A mandate to lead: independence leaders in power and the unlikelihood of civil war incidence

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A mandate to lead: independence leaders in power and the unlikelihood of civil war incidence

by

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ABSTRACT

The field of civil conflict research focuses on how the structural features of states influence the odds of civil war occurring. This thesis discusses the impact that independence leaders and their reputations have on the likelihood of civil war incidence. Using data for every post-independence leader in Africa until 2004, I find that independence leaders are significantly less likely to experience civil war than a non-independence leader in any given year, all else being equal.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

On March 29, 2008 Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) eclipsed incumbent president Robert Mugabe of the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) by nearly five percentage points in Zimbabwe’s first round of the presidential election. Tsvangirai’s first round victory created a situation in which it seemed imminent that a new leader would take office for the first time since Mugabe rose to power in 1980. Despite his openly stated belief that he had secured a simple majority in the first round, Tsvangirai agreed to a June 27, 2008 run-off election against Mugabe. International coverage of Zimbabwe over the next three months regularly contained stories of fraudulent exercises and abuse against MDC supporters.

“Compelling evidence of violence, intimidation and outright terror; the studied harassment of the leadership of the MDC, including its presidential candidate, by the security organs of the Zimbabwean government; the arrest and detention of the secretary general of the MDC; the banning of MDC public meetings; and denial of access to the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation - have all convinced us that free and fair elections are not possible in the political environment prevalent in Zimbabwe today.”

The violence against his supporters led Tsvangirai to withdraw from the runoff, despite his projected victory. Mugabe won a landslide victory in the uncontested runoff, which was denounced by the South African Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU), and many western nations.

Over the next year and a half, Zimbabwe’s situation worsened considerably, especially in the realm of economics. Zimbabwe’s 2009 purchasing power parity per

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capita was ranked 228th in the world at $200; a value expected to decrease as the state was experiencing a -12.6 percent rate of economic growth, an unemployment rate of 95 percent, and an inflation rate in excess of 14.9 billion percent. Politically, the fears of MDC supporters increased as Tsvangirai made a suspicious power sharing deal with the ZANU-PF, and shortly after was nearly killed in a head on automobile collision that fatally wounded his wife.

It is curious that Zimbabwe has not erupted into a state of civil war when one considers the combination of political oppression, dire economic circumstances, ethnic divisions, and a handful of other factors that are commonly seen as indicators of conflict that exists in the state. In fact, Zimbabwe possesses eight or nine of the most common predictors of civil war, and yet has not seen substantial violence against the government.

There are other cases in which administrations avoided rebellions despite being responsible for many conditions that commonly lead to civil war. Examples include the first three decades of Mobutu’s reign in Zaire and Houphouët-Boigny’s 33 year reign in Côte d’Ivoire. Houphouët-Boigny was responsible for the existence of some civil war determinants in Côte d’Ivoire, when he failed to diversify the Ivorian economy causing its economy to collapse, generating serious political instability. In addition, “no one ever pretended the Ivory Coast under Houphouët-Boigny was a paradise of enlightened

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5 The other factors implied here are a small military (only spending 3.8% of its already low GDP), a lack of secondary schooling (the average student only finishes 9 years of education), a dispersed population, a reliance on primary commodity exports (with platinum, cotton, tobacco, and gold being the top four). A weak argument could be made for Zimbabwe having a large population which is 11 million and the 23rd most in Africa. (CIA World Factbook and Mara.org)
democracy, he was in charge and everyone knew it." Still, Côte d'Ivoire experienced zero civil wars during the 33 years he was in power, and when Houphouët-Boigny opened up the system to competitive elections in 1990, he “won handily.” After 33 years of peace under Houphouët-Boigny, Côte d’Ivoire erupted into a state of civil war less than a decade after his reign ended.

In this thesis, I explain why some countries with precipitating structural preconditions experience rebellion and others do not. I argue and show that countries governed by a leader of their independence movement are less likely to experience civil war than countries governed by non independence leaders.

There are multiple reasons why rebel groups are less likely to attack independence leaders than subsequent primary leaders. These reasons are generally related to the odds of victory being lower against independence leaders. Rebels have a smaller chance of victory against independence leaders because it is easier for independence leaders to recruit based on their position and reputation as a symbol of the state, and more difficult for rebel groups to recruit citizens to fight against an individual with such a reputation.

The “reputation” of African leaders is admittedly difficult to demonstrate, as reliable survey data has ceased to exist on the continent today, and was not compiled at the time of independence. However, the revered reputation of independence leaders is an assumption of this thesis based on the most credible literature on the topic and various comments about such leaders made in credible newspapers around the world. Bratton and

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7 ibid
8 The term “primary leader” will be used in this paper to mean the individual who is recognized as the executive power holder. Depending on the case, this will mean the President, Prime Minister, or Military Leader.
Van de Walle (1997) refer to these leaders as “larger-than-life political leaders”\(^9\). Young and Turner cite that Mobutu was treated as a deity in Zaire.\(^10\) The following quote by Interior Minister Engulu supports the statement of Mobutu’s near deification:

“In our religion, we have our own theologians. In all religions, and at all times, there are prophets. Why not today? God has sent a great prophet, our prestigious Guide Mobutu – this prophet is our liberator, our Messiah. Our Church is the MPR. Its chief is Mobutu, we respect him like one respects a Pope. Our gospel is Mobutuism. This is why the crucifixes must be replaced by the image of our Messiah. And party militants will want to place at its side his glorious mother, Mama Yemo, who gave birth to such a son.”\(^11\)

Jack R. Payton of the St. Petersburg Times (Florida) suggests that Houphouët-Boigny’s reputation in Côte d’Ivoire paralleled Mobutu’s in Zaire, by stating that “Houphouët-Boigny was something of a god to his people”\(^12\) who was “known affectionately as ‘Papa.’”\(^13\) Houphouët-Boigny’s reputation was so great, that when “in his presence, [crowds around Houphouët-Boigny] seemed transfixed, awe-struck, almost as if they had died and gone to heaven.”\(^14\) I believe that the perception of an elevated status of these leaders had a profound impact on the decisions made by their constituencies.

I argue that independence leaders are less likely to experience civil war than their non independence counterparts. If this argument is correct, scholars and policy makers will have a greater capacity to know whether a civil war is likely in a country. For example, they will likely to predict relative peace in Zimbabwe’s near future because of

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\(^11\) ibid

\(^12\) Payton (1993).


\(^14\) Payton (1993). It is worth noting that Payton is writing about the experience of meeting Houphouët-Boigny in 1980, two decades into his rule.
Mugabe’s history as a leader of their independence. Perhaps more importantly, they will likely predict that Zimbabwe will finally succumb to the existing civil war determinants shortly after Mugabe relinquishes power. Such predictions will change the approach that external states, international organizations, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) take with Zimbabwe and other comparable states.

The findings of this thesis are not only salient to the anti-colonial independence leaders currently in power, but will remain useful in the future. Independence movements exist in all parts of the world today, and it will be useful to know how to act with respect to their new leaders if those movements are successful. It is important to note that many western powers, including the United States, heralded and supported the initial successes of Mobutu and Mugabe; and therefore enabled their later tyranny. Prominent examples of current independence movements include the southern region of Sudan, the Igbo in Nigeria, the Basques in Spain, and the Chechens in Russia. As recently as March 29, 2010, Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi called for Nigeria to be divided into several individual states along ethnic lines. While it is unlikely that these independence movements will succeed, leaders of these movements are likely to play prominent roles in the civil society of their groups and states. Therefore, knowledge of how people act in response to big personas serving in leadership positions is pertinent to future research.

However, a positive finding of the main hypothesis of this thesis will only show basic correlation, and can only help scholars and policy makers in making more accurate predictions. For them to be truly effective in addressing such countries, they must also know how the presence of an independence leader prevents civil war.

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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature that attempts to explain the causes of civil war typically falls into three broad categories; which are the “grievance”, “greed”, and “state’s capacity to repress” models. This review will briefly explain the arguments presented in each category.

Throughout the 1990s, the field was dominated by literature defending the grievance model, with Ted Gurr as the leading proponent. Gurr and those that agreed with him argued that:

“Protest and rebellion by communal groups are jointly motivated by deep-seated grievances about group status and by the situationally determined pursuit of political interest, as formulated by group leaders and political entrepreneurs.”

The grievances considered to be determinants of civil war that are cited most often are group disadvantages, political and economic differentials, loss of group autonomy, poverty, and discrimination. In general, grievance scholars contend that civil wars arise as a result of one group feeling deprived relative to another group within their state. Gurr consistently uses the phrase “communal group,” which can be any group within a state that self identifies as a collective unit, but is most commonly a group characterized by religion, ethnicity, or language. In Gurr’s opinion, conflict is essential in the process of defining and strengthening these groups’ identities.

