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Introduction: An Ethnohistory of Listening

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Introduction: An Ethnohistory of Listening

Abstract
Leg dein Ohr auf die Schiene der Geschichte. (Put your ear to the rail of history.) Freudeskreis 1996

I hear them all, I hear them all, I hear them all. Old Crow Medicine Show 2006

Good ethnohistory, for lack of a different metaphor, might look somewhat like a reservation dog: the product of indefinite sources and directions, compromises and fights, a bricolage at its best; and for all that, interesting and beatiful, ready to be a loyal companion but independent enough to assert its survival, and fostering many children that all look different, yet again. Here might be the time, then, to remember one of the best stories—that-might-have-occurred (Pirsig 1992:465):

He remember it had been spring then, which is a wonderful time in Montana, and the breeze blowing down from the pine trees carried a fresh smell of melting snow and thawing earth, and they were all walking down the road, four abreast, when one of those raggedy non-descript dogs that call Indian reservations home came onto the road and walked pleasantly in front of them. They followed the dog silently for a while. Then LaVerne asked John, "What kind of dog is that?" John thought about it and said, "that's a good dog".

The cultural misunderstanding evident above makes a point that rests at the heart of ethnohistory and any attempt to investigate cross-cultural meaning: common sense ceases to be common at cultural boundaries. This means that anthropology needs history to understand the events of the past that inform the present. History, however, needs anthropology to understand the meanings of events.

Disciplines
Ancient, Medieval, Renaissance and Baroque Art and Architecture | Historic Preservation and Conservation | History of Art, Architecture, and Archaeology | Indigenous Studies | Other History of Art, Architecture, and Archaeology

Comments
Transforming Ethnohistories
Narrative, Meaning, and Community

Edited by
SEBASTIAN FELIX BRAUN

Afterword by Raymond J. DeMallie
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Preface

A crop harvested by [him]—even if he should not choose to mill the grain himself—is always capable of providing lasting nourishment for many generations of students.

Claude Lévi-Strauss (1960:351)

Twenty years after Raymond J. DeMallie’s “‘They Have No Ears’” address to the American Society of Ethnohistory (DeMallie 1993), this volume brings together a diverse group of DeMallie’s students, broadly conceived, since, as we know, classificatory relations are just as real as others. The narratives these texts weave show the structure of DeMallie’s approach to ethnohistory, and they show to what kinds of different places that approach has taken others. The texts hopefully also create a new or renewed dialogue about ethnohistory and about the ethnohistorical interpretation of narratives. Most people talk about method when they talk about ethnohistory, in part because the field performs a balancing act between disciplines that use different theories (and methodologies) in their work. I hope this volume will start a new discussion about ethnohistorical theory. In private conversations, I have been shocked to discover that many historians in the United States deny that their discipline is based on or uses any theory; many anthropologists, on the other hand, apart from “doing fieldwork,” do not think too much about methodology. I hope this text will serve to make us all think about both.

The ideas, styles, and concepts represented here are diverse, as diverse as DeMallie’s students, and as diverse as his own ever-expanding interests. They also, however, address a series of connected issues that originated in DeMallie’s work and teaching. Claude Lévi-Strauss (1960:351) said of Paul Radin that he had “the gift of singling out those facts, observations, and documents which possess an especially rich meaning, sometimes undisclosed at first, but likely to become evident as one ponders the implications woven into the material.” This is a rare gift shared by DeMallie, and in struggling with these meanings, the contributors ponder the implications of ethnohistory. The foundation of ethnohistory is the (anthropological) realization that history as an academic discipline, in order to be truly inclusive, needs to deal with a variety of different narratives, some of which lie outside the culturally constructed academic norms of what is logical or makes sense. The question is, in other words, one of the interpretation of narratives.
Most contributors address this question through their own narratives. They provide a demonstration, a description, but not a definition of ethnohistory. Instead of using an Aristotelian approach, trying to define each separate piece of every argument—although that might be the method used in ethnohistorical research—they use a Platonic one, by consciously using and creating or recreating narratives to make people understand, which is not unlike telling myths. A definition of ethnohistory runs into the same problems as definitions of culture, history, and other complex concepts that are shared yet interpreted differently. This does not need to be an obstacle to a discussion of theory. Understanding the tropes and tropiques of other cultures is always limited by real and metaphorical distances, yet paying attention to that which is close to ourselves will lead to potential understanding of cultural structures. It is through such a dialogue that we reach a measure of community and mutual agreement. The more real (and therefore complex) relations are, the less they can be explained. We can, however, demonstrate and describe them and hope that audiences understand. Concepts like justice, culture, love, beauty, truth, and time are powerful because they are vague, and they are vague, notes George Allen (2000:108), “because they are features of the most general contexts important to us, contexts logically, causally, and temporally fundamental, contexts at our outermost horizons of knowledge and action and aspiration.” A narrative approach consciously tries to leave the understanding of reality to a dialogue with the audience, who has the right and responsibility to think along and come to its own conclusions. Myths do not explain their contents. They enact them. These contributions enact ethnohistory. I cannot say it better than Elsie Clews Parsons (1921:3), who in the preface to *American Indian Life* writes that her book “is a book of pictures. . . . If the pictures remain pictures for [the reader], well and good; if they lead [the reader] to the problems, good and better. [Ethnohistory] is short on students.” As Lévi-Strauss (1970:7) points out, “In science there are no final truths. The scientific mind does not so much provide the right answers as ask the right questions.” Dialogues are not without conflicts, of course, and I fully hope that contradictions in writing styles, contents, and agendas will be evident between and within these chapters.

The contributions to this volume are loosely based on a double panel of papers in honor of Raymond J. DeMallie presented at the American Society for Ethnohistory meetings in New Orleans in 2009. The meetings are a conference dear to his heart, small enough to allow for personal interaction, engaged and important for its own historical reasons, while carrying enough weight and influence to inspire scholarship beyond its realm, without fanfare or self-important posturing. Those who, for various reasons, were not able to contribute to this text need to be acknowledged: their voices
contribute to these chapters: (in no particular order) Darlene Dietrich, David Posthumus, Kelly Branan, Brenda Farnell, Ben Kracht, Wyman Kirk, and Carolyn Anderson. Many others wanted to participate but for various reasons could not. The selection of texts here is not based on the quality of the original presentations, but on the idea that different generations of students and different interests and approaches should be represented.

