

2009

# Ideology and party in Congressional Iraq War voting patterns

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Ideology and party in Congressional Iraq War voting patterns

by

John H. Siebenmann

A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Major: Political Science

Program of Study Committee:  
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Ames, Iowa

2009

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To my parents, John F. and Nancy Lee A. Siebenmann,  
and for my beloved wife,  
Andrea

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**Abstract**

This thesis examined whether party identity (ID), or the ideological score assigned by *Americans for Democratic Action* (ADA), was a better predictor of roll-call voting on Iraq War legislation during the 110<sup>th</sup> Congress in 2007. Party ID and ADA scores were separately correlated with voting outcomes on twenty-two Senate, and twenty-six House votes on Iraq War bills. Though party and ideology both correlated strongly with voting outcomes in cross-tabulation statistics, a test of significance of the difference between two nonindependent correlations revealed ADA scores predominated in all House votes, and nearly half of the Senate votes. While the results add evidence of the increasing ideological homogeneity of parties, the particular attitudes toward military intervention directly challenged by Iraq War policy, and the mixed influence of party and ideology across Senate voting, suggest that prospects for bipartisanship in future intervention issues would depend on the justifications and circumstances of the policy.

## Chapter 1 - The Basic Question

### *Introduction*

The Iraq War has drawn attention once again to the role of Congress in war policy. The balance of foreign policy responsibilities allocated by the Constitution to the President and Congress has been debated repeatedly since President George Washington's declaration of neutrality in the war between France and Britain without consulting Congress in 1793.<sup>1</sup> When Congress does not succeed in ending an unpopular war or meet other policy aspirations, it might be tempting to conclude that the division of powers is flawed; that Congress should have either greater or lesser prerogative in international affairs than the President. However, the issue of divided government is distinct from the subject of how Congress actually uses the substantial authority it *does* have to influence the conduct of war and foreign relations.

The change of party majority in both chambers resulting from the 2006 mid-term elections opened a fierce struggle for control of Iraq War policy. The elections occurred during a year when spiraling sectarian violence and increasing U.S. casualty rates made the war the leading public concern.<sup>2</sup> The President's approval ratings had declined to new lows following the federal response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005; and eroded further as the strategy of "standing-up" Iraqi security forces while "standing-down" U.S. forces appeared unlikely to proceed fast enough to overtake the escalating violence. Amid diminished public confidence in the President's leadership, the way seemed clear for the new Democratic

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<sup>1</sup> Sundquist, James L. 1981. *The Decline and Resurgence of Congress*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution; p. 91.

<sup>2</sup> Results of a November 11, 2007 Pew Research Organization report show the war remained the foremost public policy concern of the American public through 2007; although polling started to show increases in public support for the surge strategy as a decline in violence became recognizable by November - see <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/642/public-sees-progress-in-war-effort>

majority seated in January, 2007 to easily wrest command of war policy from an unpopular president.

As this is written in the final days of the 110<sup>th</sup> Congress, the President's Iraq policy remains intact; including his strategy to increase force levels from early 2007. When the plan to deploy over 20,000 additional troops was announced in January 2007, it was greeted with deep pessimism across the political spectrum (and severely strained civil-military relations according to recent journalistic accounts).<sup>3</sup> Yet, funding and increased troop strength was sustained at or near those requested by the White House in every vote. Oversight activity and legislative challenges to Administration policy increased greatly after the new Congress was seated, but did not result in the withdrawal of U.S. troops that so many Democratic candidates had promised on the stump.

The basic question is: Why did opponents of Iraq War policy in the Democratic majority of the 110<sup>th</sup> Congress fail to achieve a legislated end to, or even a timetable for ending, U.S. involvement in the war? What factors internal to Congressional decision-making, or perhaps inherent in legislative processes generally, account for the failure of war opponents in the changed majority setting to limit or end the President's authority to maintain troops (or at least as many troops) in Iraq? Norman Ornstein (1975) observed that:

“Congress is the law-making and law-non-making body; it can pass groundbreaking legislation (as it did, for example, with the Voting Rights Act of 1964) or fail to enact new policies with equally wide ramifications (as it did with the Nixon Family Assistance Plan of 1969 and 1970). And it can override

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<sup>3</sup> Strain in relations between the White House and Joint Chiefs of Staff is reported in Woodward, Bob. 2008. *The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

a President's veto in order in order to make new policy (as it did with the War Powers Act of 1973). It can even undertake the alteration of the Constitution by initiating the amendment process, as it did. . . with equal rights for women. As Congress changes internally, the direction it takes in making policy can change also.”<sup>4</sup>

### ***Thesis Topic***

The topic of this thesis is to examine the role of partisanship and ideology in voting on Iraq War legislation during the First Session of the 110<sup>th</sup> Congress in 2007. The objective is to determine whether party allegiance - or the ideological profile ascribed to individual Members - is a better predictor of Iraq War votes in both the House and Senate. In light of accumulating evidence of increasing partisanship over the past quarter century, this research will seek to measure how dramatic a role partisanship played in votes to both support and oppose continuation of major U.S. involvement in Iraq.

A corollary objective is to determine how closely ideological coding corresponded to party-line voting on an issue as momentous as war. Unless we assume that members within each party held completely identical views of the war, then some variance between party identity and ideological coding should be discernible. Otherwise, party and ideology would have exactly the same influence in voting decisions. The essential task of this research is to test for any independent causal effects of party label and ideology in voting on the most controversial issue of U.S. foreign policy since the Vietnam War. Issues that challenge

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<sup>4</sup> Introductory remarks by Ornstein, Norman J., (Ed.) 1975. Congress in Change: Evolution and Reform. New York: Praeger Publishers; p. ix.

deeply-held values would be expected to produce measurable ideological effects in voting decisions that may or may not be consistent with party interests.

The present research addresses concerns about the implications of increasing partisan and ideological polarization for Congressional foreign policy-making. According to Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), a Liberal interest group that rates members of Congress on the proportion of their voting record that supports Liberal policy positions, the ideological divide between the two parties has never been further apart in almost 60 years of scoring than it has over the past seven years.<sup>5</sup> This would seem to challenge attempts to design a valid or reliable method of distinguishing the influence of ideology from party identity. But the assumption must be sustained that party allegiance and ideology have not (yet) become completely unified. There will certainly be a close correspondence between the two, but statistical comparison of the way each variable correlates with specific votes should still reveal “light” between their respective influences at a statistically-significant level.

Traditionally, the historical strain between idealism and realism in American outlook has shaped different attitudes toward international involvement that range from isolationism to support for engagement (internationalism). Beliefs about the use of military force are another important dimension of foreign policy opinion that differs on a demographic and regional basis across America. The way different attitudes toward international involvement and military power have become associated with party identity through realignment of the American electorate should be a key part of any analysis of Iraq War voting patterns. Changes in the electorate over the past thirty years have altered the distribution of foreign

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<sup>5</sup> Americans For Democratic Action (ADA) was founded in 1947. Its online publication *ADA Today*, describes the present ideological divide on page 5, at: [www.adaction.org/media/votingrecords/2007.pdf](http://www.adaction.org/media/votingrecords/2007.pdf)

policy ideologies within each party. As conservative Southern Democrats, more generally populist in suspicion of formal institutions and international cooperation, and more accepting of a role for military force in world affairs, moved to the Republican Party in response to Civil Rights reforms and Liberal opposition to the Vietnam War, the parties became more distinctively separated by attitudes toward military intervention, nationalism, and participation in multilateral institutions like the United Nations.

The Democratic Party became more associated with anti-military sentiments from the mid-1960s as a result of the Vietnam War. After the defeat of fascism in World War II, Liberals supported continued U.S. global involvement to uphold world peace and contain the new threat of communism. Those views shifted profoundly amid the tragic paradoxes of fighting the Vietnamese insurgency - changing to pacifism and anti-interventionism (perhaps also linked with sympathy for demands for self-determination in anti-colonial nationalism that peaked during that decade) which still echo in the policy preferences of the Left today.<sup>6</sup>

A substantial number of serving members of Congress and senior Administration officials came of age during the Vietnam War and hold strong beliefs on both sides of that earlier controversy, which they now struggle to reconcile with the new complexities of American society and a rapidly-changing international order. Security issues appeared to become much less central to relations among states following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and after the first Gulf War in 1991. Diverse interpretations of post-Soviet international change and the role of the United States as the sole remaining superpower had not coalesced into convictions anywhere nearly as well-integrated or widely-shared as the

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<sup>6</sup> The change in liberal attitudes toward international engagement, especially by members of the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), is observed by Busby, Joshua W. and Jonathan Monten. "Without Heirs? Assessing the Decline of Establishment Internationalism in U.S. Foreign Policy", *Perspectives on Politics*, Volume 6, Number 3, September, 2008; pp.451-472 (see p. 455).

Cold War containment strategy before the events of September 11, 2001. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the broader War on Terror (not to mention the current international economic crisis), have become the new crucible of American foreign policy values.

Legislative activity during a period of severe crisis in the war offers a chance to evaluate Congressional decision-making when the policy and political stakes were especially high. The war broached a sharp ideological divide across United States domestic politics and world opinion from the outset; and remains a touchstone for contested beliefs about the role of U.S. power and the utility of military force in world affairs. Therefore, it would be expected that voting on the Iraq War presents a chance to validly assess the strength of party loyalty against deeply-held ideological values. This project is an attempt to closely examine the present connection between partisanship, ideology and policy outcomes in time of war; and perhaps draw some inferences about Congressional foreign policy-making in the future.

### ***The 2006 Mid-Term Elections***

The election of Democratic majorities in 2006 was more dramatic in overcoming the traditional advantages of incumbency that had accrued to Republicans over twelve years of dominance than in the impact it would have on war policy. The Democrats gained a total of 30 seats in the House, fifteen more than necessary to cross the majority threshold; and gained six Senate seats, all taken from long-serving Republican incumbents, to achieve a one seat majority. On the whole, the Democrats gained a respectable - but not completely dominate (filibuster-proof in the Senate) - majority.

Public apprehension over rising violence in Iraq, and disapproval of President Bush's management of the war were the "primary source of the pro-Democratic tide in 2006",

according to Gary Jacobson's (2007) study of the elections.<sup>7</sup> Declining public approval of the war closely tracked the President's job approval rating in the months leading up to the elections.<sup>8</sup> In addition, discontent with the legislative productivity of the Republican-controlled Congress, which Democratic campaigns succeeded in associating with incidents of scandal involving Republican Members and lobbyists (packaged into a "culture of corruption" message strategy), bolstered the fortunes of Democratic candidates. In total, the Democrats successfully managed to "nationalize" the election into a referendum on the President and Congress.

Jacobson's study tested the relevance of three factors that, in combination, are generally deemed in the political science literature to predict party fortunes in midterm elections: the number of seats held by the President's party; the health of the economy; and public views of the President's job performance. The first two factors might have compensated somewhat for the President's poor approval ratings had it not been for the depth of public concern for the war. In terms of number of House and Senate seats, Republicans hold a "structural advantage" that (since the 1964 presidential election) "derives from the fact that [Republican voters] are distributed more efficiently across districts and states than Democratic voters." This means that while there may be numerically-fewer Republican voters across the nation as a whole, more districts lean Republican (defined as a district majority vote for the Party's candidate at least two percentage points above the national

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<sup>7</sup> Jacobson, Gary C. "Referendum: The 2006 Midterm Congressional Elections", *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 122, Number 1, 2007; pp.1-24.

<sup>8</sup> *ibid.*, Jacobson, 2007: p. 5. Jacobson cites a Lowess-smoothed summary of 771 polls of job approval ratings gleaned by Gallup, CBS News/*New York Times*, *Los Angeles Times*, NBC/*Wall Street Journal*, ABC/*Washington Post*, Quinipiac, *Newsweek*, *Time*, CNN, Bloomberg, Associated Press, and Pew Center for the People and Press poll. Measures of Iraq War support were a Lowess-smoothed summary of 579 polls (using 40 different wordings) conducted by the organizations listed above, plus Fox News, Knowledge Networks, and Zogby.

average in the most recent Presidential election). Conversely, Democratic voters are concentrated in fewer (especially urban) districts. A thirty-year trend toward increasing partisan consistency; and successful gerrymandering by Republican-controlled legislatures in key larger states, had bolstered the Republican electoral advantage. Also in the preceding months, the economy was performing well, having rebounded from the “dot-com” bubble and disruptions following the 9/11 attacks earlier in the decade.

With a correlation of 84 percent between the President’s job approval rating and public support for the war, Jacobson points-out that the correlation was “more tightly linked” than Harry Truman’s with the Korean War (60 percent) and Lyndon Johnson’s with the Vietnam War (64 percent consistent). As a general rule, he contends, “negative opinions of presidential performance tend to motivate voters more strongly than positive opinions.”<sup>9</sup>

What significantly turned the tide for Democrats was the “pessimism about the war and its consequences” among a considerable portion of Republicans; but more significantly, by independents. Unlike the elections of 2002 and 2004, when Republicans could enjoy a few percentage points greater loyalty in voting, “the opposite was true in 2006.” And while self-classified independents had given Democrats a slight advantage in 2004, “in 2006, they broke decisively for the Democrats.”

The strong suggestion of a national referendum on the war, manifest by the inroads on Republican electoral advantages and the weight in polling evidence of public discontent with the progress of the war and the President’s management, make it natural to expect that Congress would act decisively with a confidence that only strong public urgency can provide.

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<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*, Jacobson, 2007: 17. Jacobson cites Samuel Kernell, “Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting: An Alternative Explanation of the Midterm Congressional Decline of the President’s Party”, in *American Political Science Review*, 71 (March 1977): 44-46.

### *Shaping the Debate, Part I: Administration Responses to the Elections*

The President's determination to prevail against both the Iraqi insurgency and domestic opposition to the war is a crucial dimension of the partisan and ideological dynamic that stymied efforts on Capitol Hill to end the war. Congressional actions intermingled with Presidential decisions and rhetoric. It is worth reviewing Administration actions leading up to, and following, the 2006 elections to better understand how Congressional activity and statements responded to the way the President and his advisors dealt with the evolution of events in Iraq, and the political dilemmas at home broached by those events. Executive and Congressional views of the war actually converged on some issues. Electoral demands for policy change, and consequent reversal in the balance of power in Congress - as well as objective conditions in Iraq - altered the calculus of Executive Branch decision-making. Post-election military and political adjustments in Administration strategy reflected compromise on certain goals, but also a tenacious commitment to other, fundamental principles that shaped the subsequent Congressional debate.

On February 22, 2006, the bombing of the al-Askari Mosque (also known as the "Golden Mosque") of Samarra, the third most revered Shi-ah holy site, ignited fierce clashes between Shiite and Sunni militias.<sup>10</sup> Battles quickly spread throughout Baghdad, a city of around seven million, whose stability was considered the lynchpin of Iraqi national unity.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> The al-Askari Mosque, and adjoining Maqam Ghaybat shrine are significant for Shiite eschatological precepts as the mausoleum of the 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> Imams. For Twelver Shi-as, the 12th Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, or *Hujjat ibn al-Hasan* has been hidden, or "occulted" by God to emerge at the end of history to bring peace and justice to the world. The Samarra sites are usually regarded third most holy after Karbala, and Najaf. Source: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/samarra-mosque.htm>

<sup>11</sup> *Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review*, a Powerpoint slide presentation dated January, 2007, contains a summary of the pre-surge situation in slide number 6; at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/iraq-strategy011007.pdf>

Newly-constituted Iraqi security units, already precariously cleft by sectarian, ethnic and tribal loyalties, dissolved before the militias. The number of U.S. troops that could be committed to Baghdad was inadequate to hold neighborhoods that had been cleared of warring factions. Battles among sectional militias, along with refugee displacements, spread across Iraq and merged with the ongoing insurgency against the occupation, threatening to fragment the country into brutally- “cleansed” Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish sub-state regions.

Well before the sectarian crisis that ultimately led to the U.S. surge strategy of 2007, the ongoing insurgency that became recognizable in mid-2003 was wearing the patience of the American public. The cultural and tactical dilemmas of combat amid the general population (a prime source of asymmetric strength for insurgencies), and especially the increasing frequency and lethality of attacks with improvised explosive devices (IED’s), called into question the cost in American lives and prospects for a military solution. The drumbeat of criticism on various issues ranging from the absence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) used to justify the invasion; the Abu Ghraib prison scandal; allegations of mismanagement on the part of the Coalition Provisional Authority; to complaints from soldiers about the lack of armor protection against IED’s; had already placed the Administration on the defensive (and probably hardened the President’s resolve). But the escalation of communal violence on top of the insurgency greatly added to the perception that the war was spinning further out of Washington’s control. Whatever progress had been made toward legitimizing the authority of the new constitutional government following the first national elections on January 30<sup>th</sup>, 2005 was in dire jeopardy.

Pressure had been building within the Republican Party to change war policy long before the November, 2006 elections. The ideological split within the party that predated the

war widened between traditional conservative realists concerned about the deterioration of U.S. influence and strains on military power, and neoconservatives who (still) regarded the war as a test of fundamental values on the international stage.<sup>12</sup> Some Congressional Republicans, watching their reelection chances diminish with every passing day of rising turmoil, had quietly pleaded with the White House to either change management of the war – starting with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (whose brusque responses to the media, Congressional committees, and NATO ministers had come to symbolize the character of unilateralism) - or at least adopt a more conciliatory or flexible public tone toward calls for policy change.<sup>13</sup>

Iraq policy was defended in stark terms by the White House; with reasons that ranged from promoting individual freedom and democracy in the Middle East, to the danger of Iraq falling into the hands of Islamic extremists. Through the 2006 campaign season, the President repeatedly insisted that “victory” over the insurgency could be achieved, and equated calls for U.S. withdrawal with “defeat.”<sup>14</sup> He steadfastly refused to make changes in senior appointments; set a timetable for a draw-down of forces; publicly discuss alternative strategies; or acknowledge criticism of the war’s conduct prior to the elections. Whether the President intended to avoid the appearance of subordinating war policy to election politics;

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<sup>12</sup> A recent description of variation within conservative foreign policy ideology is presented by Rathbun, Brian C. “Does One Right Make a Realist?: Conservatism, Neoconservatism and Isolationism in the Ideology of American Elites”; *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 123, No. 2; Summer, 2008; pp. 271-299. The most notable fracture in party unity over Iraq surfaced seven months before the war with former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft’s editorial in the *Wall Street Journal* on August 15, 2002 bluntly entitled “Don’t Attack Saddam.”

<sup>13</sup> Nagourney, Adam and David D. Kirkpatrick, “Bad Iraq News Worries Some in GOP on ‘06”, *The New York Times*, August 18, 2005; at: [http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/18/politics/18repubs.html?\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/18/politics/18repubs.html?_r=1)

<sup>14</sup> Examples of the President’s terminology and rationale for persevering in Iraq can be found in a speech given at Ft. Bragg, N.C. on June 28, 2005, posted by the White House Press Office at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050628-7.html>

keep the enemy guessing about U.S. intentions; or even to brace Republican loyalists; his resolve was costly at the polls.

The Administration's bearing shifted immediately after the elections. The very next day, November 8, 2006, Secretary Rumsfeld was replaced by Robert M. Gates, who had served as CIA Director and deputy national security advisor under George H. W. Bush.<sup>15</sup> At the news conference to announce Rumsfeld's departure and Gates nomination, the President opened by saying: "What's changed today is the election is over, and the Democrats won"<sup>16</sup> He went on to concede that "Iraq is not working well enough, or fast enough"; and further observed that "[the] message is clear, the American people want their leaders in Washington to set aside partisan differences . . ." Some of the President's former staff later wondered aloud if the base of both parties would permit cooperation on war policy.<sup>17</sup>

To the very day of the election, the President had largely succeeded in publically concealing personal doubts about the course of the war. The surprise change in Pentagon leadership required forethought, changed beliefs, the ascendance of advisors advocating change; and recruitment of a replacement who could win Congressional confirmation - which strongly suggests that holding a resolute line through November 7th was at least partially calculated for election considerations.

The more idealistic goals of Administration war policy were apparently on their way out at least a year before the election. As early as August, 2005, Robin Wright of the

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<sup>15</sup> Fletcher, Michael A. and Peter Baker. "Bush Ousts Embattled Rumsfeld: Democrats Near Control of Senate: Ex-CIA Chief Robert Gates Nominated to Lead Pentagon". *Washington Post*, Thursday, November 9, 2006, p. A01

<sup>16</sup> *ibid.*, Fletcher and Baker, "Bush Ousts Embattled Rumsfeld", *Washington Post*, November 9, 2006.

<sup>17</sup> *ibid.*, Fletcher and Baker. 2006. Former Press Secretary Ari Fleischer is quoted as saying of President Bush: "If that means he'll compromise, he'll do so. The question is, will the Republican base let him? Will the Democratic base let [House Speaker] Nancy Pelosi and [Senate Majority Leader] Harry Reid compromise?"

*Washington Post* quoted unnamed U.S. officials “in Washington and Baghdad” as saying the Bush Administration “is significantly lowering expectations of what can be achieved in Iraq. . . [and] no longer expects to see a model new democracy, a self-supporting oil industry or a society in which the majority of people are free from serious security or economic challenges.”<sup>18</sup> In the same story, another “senior official involved in policy since the 2003 invasion” is quoted as saying “[w]e are in the process of absorbing the factors of the situation we’re in and shedding the unreality that dominated at the beginning.” By 2006, according to Ivo H. Daalder and I. M. Destler, President Bush realized that the war effort was faltering and agreed to the counsel of his new National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley, to review policy assumptions and meet with analysts offering alternative strategies.<sup>19</sup>

The presence of Robert Gates in the Cabinet was a more substantive indication that policy was about to change, as he was known to favor reducing the U.S. commitment in Iraq.<sup>20</sup> At the time of his appoint as Defense Secretary, Gates was serving on a panel of former senior government officials advising the bipartisan Iraq Study Group (ISG), co-chaired by former Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, and former House Foreign Affairs (now International Relations) Committee Chairman Lee H. Hamilton. The ISG had formed independently to assess the deteriorating security, political, economic, and international implications of the situation in Iraq. Its report, released at headline-making White House and Capitol Hill presentations December 6, 2006 (a month after the elections), was a

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<sup>18</sup> Wright, Robin and Ellen Knickmeyer, “U.S. Lowers Sights On What Can Be Achieved in Iraq”, *Washington Post*, Sunday, August 14, 2005; p. A01.

<sup>19</sup> Daalder, Ivo H. and I. M. Destler, “In the Shadow of the Oval Office”, *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 88, Number 1, January/February 2009; p. 126.

<sup>20</sup> Broder, Jonathan, “Reality Check”, *Congressional Quarterly Weekly*, September 10, 2007; p. 2613.

compendium of elite and expert opinion on the war up to that time from across the ideological spectrum.<sup>21</sup>

Judging by the number of times it is stated throughout the report, a solid consensus had formed among the principal members of the ISG that the insurgency could not be defeated by military means alone; and that stability would depend on political reconciliation among the various factions in the central government.<sup>22</sup> Three recommendations in particular (among a total of 79 offered) differentiated ISG views from Administration positions: reorientation of the U.S. military mission to training and advising Iraqi security forces, and special operations against al Qaeda affiliates; creating a modicum of security in a few locations (major cities, government zones, critical infrastructure, and supply routes) rather than defeating the insurgency in detail throughout the country; and a proposal that Iran and Syria be included in a regional effort to mediate Iraq's internal divisions. Generally, the group placed special emphasis on speeding-up the process of training and advising Iraqi forces, and hastening development of other government capacities. Many of the recommendations were for managerial or organizational changes. The President's acceptance of the report was cordial; but reserved in stating he would wait for pending reports from the Pentagon, State Department and National Security Council in order to select from "all options" available<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> The Iraq Study Group report is posted at the website of the U.S. Institute for Peace (which sponsored the Study Group); at [http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq\\_study\\_group\\_report/report/1206/index.html](http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/index.html)

<sup>22</sup> The absence of a military solution and need for political reconciliation is asserted throughout the ISG report; and listed as the first premise in the opening of the section listing military-security recommendations on page 49.

<sup>23</sup> Northam, Jackie, "Iraq Study Group: U.S. Policy 'Not Working'", *National Public Radio* broadcast, December 6, 2006; at: <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6591608>.

Democratic leaders lauded the report as affirming the need for change in Administration policy.<sup>24</sup> Key Republican lawmakers made receptive remarks, but tended to dismiss the inclusion of Syria and Iran in any regional approach. For many conservatives, the report's overall vision of shifting away from direct combat to an advisory effort and strengthening the Iraqi government did not necessarily contradict the President's long-term objectives - as long as it didn't ratify a quick withdrawal that further destabilized the country, or be interpreted as defeat by the insurgency.<sup>25</sup> Select parts of ISG report would become a touchstone for both parties in the Congressional debate over the following year; and the language of certain recommendations, especially in regard to reducing the military mission to training and special operations, would be written into legislative attempts to end U.S. involvement.<sup>26</sup> In most proposals calling for withdrawal, or the setting of deadlines for withdrawal of troops, qualifying language was always included that permitted retention of troop levels for force protection or security of diplomatic and private contractor facilities and personnel. Opponents of the war did not want to be blamed for legislating inadequate safety for troops.

During the rest of the month of December, 2006 the Administration intensified its review of alternative strategies. Apart from the pending cabinet reports, the President held consultations with the military services and retired officers, members of the intelligence

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<sup>24</sup> Both Democratic and Republican leaders in Congress are quoted at: <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6587217>

<sup>25</sup> Phillips, James, and James Jay Carafano, "The Iraq Study Group Report: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly", Heritage Foundation *WebMemo #1278*, December 6, 2006 at: <http://www.heritage.org/research/iraq/wm1278.cfm>

<sup>26</sup> An example of legislation that reflected the overall compromise position of the Iraq Study Group on continuing the Iraq military mission by reducing it to training and anti-terror special operations is H.R. 4156, a supplemental appropriations bill, that called for withdrawal of "most troops" except those deployed for "force protection, counterterrorism and. . . training of Iraqi forces."

community, prominent historians and other experts outside government. A particularly high-profile meeting occurred at the Pentagon on December 13<sup>th</sup>, where the President and Vice President Richard Cheney met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss military options.<sup>27</sup> Yet, despite White House efforts to demonstrate it was engaged in an orderly search for solutions to the crisis, uncertainty about the next course of action in Iraq hovered over the 110<sup>th</sup> Congress as it was sworn into office on January 4, 2007 - and Iraq policy seemed all the more susceptible to Congressional intercession.

### ***Shaping the Debate, Part II: The Surge***

The surge strategy that President Bush decided upon and announced January 10, 2007 seemed to endorse the views of those in both parties who had long-argued for a larger occupation force to ensure civil order once major combat operations had ceased (after the Iraqi Army withdrew from conventional warfare). Many regarded the size and composition of the post-war force as a key shortcoming in pre-war planning for the occupation, and the issue had become one more indictment of false optimism on the part of the Administration. This criticism fell mostly on Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, who had placed sustained pre-war pressure on Central Command planners to minimize force size for the initial drive to Baghdad, but then did not adjust requirements for the occupation.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Wright, Robin and Ann Scott Tyson. "Joint Chiefs Advise Change in War Strategy". *Washington Post*, Thursday, December 14, 2006; p. A01; retrieved at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/13/AR2006121301379.html> A unnamed source for the story is reported to have said that the Joint Chiefs "did not favor adding significant numbers of troops to Iraq"; and had recommended to the President placing more emphasis on training Iraqi forces - along the lines of the main Iraq Study Group recommendation. Gen. George W. Casey, Jr. then-Coalition Commander in Iraq, was already pursuing the Administration's "standing-up (Iraqi forces) while standing-down (U.S. troops) mission, and further recommended withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraqi cities into a few isolated bases.

<sup>28</sup> This is the account given by Gordon, Michael H. and General Bernard E. Trainor (Ret.). 2006. *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. New York: Pantheon Books; Chapters 1 and 2.

In outline, the surge called for sending approximately 21,500 additional troops, equivalent to about five additional brigades, and initially retained 4,000 Marines previously scheduled to end their deployment in al-Anbar Province. These would reinforce the 12-15 brigades that had served as the nominal U.S. ground force level since 2003.<sup>29</sup> The immediate objective of the surge was to stabilize Baghdad, and pacify the so-called “Sunni Triangle” to the north and west of Baghdad that encompassed much of Anbar Province. The new Coalition commander, General David Petraeus, would implement an updated counterinsurgency doctrine he had coauthored, centered on securing and isolating the general population from insurgents and militias by taking-back Baghdad neighborhood tracts, and keeping troops in those neighborhoods to backstop Iraqi security and reconstruction efforts. This “clear-hold-build” approach reversed prior Joint Staff plans to withdraw most of the Coalition occupation force into large fortified bases to reduce casualties, and the profile of the occupation.<sup>30</sup>

Iraq’s new government was expected to contribute forces that would lead clearing operations where possible, with embedded U.S. units and advisors providing backup if necessary. Furthermore, the government was to act as early as possible to make the compromises, decisions and agreements necessary to mitigate underlying political causes for the violence.

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<sup>29</sup> Based on estimate in 2006 prepared by O’Bryant, Joanne and Michael Waterhouse, “U.S. Forces in Iraq”, *CRS Report for Congress*, Order Code RS22449, November 13, 2006, found at: <http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RS22449.pdf> . Later reports suggest that the pre-surge peak was 15 brigades, In Tyson, Ann Scott, “Combat Brigade is Cut 6 Weeks Early Iraq”, *The Washington Post*, November 6, 2008; retrieved at: [www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/05/AR2008110504143.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/05/AR2008110504143.html) .

<sup>30</sup> The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24; Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2007. Also: Wright and Scott-Tyson, *The Washington Post*, December 14, 2006 regarding Joint Staff planning following the advice of Gen. George W. Casey to redeploy most U.S. forces into large bases.

An important issue for Democratic war opponents and Republican skeptics was the ability of Iraq's government to reconcile internal divisions, consolidate authority, establish legitimacy and perform democratically. Following national elections in January, 2005, frustration had mounted in Washington over the slow pace of selecting a new prime minister in a parliament comprising religious, tribal and ethnic parties, and particularly in reaching agreements over the distribution of oil revenue and other funding issues that stoked sectarian rivalry. Many Democrats and Republicans wanted to increase leverage on Iraqi decision-makers to seal agreements as a condition for any additional commitment of U.S. blood and treasure.