The articles written in the 1990s make bold statements as to the dominance of the grievance explanation, claiming that “communal grievances have driven the most

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17 ibid
18 ibid, 162.
persistent civil wars of the last 40 years” 19 and that 49 out of 58 ongoing conflicts in 1995 were ethnopolitical. 20

The grievance explanation is also dependent on the mobilization model to more adequately explain the process of civil war onset. 21 Mobilization scholars improve upon the grievance model by explaining that while grievances may cause the desire for civil war, they alone do not enable groups to act on their anger. The inability of groups to act on their anger is often the result of a collective action problem; the failure of separate individuals or groups to act as a cohesive unit in order to accomplish shared goals.

The collective action problem is often the result of individuals choosing to free ride. Free riders are individuals that do not act on behalf of the group, yet can still reap the benefits of the group’s success. In the example of civil war, it is often an entire region or ethnic group that gains freedom or political power in the event of victory, not only those who physically fought. Members of said region or ethnic group that gain such benefits without physically fighting are “free riders”. Free riding is a danger to rebel groups, for without sufficient forces a rebellion will inevitably fail. Groups wishing to legitimately challenge their state’s government must avoid this problem and have the capacity for joint action. 22

Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) convincingly dispute the notion that non-participation is significantly more costly than participation when it comes to war, because non-

19 ibid, 188.
22 ibid
combatants are often at risk of being killed. Even if free riding is not a large problem, collective action is still necessary in order to organize, coordinate, and administer communication within the grievance group.

Under the mobilization model, political entrepreneurs specialize in overcoming the collective action problem. Group leaders and political entrepreneurs capitalize on the opportunity to gain power by using shared grievances as a rallying cry to collect and mobilize group members. Political entrepreneurs overcome free riding by issuing side payments to those who fight, thereby increasing the opportunity cost of not fighting. As rebel forces increase in quantity and war duration drags on, these side payments become exceedingly costly, providing rebel leaders with incentive (or necessity) to loot state resources and disperse them among their soldiers. Regan and Norton (2005) support the proposal that greed prevents soldiers from defecting away from rebellion.

Since the turn of the 21st century, the greed model has gained salience in the field of civil conflict research. The greed argument lists a much more cynical set of civil war determinants. Greed model proponents, mainly Paul Collier, argue that grievance is a norm across the African continent, and that it is only the situations in which greed takes over that civil war will occur. Africa’s poor economic progress makes it vulnerable to civil war, as group leaders are forced to search for alternative modes of income for their group. Seizing state power to gain the rights of taxation or seizing control of the state’s primary commodity exports are lucrative and enticing options for desperately poor

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25 Regan and Norton (2005), 325.
groups. Rebel groups can also raise funds by collecting from sympathetic diasporas or subvention on the part of hostile governments.\textsuperscript{27} To the greed scholars, grievances are merely tools for opportunistic leaders seeking power and wealth. Proponents of the greed model repeatedly find empirical evidence that optimal scenarios for the greedy (a state’s reliance on primary commodity exports and military advantage for the rebels such as mountainous terrain) are significant determinants of civil war onset. These same scholars continuously find that ethnic diversity and lack of political rights are not significant indicators of civil war, as Gurr and his colleagues postulate.\textsuperscript{28} Conversely, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) find that fractionalized societies are less likely to experience civil war.\textsuperscript{29}

The third model of thought contends that civil wars occur when a state’s capacity to repress rebellion is low, so that the likelihood of rising insurgencies is high. This group is contemporaneous to Collier and Hoeffler and is led by James Fearon and David Laitin. These scholars argue that many African states have seen situations of both greed and grievance, but did not experience civil war because either their government avoided facing rebellion by sufficiently repressing rebellion groups before violence began, or because an effective insurgency failed to establish itself. State capacity scholars and mobilization scholars agree that certain variables facilitate collective action for insurgencies; including a large population and poverty.\textsuperscript{30} However, state capacity proponents alone argue the importance of “the state’s capacity to repress” in predicting civil war. A state’s capacity to repress is contingent upon its political stability, the terrain

\textsuperscript{28} Collier and Hoeffler (2002), 17.
\textsuperscript{29} ibid
of the country, and the income of the government. These scholars refute the significance of ethnic, religious, or linguistic divisions; respect for civil liberties; foreign support; trade openness; and a state’s reliance on primary commodities as civil war determinates.

In the past few years, some civil war scholars have logically chosen to explain civil war through a combination of the three models. Regan and Norton (2005) contend that collective action for civil war begins as a result of shared grievances, but can only continue if greed exists to help prevent defection. Lujala et al. (2005) argue that there are three factors that are essential for the onset of civil war: motives, either positive or negative (greed or grievance); opportunity, collective action and money (mobilization); and a common identity (which is also considered as essential in the grievance literature). Hegre and Sambanis (2006) ran a plethora of robustness tests to show that various determinants from different fields are significant.

While one or a combination of these three theories can explain many of the world’s civil conflicts, they fail to account for Zimbabwe’s unexpected peace. A possible reason for these theories’ shortcomings is that they focus heavily on the structural features of states, and little on the human aspect of leadership. The greed and grievance models focus heavily on the economic and political aspects of the state, for example variables such as what commodities are available for exploit, economic measures and democratic values. The state’s capacity to repress model focuses on the resources

31 ibid
32 ibid
33 Regan and Norton (2005), 319.
34 Lujala et al (2005), 539.
available to the state, such as military strength or the prowess of the police force. These variables would arguably be the same (or similar) regardless of which individual is in power. I believe that differences between individual leaders make a substantial difference in the mindset of the public, and contend that the reputation of the leadership has a drastic effect on the decision-making of its constituents. In this thesis, I intend to show that countries whose primary leader is a former independence leader of their nation are less likely to experience civil war than countries whose primary leader is not an independence leader.
CHAPTER 3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Independence leaders commonly hold a significant place in the history and culture of their nations, especially in Africa. Regardless of their intentions, they are often remembered as those who fought colonial powers in defense of their nation’s honor and sovereignty. Their role in shaping the institutions of their countries earned them the titles of founding fathers; a status held in higher respect than subsequent leaders. Does this higher level of respect affect the way that citizens react to their rule? Would people respond differently to the same policies and leadership had the primary leader not had a special reputation or background?

Much has been published regarding the significant effects a leadership’s reputation has on its constituency and tenure. Many of African politics’ leading scholars have written that “founding fathers” of nations receive adoration, trust, and respect above what they otherwise would. However, scholars have yet to link this phenomenon to the likelihood of civil war incidence.

Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) suggest that leaders’ reputations have in fact led to an extension of their tenures in office, by explaining that many incumbent leaders won votes by appealing to their status as father figures of their nations.36 This implies that “father figure” leaders may potentially have experienced earlier exits by democratic means at the very least, had it not been for their status. Goren Hyden (2006) adds evidence to the argument that reputations matter, when he states that constitutional framers were granted more credibility by African citizens, merely by their involvement in the creation of their institutions; implying that otherwise their constituents may have

36 Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), 161.
deemed them as unqualified to lead. Bratton and Van de Walle further show the status and power of former heroes by referring to them as “larger-than-life personas” and stating that they were able to set the agenda for African nationalism.

Young and Turner (1985) provide empirical evidence which suggests that former heroes use their histories to promote reputations that will further their careers. They focus on Mobutu’s story in Zaire. Mobutu served a 32 year tenure, after taking control of Zaire’s government two separate times. He ingrained his status as a hero of Zaire’s independence by naming his party the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR), after serving as “an effective commander of the army and as a political arbiter” of the revolution. Mobutu further manipulated the country into considering his persona as “larger than life” by mandating that the media refer to only him by name for a period of weeks; the media was required to refer to other officials by their title only. The national anthem of Zaire was also written to include Mobutu’s name, so that the people tied his well-being to that of the nation’s.

It is exceedingly difficult to raise support to overthrow a leader when he has a cult of personality like Mobutu in Zaire or Houphouët-Boigny in Côte d’Ivoire, even if legitimate grievances exist.

“The fundamental fact about insurgency is that insurgents are weak relative to the governments they are fighting, at least at the start of operations. If government forces knew who the rebels were and how to find them, they would be fairly easily destroyed or captured. This is true even in states whose military and police capabilities are low.”

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38 Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), 25.
39 Young and Turner (1985)
40 ibid, 176.
41 ibid, 169.
42 ibid, 170.
43 Fearon and Laitin (2003), 79.
I assume that when a leader is highly revered, or when the population ties the well-being of their nation to that of the leader’s, that there is a higher percentage of the population willing to report to authorities “who the rebels are and how to find them.” The increased likelihood of the government knowing who and where rebels are is an increase in the state’s capacity to repress, and “if the state is capable of repressing, then the likelihood of imprisonment, injury, or death will be higher and mobilization will be less likely.”

