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Hybridization and Kazakh ethnic identity formation

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Hybridization and Kazakh ethnic identity formation

by

Aslihan Yeniceri

A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Major: Political Science

Program of Study Committee:
Richard Mansbach, Major Professor
Ellen B. Pirro,
James T. Andrews

Iowa State University

Ames, Iowa

2015

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DEDICATION

To my beloved Father and Mother whose heart, encouragement and pray are always with me.
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ABSTRACT

The immigrant integration process became popular in literature, while hybridization studies have gained little space. Exploring the characteristics of the formation of Kazakh identity in Turkey and the prominent features, with a survey study consisting of a sample of 93 (N=93) participants. The participants served as subjects in a study designed to investigate how hybrid identities are constructed. The results revealed that Kazakhs attached a new kind of hybrid identity with more emphasize on Turkic roots and they reconstructed their ethnic identity which is not a product of assimilated fragile identity through globalization trends, but it is a new form of alive cultural and ethnic identity which carries its own values, preferences and its historical treasures from their past but acquires new traits from its Turkic identity at the same time. The paper also makes the case that studying Kirgiz in Turkey could improve this study by comparing those similar groups whether their identity formation traced similar way.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This thesis involves an analysis about the characteristic of Kazakh ethnic identity formation in Turkey. This chapter begins with explanations over ethnic identity and its scope in hybridization theory. Later, it concentrates on research objective and brief historical background about Kazakhs who immigrated from Xinjiang -an inner Chinese autonomous region- to Turkey. Finally, this chapter ends with thesis outline.

Every individual puts forth a different feature when describing their personality. Some individuals emphasize their ethnic origins, while others put more emphasis on their religion. In the last 30 years, globalization and its ramifications on ethnic identity have become popular among scholars. Researchers share some common views about characteristics when they define ethnic identity. It can be defined that individual placed himself/herself on ethnicity which could vary and the perception about a shared common origin and culture are the main parts of ethnic identity definition that carries some features from the past. One such feature is that ethnic identity does not have borders, harboring many grey areas. It is also a concept subject to constant change. Recent developments in technology, communication, and transportation play an important role in radically changing individuals’ and communities’ immigration efforts. On the other hand, immigrants are more aware of protecting their own values; they are able to travel to their homelands more frequently, have easier access to historical information. Communities in host countries are more understanding towards immigrants.
Immigrants have a different approach towards identity. They harbor values from the two countries they have lived in, from different cultures, and even different civilizations. They integrate the host country’s values into their own if those values are similar, creating a hybrid identity, thus, contributing to the formation of multi-ethnic societies, cities, and families.

Overall, new cultural or ethnic hybrid identities are formed through increasing cross-cultural communication, migration, intermarriage or adoption of new cultural values. Many authors and researchers often emphasize that globalization has many effects on cultures not only on economy, while globalization does not mean purely Westernization. They also argue that local cultures have pressurizing and directive effects in the greater order.

Researchers have paid ample amount of attention to the relationship between globalization and economic assets. Concerning this relationship, in one way, the economic unification of the globe appears more attractive to study. Therefore studying cultural globalization has always been attracted the attention of smaller group. This thesis emphasizes the issue of ethnical and cultural consequences of globalization. Three dominant paradigms situate the relationship between culture and globalization. I am going examine the three approaches

1 According to Huntington’s famous theory—clash of civilizations— a civilization is “the highest cultural grouping of people and people in the broadest level of cultural identity has short of that which distinguishes humans from other species” (Huntington, 1993:24) and the most important division among peoples is cultural rather than ideological or economic in the modern world. People belongs different kind of civilizations that there are 8 major civilizations: some of them stemming from religion such as Orthodox, Hindu and Islamic, some of them stemming from race such as Japanese and Sinic, while for some the regional unity form the civilizations such as Western, Latin American and African. The source of conflict stems from the cultural fault lines between civilizations. And, immigrants have gained special positions by immigrating one civilization to another.

2 Concerning globalization as Westernization does not valid anymore. According to Pieterse “growing awareness of cultural difference is function of globalization in virtue of increasing cross-cultural communication, mobility, migration, trade, investment, tourism” (Pieterse, 1996:1393).

3 Pieterse’ approach stresses three globalization perspectives which are globalization as Westernization, globalization as Polarization and globalization as Hybridization. She argues that growing worldwide interconnectedness created more standardized world owing to modernization which is stemming from the West. Furthermore, the spread of Western hegemony and its opponents create a kind of clash among civilizations. This
(see chapter 3). First one is homogenization theory, which supports a part of cultural convergence, is a product of globalization. Second is polarization theory, which points out cultural oppositions between Western dominated globalization and rest of the world. Third is hybridization theory, which claims a process resulting from the cross-border exchanges by mixing different kind of races and cultures. One of major finding of this study is that hybridization captures better than the any others on what happened to Kazakhs by immigrated to Turkey, while all three perspectives have merits regarding of migration. Indeed I discussed Pieterse (1996)’s approach which stress those three perspectives and then showed that where those work. For example, the clash of civilizations, polarization approach, suits there was a class of civilizations in 1990s between Bosnian Serbian and Bosnian Muslims. For homogenization, there are elements of homogenization or Americanization, one can see everywhere, especially in economy. However, in the case of Kazakh migrants to Turkey, hybridization perspective captures better than the any others on what happened to Kazakhs by immigrated to Turkey. Overall, I am comparing these three perspectives which I will discuss further in Chapter 3. I then sought to see which fits best the phenomenon of Kazakh immigrants in Turkey. As I will argue later, the hybridization perspective captures better than the others to explain the migrated Kazakh community in Turkey. I established this by interviews with 93 Kazakh participants in Turkey during the months of January-February, 2015. In order to decide whether hybridization occurred among Kazakhs in Turkey, I focused on their ethnic identity retention and self-identification, followed by a creation of hybrid statements and new meanings for both identity and culture.

Migration causes both dislocation and deterritorialization, and it foster the way of the process of hybridization (Garcia Canclini, 1995). Canclini attempts to reveal that how cultural approach is called polarization. While Pieterse’s argument stresses the feature of globalization that rises to a global mélange, which is hybridization.
transformation is a natural process and constitutive dialectic between structure and human agency. Structure and human movements constructs society through integration and hybridization by migration flows. Therefore, cultural hybridization is a phenomenon that occurs when individuals and social groups encounter others and embrace new changes; the success and failure depend on their personal and community resources” (Dear & Burried, 2005:304).

The case for understanding the reasons that transform culture, ethnicity and their respective outcomes requires much attention. The process of transformation is volatile, complex, and multilayered. It is important to find how the link between structure and cultural change is articulated. Arjun Appadurai’s classification about encounters of cultures will help clarify the argument. Appadurai (1990) classifies the encounters of cultures in five groups: “ethnoscapess (tourists, immigrants, refugees, etc.), mediascapes (radio, television, etc), technoscapes (low and high technology transfers), finanscapes (capital flows), and ideoscapes (ideologies) (cited in Husted, 2001:6). Every one of these flows has resulted in the spread and advancement of ideas in novel cultural forms and their effect on ethnic identity formation is examined throughout this study.

**Study Objectives**

This research is to seek a theory which explains best Kazakhs' identity formation and their immigration to Turkey and their ethnic identity formation. Exploring the characteristics of the formation of Kazakh identity in Turkey and the prominent features, with a survey study consisting of sample of 93 (N=93) participants. Four Kazakhstani-born, three Chinese-born and eighty six Turkish-born Kazakhs who were selected using snowball (reputational) sampling was

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4 Kazakhs are Turkic people who have settled in Central Asia (primarily Kazakhstan, Afghanistan and China) (Guo, et al., 2014:14)
used for this study. Moreover, it includes a detailed historical part in order to produce written documentation on Kazakh exodus and their lives in Turkey. This research, in particular, examines the internal and external aspects of Kazakh identity and general overview about Kazakh settlements in Turkey. Hence, it is examining the relationship between Kazak ethnic identity and its ties with Turkic identity.

The following chapter begins with background information on the Kazakhs, followed by a brief introduction to the Kazakh ethnic group in Turkey and then the importance of this study with a snapshot of chapters.

**Kazakh People of Xinjiang up to 1949**

Xinjiang, or China’s the biggest autonomous region, is bordered by the Mongolian People’s Republic on the east, Russia on the north, India and The Tibet Autonomous Region on the south, Afghanistan and the distributed territory of Kashmir on the southwest, Kazakhstan on the northwest, and Kirgizstan and Tajikistan on the west. Hence the meaning of Xinjiang is “New Domain” and its size about Iran. Xinjiang’s importance comes from both natural resources of the region such as the oil and gas reserves, its geographic position at the same time. This new domain has been a gateway to Central Asia. First, for China, Xinjiang has a geographic importance. China’s transportation to the post-Soviet region takes place through this area and many nuclear facilities are located in this area. Furthermore, the rich agriculture in Xinjiang helps meet the needs of China.

About seventeen million people (2013), numerically, the Kazakhs are relatively wide ethnic groups in Central Asia in terms of population. Kazakhs are followed by the Turks of Turkey, the Azerbaijani Turks, and the Uzbeks according to population. Kazakhs comprise a
quarter of the Turkic population in Central Asia. The total Kazakh population is estimated to be around 18,000,000: Kazakhstan is home to 16,909,800 (2013 OECD), China is home to 1,420,000, the Mongolian People’s Republic is home to 120,000 (2013 The Mongolian Kazak Diaspora), Afghanistan is home to 50,000 (Cinarli, 2012:77), and Turkey is home to around 10,000-15,000 of the total Kazakh population.

The Kazakh ethnic history is very complex and stemming from Turkic and Mongolian tribes since Genghis Khan’s time. “The ethnonym Kazak (qazaq) began to be used during 1520s and 1530s” (Svanberg, 1989: 40) and their unity was become known as Kazakh Orda. “Kazakhs were nomadic people and their unification was under the name of three tribal federations, or Hordes, called *Ulu Cuz* (The Great Zhuz), which occupied regions south of the northern end of the Caspian Sea and the northern end of the Aral Sea; *Orta Cuz* (Middle Zhuz), between the Great Zhuz; and *Kucuk Cuz* (The Little Zhuz), between the northern end of the Caspian Sea and the northern end of the Aral Sea” (Hostler, 1993: 49). These three Zhuz covered the Urals and the Volga geographically. This Kazakh division ended with the victory of the Small Zhuz Khan, Bukey Khan in the 19th century until the Russian expansion.

In China, the Kazakh ethnic minority dwells mainly in the Ili Kazak autonomous province, Barkol autonomous countries of Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region, and in Qinghai and Gansu provinces. For Xinjiang, the ethnic and demographic situation is a bit more complex. The Chinese Republic has been a country for people from many different languages, and religions. Different ethnic groups in the Xinjiang region are related to one another, although their culture unity is not as extensive as it is among Uighur, Kazakh and Kirgiz populations. The multi-ethnic population of Xinjiang is not a new phenomenon. During 1940s its population very intense, however the rest of China was more crowded. “Fourteen different nationalities were
present in Xinjiang, including: Uighurs, Kazakhs, Han and Hui Chinese, Taranchis, Kirgiz, Mongolians, Russians, Uzbeks, Sibos, Tajiks, Tatars, Solons, and Manchus. Many of these nationalities, particularly the Uighurs, Kazakhs, Taranchi, Russian, Uzbeks, and Tajiks arrived to the region from Central Asia, not China” (Laronde, 2008: 10-11). As a result, a melting pot was not case for Xinjiang since these different nationalities were not mixed.

**Kazakhs in Turkey**

The majority of those Kazakhs who immigrated to Turkey merged and became permanent immigrants during 1950s. Almost two thousands permanent immigrants came to Turkey from East and Central Asia who were ethnically Turk such as Kazakhs, Uighurs and Kirgiz (Adatepe 1959: 194). These ethnically Turkic immigrants started their last journey in Bombay, continuing to Basra and Baghdad by sea way to Turkey then via train. They entered Turkey and food was provided after the formal processes of registration, identity preparation, and health inspection.

Those Kazakhs who came to Turkey during the winter of 1952-1954 were inserted in three different camps in Istanbul (Eren 1956 cited in Svanberg (1989:83). Their basic needs were met, and they received language courses. After their stay in the Istanbul camps, the Kazakhs moved to different cities such as Kayseri, Konya, Sakarya, Manisa and Nigde under control of Turkish Headship of Land Ministry. There were several families remained in Istanbul. In addition to new houses, the Kazakhs also received land. Those people also became Turkish citizens. Their number increased from 1,892 to around 15,000 since exodus days, (1952-1952) and this number also includes Kazakh who both emigrated from Kazakhstan and China since
Moreover, this thesis is interested mainly in the ethnic identity of those Kazakh group who emigrated from China, Xinjiang.

**Thesis Outline**

In order to provide a well-organized thesis, seven chapters were included. Chapter 1 explains the Kazakh history. Moreover, Kazakhs’ historical past in Xinjiang, and Kazakhstan. In particular, their journey from Xinjiang to India, Pakistan, and Turkey were examined. I attempt to include detailed information about Xinjiang’s historical background in order to take into account how center and periphery relations affect identity formation, self-identification, and culture formation. Overall migration history and their socio-economic status of participants were presented. Furthermore, when exploring the Kazakhs in Turkey, population size, and ethnic-cultural associations are some of the characteristics examined.