Calls to leverage greater responsibility from Iraq's government were partially heeded by President Bush. The announcement of the surge included mention of certain goals or "benchmarks" that the leadership would be expected to achieve under the umbrella of greater security created by the surge. In addition to oil revenue decisions, these included: reconstruction spending, provincial elections, reform of de-Baathification laws originally imposed by the Coalition Provisional Authority, and the institutionalization of an equitable process to amend Iraq's constitution.<sup>31</sup> Security, for the most part, would be the tacit fulcrum of political progress. However, the goals were not defined in terms of ways to measure specific progress or outcomes; nor were any timeframes or deadlines mentioned. In the absence of specifics or timelines, continued delays in meeting the goals generated increasing

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<sup>31</sup> A transcript of President Bush's January 10, 2007 speech was found during November, 2008 at: [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html)

frustration and criticism in Congress from members of both parties, placing the surge policy under greater political siege.<sup>32</sup>

Later, an absence of confidence in the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, to lead parliamentary reconciliation efforts became yet another controversy in the struggle between the President and Congress. In this case, concerns about the intentions and ability of Mr. Maliki were actually shared by the White House and Congressional opponents, but had the political effect of challenging the wisdom of committing more troops. A memo written by National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, and leaked to the media in November 2006, described a pattern of sectarian bias in the distribution of government services, dismissal of Sunni officials, and emergence of Shiite majorities in all government ministries.<sup>33</sup> Mr. al-Maliki was known to be dependent on the support of extremist-Shiite groups connected to the powerful Iranian-supported cleric Moutada al-Sadr, whose militias accounted for much of the instability in the southern provinces (which had suffered substantial defeat after attempting to make a stand against Coalition forces in Najaf the previous year).<sup>34</sup> In public statements, President Bush always expressed unqualified support for al-Maliki. But questions about his ability to bridge the sectarian divide raised concerns about Iraq's long-term integrity – let alone achieving the Bush Administration's objective of secular and democratic institutions -

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<sup>32</sup> Issues surrounding the benchmarks for Iraqi political progress, including reporting of criticisms and concerns by officials inside the Bush Administration, can be found in Richter, Paul, "Administration Foiled by its Own Iraq Benchmarks – Failure to Prod Baghdad into Action has Aided Foes in Congress and in the Field, Officials Say", *The Los Angeles Times*, July 12, 2007; p. A1; found at: <http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jul/12/nation/na-benchmarks12> Also, a summary by Beehner, Lionel, "Defining 'Benchmarks' in Iraq", Council on Foreign Relations background paper, at: [www.cfr.org/publication/13329/defining\\_benchmarks\\_in\\_iraq.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/13329/defining_benchmarks_in_iraq.html)

<sup>33</sup> Gordon, Michael R., "Bush Aide's Memo Doubts Iraqi Leader", *The New York Times*, November 29, 2006; retrieved at: [www.nytimes.com/2006/11/29/world/middleeast/29cnd-military.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/29/world/middleeast/29cnd-military.html) Also see Broder, Jonathan, "Reality Check", *CQ Weekly*, September 10, 2007; pp. 2615-2616.

<sup>34</sup> *ibid.*, Gordon, Michael R., "Bush Aide's Memo Doubts Iraqi Leader", *The New York Times*, November 29, 2006. Mr. al-Maliki's connection to Moutada al-Sadr's Jaish al-Mahdi militia is also mentioned in Broder, Jonathan, "Reality Check", *Congressional Quarterly Weekly*, September 10, 2007; p. 2615.

and perhaps heightened the sense that the surge was a gamble unless governing capacities and legitimacy improved.

***Comparison of the Surge with Iraq Study Group Recommendations***

At first glance, the President's troop augmentation plan resembled the ISG's allowance for the possibility of a "*short-term redeployment or surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad, or to speed up the training and equipping mission, if the U.S. commander in Iraq determines that such steps would be effective*" (p.50). The ISG had phrased their recommendation to imply an exchange of forces – advisors for combat units - or as a covering force to stabilize Baghdad for a simultaneous transition to an advisory and economic development mission. As described in the fourth ISG recommendation, in reference to accelerating the transition to an advisory role:

“As these actions proceed, we could begin to move combat forces out of Iraq.

The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations” (p.48).

The ISG had rejected the idea of maintaining a larger number of U.S. troops for an indefinite time; not only because of the scarcity of available forces, but also to avoid the semblance of a permanent occupation that might incite further security challenges (see Recommendation No.11 on page 50 in the ISG report).

However, the surge strategy differed from the ISG's vision in one important way: Despite the President's assertion that he had “made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders that America's commitment is not open-ended”, no timetable was given for ending the surge or progress by Iraq's government in meeting the benchmark expectations.

The surge strategy appeared to be a more open-ended “surge-and-stay” plan, rather than a “surge-and-redeploy” plan or beginning of a withdrawal that Democratic opponents and Republican skeptics of the war’s progress (and prospects for success) would have preferred. Secretary Gates however, testifying before the House Armed Services Committee the day after the surge announcement, hinted that the absence of deadlines did not mean an indefinite commitment when he stated: “American patience is limited, and obviously if the Iraqis fail to maintain their commitments we’ll have to revisit our strategy.” Later in the same hearing however, he more closely defended the Administration line by saying: “At the outset of the [surge] strategy, it’s a mistake to talk about an exit strategy.”<sup>35</sup>

The Administration had certain conditions that would have to be realized before contemplation of withdrawal. The ‘strategic objectives’ that the surge was to help accomplish included large nation-building assignments; as summarized in a National Security Council PowerPoint presentation dated January, 2007:

- 1.) ”Defeat al-Qaida and its supporters and ensure that no terrorist safe haven exists in Iraq.
- 2.) Support Iraqi efforts to quell sectarian violence in Baghdad and regain control over the capital.
- 3.) Ensure the territorial integrity of Iraq and counter/limit destructive Iranian and Syrian activity in Iraq.
- 4.) Help safeguard democracy in Iraq by encouraging strong democratic institutions impartially serving all Iraqis and preventing the return of the forces of tyranny.

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<sup>35</sup> Quoted by Raum, Tom, “Bush War Plan Draws Fire on Capitol Hill”, *Washington Post*, January 11, 2007.

- 5.) Foster the conditions for Iraqi national reconciliation, but with the Iraqi Government clearly in the lead.
- 6.) Continue to strengthen Iraqi Security Forces and accelerate the transition of security responsibility to the Iraqi Government.
- 7.) Encourage an expanding Iraqi economy, including by helping Iraq maintain and expand its export of oil to support Iraqi development.
- 8.) Promote support for Iraq from its neighbors, the region, and the international community.”<sup>36</sup>

These aspirations differed little from the original goal of changing the Baathist regime, except perhaps to emphasize that Iraq had become even more important as the central battlefield in the global war on terror. The Administration took seriously al Qaeda’s stated intention to found a “caliphate” in Iraq as the first step toward creating an expanding territorial sanctuary for radical Islam, and viewed the sectarian violence as a deliberate strategy for creating a failed state in which a new Islamic authority could emerge. Radicals from across the Muslim world and Europe also appeared to believe in al Qaeda’s goal, and flowed into Iraq to join the war.

Taken together, it can be argued that differences over the extent of real policy change played a large part in subsequent battles in Congress for control of Iraq War policy. The length of time it would take to achieve the President’s strategic goals, and precise point at which each goal would be considered fulfilled, were open and contentious questions. The absence of a timescale or deadlines for Iraqi government decisions suggests that the

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid., *Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review*, slide number 8, “Strategic Goals and Objectives”; at: [www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/iraq-strategy011007.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/iraq-strategy011007.pdf)

President's goal was to reduce forces only after a more thorough consolidation of Iraqi stability. The former head of the State Department's cell overseeing intelligence on Iraq, Wayne White, told the *Washington Post* in 2005 that "[in] order to get out earlier, expectations are going to have to be lower, even much lower. The higher your expectation, the longer you have to stay."<sup>37</sup>

The White House response to the elections was less a search for an exit strategy than it was for a new way to overcome the insurgency and sectarian conflict. The evolving balance between finding a pragmatic solution to the insurgency, and trying to salvage as much of the ideological agenda for liberal political and economic development as possible, is the central drama of Administration policy; and perhaps, the unspoken axial difference in voting decisions in Congress. The adaptation of select bipartisan recommendations for a change of policy into a more robust redoubling of efforts to transform Iraq appeared to defy rather than compromise, and may have raised political barriers higher. However, the sectarian divisions that made it difficult for Iraq's governing parties to reach early important agreements crucial to establishing the legitimacy of their authority made it all too clear that a liberal democratic vision of Iraq's future was not going to be self-generating after Saddam's removal. Any new Administration strategy had to face an enormous range of nation-building – and confidence-building - challenges; beginning with the absence of basic security at the street level. In that sense, simply as a practical matter, any continued effort to salvage policy or influence Iraq's development would inevitably have to involve increasing the number of troops.

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<sup>37</sup> *ibid.*, Wright and Knickmeyer, "U.S. Lowers Sights On What Can Be Achieved in Iraq", *Washington Post*, August 14, 2005.

### *Early Congressional Reactions to the Surge Strategy*

Even before the surge strategy was announced by President Bush, Congressional opinion leaders on both sides of the aisle began to weigh-in on outlines of the strategy that had been briefed (and leaked) beforehand. The newly seated House Speaker, Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-CA.), and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV), expressed distrust and skepticism about the plan in broadcast interviews. Speaker Pelosi said: “If the President wants to add to this mission, he is going to have to justify it.” Intriguingly, she went on to say: “If the President chooses to escalate the war, in his budget request we want to see a distinction between what is there to support the troops who are there now.”<sup>38</sup> On the surface, and in tone, these statements might have implied unqualified opposition to the surge strategy; but in essence, they merely called for further justification of the mission, and clarification of budget requirements. The statements were not an outright rejection of the proposal.

A day later, Senator Edward Kennedy was quoted in the *New York Times* as saying that prohibition of money for a troop buildup was “under discussion”.<sup>39</sup> The term “discussion” was likely a careful way of indicating that debate was underway among Senate Democrats, further implying a potential openness to the idea of increasing troop levels to address the evolving chaos in Iraq. By mid-January, journalists had already detected a split in the Democratic Party; between those merely willing to remain rhetorically in opposition, versus those seeking to pass spending limits or other legislative measures to limit the President’s discretion.<sup>40</sup> On January 17<sup>th</sup>, only a week after the surge announcement, Senator

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<sup>38</sup> Both of Speaker Pelosi’s quotes are taken from Gordon, Michael R. and Jeff Zeleny, “Latest Plan Sets a Series of Goals for Iraq Leaders”, *The New York Times*, January 8, 2007.

<sup>39</sup> Loven, Jennifer, “Senator: Bush Plans Iraq Troop Surge”, *The New York Times*, January 9, 2007.

<sup>40</sup> See Branigin, William and Howard Schneider, “Dodd Introduces Bill to Cap U.S. Troops in Iraq”, *The Washington Post*, January 17, 2007; p. A1.

Christopher Dodd (D-CT.) introduced the first bill to cap funding on forces already deployed in Iraq. “Other than expressing opposition,” Dodd said, “I felt we should do something more.”<sup>41</sup>

During the same week, Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D-DE.), Democratic Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had expressed skepticism that Congress could substantively block the President’s strategy. When speaking of exercising congressional power over the war budget, he said: “You can’t go in like a Tinkertoy and play around and say you [the President] can’t spend the money on this piece and this piece. He’ll be able to keep the troops there forever, constitutionally, if he wants to. As a practical matter, there is no way to say, ‘Mr. President, stop.’”<sup>42</sup> Biden was clarifying a central reality of congressional authority, and offering a partial answer to the basic question of the ability of Congress to exercise control of war policy: the power of the budget is a difficult instrument to wield with precision in managing or micro-managing the conduct of foreign policy. But was Senator Biden also suggesting a degree of Democratic acquiescence to the surge plan? And was he also perhaps laying a basis beforehand for defending the inability of Democratic lawmakers to end the war, given the slim Democratic majority margins and structure of preferences in both chambers?

Positions were also being established on the Republican side of the aisle prior to announcement of the surge. Senator John E. Sununu (R-N.H.) recounted that at a January 8<sup>th</sup> White House meeting with Republicans, in response to a question as to how the additional forces proposed for the surge “would be more likely to succeed than previous troop

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<sup>41</sup> *ibid.*, Branigin and Schneider, *The Washington Post*, January 17, 2007.

<sup>42</sup> *ibid.*, Gordon and Zeleny, *The New York Times*. January 8, 2007.

increases”, the President and National Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley replied that the surge would be accompanied by “specific goals, different rules of engagement, and different expectations for cooperation with the Iraqi government.”<sup>43</sup> Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) came out of that same briefing to say the President had offered no details about expectations of the Iraqi government, or numbers of troops that both the U.S. would send and that the Iraq government would make available.<sup>44</sup> Mentioning these basic details may have been a tacit signal that both Republicans and Democrats would be weighing the advantages of the surge proposal in detail. Other “leading Republicans” were reported to have said that “sending more troops would overly strain the armed forces without assurances of success.”<sup>45</sup> Even those Republicans who had been consistent advocates of increasing the force size; especially John McCain (R-AZ), who had been critical of force planning from the moment Iraqis began widespread looting shortly after the invasion, expressed concern about the Iraqi side of the strategy and the availability of U.S. troops; but told reporters, “I think we can succeed.” Senator Gordon Smith (R-OR.) reported that the President and Mr. Hadley had emphasized that the surge plan responded to a request from Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki several weeks prior. Each of the three Republicans faced difficult reelection bids in 2008. All of these statements could be viewed as placing a cautious spin on the private skepticism they held about the surge plan – and which the Administration feared was shared by many Hill Republicans.

Members on both sides of the aisle wanted the benchmarks mentioned by President Bush in his January 10<sup>th</sup> surge announcement made into a formal reporting requirement; not

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<sup>43</sup> *ibid.*, Gordon and Zeleny, January 8, 2007.

<sup>44</sup> *ibid.*, Loven, *The New York Times*, January 9, 2007.

<sup>45</sup> *ibid.*, Loven, January 9, 2007.

only to hold Iraq's government responsible, but also as a way to hold the U.S. commitment to concrete measures of progress. The Administration initially opposed setting formal requirements in order to preserve the President's discretion.<sup>46</sup> However, eighteen benchmarks became an Executive reporting requirement under section 1314 (b)(2)(A) of Public Law 110-28; the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007 that passed as H.R. 2206 on May 24<sup>th</sup> and signed by President Bush the next day. The President's subsequent report rated progress on ten of the eighteen benchmarks "satisfactory" by the date that the report was submitted on July 12<sup>th</sup>.<sup>47</sup>

The day after the President's announcement of the surge, public position-taking began in earnest, and the reaction of Republicans was closely watched. The most critical statement came from Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE.), who told Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "I think [the] speech given last night by this president represents the most dangerous foreign policy blunder in this country since Vietnam, if it's carried out."<sup>48</sup>

### ***Additional Basic Questions***

This thesis is about the relative contributions of partisanship and ideology in Congressional voting decisions on the war. If strong ideological preferences determined voting decisions, then how were those preferences weighed against party loyalty? Conversely, if party loyalty was determinant as the stronger voting pattern, then how was

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<sup>46</sup>ibid., Richter, Paul, "Administration Foiled by its Own Benchmarks – Failure to Prod Baghdad into Action has aided foes in Congress and in the Field, Officials Say", *Los Angeles Times*, July 12, 2007.

<sup>47</sup> The President's July 12, 2007 report to Congress on progress by Iraq's government toward meeting 18 benchmarks specified under Public Law 110-28 was found during December, 2008 at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070712.html>

<sup>48</sup> Quoted in Raum, Tom, "Bush Plan Draws Fire on Capitol Hill", *The New York Times*, January 11, 2007

ideology connected to party-loyalty? As yet a third dimension - what role did electorate preferences have? The answers to these questions might be deduced or inferred from the ways scholars theorize the role of party influence and ideology in legislative decision-making, discussed in the next chapter. But theorizing would be richer and perhaps more valid in the context of the particular policy questions being decided.

For members of both parties, essential realities of the war certainly must have influenced beliefs about what was practically achievable for U.S. efforts in Iraq. To what extent were there shared understandings of the objective circumstances and available policy options? Members of both political parties viewed the same media footage of mayhem in Iraq, heard the same presentations by empanelled experts and warfighters, but arrived at quite different voting decisions.

The signal feature of the Iraq War by the end of 2006 and into early 2007 was that it appeared to virtually all observers as “beyond strategy”.<sup>49</sup> Few professional analysts were willing or able to confidently predict positive outcomes resulting from any change in strategy. Both of the general policy options – stay, or withdraw – held potentially terrible consequences, and included considerations at odds with distinctive sets of American values. In times of uncertainty, reliance on ideological values increases and becomes more influential in structuring perceptions. The way that both American parties had become more closely associated with particular belief systems may explain the strength of partisan voting as a link to ideological convictions.

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<sup>49</sup> *ibid.*, Broder, “Reality Check”, *CQ Weekly*, September 10, 2007. The phrase “beyond strategy” is borrowed from Broder’s use of the term on page 2610 of the article.

But what was the most fundamental “issue space” or dimension of policy difference between the parties? And did it arise from electoral demands, or pre-existing ideology beliefs about the war?

It is instructive to summarize the ways in which the viewpoints of the President and his domestic political opponents differed and converged (or overlapped) on war policy. Very substantial differences existed; but just enough overlap in agreement on the conditions in Iraq, and consequences of abrupt departure existed to permit continued Republican partisan support of the policy, and also Democratic reluctance to support measures completely shutting-down military efforts. Elements of Administration war policy contested by Congressional opponents and moderate skeptics include:

- 1.) The strategic wisdom of invading Iraq (and the doctrine of preemptive war and regime change generally); regardless of Iraq’s connection to terrorism;
- 2.) Susceptibility of the Iraqi insurgency and sectarian conflict to a military solution; thus the wisdom of surging additional troops;
- 3.) The long-term prospects for development of liberal democratic and capitalist institutions in Iraq.

Issues where the views of the President and war opponents converged – especially after the 2006 elections - include:

- 1.) The need to change or adapt strategy as strife spiraled out of control;
- 2.) The need to hold the Iraq government accountable for political progress and consolidation of legitimate authority;
- 3.) Doubts about the intentions and ability of Prime Minister al-Maliki’s government to broker political progress.

Until the 2006 elections, the Bush Administration's unwillingness to concede the development of military and political difficulties, and unilateral tone, especially on the part of senior war policy advocates (especially Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld) did not succeed as an adroit *political strategy* in minimizing opposition to war policy. Did the quality of the Administration's political practice influence or even harden subsequent attitudes and voting outcomes in Congress? It would be surprising if this were not the case. Profound differences over the strategic importance of changing Iraq's regime in the first place was already a significant political problem for the President and the Republican party as conditions worsened in Iraq. The reluctance and delay in publically acknowledging problems or adjusting policy/strategy, or in explaining policy dilemmas and possible solutions more frankly, as well as the delay in taking a stronger and more specific (public) stand on expectations for Iraq's government, eroded the President's political capital - even among members of his own party. It is hard not to conclude that while Presidential prerogative is essential for executive effectiveness, it appears to make a poor justification for foreign policy on its own, and is probably better guarded in any event by the cultivation of broader political support.

Michael Hunt (1987), characterizing the role of the American electorate's interest and influence in U.S. foreign policy-making, and given polling evidence of substantial gaps in electorate knowledge and understanding of foreign policy issues, concluded that:

“. . . an intolerance of ambiguous policy, an impatience with complicated, long-term solutions to difficult policy problems, and deep divisions over how to handle major commitments that run into serious, unexpected difficulties.”

Precisely because of these traits and the suspicion that many Americans are at heart isolationist, policymakers have been reluctant to make the public a genuine partner in policymaking, or to risk open and vigorous debate. . . . Policymakers have instead preferred to exploit the tendency of the electorate to take at face value official estimates of the world scene and to withhold information likely to excite popular isolationism or diminish the likelihood of getting the national resources essential to realizing their vision of national security.”<sup>50</sup>

Twenty years later, this argument might fit the public debate and behavior of a triangular relationship between the electorate, Congress and the President in the struggle for control of Iraq War policy.

By the end of 2008, at the conclusion of the 110<sup>th</sup> Congress, we can now begin to cautiously see that a combination of several factors in addition to the surge strategy have substantially improved Iraq’s security and stability. Junior officers on their own initiative approached tribal leaders and other population elements to win greater confidence, and built alliances with Sunni tribesmen against foreign al-Qaeda cells.<sup>51</sup> Allusions have been made to the role of new technologies and methods of intelligence that substantially improved capacities for monitoring and locating insurgent networks.<sup>52</sup> Perhaps, simply, the adaptation of the Iraqi population to the daily presence of American soldiers reduced cultural alienation to a level that gradually made it easier for U.S. forces to work with local communities. More pessimistic observers believe that the reduced levels of conflict are merely the end result of

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<sup>50</sup> Hunt, Michael H. 1987. *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*. New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press; p.180.

<sup>51</sup> Jaffe, Greg, “How Courting Sheiks Slowed Violence in Iraq”, *The Wall Street Journal*, Vol. CCL, No. 32, August 8, 2007; p. 1.

<sup>52</sup> *ibid.*, Woodward: 2008.

population displacements wrought by the earlier sectarian and ethnic “cleansing”. Other patterns of influence, and negotiations of consequence, await future revelation to explain the full historical unfolding; but the surge policy, and reorientation of approaches to the conduct of the war, appears to have succeeded in changing the security situation. Ultimately, as described below, Congressional efforts to impose deadlines for withdrawal, or inhibit White House war powers, dropped-off as evidence of increasing security became apparent to Congressional delegations visiting Iraq.

None of these subsequent impacts were visible as the 110<sup>th</sup> Congress began to generate war policy legislation in January, 2007.

## Chapter 2 – Parties and Ideology

This chapter will explain how Congress generally involves itself in the making of foreign policy, and describe how political parties and ideologies of international order are theorized in Congressional research.<sup>53</sup> The central argument is that Congressional activism in foreign policy parallels historical changes in the ideological consistency of the political parties, which according to most theories of party influence, pursue certain strategies for increasing their share of institutional power. The parties, defined as “organized groups who pursue their goals by contesting elections and perhaps controlling political offices,” compete for positions of institutional power from which to exert greater (if not always dominant) influence over policy.<sup>54</sup> Sometimes, assumptions about international policy are shared across the aisle, but increasingly they define party differences.<sup>55</sup> Party identity has become almost synonymous with certain foreign policy doctrines since the Vietnam War, largely due to changes in the American electorate. This melding has substantive implications for institutional power and the way international issues are debated and decided in Congress - and between branches of government. The objective of this chapter is to explain the links between activism, ideology, and partisanship that would account for voting on Iraq War legislation.

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<sup>53</sup> The term “international order” that I refer to as the ideological subject does not mean a particular arrangement; but rather a “pattern of activities or set of arrangements that characterize the mutual behavior of states . . . which provide method and regularity to international relations”; as defined in Evans, Graham and Jeffery Newnham. 1998. *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*. London and New York: Penguin Books, Ltd.; p. 269.

<sup>54</sup> This definition of parties is quoted from: McCormick, James M. 1998. *American Foreign Policy & Process*, Third Edition. Itasca, IL: F. E. Peacock Publishers, Inc.; p. 472, who in turn cites: Sorauf, Frank J. 1984. *Party Politics in America*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company; pp. 6-28.

<sup>55</sup> *ibid.*, McCormick, 1998:477-478. The ‘across’ and ‘along’ geometry of ideological differences between the political parties guides the discussion of changing bipartisanship since World War II in the opening pages of Chapter 11.

The question this project explores is the gap between Congressional actions to end or reduce U.S. involvement in Iraq during 2007, and the failure to enact measures to do so. Explaining this gap necessarily begins with describing how Congress decides foreign policy issues and why efforts to assert its prerogatives in that sphere have varied over time. The level of attention and activity devoted to foreign affairs by Congress is governed far less by any limits of formal (Constitutional) authority than by several political considerations proposed by James M. Lindsay (1994, 2004).<sup>56</sup> Congressional activism will be linked in a second section to changes in the electorate and certain institutional reforms in Congress that have polarized the parties and raised the stakes for partisan competition over the past four decades (Davidson, 1992; Deibel, 2007; Jacobson, 2002). The subject of electoral changes will blend into a third section that reports on how parties and ideology have been theorized. Theories of party influence – including those that minimize the role of parties - are important for how they propose political authority flows through and shapes the institution. The significance of the content of the various ideological orientations within the (realigned) Democratic and Republican parties for foreign policy voting will also be discussed in the third section. A fourth and final section will hopefully summarize a nearly seamless account of how historical variance in Congressional foreign policy engagement is connected to changes in the American electorate - and the parties they belong to - that might be used to explain Iraq War voting during 2007.

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<sup>56</sup> James M. Lindsay, "Congress and the Politics of American Foreign Policy", in Wittkopf Eugene and James M. McCormick, (Eds.). 2004. *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*. Lanham, MD. and Oxford, U.K.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.; pp. 183-195. Also, Lindsay, James M. 1994. *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy*. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press.

### ***I - The Role of Congress in Foreign Policy-Making***

The role of Congress in U.S. foreign policy is potentially as broad as the political imagination of its membership, and ranges far beyond the powers specified in the Constitution. James M. Lindsay (2004) divides the subject into two distinct “realms” (or sets) of issues and arguments. The “legal” realm concerns the balance of powers that essentially stem from the core issue of “which branch should prevail as a matter of principle when their powers conflict.”<sup>57</sup> The other realm concerns the politics of decision-making that mirror informal patterns of institutional authority which account for alternating periods of assertiveness and deference to Presidential initiative. Questions surrounding this latter dimension are often about *why* Congress may have acted in a particular way on a given policy issue.

#### ***The “Legal” (Constitutional) Realm***

The issue of whether Congress has adequate authority to influence foreign policy can be laid to rest at the outset. Lindsay reminds us that the Constitution actually confers a greater variety of specified powers to Congress than the President; the latter serving as ‘Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy’ (Article 2, Section 2); makes treaties and appoints ambassadors (subject to Senate approval) ; who “shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers” (Section 2, Article 3). “Other than these clauses”, Lindsay observes, “the Constitution stands silent on the question of the President’s authority in foreign affairs.”

For Congress: Article I, Section 8 stipulates the power “to provide for the common Defence”; to regulate Commerce with foreign nations”; to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas”; to declare war”; to raise and support Armies”, to

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<sup>57</sup> *ibid.*, Lindsay, 2004: 185.

provide and maintain a Navy”; and “to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” The Senate is required to provide advice and consent to treaties and ambassadorial appointments under Article 2, Section 2. Each of these mandates cover broad policy sectors, especially the “making of Rules for Government” clause which comprises procedural legislation, discussed further below.

Beyond these specified powers, “[determining which] branch of government has the power to make peace, to abrogate treaties, or to extend recognition to other states are all questions that cannot be answered by reading the text of the Constitution” (p.13). Virtually all other powers and practices have been institutionalized by two centuries of practice and legal precedent, and are built on inferred intent and assertions rather than literal readings. Lindsay believes that “even if the Constitution dealt with foreign policy in greater depth, we still would not know exactly how foreign policy powers are divided between the president and Congress.”

Democrats and Republicans employed nearly the full range of legislative and non-legislative instruments to oppose and support the war effort during 2007. In addition to the few powers that specifically refer to international relations, the most important lever for Congressional foreign policy involvement is Article I, Section 9 that states “No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” The Founders drew many lessons from British political history. Perhaps the foremost of these, in the words of George Mason at the 1787 Philadelphia convention, is that the “purse & the sword ought never to get into the same hands – whether Legislative or Executive.”<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> *ibid.*, Fisher: 1997: 221. Fisher quotes Max Farrand’s *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, Volume 1, pp. 139-40.

Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 69 that the American President was far less threatening than the King of England, because the King could both declare war and raise and regulate armies and fleets. Likewise, James Madison wrote: “Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded.”<sup>59</sup> Madison also wrote in Federalist 68 that:

“. . . the power of the purse is “the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.”

The use of funding authority comprises several approaches. As James McCormick observes, “the elimination of funds for foreign policy actions that it oppos[es]” is the “blunt instrument” Congress uses to influence policy. When roll call votes on bills specifically written to change policy do not succeed, reductions or outright elimination of funding in appropriation bills for policy programs might have the effect desired by policy opponents. Lindsay has observed that “the most popular congressional instrument for influencing the substance of foreign policy is the appropriations power . . . The popularity of authorizations and appropriations bills is due in part to the fact that dollars often are policy.”<sup>60</sup>

Influence can be finely calibrated by the conditions set on how appropriations are to be spent. This offers enormous leverage for satisfying legislative preferences that range from the ability to extract more information about programs by mandating reporting requirements, to reductions or restrictions that slow (or effectively prevent) achievement of program

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<sup>59</sup> *ibid.*, 1997: 221. Fisher quotes from Hunt, Gaillard. 1910. *The Writings of James Madison*, Volume 5: 148.

<sup>60</sup> *ibid.*, Lindsay, 1994:86.

objectives. The Boland Amendments to defense appropriation bills and continuing resolutions passed during 1982-1986 were some of the most formidable obstacles to Executive independence in recent history by imposing militarily-significant restrictions on the use of aid, and ultimately cutting-off funding for the Reagan Administration's controversial support of insurgencies against pro-Soviet regimes in Central America. Congress has also succeeded in injecting particular values into U.S. policy, such as human rights reporting requirements in arms control legislation, or as conditions for trade agreements with other nations.

The earmarking of funds for specific purposes is another way Congress is able to pursue its policy objectives. Earmarking is simply the designation of funds for particular programs, which for foreign policy have traditionally included development aid and arms transfers; allocating funding independent of either existing programs or bills sent over from the other chamber or the White House.

Oversight of executive branch activity is the other major dimension of Congressional power in foreign policy. Oversight consists of the review and monitoring of government action through reports that are specifically mandated in legislation.<sup>61</sup> Three types of reports are usually required: *periodic* or *recurring*; *notifications*; and *one-time* reports.<sup>62</sup> The *periodic/recurring* reports typically require the President or government agencies to report certain kinds of information, such as changes in human rights conditions, or progress toward certain policy goals, that have transpired over the reporting interval. *Notifications* are the most frequent type of report submitted, and are especially important as a requirement – in

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<sup>61</sup> *ibid.*, McCormick, 1998: 346

<sup>62</sup> *ibid.*, 1998: 347

both juridical and political terms – to military action. Notification of military commitments abroad are a centerpiece of the 1973 War Powers Act that signified a new era of Congressional foreign policy activism in response to the Vietnam war and strong assertions of Executive prerogative during the Nixon Administration. Importantly, notifications can serve as either tacit assertions of will, or applications for Congressional approval. George W. Bush notified Congress of his intention to change the regime of Saddam Hussein as both an assertion of Executive prerogative, and to legitimize the intended action by complying with Congressional expectations and requirements to be informed. Finally, *one-time* reporting requirements are usually mandated to clarify policy, or to analyze or answer particular questions about an issue area.

Oversight also involves direct questioning of government officials, including military officers, and other witnesses in hearings before a variety of committees. Both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and House Foreign Affairs (formerly, International Relations) Committee, were the leading centers of Congressional foreign policy-making in their respective chamber. Over the past quarter century however, their prominence has receded as U.S. international involvement has diversified, and their role has changed in response to the changing quality and activism of leadership, diversification of U.S. international involvement, and resulting competition from other committees with widening jurisdiction over international economic and special interest involvement.

