Linkage and complex interdependence in the air: a study of the political role of the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations (IFATCA)

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Linkage and complex interdependence in the air:
A study of the political role of the International
Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations (IFATCA)

by
Gary Wayne Munson

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CHAPTER I.

THE PROBLEM STATED: AN OVERVIEW

The primary focus of this thesis is to analyze an international organization (IFATCA) in its role in the international community. Of specific interest to this study will be an examination of the theories of linkage and complex interdependence. These two theories, which will be covered in detail in an ensuing section, will be viewed from the perspective of IFATCA's role in the international environment.

My analysis will consist of a simple profile of this organization, in order to determine "typology", accompanied by a case study of a conflict issue with which IFATCA has had to deal. The case study under analysis will be the PATCO strike/walk-out of 1981.

The importance of air traffic controllers, along with their representative organizations, has been under-rated in the larger picture of air travel. In the summer of 1981, a strike/walk-out by the Professional Air Traffic Controllers' Organization (PATCO), in the United States, dramatically portrayed the importance of air traffic controllers in air travel not only in this country, but also in the international environment. The ramifications of the PATCO action were most prominent in two areas: air safety and economics. Analysts and critics of the action claimed that the PATCO strike diminished airline revenues while lowering the safety levels of air transport, in general. The PATCO strike also
caused conflict in many other nation-states where air traffic controller union action was taken either in sympathy for PATCO, or to protest the lower safety levels. These actions, resulting from the linkage actions of IFATCA, will be the subject of my inquiry.

Introduction to Linkage and Complex Interdependence: A Literature Survey

In recent years, a new school of thought has emerged among students of international relations. This new theory is that of "complex interdependence" among nations. This theory, which subscribes to an international environment in which nations are "linked" together either economically, politically, or ideologically, holds as its "corner-stone" the sub-theory of "issue-linkage", among nations, and the subsequent building of "international regimes" to organize these "linkages" and prosecute various issues.

Attempts to define and study complex interdependence have increased markedly, as of late. Certain prominent political scientists have laid the "groundwork" for categorization and study of this "complex interdependence" in the international community. Stanley Hoffman, of Harvard University, etched the parameters of this new field in his work, "International Relations: The Long Road to Theory", in 1959. Some eighteen years later, one of Hoffman's former colleagues at Harvard, Joseph Nye along with Robert Koehane, a student of Hoffman's, wrote Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. This study incorporated Hoffman's foundation and applied it to the new theory of "complex inter-


dependence". The following statement from their book gives the "flavor" of this new philosophy: "To a greater or lesser extent, a number of scholars see our era as one in which the territorial state, which has been dominant in world politics for the four centuries since feudal times ended, is being eclipsed by nonterritorial actors such as multinational corporations, transnational social movements, and international organizations."³ Keohane and Nye included themselves among these scholars who see the emergence of this new trend of interdependence in world affairs.

Complex interdependence, defined, holds an international environment in which nation-states and international non-governmental actors (such as IFATCA and MNCs) have become integrated by virtue of the complexities of the international market-place and international issues. Johan Galtung, in The True Worlds: A Transnational Perspective, placed the concept of complex interdependence into theoretical format in his "dependencia" theory.⁴ Basically, Galtung felt that each nation in the international setting is composed of a center (encompassing the country's governing elite), and the periphery (encompassing the country's largely disenfranchised masses). Galtung stated that there is harmony (interdependence) between the centers of various nations. This harmony, he claimed, was fostered to repress, dominate and exploit the periphery, or the masses.⁵ While this theory exudes a Marxist approach to international interdependence, it further demonstrates the work that has come from


⁵Ibid., pp. 119-123
the concept of complex interdependence.

Still, though, most political scientists had tied the idea of complex interdependence to one of nation-state integration largely overlooking Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and indigenous national actors (citizens, nation-based interest groups, etc.). James N. Rosenau, In The Study Of Global Interdependence: Essays on the Transnationalization of World Affairs, enlarged the parameters of the study of interdependence with his theory of "transnationalization" of world affairs. 6 Rosenau felt that interdependence, as a concept, was "so broad that often it is used to analyze circumstances and conditions in the physical world that shape and limit the course of human events." 7 Rosenau felt this type of study to be stagnant and felt a new direction in complex interdependence study needed to be enacted. This new concept, "transnational relations" was seen by Rosenau as encompassing a "dynamic process initiated and sustained by people." He further stated that this concept "serves to stress a concern with those aspects of mounting interdependence that extend beyond changing physical realities into the realms of individual experience, collective endeavor, and group interaction." 8 Rosenau defined "transnational theory" as such: "... the processes whereby international relations conducted by governments have been supplemented by relations among private individuals, groups and societies that can and do have important consequences for the course of


7 Ibid., p. 1

8 Ibid.
events." This new conceptualization by Rosenau opened the field of research in complex interdependence theory to encompass all potential international actors.

Another "school" of political scientists, working along the same lines as these scholars, embarked upon a subfield of complex interdependence theory. This subfield dealt with the concepts of issue-linkage and regime-building. Defined, issue-linkage, on the international scene, describes a condition whereby international actors (IGOs, NGOs, MNOs) enter into a relationship over a common issue, and international regimes can result. Ernest B. Haas, in "Why Collaborate: Issue-Linkage and International Regimes" defined regimes as "norms, rules and procedures agreed to in order to regulate an issue area." Haas has studied international regimes in order to broadly categorize types and to develop a solid principle for study of these organizations. Haas proposed that the first order of regime-building is to establish the norms, rules and procedures the regime is to follow. The conference, which is commonly held to determine these is, according to Haas, the focal point of study in determining a regime's character. Haas gives four types of regime conferences.

(1) If the negotiating conference is characterized by eclecticism, issues will be linked exclusively in a tactical manner. The credibility of the linkage is largely a function of the will and the ability of key parties to impose it, including the ma-

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9 Ibid.


11 Ibid., p. 358.
nipulation of technical information. It is unlikely that a re-
gime will emerge; if it does, it will not outlive the first im-
portant technological innovation.

(2) If the negotiating conference is dominated by the rational mode,
substantive issue-linkage on the basis of agreed doctrines will
prevail. Power differentials among states are not important as
mediating instruments. The resulting regime will be as stable
as the doctrinal consensus on which it rests.

(3) If the negotiators are skeptics, fragmented issue-linkage will
prevail, and the will and capability of powerful states can be
expected to remain important as instrumentalities for rewarding
coalition partners and paying off opponents. The resulting re-
gime will be weak and unstable.

(4) If the negotiators are pragmatists, they will first attempt sub-
stantive issue-linkage and withdraw to fragmented linkage when
this becomes politic. State power is a factor in reaching an
agreement, but not an essential one. The resulting regime,
though including fewer issues than had been hoped, will never-
theless be fairly stable. It will also be capable of being
adapted and adjusted so as to include additional issues later.12

Once a regime's foundation has been set, Haas states the regime can
then be placed into a typological framework based on the regime's per-
formance. This typology, as proposed by Haas, is as follows (Figure I,
on the following page).

12Ibid., p. 386.
Out of this typology come five basic regime types, according to Haas. In Type 1, actors proceeding within a common framework engage essentially in collecting and exchanging information. Their pooling of information is supplemented with technical assistance from the better-to the poorer-endowed countries when existing capabilities are unevenly distributed among the members. Type 2 regimes force the actors to choose a joint facility if they wish to do more than share information. If they so choose, information is not only pooled, but new information requested, and the substantive area of concern, is subjected to standardized monitoring procedures. The standardization of information processing amounts to "shaping" the information into accepted bodies of knowledge used in making policies. If capabilities are unevenly distributed, the richer are expected to aid the poorer by allocating a disproportionate share of common resources to them. Allocation implies that joint action is "scheduled"; there has to be some understanding on who is to give whom how much before the activity can be carried out effectively.