It is not customary, in either my own culture nor those I have become ethnographically familiar with, for young whippersnappers, as Douglas Parks¹ would say, to take the stage and offer opinions. I therefore need to apologize to my elders. A volume like this one, or perhaps a true Festschrift, has been talked about for many years; I remember the conversations Mindy Morgan, Carolyn Anderson, and Paula Wagoner had at the Ethnohistory meetings in Tulsa in 2007, and I know there had been others before. I simply followed in the footsteps of my elder peers and organized something, perhaps because I have the (dis)ability to disregard rational obstacles and objections when I know something is worthwhile.

Aside from all of the academic and professional help Ray has extended to me, most importantly he modeled and models what a good academic, a good professor, a good human being, a good relative, and a good advisor should be like. He always tried to protect me from the guerres academiques, perhaps because of his own experiences in that field (DeMallie 2001b). As both Ray and I know perfectly well, I am not a “good relative” (Deloria 1998:25). Yet, as a fascinated observer of normal kinship behaviors, I know the rules. While I have tried to go my own way, I have deep respect and gratitude for my teachers and the trust they showed to me in allowing such exploration. Ray DeMallie’s lessons to me are academic, for sure. They are, perhaps more so, however, also profoundly moral. I know that I, and I suspect most of the contributors to this volume, will be trying to do my best to justify Ray’s trust in me for the rest of my academic and personal life.

Sebastian Felix Braun
August 2012

NOTES

1. As several contributors point out, the collaboration between Parks and DeMallie has produced critical work for the knowledge of Plains societies, for ethnohistory, and for scholarly and applied work on Native languages. Douglas Parks’ and Ray DeMallie’s mastery of both ethnohistory and linguistic anthropology can perhaps best be appreciated in their definitive study on the Lakota-Dakota-Nakota issue, in which they pointed out very clearly that Yankton-Yanktonai is not “Nakota” (Parks and DeMallie 1992b). Although I had the opportunity to assist Douglas Parks in teaching Lakota at Indiana University (and
have since been using the new Lakota textbooks the American Indian Studies Research Institute (AISRI) has been developing in collaboration with Red Cloud School on Pine Ridge, the most revealing insight into Douglas Park's work for me came on a fall day in Cannonball. Doug wanted to visit a collaborator on the Yanktonai dictionary he has been working on, and Ray DeMallie, two graduate students, and I went along from the Plains Anthropology conference in Bismarck. While Doug went into the house, we were sitting in the car watching the dogs outside. When we went in, it was obvious that the elderly woman was seriously ill. I have never seen Doug so heartbroken. I learned a lot about Douglas Parks and his work that day.
Transforming Ethnohistories
Introduction

_An Ethnohistory of Listening_

SEBASTIAN FELIX BRAUN

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Freundeskreis 1996

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They followed the dog silently for a while.

Then LaVerne asked John, “What kind of a dog is that?”

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The cultural misunderstanding evident above makes a point that rests at the heart of ethnohistory and any attempt to investigate cross-cultural meaning: common sense ceases to be common at cultural boundaries. This means that anthropology needs history to understand the events of the past that inform the present. History, however, needs anthropology to understand the
meanings of events. As Joynt and Rescher (1961:153) wrote, such an “understanding’ calls for interpretation, classification, and assessment, which can only be attained by grasping the relationship of causal and conceptual inter-relation among the chronological particulars.” Knowledge emerges from the ability to relate things to each other. Only relations provide the context for meaning; facts without contexts stay meaningless. Mommsen (1978:21) stressed that the “structures and developments in which an historical fact is embedded also make up a vast mass” and that “these structures and developments are not self-evident as such; we perceive their contours only if we view them from an appropriate perspective.” Holding that “culture and culture change are, in effect, the same phenomenon” (DeMallie 1993:533), it is the proposition of this book, as of many scholars, that the appropriate perspective is informed by the methods of ethnohistory. This is not a new insight—the idea of static culture is reminiscent of the idea of an uninvented tradition—but it is one that bears clear articulation and emphasis.

The necessity of firmly placing culture in history and vice versa may recall Paul Radin (1987:184), according to whom the task of describing any culture “is always the same: a description of a specific period, and as much of the past and as much of the contacts with other cultures as is necessary for the elucidation of the particular period. No more.” It might be this “no more” that is deceptive: combined with the emphasis on the particular, it creates a deceptive simplicity. If Radin (1987:185) is right, and it is truly “this particularity that is the essence of all history,” then culture change, especially if viewed from particular, individual perspectives, can be overwhelming in its cultural and historical details. A true ethnohistorical study will have to be based on an encyclopedic knowledge, amassed in patient, detailed research over a lifetime. It takes an extraordinary person and an extraordinary commitment to achieve this. Raymond J. DeMallie is one of those scholars who have shown “how much can be attained by the intensive study of a single document, provided one is adequately acquainted with a particular culture” (Radin 1987:186). It is the meaning of “adequate” that DeMallie has provided with a new standard, one that is higher than most can hope to achieve. In the process, he has also helped to define the methods needed to accomplish the task.

The methods of ethnohistory are not self-explanatory, and they are not simply an application of historical or anthropological method and theory to common interests. At the 2011 Annual Meetings of the American Society for Ethnohistory in Pasadena, a very prominent (ethno)historian said that she was pleased that her students are among those who have shown that ethnohistory belongs in the mainstream of history as a discipline, because they have demonstrated that the issues of ethnohistory can be approached with the same methods as any other historical issues. I agree that these scholars have contributed much to history; at the same time, however, I would hesitate
to characterize their work as ethnohistorical. Many historians regard ethno-
history as simply the history of Others, the construction of chronologies of those who had been denied a historical past—a reaction that predates Wolf (1982) by several decades—just as many anthropologists think ethno-
history is simply the description of historical cultures. Both distrust the use of the other’s methodology and, therefore, often appropriate it in such a way as to eliminate any potential threat. This leaves them comfortably grounded in disciplinary perspectives but also eliminates valuable contributions to and critiques of these perspectives. It prevents an engagement of alternative narratives on their own terms. This volume is not trying to re-
build historical or anthropological theories, or to reargue the proper approach for a critical analysis of texts. What it is attempting to do is to show how these different approaches can be bridged to create a true ethnohis-
torical approach. It does so by taking as a starting point DeMallie’s 1992 address to the American Society for Ethnohistory, in which he laid out the ethnohistorical method by placing emphasis on having ears: listening to narratives.