I need to see that if hybridization is helpful to explain what happened those Kazakhs to migrated to Turkey, did they retention their ethnic identity and form a new implications for ethnic identity. Chapter Three explains some definitions such identity, ethnic identity and the relations between gender, age and socio-economic status with ethnic identity retention. Then, it reviews existing literature on three dominant paradigms situating the relationship between culture and globalization: homogenization, polarization and hybridization. It also presents the map of research and aims to figure out how hybridization and culture influence the formation of ethnic identity and how this thesis explains it.

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5 Population of Kazakh is slightly increasing since 1990s. For example, according to Turkish Immigrant records, 4,531 Kazakhs immigrated to Turkey (4,153 Kazakh from Kazakhstan and 378 Kazakhs from China) during 1995-2000 (Subanova, 2013:53).
The process and method of study is discussed in Chapter Four. Moreover, research size, participants’ selection, and data collection are also included. While Chapter Four stresses the study area, Turkey in detail, the analysis techniques, limitations and ethnics explained.

The empirical findings presented in Chapter five. It also examines the participants’ demographic profiles and retention of Kazakh identity. It gives some overview points from the survey: participants’ answers to survey questions. Furthermore, it shows the Kazakh ethnic identity retention through external and internal aspects focusing on participants’ responses. Speaking Kazakh Language, giving importance to ethnicity, attending ethnic organizations’ functions and media preferences are the six features for external aspect of ethnic identity retention, while affective, fiducial, cognitive and moral dimension were examined for internal aspect of ethnic identity retention.

Chapter Six emphasizes on self-identification of participants. It placed participants’ responses to open-ended questions in relation to the three dominant perspectives on cultural globalization: homogenization, polarization, and hybridization. Furthermore, it analyses the importance of Kazakh identity, and culture among participants. The chapter concludes by discussing participants’ reactions to Turkic identity and its relations with Kazak ethnic identity.

At the end, Chapter Seven concludes the study and summarizes the findings. In addition, direction for further research is stated in this chapter.
CHAPTER 2

KAZAKHS: THE ROAD TO TURKEY

This chapter is intended to explain how Kazakhs finally arrived in Turkey. The following chapter begins with background information on the origin of Kazakhs, followed by a general historical knowledge about the Kazakh people from Kazakhstan to Xinjiang. In order to draw a big picture about Kazakh history, the relations with Russia and China are examined in this part. Finally, the chapter concludes with the Kazakh exodus to Turkey.

Origin of the Kazakhs

This study is focused on Kazakh ethnic identity. Therefore, discussing the origin of the Kazakh people is a useful starting point. The nation of Kazakhs is formed in a hybrid fashion, with two distinct origins from both Turkic and Mongolian blood. Word meaning of Kazakh (Qazaq in Turkic and Qazzah in Persian) for some scholars is originally a free person as a wanderer, and brave person (Yigit, 2001:3). In time, it gradually gained social content through the emergence of a clan or a tribe⁶. As stressed by other scholars (Baipakov & Kumekov, 2003), the Kazakh history and formation of Kazakh identity does not concur at the same time.

In 1508-1509, Fazlullah bin Ruzbihan noted that Kazakhs were one of three groups of people among the Uzbeks: Shaybans, Kazakhs, and Manghits. More possibly, the three groups of people were actually tribes. “The first group was that of the Shaybans- a part of the Kipchak tribes or a lesser division of them under Muhammed Shayhani. The second were the Kazakhs, by

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⁶ The spelling of the Kazakh words for this study, I will follow a well-known form of the words. Deciding the form of world require more attention since sources in other languages have come across difficulties in translation. For example, Qazaq is more appropriate to pronounce in the Kazakh language for “Kazakhs,” which is more common in English. Most of the researchers are also using “Kazak” (Linda Benson, Godfrey Lias, etc.) or “Qazaq” (researches in Kazakh literature). Therefore, I will use the spelling “Kazakh” for Qazaq, or Kazak in order to catch up with modern literature, in which the spelling “Kazakh” is used more frequently.
which Fazlullah meant the subjects of the first Kazakh khans, who had wandered over the vast expanses between Itil (Volga) and the Syr Darya (Jaxartes). And the third were the Manghits, a group that included a part of the population of the Noghay Horde” (Baipakov & Kumekov, 2003: 91).

Kazakh ethnic identity was stemming from its Uzbek root; however it also gained a distinct identity. As a result, Uzbek-Kazakh division had appeared. The Kazakh people, in time, became an “ethnonym” - a name given an ethnic group- indicating a specific group of people belongs to Kazakhstan. “The collapse of the Khanate of Moghulistan and the Noghay Horde- is a subgroup of the Kazakh people- led to an increase in scope of the ethnonym ‘Kazakh’ to the population of Semirechye (Jeti-su) and the western part of the eastern Dasht-I Qipchaq (Kipchak steppes). The people expressed their consciousness of this new ethnic unity in a shared heritage of epic tales” (Baipakov & Kumekov, 2003:91). Finally, the ethnonym ‘Kazakh’ was used nomadic groups who live in Kazakhstan region.

The Kazakh nation came into existence in the fifteenth century. “The formation of a nation is a lengthy process and it is sometimes difficult to ascribe any precisely dated period to it. Even so, it is evident from an overall consideration of the historical, ethnographical, and linguistic materials that the formation of the Kazakh nationality had been largely completed by the close of the fifteenth century” (Baipakov & Kumekov, 2003:91). Moreover, the appearance of Kazakhs as an independent ethnic unit was observed under Kasam Khan (1511-1518).

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7Ethnonym is originally Greek word which means “a national group” and “name” and is the name that distinguishes peoples into groups as “we” and “you” (Mullen, Calogero, and Leader, 2007:612).
The Kazakh of Kazakhstan

Kazakhs have a very complex ethnic history with a well-known nomadic past in the steppes of Turkestan, and they were a part of nomadic culture which shared similar characteristics with Mongolians and Turks. As noted earlier, the world of “Kazakh” had been used for the specific group of Kazakhstan during 1520s and 1530s” (Svanberg, 1989: 40) and this century paved the way of semi-political formation. Kazakhs had been nomadic pastoralists during the 1500s. Their pastures were originally in the eastern part of the Chagatai region, along the Chu River with dependency to Uzbek Khan. During the 16th century, the Kazakh Orda controlled the region of Chagatai. Moreover, other Turkic nomads joined this new Kazakh Khanate formation. During the 16th century, “the term Kazakh, which had had until then a political federative significance, took on an ethnic meaning” (Krader, 1971:63). The Kazakhs ultimately gained a distinct ethnic identity which separated them from their Uzbek and Kirgiz roots.

The Kazakh political confederation was also known as Kazak Orda. Over the last three decades of the sixteenth century, while its power was rising, the Monghul Khanate lost its strength over not only the Central Asia but Asia as a whole. However, Kazakh Orda was not able to survive as a unity, this did not take much time for the Kazakh Khanate to divide into the 3 Zhuz systems which consisted of Uly Zhuz (Great Horde), Orta Horde (Middle Horde), and Kishi Zhuz (Little Horde). These three Zhuz had an impact on Kazakh ethnic identity formation. Although the time and mode of formation of these three Hordes were uncertain, their entities have shaped the power relations, ethnicity, and culture of Kazakh people. The nomadic life style of the Kazakh people declined the process of ethnicity shifted. In sum, the consolidation of their ethnic identity was accompanied with ethnic territory ties. “Under conditions of a largely
nomadic way of life with extensive cattle-herding, the boundaries of the areas occupied by clans and tribes were not clearly defined, but they nevertheless became increasingly definite and comparatively stable in the course of ethnic integration” (Baipakov & Kumekov, 2003:93). For example, Kazakhs keep their family records with “shezhyre,” a genealogical family tree, which shows horde information and seven generations of their ancestry. These are used for living in one of the hordes and permission to marry. Knowledge of one’s own Horde still is an important for Kazakhs. The following map illustrates the location of Hordes:

**Figure 1.** Kazakh Zhuzs

1. “The Great Horde, which occupied regions south of the northern end of the Caspian Sea and northern end of the Aral Sea;

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2. The Little Horde, located between the northern end of the Caspian Sea and the end of the Aral Sea;

3. The Middle Horde, positioned between the two other Hordes” (Hostler, 1993: 49).

These three hordes were collaterally organized according to seniority and the power relations among families. In the 17th century, one century after the formation of the three hordes, Kazakhstan was still unable to unify the country under one powerful khan. “No stable economic and political ties could be formed between the Kazakh Zhuzs. The difficulties standing in the way of unifying the Kazakh lands into a stable centralized state may be attributed to the economic backwardness of the Kazakh Khanate and the predominance of a natural economy, marked by the decline of the towns in southern Kazakhstan” (Baipakov & Kumekov, 2003:97). In the mid-eighteenth century, promoting the sense of belonging to the same Kazakh nation, the Great Horde was able to gain control over the Middle and Little Hordes. During this time, Kazakhs were also fighting with the Oirots (Kalmuks) --one of the Western Mongolian people who were powerful in present-day parts of Russia, Kazakhstan, Mongalia and China-- until it was defeated (Gurbuz, 2011).

In order to balance the Kalmuks and the Dzungar Khanate, the Kazakhs sought help from the Russians. Due to the Kazakhs’ military and political condition --the lack of unification owing to the Dzungar invasion through Dzungaria (historically northern Xinjiang, China) -- the only option was help from the Russians. The initial effort was to gain protection; however, the power relations did not lead to a desirable outcome for the Kazakhs. Thereafter, the leader of Little Horde entered the Russian Empire’ rule. He signed a deed agreement and by doing to this the three hordes accepting acquisition of domination of Tsarist Russia by supposing a protection deal (Baipakov & Kumekov, 2003:97).
The hordes were approaching Russia progressively. “Contacts between the Kazakhs and the Russians, which had started in the sixteenth century, grew steadily stronger and the Kazakhs found themselves drawn ever more firmly into the Russian orbit” (Akiner, 1986:288). The Middle Horde accepted this subjugation by Russia, following the steps of the Little Horde. They reached an agreement with Peter the Great (1696-1725), who tried to assimilate the Kazakh Khan by diplomatic and military means. In the course of events --strong Kalmuk attacks, the Dzungar wars, and rising Chinese pressure-- the Kazakh Khans of the Middle and Little Hordes accepted Russian protection by 1731. The Great Horde was the last to confirm the agreement that guaranteed it had been admitted into Russia.

The Tsarist government initiated new migration policies and land reforms. This new system restricted the movements of Kazakhs, who had lost their best and most fertile lands to non-Kazakhs. This situation triggered revolts and rebellions. Thus, the Pugachev Revolt from 1773 to 1775 was a result of increased tax burdens on peasants, levied by Catherine the Great in order for Tsarist Russia to acquire western technology, fashion, and art (Bosin, 2009). This innovation required the active support at the Kazakhs, who felt they were becoming powerless in their homeland. One of the main reasons for this revolt was the mandatory conversion to Christianity towards Kazakhs (Ibid, 2275). Unfortunately, the revolts compelled the Tsarist governments to Little Horde and Middle Horde more stringently. New administrative regulations abolished the rule of Kazakh Khans and new administrative districts were governed by a leader approved by Russia.

While Russian dominance in the region was increasing, the Kazakh uprisings resulted in a famous revolt, Kenesari, which united among the three hordes, which agreed to rebel against the Russian state (1837-1847). Nevertheless, this rebellion failed because of a lack of
coordination among the hordes and rebels, which fought separately and remained unorganized fashion (Hostler, 1993: 50). The Kazakh territories lost their best fertile land in favor of the Slavs as a result of austere Russian policies. “The natives were dispossessed of their best pastures and their most fertile areas: the local Russian authorities, acting on behalf of St. Petersburg, periodically removed the Kazakhs to less arable areas, and the Slavs were then settled on the best land which continued into the twentieth century “(Hostler, 1993:50).

The first period of voluntary unification with Russia was strategic. Kazakh historians argue that the alliances aimed to acquire temporary aid from the Russians. After every revolt and defeat, new regulations were imposed. Encounters with Tsarist Russia concluded with the seizure of land and thus, colonization. By the late 19th century, Russia dominated most of Central Asia. At the same time, the ethnic geography changed progressively. The ethnography of Kazakhstan was changed transporting the Russian and Germans into the land of Kazakhs, while Kazakh population was suppressed. The rapid modernization of Russia required cheap raw materials. Therefore Kazakhstan, wealthy in natural and agricultural resources, since Russia aimed to benefitted from those resources.