A common policy also requires the sharing of information and the
increasing of knowledge. In addition, it carries with it understandings that each actor will seek to obtain a desirable outcome by a certain time. The outcome is decided collectively, but each participant remains in charge of implementing the decision. In Type 3, the actors realize that one way of accomplishing this involves forecasting without setting targets for achievement. The collective forecasting of the future is an exercise in increasing knowledge, but the forecasts need not call for action. In Type 4, if action is desired by the actors, the results of the forecasts are translated into targets for each of the participants. Targeting without forecasting and the sharing of information is not conceivable. In the final type of regime, Type 5, the actors enter into a single policy for a set of states that presupposes all of the above, plus commitment to a firm plan of action which is implemented by the central organization.\footnote{Ibid., p. 401.}

In concluding, Haas delineated two schools of thought concerning linkages and regime-building. In the first school, structuralists stress the role of hegemonial states - of power - in the creation and maintenance of regimes. The second school of thought on these theories were termed "evolutionary holists" by Haas. Other political scientists group these individuals under the heading of "cognitives". These individuals, in opposition to structuralists, stress both the fact of perceptual change and the need for further changes. Desirable changes can be specified in accordance with this teleological dynamic.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 359-360.} Haas con-
sidered himself to be a synthesis of the two; however, after viewing his model, one might deduce that Haas is more structuralist than cognitive, in his view of linkage and regime-building.

James N. Rosenau, a catalyst of political science thought, entered into his own study of linkage in *Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems*. As will be shown, Rosenau's study is somewhat of an antithesis to Haas'. As such, Rosenau's work places him within the confines of the cognitive school.

Rosenau's book is an amalgam of articles and authors versed on the intricacies of linkage. The various articles studied the cross-national effect of many issues along with the presence of linkages surrounding these issues. Rosenau, at the outset, defined linkage broadly "as our basic unit of analysis, defining it as any recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in one system and is reacted to in another."

Rosenau further characterized linkage as having two components: inputs and outputs. Polity outputs were used by Rosenau to describe sequences of behavior that originate within one political system and either culminate in, or are sustained by, that environment. If these outputs survived, and were transmitted to another system such that further sequences of behavior were spawned by this output, then this phenomenon was characterized by Rosenau as environment inputs. On the 'other side of the coin', if an external system gave rise to a sequence of behavior which either culminated in, or was sustained by the system, Rosenau claimed this constituted environmental outputs. If this behav-

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ior is then transmitted to the original system, in this theory trans-
ferral was termed polity inputs.16

Rosenau, in a loose framework, envisioned a three-category typolo-
gy for regimes, or linkage-processes (as Rosenau dubbed them). The first
category was referred to as penetrative process which occurred when mem-
ers of one system serve as participants in the political process of an-
other. One type of situation, under this typology, would be that of an
occupying army. The second category was referred to as a reactive proc-
ess. This situation envisions a system that enfuses outputs into an-
other system but does not actively participate once the output had been
accepted, and the former does not react to the response of the latter to
this output. The final category was referred to as an emulative proc-
ess. In this situation, outputs by one system are responded to by an-
other system by emulating behavior.17 This type of linkage has been
used by some political scientists to explain the proliferation of coups
in third world countries.

In any event, Rosenau's framework conceptualized a weak, indeed
almost non-existent, regime-building network. Rosenau, through this
model, seemed to intimate that once the structure of organization (either
governmental or non-governmental) was removed from linkage, regime
structure became weak and diffuse.

Rosenau's inclusion of other actors in linkage has given birth to
other studies of linkage. Kay Lawson, Political Parties and Linkage: A

16 Ibid., p. 45.
17 Ibid., p. 46.
Comparative Perspective, studied linkage on the nation-state level as it occurred in relation to party politics. Indeed, Lawson attributed Rosenau's widened perspective to her study of the interaction (links) between citizens and political leaders. Lawson states that while Rosenau "discuss(ed) the interaction ... he never seizes upon the seemingly obvious opportunity to fit this study into the wider perspective of linkage studies." Lawson, naturally, seized the opportunity and produced an accumulated text on the numerous types and styles of linkage between the citizen and the party, on the national level.

In concluding, while there are many conflicting schools of thought on the theories of complex interdependence and linkage, I place the most credence in the structuralist theories. Keohane and Nye's view of complex interdependence and Ernest Haas's view of linkage, because of the basically positive nature of their models, are the ones I believe reflect the true nature of the "international community".

International Aviation Literature Review

The subject of commercial air travel has come of age as a result of the technological advances in World War II. Such innovations as jet propulsion engines and large "payload" aircraft made economically feasible commercial air travel. The post-World War II international market-place became increasingly complex and inter-connected. This solidified international market-place required increased international transport of both passengers and cargo. The vital importance of air transport was given


19 Ibid., p. 7.
world-wide coverage in 1948, when the United States was forced to import millions of tons of cargo into blockaded Berlin. This "air bridge" has been heralded as the start of commercial air transport and travel.

Even before World War II, political scientists realized the importance of international aviation. In 1930, Kenneth W. Colegrove, a Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University, published a thesis on the ramifications of international aviation for the World Peace Foundation. His book, *International Control of Aviation*, proposed the establishment of international norms and guidelines to standardize international aviation. Even though air traffic control was in its infancy, Colegrove proposed that air lanes and callsigns be standardized on an international level.20

As commercial airlines grew, so did literature concerning their operation and politics. David Corbett, an Associate Professor of Political Science at the Australian National University, published *Politics and the Airlines*, in 1965. Corbett’s study concerned the policies and procedures governing airlines in five countries: Australia, Britain, Canada, India and the United States. Three of the five countries Corbett studied had much in common. Australia, Britain and Canada, all commonwealth countries, aside from having common governmental institutions and processes, also had public ownership of the airlines. This study, while weak in studying the composite international system, did an excellent job of comparing and contrasting systems of public vs. private owner-

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ship of airlines and the policies which spring forth from such systems.

Most recently, Betsy Gidwitz produced an indepth study of the politics surrounding international air transport. Her book, The Politics of International Air Transport, while covering most of Corbett's work also incorporated history, structures, and processes on a composite level. Gidwitz stated the purpose of her book was to examine the various political forces influencing the international air-transport industry and to clarify the interaction between these forces and different components of the industry. While air traffic control received some coverage, the majority of policies and problems inherent in air traffic control were lacking.\[^{21}\]

The study of various international aviation organizations has gained in popularity in recent years. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) has gained the most popularity in political science works. Richard Y. Chuang, in 1972, wrote The International Air Transport Association: A Case Study of a Quasi-Governmental Organization. Chuang's book was primarily a profile of IATA with a short coverage of the outputs and philosophies of the organization.\[^{22}\]

J.W.S. Brancker, some five years later, published a more definitive study of the policies and processes of IATA. However, since Brancker was intimately involved with IATA, having served on one of its boards, his book tends to present IATA in a highly positive tone. His book, while a complete survey of IATA's policies and processes, presents a


slanted view which detracts from its overall effectiveness.  