Regan and Norton support this claim by stating that “rebel support will be largely a function of the fear of punishment if their support is detected.” Not only will rebels be less likely to mobilize, but individuals who are on the fence about joining the rebellion will likely be deterred from doing so.

The example of Zaire, along with the statements quoted above from other notable African politics scholars, serve as credible evidence supporting the significance of a leader’s national reputation.

While it is widely accepted that many things in a state are affected by leadership qualities, it is yet to be reported whether or not this effect extends to conflict. Such a study is a useful endeavor as conflicts and governments are inextricably linked. The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset defines civil conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.”

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45 Regan and Norton (2005), 324.
As civil conflict necessarily involves the government, primary leaders have the most to lose in civil war, especially in Africa where leaders have significant control of the state; as was said about Houphouët-Boigny: “he was in charge, and everyone knew it.” Houphouët-Boigny had enough power that he was able to mandate that Côte d’Ivoire focus the entirety of its economy on agriculture and not diversify.47 African leaders also have nearly unfettered access to the state’s coffers; which means that they and their family can accumulate massive wealth if the state has the ability to effectively tax the population. Further, African leaders commonly have the ability to allocate state services (as unequally as they might wish), and therefore their home-region or ethnicity gains significantly from their position. Leaders who are particularly good at promoting their reputation are able to portray the allocation of state services as “a personal gift from the president.”48 Filling the position of primary leader in Africa typically allows one to monopolize power, as well as become exceedingly wealthy and share that wealth with their kin and preferred constituents.

Having so much to lose puts leaders in a situation in which they must be inherently concerned with the ramifications of civil war. Regardless of what motivations a group has to rebel, or if those motivations have anything to do with complaints about the leadership, it is the primary leader who stands to lose vast wealth and power. Even if the state triumphs in a civil war, the army will likely suffer casualties and therefore be less likely to succeed in a subsequent war. If the state loses a civil war, the rebel group will likely assume power, punish the leader, and take control of the states’ finances; leaving the leader and those that he supported with no income. Thus, to increase the

47 Payton (1993)
48 Young and Turner (1985), 168.
likelihood of staying in power, I believe that primary leaders do what they can to disincentivize rebellion by promoting their status as “father figures” of the nation. This might explain why Mobutu tied his well-being to that of the nations; while disadvantaged groups may have wanted to oust Mobutu, they may not have wanted to “attack Zaire” itself, which was embodied by Mobutu thanks to his efforts. Evidence that the people of Zaire believed that their well-being was contingent upon the leadership of Mobutu is beholden in the following quote from the 1970 MPR Congress:

Only one man, previously noted for his outstanding services to his country, can assure the well-being of each one of us and create the conditions propitious of the people’s moral and spiritual growth, and offer them a common ideal, the feelings of a joint destiny and the knowledge of belonging to one country.\textsuperscript{49}

I posit that a rebel group’s sentiment toward the leader is at least one of the variables weighed in the decision of rebel groups to take up arms, as a successful rebellion will have dire consequences for the leader. Therefore it follows, that a leader who is held in high esteem by the populace is less likely to experience attempted uprisings against his government than his counterparts, who lack this high regard.

In order to explain why this phenomenon exists, it is essential to first lay out who the major actors in civil conflict are. In this thesis, I categorize the participants of civil war into four groups; each acting as a unitary actor. The first major actor is the administration of the primary leader, which focuses on the primary leader, but also includes those in posts that surround and support him, as these top tier positions are often filled by direct appointments by the leader.

\textsuperscript{49} Young and Turner (1985), 164.
In this thesis, I will focus on primary leaders who played visible roles in their nations’ independence movements. While the majority of the focus will be on the primary leaders, it can be assumed that many of the other major governmental posts are also held by former freedom fighters, as nepotism is more the rule than the exception in newly independent states, and state leaders are likely to pick those who have “paid their dues” or proven loyalty to them.

The second major actor is what I will refer to as the “grievance group,” which is the core group of citizens which seeks to challenge the administration. Any group which feels it is being unduly oppressed for a common trait that they share would be identified as a grievance group, but will most likely identify itself by ethnic, religious, linguistic, regional, or economic means.

The third group consists of the political entrepreneurs, those who use their leadership skills to organize the grievance group as a means of reaching political power. Political entrepreneurs solve the coordination problem that individuals with shared grievances commonly come across, and enable those individuals to become a unitary actor. Political entrepreneurs gain from coordinating grievance groups, because they are the most likely individuals to take office if the rebellion is successful.\(^\text{50}\) It is interesting to note that if this ascension to power does take place; the political entrepreneur’s title will incorporate the identity of a former freedom fighter or national hero. It is for this reason that political entrepreneurs might “exaggerate the hostility of others and magnify the likelihood of conflict.”\(^\text{51}\)


\(^{51}\) ibid
The final group of actors is the otherwise neutral public, citizens who do not belong to the grievance group. These neutral citizens can choose to join the government’s side, the rebellion’s side, or to remain neutral. Recruitment of these citizens is essential for either side to stand a chance of succeeding in the civil war. The longevity of civil war necessitates that both sides have access to soldiers and financing, which are provided by persuading otherwise neutral citizens to support their causes.52

All four groups are essential elements to civil war, for without one of them the war would not take place. By definition, a civil war must include violence between the government and opposition forces from within the state (referred to as the grievance group in this article.) Without political entrepreneurs the grievance group will fail to coordinate and mobilize. Without support and assistance from otherwise neutral citizens the grievance group will neither have the manpower nor financial means to succeed in war.

Are these actors less likely to violently clash when an independence leader is in office? I contend that the persona and reputation of an independence leader acting as the primary leader are significant enough to convince one of the other three actors to remain at peace. Four possible decisions of “non-actions” will be discussed.

**H1: Grievance groups are less likely to form when an independence leader is the primary leader of the state**

52 It is acknowledged that often times financial support can come from external sources, particularly diasporas. However, for the purposes of this thesis, I consider those diasporas to be acting much like the otherwise neutral public, as they are by definition at least former citizens of the state. Therefore, they similarly can be convinced to support either the rebels or the government. There are also civil wars financed by external states. While there is no way to count this support as coming from the otherwise neutral public, the otherwise neutral public is still a necessary component of these conflicts, as insurgencies often require safe havens, food, and other services that might come from non-combatant citizens.
When an independence leader is in power, grievance groups are less likely to form; this is the first non-action that might take place. Grievances are more likely to be overlooked when the leader has a reputation that is highly revered and associated with the founding of the state. This is the result of the extra credit that is given to those leaders that shaped constitutions, as explained by Hyden earlier in this thesis.\(^{53}\) Upset citizens are more likely to assume that the national hero’s failure to solve their problems means that nobody could succeed in doing so. This is supported by Zaire’s 1970 MPR Congressional statement that “only one man… can assure the well-being of each one of us.”\(^{54}\) It is also likely that those who have grievances do not feel that it is justified, or even feel that it is treasonous, to rise against a leader whose reputation is so closely tied to that of the nation, such as Mobutu in Zaire. The link between rebelling and treason is more easily understood when considering that Mobutu’s nicknames in the media and the public consisted of “Guide of the Zairian Revolution, the Helmsman, Father of the Nation, [and] Founding President.”\(^{55}\)

The lack of a grievance group then means that political entrepreneurs have no group to mobilize, and therefore are not able to act.

If grievance groups do exist, political entrepreneurs may choose not to act for the same reasons that were just explained for the grievance groups. This is the second possible non-action.

\(^{53}\) Hyden (2006), 106.
\(^{54}\) Young and Turner (1985), 164.
\(^{55}\) ibid, 168. Mobutu is not a unique example when it comes to these revered nicknames. As two examples, in Kenya, Kenyatta’s nickname was Mzee, which translated to “wise old man” or “elder”; in Tanzania, Nyerere’s nickname was Mwalimu, which translated to “teacher of the people.”
H2: Political entrepreneurs are less likely to organize rebellions when an independence leader is the primary leader of the state

If grievance groups arise, and there are political entrepreneurs willing to take the risks involved in coordinating them, a civil war movement will cease to exist if the expectations of victory are low for the rebelling group. If grievance groups and political entrepreneurs know that their chances of winning are low, they will not even attempt to recruit from the public at large. As discussed earlier in this thesis, recruiting increases the number of individuals who know that a grievance group is planning a rebellion, and increased reverence for the leader increases the likelihood that one of those individuals will report those intentions. As the previously cited quote from Fearon and Laitin (2003) explains, even weak states will have the ability to destroy an insurgency if it can engage them during the recruitment phase.\(^\text{56}\) The decision to not recruit is the third possible non-action. War theorists have already shown that war is less likely when a gap in military capabilities is evident.\(^\text{57}\) Rebel groups will not foolishly revolt, or signal the possibility of a revolt by recruiting from the public, when their defeat is imminent and their goals are not likely to be reached.