During 1860s and 1880s, Kazakhstan’s administrative structure was changed as a final step in colonizing Kazakh lands. A new province, “Oblast,” was organized with the new nobles. New military staff was assigned and former military staff was sent to Moscow. New general governors paved Russification into society. In 1887-1888, Kazakhstan became a colony of Russia (Nurpeis, 2005:243). In 1919, after the Bolshevik Revolution, Kazakhstan was successfully invaded by the Soviet Union. Although a Kazakh national government, “Alash Orda,” was established, it was not able to survive due to the support of non-Kazakhs in Kazakhstan (Center, 1994). By the end of 1919, Soviet rule had been imposed. In January 1920,
the First Kazakh Soviet Conference decided to gather all Kazakhs under the same umbrella, namely Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. “As a result of the troubles and dissatisfaction of the Kazakhs under the new Soviet government, Moskow arranged in 1921 that all lands along the Irtysh River and a six-mile tract along the Cossack Presnogorkovskaya frontier in Almolinsk governship were restituted to the Kazakh owners. The lands confiscated by the Czarist government for the new Russian settlers and still unoccupied by the prospective newcomers were handed back to the nomads. The lands taken by the Orthodox convents or assigned for rent to Russian gentry were returned to the Kazakhs. In the province of Semirechye and in Syr-Darya Oblast all expropriation of lands by Russian colonists from overpopulated central and western regions to Kazakhstan was temporarily stopped” (Hostler, 1993:50).

On the other hand, after one year, this land reform was suspended. Some radical changes were made. These radical changes eliminated the Kazakh population. Among such changes were forced collectivization and land reform, which decreased that all the land was national property and did not allow private ownership (Andraiym et al, 2013). “The result was a disaster, almost genocide. Best estimates are that 4 million Kazakhs died in 1922-33, and that four-fifths of Kazakh livestock was slaughtered or starved. Grain yields also dropped, to about one half pre-collectivization level, ensuring continuing famine throughout the 1930s. In this period the last of the nomads either starved to death or fled to China” (Olcott, 1993:7 cited in Center 1994:6).

The twenty century can be labeled the longest century for the Kazakhs. The termination of the power struggle between Lenin and Stalin was unfavorable for Kazakh intellectuals and leaders. After Stalin became the Soviet leader, he executed many Kazakhs who had supported Lenin. In addition, political positions were filled with non-Kazakhs. Russian rule reduced Kazakhs’ wealth gradually. During the period from 1953 to 1964, the Virgin Lands project and
settlement of non-Kazakhs in the country created new ethnic problems for the Kazakh government.

The first Kazakh secretary of the Central committee, Dinmukhamed Kunayev, tried to shape Kazakh nationalism. Stalin died in 1953. Following his death, Brezhnev became Soviet head of the state. This provided more space for Kazakh nationalism; two-thirds of government was replaced by Kazakhs (Center, 1994:7). In December 1986, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev made an historical mistake by dismissing Kunayev, the ruler of Kazakhstan, and replacing him with Gennadiy Kolbin, a Russian leader. This allowed the Kazakh voice to rise, leading to its own rules and sovereignty. On December 17, 1986, a bloody revolt spread through Alma-Ata.

The dismissal of Kolbin from office ended the revolt, and the last leader of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, took office in 1989. The history of Kazakh people can be explained not only by the Russian domination, but also by their Turkic origins. Kazakhs are “numerous Turkish people living principally within the Kazakh SSR” (Hostler, 1993:49). Years of Soviet domination left its mark on the Kazakh land.

The 1979 census reported a count of 6,556,442 Kazakh in the Soviet Union; 907,582 (1982 Census) in China; 100,000 to 150,000 (mid-1980 estimate) in the Mongolian People’s Republic; almost 21,000 (1978 estimate) in Afghanistan; 5,000 (late 1980s estimate) in Turkey; and some Kazakh live in other countries (Svanberg, 1989: 40). With eight million Kazakhs in the 1980s and seventeen million in the 2010s, the Kazakhs became intense in the Central Asia ethnically, followed by the Turks, the Azerbaijani Turks, and Uzbeks. Kazakhs comprise a quarter of the Turkic population. The total Kazakh population is estimated to be around 18,000,000: 16,909,800 (2013 OECD) in Kazakhstan; 120,000 (2013 The Mongolian Kazak
Diaspora) in the Mongolian People’s Republic; 50,000 (Cinarli, 2012:77) in Afghanistan; and 10,000 to 15,000 in Turkey.

Apart from being the country of ethnic Kazakhs, Kazakhstan is crucial for all Kazakhs who live outside of the homeland. It shapes the Kazakh ethnic identity via formal state policies. The capital city of Kazakhstan, Almaty, has great influence on construction of Kazakhness. Moreover, there are four eras for the steps of construction on Kazakh identity in independent Kazakhstan. The first was from 1986 to 1990. During this era, named glasnost, nation and ethnicity obtained importance in the formation of identity preferences of Kazakhs and caused social upheavals such as Nevada-Semipalatinsk in 1989 (Assyltayeva, et. al. 2012). In the second era from 1991 to 1993, the new identity replaced the “Soviet man”. The third era, from 1993 to 1995, was characterized by the formation in Kazakhstan of a self-determined Kazakh nation. In this stage, there was a significant outflow of Russian-speaking population. More than 400,000 Russophones left Kazakhstan in 1994 and almost 2 million have left since independence (Assyltayeva, et al. 2012:193). During the fourth era, after 1995, national identity formation has focused mainly on preserving a common culture and promotion of Kazakh ethnic identity. Moreover, the construction of civic identity is part of place in Almaty’s new agenda.
The Kazakh of Xinjiang

While I have ruled here (Otukan), I have become reconciled with the Chinese people. The Chinese people, who give in abundance gold, silver, and silk have always used ingratiating words and have at their disposal enervating riches. While ensnaring them with their ingratiating talk and enervating riches, they have drawn the far-dwelling peoples nearer the themselves. But after settling down near them these have come to see their cunning.

But by letting yourselves be snared by their ingratiating talk and enervating riches, many of you, Turkish folk, have gone to destruction. I did not forget how many Turks who had been deceived by such thing had died, how many had been forced under Chinese yoke.

- A stone inscription, Orkhon Inscription by Bilge Kagan, an 8th century A.D., a Turkic ruler in what is now Mongolia (Ross and Thomsen, 1990)

Xinjiang, or Chinese Turkistan (also called East Turkestan), is bordered by the Mongolian People’s Republic on the east, Russia on the north, India and The Tibet Autonomous Region on the south, Afghanistan and the distributed territory of Kashmir on the southwest, Kazakhstan on the northwest, and Kirgizstan and Tajikistan on the west. This geopolitical location alone was enough to create multifaceted relations with Xinjiang, which is about the size of Iran. Xinjiang fell under the domination of China four times—around the first century B.C, in the first century A.D. and afterwards, in the fifth and six centuries A.D. Its final conquer was in 1955. In addition, it experienced Soviet communist pressure and colonization.
The historical past of Xinjiang has been overestimated. Despite the literature about the emergence of China’s Far West, there is little about the Turkic-Islamic nature of the region. In historical content, the revolts in Xinjiang were written in the frame of invasion of the region by Imperial China and its inhabitants and then Islamic source of local revolts. By the 17th century, the Turkic side of revolts gained more attention while contemporary tension in Xinjiang is called Islamic terrorism or Islamic separatism. On the other hand, the Turkic-Islamic nature of the region gained recognition from prominent scholars such as Linda Benson, Godfrey Lias, and Ingvar Svanberg. Fortunately, we can gain a broader view from some history book. The Tarik-I-Rashidi of Mirza Muhammad Haidar, Dughlat, for example, a book about Mongolian history in Central Asia. The topic of this thesis is not about the actual owner of Xinjiang. Nevertheless, this

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10 The implication of the People’s Republic of China is ignoring a nationalist desire from Xinjiang and trying to reduce the speed of nationalist movement by degrading the problem to Islamic extremism.
book relates the contemporary problems of the region to those unsolved historical problems. A part from the book, its second chapter, “The Eastern Khanate, or Uighuristan”, draws a comprehensive conclusion about inner Central Asia, putting emphasis on how complex were historical relations in the region. After providing detailed information about the history of Central Asia and the Xinjiang region, it concludes that this region historically belonged to the Uighurs and other Turkic races (Elias and Ross, 1973:72-115). Mirza Haidar declares that

“with the gradual breakup of the power of the Moghuls towards the end of the sixteenth century, and the rise of the Manchu dynasty in China in the first half of the seventeenth, the Khanate of Uighuristan fell more and more under the influence of China. For a time, during the eighteenth century, the Kalmaks, with the help of the Tibetans, obtained a hold over it, but this was of short duration, and on their final subjugation by the Manchus, about 1755, the whole country became Chinese territory” (Elias and Ross, 1973:113-114).

Qing China was a colonizer that controlled East Turkestan, considering it as its inner province and disregarding its name ‘East Turkestan’ (Milward 2007). China was sought to convince East Turkestan to abandon its own territory. China also applied new policies of differentiation of peripheral lands, and promoting Han colonization (Jacobs, 2010)\(^\text{11}\).

\(^{11}\) Han Chinese is the major ethnic group in China (92 %) and they also control over the Xinjiang for centuries.
Table 1: Xinjiang’s main historical events outlined in chronological order.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1644</td>
<td>The Manchus invaded China and took control over the area that had been under the control of the Ming dynasty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1663</td>
<td>Muslim Revolt in Kashgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>Yakup Bek declared himself as the Khan of Kashgaria. He stayed at power until 1870s, the Qing commaner Zhou Zungdan imploded his power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>Tsarist Russia occupied Ili valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>Kashgaria and Ili were recaptured by the Qing dynasty, and a peace treaty with Russia was signed in 1881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>The Qing dynasty, the Manchu government took over Xinjiang as a regular province of the Chinese Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>Xinjiang obtained its formal name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Chinese Revolution (The republican revolution), the end of the Qing dynasty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>Yang Zengxin (Yang Tseng-hsin), a Kuominhang party member, became Xinjiang’s governor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Chin shujen (Jin Shuren) became the new governor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>The Hami Rebellion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>The Japanese occupied Manchuria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>Yang Zengxin made some economic concessions to the Soviets, but he prevented Soviet Economic influence from developing into Soviet political Domination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930s</td>
<td>Ma Zhongying, Durgan warlord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>Jin Shuren had continued Yang Zengxian’s pattern of relations with the Soviet Union, rebuffing Nanjing’s attempt to take the Chinese consulates in Central Asia away from Xinjiang provincial control, concluding a new trade treaty with the Soviet Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Turfan Rebellion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933-1943</td>
<td>The USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933-4</td>
<td>Eastern Turkestan Republic (ETR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934-1940s</td>
<td>Sheng Shicai(Shen Shih-tsai), governor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>Rebellion in Zungharia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Ili Rebellion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Eastern Turkestan Republic resulted from the three Districts Revolution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After the region of Xinjiang become a province of China some two thousand years ago, China tried to assert dominance over the region. In 1884, the Imperial Manchu government incorporated Xinjiang as a regular province of the Chinese Empire. As China’s biggest province,
its importance arose from both its natural resource and its geographic position. It contains huge deposits of oil, gas, and Chinese nuclear test facilities are located in Xinjiang.

Historically, Xinjiang is a pivot for not only China, but for Asia as a whole owing to its geopolitical importance. It also functioned as a “cultural buffer zone” against superpowers among different civilizations such as from Islamic civilization to Sinic, to Orthodox (Starr, 2004:7). Arguments against the claims of Chinese officials that Xinjiang is an integral part of China, James Millward (2004) stressed that Xinjiang is the homeland of many people from Uigurs to Kazakhs to Kirgiz and many others. The Qing Imperial dynasty (1644-1911) was able to control Xinjiang in 1644 and ruled it as a hinterland of China. After 1644, the Qing dynasty dominated China and thereafter Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet (Dillon, 2004:17).

**Ethnic revolts**

The revolts in Xinjiang were a part of the daily life in “the New Dominion.” Almost every revolt from Xinjiang against the Chinese rulers resulted in their immigration towards the West in order to escape persecution. Neither the Empire nor Republican China was able to gain completely control over Xinjiang. In general, the main reason can be explained by the desire for religious freedom and nationalist movements against to the Manchu administration during the 19th century.

The Qing dynasty paid much attention to linking Xinjiang and China – hoping to integrate the systems economically and politically. The Ili valley was established as an administrative center in 1858. During the 1700s and 1800s, relations were relatively peaceful until Jahangir encroached upon Kashgar and drive out the Qing troop in1820. Seven years later, Chinese troops invaded the cities again, allowing the first “Han Chinese” to emigrate from China
to Xinjiang during the following years. At the same time, the Qing dynasty required control of Southern Xinjiang (Dillon, 2004:19).

The riots become a part of daily life in Xinjiang, while the Chinese progressively secured their position. At the beginning of 19th century, several upheavals occurred caused by Islamic and nationalist groups (Svanberg, 1989:44). Not only were the non-Han Chinese in revolt but also Muslim Chinese: in 1862, a widespread revolt was involved by the Dungans12.