HISTORY AND ANTHROPOLOGY

Bringing history and anthropology together is not as simple a task as suc-
cessful ethnohistorians make us think, perhaps because while both disci-
plines like to use the other’s terminology, many times they do so in ways that simply reinforce, instead of question, their own premises. While both disci-
plines need each other, they are different disciplines, and apply different theories and methods to find different truths (Augé 1982:112). Assuming that their ideological merger is simple is deceptive. In the relationship between anthropologists and historians, wrote Burke (1990:268–69), “each partner is attracted by an image of the other that the other finds difficult to accept.” This was demonstrated to me firsthand in an interdisciplinary graduate seminar at the University of Basel. The seminar on the American Southwest involved professors and students from four disciplines: history, ethnology, English literature and Spanish. Participants would meet once a week for three hours to discuss a text on Southwestern history and culture, and the pattern that very quickly developed was that we discovered every time that we had apparently read four different texts, although the words had been the same. We would spend the meetings unraveling what we had read, as the meaning of the one text always became widely disputed between the four disciplines. Attending ethnohistory meetings sometimes reminds me of that experi-
ence; it seems that the dialogue about ethnohistory within history and the one within anthropology are very clearly demarcated. This can stand in the way of truly interdisciplinary work, which is extremely rewarding but needs to be approached with an open mind and the awareness that terms like
"culture" or "history" do not always carry the same meanings in different disciplines.

Every description of culture and history is selective, and so is the assignment of meaning to the facts. As Eagleton (2000:10) has observed, "It is a fact of early industrial-capitalist civilization that young chimney sweeps tended to develop cancer of the scrotum, but it is hard to see it as a cultural achievement on a level with the Waverley novels or Rheims cathedral." Assigning much value to "cultural achievements" and insisting that they are innovative, progressive, and new can easily lead to ignoring historical and cultural facts that make up their context, especially if that context is not terribly progressive, innovative, or new. Brown and Vibert (2003:xxiii) have written that it "is a truism in history that documents ought to be read and placed in context, and their authors located and understood in terms of the period and society that produced them. Yet, the apparent simplicity of this recipe creates illusions." It is an ethnography that recognizes the illusions of simple recipes that forces us to look at chimney sweeps and cathedrals: they both contribute and define the cultural context of the Waverley novels—as does, for that matter, Indian removal, for example. The interpretation of anthropology and history as oppositional to each other creates a similar false paradox, perhaps exactly because we deny especially the classical texts in the disciplines their context, intention, setting, and relation. Ethnography is often simply seen as a creation of applied anthropology during the years of the Indian Claims Commission (see Tanner 2007 for an account of that work). I think the roots of ethnography are much older and stem from the critical, though not oppositional, engagement of history by anthropologists, as a short ethnography of anthropological ideas shows.

Onnuki-Tierney (1990:2), reflecting on a widely held anthropological origin myth or tradition, wrote that, "[i]n hindsight, anthropologists' previous failure to tackle history seriously was due primarily to their colonial mentalité. . . . ['T]hey shared the Eurocentric belief that 'nonliterate' peoples did not really have a history." From a North Americanist perspective, perhaps especially, such notions need some rethinking. After all, Franz Boas and his students were heavily involved in historical reconstruction. They were trying to find a way to define historical Native American cultures, partly because historians were not interested in the task. Kroeber (1939:1), often criticized for popularizing a static notion of culture through the culture area approach, had this to say: "The concept of a culture area is a means to an end. The end may be the understanding of culture processes as such, or of the historic events of culture." He directly connected the cultures he classified in a superficially static, ahistorical way to Euro-American approaches to history and emphasizes that he uses the concept of a culture area "much as a historian may use 'the Eighteenth Century' as a short way of referring to the culture that was characteristic of eighteenth-century Europe" (1939:2).
I agree with Jonaitis (1995:35), who has argued that Boasian historical particularism is much more liberating than British structural/functionalism, because it does not sweep inconsistencies under a theoretical carpet and thus creates space for multiple, competing voices. True, Boasians did not take oral, or any cultural history literally. The history of nonliterate peoples had to be extracted and interpreted, as Radin (1963:11) made clear in his introduction to the Autobiography of a Winnebago Indian. However, this was true for all informants, wherever they be native to, and for all texts. The collection and interpretation of texts and art as a method to write history in general was certainly a method that took others' voices seriously—more seriously than a variety of other approaches before and after.

Where fledgling anthropology failed to look for Native sources, written and oral, in its quest to write the history of Native societies, it did so in part because it took contemporary academic history as its model. It was "the definition of history as a text-based enterprise" (Conn 2004:20) that excluded oral sources, and it was the established sciences and humanities that ignored sources from outside the narrowly defined "civilized" world. Krech (1991:347) has noted that early ethnohistorical methodology, for both anthropologists and historians, meant to focus on documentary sources to write the history of Native societies, in part as an echo of Lowie's distrust of oral sources. Indeed, Boas turned the stories George Hunt tried to collect into archival documents, for example, "suggesting that culturally and geographically bounded Native American communities could be represented through a variety of texts published in book form" (Briggs and Bauman 1999:490). The intent, however, was fundamentally historical. History depended on documents, after all, and Boas's (1982:284) statement that "the whole problem of cultural history appears to us as a historical problem" might in fact showcase the then revolutionary approach to accept some Native sources—carefully selected and edited—as contributions to history. Taking history seriously, in the sense of conventional, academic history depending on written documents, might not be impeded by a "colonial mentality," but actually be an expression of it. Tuhiwai Smith (1999:1) might be correct then not only in her position that "the term 'research' is inextricably linked to European imperialism and colonialism" but also in her assessment that the term "is probably one of the dirtiest words in the indigenous world's vocabulary." Such is the power of hegemonic discourse, however, that the mentality of turning stories into documents and trying to use these documents as tools of domination is not limited to colonial practices (see, e.g., Kurkiala 2002). Anticolonial discourses replicate it.

Conn (2004:156) wrote that "by the turn of the twentieth century American intellectual life was filled with anthropological Indians and largely devoid of historical ones." He sees historical Indians, for example, in the historical romances of Cooper, whose characters, although fictionalized,
"participated in a great, if ultimately tragic, historical process, one that lay at
the heart not simply of their own history but of American history writ large"
(165). In direct contrast, Conn quotes Adolphe Bandelier, who wrote that "the
cigar-store man, and the statuesque Pocahontas . . . as they are paraded in
literature and thus pervert the public conceptions about Indians—these I
want to destroy" (165). It is, of course, true that ethnography aimed to destroy
"American history writ large," although most ethnographic descriptions
stayed, for a long time, essentially historical projects. However, this destruction
came out of the understanding that the historical process writ large described
so aptly by Cooper did in fact not resemble anything laying at the heart of
Native peoples' own histories—and probably not of most peoples' histories.
I find the ethnographic destruction of history writ large to be, on the one
hand, a historical argument, and, on the other, good academic practice.