Lindsay summarizes implications for Congressional foreign policy influence by proposing that Congressional involvement in foreign affairs differs in three categories of policy: *crisis policy*, *strategic policy*, and *structural policy*. International *crises* that are perceived as an immediate threat to national interests attract the greatest attention, but are the

least susceptible to decision-making by Congress. In crisis situations, Executive capacities to react in a timely way mean that “. . . practical, normative and electoral concerns generally leave Congress little choice but to follow the President’s lead.”<sup>63</sup> *Strategic* policy on the other hand is where broader national interests are connected to foreign policy goals and approaches. Far more issues are at stake in the development of international strategy than the Executive can claim exclusive authority over, which offers Congress a broad and creative role in deciding fundamental diplomatic, economic, and military issues. Finally, Lindsay defines *structural* policy as “govern[ing] how American resources will be used to achieve foreign policy goals.” Structural policies include the distribution of resources and creation of legal guidelines to meet particular international goals, such as foreign aid spending, military force structure funding, and immigration and trade laws. Structural policy could perhaps be thought of as a subset of strategic policy, since the structure of U.S. resource allocations and laws arguably is a reflection of U.S. international strategy.

Iraq War policy would fit into all three categories. Iraq had become an immediate *crisis* as the sectarian violence rapidly spread; it was a *strategic* issue in terms of the deterioration of the U.S. political and diplomatic standing in the world; and it had become a *structural* crisis in terms of its implications for military and reconstruction costs. Lindsay’s typology of foreign policy issue areas persuasively summarizes how Congressional power can be applied, but politics still determine the extent of Congressional participation.

### ***The Political Realm of Congressional Foreign Policy***

The politics of foreign policy-making in Congress occur as electoral calculations, ideology, and party competition shape efforts to gain influence or control over U.S.

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<sup>63</sup> *ibid.*, Lindsay, 1994: 147.

international affairs. The varying extent to which Congress actively tries to influence policy is the focal *political* issue of Congressional foreign policy-making. The basic question is: What determines the level of effort, or activism, to influence foreign policy?

Legislative decisions on any given issue are usually analyzed in the broadest term as a tension between electoral (reelection) considerations and the personal beliefs of lawmakers.<sup>64</sup> Though constituent and lawmaker preferences are not always mutually exclusive, and sometimes overlap, they form both ends of a motivational continuum in the logic of democratic representation. The politics of foreign policy decisions in Congress likewise stem from – though are not necessarily determined by – variations on this elemental tension between electoral constraint and lawmaker preferences.

Traditional understandings of electoral influence in foreign policy start from the fact that public interest and knowledge of international affairs is limited. This has had two implications for officeholders: 1.) Low constituent interest and inattention offers limited electoral incentives for involvement in foreign policy issues; and 2.) public inattention opens greater leeway for voting discretion. The reverse is *almost* true when public concern about an issue is high: Congressmen have incentives to become more involved and gain useful recognition by holding hearings, taking newsworthy positions, and prioritizing votes on relevant legislation; but electoral preferences may also proscribe voting discretion when a member's personal views differ from large or important segments of their constituency. Exceptions to this pattern can occur, during periods when international events hold little

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<sup>64</sup> *ibid.*, Lindsay, 1994: 48.

concern for the public at large, if members of Congress find and actively promote issues of narrow interest to a significant district or state constituency.<sup>65</sup>

Party interests and institutional leadership positions offer incentives that sometimes conflict with constituent preferences. Former House Minority Leader Robert Michel (R-IL.) has said: “There are some issues that I’d like to represent the people back home on, but that’s not the will of my conference. If I [vote constituent preferences] too many times, the conference will accuse me of being too parochial.”<sup>66</sup> Leadership roles demand cultivation of a broader view than constituent opinion. Because lawmakers cannot be experts on everything, they look to leadership for voting cues.<sup>67</sup>

Congressional assertiveness has also varied with the role accorded Presidential leadership in response to international conditions. Observers of American governance as early as Alexis de Tocqueville connected Congressional activism to the absence of external peril, drawing on their familiarity with the ancient pattern of concentrated politico-military authority in the sovereign or executive rule of Eurasian empires and states bordered by historical adversaries.<sup>68</sup> The public and Congress traditionally look to the President for leadership during times of crisis or threat, and Congressional activism has often been

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<sup>65</sup> *ibid.*, Lindsay, 1994: 41. Lindsay cites the example of Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-N.Y.) who succeeded in accruing both a profile as a foreign policy opinion leader, and an enormous campaign war chest, through his focus on the Marcos regime in the Philippines during the 1980’s.

<sup>66</sup> A May 25, 1995 interview with former Rep. Michel quoted by Uslander, Eric M. 1999. *The Movers and the Shirkers: Representatives and Ideologues in the Senate*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press; p. 142.

<sup>67</sup> *ibid.*, Uslander, 1999: 142. Uslander refers to Matthews, Donald R. and James A Stimson. 1975. *Yeas and Nays*. New York: John Wiley.

<sup>68</sup> *ibid.*, Lindsay, 2004: 186. A quote from de Tocqueville is cited, making the comparative historical analogy between Congressional assertiveness in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup>-century and European traditions; that I reproduce here from a different source: “If Executive power is less strong in America than in France, one must attribute the cause of it perhaps more to circumstances than laws. . . . If the life of the Union were constantly threatened, if it’s great interests were mixed every day with those of other powerful peoples, one would see the executive power grow larger in opinion, through what one would expect of it and what it would execute.”, in Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*. (Mansfield, Harvey C. and Delba Winthrop, (Eds.). 2000b. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press; p. 118.)

observed to increase when the perceived risk to the nation is minimal. When the perception of threat is high, Congress is more deferential to Presidential leadership, but confidence in White House leadership also must be sustained. The erosion of confidence in President Bush's decision-making leading up to the 2006 elections, and the election results, support Lindsay's contention that "[w]hen Americans believe they face few external threats – or think that international engagement could itself produce a threat – they see less merit in deferring to the White House on foreign policy and more merit in Congressional activism."<sup>69</sup> In this sense, the vigorous challenges to White House control of Iraq War policy following the 2006 elections may have reflected beliefs that the conflict did not sufficiently threaten U.S. national security. The same may have occurred during the Vietnam War when the contention that continued involvement was necessary to staunch the threat of Communist expansion through a regional "domino effect" lost credibility with the public.

Several implications for Congressional behavior follow from the 'threat perception' model. Throughout the Cold War, Presidents could argue that blocking their initiatives risked being interpreted as weakness by the Soviets.<sup>70</sup> After the Cold War, in the absence of a clear external threat, there were few if any political risks in challenging White House policy. And while the presence of an external threat often focuses public attention on foreign policy, in the absence of peril lawmakers become more interested in how single-issue causes will bolster re-election support, especially in districts with ethnic populations that champion a particular political issue in their country of origin. In catering to narrow interests, Congressional actions sometimes conflict with more stable, longer term strategic policies.

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<sup>69</sup> *ibid.*, 2004: 186.

<sup>70</sup> *ibid.*, Lindsay, 2004: p. 188.

The role attributed to electoral influence can be overstated. Lindsay (1994: 38-44) points out that ascribing too much credit to electoral factors does not account for the many instances when Congressional foreign policy decisions differ from public sentiment or interest group lobbying, nor does it account for the substantial increase in activity on international policy since the 1960's. Members of Congress are not simply slaves of constituent opinion. Public opinion, Lindsay contends, acts more as a constraint than a guide to voting behavior, and lawmakers do possess their own views of the national interest and good public policy that they seek to enact or lend their support to (1994: 42-44). Finally, the increasing extent of Congressional foreign policy involvement in recent decades partially reflects the broader variety of global issues (mostly economic and trade) that intersect with domestic interests, which committee and subcommittees jurisdictions have scrambled to subsume since the institutional reforms of Congress in the 1970's.<sup>71</sup>

## ***II. – Ideological Sources of Partisan Foreign Policy***

Power and interest are often regarded as the primary determinants of political affairs, especially in international relations. The role of ideas in statecraft is less easy to describe and measure, and harder to operationalize, in empirical research. But ideas - especially bundled together with beliefs and values as an *ideology* - do have an impact in world politics. As Terry Deibel (2007) observes, “[what] other cause than the impact of television could lie behind the U.S. decision to intervene with force in 1992 to feed starving people in Somalia, a country without the slightest weight in the global balance of power?”<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> *ibid.*, McCormick, 1998: 352.

<sup>72</sup> Deibel, Terry L. 2007. *Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press; p. 71.

There is no single definition or meaning of the term ‘*ideology*’.<sup>73</sup> A recent dictionary entry describes ideology as “a body of ideas reflecting the social needs and aspirations of an individual, group, class, or culture.”<sup>74</sup> This suggests that ideology fulfills two roles. The phrase “body of ideas” in the first part of the definition connotes some form of ordering, association, or interrelatedness; and indicates that ideology has a schematic function in structuring interpretation. The “needs and aspirations” half of the definition refers to a more political role, and ideology is most frequently studied for the way(s) it legitimates social or political power. “To study ideology”, contends John B. Thompson, “is to study the ways in which meaning (or signification) serves to sustain relations of domination.”<sup>75</sup> Even by the most neutral or synthesized definition, ideologies of foreign policy would not only guide perception of international events, but also justify policy approaches. Additionally, to paraphrase David Easton’s definition of politics (as the “authoritative allocation of values”), any ideology is inherently political in representing a precept of proper order or allocation that is authoritative to the person(s) holding the ideology.<sup>76</sup> Ideological assumptions can be rooted in profound beliefs that are difficult for adherents to compromise – and hard fought in efforts to prevail.

### ***Traditional American Attitudes***

Contemporary American foreign policy ideologies are rooted in assumptions as old as the Republic itself. Public attitudes toward international affairs have been shaped perhaps

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<sup>73</sup> Terry Eagleton (2007) has identified sixteen definitions of the term in his book, *Ideology: An Introduction*. London and New York: Verso; 1-2.

<sup>74</sup> Webster’s II New College Dictionary. Houghton Mifflin Company (city and date of publication not given).

<sup>75</sup> Thompson, John B. 1984. *Studies in the Theory of Ideology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 4. Cited in Eagleton (ibid.), 2007: 5.

<sup>76</sup> Easton, David. 1953. *The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

most fundamentally, as Deibel observes, by “an act of willful separation from the old world”; and Americans “see their nation as separate, different, superior, exempt from the usual laws of rise and decline, and destined to lead world progress.”<sup>77</sup> Perhaps the most important consequence of this “exceptionalism” has been a unique idealism about the possibilities of historical progress through international engagement, especially since the end of World War Two. But idealism also competes with the other side of exceptionalism: a wariness of physical and political vulnerability to the things America defines itself against. Isolationism, imbued with a dose of traditional European realism (*realpolitik*), was quintessentially expressed in George Washington’s farewell warning to avoid entangling alliances that would draw the United States into the ancient rivalries of Europe (or in other parts of the world).

The enduring strain between idealism and realism in American attitudes and policy-making is manifest at a more systematic level as a rivalry between isolationist and internationalist ideologies. These, in turn, have become sub-divided into increasingly distinctive and policy-relevant viewpoints and assumptions. The present iterations of isolationism and internationalism are the product of the three largest post-World War involvements: the Cold War, Vietnam, and 9/11. The way these general foreign policy orientations have become closely associated with party identity through realignment of the American electorate is a key factor in explaining Iraq War voting during 2007.

*Liberal internationalism* became the predominant outlook of the U.S. foreign policy elite that experienced the Great Depression, World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. The first generation of liberal internationalists, according to Joshua W. Busby and Jonathon Monten (2008), drawing lessons from America’s return to isolation after World

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<sup>77</sup> *ibid.* Deibel, 2007: 84.

War I and the rise of fascism and closure of world trade, “committed to remaining engaged in international affairs and exercising U.S. power where necessary to defend global order, coupled with a commitment to use multilateral means to defend America’s interests.”<sup>78</sup> The global order they sought was pursued with “an unprecedented array of international commitments . . . oriented around binding, rule-based international institutions, democratic governments and an open and nondiscriminatory economic system.”<sup>79</sup> The first cohort of liberal internationalists recognized a historically-unique opportunity to pair the new global capacities of U.S. military and economic power with a cooperative, multilateral approach to international issues, to contain Soviet expansionism, and prevent the emergence of the kinds of imbalances that led to both World Wars.<sup>80</sup> This was the ideological underpinning of the idealized “textbook” Congress that Presidents and lawmakers often wax nostalgic (or politically appeal) for; a condition of broad consensus on the character of the international environment shared by liberals and conservatives in both parties, with high(er) levels of bipartisan voting that appeared to be the norm during the first two decades of the Cold War when political differences “stopped at the water’s edge.”

Until the Vietnam War, the anti-communist and containment policies of the liberal internationalist consensus were approved by nearly three-quarters of the general public. More fundamentally, public support rested on high levels of basic trust in government which lasted

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<sup>78</sup> Busby, Joshua W. and Jonathan Monten, “Without Heirs? Assessing the Decline of Establishment Internationalism in U.S. Foreign Policy”, *Perspectives on Politics*, Volume 6, Number 3, September, 2008; pp. 451-472. This quotes the central definition of “establishment internationalism” that the authors operationalize for their query as to its decline as an animating view among current U.S. policy-makers.

<sup>79</sup> *ibid.*, Busby and Monten, 2008: 451.

<sup>80</sup> See also Kupchan, Charles and Peter Trubowitz, “Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal Internationalism in America”, *International Security*, Volume 32, Number 2, 2007; pp. 7-44. Kupchan and Trubowitz use the terms “power projection and cooperation” to summarize liberal internationalism; as cited by Busby and Monten (2008: 453).

into the early 1960's. The paradoxes of insurgency in Vietnam however, undercut the efficacy of U.S. power advantages. Increasing quantities of military, economic and political inputs could no longer be convincingly related to the limited strategic goals of either defending and legitimizing the South Vietnamese government, or discouraging North Vietnam from trying to achieve unification. North Vietnam's communist regime could neither be contained nor changed without bringing the U.S. into direct confrontation with the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China.

The more measures of raw power that the United States applied, the less political effect – and indeed the more political damage – it seemed to purchase. Presidents Johnson and Nixon were caught between the specter of South Vietnamese collapse or continued stalemate, but in the view of war opponents they were complicit in perpetuating unnecessary bloodshed in the service of an increasingly questionable containment rationale. Fewer believed that leaving Vietnam would result in a regional “domino” effect that could necessarily increase the risk to U.S. security. As the duration, cost, and casualties of the war increased with little tangible progress, political and military leaders confronted declining public confidence and political support. As Deibel reports, trust in government fell from nearly 80% in the early 1960's to around 25% by the late 1970's, especially after the Watergate scandal of the Nixon Administration.<sup>81</sup> Indeed, Watergate was a symptom of the rupture in trust between national leadership and the public over Vietnam policy that in President Nixon's distorted view, justified resort to illegal methods to defend against anti-war subversion.

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<sup>81</sup> *ibid.* Deibel, 2007: 91. The authors quote American National Election Studies, University of Michigan, at: [www.umich.edu/nes](http://www.umich.edu/nes).

The strategic dilemma of Vietnam and resulting domestic divisions fractured the internationalist consensus. According to measures by the liberal Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), 1967 is the threshold year when Democratic Party liberals, previously supportive of both cooperation and military intervention following World War II, tip more toward anti-military, anti-intervention, protectionist and even isolationist positions.<sup>82</sup> After Vietnam, internationalists became increasingly divided between conservative “security” internationalists concerned with the *realpolitik* of military balances, and liberal “equity” internationalists who already considered the Cold War passé (or at most a continuation of traditional great power politics), and regarded foreign poverty a more significant problem than the Soviet competition for Third World loyalties.<sup>83</sup> Although Congressional bipartisanship in foreign policy voting remained higher relative to voting on domestic issues, it steadily declined from 1967 through the end of the Cold War – and continued to decline. According to ADA and American Conservative Union (ACU) data reported by Busby and Monten (2008), bipartisan votes in the House comprised 21.1 percent of the votes between 1971 and 1990; and declined to 11.4 percent (by ACU measures), and 12.7 percent (by ADA measures) after the Cold War.<sup>84</sup> During the first decade of the post-Cold War era (1991-2001), bipartisanship was slightly higher in the House at 14.4 percent (ADA) and 16.5 percent (ACU). Startlingly, after 9/11 between 2002 and 2004, both ADA and ACU bipartisan measures declined to 0 percent!

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<sup>82</sup> *ibid.*, Busby and Monten, 2008: 455.

<sup>83</sup> *ibid.*, Deibel: 91.

<sup>84</sup> *ibid.*, Busby and Monten: 456.

### *Electoral Realignment*

Since the 1980's, changes in the electorate and partisanship in Congress have begun to alter traditional assumptions about Congressional foreign policy involvement. During the 1980's, partisanship and the influence of party organizations began to increase within Congress and across the electorate. In sum, the ideological and policy positions of voters became more internally consistent and predictive of election voting, and voters sorted themselves among parties which became correspondingly more homogeneous and differentiated from one another (Jacobson 2000b, 2001; Stonecash, Brewer and Mariani 2003; Carson et al., 2003).<sup>85</sup> Most scholars attribute the recovery of partisanship to two related factors - the realignment of the Southern electorate, and institutional changes enacted to reform Congress during the 1970's. Gary C. Jacobson (2007) describes the main interchange of the electoral realignment: "The civil rights revolution, and particularly the Voting Rights Act of 1965, brought Southern blacks into the electorate as Democrats while moving conservative whites to abandon their ancestral allegiance to the Democratic Party in favor of the ideologically and racially more compatible Republican Party."<sup>86</sup>

Over nearly the same period, from the late-1950's, successive elections brought an increasing number of liberal Democrats into office who became frustrated with the consistent ideological and policy alignments of Republicans and southern Democrats that blocked liberal policies. Upon eventually reaching a critical voting mass, the numerous reforms they passed had the overall impact of distributing authority more widely, especially away from its prior concentration in powerful committee chairmen and more toward subcommittee chairs

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<sup>85</sup> Jacobson, Gary C. "Explaining the Ideological Polarization of the Congressional Parties", in Brady, David W. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2007. *Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress*, Volume 2. Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press; p. 92.

<sup>86</sup> *ibid.*, Jacobson, 2007: 93.

and party leaders.<sup>87</sup> Decentralization was accompanied by changes in rules and procedures that (among several other impacts) ended seniority rules, opened committee and floor deliberations, required voting recordkeeping, and bolstered the power of the Speaker to select members of the agenda-controlling Rules Committee.<sup>88</sup> These reforms enhanced the ability of party leaders to shepherd the legislative preferences of the (Democratic) majority party that was becoming increasingly more ideologically homogeneous. The net implication for party influence was that the stakes for partisan control became greater, which prompted more extensive (across the electorate) and tighter (within Congress) partisan competition. Ideological competition and organizational influence now became more closely connected.

Polarization has become an internally-reinforcing dynamic in American politics. Electoral realignment, including considerable partisan gerrymandering of Congressional districts in recent years, has resulted in ideologically-consistent districts that elect increasingly partisan and ideologically-extreme candidates. Strongly-held beliefs and values are more difficult to compromise, and as the parties become more ideologically homogenous, policy positions become more opposed and difficult to agree on. As Terry Deibel observes, partisan polarization has resulted in “a certain de-legitimization of compromise as an honorable way to deal with policy differences.” The consequences for Congressional foreign policy-making would be the increasing difficulty in forging consensus on international issues, which most likely results in progressively less diplomatic and strategic flexibility in dealing with international problems.

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<sup>87</sup> A more detailed examination of Congressional reforms is presented in Davidson, Roger H. (Ed.). 1992. *The Postreform Congress*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

<sup>88</sup> This brief list of rule and procedure changes is drawn from multiple sources (see Davidson, et al., 1992 for a more comprehensive review).

Presidential leadership also depends on being able to cultivate broad support for foreign policy. However, Richard M. Skinner (2008) has proposed that Executive Branch partisanship greatly contributed to the increasing polarization of American politics.<sup>89</sup> He distinguishes between “modern” presidencies and “partisan” presidencies. Skinner argues that a succession of “modern” postwar presidencies, Eisenhower through Carter, demonstrated a pattern of apathy toward their national party committee organizations that corresponded to the general decline of party influence in the electorate during their tenures. Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980 brought a new pattern of presidency that works with, and relies more closely on the party organization; and indeed, makes the party a “tool of governance” by substituting party and ideological loyalists for non-partisan experts who (previously) staffed the “modern” administrations. Reagan’s pioneering partisan strategy culminated in an even more partisan version under George W. Bush. Although George H. W. Bush and William Clinton were less partisan presidencies and sought to engender bipartisan governance, they were highly constrained by electoral reliance on the revitalized ideological bases of their respective parties and could only go so far in compromising with the opposing party.

Where modern presidents tended to care little about down-ticket fortunes and the future of the party, partisan presidents became more involved in campaigning for party candidates and fundraising, and have placed more emphasis on highlighting party policy differences as voting choices and attempts to create a “permanent (or “new”) majority”, typified by Karl Rove’s campaign strategies. The partisan presidency is a strategy for

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<sup>89</sup> Skinner, Richard M., “George W. Bush and the Partisan Presidency”, *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 123, Number 4, 2008-09; pp. 605-622.

achieving the incumbent's agenda, partially inspired Skinner speculates, by Richard Nixon's arrangements to centralize policy control in the White House.

In terms of Congressional relations, *modern* presidents more often sought to build ad-hoc coalitions to achieve their agendas; whereas the *partisan* presidents, especially George W. Bush, relied more on the Republican majority to achieve his goals rather than needing to create bipartisan majorities. The partisan presidents prompted the opposing (Democratic) party to tighten partisan unity, further polarizing Congressional voting. Ronald Reagan began to work more closely with the Republican leadership, "and in response to Reaganism, House Democrats devolved more authority unto Speaker "Tip" O'Neill."<sup>90</sup> It is not difficult to see that Skinner's concept of the partisan presidency compliments polarizing processes already underway during the same period across the American electorate.

### ***The Structure of Foreign Policy Opinion***

Eugene R. Wittkopf (1990) has developed a widely used and debated model of internationalism in public opinion that differentiates *cooperative* from *militant* (military interventionist) internationalism.<sup>91</sup> Both categories form bisecting continuums of opposition-versus-support that sort the electorate (and by extension, their Congressional representatives) among four quadrants of foreign policy predispositions: *Accommodationists* who support cooperative internationalism but oppose military intervention; *Isolationists* who oppose both cooperative involvement and military intervention; *Internationalists* of the Cold War variety, discussed above, who support (multilateral) engagement backed by military power; and *Hardliners* who oppose cooperative internationalism but support military measures. Wittkopf

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<sup>90</sup> *ibid.*, Skinner, 2008: 608.

<sup>91</sup> Wittkopf, Eugene R. 1990. *Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*, Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

has found that since 1974, the American public divides almost evenly among these four categories, meaning that three-quarters of the public is internationalist in one sense or another. He has also found a close correspondence between these categories and certain demographic traits. Other scholars have proposed further subdividing the militant-cooperative matrix into *unilateralist* and *multilateralist* categories to judge the politically-significant question of whether public support for war hinges on engaging independently, or in concert with other states.<sup>92</sup>

These typologies describe and classify American foreign policy orientations; but how have they become associated with each party as electoral realignment progressed? And, how are they related to the process of partisan polarization?

The regional pattern of electoral realignment has already been sketched, but the foreign policy ideologies that accompanied those changes in party composition need further elaboration, beginning at the cultural level. It is at the cultural level that domestic and foreign policy dispositions meet. The starting assumption is that profound differences in attitudes toward international involvement, cooperation, and the use of military force are associated with different regions of the country which eventually become reflected in Congressional representation. For many scholars, the origins of regional attitudes lie in the historical political cultures carried by the various ethno-religious immigrants who settled each region.<sup>93</sup>

Anatol Lieven contends, for example, that conservative white Southerners who switched party affiliation as a result of the Civil Rights reforms carried into the Republican Party the influence of populist traditions rooted in the violent deep history of religious discrimination

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<sup>92</sup> Hinckley, Ronald H. 1992. *People, Polls and Policymakers*. New York: Lexington Books, Macmillan; pp. 17-28.

<sup>93</sup> Busby and Monten observe that several recent analyses of American political culture rely heavily on the description of the continuity of regional "folkways" found in Fischer, David Hackett. 1989. *Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America*. New York: Oxford University Press.

against their Scots-Irish Calvinist ancestors by Anglo-Irish Episcopalians during the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries. An enduring, reinforcing connection between religious identity and nationalism; profound distrust of religious and commercial institutions and elites (stemming from historical conflicts with the Catholic and Episcopal Churches, and the English Crown); a tradition of violent defense of personal honor and acceptance of the role of violence in world affairs – translate today into empirically measurable levels of distrust of international institutions, greater military participation and public support for use of force.

Dispositions relevant to foreign policy can be matched to the axial dichotomy between isolationism and internationalism proposed by Wittkopf. The many dimensions of any relationship between historical heritage and contemporary political attitudes would fill volumes, and is unnecessary for the essential argument that U.S. foreign policy attitudes have historical substance that systematically align with Wittkopf's dimensions.

The political dimensions of Iraq War voting are inseparable from electoral realignment and the ideological polarization of the parties. In Deibel's (2007) account of the linkage between "opinion, parties, and polarization", the end of the Cold War set in motion changes that have evolved into the highly polarized present. The "lack of perceived threats after the Soviet Union's collapse [caused] the potency of internal [U.S. domestic] influences on foreign policy to rise during the 1990's, accompanied by the reassertion of congressional prerogatives that were set aside during the long crisis of the Cold War."<sup>94</sup>

The portrait of closely-coupled ideological and partisan positions and the extension of domestic policy divisions into foreign policy contrast with the more traditional explanations for Congressional foreign policy politics based on perceptions of international threat, or

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<sup>94</sup> *ibid.* Deibel, 2007: 100.

special interest entrepreneurialism. These conventional explanations may have accurately captured (mid-) 20<sup>th</sup> century politics; but those practices – especially instances of independent leadership - are harder to discern amid the ideological voting blocs of today. Gone are the independent foreign policy opinion leaders like Henry “Scoop” Jackson, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Sam Nunn, who represented distinct but erudite policy schools whose ideas about international engagement could be mixed and matched to build majorities to vote for pragmatic policy positions. As Terry Deibel contends, “[t]he replacement of moderates with extremists means that even presidents who want to lead the country rather than just their party in foreign affairs have a much harder time doing so with firm support from the legislative branch.”<sup>95</sup> With the hardening of partisanship and absence of ideological diversity, perhaps partisan strategies are the only way left to govern.

The implications of increased partisanship and lower ideological diversity would ostensibly predict (all other factors remaining the same) that foreign policy activism in Congress will likely continue to be increasingly subordinated to partisan challenges to Executive leadership by a majority of the opposition party. However, few if any of the economic or electoral factors that have strengthened partisanship over the past thirty years are likely to remain the same. The severity of the current economic crisis and the precariousness of the global economy, along with dangerous challenges to regional stability in South Asia, mean that an increasing premium on Executive leadership and greater bipartisanship could be in the offing as the nation rallies behind Presidential leadership to face an increasingly uncertain and unstable world. The continued vitality and future of neoliberal globalization looks very uncertain as this is written in early 2009. Much will

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<sup>95</sup> *ibid.*, 2007: 103.

depend on the approaches taken, and performance of the Obama Administration, in what could potentially become an extended era of multiple severe crises and reactive measures. Congressional activism could either increase as Administration missteps reduce public confidence in the President's handling of foreign affairs, or decrease if the public places a premium on unitary leadership by the President as crises become more severe.

Perhaps more important for the future of Congressional foreign policy will be how the current economic crisis affects domestic ideological assumptions that undergird electoral politics. The virtual halt in investment and growing antipathy toward laissez faire philosophies have yet to be felt in any particular foreign policy positions or legislation; but the broader social attitudes toward domestic economic and political circumstance that connect to foreign policy attitudes could be in for changes as yet unimagined. How would new distributional attitudes effect the perceptions voters hold about American power; or in a new era of enormous federal deficit spending, how will attitudes toward U.S. military power and intervention (perhaps in terms of their expense) be perceived? This could truly be a watershed moment in U.S. foreign policy and world history.

### ***III - Theories of Political Parties***

The purpose of this section is to review current empirical theories of political parties in Congress, and identify assumptions that pertain to party influence in foreign policy decisions generally, and to voting on the Iraq War specifically. There are several ways to study Congressional lawmaking that, at root, are differentiated by the assumptions they emphasize about the sources of influence on individual legislators, whether organizational or individually preferred. The good news is that little dispute exists in the theoretical literature over the idea that political parties are an organizational means to advance the goals of

politicians, or groups.<sup>96</sup> The bad news is that substantial disagreements remain over how – or if – parties actually contribute to achieving political goals. In the absence of a universal theory, it is empirically challenging to validly connect particular voting outcomes with the behavior of party organizations. Unless research is specifically designed to test the tenets of a particular theory, researchers must choose which elements of competing approaches and paradigms best fit the voting history and data.

The question of whether political parties are significant at all in voting decisions remains a central debate in the study of democratic legislatures. The literature of legislative structure can be divided between two schools of thought on the topic of party influence. One school essentially disregards the notion of ‘party’ as an analytic category based on: 1) the substantial evidence of internal divisions within parties (including declining party influence among the electorate) over most of the past century; and 2) the difficulty of validly modeling parties as either unitary, stable, or autonomous actors in the policy-making process, arising from the instability (“chaos”) of coalitions predicted by quantitative models of spatial voting (Schofield, 1980, 2006).<sup>97</sup>

Theories belonging to the first school emphasize either the simple distribution of individual preferences, or at most, informal contingently-formed voting coalitions.<sup>98</sup> The second school sees evidence of party influence in historical examples of the ‘whipping’ of

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<sup>96</sup> Montero, Jose Ramon and Richard Gunther. “The Literature on Political Parties: A Critical Assessment”; a working paper presented at the Institut de Ciències Polítiques Socials (Working Paper No. 219, Institute of Political and Social Sciences (ICPS)), Barcelona, 2003.

<sup>97</sup> A recent application of the spatial voting model is found in Schofield, Norman. 2006. *Architects of Political Change: Constitutional Quandaries and Social Choice*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. A clear overview of basic spatial voting theory and its origins is made by Poole, Keith. (Undated) *Spatial Models of Legislative Voting*. found at [www.voteview.com/spatialbook1a.pdf](http://www.voteview.com/spatialbook1a.pdf)

<sup>98</sup> See the organization of the literature proposed by Cox, Gary W. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2002. “Theories of Legislative Organization”, a working paper at the co- author’s university website: <http://mccubbins.ucsd.edu/tlo.pdf>

votes at the stage when policy choices reach the floor; the authority of majority parties over rules, committee appointments, and legislative schedules; and the solidarity of party voting on procedural (as opposed to substantive) issues. Theories of this second kind highlight the role of parties as floor voting coalitions or as procedural (agenda-controlling) coalitions.