Studying Xinjiang history, it is difficult to comprehend why and where a given revolt broke out. However, the reasons that caused revolts seem simple as economical, religious and nationalist desires. High tax rate and forced labor fueled many of the revolts (Winje, 2007). Religion mattered and being against of Han Chinese domination too. In 1863, the Muslims rebelled in Kashgaria. Then, other Muslim groups also revolted and they also supported Yakub Bek, an influential local leader. Yakub Bek --was the commander of the Emir Khokand-- benefitted from this revolt and seized power. However, in 1865, Yakub Bek declared himself as Khan of Kashgaria and took the power of Jungaria for several years.

In 1870, the Russian forces entered the region. For a while, Russia acted as a commercial power. The colonization of Xinjiang was different than the colonization of Kazakhstan; in the sense that Tsarist Russia focused mainly on direct economic benefits. However, Tsarist Russia also aimed to humble the Manchu government to increase Russian influence in the east. Under General Kolpakofky, Russia occupied the Ili valley in July 1870. The Qing commander Zhou Zungdan was, however, able to gradually overcome the invaders. In 1877 Kashgaria was recaptured and four years later a new peace agreement between Russia and Xinjiang. Therefore,

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12 Dungan mean Chinese Muslims and Hui, or Tungans, are also known as Dungans. According to the 2000 census, they constituted 4.6 % of the present day Xinjiang population with the count of 2 million (Winje, 2007:9).
Russian left the Ili valley that made the territory part of China in 1884 (Svanberg, 1989:45). As a result, during 1870s, Zhou Zungdan eroded Yakub Beg’s power and expelled Russian forces. The region was regained from Russian forces and Yakup Bek committed suicide (Winje, 2007:11). This in 1884, the new territory of China was named “Xinjiang” and became a formal province of China (Dillon, 2004:19).

**Xinjiang under Governor Yang Zengxin**

The imperial tradition spread through Xinxiang until the Chinese Empire collapsed in 1911. “During the reign of the Manchu, the West Mongolian Torguts were favored over the Kazakhs. The fundamental right to pastures was supposed to belong to the Mongols, while the different Kazakh tribes were seen as tenants of the Mongols” (Svanberg, 1989:46). The Republican revolution transformed the Qing Empire to into a republic and a new ideology spread by Yang Zengxin. He became China’s governor in Xinjiang and was able to safeguard China’s interests. However, Yang followed a different approach by isolating the heart of Asia from China proper and enforcing strict control over the region.

Revolts in Xinjiang were considered ‘incidents’ involuntary Chinese administrations, resulting from inadequate reforms and other recovery efforts. Kazakh rebellions were classified as incidents as well. According to Svanberg (1989), for instance governor Yang made effort to overcome a major Kazakh incident. When Russian Empire tried to use Russian Kazakhs as soldiers, the Russian Kazakhs revolted because those soldiers had been exempt from military service during the First World War. The revolt later diffused quickly to West Turkestan--Russian

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13 The spelling convention, Governor Yang Zengxin, is used for this study. Some researchers use the spelling ‘Yang Tseng-Hsin.’
Turkestan. Russian forces was able to finish the revolt. Those Kazakhs were not able to stand firm against the Tsarist troops and Kazakhs escaped into Xinjiang.

“The Number of refugees amounted, according to Yang (1961), to nearly 300,000. Governor Yang was eager to get rid of them as soon as possible, both due to the problems of supporting these refugees and for security reasons. Through negotiations with Russians, Yang Zengxin managed to obtain a treaty of amnesty for the refugees, provided they returned home. Thanks to tactical and fast maneuvering, the last Kazak refugees had left Xinjiang by the autumn of 1918 (Yang 1961:306-308)” (Svanberg, 1989:46).

These kinds of Kazakh ‘incidents’ were successfully managed by governor Zengxin.

The relations with Yang Zengxin and the Soviets depended on two-sided benefits. Both side needed other to take advantage of Xinjiang. Since Yang’ period concurs with the Soviet Russian invasion of Xinjiang in 1928, Yang had applied some soviet rules to eliminate direct intervention from Russia. On the one hand, the implications of Soviet rule increased the dissatisfaction among Kazakhs in Kazakhstan. For instance, in 1928, collectivization was applied in Soviet territory. “Collectivization led to conflicts and great difficulties for the Kazakhs there. Nomadic families saw their herds starving on pastures which no longer could sustain them; others slaughtered their herds and fled. Many Kazakhs escaped to Afghanistan, while others took flight into Xinjiang” (Dreyer 1977:152 cited in Svanberg:46). On the other hand, these newcomers increased the burden of Yang Zengxin. Many Nayman Kazakhs escaped through Xinjiang during those days. “The Nayman Kazakhs, who in the 1920s were nomads in Russian Altai, had been in Xinjiang 1870-1900, but after the turn of the century they had returned to the
Russian side. Now they again entered Xinjiang and received pastures in the province (Dreyer 1972:152).” (Svanberg, 1989:46). However they understood how Yang Zengxin’ administration is similar to Soviet style with similar Soviet implications in Xinjiang.

**Xinjiang, the Republic of China, and the USSR**

Yang Zengxin became governor after the 1912 Chinese Revolution. He was able to safeguard Chinese interests of Xinjiang while trying to keep the Chinese government at bay. He was a warlord and an autocratic official of the Manchu dynasty and his political purpose was to govern Xinjiang as his own territory. Yang Zengxin’s success methods depended on balancing the Chinese government and Soviet Russia. In order to eliminate Russian dominance in the region, Yang supported “Basmatchis movement” anti-Communist guerrillas who purposed to free Central Asia and eliminated Russian forces. Yang was jeopardizing Soviet interests.

Governor Yang Zengxin was assassinated in 1928. Jin Shuren\(^\text{14}\), who was pro-Soviet, became the representative of the Chinese government. During this period, the Chinese Kuomintang Party and the Soviet Communist party had an aliens. In 1931, a new trade agreement signed increased trade and the Russian presence in the Chinese Far East. After 1925, civil war in other provinces of China had resulted in complete Soviet dominance of trade with Xinjiang (Barber & Hanwell, 1939). By 1933, the USSR controlled approximately 90 percent of trade with Xinjiang. And, with the fall of governor Chin Shu-Jen in 1933, all non-Soviet commercial groups were eliminated (Nyman & Nyman, 1991). By joining forces in Xinjiang, the White Russians, Manchurian troops, and regular Soviet forces helped overthrow the Tungan general Ma Chung-Ying. In sum, “following the assassination of Yang Zengxin, governor of the

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\(^{14}\) Jin Shuren (Winje, 2007) is also written as Sheng Shih-tsai( in McLean,1948), or Chin Shu-jen (in Nyman 1991)
province for seventeen years, his successor concluded a trade agreement which conceded many privileges to the Soviet Union without the knowledge of the Chinese Central Government” (Barber and Hanwell, 1939:103).

In short, Soviet Russia benefited from those revolts during the early 1930s and extended its influence across Xinjiang. Later, Jin Shuren was elected as a new governor, but was facing with ongoing rebellions (McLean, 1948). Dissatisfaction was a natural part of daily political life in Xinjiang. Under the rule of Governor Sheng, a harsh and Soviet-oriented governor, dissatisfaction among populations became unbearable. Sheng treated Soviet advisers mercifully and Xinjiang become a province of the USSR (Lattimore, 1950). Strict Soviet education rules advanced compulsory mass education and European-style courts (Nyman & Nyman, 1991). New administrative regulations were put into practice that increased the economic dependence the Soviets. Hence, the 1931 economic treaty was extended.

During the period of 1930s, several rebellions had flared up against the Xinjiang government. Jin Shuren was unsuccessful. He could not maintain positive relations with Xinjiang’s ethnic groups and their leaders (Dillon, 2004:20). During a rebellion in 1931, the Gansu-based Durgan warlord Ma Zhongying provided support to local Muslims. Governor Jin appointed the Manchurian Sheng Shicai, who was supported by the Soviet Union, to suppress the revolt (Winje, 2007:12). Jin Shuren defeated the Muslim rebels under Soviet guidance. At the same time, he applied some reforms which were carried used Soviets slogans such as “anti-imperialism,” “kinship to Sovietism,” and “racial equality.” Great effort was put forth to spread Marxist ideology. However, there were new upheavals,
“in the south of Xinjiang, the Uighurs, Kirghiz, Kazakhs and Hui revolted, and they soon had the whole area under their control. In February 1933 a provisional government was established for the Islamic Eastern Turkestan Republic. Even in the north of Xinjiang, people revolted against Governor Shen Shih-tsai. The Torgut Mongols joined after Jin had executed a leader of the Karashahr Torguts, Sechen Gegen Khan” (Svanberg, 1989:47).

New rebellion resulted in dismissal of Governor Shen Shih-Tsai. However, his reassignment did not settle the population. They joined the rebels and rose up against the Han Chinese.

Shen Shih-Tsai (Sheng Shicai) also applied some Soviet policies. For example, advanced students were sent to Tashkent, whose education system was controlled by the USSR. While some modern cultural activities such as theater and cinema were encouraged, Shen Shih-Tsai’s oppressive rule focused on diminishing the power of Islam. Islamic worksip—mosques-- were closed or converted into clubs and theatres, Islamic religious teachers were publicly ridiculed and persecuted (McLean, 1948:381). This situation caused additional rebellions, leading to the appearance of a strong Turkish and Tungan alliance in 1937. However, rebellion was quieted by Soviet intervention. By the end of 1938, Muslim and Turkish leaders had been defeated.

The Chinese administration had obtained Soviet support to fight the rebels. Thus, Soviet Russia gained additional influence in Xinjiang. Russian and Chinese forces managed to end the revolts. Rebel leaders died in prisons, and several thousands of Kazakhs were sent to Gansu (Lias, 1956). Kazakh goods were burned down, and their livestock and goods taken.

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15 Similar oppression continued in the PRC. Thus, China applied some hars rules for Muslims in Xinjiang, for example the imams forced to dance in the streets, and “swear an oath that they would not teach religion to children as well telling them that prayer was harmful to the soul”. [http://www.onislam.net/english/news/asia-pacific/482889-chinese-imams-forced-to-dance.html](http://www.onislam.net/english/news/asia-pacific/482889-chinese-imams-forced-to-dance.html) (Chinese Imams Forced to Dance, 2015)
This new governor, Sheng Shica, changed Chinese policies. He tried to get support and work together with local leaders and preferred to have local representatives from each group in Xinjiang for administration. New implications were also applied: “for the first time people could also start schools where teaching was provided in their own language” (Svanberg, 1989: 48). Unfortunately, these reforms were unsuccessful and short-lived. Declining Soviet power in the region led Sheng Shica to close the Kuomintang government, which intensified political oppression over Xinjiang (Svanberg, 1989). In June 1943, a new revolt occurred among Kazakhs in Altai and the Chinese government tried to rid itself of Kazakhs and forced them to migrate into Mongolia.

Xinjiang was occupied by Soviet forces from 1933 to 1943\textsuperscript{16}. Since Xinjiang was a region rich in mining, it was very attractive for Soviet Russia. The Stalinist wind spread throughout Xinjiang until Kuomintang regained region in 1943 (Nyman & Nyman, 1991). Overall, while a certain amount of communist propaganda spread in Xinjiang, Soviet Russia’s objective was mainly economic. The co-operation between Russia and China helped to eliminate revolts and preserve these two nations’ interests, however, in time, the Russian domination spread through whole Xinjiang (Whiting, 1953:1-6). It would seem that the Russians prioritized the trade agreement over constructing a Russian Administration in Xinjiang. Overall, as Lattimore (1930) stresses that there were no Russian actions intending to invade Xinjiang for Russia.

Overall, Soviet policy was not solely for economic profit. It had been exerting its influence over Xinjiang and strengthening its defenses against possible Japanese flanking movements, following Japan’s occupation of Manchuria (Barber & Hanwell, 1939:103).

\textsuperscript{16} The first Russian invasion of Ili Valley, the biggest district of Xinjiang, was in 1870.
Therefore, Japanese occupation was prevented over Xinjiang, however Russian domination spread over the region.

The Heart of Asia, Xinjiang and Ethnic Conflict

The ethnic situation in Xinjiang is complex as well as demographic. The period of Chinese Republic, people representing several categories of languages, religions, and identities made up a complex structure. Different ethnic groups in the Xinjiang region were linked with others, although the culture was not homogenous as it was in Uighur, Kazakh, and Kirgiz cultures.

There are Fourteen different nationalities in Xinjiang, including “Uyghur 2,988,528; Kazakh 438, 575; Han 222,401; Hui 99,607; Taranchi 79,296; Kirghiz 69,923; Mongolian 59,686; Russian 19,392; Uzbek 10,224; Sibo 10,626; Tajik 8,210; Tatar 5, 614; Solon 2,506; and Manchu 762.19 Many of the nationalities represented, particularly the Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Taranchi, Russian, Uzbeks, and Tajiks all arrived to the region from central Asia, not China” (Laronde, 2008: 10-11). It is clear that 95 % of the Xinjiang population consisted of Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and Mongols. The Han Chinese, whose population was round 5 percent, has maintained their political hegemony.