In his work, aiming to write history and yet simultaneously finding him-
self trapped within the conventions of history, Boas (1982:284) noted that,
"[A]s soon as [the methods of ethnology] are applied, [a] society loses the
appearance of absolute stability which is conveyed to the student who sees a
certain people only at a certain given time. All cultural forms rather appear
in a constant state of flux and subject to fundamental modifications." Robert
Lowie (1983:xviii) pointed out that "aboriginal peoples have borrowed from
one another for thousands of years, and the attempt to isolate one culture
that shall be wholly indigenous in origin is decidedly simple-minded." Boa-
sian North American anthropology understood well that culture is cultural
change and that particular cultures exist in particular historical contexts. It
was thus well placed to create the beginnings of ethnohistory because of its
emphasis on cultural dynamics. This puts into question a second accepted
tradition about classic anthropology, that of the bounded culture (see Jona-
itis 1995:34), a perception coming out of a superficial and literal reading of
the concept of culture area. Kroeber (1939:5–6), who is often most directly
tied to the concept, makes very clear that he is not happy with this perceived
boundedness. Both his and Wissler’s maps, which gave rise to the perception
of bounded cultures by drawing boundaries around areas, he considered
regrettable: "It would be desirable, therefore, to construct cultural maps
without boundary lines, on some system of shading or tint variation of
color; but the mechanical difficulties are great. For the present, it seems ne-
cessary to use the old devices and leave it to the reader to translate what his
eye sees into the dynamic aspects that are intended" (1939:6). The acknow-
ledgment of historical and cultural dynamics is present in Boasian anthro-
pology, as is a desire to somehow work out a collaboration between them.
What it lacked, in part because that concept was unthinkable to academic
history at the time, was a well-developed understanding of the importance
of alternative perspectives on the finding of historical truth and a terminol-
ogy to express this perspective.
REALITIES AND TRUTHS, DOCUMENTS AND STORIES

Accepting and understanding—not simply tolerating—different theories and meanings, different epistemologies and hermeneutics, means to accept and understand that there are different perspectives. That may seem post-modern, as such work focuses on the acceptance that other cultures, just like other disciplines, constitute reality in very different ways. These realities must be taken into account in order to write history, if we do not simply want to impose our own reality on others and thereby create a history that bears no resemblance to the historical experience of reality of the people whose history we are trying to tell. Ethnohistory, then, because history is always the history of a culture, is how history in general should be conducted. It is also how anthropology should be approached, since anthropology is always the description of a historical culture. If perspectives of reality differ from culture to culture, historical cultures had a different experience of reality from present ones, and that context needs to be explored; otherwise, the events cannot be interpreted in their context, and the analysis is stuck in presentist interpretations.

Just as many anthropologists have refused to engage a historical focus on events, however, many historians refuse a focus on perspective. Different perspectives on reality—and history—seem to deny the existence of a historical truth. A history written in search of one historical truth needs to prefer one version of an event over another. If an event carries such different interpretations and meanings that it is no longer the same event for different people, then in reality two different events might have taken place at the same time, in the same location. Declaring one event to be untrue easily becomes an exercise of ethnocentrism. Holocaust deniers and Chariots of the Gods followers can be denied historical truth because they argue within the same epistemological framework as academic history. Realities that include events or meanings of events outside that framework, however, like traditional oral histories embedded in very different cultural values of knowledge, for example, are much more difficult, if not impossible, to argue with.

Ethnohistory reminds us of the necessity to listen to all realities. This “postmodernity” is very different, and much more transformational than simply an acknowledgment of historical positionality, as it takes into account much more than the perception of history as found true by Native scholars. The “emergent new Lakota historiography,” as Kurkiala (2002:446) noted, “reproduces the very logic and structure of a Western 'grand narrative' although it challenges its contents.” An “alternative narrative structure and logic” which “represents a truly alternative way of representing history” is found “in Indian oral tradition.” It is then exactly those stories that
positivist history and anthropology have conventionally labeled as myth—as simply cultural truths that can have little bearing on academic, "morally and culturally detached" (Kurkiala 2002:452) truth—that ethnohistory demands we listen to. This is not simply the suggestion that "for better or for worse, all history can be mythical" (Augé 1999:7), or that perhaps all history is Tedlockian "mythistory" (Restall 2003a:xvi–xvii). What the ethnohistorical method demands seemingly eradicates a fundamental categorical division and bridges truths that are "of a different order" (Kurkiala 2002:456).

DeMallie's proposition in "These Have No Ears" (1993) is revolutionary in its simplicity: it does nothing less than challenge the dominance of the academic discourse, yet also, at the same time, restores credibility and inclusiveness to it. After all, if we compare different narratives and the different truths they present and represent, there is still a truth to be learned. As Restall (2003a:xvii) has stated, "There are always multiple narratives of any historical moment, but that does not mean that as interpretations they cannot tell us something true." What we learn might be a meta-truth, but then all history is that: Lévi-Strauss has shown (1966:256–58) that "history corresponds to no kind of reality" because historical events "as commonly conceived never took place" (see also Passmore 1987). A deeper investigation of DeMallie's ethnohistorical method shows that it is not postmodern in the popular sense (or non-sense) that everything is simply another perspective and must therefore be accepted as true. DeMallie is going beyond one historical truth; he is still, however, looking for historical truths. The existence of one, cross-cultural truth must be deconstructed, to be sure. However, that does not mean that each culture does or did not have its own truth.