Questions about party significance have paralleled historical variance in levels of partisanship in Congress and the electorate. In the early-1970's, parties were nearly written-off as worthy of study when new methods of analyzing historical roll call data revealed a decades-long decline in measures of influence among the electorate, and in Congressional voting cohesion.<sup>99</sup> Standard metrics of party unity, such as the size of majorities in each party voting against one another; and the frequency of party votes as a percentage of all roll-call votes, indicated the lowest levels of party cohesion since the turn of the twentieth century.<sup>100</sup> The weakening of parties was also detected in declining straight-party balloting; a reduced role for party officials in the presidential nominating process; the increasing advantages of incumbency (and corresponding independence of incumbents from party organizations); and greater cross-over voting evidenced in roll call data.<sup>101</sup>

### ***Analytical Paradigms***

As party power waned by the early-1970's, the traditional view of the Congressional party as a singular unit of analysis, comparable to the unanimity of British or Continental European parties, could no longer be justified and gave-way to more divisible models of

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<sup>99</sup> Cox, Gary W. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2007. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. See Chapter 6, especially pp. 129-134, on roll call voting trends.

<sup>100</sup> *ibid.*, Cox and McCubbins. 2007. *Legislative Leviathan*; pp. 130-131.

<sup>101</sup> *ibid.*, Cox and McCubbins, 2007: 2-3. The instability ("chaos") of coalitions is predicted by quantitative models of spatial voting (Cox and McCubbins refer to Schofield, 1980, 2006).

legislative decision-making.<sup>102</sup> Two principal analytical paradigms that seemed to fit new ideas about the complexity of lawmaking arose to guide empirical research: *rational choice* and *collective action* (also known as ‘collective choice’, with variants called ‘social’- or public choice). Theories of institutions, forming a distinctive branch of collective choice approaches, comprise a third important perspective of Congressional order that melds assumptions from both rational and social choice approaches.<sup>103</sup>

Economic theories of how individuals make choices in markets suggested analogies to legislative decisions, and scholars turned to a burgeoning number of ‘rational choice’ axioms to explain legislative outcomes in the context of individual- and group-level interest calculations. Accordingly, the predilections and choices available to individual legislators became the analytic centerpiece. Rational choice ideas are woven into theoretical assumptions on both sides of the argument for and against the significance of party influence.

Both party-centered and non-party rational choice theories can trace their lineage to Anthony Downs (1957) portrait of parties and the political actors they comprise, as goal-oriented and rational “team[s] seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted democracy”<sup>104</sup> Parties and individual legislators were assigned complimentary roles. Downs regarded parties as “platforms” for aggregating appealing policies for the electorate; while individual candidates for office (and by extension, incumbents) built platforms and voted in a pattern that gravitated toward the median ideological preferences of the electorate.

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<sup>102</sup> *ibid.* Cox and McCubbins, 2007: 5. Traditional studies of Congressional institutions by American scholars often compared the fragmentation of U.S. political parties with British and continental European parties; and idealized European bloc voting discipline without taking into account the differences in candidate recruitment, parliamentary procedures and societal expectations of those parties.

<sup>103</sup> *ibid.*, Montero and Gunther, 2003: 10-16.

<sup>104</sup> Downs, Anthony. 1957. *Towards an Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper.

At the moment of least party sway in American politics, David Mayhew's (1974) *Congress: The Electoral Connection* was among the first and most influential of a new wave of rational choice proposals to challenge the significance of parties as organizing units of Congressional decision-making.<sup>105</sup> Mayhew started from a hypothesis that each legislator acts strictly on the basis of concern for reelection. He proposed three electoral-oriented activities that preoccupy legislators: *advertising*, *credit-claiming* and *position-taking*; and assessed how institutional arrangements facilitated those efforts. As a historical pattern, legislators generally seek institutional forms that reduce or minimize electoral risk. Party cohesion figures as a weak force because it does not always offer voting choices that enhance reelection chances. Ultimately, Mayhew argued that electoral requirements inexorably shape the organizational structure and operations of Congress. The system of standing committees, and subcommittees are particularly well suited – indeed, “. . . tailored to suit members' electoral needs” - particularly *credit-claiming*.<sup>106</sup> Committees, according to Mayhew, provide a forum separate from the chamber that permits individual Members to appear directly engaged in bringing subpoenaed actors or agencies to account; blocking unfavorable legislation; adding amendments favorable to constituents, etc.<sup>107</sup> Committee and party leaderships are crucial for brokering competing interests to prevent institutional breakdown, in return for internal, rather than electoral, rewards; but Mayhew cast this as a background role rather one of primary political significance. Candidates and incumbents are their own most (reliable) organization and fundraisers. Mayhew presented such a compelling model of

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<sup>105</sup> Re-published most recently: Mayhew, David R. 2005. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Revised Edition. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. I have relied on R. Douglas Arnold's overview of the significance of Mayhew's work in the Forward of this new edition.

<sup>106</sup> *ibid.*, Mayhew, 1974: 60-61, 92.

<sup>107</sup> *ibid.*, 1974: 97.

individual incentives, that parties and almost any collective action appeared marginal to organizational and legislative performance.

When partisanship and leader activism began to increase during the 1980's and 1990's, questions about the status of parties and institutional arrangements were re-cast in terms of how they help solve problems of collective action (Rohde, 1991; Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Sinclair, 1995, 2002). Broadly defined, a collective action approach asks how organizational arrangements address core problems of legislative power.<sup>108</sup> Political institutions can be defined as bundled sets of rules, practices and relationships that translate into political outcomes.<sup>109</sup> From an institutional perspective, the analytical questions become: what key rules, responsibilities, procedures or routines are implemented by the membership to solve dilemmas in the functioning of the organization, and/or advance collective interests?<sup>110</sup>

Efforts to reach binding agreements through essential legislative processes (agenda-setting, policy formulation, mustering majority votes, etc.) carry various costs in time and other resources that confront the membership as a whole. On the benefits side, law-making not only serves societal needs, but also generates public goods for actors within the legislative institution. These public goods have implications for the electoral security and

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<sup>108</sup> Implied from the general theoretical premise of Olsen, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Boston: Harvard University Press.

<sup>109</sup> March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen. "Elaborating the 'New Institutionalism'", in Rhodes, R.A.W., Sarah A. Binder and Bert A. Rockman, (Eds.). 2006. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press; pp. 3-22.

<sup>110</sup> The essence of the collective action approach is captured in questions that open Barbara Sinclair's (1995) study of how the increasing use of special rules in the U.S. House of Representatives during the 1980's-'90's reflected growing leadership activism: "What drives institutional arrangements? What is the core problem that members of the legislature are attempting to solve through institutional arrangements? What is the key mechanism through which the problem is tackled?" - in Sinclair, Barbara, "House Special Rules and the Institutional Design Controversy", in Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast, Eds. 1995. *Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions*. Ann Arbor, MI.: University of Michigan Press; p. 239.

relative power of particular legislators and voting coalitions. The kinds of public goods created include many of those postulated in earlier theories (such as Mayhew's) that result from being able to claim credit for supporting passage of electorally-popular legislation or earmarks, or garnering commitments of support from other members on legislation of crucial interest (log-rolling). Institutional forms are assumed to reflect resource allocations and cost-benefit trade-offs among politically-potent options.<sup>111</sup>

### ***Three Theories***

The current landscape of party theory is exemplified by three contending theories that illustrate how rational choice, collective action and institutional approaches frame alternative concepts of legislative behavior. These theories can be viewed as attempts to explain how political interests are transacted at the most fundamental level, and are included here to lend perspective to the underlying question addressed in this research of what essential processes structure political transactions in foreign policy-making. The primary assumptions of each theory will be summarized in turn; followed by a section (briefly) summarizing what each might have to offer analysis of this research.

*Theory 1:* The first theory is the *Conditional Party Government* (CPG) model elaborated by David W. Rohde (1991), which argues for the presence and significance of partisan structure in Congress.<sup>112</sup> Rohde starts from the premise that “the various rules, procedures, and traditional practices that are so extensive in the House have genuine consequences”; and therefore reflect some form of order and purpose. Committees, caucuses, conferences, rules and procedures, seniority, and the activity of party leaders are postulated

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<sup>111</sup> Sinclair, Barbara. 1995. *Legislators, Leaders and Lawmaking: The U.S. House of Representatives in the Postreform Era*. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press; p. 17.

<sup>112</sup> Rohde, David W. 1991. *Parties and Leaders in the Post-Reform House*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

to “realize outcomes different than would occur in their absence.”<sup>113</sup> The model has effect when it is “clearer there is a majority party viewpoint – that is, the more homogenous the preferences of the majority party and the more distinct they are from the policy views of the minority – the more there should be a party effect” (Aldrich and Rohde, 1997b PSQ: 546).<sup>114</sup> According to Rohde; “[t]he word “*conditional*” simply means that the nature of its predictions depends on the distribution of policy views in the full House and between affiliates of the two parties” (1997: 546). The impact on voting is that “the majority party deflects outcomes from the chamber median toward the majority party median” (Sinclair, 2002: 37). As the floor median is pulled toward the majority party median, policy outcomes “will be chosen. . . somewhere between the center of the floor and the center of the majority party” (Aldrich and Rohde, 1997: 547). This implies that for a chamber divided by a Liberal majority and a Conservative minority, policy outcomes will tend to correspond to the preferences of the more conservative wing of the Liberal party.

To gather evidence, for example, of the affects of *conditional party government* in the historical voting record, four standard measures of cohesion in roll call voting that portray differences between parties, and agreement within parties, are used to analyze changes in Congressional partisanship.<sup>115</sup> For distances between parties, the most widely-used dimension is the frequency of *party voting*, which is the proportion of votes that a majority of one party votes against a majority of the opposition party. Rohde (1991) points-out that “. . .

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<sup>113</sup> Aldrich, John H. and David W. Rohde. 1997b. ‘Congressional Politics’. *Political Science Quarterly*. Volume 112: Number 4, 1997-1998; p. 545. Sinclair (1995) found strong evidence that leadership activism correlated with the rising use of rules restricting amendments from the mid-1970’s to the mid-1980’s; apparently to harness greater rewards and inducements for party voting discipline.

<sup>114</sup> *ibid.*, Aldrich and Rohde, 1997: 546.

<sup>115</sup> *ibid.*, Rohde, 1991: pp. 8-9. This statement and the following description of partisan measurement are included in this citation.

this is not an entirely satisfactory measure because it counts a vote on which the parties unanimously opposed one another the same as one on which only 51 percent majorities disagreed.”<sup>116</sup> The second standard measure, *average party difference*, sharpens the distinction between majorities by calculating the absolute value of the proportion of those voting ‘aye’ in each party.

For John H. Aldrich and David Rohde’s (1997) purposes, the level of agreement within parties is captured by two indexes. The *index of cohesion* is the absolute difference between the portion of those voting ‘aye’, and those voting ‘nay’ within each party in each vote. These figures are averaged over several votes to provide an indication of party loyalty or discipline during any given interval (or Congressional session).<sup>117</sup> Similarly, the *party-unity index* calculates the average proportion of *party votes* that individual members vote to support their party’s policy position; while the average across party member scores comprises an average for the party as a whole.

More is to be gained than voting outcomes skewed from the chamber median. Conditional party governance is also a theory of collective action that proposes how parties compete and what they gain from majority control. As the “condition” of the theory becomes more pronounced - as agreement on issues within a party approaches unanimity, and contrast more with the positions of the opposing party – “partisans are increasingly likely to expand the powers granted to party leadership and organization, and to increase the resources channeled to them to act on those powers” (1997: 546). The purpose of strengthening party organization is to help those with shared preferences achieve collective interests. As Barbara

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<sup>116</sup> *ibid.*, Rohde, 1991: 8.

<sup>117</sup> *ibid.*, 1991: 9.

Sinclair observes: “[s]o long as members are assumed to have heterogeneous legislative preferences, there is an advantage to organizing a subgroup large enough to enact legislation, and more homogenous in its legislative performance than the membership as a whole.”<sup>118</sup> But achievement of majority status also has rewards for party members. The foremost reward is control of the legislative agenda that not only satisfies collective aspirations, but also can be used to fulfill the goals of individual party members. Party leaders are also expected not simply to control the agenda, but also “to obtain policies that are along that dimension that are within the range of policies preferred by members.” An individual conservative or liberal legislator who is not necessarily the sponsor or cosponsor of a particular bill would nevertheless vote for bills that resonate with their broader view of proper social and political order. Rank-and-file party members empower their leaders, but also hold them responsible for fulfilling this (collective action) exchange.

Aldrich and Rohde tested the CPG theory by examining the behavior of the Republican leadership that assumed majority status after the 1994 elections, during the 104<sup>th</sup> Congress. They concluded that while much depended on the leadership style of the new Speaker, Newt Gingrich (R-6<sup>th</sup> District, GA.) - who gained early control over committee assignments by foregoing seniority traditions and installing loyal chairs, and sustained support of his “Contract With America” agenda through a diligent and open communication strategy with all segments of his party – he, and party leaderships generally, are still subject to considerable limitations.

Majority party control does not imply as absolute a level of control over chamber affairs that European parliamentary majorities enjoy. The partisan balance (margin of

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<sup>118</sup> *ibid.*, Sinclair, 1995: 240.

majority), and the nature of the issues, determine the degree of control the majority leadership is able to exercise. Defections are an acute hazard for a party with a thin majority margin, and place a premium on the homogeneity of preferences within the party. The model of conditional party governance is weak if the issue mix is divisive. Agenda control is vital to preventing divisive issues from coming up for vote. Party leaders are expected to support the interests of the rank-and-file in exchange for enhanced authority. On the other hand, leaders are also constrained not to press particular policy positions if the body of the party is divided over the issue; at the risk of being deposed by party factions opposed to the leader's preference(s).

James Lindsay cites an example of this dilemma when Democratic opponents of the MX ICBM missile program began to discuss unseating party leaders supporting the program, Speaker Thomas S. Foley (D, WA.) changed his position from support in 1983 to opposition the following year – despite the fact that Boeing, then headquartered in his home state of Washington, was the prime contractor for the program.<sup>119</sup> One of the more interesting corollaries of the conditional party theory is that it extends beyond Congress to include the role of the President in regulating the level of Congressional partisanship. The ideological consistency of Ronald Reagan's policy agenda made it easier for Democrats to forge a consensus on alternative policies; a phenomenon that may have contributed to George W. Bush's partisan contentions with the 110<sup>th</sup> Congress.

*Theory 2:* A second school of thought on the role of parties has been led by Keith Krehbiel (1993), who defines “significant party behavior . . . as behavior that is independent

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<sup>119</sup> *ibid.*, Lindsay, 1994: 71-72.

of [individual] preferences.”<sup>120</sup> Indeed, the foremost concept of non-partisan Congressional structure is Krehbiel’s (1991, 1993, 1997a, 1998) *Pivotal Politics* theory.<sup>121</sup> The principal assumption is that simple majority rule is more important than the rules, procedures, customs, committees, and caucus structures. Only various majorities, centered differently across different median issue preference points, matter in roll call voting. The policy adopted can therefore be predicted as the preference of the legislator occupying the median position along the policy space.

Krehbiel’s theory seeks to explain why policy gridlock in Congress is “common, but not constant,” and why coalitions do not often match the exact size of partisan majorities – in other words, why “coalitions are regularly bipartisan and greater than simple-majority size” (1998:21). Krehbiel asserts that “an improved theory of lawmaking should identify *conditions* under which gridlock is broken, and it should account for some *variation* in (unusually large) coalition sizes.”<sup>122</sup>

The *pivotal politics* model rests on assuming that the “policy space is unidimensional”; that policy proposals can be arranged along a continuous one-dimensional liberal-to-conservative line that accommodates all policy positions. The position that each legislator takes on the line is called an “ideal point” - the position that “yields greater benefits to the [legislator] than all other policies.”(1998:22).

As Aldrich and Rohde (1997) point out, majority rule is exercised in Krehbiel’s model in two ways. The first exercise of majority rule is the election and reelection of members. This is the only incentive in the theory that holds legislators responsible to their

<sup>120</sup> Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. “Where’s the Party?”, *British Journal of Political Science* 23: pp. 235-266.

<sup>121</sup> My brief description of the pivotal politics theory draws from Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press; pp. 20-30.

<sup>122</sup> *ibid.*, Krehbiel, 1998: 21 (italics in the original text).

constituencies (and accounts for the stability of their decision location on the unidimensional policy line).<sup>123</sup> Secondly, the policy status quo does not change without a simple majority vote for alternative policy – “only [those policies] that a majority of the full House prefer to the status quo can pass.”<sup>124</sup> The ideal point does not necessarily represent the exclusive preference of the individual legislator, but rather a mixed balance of constituency preferences and personal viewpoint that remains stable over time across related issues. However, legislators are constrained by two “supermajoritarian procedures”: the presidential veto, and the Senate’s filibuster debate rules (60 vote requirement for passage). Presidential vetoes must be overridden by a two-thirds majority in the House, while the Senate’s Rule 22 requires a three-fifths (60-vote) majority to end a filibuster.

Thus, the term *pivotal* refers not to each Member’s preferred decision point on the policy continuum; but rather to the importance of four constraints on voting along the continuum. Four “pivotal players” determine policy outcomes in Congress: 1) The decision of the legislator occupying the median policy preference position along the unidimensional issue space in each chamber; 2) the 41-Senator minimum filibuster pivot; 3) the presidential veto power; and 4) the congressional override power. The pivotal points work in a specific order: First, the median legislator decides first to either support a new policy, or the status quo. Next, the “filibuster pivot” in the Senate decides to either hold-up legislation or permit passage; third, the President decides to either sign or veto legislation; and finally, Congress can override a veto with a two-thirds majority if sufficient support exists.

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<sup>123</sup> *ibid.*, Aldrich and Rohde, 1997: 543.

<sup>124</sup> Aldrich and Rohde suggest reading Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast, “Institutionalizing Majority Rule: A Social Choice Theory with Policy Implications”, *American Economic Review*, Volume 72 (May, 1982), pp. 367-371.

Theorists who emphasize non-party influences set a high bar for demonstrating party and other organizational affects. Critics of the *pivotal politics* theory have three general concerns. First, as Barbara Sinclair contends, the model “takes members’ preferences as a given; the determination of preferences is not considered... [and] assumes away much of the political process in Congress.”<sup>125</sup> The *pivotal* model leaves out any consideration of “how legislative preferences are shaped”, and risks overlooking the possibility that preferences are “less stable and more manipulable . . . by party leaders in and out of Congress” (39). The assumption that party has consequence only when “individual legislators vote with fellow party members *in spite of their disagreement* about the policy in question” begs the question of who persuaded the legislator to vote against their preferences in the first place.<sup>126</sup>

The second and third concerns are raised by Aldrich and Rohde, who assert that there may potentially be multiple majorities on any given issue. They contend that “unless there is a majority to work remotely [during committee deliberations, for example] to achieve a desired policy outcome, there is little reason to expect that those actions that distantly precede final passage in time or location will be predicated on what “the” majority wants.” The third concern is that incentives for occupying leadership roles in each chamber are not explained. Party leadership positions are highly coveted, and some form of incentive must exist to bear the costs in time and effort of coaxing a majority to act in its collective interests.

Theory 3: The third theory of parties, and perhaps the foremost statement of the institutional approach is Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins *Procedural Cartel*

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<sup>125</sup> *ibid.*, Sinclair, 1995: 39.

<sup>126</sup> *ibid.*, Krehbiel, 1993: 238.

model.<sup>127</sup> In economic terms, a *cartel* is an association of independent organizations formed to limit competition by controlling the production and distribution of a product or service.<sup>128</sup> Cartels are an institutional arrangement that solve problems of collective action. In the Congressional sense, the standing committees and party leadership posts are analogous to independent firms that form an association to regulate *procedural* aspects of the decision-making process and advance (majority) party interests.

In contrast to traditional theories of “committee government” that relegated political parties to the margin, the *procedural cartel* model gives parties precedence in shaping the power of the committees (and other organizations). The majority party acts as a “structuring coalition, stacking the deck in its own favor – both on the floor and in committee – so as to create a kind of “legislative cartel” that dominates the legislative agenda”<sup>129</sup> One of the most significant forms of institutional power is control of appointments to the standing committees. In the cartel analogy, committees do not function as completely autonomous power centers (as depicted in traditional “committee government” concepts); but rather as affiliates of the (majority) party that “structur[es] the committee system – setting up jurisdictions, allocating resources, assigning members, and so forth – and then letting things proceed on “automatic pilot.” Majority parties create institutional arrangements that enable their members to both veto legislative initiatives by the opposing party, and get their own legislative initiatives to the floor.

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<sup>127</sup> Cox, Gary W. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2007. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>128</sup> Cox and McCubbins do not offer a general definition of ‘cartel.’ I borrow the definition given at: <http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=cartel>

<sup>129</sup> *ibid.*, Cox and McCubbins, 2007: 251.

Cox and McCubbins observe that there are a wide range of structural and procedural processes employed to exert party influence. Party and staffing ratios, appointments, and legislative scheduling lead a potentially longer list of ways institutional means have “been used consistently for partisan purposes.” Evidence of majority party influence on procedural, rather than final passage voting from the 94<sup>th</sup> through 105<sup>th</sup> Congress’ (1975-1998) has been reported by Jenkins, Crespin, and Carson (2003), who interviewed exiting and former House members with no further political constraints on candor about cartel processes.<sup>130</sup> Generally, the procedural cartel theory offers a way to visualize party effects as touching concrete levers of powers, though as having a less direct imprint on policy or decision-making. Where other models of party influence have a way of suggesting that the legislative agenda and bill writing are directly controlled by the party organization, the cartel model leaves slightly more space for the influence of powerful, semi-autonomous individuals.

In simple terms, the question of political party significance is whether parties make Congress different than it would be if there were no parties. Most voting research is designed to identify independent effects of party identity or organizational influence either through voting, or through some means of structuring the legislative process (through agenda control, committee appointments, rule-making, etc.).<sup>131</sup> Alternatively, those who argue that parties are less central, as Keith Krehbiel contends, point to evidence that legislator preferences are so closely matched with party identity that ideology is more predictive of voting than the influence of either party identity or party organizational processes. Krehbiel would require that to distinguish party as an independent influence, legislators would have to vote for the

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<sup>130</sup> Jenkins, Jeffery A., Michael H. Crespin and Jamie L. Carson. 2003. “Parties as Procedural Coalitions in Congress: Evidence from a Natural Experiment”, published online, and retrieved during January, 2009, at: [www.allacademic.com//meta/p\\_mla\\_apo\\_research\\_citation/0/6/7/8/2/pages67820/p67820-1.php](http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apo_research_citation/0/6/7/8/2/pages67820/p67820-1.php)

<sup>131</sup> *ibid.*, Cox and McCubbins, 2007: 3.

preference(s) of the median party voter, or the preferences of the party leader, rather than their own preferred positions. Krehbiel excludes all other criteria for discerning party influence that would disprove the hypothesis that ideology essentially matches party identity.

***Party Identity as an Empirical Variable:***

Meeting Krehbiel's criteria for autonomous party influence would certainly appear to be getting tougher as the American political parties become more ideologically homogeneous. But would it be possible to test party identification and ideological coding separately against the same voting outcomes, and compare their significance? This is the method for gauging party influence that will be employed in this research.

If the parties are becoming more ideologically uniform, does party identity remain validly distinct from ideological coding? There are two reasons why party identity can still be conceptualized as distinct from the personal ideologies of lawmakers. First, important sources of variance in ideological composition still leave room for imagining the need for internal party policy negotiations. Although Wittkopf has presented evidence that certain demographic correlates of party identification correspond to the dimensions of his typology of foreign policy attitudes (intervention v. non-intervention; isolationism v. internationalism), these are not absolute.<sup>132</sup> Each party remains internally divided between declining numbers of centrist internationalists (who regard both cooperation and military means legitimate), accommodationists of the Left, and *hardline* unilateralists of the Right in the Democratic and Republican parties respectively. While differences over the role of military force typically divide the parties from each other, exceptions occur in times of clear danger that episodes

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<sup>132</sup> *ibid.*, Wittkopf, 1990: 49. Some demographic correlates of party affiliation are summarized in Figure 2.2 on page 49.

like the Cold War, and 9/11, represented.<sup>133</sup> Both parties also have member voters who are “non-internationalist” – that swing between interventionism and isolationism: who join accommodationists when fearful of the consequences of military involvement, or join hardliners either in opposition to cooperation when they fear it runs against the national interest, or for intervention when they perceive national security is threatened. Given these qualifications, party identity can only serve as a very blunt and generic label of foreign policy preferences.

Secondly, the political parties are more than an ideological label. They are also widely-conceptualized as an organized means of collective action that structure decision-making in order to gain institutional power. We must consider that in many instances the secular aims of advancing party organizational interests may transcend the ideological merits of the policy issue as an influence in voting decisions. Hypothetically, the positions of Democratic leaders may have represented, in part, an attempt to harness electoral opposition to the war to advance the institutional power of the party, while Republican support for the President’s policy might have seemed an overriding necessity to retain the support of that party’s constituent base. In this interpretation, Iraq War legislation was merely another commodity to be transacted for party power. A central methodological challenge in voting studies is to validly distinguish between secular power gambits and the influence of more philosophical considerations.

For the purposes of this research, a compromise between the ideological and organizational significance of parties is used: Party identity simply serves to designate each side of the debate - as a label for opposition or support of Bush Administration policy. A

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<sup>133</sup> *ibid.*, Wittkopf, 1990: 105.

Democratic Party code designates a potential opponent of Administration war policy, and a Republican Party code identifies a likely supporter. The formal Democratic Party policy position was opposed to continued U.S. involvement in the war, and supported withdrawal of U.S. combat forces rather than the new surge strategy implemented during 2007. The Republican Party represented support for the President's policies. The Democratic Party thus became the "brand" of choice for various schools of opposition to U.S. involvement in Iraq. In essence, party identity simply serves as another (albeit blunt) predictor of opposition or support for war policy – for both ideological and organizational reasons. The question addressed by this research is whether it is a stronger or weaker predictor of voting.

If party identity merely serves to label opposing sides of the debate, what would be the implications of finding that party identity is more closely associated with voting outcomes than the strength of the correlation between voting and ADA scores? In that case, we would have obtained at least a first approximation answer that the benefits of organizational loyalty potentially outweighed the merits of adhering to ideological principles. The result would still not clearly tell us specifically which ideological values were compromised, or how the benefits of party loyalty translated into concrete institutional advantages for the party. Whether the benefits of voting with the party can be discerned in agenda control, committee appointments, or party leadership promotions, the essential connection is the extent to which party members vote for issue positions declared for their party organizations. However, if the Democratic opposition had succeeded in legislating constraints on Administration policy, then certainly the party would have accrued higher public approval ratings, and likely gained additional influence relative to the White House. This might have taken the form of either being able to hold, or gather more, votes for anti-

war legislation within Congress, or in forcing the Administration to revise political calculations about taking further initiatives in war policy.

During early 2007 however, the White House was apparently more concerned with Republican Party cohesion than the Democratic majorities. The Administration had to invest more effort in sustaining at least 41 Senate votes than in attempting to build bipartisan support.<sup>134</sup>

#### ***IV - Ideology in Congressional Research***

The role of ideology in voting behavior is difficult to measure. Although policy issues and legislation are debated in reference to particular ideas and beliefs, the final voting decisions of legislators are hard to validly attribute to ideological conviction alone because decisions may also have been weighed against electoral considerations. The problem is to isolate ideological influence from other considerations in voting, and for the most part, this consists of inference.

Most concepts of ideology for empirical research have a basis in Philip Converse's foundational 1964 essay, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Politics".<sup>135</sup> Drawing on survey research conducted during the 1950's, Converse identified stratified differences in ideological development between political elites and the general public. He theorized ideology as a belief system, ". . . a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence" (p. 207). Elites, including Members of Congress, hold more structured (consistent or "constrained") belief systems than most citizens primarily because they are immersed in, and think about,

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<sup>134</sup> See: Nather, David, "A Last-Ditch Plea To a Wavering Party", *CQ Weekly*, July 16, 2007; pp. 2094-2096.

<sup>135</sup> Converse, Philip E. 1964. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics", in Apter, D. E. (ed.). 1964. *Ideology and Discontent*. New York and London: Free Press; pp. 206-261.

policy issues more frequently (by virtue of their status); "...simply 'thinking about' a domain of idea-elements serves both to weld a broader range of idea-elements into a functioning belief system, and to eliminate strictly logical inconsistencies defined from an objective point of view (p. 183)."<sup>136</sup> Converse did not require that ideologies contain logically consistent or even necessarily-related beliefs; simply that issues are linked together, or "bundled", by a particular understanding of "what-goes-with-what" (p. 13).

For legislative research, belief systems are significant as a predictive trait because they bundle voting preferences together. Converse contends that, "[c]onstraint may be taken to mean the success we would have in predicting, given an initial knowledge that an individual holds a special attitude, that he holds certain further ideas and attitudes" (1964: 207). This suggests that a vote cast on one or more issues should allow us to estimate how the same individual will vote on a wider set of issues. With this premise, it becomes possible to see an empirical basis for evaluating the influence of ideology by associating the preferences reflected in the voting record on one set of issues with voting on other types of legislation.

### ***Spatial Models of Voting***

The way that belief systems predict how votes are linked to other votes is only a short step away from visualizing ideology as a "dimensional" framework that structures voting preferences in a linear order. A chamber of legislators can be ranked by how their votes consistently fall as preferred, or "ideal", points along a continuum of ideological positions from Left or liberal, to Right or conservative. Roll call votes split only two ways, for or

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<sup>136</sup> Cited from a reprinting of Converse, Philip E. 1964. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics" in Jost, John T. and Jim Sidanius, eds. 2004. *Political Psychology*. New York: Psychology Press; p. 183. Found at: <http://books.google.com/books>

against a bill, dividing the continuum in half according to how legislators evaluate the ideological implications of the bill. The roll call division itself constitutes the measure of the role ideology played in the voting outcome. The outcome of voting will be to one side or the other of how the *median* legislator has voted. If the majority of votes fall to the left of the median legislator, the liberal side wins because moderates (in the center of the continuum) and enough conservatives do not regard the issue sufficiently inconsistent with conservative principles. The converse is true of liberals if voting splits to the right and conservatives win. Voting coalitions shift as the critical median vote shifts. This very simplified depiction is the basis of spatial models of roll call voting that have become the most widely used method for evaluating the role of ideology in legislative decisions.

Some of the most sophisticated spatial models of Congressional voting have been developed by Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal (1991, 1997, and 2007), who assume that “[t]he basic implication of the constraint hypothesis is that all issues tend to be mapped onto a fixed ordering or placement of legislators” (2007:13).<sup>137</sup> This means that each issue has a particular ideological significance that corresponds – or “maps” – to a point, or interval, among a fixed order of legislators along the Left-Right ideological continuum. The ideological order of legislators forms a “predictive” dimension that policy issues map into.<sup>138</sup> The ordering of legislators holds across diverse issues, but their “ideal” voting points shift within an estimated interval unique to each issue (calculated with complex stochastic equations). Accordingly, each policy issue will have a unique midpoint between those legislators who vote for, and those who vote against, legislation (in substantive or procedural

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<sup>137</sup> Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal. (2007). *Ideology and Congress*. New Brunswick, N.J. and London: Transaction Publishers.