H3: Rebel groups are less likely to signal their intentions by recruiting when an independence leader is the primary leader of the state

\[^{56}\text{Fearon and Laitin (2003)}\]
\[^{57}\text{Butler, Christopher. “To Fight or Not to Fight: Contest Success Functions and Civil Conflict” 2005}\]
Why would rebel groups expect their likelihood of victory to be lower when the state is led by an independence leader? One possibility is that many independence leaders were also revolutionary leaders, as some states had to fight wars for sovereignty. Freedom fighters by definition have experienced a similar conflict and are war tested. The freedom fighter’s place in government necessarily implies that they have previously been victorious in conflict, and therefore have sufficient knowledge of how to fight on that territory. Formerly victorious freedom fighters that obtain the position of primary leader are most often those that were not only soldiers, but leaders in their revolutions (probably the political entrepreneurs of their revolution.) This previous military leadership further increases the primary leader’s expected military capacity. However, it is duly noted that not all independence leaders were freedom fighters, revolutionary heroes, or engaged in military conflict in any dimension.

There are reasons why a primary leader has a greater ability to recruit than the rebel groups. Because political leaders often control the media and most modes of communication, their ability to recruit is likely to be greater than insurgencies’. “President Slobodan Milosevic’s control over the media in Serbia, for instance, allowed him to present a one-sided view of the Croat violence toward Croatian Serbs.”

Mobutu’s sway over the media is evidenced by the fact that “the press carried a front-page photograph of [him] nearly every day.” Administrations are also likely to have the capacity to conscribe citizens to the national military, surely increasing its expected military capabilities. These two reasons explain how primary leaders have greater recruitment capacity than rebel groups; however, for it to have any utility to this thesis, I

58 Lake and Rothchild (1996), 54.
59 Young and Turner (1985), 168.
must show how recruitment makes independence leaders less likely to experience civil conflict than non-independence leaders.

A former independence leader is more likely to successfully recruit than subsequent leaders, on the basis of holding a “father figure” status. The most compelling example of this is Houphouët-Boigny, who was still affectionately referred to as “Papa” thirty years into his reign, despite Côte d’Ivoire’s economy and political stability declining considerably throughout the 1980s.\textsuperscript{60} Admittedly, this is only a theoretical claim, as it is impossible to know the counterfactual; Côte d’Ivoire did not experience any civil wars during Houphouët-Boigny’s tenure, and therefore he did not have to recruit a defensive force. With that said, I assume that the public is more likely to defend “father figures” of their nation than subsequent leaders.

Even if grievance groups and political entrepreneurs decide that they have a decent chance of victory, and that the administration will fail to recruit large segments of the public, the public can still choose to not support either side of the conflict. The decision of the public to remain neutral is the fourth possible non-action that would prevent the onset of civil war.

**H4: The public is less likely to support a revolution when an independence leader is the primary leader of the state**

Recruiting from a neutral public is assuredly more difficult when the public views the leader as a symbol of their nation. I give two reasons why this might be. First, citizens may consider it treasonous to rebel against something that symbolizes the nation; much

\textsuperscript{60} Payton (1993)
like why people are offended by the sight of flag burning. The second, more rational reason is that the public may fear the rebellion will be unsuccessful and therefore decide not to act. If the rebellion fails, anyone involved, even if only financially, will likely be punished by the administration.\textsuperscript{61} Citizens who lack grievances are less likely to take the same risks as citizens who do have grievances, as the benefits from success are inconsistent between the two groups. As stated before, if the public remains neutral by withholding their financial and military resources, grievance groups and political entrepreneurs will lack the capability to launch a civil war. If they attempt to fight without the support of the public, they will be easily defeated and their efforts will be classified as a minor uprising or unrest.

The involvement of all four actors is necessary for grievances to escalate into a civil war. The persona and reputation of an independence leader acting as the primary leader is significant enough that it will succeed in convincing at least one of the other actors to not revolt against it.

In order to test the effect that a leader’s reputation has on rebellion, it is necessary to find a proxy that is consistent. As is shown from the cited literature above, revolutionary heroes, founding fathers, and father figures of states are typically held in far higher regard than their subsequent heads of state. I will therefore empirically test whether or not countries that are led by leaders of their independence movement are less likely to experience civil war.

\textbf{H5: Countries whose primary leaders served as leaders of their independence movements are less likely to experience civil war}

\textsuperscript{61} Hendrix (2009), 1.
CHAPTER 4. CASE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY

In this study, I will focus on testing Hypothesis 5; the other hypotheses will remain the topics of future research.

H5: Countries whose primary leaders served as leaders of their independence movements are less likely to experience civil war

In order to test this hypothesis, I need a sample of primary leaders; some of whom were independence leaders and some of whom were not. I test whether or not those that were classified as independence leaders were less likely to experience civil war.

The unit of analysis in this study is leader-year. The set of cases are the 47 mainland African countries as well as Cape Verde, Comoros, Mauritius, and Madagascar, from their year of independence until 2004. The study stops at 2004 due to data limitations; however, I do not have reason to believe that subsequent years would substantially change the results of this test.

The cases are limited to Africa to provide for consistency and for the practical purpose of obtaining all necessary data within a limited time frame. Limiting the sample to Africa provides consistency because it rules out many regional variables such as climate, terrain, and neighbors. African countries are also consistent because all but Liberia were formerly European colonies, and the strong majority earned independence between the late 1950s and 1970s.62 While I believe that the results of this study will also

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62 Egypt, Ethiopia, and Libya earned their independence before this time. Namibia, Eritrea, and South Africa’s independence came after.
have implications for the way we understand leadership outside of Africa, further
research will be necessary to validate this belief.

To test these data, I ran a logistic binary time-series-cross-section (BTSCS)
analysis using STATA to test the impact that independence leaders had on civil war
incidence probability, controlling for the below mentioned variables.
CHAPTER 5. VARIABLES AND OPERATIONALIZATION

5.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The dependent variable for this hypothesis is the incidence of civil war. The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset was used to collect data for civil war, as well as for the definition of civil war.\textsuperscript{63}

“UCDP defines conflict as: ‘a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.’”\textsuperscript{64}

The set of conflicts used in this study were those classified as in the region of Africa and as being “internal” or “internationalized internal” in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. This means that cases that took place outside of Africa or were classified as “extrasystemic” or “interstate” were omitted from the dataset.

A dichotomous variable for civil war was created for whether or not a civil war took place during a leader’s reign for every leader-year. A 1 denotes that a civil war took place with the government during that year. A 0 denotes that no civil war with the government took place for that year.\textsuperscript{65}

5.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

The independent variable for this hypothesis is dichotomous, and measures whether each primary leader is an independence leader or not. There are times when there is ambiguity as to who is the effective leader of a state. I coded individuals as primary

\textsuperscript{63} Gleditsch et al (2009)
\textsuperscript{64} ibid, 1.
\textsuperscript{65} A list which years countries experienced civil conflict is shown in Appendix A
leaders based solely on the coding of the ARCHIGOS dataset in order to remain consistent with the field’s lead scholars.\textsuperscript{66}

A dichotomous variable was created for whether or not each leader was an independence leader. Primary leaders that were independence leaders are denoted by a 1, while those who were not independence leaders are denoted by a 0. Independence leaders were coded as such so long as there was credible evidence that the individual played a leadership role in their state’s independence movement. In most cases an individual’s involvement (or lack thereof) in an independence movement was rather clear; usually leadership in an independence movement was plainly noted by either the ARCHIGOS case studies or the Dictionary of African Historical Biography. For all other cases, Lexis-Nexis searches were conducted; articles were found that either described the individual’s involvement in the independence movement, or labeled them as an independence leader, leader of the independence movement, or leader of the independence party.\textsuperscript{67} Most often these articles were first published in American or British newspapers.\textsuperscript{68}

Of the 2119 post-independence leader-years in this sample, 715 are coded as during an independence leader’s reign (33.7%). As of 2004, the longest reign for an


\textsuperscript{67} The coding for independence leaders is admittedly loose.