As noted earlier, Xinjiang was not the “melting pot”. Despite ethnic divisions and variations in the region, the most common race is Turkic. Therefore, in this thesis, the term Turkic will be used to encompass Uighurs, Kazakhs, and Kirgizis in order to avoid repetition. Xinjiang’s insurrections arose from ideologies of Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turkism, and rising nationalism. After more than half a century of McLean’s Sinkiang, the Turkic-Muslim people of
Xinjiang still suffer from restrictive policies of China, regarding freedom of religion that fosters nationalism among the Xinjiang population as in the past.

As noted above, the destiny of the region changed when the Qing took over East Turkestan. However, this thesis will focus on the destiny of Kazakhs in Xinjiang. Xinjiang is more closely related to Central Asia, both culturally and geographically than to China (Benson, 1990). It became a province of China in 1884. Xinjiang was a legendary wealthy region, and its resources attracted not only the Chinese, but also the Russians. Muslim Turks have been a majority for Xinjiang, particularly Uighurs. They were Sunni Muslims and were the largest group in Xinjiang. Speaking an Eastern Turkic language, they were skilled in agriculture and trade. The Kazakh population in Xinjiang was small. The nomad Kazakhs were primarily located in Jungaria, and in Altai which covers the pastoral needs of Kazakh.

After a long-period of Russian dominance, the Kazakhs of Kazakhstan had largely accepted the Soviet ideology, and Kazakhstan “ has assumed almost a mystical significance as the repository of traditional Kazakh values and culture, and the place where Kazakhs who have lost their language might visit to recover it” (Dillon, 2004:30). Thus, Kazakhs from Xinjiang preserved their Kazakh qualities. “The main grazing grounds of the Sinkiang Kazakhs are along the borders between Sinkiang and the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic and between Sinkiang and the Mongolian Republic. From the Tekes and Kunguz River in the Ili region they range northeastward to the Chuguchak region and then southeastward along the Mongolian Altai” (Lattimore, 1950:129). Thus, Xinjiang Kazakhs had ensured a cultural purity over Russified Kazakhstan.
Political and Administrative Structure of Xinjiang

Political diversity was the main factor that affected the Han Chinese administration of Xinjiang. “The officials endorsed intensified influx of Hans and provided assimilative Confusian education for segments of the Turkic population” (Winje, 2007:11). According to the Far Eastern Survey (1948), the Chinese administration in the heart of Asia, Xinjiang, had internal and external aspects. Internally, the Chinese imposed a new system of land taxes. They organized well-systemized revenues which doubled the local tax and tribute burden. Externally, the Chinese administration promoted conflicts of interest to prevent local unity against its Chinese rulers (Survey, 1948). The four-pieced currency system, for example, reflected Chinese policies among its regions: “In four regions there were four different currencies, a device which prevented concentration of remittances for political purposes. At different periods Turkish-speaking Moslems were favored against Chinese-speaking Moslems, or Mongol nomads against Kazakh nomads; and such favoritism was reversed when it seemed expedient” (Survey, 1948:57).

The nomadism of the Kazaks was influenced by Kazakh political and administrative structures. The khans seemed “often to have been temporary leaders during wars” (Svanberg, 1989:43). One of the reasons that prevented unification of the Kazaks hordes also was an absence of a national leader. Xinjiang’s multiethnic structure supported the general principle of administration by the Chinese, whose strategy was to play one race against the other (Barber & Hanwell, 1939). “The fundamental rule of balancing one subject group against another, have grown out of their experience since the

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17 Nomadism was an important characteristic of being Kazakh. “The Kazaks are pastoral nomads, herding sheep, goats, horned cattle, horses, and camels. Felt tents are used in the summer, but most Kazaks live in mud huts in the winter or, in mountain country, in log cabins.” (Lattimore, 1950:129-130).
Mohammedan rebellion. On the other hand, the great decrease of population made
prosperity easy for any man who was willing to work. …. Government was, in practice,
left in the hands of headmen and minor officials drawn from the native population, the
Chinese officials exercising little more than a general supervision….. Minor disturbances
occurred at the time of the Chinese revolution, and a number of Manchus were
massacred; but the province was quickly set in order by Yang Tseng Hsin, an official of
the old administration, who installed himself as governor and, after his office had been
confirmed from Peiping, remained in power until his murder in 1928” (Lattimore,
1930:324-325).

Imperial China used to change the administrative system in order to dominate nomads. It
was a policy of “divide and conquer”. The Chinese government divided nomads into
administrative units and divided political power among tribal groups. This policy limited the
integration of different groups and the solidarity among them was not possible. The Qing
government promoted local loyalties and they appointed new local lords. These new appointed
nomadic leaders were called as “Wang”. The creation of local loyalties provided safe borders for
Imperial control. They served to establish adhere to tribal confederation with significant
autonomy for the Kazakhs. The “Wangs” appointed by the Emperor had an official emblem. The
Wangs had a special mission to promote the superiority of the Manchu. Wangs, the nomadic
leaders received valuable gifts from the Emperor. In 1912, Xinjiang was controlled by new
governor. Ten districts system were applied: Xinjiang was divided to ten regions. The governor
was made responsible for each district in Xinjiang. Apart from dividing the Kazakhs into smaller
groups, the Chinese governors consistently favored the Chinese population. Han Chinese was
settled into these new districts. In addition, the Chinese were urban and commercial rather than
rural and agricultural like Kazakh nomads (Lattimore, 1930). They spread the idea that Kazakhs and other Turkic groups needed Chinese in order to modernize the society.

**Ili Rebellion, November 1944**

In November 1944, the Kazakhs supported another revolt while Osman Batur was their leader. Not only Turkic Muslims revolted but also Russians in the Xinjiang revolted against the Chinese government. Thanks to this rebellion, the declaration of Islamic state. The new government tried to get rid of the Han Chinese out of East Turkestan and made the region free. On November 12, 1944, when the Muslim Turks of Xinjiang seized to control of the Ili valley, they declared an East Turkestan Republic. Owing to a lack of unity, and resource, the three districts of Altai, Ili, and Chugucback appeared. “Many Kazakhs outside Ili remained loyal to Chinese nationalist government. In April 1946 Osman Batur broke with the Ili rebels, as well as the great part of the Kerey Kazakhs. Quite a few Nayman Kazakhs, however, continued to support the rebellion” (Svanberg, 1989:49). Their independence lasted only until 1946.

According to Benson (1990), a central problem was fostering Turkic nationalism. At the end of 1994, a peace agreement was signed by Chinese and Muslim Turks. In addition, Osman Batur contacted and set new rules with the Kuomintang representative.

We should keep in mind that the upheavals in Xinjiang in the 1940s could be considered in reference to a colonial and colonizer relationship. Moreover, the reason behind the revolts was mainly Islamic. The manifesto and declarations of the new East Turkestan Republic clearly show what the Kazakhs were seeking in Turkey. The purposes of the new East Turkestan Republic government were clearly stated by Linda Benson. From the declaration of the Turkestam Islam Government:
“The Turkestan Islam Government is organized: praise be to Allah for his manifold blessing! Allah be praised! The aid of Allah has given us the heroism to overthrow the government of the oppressor Chinese. But even if we have set ourselves free, can it be pleasing in the sight of our God if we only stand and watch while you, our brethren in religion… still bear the bloody grievance of subjection to the black politics of the oppressor Government of the savage Chinese? Certainly our God would not be satisfied. We will not throw down our arms until we have made you free from the five bloody fingers of the Chinese oppressors’ power, nor until the very roots of the Chinese oppressors’ government have dried and died away from the face of the earth of East Turkestan, which we have inherited as our native land from our fathers and our grandfathers” (Benson, 1990:45).

In a handbill circulated in the region in 1944-1945, a political platform of fourteen points was outlined, including the following (summarized) objectives by Benson (1990):

2. Establish equality for all nationalities.
3. Organize a national political alliance representing all people in East Turkestan in numbers proportionate to their population.
4. Place local government in local hands.
5. Promote free cultural development in all groups and the use of local languages.
6. Reestablish locally manned military units.
7. Abolish Sheng Shica’s prison system.
8. Free all those arrested under Sheng
9. Establish friendly relations with the USSR and resume trade, especially for cattle, wool, skins and grains.

10. Reduce taxation.

11. Establish religious freedom.

12. Oppose immigration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang.

13. Increase the amount of irrigated land.

14. End all forced labor.” (pg: 45-46)

**Table 2: Xinjiang Population by Nationality, 1945**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uighur</td>
<td>2,988,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han Chinese</td>
<td>222,401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>99,607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazak</td>
<td>438,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolian</td>
<td>59,686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>19,392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>10,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taranchi</td>
<td>79,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>5,614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>8,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>69,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sibo</td>
<td>10,626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solon</td>
<td>2,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchu</td>
<td>762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,015,350</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Chinese government tried a strategic assault—a local person--appointed Mahsud Sabri as the new governor of Xinjiang in 1947. However, due to the dissatisfaction of the Ili rebels, Kuomintang party replaced Mahmud Sabri with Tatar Burhan Shahidi. The Chinese government had a close relation with Burhan Shahidi (Svanberg, 1989:50). After the Soviet
collapse, China decided to change its traditional policy. Moreover, Chinese administration aimed to make the province look less colonial (Jacobs, 2010: 1293).

Burhan could not gain local support from the provincial government, although the Kuomintang party influenced the members of the provincial government. The only way for Kazakh leaders was to go into the mountains and gather their forces. These forces had little success in fighting the Communist. However, the fight did not abandon and it was continued for 3 years from 1947 to 1950. Moreover, “in July, the rebels were forced to retire to Qinghai. Soon, people realized that continuing the fight was useless and the majority decided to escape to India through Tibet. Only Osman Batur remained with a few thousand men and continued the struggle. He was, however, soon caught and was executed in Urumchi in April 1951” (Lias, 1956).

Figure 3: Mansur Teyci’s the map of Exodus
When Burhan joined the Chinese Communist regime, the Uighurs Mohammed Emin Bugra, Uighur local leader in rebellions, and Isa Yusuf Bek escaped to India with 1,000 Turkestanis.

“The majority of them reached India in December 1949. Refugees continued to flow through Tibet into India. In the summer of 1950 the American anthropologist Fank Bessac, who had stayed the last winter among Osman’s Kazakhs in Xinjiang, came out. Kazakhs participating in the resistance against the Communist did not flee until the summer of 1950, when many of them joined a group of Kazakhs in Gaz Kol. Nearly 15,000 Kazakhs are said to have tried to escape to India. During a dramatic flight of nearly 4,000 kilometers the Kazakhs rode over some of the most hazardous regions in the world, i.e. the Lop Nor-desert, the Taklimakan Desert, Tibet, and the Himalayas. Only 350 individuals survived the nearly two year long flight. The rest had been dispersed, frozen or starved to death, imprisoned, or killed in battles” (Svanberg, 1989: 52).

After the Kazakhs reached the Indian border, they were not allowed to enter. The conflict among different countries made their life depend on the process of refuges. The Indian officials told the Kazakhs they would not be safe in India,

“‘I cannot let you in’ the officer in charge explained when they reached him, until ‘I receive permission to do so, as I have already said. But also we cannot protect you outside our own territory. Therefore it will be best for you to have wherewith to protect yourselves. Take your arms back, for you may need them this very day. Whether the warning was simply shrewd anticipation or the result of a good intelligence service cannot be stated, but the Communist actually did attack again within a few hours. The
battle which followed was fought within full view of the Indian frontier. It began with the
capture of eleven Kazaks by the Communists who immediately cut off their heads. …
This battle was the last. The Indian commander of the frontier post no longer needed to
be convinced of what would happen to the Kazaks if their entry into Kashmir were
further delayed. Eleven heads had been seen to fall from the bodies of bound prisoners
under his very eyes. Indeed, the Kazaks say that the grisly scene was actually filmed by
the Indians so that they could prove to others what the Communists had done. So the
frontier was opened and the Kazaks who had survived the fighting with the Communists
as Manass, Kukuluk, Kucheng, Barkul, Gezkul and along the weary way through Tibet,
were safe at least, safety having been the last thing they thought about” (Lias, 1956:216).

After long period of revolts migration flows and deaths was the destiny of East Turkestan
and its peoples. Some of those people were able to reach Turkey and their journey ended in
Istanbul. “The first immigrant wave--about 2,000--won through to Kashmir and Turkey was the
country for being new homes” (Lias, 1956:10).

In September 1941, refugee number reached 3,039 individuals with refugees’ cattle.
These refugees were hold in a tent camp in Muaffer Abad more than ten months. And, after one
year, British authorities help them to move a local village. “However, many of the weaker died
there because of infectious diseases and the unaccustomed climate. It is said that fifteen to
twenty Kazakhs died every day. The situation was not improved by their limited freedom of
movement and by the lack of opportunity to work. The original 3,000 refugees were reduced to
1,200 in a period of less than a year” (Svanberg, 1989:52).
Saudi Arabia was the country some of religious Turkistani went, although there were some who migrated to the United States. In addition, some groups wanted to follow the Kazakhs in Pakistan to Turkey. “The first 200 left Kashmir in November and December 1952, while were allowed to travel some months later. In 1953 under the leadership of Qalig Bek Hakim the last 60 Kazaks left Pakistan” (Svanberg, 1989:54).