<sup>138</sup> *ibid.*, Poole and Rosenthal, 2007: 13.

form) pertaining to the issue. Highly polarizing issues would tend to cluster legislators on either side of the issue closer together as the preference intervals of like-minded legislators narrowed. Less divisive issues would distribute voting preferences more widely along the ideological continuum.

Poole and Rosenthal caution that spatial models can evaluate policy outcomes, but not necessarily predict outcomes ahead of voting. Spatial modeling is retrospective, but applicable to roll call voting data for any Congress - indeed, over the entire history of the Republic. In a 1997 (and 2007) study, Poole and Rosenthal were able to fit all congressional roll call votes taken between 1789 and 1985 into a two-dimensional spatial model to estimate 85 percent of the voting decisions of each member. Poole (2005) has been able to estimate that a single dimension (economic/wealth distribution) accounts for close to 90 percent of all roll call votes by the 104<sup>th</sup>-105<sup>th</sup> Congress. The pertinence of these astonishing results for evaluating the role of ideology in legislative research is that a vote on a single issue is a pretty reliable clue about how that individual will vote on other legislation, largely confirming the predictive quality of ideology hypothesized by Converse.

It also becomes possible to see how beliefs pertaining to domestic policy can extend to foreign policy issues, and how increasing ideological division over domestic policy cause foreign policy positions to drift apart as well.

### ***Coding Ideology***

Another method of inferring ideological influence is a simple scoring logic employed by ideological interest groups to gauge the relative support of members of Congress for their positions on a broad array of legislation. The Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) calculates a “Liberal Quotient” (LQ) rating for every member of Congress. The LQ score is

the percentage of twenty votes each Member casts in favor of the Liberal position that the ADA identifies for each of the twenty pieces of legislation on diverse policy issues. All votes are worth five points, for a total of 100 points. A Representative or Senator voting in favor of the ADA position in 15 of the 20 votes would receive an LQ score of 75 percent; which implies a 75 percent probability that he or she will vote the liberal position on any given piece of legislation.<sup>139</sup> ADA ideological scores remain one of the best (shorthand) indicators of voting proclivities precisely because they offer a composite measure of complex belief systems across votes on multiple, disparate issues.

Because the types of issues scored in creating the LQ ratings is diverse, it may be surmised that the interest group scoring method tests Converse's "bundling" concept to the maximum. However, the ideological "constraining" function is really exercised by ADA's Legislative Committee, which decides what the Liberal position for each bill is. On one hand, this selection process may contribute to the validity of the LQ measure by providing a consistent reference for equitably calibrating the voting tendencies of the population of all members, some of whom probably hold ideological proclivities that exceed even the Liberal range of the Legislative Committee itself.

On the other hand, some scholars fear that Legislative Committee choices introduce a degree of selection bias. How representative is the Legislative Committee of median American Liberalism? William R. Shaffer (1989) performed a principle components analysis of the reliability and validity of ADA scoring for both the House and Senate between 1969 and 1986, and found that although "some specific roll-call votes are weak indicators of the

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<sup>139</sup> A more complete description of how ADA calculates the 'Liberal-Quotient' (LQ) scores using the Congressional voting record is described at the organization's website: [www.adaction.org/media/votingrecords/2007.pdf](http://www.adaction.org/media/votingrecords/2007.pdf)

‘Liberalism’ factor”, the factor remained a reliable and valid indicator of ideological character.<sup>140</sup> On the whole, ADA LQ scores, and similar scores for conservative adherence generated by the American Conservative Union (ACU), are widely used in empirical research and have become an accepted standard as a “proxy” measure of ideological attributes.

In the end, how do we know whether most members of Congress have strong ideological convictions specifically about the war? Knowledge of international affairs, and the nature of warfare itself (especially conflicts as complex as counterinsurgency), are limited among constituents, and by extension most of their representatives. Can ideological coding serve as a valid attribution of beliefs about the war? The answer is that we should think of them as suggestive of a relationship between attitudes on a wide range of issues - including war, and particularly the Iraq War. However, just because a representative or senator with an above-average (toward the Liberal end of the continuum) LQ score votes against Iraq War policy doesn’t necessarily mean that he or she has not balanced non-ideological considerations against their vote. The present research does not correlate particular foreign policy ideologies with Iraq War voting. But if roughly three-quarters of the House and Senate are internationalists to one degree or another according to Wittkopf’s typology of foreign policy opinion, then attitudes toward military intervention are the primary, or most fundamental, ideological issue distinguishing supporters from opponents of the Iraq War.

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<sup>140</sup> Shaffer, William R., “Rating the Performance of the ADA in the U.S. Congress”, *The Western Political Quarterly*, Volume 42, Number 1, March, 1989; pp. 33-51.

***Ideology as an Empirical Variable:***

Ideology has been conceptualized as a predictive quality, operationalized in empirical research as a measure of reliability in supporting Liberal or Conservative positions across multiple votes – the way ADA scores are derived as a percentage of votes for a particular (Liberal) position across diverse issues. If foreign policy attitudes are regarded as an extension of attitudes toward other types of issues and policy, then voting across diverse issues is likely to predict attitudes toward international policy. The ADA scores do not necessarily place or “map” the holder into a specific category of American strategic culture or foreign policy attitudes, but ratings along a Liberal-to-Conservative spectrum have been correlated with attitudes toward international engagement and the role of military force in world affairs. While it might be possible in future research to code individual lawmakers with a more precise measure of their foreign policy attitudes, perhaps based on votes cast specifically on foreign policy issues and/or position statements, for the purposes of this research ADA scores are used simply as a measure of the relative inclination to support or oppose war policy.

### Chapter 3 – Research Design

During 2007, a newly-elected Democratic Party majority swept into office by a powerful tide of opposition to the Iraq War was unable to alter White House war policy. It is widely recognized that the sixty-vote majority requirement in the Senate was crucial to sustaining President Bush's Iraq policy - only 41 votes were necessary to prevent passage of anti-war policy. Senate Republicans, at times by the narrowest margin, repeatedly blocked bills containing any language that would have thwarted the surge, withdrawn forces by a particular deadline, set troop rotation intervals, limit or suspend funding; or restrict employment of forces within Iraq's borders. And cloture votes were used by Senate Republicans on all issues so often that by the end of the first session in December, 2007, the 62 cloture votes had been called and cast exceeded the record set for both years of the entire 107<sup>th</sup> Congress during 2001-2002.<sup>141</sup>

This project will not provide a unique explanation for why the Bush Administration's war policy remained intact. The modest goal of this research is simply to contribute some evidence that might suggest how partisan loyalty and ideology are presently balanced in voting decisions on an issue as central to U.S. foreign policy as war. Majority status was not sufficient to wrest control of war policy from the President, but that does not mean that party influence was not strong. Nor does it mean that partisanship was the exclusive voting consideration for each legislator. The central problem is to validly distinguish the role played by each factor. The general method will be to separately correlate party identity and ideology with roll call voting, and then compare the strength of those correlations. The strength and

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<sup>141</sup> Epstein, Edward and Bart Jansen, "Role Reversal Yields Stalemate", *CQ Weekly*, January 7, 2008; p. 18.

statistical significance of those correlations will serve as the measure of the relative influence each factor exerted in voting decisions.

To this point, the focus has been on describing electoral and partisan changes external to Congress, and the theoretical issues they raise, that set the stage for voting on war legislation during 2007. The dimensions of electoral opposition to the war have been examined in Gary Jacobson's analysis of the 2006 elections; Presidential actions that appear to have further galvanized opposition prior to the elections and President Bush's change in strategy to remain engaged contrary to election results; and changes in the ideological character of the electorate and the rise of partisanship in American politics in recent decades were assessed. Theories of Congressional politics, organization, parties, and ideology have also been reviewed to frame some of the issues pertaining to the present research. The last step before turning to review Iraq War voting results *within* Congress is to describe how those outcomes will be analyzed.

### ***Method of Analysis***

In overview, the research process consisted of correlating ordinal party identification codes, and interval LQ ideological ratings provided by the *Americans for Democratic Action* (ADA), with votes for and against Iraq War policy in separate cross-tabulations. The separate party and ideology correlations were then compared to assess which variable had the closest, or most significant, association with voting outcomes. The votes included twenty-two Senate, and twenty-six House, votes on Iraq War bills selected from the numbered votes listed and described in weekly issues of *Congressional Quarterly* published during 2007. The legislation voted on was organized by issue category to compare differences in partisan and ideological voting patterns across the subject matter of Iraq War issues.

To answer the basic question of whether party identity or ideological coding is a better predictor of voting on Iraq War legislation, a statistical procedure was needed to compare the relative influence of both variables in each roll-call vote. Isolating the causal effects of the independent party and ideology variables is becoming a greater challenge as parties have become more ideologically homogeneous. Party identity has become so intertwined with certain ideological dispositions, that only careful comparisons of paired observations on these two variables will distinguish their effects.

The Chi-Square ( $\chi^2$ ) statistic is the perfect tool for this requirement because it measures the extent to which observations would be different from the case of no relationship between independent and dependent variables.<sup>142</sup> The statistic also provides a level of confidence or probability that the relationship is significant. Chi-Square analysis is applied to determine whether independent variables have any methodical impact; in this case, whether discrete party identity (ID) and ideological ADA variables ordered voting by chance, or had some level of systematic impact.

While the Chi-Square test is valuable for indicating whether the relationship between independent and dependent variables is significant, it does not report the scale or size of the relationship. Furthermore, the Chi-square statistic is influenced by sample size, which does not always reveal treatment effects – larger sample sizes simply result in larger statistics.<sup>143</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> This preliminary definition, and following discussion of the Chi-Square statistic, is borrowed from Lisa A. Baglione. 2007. *Writing a Research Paper in Political Science*. Belmont, CA.: Thomson-Wadsworth; pp. 132-136.

<sup>143</sup> Abrami, Philip C., Paul Cholmsky and Robert Gordon. 2001. *Statistical Analysis for the Social Sciences: An Interactive Approach*. Boston, London: Allyn and Bacon; p. 522.

A standard measure of effect size is the *phi-coefficient* ( $\Phi$ ), where:

$$\Phi = \sqrt{\chi^2/N}$$

(N = overall sample size, in this case the number of votes cast for each piece legislation.)

Jacob Cohen (1988) has assigned *phi-coefficient* effect sizes the following range:<sup>144</sup>

0.10 = small effect

0.30 = medium effect

0.50 = large effect.

A *phi-coefficient* will be calculated for each of the party and ideology chi-square values produced for each voting outcome. Comparison of party and ideological  $\Phi$  values should offer additional insight into the strength of each variable's respective contribution to the voting results.

### ***Variables, Sources, and Coding***

Three different variables were used for this study. Two independent variables - party identity, and the ADA ratings as a proxy score for ideology - were each separately evaluated against a third (dependent) variable that consisted of the voting record on Iraq War legislation. All statistical procedures were performed with SPSS™ (V.14) statistical analysis software.<sup>145</sup>

Party: The party identity of each member of Congress was drawn from the roll call order of the 110<sup>th</sup> Congress published with the list of legislation voted on each week by *Congressional Quarterly*. Party identification was coded with the commonly used scores of

<sup>144</sup> Cohen, Jacob. 1988. *Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Quoted in Abrami, Cholmsky and Gordon, 2001: 522.

<sup>145</sup> SPSS is a registered trademark of SPSS Inc. © 2009 . All rights reserved. SPSS Inc. Headquarters, 233 S. Wacker Drive, 11th floor, Chicago, Illinois 60606.

‘100’ for Democrats, and ‘200’ for Republicans. Independent and other party affiliations were excluded from the data set, with the exception of Senator Joseph Lieberman (I- CT.), who was re-coded as a Democrat because he continues to caucus with Senate Democrats since changing his party affiliation in 2006. In all but foreign affairs, Senator Lieberman’s voting record closely resembles median Democratic preferences in supporting social and economically liberal domestic legislation.

ADA Scores: The ideological orientation of each Member, on a Liberal-Conservative continuum, was represented by proxy measure in the form of the widely-used Liberal Quotient (LQ) calculated by the ADA. As discussed in the previous chapter, LQ ratings are determined by the percentage of votes cast in support of twenty pieces of legislation representing liberal policies on a variety of issues selected by ADA’s Legislative Committee. Liberal Quotient (LQ) scores for this research were drawn from ADA data sets for the 110<sup>th</sup> Congress at ADA’s website: [www.adaction.org](http://www.adaction.org).<sup>146</sup>

Because the ADA scores are continuous variables, it was necessary to recode them for bivariate analysis according to the mean ADA score in each chamber: ‘0’ for those percentages less than the chamber mean, and ‘1’ for percentages greater than the chamber mean. Some members of the House entered office between elections to fill vacancies caused by illness or death, and had not yet received an ADA rating. The seven House members missing ADA scores, and their votes, were selected-out of the sample.

Voting Record Data: The voting record that provided the dependent variables for this analysis consisted of selected roll call votes on Iraq War legislation taken from data arrays

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<sup>146</sup> The full website address is: [www.adaction.org/media/votingrecords/2007.pdf](http://www.adaction.org/media/votingrecords/2007.pdf). Commentary and overview are provided at the site in the *ADA Action* online publication section.

compiled by Jeff Lewis and Keith Poole at their website: [www.voteview.com/DWNL.htm](http://www.voteview.com/DWNL.htm).<sup>147</sup>

The separate data arrays for the House and Senate are a record of all votes taken during the current Congress, and are very large digital files. Information on each lawmaker, including party identification, state, and district numbers, are coded with ICPSR conventions. The twenty-two Senate and twenty-six House votes used for the present research were selected out of the total voting record, and placed into two new arrays in separate *Excel*<sup>TM</sup> spreadsheets that served as SPSS<sup>TM</sup> input.<sup>148</sup> All voting abstentions were selected-out of each cross-tabulation.

One concern bearing on the research design was that the level of influence exerted by the independent variables might vary according to the issues being voted on in each piece of legislation. Some policy issues might be more significant for ideological beliefs than others; with less sensitive issues decided in the context of certain institutional advantages accrued from demonstrating party loyalty. To control for issue content, the voting record was sorted into five categories of war policy issues, identical for each chamber, described in more detail below.

### ***Tests Performed***

Chi-Square tests were performed on cross-tabulations assembled by SPSS<sup>TM</sup> to separately correlate party identification (ID) and ideology (ADA score) with each and every vote. Cross-tabulations express the joint distribution between two or more variables. The cross-tabs for each vote consisted of 2x2 matrices with *yea* and *nay* votes along one axis -

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<sup>147</sup> The data arrays actually exist further into the voteview website at: <http://adric.sscnet.ucla.edu/rollcall/static/S110.ord> (110th Senate roll call voting data) and <http://adric.sscnet.ucla.edu/rollcall/static/H110.ord> (110th House roll call votes).

<sup>148</sup> Excel is a registered trademark of ©Microsoft Corporation. The Excel version used for this project is part of *Microsoft Office 2007*.

and either the party ID codes ('100' for Democrats, '200' for Republicans), or the recoded ADA variables (recoded '1' or '0' depending on the original scores relationship to the chamber mean) - along the other axis.

Along with basic Chi-Square testing, SPSS™ conveniently facilitated the performance of other tests of the strength-of-association of variables within each of the cross-tabulations. These statistics included a Chi-Square Test of Pearson that is a 'goodness-of-fit' test to identify whether data fits a particular type of probability distribution; a continuity correction function; likelihood ratio; and linear-by-linear association. For all tests, the number of degrees of freedom (*df*), a key factor in the significance level of variable associations, was '1'. Directional, nominal-by-nominal measures included Lambda, Goodman and Kruskal tau, Uncertainty Coefficient, and an ordinal-by-ordinal Somers' d test. Finally, Nominal-by-nominal symmetric measures included Phi, Cramer's V, Contingency Coefficient, an ordinal by ordinal Gamma and Spearman Correlation, and an interval-by-interval case Pearson's R. All of these tests provided cross-confirming avenues of verification.

The statistical significance of the relationship between variables was equated with voting influence. The average of the chi-square-derived significance levels of both the party ID and ADA scores were simply compared to determine which variable had the strongest influence. The significance levels of party ID and ADA score relationships were also averaged within each category of legislation to assess whether there was any variance in the influence of party and ideology between the categories – to detect whether a different mix of decision considerations between the types of issues voted on may have been present.

An excepted standard for statistical significance in the social sciences is that hypotheses must hold at the 0.5 percent level or lower (no less than ninety percent of the phenomenon must be explained for the hypothesis to hold true).<sup>149</sup> Statistical significance depends on the sample size and the number of categories (in matrix form) evaluated. The results of the statistical analyses are summarized in tables included in the chapters that follow which separately describe voting in each chamber. Three categories of information are included in the summaries. The first two are the chi-square statistics and their significance in each vote for both party ID and ideological ADA. Additional columns contain the percentage of the total number of lawmakers voting in each roll call by both party ID and ADA score. These columns form an additional cross-tabulation to help visualize the distribution of voting across the two independent variables.

### *Testing the Difference between Two Non-independent Variables*

Because party affiliation and ADA scores have become so closely correlated, it may be necessary to regard these independent coefficients as non-independent. Ideological scoring essentially predicts party affiliation, and vice versa. A further test of significance can be applied to examine how substantially the treatment variables, party ID and ADA scores, are themselves inter-correlated versus the dependent vote variables.<sup>150</sup> Developed by Williams (1959), and confirmed by Steiger (1980), this test of non-independent variables is:

$$t = (r_{12} - r_{13}) \sqrt{\frac{(N-1)(1+r_{23})}{2\left(\frac{N-1}{N-3}\right)|R| + \frac{(r_{12}+r_{13})}{4}(1-r_{23}^2)}}$$

<sup>149</sup> *ibid.*, Baglione, 2007: 136.

<sup>150</sup> Howell, David C. 2007. *Statistical Methods for Psychology*, Seventh Edition. Belmont, CA.: Cengage Wadsworth; pp. 277-278.

where

$$|R| = (1 - r_{12}^2 - r_{13}^2 - r_{23}^2) + (2r_{12}r_{13}r_{23})$$

This ratio is distributed as  $t$  on  $N-3$  degrees of freedom ( $df$ ). The terms  $r_{12}$  and  $r_{13}$  are the correlation coefficients whose difference is to be tested, and  $r_{23}$  is the correlation between the two predictors.  $|R|$  is the determinant of the 3 x 3 matrix of intercorrelations, but can be calculated without knowing the determinants. As Williams observes, the test “is valid for comparing the efficiency, as predictors of the given sets of values  $x_1$  and  $x_2$  [the independent variables party and ADA scores]. However, he cautions, “treated as an unconditional test, it underestimates significance since it does not take into account the possible variation in  $x_1$  and  $x_2$  [the independent variables] from sample to sample.”

### *Party Defectors*

The identification of lawmakers defecting from party-line voting could be considered yet another gauge of the relative strength of party influence versus personal preference. Very few members of either party in both the House or Senate crossed the aisle more than once – but those that did tended to do so frequently. Charts were constructed to rank members in both parties and in both chambers on the number of times they voted across party lines on all Iraq War legislation. This analysis consisted of simply tabulating the names of those voting across party lines for each vote, and then counting the total number of times they voted with the other party across all Iraq War votes. These frequencies are summarized in the Appendix.

If opposition to the war (or at least opposition to the way President Bush was conducting the war) extended across party lines, then Democrats should have been able to form a coalition with Republicans from districts or states whose constituents favored change

in war policy to create sufficient numbers of votes to enact policy change. Ideology may be increasingly coextensive with party identity, and vice versa, but how much of a difference is there in the strength of ideological traits (coded by ADA LQ scores) to make a difference in adherence to party voting discipline? In other words, does the extent of cross-over voting indicate a threshold ADA value at which lawmakers, presumably starting with those in the middle (centrist) ranks, break with their party over particular issues?

### ***Legislation***

The weekly voting record published in Congressional Quarterly's *CQ Weekly* was used to select the numbered votes subsequently drawn from Lewis and Poole's *voteview.com* website. All issues of *CQ Weekly* published during 2007 were screened for votes pertaining specifically to the Iraq War. As many war-related votes as could be found were selected in order to provide the largest possible sample. No selection criteria on the basis of the type of (war-related) legislation, procedure, or content were applied.

### ***Issue Categorization***

One possible result of the research would be evidence that party and ideology weigh differently for different categories of legislation. How does partisanship and ideology vary in influence across different kinds of legislation? What kinds of legislation invoke stronger party unity versus ideological voting?

To better control for the influence of legislative content, Iraq War legislation was sorted into five general issue categories, applied to votes in both chambers. The order of the five issue areas largely represents the chronological procession of legislative strategies during 2007. These are briefly introduced below, and described in more detail along with the results of the voting analysis presented for each chamber in Chapters 4 and 5.

Issue A: *Troop Levels (Surge Policy)*House Legislation

Vote No.	Bill Title/Type and Description	Date of Vote (2007)	Voting Outcome	Political Implication
96	<b>H.Con.Res. 63 - Iraq War/Previous Question:</b> Motion to order the previous question (ending debate and amendment) on adoption of rule (H.Res. 157) to provide for House consideration of a non-binding concurrent resolution that would express support for troops already serving in Iraq, while disapproving deployment of additional troops (Sponsor: Slaughter, D-N.Y.)	13-Feb	Agreed, 227-197	Nay supported President
97	<b>H.Con.Res. 63 - Iraq War/Rule:</b> Adoption of the Rule (H.Res. 157) to provide for House consideration of a non-binding concurrent resolution that would express support for U.S. military personnel serving in Iraq, while disapproving of President Bush's decision to deploy additional combat troops.	13-Feb	Adopted 232-192	Nay supported President
99	<b>H.Con.Res. 63 - Iraq War/Adoption:</b> Adoption of the concurrent resolution that would express support for U.S. military personnel serving in Iraq, while disapproving of President Bush's decision to deploy more than 20,000 additional troops to that country.	16-Feb	Adopted 246-182	Nay supported President

Senate Legislation

Vote No.	Bill Title/Type and Description	Date of Vote (2007)	Voting Outcome	Political Implication
44	<b>S.470 - U.S. Troop Levels in Iraq/Cloture:</b> (Same as S.Con.Res. 2 above) Motion to invoke cloture limiting debate on motion to proceed to a concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Senate it is not in the U.S. interest to deepen U.S. involvement in Iraq by increasing troop levels; <i>plus</i> , stating that Congress should not withhold funds for U.S. forces already serving in Iraq	5-Feb	Rejected 49-47 (cloture always requires 60 votes.)	Nay supported President
51	<b>S.574 - Iraq War/Cloture:</b> Motion to invoke cloture on motion to proceed to bill expressing sense of the Senate supporting U.S. troops already in Iraq while disapproving additional deployments. Also, to require the President to report to Congress every 30 days on military progress	17-Feb	Rejected 56-34	Nay supported President

The first category of bills concerned the *troop surge* strategy proposed by the Administration at the outset of the year. Politically, the surge was portrayed by opponents as a potentially fruitless escalation – “throwing good resources after bad” – designed to resonate with those generally skeptical of the role or utility of military force in international affairs. In the Senate, efforts to halt the surge consisted of two cloture votes on non-legislative items. The first cloture vote on February 5, 2007 for S.470 was to close debate over a concurrent

resolution to express the sense of the Senate that deepening U.S. involvement was not in the national interest. The concurrent resolution also contained a clause stating Congress should not withhold funds from U.S. forces already deployed in Iraq. The first cloture vote was taken nearly three weeks after President Bush announced the surge, and well into the deployment planning cycle of the first wave of surge units to deploy. The cloture motion, requiring 60 votes for passage, was rejected by only a two-vote margin, 49-47. The second cloture vote, for S.574, also was intended to close debate over a bill expressing support for troops already in Iraq, but also disapproving additional deployments. The same bill however, also had a procedural requirement that the President report to Congress every thirty days on military progress.

The second and most numerous category of legislation voted on in both chambers dealt with the subject of *troop withdrawal*. Withdrawal proposals were probably more numerous – and attractive to lawmakers - because they could be viewed as the most direct policy response to electoral opposition to the war. These votes largely consisted of amendments to funding bills that would have mandated completion of withdrawal (“redeployment”) by various proposed dates during the following spring of 2008. The most notable of the troop withdrawal bills was an amendment to the Fiscal 2008 Defense Authorization bill, H.R.1585, sponsored by House Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin (D-MI.) and Senator Jack Reed (D-R.I.) that would have required the President to complete the withdrawal of most U.S. combat forces by April 30, 2008. On July 18<sup>th</sup>, after a dramatic all-night session, forty-seven Republicans blocked the two-thirds (60-vote) majority required to end debate on the amendment so that the authorization bill could be voted on as a whole (thus enacting the withdrawal amendment). After failure to block the filibuster, the

Democratic leadership pulled the authorization bill to delay consideration until September after the Petraeus-Crocker report. It was defeated again on September 20<sup>th</sup> (vote number 345), this time – and perhaps because of - an amendment by Senator Feingold (D-WI.) that required the redeployment of “most” U.S. troops from Iraq within 90 days of enactment and would have completely prohibited funding of U.S. deployments in Iraq after June 30, 2008. The most abrupt proposals for ending the war, often inserted as amendments to more routine defense funding bills (and even a domestic water resource bill, H.R. 1495, which Senator Feingold attempted to amend with a March 31, 2008 withdrawal deadline), usually did not pass.<sup>151</sup>

*Issue B: Setting a Withdrawal Date*

House Legislation

Vote No.	Bill Title/Type and Description	Date of Vote (2007)	Voting Outcome	Political Implication
264	<b>H.R. 1591 - Fiscal 2007 Supplemental/ Conference Report:</b> Adoption of the conference report on the bill that would provide \$124.2B in fiscal 2007 emergency supplemental funding, as well as set a goal of redeploying most U.S. combat troops in Iraq by the end of March, 2008, if the president can certify that the Iraq government is meeting benchmarks, and by the end of 2007 if he cannot.	25-Apr	Adopted 226-195	
265	<b>H.R. 1591 - Fiscal 2007 Supplemental/ Conference Report:</b> Adoption of the conference report on the bill that would provide \$124.2B in fiscal 2007 emergency supplemental funding, as well as set a goal of redeploying most U.S. combat troops in Iraq by the end of March, 2008, if the president can certify that the Iraq government is meeting benchmarks, and by the end of 2007 if he cannot. The measure would provide \$95.5B for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, \$6.8B for hurricane recovery and relief, \$3.5B in crop and livestock disaster assistance, and \$2.25B for homeland security anti-terrorism programs. It would also raise the minimum wage to \$7.25 per hour over two years and provide \$4.8B in small-business tax incentives.	25-Apr	Adopted 218-208 (Sent to Senate)	Nay supported President

*Issue B: Setting a Withdrawal Date, Continued:*

House Legislation, Con't.

<sup>151</sup> The cloture vote on the troop withdrawal amendment attached to H.R. 1495 is covered in Jonathan Broder's "Reality Check", *CQ Weekly*, September 10, 2007; p. 2616.

Vote No.	Bill Title/Type and Description	Date of Vote (2007)	Voting Outcome	Political Implication
276	<b>H.R. 1591 - Fiscal 2007 Supplemental/Conference Report:</b> Passage, <b>over President Bush's May 1, 2007 veto</b> , of the bill that would provide \$124.2B in fiscal 2007 emergency supplemental funding, as well as set a goal of redeploying most U.S. combat troops in Iraq by the end of March, 2008, if the president can certify that the Iraq government is meeting benchmarks, and by the end of 2007 if he cannot. The measure would provide \$95.5B for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, \$6.8B for hurricane recovery and relief, \$3.5B in crop and livestock disaster assistance, and \$2.25B for homeland security anti-terrorism programs. it would also raise the minimum wage to \$7.25 per hour over two years and provide \$4.8B in small-business tax incentives.	2-May	Rejected 222-203 (Two-thirds majority, 284 votes, required to over-ride veto)	Nay supported President
329	<b>H.R. 2237 - Iraq Troop Withdrawal/Recommit:</b> Saxton, R-N.J. motion to recommit the bill to the Armed Services Committee with instructions that it be immediately reported back with language stating that a determination to withdraw or redeploy troops should be based on a number of factors including protection of the U.S. armed forces, Army Corps of Engineers, and the U.S. Embassy	10-May	Motion Rejected 210-218	
330	<b>H.R. 2237 - Iraq Troop Withdrawal/Passage:</b> Passage of the bill that would require the withdrawal of U.S. troops and Defense Department contractors from Iraq within 90 days of enactment. The withdrawal would have to be completed within 180 days. The bill would prohibit the Defense Department from increasing the number of U.S. troops serving in Iraq beyond the number serving there as of Jan. 1, 2007 without a specific congressional authorization.	10-May	Rejected 171-255	Nay supported President
620	<b>H.R. 2956 - Iraq Redeployment/Previous Question:</b> Slaughter, D-N.Y. motion to order the previous question (thus ending debate and possible amendment) on adoption of the rule (H.Res. 533) to provide for House floor consideration of the bill that would require the Secretary of Defense, within 120 days of enactment, to begin redeploying U.S. armed forces out of Iraq.	7-12-07 (?)	Motion agreed to 225-197	
621	<b>H.R. 2956 - Iraq Redeployment/Rule:</b> Adoption of the rule (H. Res. 533) to provide for House floor consideration of the bill that would require the Secretary of Defense, within 120 days of enactment, to begin redeploying U.S. armed forces out of Iraq.	12-Jul	Adopted 221-196	
624	<b>H.R. 2956 - Iraq Redeployment/Passage:</b> Passage of the bill that would require the Defense secretary to begin redeploying U.S. troops out of Iraq within 120 days of the bill's enactment. The redeployment, except for a "limited presence", would have to be completed by April 1, 2008. The bill would require the President, not later than January 1, 2008, to transmit to Congress a comprehensive U.S. strategy for Iraq that includes a justification of the minimum force levels required to protect U.S. national security interests in Iraq after April 1, 2008; a description of specific missions of U.S. forces to be undertaken; the cost of maintaining such a force; and the expected duration of the missions.	12-Jul	Passed 223-201	Nay supported President

Issue B: *Setting a Withdrawal Date*, Continued:

House Legislation, Con't.