Young W. Kihl, in 1971, published a work profiling and examining the political processes of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Kihl's work encompassed a profile of the organization followed by three case studies of conflict issues with which ICAO has had to deal in recent times. The object of the ICAO study was to examine the role of an Inter-Governmental Organization (IGO) in the settlement of each of the three conflict issues studied. Kihl's study was used extensively by this author in organizing his work.

The nature and problems of air traffic control began to grow in prominence after World War II with the increase in international air transport. Although private-sector corporations worked furiously on machinery to relieve the over-burdened controller, and various national governmental agencies, world-wide, worked to develop more standardized policies and procedures for air traffic control, little discussion of the politics involved with air traffic control surfaced. Milton G. White, operating under the James Jackson Cabot Professorship of Air Traffic Regulation and Air Transportation at Norwich University, gave a lecture, and subsequently published a book, concerning the problems and bottle-necks in the future of air traffic control. White felt that procedures, especially concerning the use of radar, would have to


eventually occur due to increasing demands for air space by commercial, as well as private citizen pilots. White stated, "The eventual limit to which commercial and private aviation can rise is very much determined by the amount and form of information available to the pilot. This precipitous drop in airport efficiency is caused by low visibility, which denies to the pilot and control tower most of the information normally available on a clear day. (As such) night and bad weather flying must receive a satisfactory solution before the Age of Air will truly be with us." Thus, the controller position was seen as crucial to the future of air transport.

Since White's study, little has been written about the politics and implications of air traffic control to international aviation. However, early last year Christer Jonsson published an article dealing with holistic aspects of the politics of international relations (IR) perspective which utilized the concepts of complex interdependence and linkage. Jonsson surmised that "the development of international aviation seems to conform with overall global trends toward increasing interdependence. Following Keohane and Nye, "complex interdependence" can be understood as an "ideal-type" condition under which actors other than states participate directly in international politics, a clear hierarchy of issues does not exist, and military force plays a minor role. International air transport has indeed evolved in the direction of this ideal type."
The study which I propose follows Jonsson's scenario. Operating out of this "ideal environment" I will examine a component part of the system of international aviation, the international air traffic controllers. Jonsson's article, while explaining the important connection between international aviation and complex interdependence, did not touch upon the politics and problems of air traffic control. In light of the recent PATCO strike, study of the processes and political role of air traffic control, internationally, is a must. This perceived need, and the "virgin" quality of this area of international aviation, motivated this work.
CHAPTER II.

PROFILE OF THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS' ASSOCIATIONS (IFATCA)

Introduction

"The objects and problems of Air Traffic Control are generally the same all over the world. They can be mastered only by international co-operation, mutual understanding and an exchange of ideas and experiences.

It is fitting, therefore, that Air Traffic Controllers of all nations should unite in a world-wide professional federation, which is based on the principle of co-operation in all professional matters." 29

As shown, the aforementioned preamble to the Constitution of IFATCA characterizes the Association as an international organization constructed to achieve certain objectives. These objectives will be stated later in this thesis; however, it is important to note that IFATCA is an organization which operates in the international community.

In order to "set the stage" for IFATCA's role in the international community, it must first be determined what type of organization IFATCA encompasses. To determine typology, the functions and duties of the Association must be determined through a study of its institutions and

processes. Of primary importance, to this typology, is an international characterization of IFATCA.

Students of international politics recognize three broad categories of actors which operate in the international environment: Inter-governmental Organizations (IGOs), Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), and Multinational (Business) Organizations (MNOs). In order to determine IFATCA’s character, and hence develop a plan with which to study this organization, it must first be determined which category IFATCA falls.

**Inter-Governmental Organizations**

IGOs are a subset of international organizations which have as their membership the sovereign and independent nation-states in the world. The states are represented in IGOs by the delegation of the governmental agencies of individual member states. IGOs are established to perform a specific task (such as standardizing practices of air navigation, weather forecasting, epidemic control, etc.). The objectives of IGOs are stated clearly in the constitutional document of the organization which is adopted as a multilateral agreement.\(^{30}\)

**Non-Governmental Organizations**

NGOs, a second subset of international organizations, have as their membership private-sector nation-based organizations such as trade and labor unions and organizations as well as some private enterprises. NGOs are established to address certain individual issues and/or objectives which are generally set, and agreed to, in the form of a consti-

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\(^{30}\)Young W. Kihl, "Learning Package Material for Political Science 453" class syllabus, Iowa State University, Ames, Spring 1980.
tutional document.

NGOs, as a result of their non-governmental membership, are generally not as powerful as the IGOs, and are not nearly as effective in reaching their organizational goals.

**Multinational Organizations**

MNOs, the third subset of international organizations, are defined by the United Nations as "organizations which own or control production, or service facilities, in two or more countries other than the one in which it is based." MNOs are organized, generally, for one purpose: profit. It is this motivation which is the primary objective of the MNO. MNOs are, as a rule, controlled by a ruling board of directors with a corporate secretariat as its governing mechanism.

What makes IFATCA interesting, as an organization, is that it is composed of labor unions, as well as trade associations, from various nations. IFATCA, as such, is an NGO, although the dual composition of the membership - labor and trade associations - makes it somewhat different from other NGOs. NGOs are established, primarily, to address certain objectives of the individual membership; i.e. their wants and needs. IFATCA, as an NGO, is not different from others in this regard. Contained within the IFATCA Constitution, for instance, is a set of seven objectives to be promoted by the organization. They are:

(a) to operate as a non-profit and non-political federation of air traffic controllers' associations;

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31Ibid.
(b) to promote safety, efficiency and regularity in International Air Navigation;

(c) to assist and advise in the development of safe and orderly systems of Air Traffic Control;

(d) to promote and uphold a high standard of knowledge and professional efficiency among Air Traffic Controllers;

(e) to protect and safeguard the interests of the Air Traffic Control profession;

(f) to make mutual benefit affiliations with other Air Traffic Controllers organizations and international professional organizations; and

(g) to strive for a world-wide Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations. 32

These objectives are, as a group, impressive and of the utmost importance in the realm of air safety and professionalism. It is, though, important to realize that IFATCA is composed, primarily, of trade unions and associations which are, in turn, composed of individual air traffic controllers. IFATCA is, then, a union of unions. Unions, characteristically, are organized to promote the welfare and general interests of their composite members. IFATCA is no different. Being an international union of air traffic controllers, their primary interest should be, and is, the promotion of the wants and needs of the air traffic controllers it professes to represent. As such, it would appear that objective E, as set forth in the IFATCA Manual, "to protect and safeguard the in-

terests of the Air Traffic Control Profession" is the over-riding objective and concern of IFATCA. How well IFATCA articulates this primary objective, as well as its other objectives, can best be demonstrated by a study of individual cases. Such an analysis will be presented toward the end of this thesis. But first, we need to trace the origin and development of IFATCA as an international organization.

Origin

IFATCA was founded October 20, 1961, in Amsterdam, Netherlands when eleven (11) representatives from their respective national air traffic controllers unions agreed upon, and signed into being, the Constitution, by-laws, and objectives of IFATCA. The founding fathers, of IFATCA, agreed to co-operate and co-ordinate activities in four (4) broad areas:  

1) The parties bound themselves to promote, maintain and enhance the stature of the air traffic control profession and to develop and disseminate knowledge of the control of air traffic in all its phases and applications.

2) The parties bound themselves to co-operate with each other in all matters affecting their common professional interests.

3) The various national Associations bound themselves to inform the Federation on pertinent activities and to exchange with each other relevant information of common concern.