Taylor (1986:32. italics in original) has written that for deconstructionism, "questions of origin, influence, and parentage are, in a certain sense, irrelevant." For the ethnohistorical method, this is true in the sense that the origin of source materials, for example, is irrelevant; oral history is an equally truthful and important source of history as written documentation. Ethnohistory combines historical and anthropological perspectives, written and oral sources, the voices of dominant and oppressed people and peoples, as well as those of intermediaries. If it is the comparison of different truths that leads us to something that is true, all truths need to be heard, not just those that are documented by whoever is in control of the discourse. The differentiation between primary, secondary, and tertiary sources in terms of their credibility makes no more sense, then, than to question Dvořák about whether the influences from classical music, spirituals, Scottish folk music, or what he understood as Native music were more important in writing his Symphony No. 9, or to question the authenticity of any of these influences or indeed the authenticity of the final work. The ethnohistorical method is about as postmodern as the telling of myth or the writing of a symphony. Ethnohistory is not the telling of myth, however: it comes from and follows
a very different epistemology. Origin, influence, and parentage are still important in the analysis of the cultural and historical contexts that are the focus of the investigation. Ethnohistory must take mythical reality into account, accept it, and understand it as a reality. But as a reality, it has to be analyzed, contextualized, and investigated in terms of presenting an academic truth. If the postmodern is the critique of the modern, then ethnohistory is postmodern because it critiques the random hegemonic classification of one particular historical truth as the historical truth. However, this insight is not postmodern. Modernity in that sense has always been critiqued, before, during, and after the historical era of modernity. Alternative cultural narratives are always a stumbling block to hegemonic ideas. These narratives, at the intersection of anthropology, ethnography, and history, were and are the building blocks and inspiration of ethnohistory.

The distinction between history and theory, and the consequential distinction between a theory-free, methodological discipline of history and an ahistorical, theory-based anthropology, is a curious idea with a long history. Historians who openly employ theory to form thoughts (the emphasis is on “openly,” as it is impossible to form coherent thought without recourse to some theoretical model), are still often seen as “doctrinaires,” as Isaiah Berlin (1960:9) made clear over fifty years ago: “Such historians are accused of being prisoners of their theories; they are accused of being fanatical or cranky or doctrinaire, of misrepresenting or misreading reality to fit in with their obsessions, and the like.”Anthropologists, on the other hand, often see historians as limited by an emphasis on written documentation, by emphasizing the supposedly concrete proof. Stokes (1965:234) noted that “Many anthropologists go so far as to assume that their discipline gives them a special intuitive insight into the historical processes of African societies, particularly since the central body of evidence is contained in oral tradition.” Indeed, oral tradition, or rather the use of it as a reliable source of “truthful” information is often seen as the main dividing line between history and anthropology (see Abler 1982). I think the discussion about written versus oral sources and the meanings of their respective contributions to historical information is largely a consequence of a fundamental misunderstanding. Many times, it involves a political component, a competition about who may, who should, and who is able to tell the truth; this competitive “discourse on truth” does not take into account the different purpose of academic and oral histories (see, e.g., Kurkiela 1997:195–207). A more useful approach than to try and divvy out the differences between history and anthropology and oral and written history, I think, is to look at the interpretation and use of narratives, not at their form.

By convention, academia has distinguished different forms of narratives. “Every human being,” Passmore (1987:69) observed, “is born into a world of stories. Unlike most societies, however, the West gradually came to draw
distinctions between different kinds of story and to make correspondingly different demands upon different kinds of storytellers.” At least since Ella Deloria (2006:xxv–xxvi), we have known, of course, that other societies also differentiate between categories of narratives, even though academically all of these narratives were treated as stories or myths, the content of which was only believable once verified (DeMallie 2006a:xiv). Jahner (1983:25) writes that “the Lakota names for genres include no single category that encompasses all of those narratives that scholars label ‘mythic.’” Obviously they would not, as they represented different categories. Conventional academia, however, made a crucial distinction that obliterates such cultural notions. It simply differentiated between document and story, science and fiction, logos and mythos, and assigned to these categorizations different levels of academic truth. While it has been trying to disentangle itself from these assumptions, it has been a slow process, and one that has met with resistance. My point here is not to repeat the critique of science nor the critique of postmodern reactions. It is simply to question whether a classification of what narratives constitute and present truth can be made according to narrator, origin, or form of the narrative, or whether it depends on the context of the narrative and the relation it assumes to its audiences.

Story and document, science and fiction, are not that far from each other when we look at texts like Ella Deloria’s Waterlily (2009) or Elsie Clews Parsons’ American Indian Life (1991). The methods used in both books can be summed up by Deloria’s explanation of her work (in Gardner 2009:vii): “Only my characters are imaginary.” For her, the “things that happen” are true in that they are based on real events. They are only fictitious in that these real events happen to imaginary characters. Kroeber (1991:13), in the introduction to Parsons’s volume, emphasized that the stories “are reliable.” He explains that “[t]he customs depicted are never invented. Each author has adhered strictly to the social facts as he knew them.” While Parsons (1991:2) herself critiqued the notion of ethnographic truth in her preface, Kroeber’s statement is reminiscent of Boas’s attempt to include Native sources into his historical-anthropological reconstructions. Each author has to hold on to conventional wisdom even while trying to push the boundaries. Boas held on to history as derived from written documents but tried to include Native sources. Kroeber held on to the concept of reliable, historical and ethnographic truth even as he admitted that fiction “has definite merit” (1991:13). Parsons, who went the furthest, simply held on to the value of anthropology as a discipline, but questioned whether truth could exclusively be found in logos, or whether it could at all be found through logos, exclusively. It might be an expression of the fundamental difficulty of this question, or the difficulty (for science) of facing this question, as well as an expression of what power traditional dogma exerts over a community, that debates on this very question still abound in departments and disciplines. I find it somewhat
refreshing that Kroeber pointed to Bandelier's 1890 *The Delight Makers*, and Parsons added Grinnell's 1920 *When Buffalo Ran* as examples of what an infusion of story into document or vice versa can deliver. Of Bandelier's work, Kroeber (1991:13, italics in original) wrote: "this novel still renders a more comprehensive and coherent view of native Pueblo life than any scientific volume on the Southwest."