Vote No.	Bill Title/Type and Description	Date of Vote (2007)	Voting Outcome	Political Implication
1103	<b>H.R. 4156 - Iraq War Supplemental Appropriations/Previous Question:</b> McGovern, D-MA motion to order the previous question (thus ending debate) on adoption of the rule (H.Res. 818) to provide for House floor consideration of the bill that would provide \$50B to fund the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and require troops to begin withdrawing from Iraq within 30 days of enactment, with a goal of withdrawing most troops by Dec. 15, 2008.	14-Nov	Agreed to 209-185	
1104	<b>H.R. 4156 - Iraq War Supplemental Appropriations/Rule:</b> Adoption of the rule (H.Res. 818) to provide for House floor consideration of the bill that would provide \$50B to fund the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and require troops to begin withdrawing from Iraq within 30 days of enactment, with a goal of withdrawing most troops by Dec. 15, 2008.	14-Nov	Adopted 219-190	
1107	<b>H.R. 4156 - Iraq War Supplemental Appropriations/Recommit:</b> Young, R-FL motion to recommit the bill to the Appropriations Committee with instructions that it be reported back immediately after striking the provisions on troop withdrawal, troop readiness and application of the Army field manual. The motion would also strike language that would express the sense of Congress that all funds are for redeployment and that the amounts are sufficient to meet the needs of the armed forces.	14-Nov	Motion rejected 192-231	Yea supported President
1108	<b>H.R. 4156 - Iraq War Supplemental Appropriations/Passage:</b> Passage of the bill that would appropriate \$50B in emergency supplemental funds for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, an amount estimated to last until February, 2008. The bill would require troops to begin withdrawing from Iraq within 30 days of enactment, with a goal of withdrawing most troops by Dec. 15, 2008. It would restrict U.S. armed forces to missions of force protection, counterterrorism and training of Iraqi security forces. It would also prohibit the deployment of troops who are not fully trained and equipped, and would require all U.S. personnel, including the CIA, to follow the Army field manual's rules against torture.	14-Nov	Passed 218-203	Nay supported President

Issue B: *Setting a Withdrawal Date*, Continued:

### Senate Legislation

Vote No.	Bill Title/Type and Description	Date of Vote (2007)	Voting Outcome	Political Implication
74	<b>S. J. Res. 9 - Iraq Mission/Cloture:</b> Motion to evoke cloture on motion to proceed to joint resolution to establish a more limited mission for U.S. forces in Iraq, and to set a binding goal of withdrawing most troops by March 31, 2008.	14-Mar	Agreed to, 89-9	
75	<b>Iraq Mission/Passage:</b> Passage of the joint resolution to establish a more limited mission for U.S. forces, and set a binding withdrawal date of March 31, 2008	15-Mar	Rejected 48-50	Nay supported President
147	<b>H.R. 1591 - Fiscal 2007 Supplemental/Conference Report:</b> Adoption of the conference report on the bill that would provide \$124.2B in fiscal 2007 emergency supplemental funding, as well as set a goal of redeploying most U.S. combat troops in Iraq by the end of March, 2008, if the president can certify that the Iraq government is meeting benchmarks, and by the end of 2007 if he cannot. The measure would provide \$95.5B for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, \$6.8B for hurricane recovery and relief, \$3.5B in crop and livestock disaster assistance, and \$2.25B for homeland security anti-terrorism programs. It would also raise the minimum wage to \$7.25 per hour over two years and provide \$4.8B in small-business tax incentives.	26-Apr	Adopted 51-46	Nay supported President
167	<b>H.R. 1495 - Water Resources Development Act Reauthorization / Cloture:</b> Motion to invoke cloture (thus ending debate) on the Feingold, D-WI amendment to the Levin, D-MI amendment. The Feingold amendment would require the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, except for limited missions, by March 31, 2008. The Levin amendment would commence redeployment of U.S. troops from Iraq by Oct. 1, 2007, and require full withdrawal within 180 days thereafter; but would allow the president to waive the second requirement.	16-May	Motion Failed 29-67	
252	<b>H.R. 1585 - Fiscal 2008 Defense Authorization/Cloture:</b> Motion to invoke cloture (thus limiting debate) on the Levin, D-MI amendment to the Levin substitute. The Levin amendment would require a drawdown and redeployment of U.S. forces in Iraq, with certain exceptions, by the end of April, 2008. Redeployment would begin within 120 days of enactment. Troop activity in Iraq would be limited to protecting U.S. personnel, training Iraqi security forces, and conducting counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda and other international terrorist organizations.	19-Jul	Motion Rejected 52-47	Nay supported President

Issue B: *Setting a Withdrawal Date*, Continued:

Senate Legislation, Con't.

Vote No.	Bill Title/Type and Description	Date of Vote (2007)	Voting Outcome	Political Implication
345	<b>H.R. 1585 - 2008 Defense Authorization/U.S. Troop Redeployment from Iraq:</b> Feingold, D-WI amendment to the Levin, D-MI substitute. The Feingold amendment would require the redeployment of most U.S. troops from Iraq to begin within 90 days of enactment. It would also bar the use of funds for deployment in Iraq of members of the U.S. armed forces after June 30, 2008, with limited exceptions, including troops providing security for U.S. government personnel and infrastructure, training Iraqi security forces, and conducted limited targeted operations against members of al Qaeda and other affiliated international terrorist organizations.	20-Sep	Rejected 28-70	Nay supported President
411	<b>H.R. 4156 - Iraq War Supplemental Appropriations/Cloture:</b> Motion to invoke cloture (thus limiting debate) on the Reid, D-NV motion to proceed to the bill that would appropriate \$50B in emergency supplemental funds for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan for fiscal 2008. The bill would require troops to begin withdrawing from Iraq within 30 days of enactment, with a goal of withdrawing most troops by Dec. 15, 2008.	16-Nov	Motion Rejected 53-45	Nay supported President

The third category of legislation consisted of efforts to regulate the *deployment interval* of troops as a means of limiting the availability of units for rotation to Iraq and inhibiting the surge strategy. This applied particularly to ground forces as the Pentagon struggled to schedule sufficient numbers of personnel and ready units to fill surge requirements. The availability of ground forces to execute the surge strategy over an indefinite period became the foremost problem confronting Pentagon planners. Sustaining over 150,000 troops in Iraq was going to require the rotation of nearly all Army and National Guard, and Marine Corps, combat formations. By 2007, many of these units were already making their second, and in some cases third, deployments for duty in Iraq, and the strain on families, and the absence of National Guardsmen from their civilian employments, was receiving increasing media coverage and widespread public sympathy.

Opponents of the war seized the troop rotation problem as a way to limit Executive options. Several of the bills contained language that would have set a minimum rotation interval between deployments, effectively limiting the number of troops in Iraq, and Central

Command's operational planning in-country. The issue carried great political weight due to public concern for the welfare of the troops and their families, and was a way to bring not only additional public pressure against the war (and make inroads with a growing number of pro-military, non-internationalist conservatives), but also further challenge the Administration's relationship with the military, which had already become strained during Secretary Rumsfeld's tenure.

*Deployment interval* legislation consisted mostly of amendments to the 2008 Defense Authorization Bill, H.R. 1585. Four amendments and one cloture vote in the Senate, pertaining to H.R. 1585, the 2008 Defense Authorization bill, were voted on in the Senate; and four motions to H.R. 3159 in the House, comprise this category of legislation. All of these proposals passed the House by nearly twenty-vote margins – close to the exact difference in membership between the Majority and Minority parties, meaning that these votes were the product of intense partisan struggle.

### *Issue C: Deployment Interval*

#### House Legislation

Vote No.	Bill Title/Type and Description	Date of Vote (2007)	Voting Outcome	Political Implication
793	<b>H.R. 3159 - Troop Deployment Policy/Previous Question:</b> Slaughter, D-N.Y. motion to order the previous question (thus ending debate and possible amendment) on adoption of the rule (H. Res. 601) to provide for House floor consideration of the bill that would mandate minimum periods of rest and recuperation for units and members of the regular and reserve components of the U.S. military serving in Iraq.	2-Aug	Motion agreed to 225-201	
794	<b>H.R. 4156 - Troop Deployment Policy/Rule:</b> Adoption of the rule (H. Res. 601) to provide for House floor consideration of the bill that would mandate minimum periods of rest and recuperation for units and members of the regular and reserve components of the U.S. military serving in Iraq.	2-Aug	Adopted 224-200	

*Issue C: Deployment Interval, Continued:*

House Legislation, Con't.

Vote No.	Bill Title/Type and Description	Date of Vote (2007)	Voting Outcome	Political Implication
795	<b>H.R. 4156 - Troop Deployment Policy/Recommit:</b> Hunter, R-CA. motion to recommit the bill to the Armed Services Committee with instructions that it be immediately reported back with language that would require that the proposed minimum rest times could only be implemented if the Defense secretary certifies that they would not result in extending the tours of those already in Iraq or increase their "operational risk."	2-Aug	Motion Rejected 207-217	
796	<b>H.R. 4156 - Troop Deployment Policy/Passage:</b> Passage of the bill that would mandate minimum periods of rest and recuperation for units and members of the regular and reserve components of the U.S. military serving in Iraq. It would exempt special operations forces units and allow the President and military service chiefs to waive these requirements in response to unforeseen circumstances.	2-Aug	Passed 229-194	Nay supported President

Senate Legislation

Vote No.	Bill Title/Type and Description	Date of Vote (2007)	Voting Outcome	Political Implication
241	<b>H.R. 1585 - Fiscal 2008 Authorization/Cloture:</b> To invoke cloture on Webb Amendment to mandate minimum deployment intervals: <i>Active</i> - as long as deployed previously; <i>Reserve/Guard</i> - minimum of 3 years.	11-Jul	Motion Rejected 56-41	
243	<b>H.R. 1585 - 2008 Defense Authorization/Troop Deployments:</b> Hagel Amendment to Levin Substitute - would limit length of troop deployments to Iraq beginning 120 days after enactment; and limit Army Regular and Guard to 12 consecutive months; Active and Reserve Marines to 7 consecutive months (waived in times of emergency).	11-Jul	Rejected 52-45	
244	<b>H.R. 1585 - 2008 Defense Authorization/Troop Deployments:</b> Graham Amendment to Levin Substitute - to express the sense of Congress that the goal for leave time between deployments should be no less than 12 months for Active forces, and no less than 5 years for Reservists.		Rejected 41-55	
341	<b>H.R. 1585 - 2008 Defense Authorization/Troop Deployments:</b> Webb, D-VA. Amendment to the Levin, D-MI substitute. The Webb amendment would require active duty forces to be guaranteed as much time at home as they served while deployed. National Guard and reservists would be guaranteed three years at home between deployments.	19-Sep	Rejected 56-44	Nay supported President
342	<b>H.R. 1585 - 2008 Defense Authorization/Troop Deployments:</b> McCain, R-AZ amendment to the Levin, D-MI substitute. The McCain Amendment would express the sense of the Congress that the Department of Defense should develop a troop-deployment policy that would provide troops time between deployments that is equal to or longer than the length of their previous deployment and would guarantee that members of the reserve would not be deployed within three years of their last deployment. The Secretary of Defense could waive the policy for national security reasons.	19-Sep	Rejected 55-45	

The fourth category of legislation was *funding support* for the war. The most important aspect of the funding issue was the apparent victory by the Administration in raising political barriers to the use of Congressional “purse-strings” to constrain both the surge strategy, and overall continued U.S. combat involvement in Iraq. To begin with, unlike the Vietnam-era conscription-based force that was regarded at the time (and still often cast) in rebellious and unpatriotically-reluctant terms; the current all-volunteer generation of U.S. servicemen and women are held in much higher public esteem. During Vietnam, opponents regarded both military and political institutions culpable perpetrators. In contrast, the Iraq War is almost exclusively synonymous with the White House. Legislators in both parties were inhibited from casting any votes potentially susceptible to portrayal by electoral opponents as handicapping the troops or emboldening the Iraqi insurgency. The issue of inadequate armor protection against the emergent threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED’s) is a case in point: at first leveraged by war opponents as evidence of neglect and poor planning on the part of the Administration - but then used by the Administration to pressure Congress for full funding of war operations to guarantee troop safety. The Democratic agenda was therefore rhetorically re-cast in terms of ensuring the ultimate safety and welfare of troops by withdrawal from Iraq.

Secondly, “benchmarks” for Iraqi political and security progress, offered by the President as goals that higher troop levels would facilitate, also cut both ways in funding debates. Although initially resisted by the Administration, benchmarks were eventually used to justify the utility of the surge and bolster the appearance of a systematic exit strategy. For war opponents, unmet benchmarks could be used to rationalize withholding funding for

continued U.S. military operations and aid to Iraq; as well as the setting of deadlines for withdrawal to pressure the Iraqi government to make progress.

Only two votes challenging Administration policy in regard to funding were made in the House, while a total of five votes in this issue category were conducted in the Senate. In the House, the primary challenge to war policy concerned requirements attached to the Fiscal 2007 Supplemental Appropriations bill, H.R. 2206 that the President report on progress by Iraq's government toward political reconciliation. In the Senate, along with a vote on H.R. 2206, a more diverse set of legislation ranged from adoption of two non-legislative resolutions expressing support for funding troops deployed in Iraq (as well as provision of adequate Veterans' Administration medical support upon their return home, in S.Res. 107), to two amendments by Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R.,-KY.) to substitute \$70 billion in supplemental funding to fight both the Iraq and Afghan wars for \$31 billion to continue operations exclusively in Afghanistan (which was already part of the Fiscal 2008 Omnibus Appropriations bill). McConnell's intention was apparently to get through an additional \$39 billion for the Iraq War. (Votes on the war funding issue are summarized in the chart beginning on the next page.)

Issue D: *Funding/Support*House Legislation

Vote No.	Bill Number and Description	Date of Vote	Voting Outcome	Implication for Exec. Policy
332	<b>H.R. 2206 - Fiscal 2007 Supplemental/Recommit:</b> Lewis, R-CA. motion to recommit bill to the Armed Services Committee with instructions to report it back immediately after deleting the section requiring a second vote to release part of the funds after the President reports to Congress on the Iraqi government's progress in meeting benchmarks.	10-May	Motion Rejected 195-229	
333	<b>H.R. 2206 - Fiscal 2007 Supplemental/Passage:</b> Passage of the bill that would provide \$42.8B in fiscal 2007 emergency spending for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and require another Congressional vote in late July to release the remaining \$52.8B. The President would have to report by July 13 on the Iraqi government's progress toward meeting certain benchmarks. Congress would have to adopt a joint resolution releasing the fenced-off funds. The bill would also provide \$6.8B for hurricane recovery and relief, \$3.3B for military health care costs, and \$2.25B for homeland security programs. It would raise the minimum wage to \$7.25/hour over two years, and provide \$4.8B in small-business tax incentives.	10-May	Passed 221-205	Nay supported President

Senate Legislation

Vote No.	Bill Title/Type and Description	Date of Vote (2007)	Voting Outcome	Political Implication
76	<b>S.Res. 107 - U.S. Troop Support and Veterans/Adoption:</b> Expressing the sense of the Senate supporting funding for troops in the field, and [provision] of adequate medical care to soldiers upon their return home.	15-Mar	Adopted 96-2	
77	<b>S.Con.Res. 20 - Iraq War Funding/Adoption:</b> Adoption of the concurrent resolution that would express opposition to any Congressional action that would endanger U.S. forces in the field, including reducing or cutting-off funding for their assigned missions.	15-Mar	Adopted 82-16	
181	<b>Fiscal 2007 Supplemental/Motion to Concur:</b> To appropriate \$94.7B for Iraq and Afghanistan operations; and also to require the President to report on 18 benchmarks and permit the President to withhold reconstruction funds for benchmarks not met (sponsored by Sen. Reid, D., Nev.).	24-May	Agreed 80-14	
410	<b>S. 2340 - Iraq War Supplemental Appropriations/Cloture:</b> Motion to invoke cloture (thus limiting debate) on the McConnell, R-KY motion to proceed to the bill that would appropriate \$70B in emergency supplemental funds for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan for fiscal 2008.	16-Nov	Motion Rejected 45-53	
439	<b>H.R. 2764 - Fiscal 2008 Omnibus Appropriations/Motion to Concur:</b> McConnell, R-KY motion to concur in the House amendment to the Senate amendment to the bill with an amendment that would replace the \$31B in funding for the war in Afghanistan with \$70B that the Defense Department could use to conduct the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan without restrictions.	18-Dec	Motion agreed to 70-25	

The fifth and final category of legislation was simply for *all other questions* pertaining to the Iraq War that could not be classified either as a distinctive issue category, or as a legislative strategy for supporting or ending the war. In the House, these all consisted of votes on amendments to the Fiscal 2008 Defense Authorization bill, H.R. 1585. The House amendments did not deal directly with any of the immediate issues of combat in Iraq, but included concern for the use of funding allocated for the Iraq War for any contingency involving Iran; and the establishment of permanent basing in Iraq, and use of Iraqi economic resources. The procedural motion to go into closed session to discuss information from the President, vote number 331, was rejected presumably because the Democratic leadership did not want to give the Administration any further opportunity to plead its case for continuation of the war.

Category E: *Other*

House Legislation

Vote No.	Bill Number and Description	Date of Vote	Voting Outcome	Implication for Exec. Policy
331	<b>Procedural Motion/Closed Session:</b> Issa, R-CA. privileged motion to go into closed session to discuss information from the President.	10-May	Motion Rejected 198-216	
364	<b>H.R. 1585 - Fiscal 2008 Defense Authorization/Iran Contingency:</b> Andrews, D-N.J. amendment that would prohibit funds authorized in the bill for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan from being used to plan a contingency operation in Iran.	16-May	Rejected in Committee of the Whole 202-216	Nay supported President
365	<b>H.R. 1585 - Fiscal 2008 Defense Authorization/Military Action Against Iran:</b> DeFazio, D-OR. Amendment that would clarify that no previously enacted law authorizes military action against Iran. It would prohibit the use of funds authorized in the bill or any other act to take military action against Iran without specific congressional authorization unless there is a national emergency created by an attack by Iran on the United States, its territories or possessions or its armed forces.	16-May	Rejected in Committee of the Whole 136-288	Nay supported President

Category E: *Other*, Continued:House Legislation, Con't.

Vote No.	Bill Title/Type and Description	Date of Vote (2007)	Voting Outcome	Political Implication
369	<b>H.R. 1585 - Fiscal 2008 Defense Authorization/Temporary Military Bases in Iraq:</b> King, R-IA. Amendment that would clarify that the bill's prohibition on the establishment of permanent military bases in Iraq should not be construed to prohibit the [U.S.] from establishing a temporary military base or installation by entering into a basing rights agreement with Iraq.	17-May	Rejected in Committee of the Whole 201-219	
717	<b>H.R. 2929 - Ban on Permanent Military Bases in Iraq/Passage:</b> Ackerman, D-N.Y. motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill that would prohibit the use of any funds made available by an act of Congress to establish any military installation or base for the permanent stationing of U.S. armed forces in Iraq, or exercise U.S. economic control of the oil resources of Iraq.	25-Jul	Motion agreed to 399-24 (two-thirds majority, 282 votes, required for passage)	

Senate Legislation

Vote No.	Bill Title/Type and Description	Date of Vote (2007)	Voting Outcome	Political Implication
248	<b>H.R. 1585 - 2008 Defense Authorization/Iraq Strategy:</b> Cornyn Amendment to Levin Substitute - expressing the sense of the Senate that the Senate should commit to a strategy not to "leave a failed state" in Iraq.	17-Jul	Adopted 94-3	
343	<b>H.R. 1585 - 2008 Defense Authorization/Support for U.S. Armed Forces:</b> Boxer, D-CA amendment to the Levin, D-MI substitute. The Boxer amendment would express the sense of the Senate to affirm strong support for those in the U.S. armed forces, and strongly condemn attacks on the honor, integrity and patriotism of any individual who is serving or has served honorably.	20-Sep	Rejected 50-47	
344	<b>H.R. 1585 - 2008 Defense Authorization/Support for Gen. Petraeus:</b> Cornyn, R-TX amendment to the Levin, D-MI substitute. The Cornyn amendment expressed the sense of the Senate to affirm support for Gen. David H. Petraeus; strongly condemn personal attacks on the honor and integrity of Petraeus and members of the U.S. armed forces; and repudiate an advertisement by MoveOn.org about Petraeus.	20-Sep	Adopted 72-25	

## Chapter 4 - Iraq War Voting Results in the House

### *Summary of Overall Voting Results*

The most striking result of the cross-tabulation analysis of House and Senate voting is that the chi-square correlations for both party identity (ID) codes and ADA scores with voting outcomes are very high, and indicative of strong influence on the part of both variables in voting. This means that we can reject the null hypothesis that each variable did not have a significant relationship to voting outcomes. The large sample size for each roll call vote in the House accounts for the very high chi-square numbers for that chamber. Phi-coefficient values for party and ideology were well into the range considered by Cohen (1988) to be of “large effect” in the correlations. The difference between party ID and ADA chi-square scores is also quite small, confirming that ideological beliefs about the war and party identity are closely linked. Strictly in terms of the chi-square and phi-coefficients, at a statistically-significant level party affiliation and ideology had essentially equivalent predictive power in voting on Iraq War issues during 2007.

At the same time, the slight differences between chi-square values for party ID and ADA correlations may have an important implication. We might assume that the consistently lower party ID chi-values are the result of cross-over voting that carried the contribution of the ADA scores of the defecting members (on one side of the chamber mean) over to the side of the vote contra-predictive of the ideological scoring of those defecting members. This would have the effect of (slightly) reducing the size of the correlation of party with the voting outcome. If one or more members of each party crossed the aisle, the overall chi-square value for party declined.

Because this effect happened more frequently for the party correlations, it suggests that ideology may be a slightly better predictor of voting on the war. Not only were the chi-square values for ADA scores somewhat higher in every vote, but if lower party correlations reflect cross-over voting, it may indicate that ideology, or some other consideration (such as constituent preferences), influenced decisions to defect from the party-line. In other words, decisions to vote the party line were more dependent on ideology than ideology on party loyalty. This applies to members of both parties.

Another analytical assumption is that the chi-square values and their associated phi-coefficients reflect the relative political significance of the votes. Higher chi-square values for both party and ADA scores represent more intense partisan and ideological contention over the vote: the higher the correlation values, the more divisive the vote. Lower values indicate that party loyalty and/or ideology were less crucial in the voting decision, and would not correlate as strongly with the voting outcomes.

Chi-square results for party ID and ADA scores were averaged for each issue area and summarized in Figure 4.1. The differences between those averages are quite small, and statistically insignificant in terms of indicating whether party or ideology played a leading role. However, they do vary between issue areas, indicating that votes on the troop surge and deployment interval proposals prompted the highest ADA and party chi-square values (were most divisive). Votes on issues less directly associated with war policy provoked the lowest chi-square and phi-coefficient values, indicative of less contention.

Figure 4.1: Average Chi-Square  $\chi^2$ , Phi-Coefficients  $\Phi$ , and Significance ( $t$ ) of Difference between Correlation Coefficients for Party and Ideology in the House

	Average N	Average Party $\chi^2$	$\Phi$ for Average Party $\chi^2$	Average ADA $\chi^2$	$\Phi$ for Average ADA $\chi^2$	Difference of $\chi^2$ Averages	Average $t$
<b>Issue A: Troop Levels (Surge Policy):</b>	426	<b>390.189</b>	0.957	<b>400.506</b>	0.970	<b>10.317</b>	-20.963
<b>Issue B: Setting a Withdrawal Date:</b>	419.75	<b>368.255</b>	0.937	<b>386.724</b>	0.960	<b>18.469</b>	-21.033
<b>Issue C: Deployment Interval:</b>	425.5	<b>391.264</b>	0.959	<b>401.081</b>	0.971	<b>9.839</b>	-21.143
<b>Issue D: Funding/Support:</b>	425	<b>389.975</b>	0.918	<b>397.114</b>	0.967	<b>7.140</b>	-21.025
<b>Category E: Other</b>	418.4	<b>235.924</b>	0.751	<b>260.897</b>	0.790	<b>24.974</b>	-18.864

Degrees of Freedom = 1, and  $p \leq .01$  for all Chi-Square values.

The most illuminating results of the project were obtained from the tests of significance performed on the difference between the correlation coefficients for party ID and ADA scores for each vote.<sup>152</sup> For every vote in the House, the value of each of the ADA Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients ( $r_{13}$ ) was consistently higher than the corresponding correlation for party affiliation ( $r_{12}$ ). The tests of significance for the *difference* between the correlations (Equation 1) were consistently negative, meaning that the ADA correlations were significantly stronger for explaining voting outcomes. When the values of the ADA correlation with vote outcome, the party correlation with vote outcome, and the correlation of party with ADA resulted in a negative value under the square root sign

<sup>152</sup> I am indebted to University Professor Mack C. Shelley, II, Director, Public Policy and Administration Program, Department of Political Science, Iowa State University, for suggesting, performing, and explaining the use of the test of significance between two nonindependent correlations. Professor Shelley performed the calculations by inputting the test equation (Equation 1) into SPSS in separate elements, and ran the data for the party ID and ADA score correlations through each element of the equation to build-up a complete solution for each roll-call vote. Professor Shelley performed the significance test on both the House and Senate voting data. The explanation of the test equation and calculation are his.

(which is an imaginary number, and hence not a calculable result), the sign of the determinant of the intercorrelation matrix,  $|R|$  was changed to produce a nonnegative value under the radical sign in Equation 1. The significant  $t$ -values range between -20.12 to -23.53 across all votes, where a value of  $t$  more negative than -2 or larger than positive 2 generally indicates a statistically significant result ( $p < 0.05$ ). The more negative the value of the  $t$ -result, the more significant the effect of ADA score (ideology) in the vote. No positive  $t$ -values occur for votes in the House on the Iraq War, meaning that ideology exceeded the contribution of party identity in every vote by a large margin.

$$t = (r_{12} - r_{13}) \sqrt{\frac{(N-1)(1+r_{23})}{2\left(\frac{N-1}{N-3}\right)|R| + \frac{(r_{12}+r_{13})^2}{4}(1-r_{23}^2)}} \quad \text{Equation 1}$$

where

$$|R| = (1 - r_{12}^2 - r_{13}^2 - r_{23}^2) + (2r_{12}r_{13}r_{23})$$

$r_{12}$  is the correlation between party and vote outcome;

$r_{13}$  is the correlation between ADA score and vote outcome;

$r_{23}$  is the correlation between party and ADA score.

$N$  is the number of roll-call votes recorded on each vote.

We can interpret the relatively higher chi-square values over the issues of *troop levels* (Issue A) and *deployment interval* (Issue C) as a reflection of how highly contentious those issues had become in the public arena. *Funding/Support* (Issue D), the third-highest chi-square correlation and a relatively mid-level source of conflict, may reflect the more complex political problem of voting against any legislation that threatened to interrupt funding of

forces already in Iraq. Votes against war funding always faced the political risk of appearing unsupportive of the troops, who have retained vast support across the electorate for their service and sacrifices. Although a large portion of opponents of the war were still willing to use funding measures as a tactic to end the war, the supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 2206) to continue operations to the full extent requested by the Pentagon passed by a narrow, but comfortable, margin with ten Democratic defections – including that of outspoken war opponent and Presidential candidate Dennis Kucinich (D. - 10<sup>th</sup> OH.).

The lowest chi-square averages (though still overwhelmingly “effective”) occurred for the fifth group, Category E (*Other*), which hints that for legislative questions not bearing directly on U.S. combat involvement in Iraq, the closeness of the correlation between party and ideology diverged. Category E legislation included post-war questions about the establishment of permanent bases in Iraq, use of Iraq’s economic resources, and the use of funding for military action against Iran. These issues were less directly concerned with the immediate debate over the scope of U.S. involvement, measured in political discourse by the number of troops involved in combat (although accusations about Iran’s involvement would have appeared to threaten an entirely new war). Numbers of troops had become the political metric of U.S. war policy.

On the whole, many more Democrats voted across the aisle at least once compared to Republicans, while many fewer Republicans than Democrats defected at least two or more times. The Republican minority had greater party solidarity than their counterparts. The average ADA score of those Republicans voting across party lines *two or more times* was 38.46; while the average score for Democrats defecting two or more times was 82.66. For all Republicans who defected *at least once* in any of the Iraq War votes, the average ADA score

was a much more Conservative 19.26; while the average for all Democrats defecting at least once was a lower (more Conservative) score of 77.0.

Figure 4.2: *Cross-Over Voting Averages in the House*

	2007 Party Average ADA Score <sup>153</sup>	Average ADA Score of Those Defecting Two or More Times	Average ADA Score of All Cross-Over Votes
<b>Democrats</b>	92%	82.66%	77.0%
<b>Republicans</b>	16%	38.46%	19.26%

The average Republican who defected from party line voting two or more times was over twice as liberal as the 2007 party average ADA score of 16 percent. However, across all Iraq War votes, many fewer Republicans (a total of 47 voting across aisle at least once) defected than the 75 Democrats who crossed party lines at least once. The average Democrat voting across the aisle was only ten percentage points more conservative than the party average of 92 percent. This suggests that liberal members were more susceptible than conservatives to being drawn away from their party's preferences – Democrats crossed the aisle more frequently to oppose measures to end the war than conservative Republicans could be drawn to support measures ending the war. Republicans appear to have maintained greater party and ideological discipline than Democrats.

### *Analysis of Voting Within Issue Categories*

The following sections will examine voting results within each issue category. The idea here is that the party and ideological chi-square correlations correspond to the political significance of each piece of legislation. Hypothetically, higher values reflect greater partisan

<sup>153</sup> Average party ADA scores for 2007 were drawn from the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) website at: [www.adaction.org/media/voting\\_records/2007.pdf](http://www.adaction.org/media/voting_records/2007.pdf)

and ideological contention on the issue, while lower values move (ever so slightly) in the direction of bipartisanship.

*Issue A: Troop Levels (Surge Policy)*

Vote No.	Bill Number and Title	N Voting	Voting Outcome	Party $\chi^2$	Party $\Phi$	ADA $\chi^2$	ADA $\Phi$	<i>t</i>
96	H.Con.Res. 63 - Iraq War/Previous Question:	425	Agreed, 227-197	413.035	0.986	415.489	0.989	-20.87
97	H.Con.Res. 63 - Iraq War/Rule:	425	Adopted 232-192	401.197	0.972	411.275	0.984	-20.88
99	H.Con.Res. 63 - Iraq War/Adoption:	428	Adopted 246-182	356.335	0.912	374.754	0.936	-21.14

The question of troop levels in Iraq concerned the surge policy announced by President Bush in January, 2007. The only votes available for sampling in this category consisted of decisions on a non-binding concurrent resolution, H. Con. Res. 63, a non-legislative expression of opposition to increasing the number of U.S. forces in Iraq. As indicated in the chart for this category, all passed. Democratic Majority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D. - 8<sup>th</sup> CA.) voted with Republicans on February 13th in opposing the first two votes on the measure, but in the final vote joined fellow Democrats for the resolution's final passage. Final passage was supported by seventeen Republicans – the second highest number of Republicans voting with Democrats among any of the Iraq War votes. The large number of Republican defectors in that particular vote skewed the chi-square averages for both party and ADA below the average for the issue category as a whole. The early days of the surge policy were fraught with uncertainty, which probably explains the level of Republican wavering. Republican party defectors would have been able to claim some loyalty to the party position on the first two votes, but satisfy constituent opposition to increasing involvement in Iraq in the final vote.