Migration to Turkey

The majority of those Kazakhs who immigrated to Turkey merged and became permanent immigrants between 1952 and 1954. Almost two thousands permanent immigrants came to Turkey from East and Central Asia who were ethnically Turk such as Kazakhs, Uighurs and Kirgiz (Adatpe 1959: 194). These ethnically Turkic immigrants started their last journey in Bombay, continuing to Basra and Baghdad by sea way to Turkey then via train. They entered Turkey and food was provided after the formal processes of registration, identity preparation, and health inspection.

Those Kazakhs who came to Turkey during the winter of 1952-1954 were inserted in three different camps in Istanbul (Eren 1956 cited in Svanberg (1989:83). Their basic needs were met, and they received language courses. After their stay in the Istanbul camps, the Kazakhs moved to different cities such as Kayseri, Konya, Sakarya, Manisa and Nigde under control of Turkish Headship of Land. About ten families remained in Istanbul. In addition to new houses, the Kazakhs also received fields.

Figure 3 (in pg. 38) was drawn by Mansur Teyci, the son of Huseyin Teyci who helped decide the reason why Kazakhs could not stay in India or Pakistan. When I met Mansur Teyci, he told me that they migrated from “their fatherland to their motherland.” His statement
demonstrated that these Kazakhs were willing to embrace a Turkic identity and desired to unity with Turkic races that share a common historical and linguistic ties.
CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

My study started when I decided to work on the influence of globalization on the identity of Kazakhs of Turkey. I focused on how hybrid identities were constructed in a globalized world. This chapter starts with a discussion of identity as a relatively dynamic phase of life in which immigrants create a special form of their own identity. Later, this chapter focuses on the theoretical framework of the thesis. Globalization in the form of hybridization is one of the factors that has impacted identity formation. Three prominent theories, homogenization, polarization, and hybridization are described.

Identity

Who are we? As a human being, identity, a well-studied topic in the social sciences is both very complex and simple concept (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000). Culture, ethnicity, and ethnic identity help answer the question ‘who am I?’ Identity can be defined as affiliation with a “particular group, ideology, religion, social role or career” (Nayer, 2014: 13 cited in Eberhardt, 2006). Therefore, for this thesis, culture and ethnic identity were considered in terms of globalization, considered an enemy of cultural identities by scholars such as Shepardand & Hayduk (2002). They view globalization as Westernization or new Western Imperialism. On the other hand, globalization is also considered as a phenomenon which raises awareness of local culture. Nevertheless, globalized capitalism and cultural imperialism are burdens of globalization, which must be managed to.

In the literature, cultural identity is seen as to be a victim of globalization rather than its product. However, this assumption implies that identity is related to individuals and their
community’s geographic and cultural borders, which construct and manage the features of cultural identity. In this sense, cultural identity is not an indicator of cultural belonging, it is a product of local communities (Tomlinson, 2003). Moreover, identity is something people simply have because of their traditional residence that protects their identity and culture from the outsiders. Therefore, Tomlinson (2003) criticized this approach because he does not believe that identity is a fragile in the face of globalization. Tomlinson views culture as a strong feature, it also transforms the global culture. In this framework, McWorld has to adjust its rules and its menus in order to make more profit. Local identities pressure global actors and they affect the universal culture.

I assume that Kazaks in Turkey created a new cultural and ethnic identity, which is not a product of assimilated fragile identities resulting from globalization, but is a new form of cultural identity, which carries its own values, preferences, and historical treasures from its past, while gaining new characteristics from the Turkic identity. They formed an identity as “Kazakh Turkish” which emphasizes a common ancestry between Kazaks and Turks. Kazaks obtained a comprehensive identity which can be explained by hybrid identity construction.

I focused mainly on ethnic identity retention and self-identification of Kazaks by distinguishing cultural differences in order to see whether hybridization occurred in those two components of identity.

Since people have used ethnicity as their point of departure when asked their identity, this thesis focuses on ethnic identity retention for Kazaks. We are aware of generalizing the attachment on importance of ethnicity is not totally fair since every individual put difference level of importance to ethnicity. However, it also appears that immigrants have paid more
attention to their ethnic identities, especially after they integrated to the new environment in the host country. As Clark & Drinkwater (2010) found, the first generation usually spends time and effort to integrate into society. They have to deal with basic needs, so they ignore ethnic identities. After they are satisfied with their lives, identity becomes more apparent in their agenda.

**Ethnic Identity**

Ethnic identity is an elusive and complex notion and someone can find very different definitions among different disciplines. It can be defined that individual placed himself/herself on ethnicity which could vary and the perception about a shared common origin and culture are the main parts of ethnic identity definition that carries some features from the past. Phinney (2004) studies on ethnic identity development and change. She defines ethnic identity as a process of becoming an adult.

Ethnic identity formation and acculturation are not completely divergent (Phinney, 1990). The relationship between ethnicity and ethnic identity could be a reason why ethnic identity formation and acculturation overlap. Ethnic identity stems from one’s belonging to a particular ethnic group, while ethnicity is defined in many different ways. Four fundamental approaches are used defining ethnicity. They are “ethnicity in term of primordial phenomenon, epiphenomenon, situational phenomenon, a purely subjective phenomenon” (Isajiw, 1993:2). The primordial element of ethnicity is gained by birth. Although the other three definitions have been constructed to deal with the deficiencies of primordial theory, they help to explain how ethnic identity is formed. Thus, Hetcher (1978) focused on the labor of to two groups ‘the immigrant group’ as periphery and ‘host country’ main culture as center. In the periphery,
marginal jobs, such as agricultural work, are not guaranteed a high compensation unlike jobs at the center (Hechter, 1978). Moreover, maintaining their own cultures are widely spread through the peripheral labor sector.

A unique definition of ethnicity is not possible, and its definition derived from common culture. Rational choice theory has used the situational approach, and assumes that ethnic identity is selected according to its benefits. In this approach, individuals are able to acquire ethnicity in some cases, but not in others. Ross (1992) stresses ethnic membership and its relations with political advantage; hence ethnicity can be a tool for pressuring the political elites for public goods and benefits (Ross, 1992 cited in Isajiw, 1993:3). As rational creatures, individuals balance the ascription of ethnic identity and social situations. Isajiw (1992) points out that this instrumental theory makes it difficult to explain some aspects of ethnicity because only practical interests are sufficient to deal with one’s feelings and concept of identity.

The subjective approach presents ethnicity as “a product of social-psychological reality or a matter of perception of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in contradistinction to looking at it as something given, which exists objectively as it were ‘out there’ (Isajiw, 1993:3). Subjectivists do not completely reject the objective side of ethnicity. They focus mainly on the objective side of ethnicity as dependent on socio-psychological experiences. Thus, culture and ethnic identity are distinguished from each by Barth (1969). Barth pioneered new psychological path to ethnic groups. Moreover, ethnicity and ethnic culture are not necessarily the same. Another subjective approach to ethnicity is constructionism in which ethnicity is a product of the process by negotiating and constructing with everyday living activities (Isajiw, 1993:4). Immigrants’ behavior and their perceptions of ethnicity, ethnic identity, and culture help understand how these concepts are related and to each other.
Isajiw (1993:5) argues that “ethnicity is an abstract concept which includes an implicit reference to both collective and individual aspects of phenomenon.” He advises researchers to include at least some factors from both of these dimensions in order to measure ethnicity. Ethnicity has objective dimensions such as kinship and descent. It also has subjective dimensions such as attitudes, values, and preconceptions, the contents of which can be understood in the process of communication (Isajiw, 1993:5). Hence, ethnic identity emerges when an individual internalizes ethnicity. Ethnicity requires a perception about “common origin or at least a perceived common origin” and a practice for a common culture. While culture is a crucial element of ethnicity, it is not the same as ethnicity. It can be defined as “an essence a system of encoding such experience into a set of symbolic patterns” (Isajiw, 1993:5). Therefore, culture is one of primary part of ethnic identity. They are not mutually exclusive. In addition, ethnic boundaries form a culture by transforming and creating the meaning of life, its content, and its norms. Most importantly, it distinguishes groups. At the same time, “culture contributes to the demarcation of group boundaries which psychologically (and frequently also in the real world) separate those who share these cultural features from those who are perceived as not participating in them” (Ferdman & Horenczyk, 2000:83). It is fair to say that culture is not totally static or fixed. It is a continuous state of transformation, which can be seen at different levels for different groups, whether it the results from power relations as center and periphery or from the level of social and economic development. “Elements of culture – its signals and symbols- may be transformed or filled with new meanings and take on new functions and expressions during intra-and intergroup contact (Lienkind, 1992).”(Ferdman & Horenczyk, 2000: 84).

According to Nagel (1994), socially constructed ethnicity, ethnic cultures, ethnic boundaries, and identities are results of interactions between different groups. Moreover, the
social interaction created, negotiated, and defined the ethnic identity too. When new ethnic group identities are constructed and their self-identification, the new form appears from distinct identities such as “Lationo” or “Asian-American” (Yancey, Ericksen, & Juliani, 1976), and the fluid side of culture and ethnicity become apparent.

We must also note that individual constructions or representations of culture can alter within groups. Although culture is meaningful only with reference to the group, it is enacted by individuals (Ferdman, 1995). Group identity and individual identity can vary.

The construction of life in pluralistic societies is effected by pressure from mainstream culture to the periphery that provides to have some adaptable aspects of all ethnicities. There are two processes of ethnic identity formation: deconstruction and reconstruction. Deconstruction comprises some objective aspects “losing their meaning and use, while others lose their meaning without being completely dropped or for others still, the meaning may become latent” (Isajiw, 1993:16). Reconstruction includes some objectives of ethnicity, which provide a new meaning to ethnic identity. It depends on ascribing and creating a new form that retains earlier elements.

Ethnic identity retention is very important. Isajiw’s (1990) approach to ethnic identity retention and his method were used in this thesis. According to Isajiw (1990:36; 1999: 416) ethnic identity includes two aspects: internal and external.

“Locating oneself in relation to a community and society is not only a physiological phenomenon, but also a social phenomenon in the sense that the internal psychological states express themselves objectively in external behavior patterns that come to be shared by others. Thus, individuals locate themselves in one or another community internally by

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18 These processes of reconstruction, creation, and recreation of culture are eloquently described by Nagel (1994).
states of mind and feelings, such as selfdefinitions or feelings of closeness, and externally by behavior appropriate to these states of mind and feelings” (Isajiw W., 1990:35-36).

We can gain detailed information about its external aspects by observing behavior:

1) “Speaking a particular language;
2) Practicing ethnic traditions;
3) Participating in ethnic personal networks, such as family and friendship;
4) Involvement in ethnic institutions like schools, enterprises, and media;
5) Participating in ethnic voluntary organizations; and
6) Participating in functions sponsored by ethnic organizations such as picnics, concerts, and dances” (Isajiw, 1990:36).

The internal aspects of ethnic identity include attitudes, feelings, and attachment to groups. These can be grouped in align four dimensions: affective, fiducial, cognitive, and moral (Chiu, 2003). The affective dimension consists of feelings of attachment to groups with two special types of feelings. The first emphasizes one’s groups more than other groups, and the second encompasses feelings of comfort within one is group. The fiducial dimension of ethnic identity includes trust in one’s own ethnic group. The cognitive dimension refers to self-images, knowledge about the group’s values, history, and heritage. Lastly, the moral dimension refers to feeling to force someone to care because of ethnicity or to marry within the ethnic community, thus giving special attention to the retention of one’s native language (Isajiw W., 1990:36).

It is well studied that different generations act in a particular manner for ethnicity and ethnic identities. The Hansen hypothesis can summarize the general viewpoint for ethnic
identity retention among generations (Isajiw, 1981:6). According to this, the first generation is more willing to stress its ethnic identity, and ethnic identity retention is relatively high for first generation. However, the second generation gives relatively less important to their ethnicity or rebels against its ethnic group; low ethnic identity retention. Furthermore, the third generation turns to ethnic identity and spent effort to know more about their ethnicity. Isajiw (1990) also states that the retention of ethnic identity among generations can result in different outcomes. He stresses that in comparing the second and third generations with the first, the latter tends to emphasize identity retention much more. Considering the differentiation among generations makes easy to have insight information for research on process of embracing new ethnic identity construction and retention of old ethnic identity (Eberhardt, 2006:55).

Apart from these, the homogenization of ethnic groups poses a significant problem. Since ethnic identities are still considered as culture, and there is no much attention to realize how they are internally contested and how the multiple layers of culture exist. (Nagel 2001: 252). This helps us understand hybridized transnational migrants.