\textsuperscript{68} For most cases, the year of independence is rather indisputable. However, there are four cases that are more vague and worth explaining here. 1) Liberia was never colonized; therefore I began with the year 1950, to ensure a comparable timeframe. 2) Libya’s inaugural leader after independence was Idris, who was essentially a defacto colonialist (“Libyan Report about the Late King and His Death.” \textit{BBC Summary of World Broadcasts} 31 May 1986. \textit{Lexis Nexis}. Web.). Qaddafi’s revolution against Idris is seen by many as the true independence movement, and is therefore coded as such (“Qaddafi Urges Death for Foes On Anniversary Of 1969 Coup.” \textit{The New York Times} 1 Sept. 2006, late ed. \textit{Lexis Nexis}. Web.; “BBC News - Gaddafi Says Nigeria Should Split into Several States.” \textit{BBC NEWS} | News Front Page. Web. 04 Apr. 2010. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8593355.stm>). 3 and 4) Zimbabwe and South Africa both recognize two independence years; one from Britain and one from white rule. For both, I recognize independence from white rule as the independence year and movement. As a robustness test, I recoded these leaders as non independence leaders, and received nearly identical results. Lists for all leaders coded as independence leaders and non independence leaders in this thesis are included in Appendix B.
independence leader was Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, who had been in power for 36 years. The next longest tenures were Houphouët-Boigny in Côte d’Ivoire with 33 years and Mobutu in Zaire with 32 years. The shortest tenures for independence leaders were the seven leaders removed from power in their first year, including Ben Khedda and Bitat in Algeria and Andom in Ethiopia. It is worth noting that these seven leaders represent only four countries⁶⁹, and six of them were removed from power by a different independence leader; only Abdallah of Comoros was not. The average length of tenure for independence leaders in this sample is 12 years.

5.3 CONTROL VARIABLES

To fully test the hypothesis, I needed to take into account the variety of factors that affect both the dependent and independent variables. Most of these variables are factors that are commonly seen as civil war determinants and are more likely to have been prevalent in the 1980s (when many civil wars occurred) than in the 1960s (when most independence leaders were in power).

Most African states gained independence in the 1960s and 1970s, a time when states were much stronger, as well as more likely to have an independence leader heading their government. The 1980s were a time of diminished state strength, as well as a time when it is reasonably expected that some of the leaders will have previously left office. “Real income per head in much of sub-Saharan Africa grew rapidly in the 1960s, but faltered following the first OPEC oil price shock in 1973-74, and then stagnated or fell

⁶⁹ Algeria, Comoros, Ethiopia, and Zaire
from the late 1970s to the early 1990s.”70 The 1980s were also a time of institutional transition, as the 1960s saw a large quantity of authoritarian regimes in Africa, which contrasts with the higher quantity of democracies of the 1990s.71 I control for state strength using a logged Real Gross Domestic Product per capita in 1996 dollars as a proxy.

“(Log) GDP per capita is highly correlated with a variety of measures of bureaucratic/administrative capacity… and may be plausibly considered both a cause and effect of bureaucratic quality and strong state institutions.”72

GDP per capita is unlikely to have an affect on whether or not an inaugural leader is an independence leader. However, I assume that independence leaders in more wealthy countries have more power to appoint the next primary leader. I also assume that constituents of independence leaders in richer countries are more likely to welcome other independence leaders into executive leadership, than constituents of poorer countries. This assumption follows the belief that individuals who are financially stable are generally more satisfied with their current government.

As this study is at least partially testing the effect that a leader’s “father figure” status has on the public, I control for leaders’ ages assuming that older leaders are more likely to carry such a reputation. Similarly, I assume that the longer one is in office the more likely they are to be seen as a father figure; therefore I control this with a variable measuring how many years each leader has been in office.

Weak democratic governance increases the likelihood of civil war, and also influences leadership. Societies in states with less democratic values are less likely to

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71 ibid
72 Hendrix (2009), 15.
bear grievances with a leader declaring himself “leader for life,” or otherwise finding a way to hold power for two or three decades.\footnote{There are admitted endogeneity issues with this variable, as a leader refusing to release power is necessarily going to decrease any score of democracy.} Also, democratic governance is likely to affect whether or not an independence leader is replaced by another independence leader when the first leaves office.\footnote{There are some who contend that there can only be one independence leader; the inaugural leader who oversees the transition from colonialism. I acknowledge this theory, but choose to code any leader who served as a leader of the independence movement as an independence leader.} States that are fully authoritarian are more likely to accept the appointment of a loyal member of the leader’s party as the subsequent leader. I control for democracy using Polity IV’s Polity 2 variable. Polity 2 is a measure of democracy ranging from -10 (completely authoritarian) to 10 (completely democratic).

Similarly, political instability is a factor that is seen as a determinant of civil war and influences leadership. I do not expect that power transfers in unstable political arenas are likely to go from one individual to a member of his own party. The correlation between political instability and leadership change can be explained in either causal direction: instability is likely to cause the desire for change, and the desire for change is likely to cause instability. Either way, I assume that independence leaders during unstable times are likely to experience conflict and to be followed by a non-independence leader (or an independence leader who is now a rival; however the empirical evidence suggests that in Africa it is common for the independence party to rule for an extended period of time.) A dummy variable was created for political instability using the Polity 2 variable in the Polity IV dataset.\footnote{“Polity IV Dataset.” Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Database. Web. <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm>.
}
which the Polity 2 score changed by a value three or more; whereas a 0 denotes years in which the political system (and therefore the Polity 2 score) was relatively stable.\textsuperscript{76}

Military power is used as a proxy to control for the state’s capacity to repress. In this study, military power is measured by military personnel from the Correlates of War Project.\textsuperscript{77} As military power is not linearly related to military personnel, it was necessary to create a variable measuring the natural log of military personnel. To further explain, consider a military increasing its personnel by 100 men. A military would be increasing its power by a significantly greater margin if its starting point is 250 men than if its starting point is 250,000 men.

Using military personnel as a proxy was chosen over military expenditures as expenditures are expected to increase rapidly once the threat of rebellion is perceived. Therefore military expenditures and civil war are likely to be highly correlated, however the causal direction is disputable. Military personnel is also likely to increase with the threat of rebellion, however I assume that this is a slower process.

The robustness of this study is checked by testing the effect of three factors; European colonizer, African region, and inaugural leadership. Which European country colonized a state logically affects who becomes the primary leader as well as the likelihood of civil conflict, as each country impacted (and in some cases framed) the political institutions and norms of their colonies.

African region is added to test robustness as regional factors are likely to affect both leadership and civil conflict incidence. Controlling for being in a particular region

\textsuperscript{76} It was decided that this variable would be binary because a change in polity score of 3 or more was almost always the result of regime change in this dataset. So while a change of 8 is certainly more impactful than a change of 3, the binary concept adequately shows when an event caused a significant change in democratic governance.

takes into account the possibility of, for example, West African states being especially 
prone to both civil strife and the veneration of independence leaders.

Inaugural leadership is highly correlated with independence leadership, as the 
majority of inaugural leaders are coded as independence leaders. A robustness test will 
ensure that I am not simply showing the effect that inaugural leadership has on the 
likelihood of civil conflict incidence.

Finally, to “correct for duration dependence,”78 and to control for autocorrelation, 
I include a measure of the number of years that the country has been at peace and three 
cubic splines. The variable for peace years measures the number of consecutive years 
without the occurrence of a civil war. Accounting for duration dependence is important 
because the probability of civil war is likely to be much higher immediately following a 
previous civil war and then decline. For example; if Country A has been at peace for 2 
years, and Country B has been at peace for 25 years, it is less likely Country A will make 
it through its 3\textsuperscript{rd} year without civil war than Country B will make it through its 26\textsuperscript{th} year. 
Without controlling for duration dependence, the analysis could violate the assumption 
that errors are uncorrelated.

The following table displays descriptive statistics for the variables discussed in 
this thesis.

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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>2119</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence Leader</td>
<td>2119</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inaugural Leader</td>
<td>2119</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP per capita</td>
<td>2049</td>
<td>1522.31</td>
<td>1997.60</td>
<td>88.48</td>
<td>17986.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders Age</td>
<td>2117</td>
<td>54.00</td>
<td>12.24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure Year</td>
<td>2119</td>
<td>9.05</td>
<td>7.75</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>2082</td>
<td>-3.75</td>
<td>5.42</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>33.95</td>
<td>68.42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Instability</td>
<td>2068</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Years</td>
<td>2119</td>
<td>11.48</td>
<td>11.44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Civil War’s mean of 0.17 tells us that civil war occurred in about one out of every six leader-years in this study. Approximately one third of all primary leaders in this sample are coded as independence leaders, and slightly more than one quarter are coded as inaugural leaders. I provide the cases that coincide with the following minimums and maximums to provide reference points for the reader. The maximum GDP per capita in the sample is Mauritius, in 2004, with $17,986.24. The minimum GDP per capita is Tanzania, in 1961, with the average person earning less than $100 that year. The eldest leader in the sample is Siad Barre in Somalia, in 2004, at the age of 92. Finally, the longest duration of peace in the sample is Egypt, which avoided civil conflict from the first year it was coded (1950) through 2004.