Issue B: *Setting a Withdrawal Date*

Vote No.	Bill Number and Title	N Voting	Voting Outcome	Party $\chi^2$	Party $\Phi$	ADA $\chi^2$	ADA $\Phi$	t
264	H.R. 1591 - Fiscal 2007 Supplemental/Conference Report:	422	Adopted 226-195	402.200	0.976	413.155	0.989	-20.84
265	H.R. 1591 - Fiscal 2007 Supplemental/Conference Report:	426	Adopted 218-208 (Sent to Senate)	369.002	0.931	391.611	0.959	-21.11
276	H.R. 1591 - Fiscal 2007 Supplemental/Conference Report: Passage (over President Bush's May 1, 2007 veto - Two-thirds majority, 284 votes, required to over-ride veto)	425	Rejected 222-203	389.874	0.958	408.523	0.98	-21.01
329	H.R. 2237 - Iraq Troop Withdrawal/Recommit:	428	Motion Rejected 210-218	371.012	0.931	384.981	0.948	-21.18
330	H.R. 2237 - Iraq Troop Withdrawal/Passage:	426	Rejected 171-255	235.754	0.744	301.274	0.841	-22.23
620	H.R. 2956 - Iraq Redeployment/Previous Question:	423	Motion agreed to 225-197	403.221	0.976	411.641	0.986	-21.00
621	H.R. 2956 - Iraq Redeployment/Rule:	418	Adopted 221-196	394.557	0.972	398.439	0.976	-20.89
624	H.R. 2956 - Iraq Redeployment/Passage:	424	Passed 223-201	369.929	0.934	394.167	0.964	-21.31
1103	H.R. 4156 - Iraq War Supplemental Appropriations/Previous Question:	394	Agreed to 209-185	383.130	0.986	383.150	0.986	-20.12
1104	H.R. 4156 - Iraq War Supplemental Appropriations/Rule:	409	Adopted 219-190	386.531	0.972	396.286	0.984	-20.53
1107	H.R. 4156 - Iraq War Supplemental Appropriations/Recommit:	422	Motion rejected 192-231	364.683	0.929	381.383	0.951	-21.04
1108	H.R. 4156 - Iraq War Supplemental Appropriations/Passage:	420	Passed 218-203	349.172	0.912	376.079	0.946	-21.05

As the size of the preceding chart indicates - simply on the basis of the number of votes taken on the issue - the setting of a withdrawal date was the most contested legislative battleground in both House and Senate voting on the war. The 2006 elections pivoted on public anticipation of Congress deciding a clear exit strategy and/or specific end-date to the war. Setting a withdrawal date would have most directly fulfilled electoral sentiments.

Within the structure of voting on withdrawal proposals however, just enough Democrats crossed the aisle to vote against setting a specific timetable. The earlier, or more rapid, the withdrawal proposal, the larger the number of Democratic Party defectors, although most withdrawal-related measures passed the House (they did not necessarily pass the Senate in the same form). Ideology dominated party affiliation as evidence by the large negative values of the tests of significance ( $t$ ) in all withdrawal votes.

The passage vote on H.R. 2237 (vote 330), the Iraq Troop Withdrawal Bill, resulted in the highest  $t$ -value (-22.23) among all votes on the Iraq War in the House. This vote is also notable as garnering the defection of 58 Democrats - the largest Democratic defection in any vote on Iraq War legislation in the House. This bill bundled together a requirement to begin withdrawal 90 days after enactment, to be completed only 90 days later (180 days after enactment), with an anti-surge provision stipulating force levels could not rise beyond the level deployed on January 1, 2007, prior to the surge. Democratic opponents of the bill voting with Republicans were either persuaded by the Pentagon that such a move was impractical, especially as the surge buildup was already well underway by the time of the vote on May 10<sup>th</sup>, or the President's argument against leaving Iraq a failed state was gaining traction. The bill did not come to the floor of the Senate because the Democratic leadership considered it unlikely to pass. In any case, the rejection of early withdrawal proposals due to Democratic defections was a clear indication that a rapid end to U.S. involvement would not pass before the Petraeus-Crocker report on results of the surge strategy, scheduled for September 15<sup>th</sup>.

The most dramatic confrontation with the White House occurred on May 2<sup>nd</sup> for the attempt to override the President's veto of H.R. 1591, the Fiscal 2007 Supplemental. Apart

from providing an additional \$124.2 billion for the war, the bill initially passed April 25<sup>th</sup> with language requiring the redeployment of most combat troops out of Iraq by March 2008, if Iraq's government was meeting benchmarks, and by the end of 2007 if benchmarks were not being met. The override attempt was a numerically-close vote of 222-203, but nowhere near the two-thirds majority of 284 votes needed. Seven Democrats joined Republicans, while two of the most consistent Republican Party defectors, Wayne Gilchrest (R.-1<sup>st</sup> MD.) and Walter Jones (R.-3<sup>rd</sup> N.C.), voted with Democratic war opponents. Defecting Democrats may have been influenced by electoral considerations. The seven Democrats voting against the override attempt were John Barrow (D.-12<sup>th</sup> GA.), Dan Boren (D.-2<sup>nd</sup> OK.), Lincoln Davis (D.-4<sup>th</sup> TN.), Jim Marshall (D.-8<sup>th</sup> GA.), Jim Matheson (D.-2<sup>nd</sup> UT.), Michael McNulty (D.-21<sup>st</sup> N.Y.), and Gene Taylor (D.-4<sup>th</sup> MS.). With the exception of Michael McNulty's district in N.Y., all of his other co-defecting Democratic colleagues were from relatively Conservative districts in Conservative-leaning ("Red") Southern states.

*Issue C: Deployment Interval:*

Vote No.	Bill Number and Title	N Voting	Voting Outcome	Party $\chi^2$	Party $\Phi$	ADA $\chi^2$	ADA $\Phi$	<i>t</i>
793	H.R. 3159 - Troop Deployment Policy/Previous Question:	427	Motion agreed to 225-201	411.234	0.981	415.247	0.986	-21.09
794	H.R. 3159 - Troop Deployment Policy/Rule:	425	Adopted 224-200	405.244	0.976	409.696	0.982	-21.05
795	H.R. 3159 - Troop Deployment Policy/Recommit:	425	Motion Rejected 207-217	367.681	0.930	384.363	0.951	-21.34
796	H.R. 3159 - Troop Deployment Policy/Passage:	425	Passed 229-194	380.896	0.947	395.016	0.964	-21.09

The second most contentious debate was over troop rotation intervals, and all votes in this category were taken on legislation specifically addressing the issue: the Troop Deployment Policy bill, H.R. 3159. Here, the significance (*t*) of ADA scoring was

consistently high – exceeding negative 21 in all votes (the high chi-square and phi values reinforce the significance levels).

The closer accountability of Representatives to constituents in their districts serving in the military, and their families, may have offered at least a partial electoral incentive to decrease the frequency of deployments. And from the standpoint of electoral risks traditionally associated with challenging Presidential leadership in wartime, the passage of any legislated rotation intervals would have been viewed as a more acceptable way to impede war policy by elevating concern for the welfare of troops above justifications for continuing the war. Along with efforts to set a withdrawal date, or withhold funding, the deployment interval issue presented a potent “third way” to challenge the ability of the President to pursue the surge strategy, thus provoking tighter (more divisive) party and ideology correlations.

*Issue D: Funding/Support:*

Vote No.	Bill Number and Title	N Voting	Voting Outcome	Party $\chi^2$	Party $\Phi$	ADA $\chi^2$	ADA $\Phi$	<i>t</i>
332	H.R. 2206 - Fiscal 2007 Supplemental/ Recommit:	424	Motion Rejected 195-229	400.186	0.972	406.890	0.98	-20.96
333	H.R. 2206 - Fiscal 2007 Supplemental/ Passage:	426	Passed 221-205	379.763	0.944	387.338	0.953	-21.09

As mentioned above, all funding requests for war operations were passed in House voting. But how difficult were funding bills to oppose? How steep was the perceived political cost of voting to use Congressional control of the “purse strings” as a way to end the war, given the esteem in which the U.S. military is held in contemporary American society? The answer seems to be “not very steep”. Party chi-square and phi-coefficients are as tightly-

related to voting outcomes as the more contested issues. This means that ideological opponents of the war were willing to vote against funding to stop the war regardless of the President's argument that starving operations of funds would reflect disregard for troops in combat.

The first vote on H.R. 2206 directly concerned benchmark reporting. The vote was on a motion to recommit the bill to the Armed Services Committee for deletion of language requiring a second vote to release funds after the President reported to Congress on Iraqi Government progress toward meeting the benchmarks. The recommit proposal was defeated in a tightly-partisan vote of 195-229 on May 10<sup>th</sup>. May was still early in the surge strategy, and progress toward stability remained ambiguous. During the first half of 2007, it was still not clear (and perhaps remains ambiguous to date) that the benchmarks could be met, or would provide the Administration sufficient leverage to force substantive gains in Iraq's political progress. The fear among the President's supporters was that the benchmarks could not be effectively implemented by Iraq's leadership, and would inevitably be used to increase pressure for withdrawal. Once it became clear that benchmark reporting requirements had sufficient bipartisan support, the supplemental appropriation passed 221-205. Two-hundred and five members apparently voted against final passage hoping to halt the war through funding measures.

Category E – all other legislation not falling within the subject matter of the other four issue areas – contained some of the lowest Chi-Square and phi-coefficient effect levels, as well as the highest significance levels (*t*) for the difference between variable correlations. The lower chi-square and phi-coefficients can be interpreted as representing the greatest departures from the influence of party and ideology. As previously mentioned, it may also

suggest that issues broader than U.S. combat involvement in Iraq *per se*, were (and generally may be) not as ideologically-provocative and thus amenable to broader bipartisan agreement.

Category E: *Other*:

Vote No.	Bill Number and Title	N Voting	Voting Outcome	Party $\chi^2$	Party $\Phi$	ADA $\chi^2$	ADA $\Phi$	<i>t</i>
331	Procedural Motion/Closed Session:	415	Motion Rejected 198-216	399.257	0.981	396.337	0.977	-20.73
364	H.R. 1585 - Fiscal 2008 Defense Authorization/ Iran Contingency: Vote in the Committee of the Whole	416	Rejected 202-216	288.633	0.833	318.990	0.876	-20.70
365	H.R. 1585 - Fiscal 2008 Defense Authorization/Military Action Against Iran: Voting in the Committee of the Whole	421	Rejected 136-288	132.060	0.560	177.390	0.649	-23.53
369	H.R. 1585 - Fiscal 2008 Defense Authorization/Temporary Military Bases in Iraq: Voting in the Committee of the Whole	417	Rejected 201-219	330.200	0.890	343.979	0.908	-21.04
717	H.R. 2929 - Ban on Permanent Military Bases in Iraq/Passage: (two-thirds majority, 282 votes, required for passage)	423	Motion agreed to 399-24	29.468	0.294	67.791	0.4	-8.32

Category E contained two votes that sought to influence Administration decisions about Iran (in relation to Iraq War funding) which may be suggestive of House attitudes toward more traditional state-to-state military tensions in international politics beyond the politicized glare of the Iraq War. The first vote, on an amendment to H.R. 1585, the Fiscal 2008 Defense Authorization bill, sponsored by Robert Andrews (D. – 1<sup>st</sup> N.J.), would have prohibited funds authorized for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan from being used to plan contingency operations [against] Iran. The amendment was rejected by a vote of 202-216, preserving Presidential prerogatives, with thirty Democrats crossing the aisle to support the President’s position. At that time, U.S. military officials were publicizing the discovery of Iranian-manufactured munitions used by Iraqi insurgents, and with growing concern in the

world diplomatic community about the implications of Iran's nuclear program for the region, especially Israel, a larger number of Democrats may have been persuaded to keep Administration options open.

The second Iran-related vote was for another amendment to H.R. 1585 that would have prohibited any "military action" against Iran with funds authorized in any other bill without Congressional authorization. This amendment garnered less bipartisan support in being rejected - but none-the-less narrowly preserved Executive options. House lawmakers were more supportive of "planning" than "action", seeking to limit U.S. regional involvement while also leaving the Executive options to deal with any Iranian military initiative. The difference in wording between "planning" and "action" had a substantial ideological significance in boosting the  $t$  value for the vote to a (quite strong) negative 23.53.

Iraq War voting results in the House have been analyzed in terms of how variation in the chi-square values and tests of significance between the party ID and ADA correlations related to the political content of legislation. As the political parties and House districts have become more ideologically homogenous, and those elected increasingly reflective of district party and ideological preferences, lawmakers are freer to vote their ideological preferences in electoral safety. Widespread public opposition to the war by 2007 meant that all Democrats, representing the party "brand" opposed to the war, were free to challenge all aspects of White House war policy (the exception being the few Democrats from traditionally conservative Southern districts or districts with a military base or industry). The dominance of ideology (ADA scores) indicated by the negative  $t$ -statistics of all House votes on the Iraq War may also be interpreted as further evidence of the growing extent of the polarization of the electorate.

Cross-over voting on issues was also attributed here to variation in the value and magnitude of the chi-square and  $t$  statistics. However, changes in those statistics likely depend on the number of party members crossing the aisle, and the particular composition of values of the ADA scores they carried.

## CHAPTER 5 - Iraq War Voting in the Senate

### *Summary of Overall Voting Results*

Like the cross-tabulation analysis of House voting, the chi-square correlations for both party ID and ADA scores in the Senate are very high, and very significant - meaning that we can reject the null hypothesis that either variable did not have a significant relationship to voting outcomes. The smaller sample sizes of each vote (no greater than 100 votes in the chamber) account for the chi-square values being approximately one-quarter those in the House (roughly proportional to the difference in the size of the membership in each chamber). Phi-coefficient values for party and ideology were also well into the range considered by Cohen (1988) to be of “large effect” in the correlations. The differences between party ID and ADA chi-square scores are also quite small, confirming that ideological beliefs about the war and party identity are closely linked. As an overall interpretation of the chi-square statistics, party affiliation and ideology had essentially equivalent predictive power in voting on Iraq War issues in the Senate.

However, there is a slightly-wider difference between chi-square values for party and ideology in the Senate. Although the difference remains statistically insignificant, it is larger than the House results. If that wider difference in chi-square values is interpreted as representing a greater level of independence for the party ID and ideology variables in Senate decision-making, then it may reflect the unique institutional traits of that chamber. In comparison with the House, this includes the greater decision-making autonomy of Senators afforded by six-year terms, more ideologically-diverse statewide constituencies, more numerous Constitutional responsibilities in foreign policy (and a correspondingly greater

attentiveness, exposure, and expertise in international affairs), and somewhat greater electoral (and ideological) independence from party organizations.

Another analytical premise used in the previous chapter to evaluate the House results may also apply to the Senate: the differences in chi-square values between the party ID and ADA correlations may correspond to cross-over voting. The consistently lower party ID scores might reflect the proportionally greater effect of each cross-over vote in the Senate given the smaller sample (chamber) size, while the ADA scores carried by party defectors added correspondingly greater strength to the correlations for ideology. Again, this suggests that on the whole, ideology may be a marginally better predictor of voting on the war (though not necessarily due to proportionately larger ADA chi-square scores).

A comparison of chi-square averages between the issue categories summarized in Figure 5.1 reveals that roll-call votes on non-legislative resolutions opposing the surge strategy (in Issue A: *Troop Levels*), and for deployment interval amendments (Issue C) were the most partisan and ideological of the Iraq War votes in the Senate. The guiding hypothesis for House voting on the withdrawal issue (Issue B) was that it signified the most direct policy for ending the war, and was therefore highly contested. However, the same issue category provoked somewhat lower absolute levels of partisan and ideological tension in the Senate compared to voting in the House.

Once again, the most revealing research results are the diverse range of  $t$ -values generated by the difference tests between the correlation coefficients for party ID and ADA scores - especially the mix of valences among those figures.<sup>154</sup> Unlike the House,  $t$  in the

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<sup>154</sup> As with the results of the difference tests between correlation coefficients for party ID and ADA scores with voting results in the House, presented in the previous chapter, Professor Mack C. Shelley, II also performed the calculations to derive  $t$ -values for the Senate voting data, presented in this chapter.

Senate varies considerably, and includes positive values that indicate partisanship played a relatively stronger, though often indeterminate, role in Senate decision-making. Roll-call votes in the catch-all Category E actually averaged *greater* statistically-significant influence for party affiliation.

Figure 5.1: Average Chi-Square  $\chi^2$ , Phi-Coefficients  $\Phi$ , and Significance ( $t$ ) of Difference between Correlation Coefficients for Party and Ideology in the Senate

	Average N	Average Party $\chi^2$	$\Phi$ for Average Party $\chi^2$	Average ADA $\chi^2$	$\Phi$ for Average ADA $\chi^2$	Difference of $\chi^2$ Averages	$t$
<b>Issue A: Troop Levels (Surge Policy):</b>	92	70.966	0.880	86.434	0.970	15.468	-11.17
<b>Issue B: Setting a Withdrawal Date:</b>	96.714	58.861	0.780	70.255	0.852	11.394	-9.391
<b>Issue C: Deployment Interval:</b>	97	72.873	0.867	83.805	0.929	10.932	+2.044
<b>Issue D: Funding/Support:</b>	95.6	28.783	0.549	37.599	0.627	8.816	-1.458
<b>Category E: Other</b>	96	41.436	0.657	46.833	0.698	5.397	+4.48

Degrees of Freedom ( $df$ ) = 1, and  $\rho \leq .01$  for all Chi-Square values.

Positive  $t$ -values would be due to the Pearson product-moment correlation for party affiliation ( $r_{12}$ ) being greater than the corresponding correlation for ADA scores and voting outcomes ( $r_{13}$ ) – not only resulting in a positive value for the determinant of the intercorrelation matrix  $|R|$  under the radical sign in Equation 1 (Chapter 4, page 110), but also a positive value for the multiplicative factor ( $r_{12} - r_{13}$ ). Many  $t$ -values (including some of the positive figures) fall within a range that provides no statistically-significant indication of the primacy of either party ID or ADA scores in voting decisions (within the interval greater than -2 and less than positive 2, for which  $p > 0.05$ ). For many votes in the Senate, neither party identity nor ADA scoring were dominant in voting decisions, in comparison with the primacy of ideology in every vote in the House. The Pearson product-moment values for

party ID and ADA scores in those votes were very close, resulting in smaller  $t$ -values that fell within the interval of having no statistical significance.

There is a chronological pattern in the distribution of  $t$ -values for voting in the Senate. Votes earlier in 2007 on the surge, setting a withdrawal date, and funding are dominated by the significance of ideology (ADA scores) – though not to levels consistently attained in the House. As Figure 5.1 (and the statistics for individual votes in each of the separate issue categories presented below), the strongest ideological influence occurs for votes *prior* to the Petraeus-Crocker report in mid-September. This is also reflected in the differences between chi-square values for the average party and ADA scores, where the greatest difference occurs for the (early 2007) issue of the surge. Despite the fact that some of the highest chi-square values for ideology occurred for troop deployment votes, the difference in Pearson product-moment values between the party and ADA correlation coefficients in that issue category were small, and resulted in  $t$  values indeterminate of the significance of either party ID or ideology (having values within the interval of no statistical significance,  $p > 0.05$ ).

The cautiously positive report on the progress of the surge that General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker presented September 15-16 appears to have undercut support for troop withdrawals or deployment/rotation and funding constraints on the surge strategy. The chronological gradient of  $t$ -values and chi-square/phi-coefficient statistics may reflect the changing intensity of uncertainty about the war, which declined from its height in the emotionally-charged weeks following the President's announcement of the surge strategy, to a state of cautious optimism after the September 15<sup>th</sup> report. Accumulating evidence of ebbing violence and changing loyalties among Sunni insurgents against al-Qaeda began to offer early hope that the surge would succeed. A substantial reservoir of opposition to the

war remained in the electorate (unalterably-so the further to the Left), and it is likely that the Democratic leadership turned to a more partisan strategy and discourse to sustain opposition to White House policy in order to keep anti-war voters in the party fold for the upcoming 2008 elections.

Figure 5.2 presents the comparison of ADA averages for those voting across the aisle. The average Republican who defected from party-line voting two or more times was about seventy-five percent more liberal than the 2007 party average ADA score of 20 percent.<sup>155</sup> Somewhat in contrast with the House results (and in proportion to chamber membership size), a larger portion of the Republican Caucus voted across party lines on all Iraq War votes - though a greater total number of Democrats defected. Importantly, the average Democrat voting across the aisle more than once carried almost exactly the same ADA score as the chamber Democratic average. What this tells us is that pressure to uphold Administration policy penetrated further through the ideological distribution of Democrats – Democrats were more factionalized, at least in a statistical sense. Pressure to defect from the President never reached the mid-range of the Republican distribution. We can infer that Republicans were more unified than Democrats on the war issue - party and ideology were more overlapping.

Figure 5.2: *Cross-Over Voting Averages in the Senate*

	<b>2007 Party Average ADA Score</b>	<b>Average ADA Score of Those Defecting Two or More Times</b>	<b>Average ADA Score of All Cross-Over Votes</b>
<b>Democrats</b>	87%	87.22%	86.388%
<b>Republicans</b>	20%	34.62%	25.75%

<sup>155</sup> Average party ADA scores for 2007 were drawn from the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) website at: [www.adaction.org/media/voting\\_records/2007.pdf](http://www.adaction.org/media/voting_records/2007.pdf)

The lowest Party and ADA correlations occurred for funding and support votes, for much the same reason given for continued support of war funding in the House: reluctance to have votes against funding be viewed as endangering troops in the field. This idea is re-examined for that category more closely below.

### *Analysis of Voting Within Issue Categories*

Like the previous review of House data, voting results in the Senate will also be examined on a category-by-category basis. Similarly, the values of the party and ideological chi-square correlations are assumed to correspond to the political significance of each piece of legislation, with higher values reflecting greater partisan and ideological contention on the issue, and lower values signifying somewhat greater bipartisanship.

#### Issue A: Troop Levels (Surge Policy)

Vote No.	Bill Number and Title	N	Voting Outcome	Party $\chi^2$	Party $\Phi$	ADA $\chi^2$	ADA $\Phi$	<i>t</i>
44	<b>S.470 - U.S. Troop Levels in Iraq/Cloture:</b> (Cloture always requires 60 votes.)	95	Rejected 49-47	80.667	0.921	87.830	0.962	-11.58
51	<b>S.574 - Iraq War/Cloture:</b>	89	Rejected 56-34	61.265	0.830	85.037	0.977	-10.76

As with voting in the House, the two pieces of legislation responding to the troop surge strategy in the Senate were non-legislative measures to express the chamber's position on the surge policy. Senate Republicans voted against both measures (a "nay" vote supported the President's position). The first vote, a cloture motion on S.470, drew Republican opposition to language in the bill opposing "deepen[ed] U.S. involvement" with the troop increase. It was one of the closest votes on Iraq War legislation in the Senate sample at 49-47 (though eleven votes short of the required 60 votes needed for passage of cloture in the

Senate). Two of the most centrist (or liberal) Republicans in the Senate - Maine's Susan M. Collins (ADA score 55), and Minnesota's Norm Coleman (ADA score 50) - voted with Democrats. Senators' Joseph Lieberman and Majority Leader Harry Reid joined Republicans. The two-for-two exchange virtually nullified any change in the strength of Party chi-square and phi-coefficient values, while the centrist Republican cross-over votes added strength to the ADA correlation below the chamber mean. Ideology played the most significant role, indicated by the negative *t*-statistic (-11.58).

The second vote, on a cloture motion for S.574, likely drew Republican opposition to benchmark reporting requirements that would have required the President to report on military progress every 30 days. As previously observed, all efforts to legislatively mandate Administration accountability were resisted by the President's supporters as an encroachment on Executive prerogative. Senator Reid's vote with Republicans was likely a procedural tactic to ensure that the legislation could be revisited at a later time. In this vote, seven Republican senators - including John Warner (R.,-VA.), possessing a mid-range Conservative ADA score of 35, and considerable stature among both moderates and conservatives in his party - voted with the Democrats.<sup>156</sup> Warner had actually co-authored the law requiring Administration reports in July and September that passed with a supplemental war spending bill earlier in the spring.

Greater variance in voting on the issue of setting a withdrawal date (category B) occurred in the Senate, compared to the House. As indicated by the *t*-values, ideology remained a potent influence in voting on withdrawal proposals, but it also varied widely, ranging from a statistically-insignificant positive 1.13, to a weighty -29.41 – the strongest

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<sup>156</sup> Nather, David, "A Last-Ditch Plea to a Wavering Party", *CQ Weekly*, July 16, 2007, p.2094-2096.

manifestation of ideological influence among all Senate Iraq War votes. That particular vote occurred May 16<sup>th</sup> for a motion to invoke cloture on debate over an amendment by Senator Feingold to the Water Resources Development Act Reauthorization, H.R. 1495, and likely reflected the anger of members on both sides of the aisle by holding a non-war-related piece of legislation hostage to the withdrawal issue (the motion failed 29-67).

*Issue B: Setting a Withdrawal Date*

Vote No.	Bill Number and Title	N	Voting Outcome	Party $\chi^2$	Party $\Phi$	ADA $\chi^2$	ADA $\Phi$	<i>t</i>
74	S. J. Res. 9 - Iraq Mission/Cloture	97	Agreed to, 89-9	9.910	0.320	33.508	0.588	-3.53
75	Iraq Mission/Passage:	97	Rejected 48-50	82.812	0.924	90.303	0.965	-11.67
147	H.R. 1591 - Fiscal 2007 Supplemental/Conference Report	96	Adopted 51-46	85.391	0.943	89.313	0.965	-11.44
167	H.R. 1495 - Water Resources Development Act Reauthorization / Cloture	95	Motion failed 29-67	41.690	0.662	53.900	0.753	-29.41
252	H.R. 1585 - Fiscal 2008 Defense Authorization/Cloture	98	Motion Rejected 52-47	76.575	0.884	87.805	0.947	-11.22
345	H.R. 1585 - 2008 Defense Authorization/U.S. Troop Redeployment from Iraq	97	Rejected 28-70	40.119	0.643	46.673	0.694	1.13
411	H.R. 4156 - Iraq War Supplemental Appropriations/Cloture	97	Motion Rejected 53-45	75.532	0.882	90.282	0.965	0.40

In the largest cross-aisle migration of the issue category, twenty-one Democrats joined Republicans to reject another amendment by Sen. Feingold (D., WI.) to the 2008 Defense Authorization bill (H.R. 1585) that would have mandated one of the most expedited withdrawal requirements put forward to that date. It is likely Democratic crossovers did not want to derail a spending package crucial to a wider variety of defense programs. Democrats voting with the President tended to come from either relatively Conservative (Red) states,

such as Arkansas (both Democratic Senators), Indiana (Sen. Evan Bayh) and Montana (both Democratic Senators); or from states with substantial defense industries or military bases such as Florida (Sen. Bill Nelson), Missouri (Sen. Claire McCaskill), North Dakota (Sen. Kent Conrad), and Virginia (Sen. James Webb, a leading Democratic critic of the war and highly credible with the rank and file by virtue of decorated military service, and tenure as Navy Secretary in the Reagan Administration, voted with the President). Here again, electoral calculations appear to have been robustly competitive with party allegiance and ideology in voting decisions, given how Iraq War-related language was shared with other legislative content in each vote.

The issue of setting a specific withdrawal date revolved around the expected report on the surge by General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, scheduled for mid-September (presented on September 15<sup>th</sup>). Prior to September, a core dispute between Republicans and Democrats emerged over whether to pass withdrawal legislation before or after the report. An attempt at compromise was offered by Sen. John Warner and Richard Lugar that would have required the Administration to present a withdrawal plan by mid-October if the Petraeus-Crocker report did not show that the surge was effective. Senator Warner, an opinion leader on defense matters on both sides of the aisle, holding an ADA score of 35% in 2007, voted across the aisle twice, raising substantial concerns in the Administration over how many Republicans would follow. Lugar, perhaps the most respected voice on foreign policy in the Senate, and with an ADA score of 45% in 2007, probably captured the sentiments of other centrist Republicans when he stated in a floor speech on June 25<sup>th</sup>: “In my judgment, the costs and risks of continuing down the current path outweigh the potential benefits that might be achieved. Persisting indefinitely with the

surge strategy will delay policy adjustments that have a better chance of protecting our vital interests over the long term.”<sup>157</sup> Democrats did not want to wait until the Petraeus-Crocker report. But former Democratic Rep. Lee Hamilton, co-chair of the Iraq Study Group, urged fellow Democrats to support the Warner-Lugar compromise if a withdrawal deadline could not be passed before mid-September. In opposing the Warner-Lugar proposal, Majority Whip Dick Durban (D., IL.) explained that: “I like Lee Hamilton, and certainly value his counsel, but I want American troops to start coming home. Anything short of a timetable is interesting, but not effective”<sup>158</sup> The Democratic leadership clearly recognized that their caucus could be easily divided over waiting for the September report, and must have feared Lee Hamilton’s remark would have substantial credence in suggesting that any withdrawal plan was unlikely to get past the Republican minority before September.

Senator Lugar never voted with Democrats, but his statement was indicative of a wider uncertainty among Republicans about prospects for the surge. Unfortunately, the present research cannot account for how many Republicans were willing to wait for the September report on the progress of the surge – but were prepared to vote for withdrawal if the surge had not started to show some progress toward reducing violence.

By most accounts, the pivotal “showdown” vote on the withdrawal issue occurred during an overnight session July 17-18 when Republicans held the line to prevent passage of a cloture motion (vote number 252) to close debate on an amendment to H.R. 1585 by Senator Carl Levin (D., MI.), chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, requiring a draw-down

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<sup>157</sup> “Key GOP Senator Says Iraq Strategy Not Working: In Blow to Bush, Lugar Calls for New Approach that Downsizes Military’s Role”, *Associated Press*, Tuesday, June 26, 2007; posted at [www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19426648](http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19426648) (Author not given in byline).

<sup>158</sup> Donnelly, John M. and Adam Graham-Silverman, “Reid Shelves Troop Proposal”, *CQ Weekly*, July 23, 2007, p. 2187.

and redeployment of forces by April, 2008. The next vote for withdrawal did not occur until September 20<sup>th</sup> - the week after the Petraeus-Crocker report. This time, an amendment by Senator Feingold that expanded the timeframe and terms of withdrawal was rejected 28-70. The dramatic difference in numbers, on a proposal allowing more time in favor of Administration policy for redeployment, and relaxing other funding conditions (in comparison to the previous Levin amendment), was opposed by 21 Democrats – including Levin – and is reflected in the low Party and ADA chi-square correlations. This constitutes some of the clearest evidence that the Petraeus-Crocker report succeeded in allaying fears about the surge.

