change in the current process is due. However, since it is obvious that the presence of a
350 partnering relationship of any sort has been repeatedly referred to as evidence of an obligation of
351 the parties to the agreement to abide by it, consideration of dropping the nonbinding appellation
352 should be made with the idea that the OCPC be incorporated as a binding modification to the
353 contract that regulates the behavior of the parties. While this may seem contrary the so-called
354 “spirit of partnering” as expressed in the literature (CII 1991; Lahdenperä 2012), it is not without
355 precedent in the private sector. The International Partnering Institute has already broached this
356 idea in a White Paper that contained the following quotation:

357 “For years we have believed that partnering must be voluntary. We believed the same thing
358 about mediation. Recently courts have been experimenting with mandatory mediation.
359 Low and behold they found that they had the same high percentage of resolved cases
360 whether the parties entered into mediation voluntarily or because it was mandated. The
361 same has shown to be true for partnering.” (Dyer, 2011)

362 One option to develop and implement a binding partnering agreement is found in the
363 Alliance contracts in use in Australia and New Zealand for the past two decades. In alliance
364 contracting, the owner, the designer, and the contractor execute an agreement to jointly “share the
365 pain and share the gain.” Alliance contracts contain a mechanism for resolving disagreements at
366 the project level by elevating them to a governing board made up of the principals of the entities
367 in the alliance for a final decision in much the same manner as a US “dispute escalation ladder.”
368 (Gransberg and Scheepbouwer 2015). Lastly, the agreement is based on the principle that
369 decisions should be made on a “best for project” basis and to secure that level of willing

370 collaboration, alliances depend of the founding principle that: “we all win or we all lose.” (Ross
371 2006). A separate study of 217 Australian public infrastructure alliance contracts executed between
372 1996 and 2006 revealed that in no case was there an instance where the alliance members resorted
373 to the courts to resolve a dispute (Noble 2010; McDonald 2011). From the US perspective, the
374 idea of going two decades without the need to resort to the courts for relief must be attractive to
375 both owners and their partners in the design and construction industries.

376

377 **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

378 This paper reviewed the US case law regarding partnered construction projects through the lens
379 of whether the OCPC was in fact nonbinding. The conclusion reached from the review of 20 cases
380 heard over the past three decades is that the document itself is truly nonbinding and that no changes
381 to the present system are required to accommodate the instrument to the doctrine of GFFD.
382 Therefore, the answer to the second rhetorical question in the paper’s first section is: no, the OCPC
383 is not a binding document.

384 However, those cases clearly show that the OCPC is a part of the partnered project’s
385 discoverable record and that clever lawyers have used it to try and prove that it represents a body
386 of details on which the parties to the OCPC agreed and to which they “intended” to comply. The
387 fact that reference to the OCPC has been made in personal injury claims shows the extent to which
388 that document can be put to use to try to prove that a covenant was made in writing. One must
389 remember that the OCPC’s purpose is to avoid disputes and as such, it is not crafted in a manner
390 that contemplates it as a potential piece of evidence if partnering fails. Therefore, it seems that
391 some care must be given to the drafting of the OCPC to ensure that it can’t be used against its
392 authors in a third party personal injury suit or some other action that was not contemplated at the

393 time it was signed. Additionally, when viewed through the GFFD lens, there is little question that
394 at the time OCPC was signed that both parties intended deal fairly in good faith with each other.
395 Thus, if one party fails to live up to the expectations set forth in the OCPC and the matter ends up
396 in court, the combination of the signed OCPC and the GFFD doctrine might be a very powerful
397 argument that could sway the jury/judge/arbitrator’s view of the dispute to the complainant’s side
398 and certainly influence the final decision. The split decision found in the Stanley case where the
399 court found for the contractor and awarded delay damages based on the OCPC milestone schedule
400 is an example of the situation. Therefore, the inference is not merely hypothetical.

401 This issue speaks to answering the first rhetorical question. Given that the “spirit of
402 partnering” is about trust, collaboration, and open communication, having both parties make a
403 “moral commitment” and “swear an oath of allegiance” to the project’s goals makes the notion
404 that codifying those mutually agreed details of organizational behavior seem logical. Negotiated
405 contracts of all types have been successfully used throughout the history of the US construction
406 industry. If both parties are *truly morally committed* to the point where they are willing to sign an
407 OCPC that details how they will do business together on a given project, then giving that
408 agreement the same force as the remainder of the contract to which it refers is not illogical. It also
409 seems prudent to draft it in the same light with an eye to minimize the potential misuse of its
410 contents by parties outside the construction contract itself. Therefore, the answer to the first
411 rhetorical question is: if they are honestly committed to the nonbinding charter, they should be
412 willing to incorporate the OCPC’s details in a binding manner – an idea supported by the
413 International Partnering Institute for some time (Dyer 2011).

414 Multi-party relational contracts are gaining traction in the US construction market and
415 these already contain the verbiage regarding joint decision-making, maximizing joint utility and

416 the sharing of both gain and pain. Given the long-term success of these kinds of contracts seen in
417 the international market, it seems that the time is right to develop US versions that institutionalize
418 the principles of partnering, like shared risk and reward, in their construction contract boilerplate.

419

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423

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