A story can become a document and a document can be told as a story. The difference lies not so much in the text itself, and perhaps not even in the relation of the author to the audience, as in the relation of the audience to the text. The audience's relation to a text and their use of it determines its nature. A text might be told or written as a document, or might be a document because its audience uses it as one. The same text can be turned into a story, however. The same text becomes a document or a story depending on whether it is read or heard as one. Everything is what it is perceived to be, depending on how we relate to it, of course; and yet, this fact is often ignored or forgotten with historical texts, perhaps because we are used to seeing our reality as an archive of documents instead of the collection of stories it is. Schneider (1987:682) connected the obsession with documentation to the secularization of a society that followed the Protestant obsession with self-observation and control. If Protestantism gave us capitalism, and capitalism is simplification, as Dussel (1998:13) argued, then archives of documents—not stories—are the capitalism of history. The abstraction and simplification of culture, history, community, and the self that Dussel argued capitalism brings with it also meant the simplification of history, memory, and the past, which led to the loss of the capacity to listen to stories. It is that act of listening that makes a text a story; simplification and abstraction create archival documents. The fact that there does not exist two similarly distinguished terms for the act of reading as there does for hearing and listening might reflect the relatively recent expansion of literacy to the general public, but we can still "read between the lines" of a text and "read in" a text. Of course, all of our senses can be used in the same different ways. Lévi-Strauss (1997) showed how to use three of them as acts of attention in *Look, Listen, Read.*

Whether written or oral, it is not the truth content but the codification and selection of a source that makes a document different from a story. A document is used to document something; it places an event as the truth and is used as proof of that truth. A story is much more complex than that, and it does different things, too. "It is storytelling," wrote Jackson (1998:177) "that effects this transformation [the embedding of the human being in the world] and creates this embeddedness, connecting people to country, connecting particular experience to shared parameters of meaning." While the importance of a document lies in its content—what it documents—a story can play. It can imply. It can be incomplete. The value of a story does not only lie in its content: it lies in its meaning and in the transformation that this
meaning creates. Jackson (1998:181, italics in original) further noted Biddle's observation that "the truth of stories emerges from a relationship between teller and listener." In contrast, the relationship between author and reader has (supposedly) nothing to do with the meaning of a document, not even with oral history as a document. Documents cannot transform because they are alienated stories.

In its telling, a story transforms not only the past but also the present, because through telling a story the past is brought into the present (Jackson 1998:123). In the overture to The Raw and the Cooked, Lévi-Strauss (1970:15, 16; italics mine) points out that both myth and music are "languages which, in their different ways, transcend articulate expression, while at the same time—like articulate speech, but unlike painting—requiring a temporal dimension in which to unfold. . . . Because of the internal organization of the musical work, the act of listening to it immobilizes passing time. . . . [B]y listening to music, and while we are listening to music, we enter into a kind of immortality.” Just like music, a good story allows the audience to enter into “a kind of immortality.” The purpose of telling a story, then, is not simply historical. This, again, is a transformation of relationships, and in order to understand this transformation, we need, as Ingold (2000:24) has put it, not to hear but to listen: our perception needs to be “grounded in an act of attention.” It is that act of attention that leads us to put clues in relation to each other, that lets Janaček’s sketches resonate with music, that lets Ingold’s Cree hunter “tell.” DeMallie’s ethnohistorical method resonates within this act of attention, where it gives rise, as Ingold (2000:24–26) put it, to sensitivity and responsiveness, to a sentient ecology, a poetics of dwelling. Listening as an act of attention leads us to transformation. Paraphrasing Ingold’s (2000:24–25) text on the hunter’s understanding of the caribou, we can express how it transforms ethnohistory: “When the [ethnologist] speaks of how the [specific culture] presented itself to him, he does not mean to portray the [culture] as a self-contained, rational agent whose action in giving itself up served to give outward expression to some inner resolution. Like music, the [ethnologist’s] story is a performance; and again like music, its aim is to give form to human feeling—in this case the feeling of the [other’s] vivid proximity as another living, sentient being.” This is the transformation DeMallie has brought to ethnohistory. His appeal for ethnohistorians to “have ears” is an appeal to base historical knowledge on more than documents. It presents the challenge to listen, in addition, to context and relationships: to community and kinship.

TRANSFORMING ETHNOHISTORIES

Sahlins (2000:471) defined historical ethnography as works "whose aim is to synthesize the field experience of a community with an investigation of its
archival past." Keeping in mind what Lévi-Strauss (1966:242) had to say about archives, namely that their virtue "is to put us into contact with pure historicity," it becomes obvious that such historical ethnography is still reconstructing history and is not an ethnohistory that listens to stories. The employment of pure historicity cannot lead to ethnohistory because the method limits the ways in which we can listen. Augé (1999:4) pointed out that "Anthropologists can see and talk to their informants, historians cannot; historians know how the story unfolds, anthropologists do not." That might be true, but both anthropologists and historians, as ethnohistorians, in order to know the story, must listen to their informants. Both must listen to documents, whether oral or written, and thus transform them into stories. From such listening one develops the ability to understand, to "tell," to use Ingold's term, and to create ethnohistory, which is not so much a practice "to establish the history of the peoples [we] study as to understand their conception of history or, more precisely, their conception of their own history" (Augé 1999:8, italics in original). This, I would insist, is something worth holding on to, even in the face of Lévi-Strauss's (1992:412) critique of the search for greater meaning: "Between the Marxist critique, which frees man from his initial bondage—by teaching him that the apparent meaning of his condition evaporates as soon as he agrees to see things in a wider context—and the Buddhist critique which completes his liberation, there is neither opposition nor contradiction." Myth and academic truth, story and document, can lead to an understanding of reality and therefore the liberation from it. This realization not only allows the acknowledgment that academic truth is an artificial category without relevance for many sources, but also provides a better tool with which to understand ethnohistory as a field in which history, anthropology, and all other disciplines who interpret narratives have a stake.

DeMallie's cultural truth in historical context cannot be found in datasets, primary and secondary conclusions, or the measurement of quantities, and it cannot be found in documents alone. Measurement of objects constitutes truth in natural sciences; social sciences find their truth in the relations between objects. Documents, in their simplified and generalized nature, are different from stories, which, embedded in cultural contexts and therefore difference, provide conflicting, paradoxical, ironic, and, as such, cultural information. To understand the difference between document and story, and the necessity of going beyond documents, consider the example DeMallie (1977a:113, italics mine) gave in his testimony before the Sioux Treaty Hearing in 1974: "The treaty concepts are based upon European tradition and though you might be able to translate these words into Lakota and have them mean something, unless they have some basis in reality (as perceived by the Sioux), the Indians would be totally unprepared to understand what was meant." The whole hearing (Ortiz 1977) was exactly an attempt to base
documents in some basis of reality. It is also an example of going beyond the archive and comparing different histories to find, in this comparison of multiple narratives of different orders, something true. "As Bateson pointed out on many occasions," wrote Harries-Jones (1995:9, italics in original), "the scientific approach to difference is not of the same order as the scientific approach to similarity. Emphasis on difference leads to patterns, while emphasis on sameness leads to quantification." The systems of thought DeMallie is trying to understand are patterns of meaning, and patterns are discerned from stories. An ethnohistory that has ears, that is based on the act of listening—based on stories in addition to documents—will be a transformed and transformative field.