Ibid., IFATCA Manual, 1980. Founders were: Roger Sadet, Belgium; Ottokar Schubert, Austria; A.G.T. Nielsen, Denmark; F.A. Lehto, Finland; J. Flament, France; Hans W. Thau, Germany; Valdimar Olafsson, Iceland; James E. Murphy, Ireland; Alfred Feltes, Luxembourg; Jan Van Ginkel, Netherlands; O. Saeboe, Norway and Bernhard Ruthy, Switzerland.
(4) The Member Associations accepted the principle that the Federation should be represented at any international meeting, in addition to meetings of ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization), which had under consideration matters associated with air navigation and in particular with air traffic control and that, where possible, an observer should be sent to such meetings.34

Even though the cohesion and co-ordination of the organization was proposed in these goals, the general welfare of the individual air traffic controller was still the over-riding concern of IFATCA. This concern was aptly stated in their professional journal in this way: "The particular nature of the work of an air traffic controller, and the international character of the air traffic controllers profession (is what) impelled the national controllers' associations to join forces in an international organization."35

Originally, and especially due to the character of the founding membership, the founder members envisioned the organization as solely a European one. This was a short-lived notion as the founders realized the importance of expanding the parameters of membership to encompass the entire air traffic control community. By the time the organization developed its charter, the "aim (of the organization) became world-wide and membership open to all Associations ..."36 The founders realized

34 Ibid., pp. 1101-1102.
35 Ted Bradshaw Executive Secretary of IFATCA, "IFATCA; An Introduction to the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations", The Controller 5 (1981): 3.
36 Ibid.
that a dilated membership, restricted to only European associations, would unnecessarily constrict the power and operating authority of the organization.

Organizational Growth - Membership

The outstanding and unique aspect of the organization of IFATCA lies in its dual membership. IFATCA, in terms of the composition of its membership, is a heterogeneous international NGO. Membership in the Federation consists of three diverse categories:

(1) Professional - comprised of Member Associations, the individual members of which shall be considered as individual members of the Federation;

(2) Associate Professional - comprised of those individuals who are unable to qualify for Professional membership through a Member association; and

(3) Corporate - forming the supporting membership. These members are comprised of trade associations (private enterprises, MNCs who wish to join and, because of their product-line, have some vested interest in air navigation.37

The unique diversity of membership, within the Federation, consists of the inclusion of corporate associations within its rank-and-file. This amalgamation of labor unions and trade associations, within one organization, deviates markedly from the international "norm" of NGOs, making IFATCA stand out, as an international organization. This unique struc-

ture, of its own volition, warrants further investigation.

The largest number of members in the organization fall under the category of "professional" membership. Professional members are eligible for affiliation if the proposed organization's membership is of air traffic control personnel, and if the organization's technical objectives are essentially the same as those of the Federation. The proposed organization must prove to the Directors of IFATCA that it actually represents, or has the possibility to represent, a majority of the air traffic controllers within its area of representation. This requirement is of the utmost concern to IFATCA, as this requisite automatically accords de facto legitimacy to IFATCA as a truly representative body of air traffic controllers. Finally, affiliation of a prospective Member Associations is subject to approval by a two-thirds majority of the Directors. 38

Associate professional memberships are awarded to eligible individual air traffic controllers employed in areas where there is no possibility of affiliation to the Federation through a Member Association. 39

This type of membership further legitimizes the representative nature of IFATCA by opening its organization to all air traffic controllers. However, some restrictions are placed on Associate members. Most prominent among these are the restrictions of office and suffrage. Associate members, in accordance with Section 2.2.3 of the IFATCA Manual,

38 Ibid., pp. 1221-1222.

39 Ibid.
cannot hold any elective office, or have any right to vote.  

Supporting membership is conferred upon a corporation, organization or institutions wishing to support the aims of the Federation. As previously shown, this aspect of IFATCA's membership is both unique, internationally, and an intriguing provision of this NGO. As stated in the IFATCA Manual, acceptance of any prospective supporting member is subject to approval of the Executive Board. Because of the possibility of special interest pressure, on the part of the corporate members, being brought to bear upon the air traffic controllers, IFATCA inserted an *ex ante* provision into Section 2.2.3 of the Supporting Member requisites in the IFATCA Manual. The provision, in effect a disclaimer, is worded as such: "Acceptance of Corporate Members does not bind the Federation to favor certain technical developments, unless caused to do so by unprejudiced professional judgment in the interest of safe and efficient air navigation." This provision would, then, seem to annul the possibility of special-interest politicking on the part of the corporate members.

All three types of members are incorporated under the same group of membership requirements. These "obligations" are six in number:

1. Members shall uphold the Constitution, Convention and By-laws;
2. In national respects each Member Association will act indepen-

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40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., p. 1223.
43 Ibid.
(As I will present in the PATCO case study, in the concluding segment of this thesis, this obligation was dismissed and, indeed, abrogated.).

(3) each Member Association must make a declaration of professional membership, yearly, within four weeks of the first of November;

(4) Member Associations must appoint one of its professional members as its delegated representative, and the name of this Director shall be given to the Executive Secretary;

(5) Member Associations, as well as its individual members, shall not engage in any action detrimental to the common interest and public recognition of the profession; and

(6) Associate Members should, as much as possible, support and publicize the Federation and conduct themselves in the same manner as if they belonged to a Member Association.  

In summation, it is worthwhile to point out that these criteria are somewhat amorphous and general. Despite this, these criteria are specific enough to guide the actions of the members. However, as will be shown, various member associations acted contrary to these obligations.

Finally, I would like to turn to an examination of the organizational growth of IFATCA. In tracing membership growth, we need to distinguish two aspects of the membership: nations and corporations.

Nations

Previously, I alluded to the first organizational meeting of IFATCA

44 Ibid.
in Amsterdam, in late 1961. The twelve founder members of IFATCA are shown in Table I.

Table I. Founding Members of IFATCA, by nation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notable among these founding members is the regional similarity of nations. This reflects the fact that the founders of IFATCA initially envisioned a strictly European organization. However, before IFATCA became a formalized agency the membership requirement and character of the organization became deregionalized although the European slant of the organization, as shown in Table I, is quite apparent in viewing its founder membership.

As shown in Figure II, on the ensuing page, the growth in national union membership has been quite healthy since IFATCA's inception. In fact, in just over twenty years IFATCA has grown over 400%, or by 52 members, in real terms. In viewing the individual member organizations, it becomes readily apparent that the European character of IFATCA soon dissipated with the incorporation of new members. Thus, with the exceptional growth of IFATCA, coupled with its transnational character, has come added power and prestige in the international environment.
Corporations

Corporate membership is both an unusual and important component of IFATCA. Growth in corporate membership has equaled that of union membership, although the first corporate member joined IFATCA in 1962, one year after the organization's inception.