Table 2 is a correlation matrix for the variables used in this study. This correlation matrix only shows correlation, and does not provide evidence for causal direction of substantive correlation.

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79 The splines were omitted from this table in order to display the table more legibly. The splines were all very highly correlated with one another, but not with other variables.
Table 2. Correlation of Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Civil War</th>
<th>Independence Leader</th>
<th>Inaugural Leader</th>
<th>GDP Per Capita</th>
<th>Leaders Age</th>
<th>Years in Office</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Military Personnel</th>
<th>Political Instability</th>
<th>Peace Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence Leader</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inaugural Leader</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders Age</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years in Office</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Instability</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Years</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first highly correlated pair of variables in the study worth mentioning is independence leaders with inaugural leaders. This correlation means that most independence leaders were also the first post-independence leader of their state.\(^{80}\) The other highly correlated pair worth noting is peace years with GDP; wealthier states are correlated with states that have been at peace for longer periods of time. While substantively small, the positive correlation between civil war and large militaries is of interest, as the state’s capacity to repress model suggests that states with larger militaries should be less likely to experience civil conflict. This correlation will be discussed later in the thesis. Lastly, although independence leaders and inaugural leaders are highly

\(^{80}\) In this sample there are 46 inaugural leaders, 36 of which were also independence leaders.
correlated, their respective correlations with civil conflict are much different; inaugural leaders have a significantly higher correlation with civil war than do independence leaders.
CHAPTER 6. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

“A logistic regression model allows us to establish a relationship between a binary outcome variable and a group of predictor variables.” 81 Here, I report odds ratios. Odds ratios are the ratio of the odds of an event occurring in one circumstance to the odds of it occurring in another. As an example for one variable in this thesis, the odds ratio will be the odds of civil war incidence when an independence leader is in power divided by the odds of civil war incidence when a non independence leader is in power.

To interpret odds ratios, remember that “an odds ratio tells you by how much the odds of the dependent variable change for each unit change in the independent variable.” 82 So, in this case, an odds ratio of 0.2 would mean that a one unit change in the variable decreases the odds of civil war incidence by 80%, in any given year; and an odds ratio of 1.8 would mean that a one unit change in the variable increased the odds of civil war incidence by 80%, in any given year.

It is necessary to note that the reported percentages below are the percentage changes in the odds of civil war incidence, and not the percentage changes in likelihood (synonymous with probability) of civil war incidence, as the two are substantially different. To help explain, take the following example (the values of which were chosen for ease of explanation, not accuracy to this thesis). Take a state in which the likelihood of civil war incidence is 75%: the probability is 3 in 4, while the odds are 3 to 1. A 100% increase in likelihood would then increase the likelihood to 150% (6/4) (a nonsensical number meaning that civil war incidence was guaranteed and a half). A 100% increase in the odds would increase the odds to 6:1 (approximately 86% likelihood). Clearly, the

difference between 86% and 150% likelihood in this example shows the importance of clearly distinguishing whether I am reporting odds or likelihoods. Most important to understand here, is that the effect of a percentage change in odds is usually quite less substantial than the same nominal percentage change in likelihood.

In this thesis I am reporting odds ratios, not likelihood. While coefficients for likelihood would tell you exactly how much a one unit change in each variable would change the likelihood of civil war incidence (and would be quite useful), the results I report using odds ratios are just as valid; meaning the reported significance, effect and direction of correlation reported for each variable are adequately described by odds ratios. Using odds ratios was beneficial to this thesis because it allowed me to show how strongly each variable was associated with civil war incidence relative to the other variables.

Table 3. Odds Ratios of Civil War Incidence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil War</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
<th>(std. err.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independence Leader</td>
<td>0.342***</td>
<td>0.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Log) GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.907</td>
<td>0.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders Age</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Log) Years in Office</td>
<td>1.005</td>
<td>0.182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (Polity 2)</td>
<td>0.981</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Log) Military Personnel</td>
<td>1.200***</td>
<td>0.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Instability</td>
<td>2.636***</td>
<td>1.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Log) Peace Years</td>
<td>0.767</td>
<td>0.267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spline 1</td>
<td>1.021***</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spline 2</td>
<td>0.995***</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spline 3</td>
<td>1.001***</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1401  Pseudo R^2 = 0.1161

*: Z_{0.1} = 1.283. **: Z_{0.05} = 1.645  ***: Z_{0.01} = 2.33, one-tailed test, robust standard errors
From this, I find that status as an independence leader does have a highly statistically significant and negative effect on the likelihood of civil war incidence. Having an independence leader serving as the primary leader decreases the odds of civil war incidence by 66%, all else being equal. When holding all the control variables constant at their mean, a country whose primary leader is an independence leader is 3.3% less likely to experience civil conflict than a country whose primary leader is not an independence leader, with a 95% confidence interval ranging from 1.5 to 5.3 percentage points. Because the likelihood of civil war in any given year in any country is quite low, this is a statistically significant and substantive effect. Both the percentage change in odds and predicted likelihood presented here strongly support Hypothesis 5.

Of the control variables, only political instability and military personnel have statistically significant effects on the odds of civil war incidence in this regression. Not surprisingly, an increase in political instability is associated with increased odds of civil war incidence. According to this regression, political instability increases the odds of civil war incidence by 164%, all else being equal.

Interestingly, this test shows that states with more populous militaries are more likely to face rebellions, which seems to contradict the state’s capacity to repress argument. However, an increase in GDP per capita (my measure for the state’s capacity to repress) is negatively correlated with civil war incidence, which supports the state’s capacity argument.

To see how great of an effect logged military personnel has on the odds of civil war incidence, I computed two numbers for substantive significance. The substantive significance of a one unit increase in an independent variable is that variable’s odds ratio,
the substantive significance of a two unit increase in an independence variable is its odds ratio squared, and so on. Therefore, to find the total significance of logged military personnel, I took the odds ratio (1.2) to the power of the total variation of logged military personnel. The product of this calculation is the percentage change in odds of civil war incidence for states with the lowest value of logged military personnel and states with the highest value of logged military personnel in any given year, all else being equal. This computation shows that a state with military personnel equivalent to the largest value in the sample’s (Egypt in 1984 where the armed forces included 466,000 fighters) odds of civil war incidence are two times greater than a state with the smallest military in the sample (which is zero). Since this is admittedly a very large gap, I then did the same computation measuring from the mean of the logged military variable to the largest value. This shows that a state with a military equivalent to 466,000 soldiers’ odds of civil war incidence is 95% greater than a state that has an average sized military for this sample (equivalent to Mozambique’s army in 1984 which had 34,000 soldiers), in any given year, all else being equal. Clearly, an increased military has a substantial and positive effect on the odds of civil war incidence.

The other control variables are statistically insignificant in this regression; however, their substantive effects are worth noting. As stated above, GDP per capita is negatively correlated with civil war incidence in this regression, implying that wealthier countries are less likely to experience civil conflict.

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83 The equation for substantive significance is “odds ratio^n” where “n” is how many units the independent variable is changing.

84 Possible explanations for the strength of this effect will be discussed in the next section. As a robustness test, the same regression was run using logged military personnel per capita which yielded nearly identical results for all variables. When running the regression with military personnel per capita (not logged), the results were less substantive, yet still statically significant and positively correlated with civil war onset (odds ratio of 1.036 with a standard error of 0.02 and a z score of 1.54); the other variables remained nearly identical.
The duration of peace has a strong substantive negative effect on civil war. This regression shows that each year of peace decreases the odds of civil war incidence by 23%. The three splines are statistically significant in this regression, and will be statistically significant in the following two robustness tests. The splines suggest that the regressions are showing some temporal pattern to civil conflict incidence. With the information at hand, however, I cannot conclude what this pattern is.

This regression shows that civil conflict is less likely in more democratic states. Leader’s age and years in office are not correlated with civil war incidence in this regression, as their odds ratios are very close to 1.

The regression adding European colonizer does not substantively change the reported effect of any of the variables. When adding a spatial lag for African region, all values remain substantively the same, except for a minor change in the odds ratio for logged years in office (which decreases by 0.09). This suggests that the test is robust in respect to these factors.