A society (Gesellschaft) is created, imagined, and constructed, both in practice and as a category of thinking in research, through documents, but it is stories that create a community (Gemeinschaft). A society transforms into a community through stories; if the stories are replaced by documents, the community becomes a society. What is true for the places in which (or perhaps at which) we live goes for the places where we work: academia, industry, think tanks, construction companies. No amount of street signs, branding, or brochures will create a community if the people do not build and share stories. Those interdisciplinary synergies that universities are trying to create by putting departments into the same buildings or faculty in adjoining offices, for example, cannot be artificially created by administrative measures and have to be built by allowing faculty to share stories.

Of course, there are different kinds of stories, and not all of them create the same meanings. I remember the first Committee on Institutional Cooperation Graduate Student Conference in Iowa City; two students interpreted Pueblo stories according to culturally significant symbolic meanings. At the very end of the question-and-answer session, DeMallie suggested that perhaps some of these stories might simply have meanings as stories—a bedtime story is simply that, for example. Looking through my old class notes recently, I found I had written "Sometimes 'symbols' have no meaning whatsoever! Sometimes people just do things." Overinterpretation of culture—seeking great meaning in every detail of daily lives—is just as dangerous as simply taking everything literally. "The inhabitant of an anthropological place," Augé (1995:55) noted, "does not make history; he lives in it." The ability to tell stories apart, to distinguish those with different meanings, is one of the most difficult, and yet most important, tasks of cultural competency. It is often the proof of true cultural understanding, manifested for example in understanding humor, prayer, or sacredness. However, sharing stories always creates community as it brings about and cements the realization that others are, in the end, not terribly different from ourselves and transforms them into "living, sentient beings," in contrast to an analysis that hears, but does not listen.
In terms of historical influences on DeMallie and on the method of ethnohistory he proposes, it is impossible to overlook Morgan, Eggan, Lévi-Strauss, and others. Unquestionably, it was DeMallie's determination, drive, and commitment to master the grand documents of anthropology and history from a very early age that has led to his encyclopedic knowledge of the fields in which he works. However, I cannot help but wonder in what ways the stories in the stack of Indian Chief comic books that he collected have been responsible for his formulation of the ethnohistorical method. After all, it has been the capacity to listen to texts as stories that has engendered a capacity to weave relations of friendship with many people anchored in communities; grassroots people, as some may call them, and tricksters, if we take the transformational aspects of storytelling seriously. Ivan Drift was a trickster, as Paula Wagoner argues in her contribution to this volume. His text might not be one that is taken too seriously by conventional (ethno)historians, but perhaps we should remember what Jahner (1992:148) said about texts that emerge "from the immediate and consciously negotiated experience of radical cultural change": that "the act of writing [might be] simultaneously a development of an imaginative tradition and an attempted entry into a new cultural order." Being a trickster is not a bad qualification for such an undertaking. In this context, one might wonder anew about the reception of Lakota (or academic) texts that are today regarded as seminal, but perhaps did not receive that acclaim from everybody when they were constructed.

Transforming both anthropology and history into ethnohistory requires us to break the shackles of conventional knowledge, of common-sense facts. Ethnohistorians might have to be tricksters. At the very least, however, they need to be able to understand tricksters and to accept that what tricksters do is also fact. A transformed and transforming ethnohistory needs to accept that Cheyennes transforming into buffalo is perfectly acceptable as fact in a Cheyenne history, and must have the ears to listen to such facts (DeMallie 1993). Myths, in fact, establish communities, uphold them, give them rules to live by, and explain realities. It should not come as a surprise that DeMallie's students have tried to understand stories to understand relations. Most of us, I think, define the world we look at using three main relations that constitute reality through stories: language, kinship, and community. The three form, fittingly, a Lévi-Straussian triad, with community transcending both language and kinship—story and relationship—which both express, reinforce, and continuously reenact community itself. The chapters of this volume address all three of these relations.

David Miller ethnohistorically contextualizes DeMallie's work, a large part of ethnohistory itself, and this volume in his contribution. This context both reveals the complexity and diversity of DeMallie's approach and provides a background to the following chapters. It is revealing to see glimpses
of Eggan, Fogelson, Lévi-Strauss, Schneider, Geertz, and Tax in the following chapters, whether they are clearly and consciously identified or not. Then Kellie Hogue, Sarah Quick, and Jason Jackson discuss ethnohistorical performances, ethnohistory as performance, and the role that performance plays in ethnohistory. As Jackson discussed with me, performance studies is not something that might be automatically associated with DeMallie, but I do think these contributions show how ethnohistory can profit from and contribute to other fields in which an interpretation of meaning and context is extremely important. I am also thinking here, of Brenda Farnell’s paper, “Precision in Meaning,” at the 2009 Ethnohistory meetings, which bridged the interpretation of movement and the interpretation of narrative. David Dinwoodie and Patrick Moore steer the discussion more directly toward narrative, although both chapters also continue some themes from the previous ones, now applied to storytelling. Both contributions enter into a fascinating, direct dialogue, and both demonstrate masterfully how texts—whether English or Native—should be analyzed, contextualized, and used to gain larger insights into history and community. Both also show the dialogues of ethnohistory with linguistics and sociolinguistics. Raymond Bucko and Paula Wagoner then approach ethnohistory from a more biographical perspective, discussing narrative as a product of a more personal history. Where Arthur John’s story seems to be more concerned with and used for community, William Bordeaux clearly presents his own historical interpretation, for example. Bucko’s and Wagoner’s contextualizations of texts reemphasize the potential of the ethnohistorical method, while at the same time pointing to the long neglect of authors and sources writing against the large historical process held as historical standards by those who control the discourse. Mindy Morgan continues this discussion of historical text with her contribution on James Larpenteur Long. She also reiterates an important point already stressed by Dinwoodie, namely that studies of indigenous narratives, societies, and cultures extend to English texts: here because the underlying language ideologies contribute to the context of narratives; with Dinwoodie because the context of narratives contributes to underlying ideologies. Morgan’s and Braun’s chapters both also question which narratives are told, and, as a consequence, what histories are remembered. The selective presentation of Native peoples as “Indians” that Morgan describes can easily be interpreted as Braun’s expansion of the procedural landscape.