Many interesting facts emerge when the data in Figure III is further examined. First, Corporate membership has grown over 1300% in less than twenty years, or by 39 corporations, in real terms. Second, the majority of Corporate members have their regional headquarters in four major countries. Thirty-three (33) of the 42 Corporate members are located in these four countries, or 79% of all such members. The four countries, along with their respective percentages, are shown in Table II.
Figure III. Increase in the IFATCA Corporate Membership: 1962 - 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER OF CORPORATE MEMBERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table II. Major Corporate Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>NUMBER OF CORPORATIONS</th>
<th>PERCENTAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (West)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A few dominant characteristics are also apparent when viewing Table II. First, three of the four countries are European, renewing the European "flavor" initially envisioned for IFATCA by its founders. Second, all four nations are of the industrialized regions in the developed north. Although this fact merely reflects the reality of the modern economic market-place, it is still an interesting statistic.
Structure - Governing Organizations

The day-to-day business and operation of IFATCA is accomplished through a body of centralized Executive Board and ten regional vice-presidents. These officers are elected through the Annual Conference, held every year, in different locations. Although host-cities have repeated their role as an annual venue, the location of the annual conference has been moved to different member countries, as a matter of course. This shift, in annual venue, has seemed to further strengthen the links between the national unions, and IFATCA, through close contact.

The Executive Board, which now meets at least four times per year to elect officers and rectify problems and policies before the organization, is composed of five officers:

1. President
2. Vice-President Administration
3. Vice-President Technical
4. Vice-President Professional
5. Treasurer.

IFATCA, as with most other organizations, has dealt with its more complex problems by forming standing committees. These committees are manned and operated by controllers of the designated country. The following are the seven standing committees, with their respective charge, and countries.
IFATCA's standing committee structure is important in the formulation and implementation of policies and procedures for both IFATCA and air traffic control. These standing committees allow the expertise inherent in national air traffic controller unions to be utilized through a committee structure. The various committees also strengthened the bonds (links) between these national air traffic controller unions, and between the individual national air traffic controller unions and IFATCA.

A unique regional organization is encompassed in IFATCA's governmental structure. IFATCA structured their government to encompass these regions in order to better formulate general policy. Ted Bradshaw, Executive Secretary of IFATCA, has stated, "... experience has proved that our general policy, particularly in the technical field needed to be supplemented by procedures applicable to particular regions of the
world. To meet these requirements, ten regions were formed and each now has its Vice-President and advisors responsible for the organization of affairs, within the region.\textsuperscript{45} These ten regions, along with their current Vice-Presidents, are:

1. North and Central America - Carlos Olmos M. (Mexico)
2. South America - M. Salazar (Venezuela)
3. Caribbean - Richard Greene (Bahamas)
4. Pacific - Robin Saor (New Zealand)
5. Asia - G.W. Smith (Hong Kong)
6. Middle East and Mediterranean - Petros Georgis (Cyprus)
7. Central and Eastern Europe - W. Schindler (Austria)
8. Western Europe - Bjarne Nilssen (Norway)
9. Africa East - Ralph Kimilu (Nairobi)
10. Africa West - D.E.Y. Klaye (Ghana).\textsuperscript{46}

These regional Vice-Presidents are elected on a much different system than the Executive Board. All 61 member countries are divided into the above ten regions. Every year, five of the regional Vice-Presidents are elected for two-year terms, on the following rotational formula:

\begin{align*}
\text{EVEN years:} & \quad \text{EUR} & \quad \text{PAC} & \quad \text{MID} & \quad \text{AFE} & \quad \text{SAM} \\
\text{ODD years:} & \quad \text{CEN} & \quad \text{ASI} & \quad \text{CAR} & \quad \text{AFW} & \quad \text{NCA}. \quad \textsuperscript{47}
\end{align*}

Nominations and elections are conducted within the regional divisions. These regional Vice-Presidents are elected by a simple majority.

\textsuperscript{45} Ted Bradshaw, "IFATCA; An Introduction": 3.

\textsuperscript{46} IFATCA Manual, p. 2861.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., p. 2821.
vote of the Directors representing the nations in the respective region.\textsuperscript{48}
The IFATCA Manual is very explicit in connoting the responsibilities of the regional Vice-President. These responsibilities, which are four in number, constitute the following:

(1) to represent Member Associations national problems;
(2) to interpret Executive Council decisions to his Member Associations and ensuring IFATCA policy is adhered to in his region;
(3) to submit written reports as per Article VII, paragraph 3.2 of the Constitution; and
(4) to attend all Executive Council meetings and Conferences.\textsuperscript{49}

As with the standing committees, this regional breakdown aids in strengthening the links between different unions and between the unions and IFATCA. The standing committees and the regional vice-presidents help to build a corner-stone of operating authority for IFATCA. This corner-stone of power sets apart IFATCA from the "run-of-the-mill" NGO, which is typically weak and ineffective in reaching the goals of its membership. This is not to say that IFATCA, as a result of its governing structure, can reach all of its goals. IFATCA still has many of the short-comings and weaknesses inherent in typical NGOs. However, IFATCA does incorporate a greater degree of operating authority, within its ranks, due to its standing committee, and regional structure.

In summary, IFATCA's governing structure can be best characterized as a weak Federal system. IFATCA's main decision-making body, the Exec-

\textsuperscript{48}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{49}Ibid., p. 2731.
utive Board, centralizes most of the power of this NGO within its office. The regional units are given small amounts of power, in order to supplement and adapt general IFATCA policy to the specific needs of the region.

Publications

IFATCA provides publications to its members and other individuals interested in the field of air traffic control. Ted Bradshaw, as Executive Secretary, co-ordinates the publication of IFATCA's two circulars, The Controller and the IFATCA Circular. IFATCA feels the publication of these two journals is of utmost importance to the organization. This view is also held by Bradshaw, as is shown by this passage: "In order to maintain close contact with the Member Associations, with other ATC (air traffic control) organizations which are interested in the Federation, with the Corporate Members, and with the public, IFATCA publishes quarterly a Journal of Air Traffic Control: The Controller, and a bi-monthly IFATCA Circular."

"The Controller treats all aspects of Air Traffic Control, with particular emphasis on new advances in ATC and the human elements in this highly sophisticated environment. At the same time, it represents a mouth-piece of service to the Corporation Members for discussing the latest technical and methodical developments in the field of air traffic safety."

"The IFATCA Circular is an internal publication, mainly concerned with news from the Federation and Member Associations worth to be known by all Member Associations."
"Urgent matters of sufficient importance to be made known immediately to all Member associations are communicated by Special Newsletters."\(^50\)

These publications are excellent methods of establishing and solidifying links among and between the national ATC unions. Under Rosenau's theory of linkage, these publications constitute polity and environmental outputs. Whether other unions act upon these outputs, contained in these publications, determines the quality and quantity of links fostered by these publications.

The role of IFATCA's two publications is deemed, by this organization, as one of continuity. Not only do these publications try to inform and educate air traffic controllers to new and modern innovations in their field, but these two journals provide a forum for the Corporate Members to display their "wares". However, in assessing the role of the Corporate Members in these publications, Mr. Bradshaw neglected to mention the role of advertising. Interested individuals may purchase advertising space in The Controller. Advertising, in this journal, is certainly an added advantage to the Corporate Members. The fact that Corporate Members may advertise their equipment in The Controller seems, to this author, to be trying a tenet of the IFATCA Constitution, Section 2.2.3. This section of the Constitution, as quoted previously on page 25, deals with possible conflicts of interest as regards the interaction between the member corporations, and the air traffic controller. The possibility that advertisements in The Controller might sway a controller

\(^50\) Ted Bradshaw, "IFATCA; An Introduction", pp. 4-5.
to a position of support, for use of a corporation's equipment, is increased with the advent of this advertisement.
CHAPTER III.

A CASE STUDY OF THE PATCO STRIKE/WALK-OUT OF 1981

Introduction

In the previous chapters, I have examined the theories behind this study, as well as a study of the organization. In this chapter, we will examine a case study of IFATCA as it dealt with a conflict issue. This study will tie together the previous chapters by showing IFATCA establishing links in order to prosecute its goals, and policies, on issues. The case study of the PATCO conflict will demonstrate IFATCA's role in furthering complex interdependence in the international environment.