Despite Senator Russell Feingold's (D.-WI.) determined efforts to obtain the earliest start on the withdrawal process – the issue may simply not have been as crucial to Senate electoral fortunes as the issue was for Representatives. Most Republican Senators who did cross the aisle to support setting specific redeployment proposals faced 2008 reelection races. Republicans Coleman (R., MN.), Collins (R., ME.), Hagel (R., NE.), Smith (R., OR.), Snowe (R., ME.), Sununu (R., N.H.), and Voinovich (R., OH.) all voted consistently with Democrats on withdrawal legislation. With the exception of Olympia Snowe, who was not facing an upcoming race, the remaining Republican defectors faced reelection in the coming cycle in more Liberal-leaning (“Blue”) states. Senator Joseph Lieberman was the only Democrat to defect in four out of five of the votes on the issue. The large number of Republican crossover votes diluted the strength of Party and ADA values.

Issue C: *Deployment Interval:*

Vote No.	Bill Number and Title	N	Voting Outcome	Party $\chi^2$	Party $\Phi$	ADA $\chi^2$	ADA $\Phi$	<i>t</i>
241	H.R. 1585 - Fiscal 2008 Authorization/Cloture:	96	Motion Rejected 56-41	68.572	0.845	85.560	0.944	0.87
243	H.R. 1585 - 2008 Defense Authorization/Troop Deployments:	96	Rejected 52-45	81.768	0.923	87.283	0.954	0.06
244	H.R. 1585 - 2008 Defense Authorization/Troop Deployments:	95	Rejected 41-55	67.651	0.844	77.949	0.906	2.77
341	H.R. 1585 - 2008 Defense Authorization/Troop Deployments:	99	Rejected 56-44	74.654	0.868	88.670	0.946	1.50
342	H.R. 1585 - 2008 Defense Authorization/Troop Deployments:	99	Rejected 55-45	71.719	0.851	79.564	0.896	5.02

Legislation regarding the deployment interval of troops in Iraq was the second-most contested issue in the Senate. All votes were taken on amendments to the important 2008 Defense Authorization bill, H.R. 1585. Ostensibly, the debate was about relieving the stress of repetitive rotations to Iraq on U.S. troops. Politically however, the issue had the potential to limit the President's options in implementing the surge strategy if legislatively mandated rotation intervals reduced the availability of ground force units. It therefore became a critical battleground in the struggle to restrain Administration policy.

Senator James Webb (D., VA.) was the leading Democratic proponent of setting rotation intervals. The first vote on the issue, to invoke cloture on Webb's amendment, which included a mandate that active duty forces be guaranteed as much time home as served while deployed, took place on July 11<sup>th</sup> and was narrowly defeated by the bare minimum of 41 Republican votes needed to defeat legislation requiring a 60-vote majority (in fact, the 56-41 outcome would not have resulted in passage even if three more Republicans had defected). With the exception of John Warner and Olympia Snowe, four of the most liberal and

electorally-vulnerable Republicans once again crossed the aisle: Collins (R., ME.), Hagel (R., NE.), Smith (R., OR.), and Sununu (R. N.H.).

Senator Chuck Hagel (R., NE.), the most vocal Republican opponent of the surge strategy, offered an amendment that sought to limit deployment schedules from a different angle – by setting limits on the time troops could be deployed: 12 months maximum for Army/National Guard forces, and 7 months for Marine units. This amendment was also narrowly rejected on a less bipartisan basis, 52-45, with only four Republicans crossing the aisle. Where ideology had been particular strong in House voting on the deployment/rotation bill (H.R. 3159), neither variable dominated consideration of the various amendments that Senators Hagel, Levin, McCain, and Webb attempted to attach to the Fiscal 2008 Defense Authorization bill, H.R. 1585.

Issue D: *Funding/Support:*

Vote No.	Bill Number and Title	N	Voting Outcome	Party $\chi^2$	Party $\Phi$	ADA $\chi^2$	ADA $\Phi$	<i>t</i>
76	S.Res. 107 - U.S. Troop Support and Veterans/Adoption	97	Adopted 96-2	2.127	0.148	16.716	0.415	-2.39
77	S.Con.Res. 20 - Iraq War Funding/Adoption	97	Adopted 82-16	17.631	0.426	19.790	0.452	-7.16
181	Fiscal 2007 Supplemental/Motion to Concur	93	Agreed 80-14	9.453	0.319	16.403	0.420	-0.67
410	S. 2340 - Iraq War Supplemental Appropriations/Cloture	97	Motion Rejected 45-53	82.744	0.924	87.262	0.948	1.86
439	H.R. 2764 - Fiscal 2008 Omnibus Appropriations/Motion to Concur	94	Motion agreed to 70-25	31.959	0.583	47.824	0.713	1.07

On two of those votes, large numbers of Democrats crossed the aisle to join Republicans. The first vote, to adopt a non-legislative Senate Resolution (S. Res.) 107, was certainly an un-divisive vote for members in both parties – expressing support for troops in

the field, and the provision of “adequate medical care to soldiers upon their return home.” Medical care for convalescing soldiers and wounded veterans generated a public uproar after facilities and care quality at Walter Reed Army Medical Center was found substandard and potentially harmful. Access to care for wounded veterans across the Veterans’ Administration system (especially the growing number with severe head injuries requiring highly-specialized care that had become an unintended consequence of surviving IED blasts and gunfire due to improved body armor) was also found inadequate, and was significant for the increased political pressure it placed on the Bush Administration war policy as a whole. The near unanimous support for such a measure would not ordinarily be valuable to leave in the data set because it would not betray any partisan or ideological tension. However, the vote was a rare moment of agreement, and was left in the data simply to illustrate how dramatically party and ADA scores change at a very high level of bipartisanship.

The second voting decision (chronologically) was to vote ‘yea’ in support of S. Res. 20, which pledged opposition to “any Congressional action that would endanger of support for troops already in the field, including reducing or cutting-off funding for their assigned missions.” This concurrent resolution was overwhelmingly adopted 82-16, quite early in the surge on March 15<sup>th</sup>. With more and more units arriving in Iraq, adoption of a statement pledging continuation of funding for operations in-country certainly should have indicated to war opponents in Congress (and the public-at-large) that the war was probably not going to be restricted by Congressional purse-strings - at least not in the Senate. Logically, Congress would have needed to find a way to prevent the deployment of any additional forces to prevent additional funding support if they adhered to the resolution.

In fact, a pattern of reluctance on both sides of the aisle to close-off funding is reflected in the lower party and ADA chi-square and phi values occurring in subsequent vote on the issue. The second lowest chi-square and phi correlations resulted from another overwhelming majority vote of 80-14 on a motion to concur for the 2007 Supplemental funding bill, H.R. 2206, agreed to May 24<sup>th</sup>. However, the bill did require the President to report on eighteen benchmarks of Iraqi progress, and authorized him to withhold reconstruction funds for benchmarks not met. By late May, it was probably apparent to Republicans that benchmark reporting would be a minor price to pay for sustaining political support of the war. (One of the mysteries to this researcher is why the President didn't take the political initiative early-on to use benchmark reporting to bolster at least the appearance of working toward an exit strategy.)

Finally, the vote exhibiting the most partisan and ideological tension in the funding category was to invoke cloture (suspend debate) on a motion by Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R., KY.) to proceed to the bill (S.2340) that was to appropriate emergency supplemental funding (\$70 billion) for both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars for fiscal 2008. In this case, both partisanship and ideological commitment were very high – all Democrats, (except Joseph Lieberman), and all Republicans except the three most consistent war opponents (Hagel, Smith, and Voinovich) – drove chi-square and phi values almost to the maximum they could reach. The vote occurred late in the year, on November 16<sup>th</sup>, and despite substantive signs of progress in the war, Republicans and Democrats remained divided on the future of the U.S. commitment. Opponents of the war still sought to end U.S. involvement as rapidly as possible. House Democrats had passed an emergency supplemental bill (H.R. 4156, House vote number 1108) only two days prior on November 14<sup>th</sup> that would

have allocated \$50 billion as a bridge fund into the following Congressional session - but tied those funds to a withdrawal-oriented shift in war policy with a total withdrawal deadline of December 15, 2008. Although it failed to pass in the Senate 53-45 (vote number 411), a Republican counterproposal to provide \$70 billion with no conditions (S.2340, sponsored by Sen. Saxby Chambliss, R., GA.) also failed by a mirrored-vote of 45-53 (vote no. 410).<sup>159</sup> The core dispute over continued U.S. involvement in the war remained as strong as ever.

Issue E: *Other*:

Vote No.	Bill Number and Title	N	Voting Outcome	Party $\chi^2$	Party $\Phi$	ADA $\chi^2$	ADA $\Phi$	<i>t</i>
248	H.R. 1585 - 2008 Defense Authorization/Iraq Strategy:	96	Adopted 94-3	3.293	0.185	11.428	0.345	11.44
343	H.R. 1585 - 2008 Defense Authorization/ Support for U.S. Armed Forces:	96	Rejected 50-47	85.406	0.943	88.242	0.959	1.11
344	H.R. 1585 - 2008 Defense Authorization/Support for Gen. Petraeus:	96	Adopted 72-25	35.608	0.609	40.829	0.652	0.89

Issue Category E in the Senate, like its counterpart in the House, contains issues substantively different from questions bearing directly on combat in Iraq, although none of the votes concern broader foreign policy questions. All votes in this group pertain to the 2008 Defense Authorization (H.R. 1585). The two votes with the lowest chi- and phi values were relatively uncontroversial. The first of these was a vote in support of a (non-legislative) Levin amendment expressing the sense of the Senate not to leave Iraq “a failed state”; the second to support an amendment by Senator John Cornyn (R., TX.) expressing the sense of the Senate to “reaffirm support for Gen. David H. Petraeus . . . strongly condemn personal attacks on the honor and integrity of Petraeus and members of the Armed Forces; and

<sup>159</sup>Rogin, Josh, “War Supplementals Frozen in Senate: Parties Lock Up Over Policy Language; Action May Wait Until 2008”, *CQ Weekly*, November 19, 2007; pp. 3482-3483.

repudiate an advertisement by MoveOn.org about Gen. Petraeus.” Inexplicably, the second vote supporting Gen. Petraeus drew 25 Democratic opposition votes - nothing has been published in the public record to date that indicates why it would have been advantageous for the sake of party solidarity, ideological commitment, or electoral advantage, to have voted against the bill.

The most partisan vote among all Senate Iraq War decisions occurred in Category E for yet another amendment to the 2008 Defense Authorization (vote number 248), with a value of +11.44, sponsored by conservative Senator John Cornyn (R.-TX.), expressing the sense of the Senate that the Senate should commit to a strategy not to “leave a failed state” in Iraq. The question becomes, why would partisanship have taken precedence over ideology on such a matter? What aspect of the bill’s content would have provoked greater party conflict? It can only be speculated that the term “failed state” in a Republican-sponsored bill (in contrast with Sen. Levin’s amendment with the same term) probably was a red flag for war opponents who saw an essentially partisan strategy to shift blame for mission failure to those supporting any effort to end U.S. involvement in Iraq, or oppose the surge strategy.

The most contentious vote in terms of having the highest chi- and phi values for party and ideology, was a bill sponsored by Senator Barbara Boxer (D., CA.), expressing in more general terms the sense of the Senate “to affirm strong support for those in the U.S. armed forces, and strongly condemn attacks on the honor, integrity and patriotism of any individual who is serving or has served honorably.” This amendment was rejected by a very tight 50-47 vote, which pushed party ID and ADA chi-square correlations to near maximum values of 85.406 and 88.242 respectively. It is unclear whether the more specific reference to General Petraeus in the Cornyn amendment provoked the more generalized references to “service

personnel” in the Boxer amendment, or whether Republicans objected in principle to the very idea of needing a second amendment omitting any reference to General Petraeus personally. The political rationale for the Cornyn amendment condemning the personal attack on General Petraeus may be little clearer, given the adverse publicity the MoveOn.org ad attracted, but the politics of the later Boxer amendment is murky. Senator Boxer was among those voting against the Cornyn amendment, and her amendment may have addressed concerns (that remain unclear) of opponents who voted with her on the earlier bill.

***Frequent Senate Party Defectors:***

Party discipline was higher among Democrats than Republicans across all of the Iraq War votes. Senator Joseph Lieberman (I.-CT.) was coded as a Democrat in the data array because he caucuses with Democrats; but voted with Republicans in 11 out of 22 Iraq War votes. A strong supporter of Israel, and reliably conservative on cultural and national defense issues, Sen. Lieberman’s interest in continuing and increasing the U.S. commitment in Iraq was (and remains) likely connected to his concern for regional security if Iraqi instability were allowed to fester.<sup>160</sup> Sen. Lieberman was twice joined by Majority Leader Reid, a vocal leader in opposing continued U.S. involvement – whose votes should not be regarded as a party defection, but rather as parliamentary tactics to enable later consideration of motions failing in the first round.

On the Republican side, Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE.) matched Sen. Lieberman’s rate of eleven cross-over votes across all categories of legislation. He was followed closely by Senator Gordon H. Smith’s (R-OR.) nine defections; exceeding the seven votes cast by

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<sup>160</sup> Characterization of the Senator’s cultural and defense policy orientations are found in Koszczuk, Jackie and H. Amy Stern (Eds.). 2006. *CQ’s Politics in America 2006: The 109<sup>th</sup> Congress*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.; pp. 200-201.

each of Maine's liberal Senate delegation: Olympia J. Snowe and Junior Senator Susan Collins. Hagel and Smith were the only two Republicans to vote in March, 2007 for S. J. Res. 9, adding a provision to the \$123 billion supplemental spending bill that called for a "non-binding" goal to remove most U.S. troops by March 31, 2008. Senator Snowe actually went as far as cosponsoring a Democratic bill that would have mandated a withdrawal to begin by early 2008. Senator Collins was regarded as one of the most electorally-vulnerable GOP seats in 2008, but was returned to office that year by a narrow margin.

Through the uncertain spring of 2007, the Administration lobbied Republican senators extensively to wait until the September 15<sup>th</sup> progress report by Gen. Petraeus before proceeding with any measures to limit U.S. involvement. The slim Democratic majority, along with supermajority (two-thirds majority) passage requirements, meant that only 41 Republicans were needed to sustain Administration objectives. However, doubts about the strategy had become so deep and widespread, that two of the most influential GOP voices in foreign and defense policy, Richard Lugar of Indiana and John Warner of Virginia, publically joined the call for troop reductions. Although the White House succeeded in getting Sen. Warner to agree to wait until September, he cosponsored an amendment with Sen. Lugar requiring additional Administration reports; including preparation of a post-September follow-on plan that would specify circumstances in which troop withdrawal might begin and how the mission could be narrowed.<sup>161</sup>

Generally, the mixed influence of party affiliation and ideology, and the declining salience of ideology over the First Session, probably reflects the greater independence from public and partisan influence that Senate tenure affords. This is not to say that opposition or

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<sup>161</sup> *CQ Weekly*, July 16, 2007, p.2095.

support for Administration policy was any less impassioned, but that Senators have more leeway in adjusting their debates as issues evolve. Over the course of 2007, conflict over withdrawal policy led to a seminal confrontation in July, after which it was clear to the Democratic leadership that the lack of a filibuster-proof majority would thwart any further efforts to substantially alter Administration policy. In the end, the absence of a filibuster-proof Democratic majority, and improving conditions in Iraq, determined the outcome of the policy struggle. From about the time of the Petraeus-Crocker report, voting on war legislation would be determined by less ideological measures. As conditions improved in Iraq, more pragmatic concerns, such as sustaining progress through continued support of the surge strategy, policy towards Iran, and (for Democrats) the need to sustain electoral support, took precedence.

## CHAPTER 6 - Conclusions

This thesis project has examined the question of whether political party identity (ID), or the ideological score (ADA Liberal Quotient) assigned to members of Congress, was a better predictor of roll-call votes on Iraq War legislation during the First Session of the 110<sup>th</sup> Congress in 2007. A comparison of separate correlations of party ID and ADA scores with those voting tallies revealed that while both variables were strongly related to voting outcomes, ideology exceeded the influence of partisan identity in nearly three-quarters of the votes taken across both the House and Senate to a very significant degree. ADA scores were the predominant predictor of voting decisions on the Iraq War in every roll call in the House, but slightly less than half of the votes taken in the Senate. Varied results across the Senate voting record hint at the greater decision-making independence of that membership (despite the persistent blocking role that the minority was able to sustain in defense of Administration policy), and actually diminished over the year as evidence of the success of the surge strategy accumulated. Senators were apparently able to subordinate ideological considerations to partisan strategy as the prospect of surmounting the filibuster-proof Republican minority, and the crisis in Iraq, began to subside. However, the parallel strength of party ID and ADA correlations in all Iraq War votes across Congress contributes more evidence of how closely associated ideology has become with party affiliation in recent decades - at least on the specific issue of the Iraq War.

Early in the research, separate correlations of party ID codes with roll-call voting results, and ADA scores with the same voting results, produced chi-square and phi-coefficient statistics that indicated party ID and ADA scores were both strongly - and almost equivalently - correlated with Iraq War voting outcomes in both chambers. Although the

strength of the correlations varied slightly across the voting sample (indicating variance in the intensity of political conflict over the legislation), and while correlations for ideology tended to slightly exceed those for party, the difference between the correlations was not statistically significant, and did not definitively answer which variable predominated in voting decisions. The initial results, based exclusively on the chi-square tests and phi-coefficient measures of effect, seemed to suggest that the partisan and ideological polarization of the American political system over the past four decades had become so extreme, that party and ideology had essentially merged in having almost exactly the same influence in voting decisions.

A test of significance for the difference between two nonindependent correlations was applied to evaluate the difference between the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients for party ID and ADA scores. These tests fully illuminated the respective weight of party affiliation and ideology in the votes on the Iraq War. In the House of Representatives, the ADA correlations very clearly exceeded those of party ID in every vote by a large margin, and well within a range considered statistically significant at the  $p < 0.05$  level.

In the Senate, most votes taken through the middle months of 2007, and prior to the September 15<sup>th</sup> report on the progress of the troop surge by General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, indicated that ADA scores were more influential than party ID. Voting during the rest of the year in the Senate showed diverse results, with party ID actually surpassing the influence of ideology in votes taken on issues that tended not to bear directly on the immediate involvement of U.S. troops in Iraq (such as policy towards Iran). In many of the votes, no statistically-significant difference between party and ideology could be

highlighted by the significance test. However, ideology was the stronger influence in Senate voting in nine out of twenty-two of the votes taken across all categories of legislation.

The results are also suggestive of the institutional difference between the House and Senate. The mixed influence of party and ideology across Senate voting implies that the greater decision-making autonomy of Senators from near-term electoral accountability left greater room for broader political calculations of party fortunes, as Democratic leaders switched to more partisan tactics to continue opposition to the war after it became clear that the surge was beginning to succeed, and that the absence of a filibuster-proof majority would allow Republicans to block anti-war policy indefinitely. Republicans from historically-centrist or liberal-leaning states (i.e. Maine, Minnesota, Oregon) facing imminent elections did bow to the greater extent of public dissatisfaction with war policy among their constituents and crossed the aisle accordingly. Regardless of which side of the issue the reader takes, it can be argued that the Senate functioned in the anti-majoritarian role that the Founders intended to check public passion.

What role did party identity, or party organization, play in the Iraq War issue? Party identity correlated very strongly with all roll-call voting outcomes, despite being eclipsed by the influence of ideological coding in most votes. In very few of the votes in both the House and Senate did more than 6-8 lawmakers from either party defect. The research results lend support to assertions that the party organizations are now closely associated with particular sets of foreign policy attitudes (e.g. Deibel, 2007:101-106). The results also support other observations that the issue of military intervention remains a deeply polarizing cleavage in American foreign policy attitudes - despite the nearly continuous and widespread global

engagement of U.S. power around the world since 9/11. The division over military intervention between the parties could not be clearer in Iraq War voting.

However, it is difficult to infer from the present results that all issues of military intervention would promote such a struggle. The particular salience of the Iraq War itself was likely an important factor in the voting results. It could be argued that the Iraq War became vested as a symbol of a particular set of attitudes (neoconservative unilateralism) that directly challenged premises central to those opposed to intervention in Wittkopf's continuum. Indeed, the war was the ultimate form of intervention – to overthrow a sovereign government (regardless of the nature of the regime). The initial level of opposition may have been muted by the military success of the drive to Baghdad and the rapid capitulation of Saddam's regime. But controversy intensified as an already divisive policy approach began to face severe challenges when the Iraqi insurgency and sectarian violence overlapped during 2006. As the November elections approached, the severity of the war seemed beyond the capacities of U.S. military or political power to ameliorate ("beyond strategy"). The specter of complete mission failure raised anxieties, and created an atmosphere of urgency that likely pushed the ideological (and partisan) correlations to greater strength.

What does the research tell us about Congressional foreign policy-making in general? The literature on legislative foreign policy decision-making has long documented the electoral disincentives for lawmakers to involve themselves in foreign policy issues, due mainly to a lack of public interest and attentiveness. The 2006 elections were one of those very rare events in American election history that turned on an international issue – albeit a crisis of war (as opposed to a more routine issue of world politics) - which galvanized public interest. Given the unusually high level of electoral interest, the precedence of ideology in the

closely-fought votes over Iraq War legislation should not be surprising. Ideas, beliefs and opinions are probably prior to party loyalty in most foreign policy issues anyway, given the public's interest level. Party loyalty is built on common or converging policy viewpoints, and those of similar mind find common cause in party membership. Political parties are, almost by definition, a form of collective action on the basis of shared interests - interests based largely on shared ideas or values. In light of the precedence of ideology in Iraq War voting, American foreign policy-making appears to remain in the domain of ideas (or beliefs/values/opinion), rather than party competition.

Secondly, while the role of ideology in Iraq War voting would seem to bode-ill for bipartisanship in future Congressional foreign policy-making, portending the same level of difficulty in reaching compromises that attend the most divisive issues of domestic policy, other traditional influences on American foreign policy behavior, such as those described by James Lindsay (2004, 2007), should not be forgotten. Perceptions of international threat, or the degree to which Congress and the public look to Executive leadership under certain circumstances, or trust in the judgment of a particular President, could still serve as a basis for strong bipartisan support in some future question of intervention.

Lastly, anti-interventionism on the Left does not necessarily mean pacificism (Walzer, 2004).<sup>162</sup> A lively debate is currently underway on the left concerning the conditions justifying intervention in light of the Rwandan genocide, the Balkan wars, Darfur, and the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Right is similarly fractured between neo-conservatism, traditional realism, and non-internationalist nationalism over the

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<sup>162</sup> Walzer, Michael. 2004. *Arguing About War*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

lessons of Iraq. The prognosis for bipartisanship in Congress would still seem to depend greatly on the terms of the intervention issue.

A deeper examination of the Iraq War voting record might take the approach of coding each member of Congress according to Eugene Wittkopf's (1991) typology of attitudes toward international involvement versus military intervention. The results might indicate, for example, what portion of those voting against the war were internationalists not so much opposed to military intervention in principle as they were interested in extricating U.S. forces from the dire exigencies of Iraq. Intercorrelations among party ID, ADA scoring, and coding for internationalism might shed more light on how attitudes toward international involvement are presently distributed in Congress. With those results, a finer-grain assessment of the role of ideology in foreign policy decision-making might be achievable.

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## Appendix A – Senate Cross-Over Votes

### Democrat Senators Voting Across Party Lines

Cross-Over Frequency	Name	State	ADA LQ Score
11	Lieberman	CT.	70
5	Dodd	CT.	70
5	Feingold	WI	95
5	Reid	NV	85
4	Kennedy	MA	85
4	Whitehouse	RI	95
3	Akaka	HI	95
3	Boxer	CA	80
3	Byrd	WV	80
3	Clinton	NY	75
3	Harkin	IA	95
3	Kerry	MA	90
3	Leahy	VT	95
3	Mendendez	NJ	95
3	Murray	WV	90
3	Rockefeller	WV	85
3	Wyden	OR	95
2	Biden	DE	75
2	Brown	OH	95
2	Durbin	IL	95
2	Inouye	HI	90
2	Lautenberg	NJ	90
2	Nelson, Ben	NE	75
2	Obama	IL	75
2	Reed	RI	95
2	Schumer	NY	90
2	Stabenow	MI	100
1	Bayh	IN	95
1	Cardin	MD	95
1	Feinstein	CA	90
1	Johnson	SD	40
1	Klobuchar	MN	100
1	Kohl	WI	95
1	Landrieu	LA	80
1	Nelson, Bill	FL	90
1	Pryor	AR	70
36 Democrats			

Average ADA score of those defecting two or more times: **87.222**

Average ADA score of those defecting at least once: **86.388**

### Republican Senators Voting Across Party Lines

Cross-Over Frequency	Name	State	ADA LQ Score
11	Hagel	NE	30
9	Smith-Gordon	OR	55
7	Collins	ME	55
7	Snowe	ME	60
4	Coleman	MN	50
3	Sununu	NH	15
2	Coburn	OK	5
2	Corker	TN	20
2	Enzi	WY	10
2	Hatch	UT	30
2	Spector	PA	60
2	Voinovich	OH	25
2	Warner	VA	35
1	Allard	CO	10
1	Bond	MO	25
1	Bunning	KY	10
1	Burr	NC	0
1	DeMint	SC	0
1	Inhofe	OK	10
1	Sessions	AL	10
1	Thomas	WY	n/a

#### 21 Republicans

Average ADA score of those defecting two or more times: **34.62**

Average ADA score of those defecting at least once: **25.75**

## Appendix B – House Republican Cross-Over Votes

<b>House Republicans Voting Across Party Lines</b>				
Cross-Over Frequency	Name	Dist.	State	ADA LQ Score
18	Jones	3	NORTH C	50
12	Gilcrest	1	MARYLAN	60
12	Paul	14	TEXAS	15
8	Duncan	2	TENNESS	20
3	Castle	1	DELAWAR	50
3	English	3	PENNSYL	40
3	Ramstad	3	MINNESO	45
3	Shays	4	CONNECT	55
3	Walsh	25	NEW YOR	40
2	Bartlett	6	MARYLAN	15
2	Ehlers	3	MICHIGA	20
2	Emerson	8	MISSOUR	50
2	Upton	6	MICHIGA	40
1	Bachus	6	ALABAMA	10
1	Baker	6	LOUISIA	0
1	Barrett	3	SOUTH C	0
1	Barton	6	TEXAS	10
1	Biggert	13	ILLINOI	30
1	Blackburn	7	TENNESS	5
1	Brady	8	TEXAS	5
1	Burgess	26	TEXAS	10
1	Campbell	48	CALIFOR	10
1	Cannon	3	UTAH	10
1	Coble	6	NORTH C	10
1	Davis, T	11	VIRGINI	30
1	Flake	6	ARIZONA	5
1	Franks	2	ARIZONA	0
1	Garrett	5	NEW JER	0
1	Gingrey	11	GEORGIA	0
1	Hastert	14	ILLINOI	15
1	Herger	2	CALIFOR	5
1	Hulshof	9	MISSOUR	20
1	Inglis	4	SOUTH C	5
1	Johnson	15	ILLINOI	35
1	Jordan	4	OHIO	0
1	Keller	8	FLORIDA	20
1	King	5	IOWA	0
1	Kirk	10	ILLINOI	40
1	LaTourette	14	OHIO	55
1	Linder	7	GEORGIA	0
1	Miller	1	FLORIDA	10
1	Pearce	2	NEW MEX	5
1	Petri	6	WISCONS	30
1	Sali	1	IDAHO	0
1	Shadegg	3	ARIZONA	0
1	Thornberry	13	TEXAS	5
1	Turner	3	OHIO	25
<b>47 Republicans</b>				

Average ADA score of those defecting two or more times: **38.46**

Average ADA score of those defecting at least once: **19.26**

### Appendix C – House Democratic Cross-Over Votes

House Democrats Voting Across Party Lines									
Cross-Over Frequency	Name	Dist	State	ADA LQ Score					
18	Marshall	8	GEORGIA	60	2	Lewis	5	GEORGIA	85
15	Barrow	12	GEORGIA	70	2	McIntyre	7	NORTH C	85
12	Taylor	4	MISSISSIPPI	65	2	Salazar	3	COLORAD	90
11	Carney	10	PENNSYL	85	2	Schwartz	13	PENNSYL	90
11	Pelosi	8	CALIFOR		2	Scott	13	GEORGIA	90
9	Matheson	2	UTAH	75	2	Stark	13	CALIFOR	80
8	Boren	2	OKLAHOM	50	2	Waters	35	CALIFOR	85
7	Baird	3	WASHING	95	2	Woolsey	6	CALIFOR	80
6	Kucinich	10	OHIO	70	1	Ackerman	5	NEW YOR	90
6	Melancon	3	LOUISIA	85	1	Allen	1	MAINE	100
5	Davis, L.	4	TENNESS	75	1	Berman	28	CALIFOR	85
4	Cramer	5	ALABAMA	80	1	Boswell	3	IOWA	90
4	Lampson	22	TEXAS	60	1	Boyda	2	KANSAS	80
4	Mahoney	16	FLORIDA	80	1	Edwards	17	TEXAS	85
4	McNulty	21	NEW YOR	90	1	Etheridge	2	NORTH C	90
4	Mitchell	5	ARIZONA	80	1	Giffords	8	ARIZONA	80
4	Tanner	8	TENNESS	80	1	Gordon	6	TENNESS	85
3	Altmire	4	PENNSYL	95	1	Green, G.	29	TEXAS	95
3	Cooper	5	TENNESS	85	1	Hill	9	INDIANA	85
3	Cuellar	28	TEXAS	90	1	Hoyer	5	MARYLAN	90
3	Donnelly	2	INDIANA	85	1	Kind	3	WISCONS	90
3	Ellsworth	8	INDIANA	75	1	Klein	22	FLORIDA	95
3	Holden	17	PENNSYL	80	1	Lipinski	3	ILLINOI	85
3	Michaud	2	MAINE	85	1	Moore	3	KANSAS	90
3	Sestak	7	PENNSYL	95	1	Murtha	12	PENNSYL	95
3	Shuler	11	NORTH C	80	1	Ortiz	27	TEXAS	80
3	Snyder	2	ARKANSA	85	1	Peterson	7	MINNESO	85
3	Space	18	OHIO	95	1	Pomeroy	1	NORTH D	85
2	Bean	8	ILLINOI	80	1	Rodriquez	23	TEXAS	95
2	Berkley	1	NEVADA	85	1	Ross	4	ARKANSA	85
2	Bishop	2	GEORGIA	90	1	Rothman	9	NEW JER	95
2	Boucher	9	VIRGINI	95	1	Ruppersberger	2	MARYLAN	90
2	Boyd	2	FLORIDA	80	1	Sherman	27	CALIFOR	100
2	Cardoza	18	CALIFOR	90	1	Skelton	4	MISSOUR	85
2	Chandler	6	KENTUCK	95	1	Spratt	5	SOUTH C	95
2	Costa	20	CALIFOR	90	1	Udall	2	COLORAD	90
2	Herseith	1	SOUTH D	90	1	Watson	33	CALIFOR	95
2	Lee	9	CALIFOR	90	1	Wilson	6	OHIO	85

**76 Democrats**

Average ADA score of the 45 members defecting two or more times: **82.66**  
Average ADA score of the total 75 members defecting at least once: **77.0**