AN ETHNOHISTORY OF LISTENING

The reader might notice that firm lines between the issues the chapters in this volume address are difficult to draw; a Kroeberian coloring scheme might be in order. Addressing language without kinship is impossible; we
need to know the relationship of the speakers (or listeners) to be able to interpret the form, content, and purpose of what is said, implied, and left out. Addressing kinship without language is equally impossible; relationships manifest themselves by relating, and relating messages—communicating—is the primary way of doing this. In both cases, we need the context of community; both language and kinship build community, and community depends on language and kinship, so that each of the chapters might emphasize one of the three, but nevertheless speak to all three together. The authors approach these issues from a diversity of perspectives, and their conclusions are equally diverse. This, I would argue, does not prevent the reader from seeing a broader pattern emerge, however. Stories are always diverse, and we do not have to engage in formal structural analysis to make sense of this diversity—or perhaps we do so naturally, just like children are able to order their bedtime stories into a moral universe that makes sense: a cultural pattern. Diversity in content, form, and perspective is an obstacle for interpretation only for fundamentalists who do not understand stories because they take them literally. It is, after all, in actively listening to the different kinds and versions of Lakota creation stories, for example, that a glimpse of Lakota cultural patterns can be caught.

It is thus the emphasis on story that forces us to “have ears.” Story always implies. At the same time that this presupposes familiarity with culture, locality, kinship, language, and community, it also teaches these things as the careful listener is reminded to explore further. Teaching by not explaining, without immediate lucidity, so to speak, might be a weird concept from the standpoint of document, but it makes sense when we teach and learn by story, where we are forced to make connections: to create relations (see Sharp 2001:132). Gregory Bateson (Bateson and Bateson 1987:80, italics in original) has said that “noncommunication of certain sorts is needed if we are to maintain the ‘sacred.’ Communication is undesirable, not because of fear, but because communication would somehow alter the nature of the ideas.” This might be why, in fact, that “Christianity is just writhing with contradictions” (Bateson and Bateson 1987:146) and yet obviously creates a religion that makes sense of the world. As Sharp (2001:123) explains, any communication depends on the illusion of understanding of meaning. This is successful as long as the participants to a communication share close enough general meanings of reality. Intercultural communication is difficult not because the disconnect between meanings is newly introduced, but because it becomes obvious: no shared general reading of reality allows to uphold the illusion that we share an understanding of meaning.

Keeping in mind Geertz’s essay “On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding” (1983:55–70), I am far from suggesting that we need to have spiritual communion with culture in order to understand it. However, intercultural understanding, including ethnohistory, requires active listening,
sharing, and knowledge of a shared context to understand (and misunderstand) implied references in a difficult, long-term process. As David Dinwoodie points out in his contribution, it is, as White put it, a “process of creative, and often expedient, misunderstandings.” Without the investment in such a process, which might take a lifetime to accomplish, the illusion of understanding results in what Plumwood (2001:66–67) called “oppressive projects of unity.” As Todorov (1992:165) observed, “If it is incontestable that the prejudice of superiority is an obstacle in the road to knowledge, we must also admit that the prejudice of equality is a still greater one, for it consists in identifying the other purely and simply with one’s own ‘ego ideal’ (or with oneself).” DeMallie reminds us that the past is not such a foreign country that it cannot be understood. If culture is culture change, however, we can also not simply identify the historic other with our contemporary self, as knowing our past depends on an intercultural dialogue, too. Foregoing the hard work required to understand another culture in its own right can have as dire consequences as using knowledge to destroy a culture. Cortez knew more of the Aztecs than Las Casas, Todorov (1992) has shown, and it is important to understand that empathy without knowledge can create as much oppression as enmity with knowledge. We are not able, otherwise, to truly understand the Dawes Act, for example, or Carlisle boarding school.

To get acquainted with a foreign country, whether in the past or the present, and whether for reasons of conquest or acceptance, means an act of translation. So far, I have talked about translation as a metaphor, but DeMallie, in his teachings and his work, also reminds us that linguistic translation—the knowledge of and sympathy for other languages—is a necessity for ethnohistorical work. The importance of Native languages is evident throughout DeMallie’s teachings, and his intricate understanding of Lakota, especially, is evident to all of his students to whom he tried to teach it. I just recently reread the acknowledgments in Vine Deloria, Jr.’s Singing for a Spirit (1999)—reading those contextual materials is one lesson I have learned from DeMallie—and saw that he thanked DeMallie, “who made corrections in the Dakota words and grammatical structures.” DeMallie’s connections to French history and ethnography, too, go as far back as translations of French sources such as Niccollet’s journal (DeMallie 1976b).

Beyond the importance of knowing a language for purposes of translation and direct reading of sources, however, DeMallie’s interest in language makes a moral point. I suspect that he sees his engagement with language as a necessity to understand culture not because culture equals language but because it enables one to really understand stories, and stories enable us to understand culture. The acknowledgment that other people’s perspectives are as valid as ours and contribute just as much to knowledge—and therefore deserve to be, indeed must be, read and heard—should lead to more
than a generic endorsement of "diversity." In practice, it has to be translated into cultural and linguistic understanding.

Thus, as becomes very clear in perhaps the most important aspect of DeMallie's teaching, the study and practice of community acquires a moral obligation, that is, a kinship obligation. The search for an understanding of community can only come to fruition by participating in the community. This does not mean posing as a member of a community; it means listening with humility and integrity and trying to bear witness to ideas and events instead of using communities for scholarly, political, or personal boasting. As Todorov (1992:132, italics in original) stated, "it is only by speaking to the other (not giving orders but engaging in a dialogue) that I can acknowledge him [or her] as a subject, comparable to what I am myself. . . . Unless grasping is accompanied by a full acknowledgment of the other as subject, it risks being used for purposes of exploitation, of 'taking'; knowledge will be subordinated to power." Participating in a community means engaging in this dialogue through the humility of real listening. We are thus able to participate in historic communities, too, by applying ethnohistorical methods. We must acknowledge the others as subjects, as living and sentient beings. We have to allow them to share and allow ourselves to listen. This is not as easy as it sounds: we are all, whatever our nationality, community, university, and discipline, much less inclined to listen than hear. It is, however, the complex implication of what it ultimately means to truly "have ears," to engage in listening as an act of attention. "The idea of truth appears only when one takes the other person into account," wrote Veyne (1988:128), and that might be why it "is the thin layer of gregarious self-satisfaction that separates us from the will to power." Listening in that sense, then, is in itself a transformational act, an act of which we have to continuously and consciously remind ourselves. Raymond J. DeMallie has always acted with that humility and has reminded his students of it many times: not directly, but by gently prodding us through stories and above all by setting the example to follow.

NOTES