IFATCA's organizational character, as an NGO, will also be examined in this chapter. The success, or failure, of an NGO, in prosecuting its policies through linkage and regime-building, is an important topic in international relations research, and is a primary focal point in this work.

The PATCO case study involves a national organization, the United States Professional Air Traffic Controllers' Organization, and its wage and benefit dispute with the United States Government, PATCO's employer. The PATCO Union is an organization composed of the majority of air traffic controllers working throughout the United States. PATCO, which had the sole bargaining power for United States controllers vis-a-vis the United States Government, was affiliated with the AFL-CIO, a national
organization of separate worker's unions.

History

In early June of 1981, after almost fourteen months of negotiation, a tentative contract was reached between PATCO, through President Robert E. Poli (of PATCO), and Department of Transportation Secretary Drew Lewis. This contract, which would become active after being ratified by at least an 80% vote of all PATCO members, contained the following provisions (Figure IV, on the following page).

Upon returning the contract to the Union, Poli found support had dwindled for the proposed document. PATCO union members subsequently voted down the proposed measures.

Poli was again sent back with new demands for wage and benefit increases. PATCO union members demanded the following contractual measures (see Figure V, on page 41). The Federal Government deemed these new demands excessive and unreasonable. Negotiations between PATCO, and the Federal Government, ceased, a situation which lasted all of June and most of July.

On July 30, 1981, talks again were renewed between PATCO and the Federal Government. In an effort to close the negotiations as soon as possible, the Federal Government called in a special mediator, Kenneth E. Moffet. When the talks resumed, on that Friday, Poli presented an ultimatum to Secretary Drew Lewis: come up with a new deal in the next three days, or PATCO would order all its controllers off the job. Lewis


52 Ibid.
(1) $40 Million total wage and benefits package

a. 42 hours of pay for every 40 hours of work

b. 15% night differential pay instead of the then current 10%

c. exemption of night, Sunday and holiday premium pay from the Government's legal limit of $50,112 on annual pay of Federal employees

d. Increase in all pay levels, on the average, $2,300 per year over and above the $1,700 annual increase to all Federal employees.

Current pay levels were:
- $33,000 – fully qualified controllers
- $20,500 – base for light-load traffic controllers
- $50,000 – base for most experienced controllers.

Figure IV. Tentative Contract: June 1981

called this new demand, and the PATCO contractual proposals "unfair", and stated the government stood firm on its previous $40 Million proposed contract. Kenneth Moffet, the special government mediator, summed up the conflict when he stated the two sides were "light-years apart", and that he saw little chance of agreement, in the allotted time. Little did both sides know, but Moffet had correctly assessed the intran-sigence of both parties.

Ibid.
(1) $700 Million total wage and benefit package

a. 14 weeks of pay for retaining certain medically disqualified controllers
b. 32 hour work week
c. $10,000 across-the-board wage increase
d. Retirement after twenty-years of service, regardless of age.
   The previous contract called for retirement after 25 years or 20 years at age 50.
e. Retirement income must be 75% of a controller's highest gross salary. The previous contract called for retirement income 50% of the average base salary of the three years of highest pay.

Figure V. PATCO Counter-demands: June 1981a


On Monday, August 3, at 7:00 AM (New York time), after all negotiations had failed, PATCO staged its walk-out/strike.54 The Reagan Administration immediately tried to counter this move by proclaiming the walk-out "illegal" and in breach of the contracts the controllers signed upon initially being hired. President Reagan continued his statement to the press by setting a time-limit of his own - if the controllers didn't return to their jobs by 11:00 AM (New York time), Wednesday, August 5, the controllers would forfeit their jobs de facto. Furthermore, the

54 Ibid., 4 August, pp. 1 & B8.
Reagan Administration, acting through the Justice Department, began taking legal actions against the Union. First, in order to economically injure the strikers, the Justice Department impounded all of the $3.5 million in strike funds which were to be used to supplement the incomes of the strikers. Next, the Justice Department reiterated the Reagan Administration's claim the strike was illegal, and in breach of contract, and would lead to the firing of all striking members. The Justice Department also claimed arrest and jail terms would ensue for many of the strikers. And, finally, the Justice Department ordered that President Robert Poli be held in contempt, and be fined $1000 per day, for each day of the strike. Despite all the threats and penalties, it became increasingly obvious the controllers would not return to work on Wednesday, August 5, the Reagan-imposed deadline. Just like clock-work, on Wednesday morning, President Reagan made good his pledge, and fired all striking controllers.

Since August 5, very little has occurred, on the national scene, in the struggle between PATCO and the Federal Government. On October 22, 1981, the Federal Labor Relations Board (FLRB) stripped the PATCO Union of its action in calling the strike. This action by the FLRB, also stripped PATCO of its right to bargain for the controllers. This move by the FLRB, was the first such action against any union, and PATCO was the first union to ever loose its right as an exclusive bargaining agent for government employees. The PATCO strike/walk-out has never ended

55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., 23 October, p. 1.
and the majority of PATCO employees have never returned to work.

IFATCA Involvement

Although PATCO officials still claim they never sequestered IFATCA for backing, or aid, IFATCA nevertheless became involved in PATCO's fate very early in the conflict. Specifically, IFATCA jumped into the midst of the conflict Thursday, August 6, only three days after the conflict began. Harri Henschler, President of IFATCA, asked its 60 member groups to deny clearance to aircraft flying to the United States, on this day. Henschler took the action for three reasons:

1. sympathy for the PATCO strikers;
2. air safety reasons - Henschler stated this was his major reason for calling this boycott; and
3. to protest controllers in other countries against legal liability in case of a crash.

In sum, Henschler stated the military replacements were not trained to handle traffic at the airports, in which they were transferred, and that this was creating air safety problems. 58

This initial reaction by IFATCA, while only "a war of words" began to have serious over-tones to the conflict. First, IFATCA's intrusion into the situation transformed the issue from a national one, to one of international proportion. Second, IFATCA's announcement called upon 60 national air traffic controllers groups to create boycotts, and thus controversies, within their respective countries. Thus, IFATCA had

58 Ibid., 7 August, p. 11.
"linked" a national conflict issue to international concerns. This international concern was now linked to over 60 national organizations. Concurrent with this international action was the possibility of action in some, if not all, the 60 nations; action which was certain to cause controversy and conflict. However, whether the second link between IFATCA and the 60 member nations occurred would depend upon the strength, and vitality, of IFATCA as an organization.

IFATCA's organizational unity proved strong, indeed. In London, the same day as the Henschler announcement, many of the European members of IFATCA issued a statement affirming their support of PATCO. This statement, although not a strongly worded as Henschler's, asked other member associations to consider "refusing air traffic control services to United States-registered aircraft."\(^{59}\)

Some national air controller's groups used other methods to express their views. While both France and Denmark expressed sympathy for PATCO, Denmark controllers went one step further by formally asking President Reagan to cancel all job dismissal notices he had ordered issued. The British controllers, in their own manner, followed the Dutch lead. Doug Bush, head of the British Institute of Professional Civil Servants (who represents Britain's 1,500 most senior air traffic controllers) said, "Sorry, this is not the practice a 20th Century nation should indulge in."\(^{60}\) However, despite all this, the only actions had consisted of words and statements.