To further test for robustness, I ran the regression restricting the sample to only non-inaugural leaders, as many independence leaders were the first primary leaders of their state after independence. This was essential to ensure that I was in fact testing the significance of being an independence leader, and not only testing the effects of being the inaugural leader of a post-independence state. Inaugural leaders might also have been less likely to face civil war if their constituencies were united around their newly found sovereignty, and I feared that the strong correlation between inaugural leaders and independence leaders would affect the results of my regressions.
For non inaugural leaders, status as an independence leader is not statistically significant, as the standard error is too high. However, if I disregard the standard error, this regression shows that the independence leader variable has a substantial effect on the dependent variable, despite losing 1/3 of the cases. As for control variables, political instability remained as a statistically significant predictor of civil conflict. When not being led by an inaugural leader, states’ odds of civil war incidence are 186% greater during a period of political instability than during a period of political stability, in any given year, all else being equal. Peace years are also statistically significant when I restrict the sample to only non inaugural leaders. Not surprisingly, the longer a country is at peace, the more likely it is to remain at peace.
Table 5. Odds Ratios of Civil War Incidence for Inaugural Leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil War</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
<th>(std. err.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independence Leader</td>
<td>0.245**</td>
<td>0.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Log) GDP per capita</td>
<td>1.240</td>
<td>0.511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders Age</td>
<td>0.967</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Log) Years in Office</td>
<td>1.912</td>
<td>1.278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (Polity 2)</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>0.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Log) Military Personnel</td>
<td>1.632*</td>
<td>0.603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Instability</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Log) Peace Years</td>
<td>1.556</td>
<td>0.973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spline 1</td>
<td>1.057***</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spline 2</td>
<td>0.976***</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spline 3</td>
<td>1.015**</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N = 390</td>
<td>Pseudo R^2 = 0.1808</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*: Z_{0.1} = 1.283. **: Z_{0.05} = 1.645. ***: Z_{0.01} = 2.33, robust standard errors

When I run the regression for only inaugural leaders, only independence leaders and military personnel are statistically significant. For states led by inaugural leaders, the odds of civil war incidence decrease by 75% when an independence leader is the primary leader of the state in any given year, all else being equal. Real GDP per capita, leader’s age, years in office, democracy, and peace years are not statistically significant in this regression. (In the next section, I will discuss logged GDP per capita’s positive correlation with civil war incidence in this regression.)

Similarly to logged GDP per capita, the peace years variable has the opposite directional effect in Table 5 than it does in Tables 3 and 4. This means that inaugural leaders become increasingly more likely to experience civil war as time goes on. (This will also be discussed in the next section.)
I conducted the same calculations for substantive significance of military personnel for this regression, as I did for the initial regression. Similarly, increased militaries show a substantive and positive correlation with civil war incidence [a state led by an inaugural leader’s odds of civil war incidence is 13 times greater with a military equivalent to the largest in the sample (Eritrea in 1999 which had an army of 215,000 soldiers) than had it had a military of 0, and 4.5 times greater than when employing a military equivalent to the mean of this sample (Cameroon in 1975 with a military of 10,000 soldiers.).]

Political instability perfectly predicted failure and was therefore removed from the regression. This means that STATA removed political instability because for inaugural leaders, instability (as measured by Polity) was always during times of peace, and therefore never associated with civil conflict. This peculiar outcome will be discussed in the next section.
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION

7.1 IMPLICATIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

My result that an independence leader is significantly less likely to experience civil war than his non-independence leader counterpart is a positive finding for Hypothesis 5. This positive finding has significant implications for the field of civil conflict research. The finding adds understanding to the phenomena of many African leaders enjoying lengthy and uncontested tenures, despite there being several civil war determinants in existence at the time; Mobutu in Zaire is a prime example. The results also provide useful knowledge about the states that are still led by independence leaders, such as Zimbabwe and Libya. Zimbabwe is in dismal shape both economically and politically, and this conclusion helps explain why grievance groups have not yet chosen to revolt against Mugabe. However, perhaps most importantly, this new information provides scholars and policy makers with knowledge to use in the future.

The positive result of this hypothesis is useful for our future understanding of the world as new states are likely to continue emerging, and relationships with their leaders will be established. While it would be difficult (and rather pointless) to predict which separatist movements will succeed, it is worth considering how to best relate with future leaders that will hold the status of “founding father” of their nation, and how to avoid promoting cults of personality as the west did with Robert Mugabe.

If the international community is truly dedicated to democracy and human rights, it will be essential to avoid promoting the development of cults of personality. As can be seen in the examples of Zimbabwe, Zaire, and Côte d’Ivoire, it is not difficult for a leader to declare himself leader for life after his reputation has developed into a cult of
personality. Leaders for life often mandate the suppression of minority groups and political opposition. As this study has shown, these oppressed groups do not have the option of rebelling violently to reclaim their rights, as waging war against an independence leader is seemingly too difficult.

The seeming impossibility for grievance groups to rise against independence leaders is not meant to imply that the international community should want or promote more civil wars. Rather, the international community should acknowledge that it is these specific cases that warrant the most attention; especially during times of election to ensure that basic human rights and dignities are being respected.

7.2 IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONTROL VARIABLES

Military personnel, political instability, and peace years were the only control variables that were statistically significant predictors in the study. Military personnel could be explained by reverse causality, as knowledge of a forthcoming civil war will cause the state to increase its military capacity to ward off the oncoming attack. Reverse causality is especially likely because the test is measuring civil war incidence, and military personnel is assuredly higher in years 2, 3, 4 (etc.) of a civil war than in the years preceding a war.

The inconsistent correlation between political instability and civil war is perplexing. When testing for the entire sample, or only for non inaugural leaders, my test shows that civil conflicts are more likely during politically unstable times. This is less than surprising as a correlation in both causal directions is expected. Civil conflict often leads to regime change, and the Polity 2 score is likely to change with any major
governmental transition (especially if it is by violent means). Likewise, drastic political change can logically lead to civil conflict, as those that recently lost power might fight to win it back.

Far more perplexing is why a less stable government is more likely to be associated with peace when an inaugural leader is in power. I believe that this can be explained by noting that only 13 observations were dropped, meaning that of the 403 years an inaugural leader was in power in Africa, only 13 of those years are considered to be politically unstable. As many of the inaugural leaders were independence leaders, I believe this supports my central thesis. Inaugural leaders (and therefore independence leaders) were far less likely to have groups within their state creating instability in the system. Using a consistent definition of political instability, this means that these leaders were less likely to have a new regime quickly enter power and drastically make the system more or less democratic. This would likely require a successful rebellion, leading to a stronger claim that independence leaders are less likely to face rebellions.

This argument is supported by the empirical cases in the study. Of the inaugural leaders, 24% (11/46) faced civil wars. Of the inaugural leaders that did not lead independence movements, 27% (3/11) faced civil wars. Of the inaugural leaders that were independence leaders, only 23% (8/35) were involved in civil conflict during their tenure. This supports the claim that independence leaders are less likely to face civil wars.

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85 The five states that do not have a primary leader coded as the “inaugural leader” are Tunisia, South Africa, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Liberia. Liberia does not have an inaugural leader in this sample as they were never colonized. The other four do not have an inaugural leader in this sample as I only included primary leaders whose tenures began after independence, and the primary leader in these states at the time of independence had began their tenures prior to independence.
This argument is also supported by Table 4, which shows that even for non inaugural leaders, countries led by independence leaders’ odds of civil war incidence are 41% less than the odds of countries led by non independence leaders, in any given year, all else being equal. This tells us that the initial regression is showing more than just the significance of inaugural leaders; rather, it is showing that independence leaders are less likely to experience civil war than their counterparts as my hypothesis predicted. Table 4 also shows that for non inaugural leaders, the odds of civil war incidence are 180% greater during politically instable years than stable years, all else being equal. This is in stark contrast to when inaugural leaders are in power, in which civil war and political instability never occurred in the same year. Once again, I believe that this is because the existence of an independence leader serving as the primary leader promotes stability, as they are less likely to face challenges from within the state.

While changing democracy scores are statistically significant determinants of civil war incidence, this study shows that democracy is not. The relationship between democracy and conflict is likely to be an inverted U; meaning that conflict is less likely in strong authoritarian systems or strong democratic systems, and is more likely when the political system sits in the middle of the spectrum.\(^{86}\)

My proxy for state strength, logged real GDP per capita, is not statistically significant in any of the three regressions. This implies that civil conflict is less likely to be a result of lacking state strength, and more about the persona of the leader, who is able to project the image of strength. However, it is worth noting that despite the lack of significant effect that this variable has, logged GDP per capita does show a substantive

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\(^{86}\) Regan and Norton (2005), 331. While the “inverted U” theory has been tested by others in the field, it has not been tested for this sample, and should be a test for future research.
effect on the dependent variable. In Tables 3 and 4, GDP per capita is negatively correlated with civil war incidence, meaning that as expected, states with higher GDP per capita are less likely to experience civil conflict. However, quite shockingly, when restricting the sample to only inaugural leaders, GDP per capita is positively correlated with civil conflict. I believe that this is likely the result of the quality of life (or at least financial success) during colonialism. Countries with lower GDP per capita during their inaugural leader’s tenure are likely to have had lower GDP per capita during colonialism. Therefore, independence is more likely to be a welcome change in those states, than in states in which the public was better off financially during colonialism. I postulate that the “welcome change” in these relatively poorer states make them less likely to have experienced civil conflict during their inaugural leader’s tenure.  