Transnationalism helps explain how the immigration fosters formation of hybrid identities. In addition, the position of the nation, and cultural narratives included to transnationalism process (Mitchell, 2003). The host country influences immigrants’ identity formation. Its policies, formal ideologies, and its government’s frames form the attitudes and behaviors of both the native population and its immigrants. Culture, locality, and ethnicity are no longer neatly contained but are instead unbound by circulation of people, commodities, capital, images, and ideas (Nagel C., 2001) . The definition transnationalism stresses that two or more

19"Transnationalism emphasizes the multiple (social, cultural, economic, and political) ties and multi-scalar networks that migrants and displaced groups maintain across the borders of two or more nations-usually between the homeland and the country of settlement" (Veronis, 2006:12).
nations become a part of a new structure with specific social, political, and economic conditions at the local and global level (Guarnizo & Smith, 1998). This point paves the way of study for two reasons. Members of the Kazakh community in Turkey were become a part of transnationalism process from their homelands to a new host county, to Turkey. These Kazakhs brings with itself some critical components in the construction of hybrid identity formation, named Kazakh-Turkish or “Kazak Turku.” This is different the term like an African-American, which does not assume a shared race link\(^\text{20}\). Subsequently, this results in a hybrid formation of a group identity in dual way: Turkish Kazakh and Kazakh Turk (for example, Turkiye Kazagi).

Therefore, the cross-border relations among these sub-groups help us understand the structure of the Kazakh community in Turkey and how their identity is deconstructed, negotiated, and reconstructed. What we need to pay more attention is that the three sided realtions: the Kazakh self-identification for sub-group identity, religionist identity and a hybrid identity. The boundaries has changed by moving a different country which influence these three sided ethnic identity.

The integration of immigrants to host countries has been intensively studied in the social sciences in recent decades. Ethnic identity of immigrants and its various demographic characteristics require further examination.

**Ethnic identity, identity and gender**

In literature, there are some studies that show a different attachment towards ethnicity according to gender (Wilford, 1998). Particularly, women haves a special mission to protect ethnic values and contribute to ethnic and national processes. First, women are biologically

\(^{20}\) Kazakh Turku does not just mean a Kazakh who live in Turkey it also covers ethnically common ancestry.
carries and forms the community's future generations and as key actors in the transmission of the community's values (Wilford, 1998). Grandmothers have a special mission to reproduce ethnic identity through family stories, and women tend to further ethnic rituals and traditional foods that fill the gap between past and future (Langellier, 2002). Women, for example, are more likely to preserve ethnic identity and there are some empirical evidences for this view: Ting-Tooney’s (1981) research reveals that Chinese-American female college students are more receptive toward ancestral culture than male student (cited in Chiu, 2003:46).

Phinney (1990), on the other hand, argues there is no relationship between gender and ethnic identity. Phinney et al. is (2000) a study of 471 immigrant families of Armenian, Mexican, and Vietnamese immigrants in the United States that showed gender had no impact on ethnicity.

**Ethnic identity, identity and socio-economic status (SES)**

According to Crimmins et al. (2004), socioeconomic status (SES) helps us to understand that individuals’ position in the social structure. SES is mainly about financial well-being and educational attachment. It is measured by looking at education, occupation, income level, and wealth. Furthermore, Phinney et al.’s (2000) research also revealed that there we cannot reach a ties between socio-economic status and ethnic identity. In Phiney (2000)’s study, 471 immigrant and 230 non-immigrant groups were interviewed. The findings showed that an affiliation between SES and ethnicity exists for Mexican families, but not for Armenian and Vietnamese families.

**Ethnic identity, identity and age**

The controversy between the view that adolescents are more global than their other family members and the conservativeness of first generation immigrants has attracted scholars
(Zimmerman, 2006). It appears that young generations embrace the practices of their host country. By doing this, they create a hybrid form, although the older generation preserves its distinct ethnic identity. The theory is that adolescents are a group which is forms multicultural identities and “they grow up knowing diverse cultural beliefs and behaviors” (Jensen, 2003).

Phinney (2000) found a gap between adolescents and their parents among Armenian and Vietnamese immigrants, while Mexican immigrants’ ethnic identity retention did not vary among generations. Furthermore, Clark & Drinkwater (2010) found that the first generation makes an effort to integrate into society and has to deal with basic needs. Therefore they tend to ignore to ethnic identities. In time, after life satisfaction occurs, identity became a part of their agenda.

**Homogenization Theory**

Across different countries, cities or regions in the world, people prefer to wear similar clothes, watch similar TV shows or listen to the same singers. Similarities among people who do not even know the name of each other’s country are becoming more visible day by day. Cultural practices and some common values such as human rights and democracy paved the way of “Global culture”. If we consider the argument that stresses the consequences of cultural globalization, we need to clarify how and to what extent globalization has an influence on the cultural landscape of distant localities. “Globalization and culture probably that is of convergence toward a common set of cultural traits and practice” (Holten, 2000:142). By the same token, the world becoming more homogenous owing to capitalism, and also cultural influences from the West, particularly the United States (Ritzer 1993 and Barber 1995).

The homogenization theory is reflects a widespread view of cultural globalization. It emphasizes increasing similarities among different cultures due to the globalization processes.
Shopping malls or hotels look much the same whether they are in Singapore, St. Louis, or Sao Paula (Holton, 2000: 142). The homogenization thesis, whether it was labeled Westernization or Americanization, has been driven by the integration of international companies into local economies. In a similar manner, McDonaldization or Coca Colazation of the world is a result of the global economy. The decreasing power of nation states in the battle with global has formed a “McWorld” (Barber, 1995). Global culture has its origins in the global economy, which is led by the Western cultures. While homogenization is also considered as the equivalent of Westernization or even Americanization, the new world also a product of the West. Thus, the worldwide economic market has changed the world order by multinational cooperation, companies, and formal institutions. In the name of trade, technological improvements, development of information technologies, communication and human rights, the world seems to have adopted Western values.

Consumer capitalism helps spread Western products and services. There are new global products, innovative improvements, and systems transforming the world. On one side, Hollywood, for instance, is a cultural industry that furthers the imaginary power of the West. The recent development of information technologies and global communications has created new spaces for homogenization. It has been spread across the world by Microsoft, Google, Apple and Amazon. The internet has a special importance for homogenization since cyber users have become cyber citizens. On the other side, restaurant chains have created common tastes and Western and non-Western citizens. Rules that are creating McWorld’s standardized products and management have created a common system within different countries.

New systems that ensure to common sense among different nations, states or organizations involve new management processes. For instance, Mc Donald’s franchise system
and its efficiency, and predictability exemplify global standardization. Mc Donald’s franchise system has successfully spread throughout the world, exemplifying the bureaucracy in Weber’s modernism (Ritzer, 2000: 99). As Max Weber work on formal rationality theory revealed the formal rational systems will dominate the world. As a result, McDonaldization paradigm is not only about the fast food trade. It has influenced social structure and institutions all over the world.

Another dimension of the issue of homogeneity is the integration of elites from around the world in the educational, economic, and political life of Western societies (Holton, 2000: 143). Globalization also produces a social class who has more similarities (Ritzer, 2010). Globalization reduces the barriers of geography and cultural differences. Moreover, it creates new cultural dimensions. The interconnection between countries and cultures creates cultural resistance in Europe and Japan, as well as non-Western countries and hybrid cultural forms. Cultural globalization is not a one-directional or one-way flow of information from the West. As Cohen (2007) states, there are multiple centers of cultural influence which are able to effect the world on a global scale. Brazilian media and Bollywood demonstrate this (Oztekin & Arioz, 2014).

**Polarization Theory**

The limits in cultural homogenization seem to support polarization. A scholar such as Appadurai (1996) denies that the West is the only actor of globalization and Featherstone (1995) also states that the universal culture does not mean a Western culture (Hassi & Storti, 2012: 7). Polarization, also called heterogenization and differentiation, relates describe to barriers that
prevent flows that would make local cultures similar (Ritzer, 2010). Indeed, the movement of local cultures across boundaries makes those local cultures part of globalization.

Heterogenization like homogenization, underestimate the fact that globalization is a process of transformation. Goods, technologies, ideas, values, and individuals flow to different directions. While globalization does not fully able to change non-western cultures, it influence some of their characteristics. In time, different cultural groups create separate entities that become diversified and different.

We must mention Benjamin Barber’s book, Jihad vs. Mc World. Barber explains how globalization fosters two different processes, which operate in opposite directions but that are closely related. Although “Mc World” seems to intensify globalization, by expanding capitalism and dominating all aspects of social life, “Jihad”, which reflects the resistance to Mc World, protects and revitalizes traditional identities. “Mc World” is harmful to local culture until it raises “Jihad” awareness protects local identity with a particular group whether national, ethnic, or religious (Barber B. R., 1995).

According to Samuel Huntington (1993), polarization approach claims that the world in a dichotomous way which is creating a different kind of civilizations. A civilization is “the highest cultural grouping of people and people in the broadest level of cultural identity has short of that which distinguishes humans from other species” (Huntington, 1993:24). Conflict--stemming from culture-- in the modern world will push different civilizations into war. Nations, communities, or groups will find themselves parts of broader cultural entities, “civilizations”,
Even if homogenization and polarization theories are useful to a certain extent, they do not answer how intercultural exchange and diverse culture from a range of sources merge into a primary cultural identity or practice (Oztekin & Arioz, 2014).

**Hybridization Theory**

Cultural hybridization is a relatively neglected approach to globalization. Hybridization is different than but is related to integration in which interdependencies develop while they preserve some features from its previous form (Dear & Burried, 2005). As Cancline (2003: 279) states, since the 1980s, the term “hybridity” has encompassed “all the processes that combine discrete social structure or practices, which already exist in distinctly separate forms, to create new structures, objects and practices in which the antecedents merge” (cited in Dear and Burried, 2005:302). The term “hybrid” is derived from biological and botanical origins. In Latin, it meant the offspring of a tame sow and a wild boar. Hybridity, according to Robert J.C. Young (1950), was used to denote the crossing of people of different races for 1950s (cited in Ackermann, 2012:6).

Cultural hybridization emphasizes that homogenization and polarization theories need to pay attention to both fragmentation and unification, simultaneously reinforcing a consciousness of cultural difference as well as common identity. In addition, intercultural relations and incorporation of diverse cultures require a more comprehensive approach like hybridization. After two different cultures meet, individuals first select particular elements, practices, and values from the new culture. Then they replace or mix those with their old cultural heritage. A new form of cultural experience soon appears. These newly created features of culture reflect a new form, name hybridization. In sum, the homogenization approach claims that cultural
globalization stems from the West and the polarization theory suggests the cultural or civilizational boundaries, but neither explains the formation of a new culture.

On the other hand, some cultural norms could not always able to find a space in new cultural hybridization. Since hybridization focuses on how a new features could embrace new components with previous one, the some prominent features of cultural attributes can be found after the integration of new culture. Moreover, immigrants tend to crate and combine their identity with host country’s identity. (Dear & Burried, 2005: 303). Some important components of cultural attributes can survive even after new attributes have been acquired.

The process of modernization process led to standardization in different areas of life, although culture seems relatively preserved during the process. Improvements in technology, trade and communication that constitute modernity are linked with globalization. The most cited metaphor for globalization is that the world is becoming a small village with more uniform, standardized and westernized societies. This perspective views globalization as Westernization. These two are interrelated aspects of globalization-- the world is becoming more uniform and standardized thanks to technological, commercial, and cultural synchronization emanating from the West and is “a product of Westernization could be interpreted as globalization as a process of hybridization which give rise to a global mélange” (Pieterse, 1995:45).

Cultural globalization, or hybridization, means the blurred relationships among cultures. The cross-cultural relations between different cultures when they interact and select particular points from each other, and then reinterpret the new particular side which is a product of both different cultures (Cohen, 2007:2). In respect to this, multiple directions of cultural flows are the
main characteristic side of universal culture. Cultural convergence cannot be reduced as Western and American values.

Modernity helped create a global society. The modernization process has fostered similar commercial, political, technological, scientific and cultural systems within this global society. The number of countries that are a part of this global society is increasing. Besides the globalization of trade and technology, cultural areas seem relatively more insulted. “While homogenization and polarization theories view culture in a territorial context as a localized learning process i.e., the culture of a society or a particular social group, hybridization thesis claims culture in a wider context as general human software (trans-local learning process) that cannot be confined to certain territory, ethnic or national entity” (Pieterse, 1994:177).

**Research Questions**

The primary goal of this study is to explore Kazakh identity in Turkey and Kazakh cultural experiences. As such, I have three research questions:

1) How do Kazakhs negotiate among bilingual and bicultural identities? In particular, how do the Kazakhs in Turkey negotiate their ethnic identity with Turkish ethnic identity?

2) What are the main forces that shape Kazakh identity?

3) Which of the three approaches --Homogenization, Polarization and Hybridization—best explains the Kazakh community in Turkey?

As a result, I apply Isajiw (1990) offers in order to take into account the power of language and culture. In addition, I am interested in the language and culture of Kazaks. Some definitions also described such as identity, ethnic identity, and hybridity as components of
culture. In addition, I apply Isajiw’s methods to measure ethnic identity formation as the methodology and research design for this study.