On the ensuing day, Friday, August 7, the IFATCA proclamation be-

\(^{59}\)Ibid.

\(^{60}\)Ibid.
gan to acquire adherents. Air traffic controllers in Finland, Norway, Italy and France took varying degrees of action against United States-aircraft, from rule-book slowdowns, to out-and-out refusals to handle American-bound flights. Air traffic controllers in Great Britain, Denmark, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Sweden and West Germany planned protests similar to those being staged by the above groups. 61

The stiffest resistance came from the Canadian air traffic controllers. In Montreal, 80 flights to, and from, the United States were delayed for up to an hour by sympathetic controllers. In Toronto, the "second-link", previously alluded to, was connected. Because of their part in delaying flights, and also for refusing to clear flights to the United States, three Toronto controllers were suspended, without pay. The PATCO conflict had finally passed through its second-stage of linkage and had begun to cause conflict, and tension, in a member country. Other Canadian controllers carried their protests outside the confines of the air traffic control tower, by picketing the United States Consulate, to protest the jailings of American controllers. 62

IFATCA reasserted itself on this Friday. Henschler stated that the United States airspace was "unsafe" due to the replacement of controllers. IFATCA's Executive Secretary, Ted Bradshaw, in response to various criticisms of IFATCA's boycott directive, stated that the appeal to not clear United States-flights was a recommendation, not a directive. 63

61 Ibid., 8 August, p. 6.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
It is in Bradshaw's statement that we can begin to see the limitations of IFATCA's power. IFATCA, as an NGO, has no governmental powers; i.e. diplomatic, economic, political. IFATCA is an organization composed largely of professionals, who are employed by their respective governments. When these professionals ignore the wishes of their employer, and use their position to protest events, the government-employer can terminate the errant controller. As such, IFATCA can scarcely ask a member controller, or his union, to forfeit their livelihood(s) to protest events concerning other controllers, in other countries.

One more "big event" would occur, on the international scene, which would allow IFATCA to flex its organizational "muscle". By Saturday, August 8, United States-flights in and out, of Canada, were beginning to slow considerably, due to actions of controllers. Over 15% of all United States-flights were delayed one hour, or more. In addition, French and New Zealand controllers stated they would no longer clear flights to the United States. The Canadians, French and New Zealanders all claimed their actions were motivated by their belief that American airspace, and military replacement controllers, were "unsafe".  

Once again, the proclamations of a national controller's group went unheeded by the United States. The United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) emphatically denied the Canadian claims and stated United States airspace was operating as usual.  

In response, the Canadian Air Traffic Control Association (CATCA) moved to a total boycott of all incoming, and outgoing, flights. This boycott began late

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64 Ibid., 9 August, p. 22.
65 Ibid.
Sunday night, August 9, 1981. CATCA instituted their boycott, citing "unsafe" controller operations, and backing up their claims with 41 documented cases of near-incidents, in Canadian airspace, since the beginning of the PATCO walk-out. This move, by CATCA, most certainly in deference to the wishes of IFATCA, placed CATCA at odds with Transport Canada, the Canadian counter-part of the FAA. Canadian Transportation Minister Jean-Luc Pepin, in addressing this new crisis, threatened to dismiss, fine and jail all controllers that refused to handle United-States-flights. CATCA, despite these threats, continued the boycott.

Meanwhile, the CATCA boycott was creating quite a few difficulties in the United States (see Maps 1 & 2 on the following page). Of utmost concern, the CATCA boycott closed the "normal" air-route to Europe, an air-route which provided more safety, and a much quicker trip, to continental Europe, for United States airlines (see Map 2, the heaviest black line). The United States FAA had to immediately work out new flight paths, ones which steered clear of the boycotted Canadian zone. These new flight paths, with the exception of the southern-most route, traveled over no land masses and were much longer, in terms of air time, than the boycotted "normal" route.

By the time of the CATCA strike, the "linkage" character of the PATCO conflict had gone almost "full-circle". As you will recall, the PATCO national conflict took on international characteristics when IFATCA

66 Ibid., 10 August, pp. 1 & D10.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid., 11 August, pp. 1, B7-9.
69 Ibid.
Map 1. Control Areas Over the Atlantic


Map 2. Typical Trans-Atlantic Air Routes: United States to Europe

spoke out on the issue, and stringently requested a world-wide boycott of all United States-flights. IFATCA had thus linked a national conflict with international concerns (see Graph I, on the following page). The various national members, CATCA being the most noteworthy, took up this call to action, by IFATCA, and thus linked a national union, utilizing indigenous resources, to international concerns; those concerns of the PATCO strike and of "unsafe" air traffic control conditions within the United States. This action, by CATCA, created a conflict, in Canada, between CATCA and their employer, the Canadian Government; a conflict reminiscent of the PATCO - United States Government conflict. So, in essence, through the vestige of IFATCA, a national conflict, in the United States, had been expanded to other nations, especially Canada. This action, by IFATCA, poignantly displays the parameters of "complex interdependence" in the international community. However, the boycott, by CATCA, did not complete the "full-circle" effect of linkage as it related to this issue.

Just two days after CATCA began its boycott, the Canadian Government acquiesced to CATCA demands, and thereby brought the boycott to a conclusion, on Wednesday, August 12. 70 Specifically, CATCA and the Canadian Government agreed to enter into a joint inquiry into the PATCO walk-out, and the complimentary issue of air safety, as it pertained to American flights. 71 The joint agreement, between CATCA and the Canadian Government, completed the cyclical path of the PATCO issue (see Graph I). Not only had a national conflict been transmitted to another na-

70 Ibid., 13 August, p. 1.
71 Ibid.
Graph I. The Cyclical Nature of the PATCO Conflict

Legend

☐ Actors and outcomes

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Linkages
IFATCA calls for boycott of all U.S. Flights - claims they are "unsafe".

Some of the members of IFATCA boycott and stall U.S. airlines.

Agreement between Canadian gov't and CATCA to investigate PATCO walk-out.

Conflict ensues in other nations esp. in Canadian instance.

PATCO Walk-out
Summer 1981
tion, but one government had acquiesced to review the domestic actions and policies of another government, a rare occurrence especially considering this action was directed at the United States. IFATCA, in this one issue, had strengthened the ligatures of "linkage", that it laid claim to, and had solidified the concept of "complex interdependence", in the international community.

Various other international organizations became involved, of their own volition, in the PATCO issue. Most notable among these was the International Air Transport Association (IATA), an organization which represents most international airlines. On August 12, IATA released a scathing denunciation of IFATCA, indirectly, and the PATCO action directly. In addressing IFATCA, IATA proclaimed that the foreign controllers have "insufficient information on which to base negative judgments on the safety" of the air traffic control system then operating in the United States. IATA further urged foreign controllers to "decide on the extent of their loyalty to their own administrations (whether to boycott, or not)." This pronouncement was a direct slap in the face of IFATCA, who had vehemently claimed United States airspace was "unsafe", and that foreign controllers should boycott United States-flights.72

IATA was equally fervent in condemning PATCO's action. IATA claimed the 12,000 American controllers had grievously erred in their walk-out, a walk-out which IATA stated breached a pledge all American controllers had made when they were originally hired. IATA summed up its position by stating the American controllers had "defied the law and ig-

72 Ibid.
nored commitments freely entered into."\(^{73}\) Basically, IATA became linked to the PATCO issue because of the ramifications of IFATCA's call to boycott. This issue-linkage, between two international organizations, is yet another example of linkage and complex international interdependence.