The duration of peace is negatively correlated with civil conflict when using the entire sample, or only looking at non-inaugural leaders. This is not surprising as grievance groups are more likely to exist and be mobilized shortly after a conflict than long after one. However, when restricting the sample to only inaugural leaders, duration of peace is suddenly associated with a higher likelihood of civil war incidence. I suspect that this means that there is a certain “grace period” for inaugural leaders resulting from the unifying force of new sovereignty.

Logged years in office and leaders age are neither significantly nor substantively correlated with civil conflict incidence in my test. This suggests either that “father figure” statuses have little to do with civil conflict incidence, or that I have failed to appropriately proxy for “father figure” status.

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87 A formal test linking GDP per capita and how constituencies respond to inaugural leaders is left to be the topic of future research.
88 This would be an excellent topic of future research.
7.3 FUTURE RESEARCH

This study was limited to testing Hypothesis 5, and found that states that are led by independence leaders are in fact less likely to experience civil war. However, exactly what happens within the state to prevent civil war is still unexplained. Future research is needed to test the remaining four hypotheses; that one of the unitary actors of civil war fails to act as a direct result of the leader’s reputation.

The sample of this study was also limited to African states, which are comparable on many levels. To verify that Hypothesis 5 extends beyond post-colonial Africa, future research using a broader sample is necessary.

Future research is also needed to test the validity of the “father figure” explanation. Better proxies are needed to measure what extent leaders are viewed as father figures to their states. Suggestions for such a proxy are operationalizing media references to the leader or how many cities or towns are named after the leader.

Testing the “inverted U” theory of democracy and civil conflict for this sample is another suggested topic of inquiry.

I also suggested two avenues of future research to test the effect that inaugural leaders have on civil conflict incidence. Specifically, it would be interesting to ask why inaugural leaders seem to have the opposite correlation with civil war incidence when it comes to GDP per capita and duration of peace. The validity of the “grace period explanation” that I brought up for duration of peace could be empirically tested and explained in future research.
7.4 CONCLUSION

This paper began by asking why Zimbabwe has not yet seen an uprising against President Robert Mugabe; and how Mobutu and Houphouët-Boigny experienced similarly prolonged tenures in Zaire and Côte d’Ivoire, despite the existence of many civil war determinants in their states. I hypothesized that prolonged duration of peace is the result of leadership characteristics, specifically that former independence leaders are so revered and/or feared by their people that they are less likely experience civil conflict.

I believe that independence leaders have an enhanced likelihood of being seen as symbols of the state and father figures of their nations by their people. I postulate that this elevated status decreases the likelihood that grievance groups and political entrepreneurs will blame the state for their misfortune, and therefore will be less likely to wage civil conflict. I also contend that even if grievance groups and political entrepreneurs do blame the state for their relative deprivation, that the overall public’s reverence for the leader will make recruitment exceedingly dangerous, decreasing the likelihood of civil conflict.

After running empirical tests, I conclude that independence leaders are significantly less likely to experience civil conflict than their non independence leader counterparts. However, further research is still needed in order to explain this outcome. Which group of actors within the state decide not to rebel?

The results of this thesis, that independence leaders are less likely to face civil conflict, provide useful knowledge to the field of civil conflict, even if the underlying explanation is still unproven. First, the international community will now have a better understanding of the power of independence leaders, and can be more cautious in their relations with such leaders, if and when they emerge, in order to avoid the promotion of
cults of personality. Also, while the focus of this thesis is on one particular source of reverence, independence leadership, the theory might also apply more broadly to other leaders who are able to generate personas of great importance and respect. Future research might explore the effects that other highly revered leaders have on the likelihood of civil conflict incidence.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


“Zimbabwe; SADC Observer Mission Says Elections Were Undemocratic.” Africa
## APPENDIX A
Years of Civil Conflict in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Start Year</th>
<th>End Year (or ongoing in 2004)</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Start Year</th>
<th>End Year (or ongoing in 2004)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1978</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>2000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>1999</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
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<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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89 Gleditsch et al (2009)
APPENDIX B
Post-Independence Leaders in Africa

INDEPENDENCE LEADERS
Algeria: Benjedid, Bella, Ben Khedda, Bitat, Bouglaif, Boumedienne, Kafi; Angola: Dos Santos, Neto; Botswana: Khama; Burkina Faso: Yameogo; Cameroon: Ahidjo; Cape Verde: Pires; Central African Republic: Dacko; Chad: Tombalbaye, Oueddei; Comoros: Abdallah; Congo: Youlou; Cote d’Ivoire: Houphouet-Boigny; Democratic Republic of Congo: Lumumba, Mobutu, Kasavubu, Laurent Kabila; Djibouti: Gouled Aptidon; Equatorial Guinea: Macias Nguema; Eritrea: Afeworki; Ethiopia: Andom, Banti, Mengistu Marriam, Selassie; Gabon: Mba; Gambia: Jawara; Ghana: Nkrumah; Guinea Bissau: Cabral; Guinea: Toure; Kenya: Kenyatta; Lesotho: Jonathan; Libya: Qaddafi; Malawi: Banda; Mali: Keita; Mauritius: Ramgoolam; Mozambique: Machel; Namibia: Nujoma; Nigeria: Balewa; Senegal: Senghor; Sierra Leone: M. Margai; South Africa: Mandela; Swaziland: Subhuza II; Tanzania: Nyerere; Togo: Olympio; Tunisia: Ben Ali Bourguiba; Uganda: Obote; Zambia: Kaunda; Zimbabwe: Mugabe;

NON INDEPENDENCE LEADERS
NON INDEPENDENCE LEADERS - CONTINUED
Sierra Leone: A. Margai, Lansana, Juxon-Smith, Stevens, Momoh, Strasser, Bio, Kabbah, Koroma, Kabbah; Somalia: Osman Daar, Shermarke, Siad Barre; Sudan: Al-Azhari, Khalil, Abboud, al-Khalifa, Maghoub, Mahdi, Nimeiri, Osman, Abdul-Rahman Swaredahab, Al-Mirghani, Al-Bashir; Swaziland: Dzeliwe Shongwe, Ntome Thwala, Mswati; Tanzania: Mwinyi, Mkapa; Togo: Grunitzky, Dadjo, Eyadema; Tunisia: Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali; Uganda: Amin, Yusuf Lule, Banaisa, Paulo Muwanga, Obote, Okello, Museveni; Zambia: Chiluba, Levy Mwanawasa

INAUGURAL LEADERS
Algeria: Ben Khedda; Angola: Neto; Benin: Maga; Burkina Faso: Yameogo; Botswana: Khama Burundi: Mwambutsa; Cameroon: Ahidjo; Cape Verde: Peres; Cote d’Ivoire: Houphouet-Boigny; Central African Republic: Dacko; Chad: Tombalbaye; Comoros: Abdallah; Congo: Youlou; Djibouti: Gouled Aptidon; Democratic Republic of Congo: Lumumba; Equatorial Guinea: Macias Nguema; Eritrea: Afeworki; Gabon: Mba; Gambia: Jawara; Ghana: Nkrumah; Guinea Bissau: Cabral; Guinea: Toure; Kenya: Kenyatta; Lesotho: Jonathan; Libya: Qaddafi; Mauritania: Ould Daddah; Madagascar: Tsiranana; Mauritius: Ramgoolan; Mali: Keita; Morocco: Mohammed V; Mozambique: Machel; Namibia: Nujoma; Nigeria: Balewa; Niger: Diori; Rwanda: Kayibanda; Senegal: Senghor; Sierra Leone: M. Margai; Somalia: Osman Daar; Sudan: Al-Azhari; Swaziland: Subhuzu II; Tanzania: Nyerere; Togo: Olympio; Uganda: Obote; Zambia: Kaunda; Zimbabwe: Mugabe
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I must also thank the Political Science staff; Joyce Wray, Darlene Brace, and Sandy Foltz, as without them the 5th floor of Ross would cease to function. Dr. Jason Chrystal’s continual advice and encouragement served as inspiration and motivation throughout this process. And finally I must thank my classmates and colleagues, who took considerable time assisting me despite having their own coursework to focus on. First, I thank Allen Wu for taking time to create the political instability variable using R. Secondly, I must thank Mike Kostboth for lending me his STATA book, helping me read my initial results, spending hours talking to me about my thesis, and for his never ending support and friendship throughout this process. Lastly, I thank my friend and officemate Rachael Voas, for offering invaluable insight and ideas about my thesis, and for her incredible patience in sharing an office with me throughout this process.