At this juncture, IFATCA needed to formulate a new direction, or at least a solid position, vis-a-vis the PATCO issue. On Thursday, August 14, IFATCA entered into an Emergency Board Meeting, in Amsterdam, to determine the direction of action to be taken.\(^{74}\) After this meeting, IFATCA President Harri Henschler announced IFATCA would rescind its call for boycotts, and other such actions, but would issue a strong appeal, to President Reagan, to resume talks with PATCO. In order to allow Reagan time to comply with this appeal, and to formulate a new set of actions if Reagan refused, IFATCA scheduled another Emergency Board Meeting for August 22.\(^{75}\)

With this pronouncement, came also the realization that IFATCA had extended, to an apex, its authority and influence in linking, and building, international regimes around these links. This became painfully obvious in an interview, conducted with IFATCA President Henschler, after the August 14 Board Meeting, in which he stated, "We still feel it is best, at this time, to attempt to bring about a peaceful settlement, if you will, as speedily as possible. We did not think the escalation (of boycotts, etc.) would be helpful at this time." This statement, by

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\(^{73}\) Ibid., 13 August, p. D22.

\(^{74}\) Ibid., 14 August, p. 1.

\(^{75}\) Ibid.
Henschler, if examined in detail, proves IFATCA had extended its power, in the PATCO issue as far as was possible. First, and most obvious, is the statement concerning "escalation" of possible action(s), against the United States Government. Demanding world-wide boycotts was the extent of possible action IFATCA could bring against the United States Government; an action which had already been taken. In addition, the Reagan Administration's consistent refusal to enter into negotiations, with the striking controllers, ensured that no agreement would be arranged between the two parties. Henschler merely minced words when he expressed hopes the issue would be speedily, and peacefully, ended.

Shortly thereafter, in another interview, Ted Bradshaw, the Executive Secretary for IFATCA, displayed IFATCA's impotence in the PATCO issue. Mr. Bradshaw stated that foreign controllers might "get in trouble with their own governments" if they boycotted flights to the United States, and the organization would not "encourage any of our members to break the law". Likewise, he said, IFATCA has not taken a position on whether it was right, for the American controllers, to strike. This impotence is characteristic of NGOs which, as such, have no legal governmental sovereignty. Thus, while IFATCA did link together various national organizations over one particular issue, it was impotent in solidifying those links, and bringing about a conclusion to the conflict.

The Emergency Board Meeting, of August 22 (Saturday), in Amsterdam, drew the true parameters of this impotence. It was at this meeting.

76 Ibid, 21 August, p. 18.

that IFATCA agreed to back PATCO, in its strike, with "labor action". 78 These "labor actions", while sounding quite impressive (as well as somewhat threatening), remained unspecifically defined. IFATCA issued no calls to direct action, despite the refusal of the Reagan Administration to renew talks with PATCO. The only positive statements issued by IFATCA were further appeals, to the Reagan Administration, to renew talks with PATCO. IFATCA also made an offer to both parties to act as a third-party mediator-negotiator. 79 Both of these requests went unheeded, in Washington.

After the Emergency Board Meeting, of August 22, IFATCA interest, and participation, in the PATCO strike diminished. Basically, the Reagan Administration had "called IFATCA's bluff, the "bluff" being that IFATCA could actually construct a world-wide boycott that would cripple, or even halt, United States-flights overseas. As was seen, by Ted Bradshaw's remarks of August 20th (see page 39), IFATCA was indeed bluffing when it first proposed a world-wide boycott of United States-flights. The actual operating authority of IFATCA was simply not enough to stage such an action.

This is not to say IFATCA was ineffective in its unconscious, secondary role, as an agent of international linkage and regime-building. In fact, as noted, IFATCA was quite effective as an agent of linkage (see Graph I, page 45). IFATCA was able to link a nation-based conflict, with other national organizations, having similar international concerns. Then, as concerned CATCA, a national controllers organization brought a

78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., 24 August, p. 1.
great deal of conflict into their own country, by responding to the PATCO issue by boycotting. Finally, CATCA, in conjunction with the Canadian Government, entered into an agreement to study the PATCO issue, linking (in effect) two nations over the issue of a union strike. Basically, through IFATCA's efforts, a great deal of international attention and action was linked to this national issue. In sum, the PATCO controversy is a "classic" case to demonstrate the working of "international linkage", and "complex interdependence", in the air.
CHAPTER IV.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In order to fully understand the importance of IFATCA, in international aviation, one must comprehend the theories of linkage and complex interdependence. Of all international issues, aviation demands the highest quality, and quantity, of links. The need for interdependence, in international aviation, is critical to the safety and well-being of both the airlines, and its customers. Nations which engage in international air transport must establish international regimes to standardize norms, and rules, of air transport.

The importance of building international regimes, around the issue of air traffic control, is equally critical for safety and welfare. Norms and rules have been standardized, on an international level, and will continue to be so handled. Just as important, in this area of international aviation, is the general welfare of the individual air traffic controller. The profession of air traffic controller has long been recognized as one which greatly taxes the mental, and physical, processes of the worker. As such, special considerations, rules and conditions of employment have been accorded this profession. Such benefits as high pay, large disability payments and leaves of absence, have become normal contractual arrangements for controllers.

IFATCA was formed to prosecute these wants, and special needs, of
the air traffic control profession. As shown, since IFATCA is an NGO, it has a weak power base from which to prosecute issues and conflicts. In order to build a power base around an issue, IFATCA must build an issue-regime around the issue. The regime, in order to be effective, must be structured well, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Since the majority of member unions are employed by their respective governments, these unions have a restricted quantity, and quality, of actions they may take, on any given issue, to bolster the regime. In the case of the CATCA boycott, some Canadian controllers were suspended, and the rest were threatened with firing and imprisonment. While prosecuting any given issue, IFATCA must be careful to not demand, or even request, any actions which will place any of its member associations in direct conflict with their respective employers. Such was almost the case with the IFATCA request to boycott United States-flights, during the PATCO strike.

Needless to say, IFATCA sees bright future for itself in a world which is becoming increasingly more interdependence. The international character of the job, of air traffic controller, further aggrandizes the "linkage-ability" of IFATCA, in the international community. Because of the nature of the position of air traffic controllers, issue-linkage and regime-building on ATC issues is facilitated much more readily by IFATCA, than with most organizations.

The PATCO case study does show that IFATCA, through a simple request, was able to direct international attention at a national conflict, and link this nation-based conflict issue with the broader international issue of general controller's welfare. IFATCA was able to build a re-
gime with which to prosecute the issue, despite the fact that the regime was somewhat shaky, and lasted for but a short period of time (see Graph I, page SOb). The regime was able to pose problems and dilemmas in the conflict, and was most certainly felt by policy-makers in the United States Government. Although IFATCA was unable to bring a satisfactory conclusion to the conflict, it was able to make its presence known, especially through the various boycotts, and re-routing schemes, that the FAA had to administer, in response to the boycotts.

In summary, IFATCA seems to possess a great deal of power, and authority, as an NGO. Through simple requests, IFATCA is able to command controllers to take actions detrimental to their individual job situations, and economic welfares. IFATCA, as such, is an agent of link-age and regime-building, in the international arena, and is able to build substantial prosecutorial regimes. The future of IFATCA, in the new international community of expanding air networks, appears to be bright, indeed.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


New York Times, 1981. Specific dates and pages used are contained within the footnotes of the thesis.