**Multiple/ Hybrid Ethnic Identities**

Inter-ethnic marriages and migration were used as main indicator for multiple ethnic identities and they foster self-identification of individuals too. Turkey has been very welcome to many ethnic groups and has been a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural country. It is home to almost 50 different Muslim and non-Muslim ethnic groups such as Sunni-Turks, Alevi-Turks, Suni-Kurds, Alevi-Kurds, Circassians, Armenians, Georgians, Jews, Greeks, Arabs and Assrians (Andrews, 1992). The encouragement of a diverse culturally-ethnic society, however, did not remain on modern Turkey’s agenda because the nationalist discourse raised fears of separatist waves. The new republic tried to construct a Turkic notion which basically assumed all ethnic identities are part of Turkic nation. However, hyphenated identities are also seen in Turkey, since the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural past and present experiences were created by multi-ethnic marriages and immigration. Hence, cultural diversity helps to hyphenate the society, while immigrants and ethnic minorities are more likely to have hyphenated identities than the country’s majority (James (1999) cited in Chiu, 2003:49).

**Research on Kazakh Identity**

When Kazakhstan became an independent country, the ethnic Kazakh identity formation was supported by state policies. The main characteristic of new state-centered Kazakh ethnicity was construction Kazakhstan as all Kazakhs’ homeland in terms of history and nation. The territorial assertion of Kazakh identity with Kazakh “yurd” was applied and the return immigrants to the homeland have been encouraged by several state policies. The repatriation in
“Kazakh Oralman,\textsuperscript{21} was implemented as state policy in order to increase the Kazakh population which had been severely dispersed during the Soviet regime.

The challenges of globalization, identity, and nation can be seen in two contexts for Kazakhstan. First, the desire to catch up with a new global order, international technology and economic system made learning English a priority for Nursultan Nazarbayev. He planned to promote the study of the Kazakh language, Russian, and English. His plan was to develop a country with a 20% English-speaking population by 2020 (Turumbetova, Tayeva, & N.Y.Grebenshikova, 2010:3). This trilingual society could foster the transformation process. Second, Kazakhstan pursued the ethno-nationalist nation-building policies during 1990s and then turned a civic-multiethnic nation building model. However, this new model retained some characteristics of the ethno-centric model such as making Kazakh traditional narratives and historical cultural roots mandatory subjects in learning the Kazakh language. Moreover, the massive outmigration of non-Kazakhs during the 1990s created new problems, for instance the loss of skilled labor including managers and technicians. Kazakhstan’s solution was to create a new kind of super national identity like the “Soviet Man.” To encourage, (re)ethnicification with non-Kazakh minorities, Nazarbayev initiated “Eurasianism.” This provided two benefits. First, the idea of a Kazakh identity was developed to soften ethno-centric nation building policies (Schatz, 2000). Second, thanks to Eurasianism, the elites could integrate all ethnic groups and nations. In this regard, Kazakhs became first among equals, which is similar to the Soviet template (Russian first among equals) (Dinc, 2010). Transnational migration emphasizes the process of building strong ties with the homeland while developing hybridized or “transnational” social identities (Werner & Barcus, 2009).

\textsuperscript{21} Kazakhs in outside of Kazakhstan were labelled as Oralman, when they returned to Kazakhstan.
There is a debate over the Russification of Kazakhs and the purity of ‘oralmans.’

However, Kazakhs who had lived in non-Soviet countries have preserved a distinct Kazakh culture for centuries. This statement is also true of Mongolian Kazakhs. According to a survey which sought to examine the problems of integration among Mongolian Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, “the repatriated Kazakhs from Mongolia overwhelmingly (73.6 %) considered themselves ‘Kazakh’ (n=637), with only 10.7 % embracing the hybridized identity of Mongolian-Kazakh or Kazakh-Mongolian “(Diener, 2013:473). However, this also shows that ethnic purity for Kazakhstan was still a prominent consideration. Moreover, 44 % of Mongolian-Kazakh ‘Oralman’ (n= 642) and almost 60% of Kazakhs in Mongolia (n=546) thought that Mongolian Kazakhs were different than Kazakhstani Kazakhs (Diener, 2003:373). “Many of us grew up as herdsmen. We live as Kazakhs lived in history; our homes and tools are things you see in Kazakhstan’s museums, but we use them in our lives. We speak Kazakh in Kazakhstan changed during socialism, they become sophisticated, more like Russians, and we remain as Kazakhs” (Diener, 2003:373).

To the question: “Has living in Mongolia helped retain Kazakh cultural purity?” Fifty-nine percent of Mongolian-Kazakh ‘Oralmans’ answered “Yes, very much”, so did 55 % of Kazakhs in Mongolia (Diener, 2013:471).

The cultural attitudes of the young in Kazakhstan are considered by scholars like Asiya et. al. (2014). The transformation of youth identify can be an indicator of globalization. Youth attitudes could also explain aspects of ethnic identity formation, during the process of becoming an adult. Moreover, it could show the differentiation among generations. Asiya et. al (2014) surveyed 100 students who were currently graduate students in Kazakhstan. Globalization was considered imperative for Kazakhstan’s modernization, and the changes in the official discourse...
and the trilingual society showed that Kazakhstan is aware of global cultural trends. Forty-two % of the students thought that globalization had a positive meaning. However, 36 % emphasized that globalization destroyed cultural identities, while 15 % thought that globalization had created a cosmopolitan identity (Asiya et. al 2014:25). The finding of this study about consumer culture showed that the economic aspect of globalization was important to the young. Seventy % of the sample responded that they followed the latest global trends in fashion, technology, and entertainment. Furthermore, youth in Kazakhstan had various responses to the question “What determines the nationality?” Fifty-three % gave language as the dominant criterion of ethnic identity. Ethnic heritage of ancestors and religion were the other two crucial criteria for 42 % of the participants, although facial features were considered an important factor for 17 % of Kazakh participants and 25 % of Russian participants. Moreover, 52 % of the Kazakh respondents said they knew their national traditions and customs as did 33 % among the Russians. As a result, Kazakh youth consider preservation of language to be a major symbol of ethnic identity.
CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Turkey as the study site

Turkey has not been considered by many observers to be a hybrid society, but it has been the site of encounters, clashes, and many historical interactions between Turks and both indigenous people and migrants, consisting not only of Muslims but also Christians and Jews. The ability of Turks to contribute to culture can be traced starting from the western of China to the Balkans, while the multiethnic and multicultural society in Turkey can be explained by a Turkic idiom: “There are 66.5 nationalities in Turkey”. Immigration, emigration, and forced emigration have been major social and political factors that created these 66.5 nationalities of contemporary Turkey – a multi-ethnic society that is the result of the history of the region (Kirisci, 2003). Anatolia, the historical name of Turkey, has been a cradle of civilizations. And after the 1200s, the Ottoman Empire used mass migration as a cultural propagator – the remains it can be seen in the Balkans today.

During the Ottoman reign, ethnicity was affiliated with an administrative system that stemmed from the religion. Each religious community was constructed as ‘millet,’ meaning ‘nation’ in English. Major nations such as Muslims, Orthodox Christians (Greek, Syriac), Armenian Apostolic Christians, and Jews had their own jurisdictional systems that also ensured religious freedom. Islam was the formal religion of the Ottoman Empire, and the Sultan was the Caliph of Sunni Muslims (Baran, 2010). From the 1000s to the 1800s, Turkic tribes had been migrating westward. The ‘millet’ system was ensured by sub-groups within each ‘millet.’ Migration waves to the Balkans turned to migration to Turkey after the 1800s.
Europe”, the Ottoman Empire, was looking for a new way to protect its territory. The doctrines of the French Revolution spread “the vulnerability of their empire to exploitation by European powers and to disintegration under pressure from independence movements” (Baran, 2010:17). The Ottoman Empire was going through a transformation not only to acquire European technologies but also to absorb minorities. Mahmut the II’s reforms launched the Westernization of Ottoman identity, although these were not able to preserve the ‘millet’ system. As a result, rebellious groups gained independence one after another.

The end of the 18th and the 19th century resulted in great political and demographic changes for the Ottomans. After the Balkan Wars, mass migrations and exchanges occurred between old Ottoman territories and new independent states. The European diplomatic intervention had great influence diluting the reforms. European states acquired influence in the Ottoman territory under the guise of the protecting Christian or minority rights. After the Crimean War, the great powers demanded greater autonomy for ethnic communities. After the war with Russia in 1877, the Ottomans lost their territories in Europe, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Armenia. While the loss of these territories emphasized a need for a pan-Islamic ideology, in time, after losing control over Arabia, the Turks constructed a nationalist ideology. A pan-Turkic movement – the Young Turks – spread over Istanbul, the Ottoman capital. This pan-Turkic identity included “Turan,” unite all Turkic nations under one country, which aimed to unite all Turks from the Balkans to Central Asia by emphasizing their common language.

After 1914, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire resulted in a creation of new Turkic identity under Ataturk’s definition. He tried to protect all ethnicities and religions. He created a
special Turkic identity for all of the different ethnicities, giving them citizenship. In this way, he emphasized the role of citizenship, rather than blood relationships, in nationality.

**Research on Ethnic Identity in Turkey**

The research on ethnic identity in Turkey has mainly dealt with immigrants’ ethnic identity from the Balkans and non-Muslim populations (Unal & Demir, 2009, Unal, 2012, Sepetcioglu, 2010). Other Turkic immigrants require further study.

During 20th century, large numbers of Muslims immigrated to Turkey, although many non-Muslims migrated from Turkey to Greece. Due to the Lausanne Population Exchange Agreement of 1923, a mass population exchange occurred. “Approximately 1.3 million ethnic Greeks were resettled in Greece, and about 500,000 ethnic Turks were resettled in Turkey (Bosswick, 2009:6)”. Taking this mass migration into consideration along with the 1.6 million immigrants who came to live in Turkey, we can to assume that Turkey is a suitable area to study ethnic identity, immigration, and hybridization.

Migration from old Ottoman territories shaped Turkey’s multiethnic society. According to Tekeli (2007), having the past 150 years, there were four types of migration. The first wave was the “balkanization migrations.” The second wave was the population exchanges between 1945 and 1980. The third wave was internal migration among Turkish cities, and the final wave was based on “multiple life roots” that emphasized a desire for a modern life and new facilities.

**Multiethnic population in Turkey**

A majority of the migrations occurred from the Balkans. More than 1, 6 million immigrants entered Turkey during the 1990s (Cesteneci, 2012). While the Kurds are the major
non-Turkish ethnic group in Turkey, the minority populations according to their primary
language is shown in the Table 3 that shows there are many different ethnic groups in Turkey.

**Table 3**: Non-Turkish Ethnic Groups in Turkey by Language (in 1,000’s)\(^{22}\)

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<td>Kurdish</td>
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<td>1,480</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>1,477</td>
<td>1,885</td>
<td>1,680</td>
<td>1,848</td>
<td>2,181</td>
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<td>247</td>
<td>269</td>
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<td>Ladino(Jews)</td>
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<td>62</td>
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<td>Georgian</td>
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<td>Circassian</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaza</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1985, refugees added to the complexity to the Turkish society. Almost a million
Iranians fled to Turkey. In 1988, Kurds from Iraq, about 100,000 in number, escaped to Turkey
in order to escape Saddam Hussein (Svanberg, 1989:68, Kirisci, 2003:2). On the other hand, the
immigrants from the Balkan are made up a majority of Muslim migrants. The first wave was
between 1923 and 1945 when 800,000 immigrants came from countries in Balkans. The second
wave was in 1989 when 345,000 immigrants came from Bulgaria. The third wave which was

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\(^{22}\) Turkish Statistical Yearbook 1951-1964, Ankara 1951-1966, cited in Svanberg (1989).60. After 1965, Turkish Statistic Institution left to asked “What is your primary and secondary language?” This is the reason why there is no formal record after this period.
between 1992 and 2998 when 20,000 migrated from Bosnia; and the last wave was in 1999 when 17,746 Kosovo citizens migrated to Turkey (Turkish Immigration Agency, 2015). Between the 1960s and the 2000s, Turkey became a country that housed many foreign populations. Changes in migrant and their birth-place can be found in Table 4:

**Table 4:** The population of Turkey-born and foreign-born people (Yakar, 2013:503).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Born outside of Turkey</th>
<th>The Proportion of foreign-born population to population of Turkey</th>
<th>Non-Turkish Citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>755,526</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>952,515</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>54,955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>889,170</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>39,543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>868,195</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>50,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1,113,152</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>245,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1,260,530</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>267,441</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The immigrants groups in Turkey have different background and condition (see Table 5 for immigrant status). According to the OECD’s international immigration report (2014), there are 267,300 migrants in Turkey who have a residence permit of which 42% (about 45,850) had work permits. Inflows to Turkey according to percent of foreigners are Azerbaijan 9%, Afghanistan 8%, Russian Federation 7%, Germany 6%, United States 5%, Iran 5%, Kazakhstan 4%, Turkmenistan 4%, Iraq 4% and United Kingdom 4%. The ongoing crisis in Syria increased the Syrian refugees in Turkey.
Table 5: Foreigners who have a residence permit and their status (Tourism not included),
Turkish National Police, the Aliens, Borders and Asylums Agency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Employed</th>
<th>Student</th>
<th>Other reasons</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>20,740</td>
<td>31,282</td>
<td>159,451</td>
<td>211,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>23,027</td>
<td>37,260</td>
<td>156,919</td>
<td>217,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>19,351</td>
<td>29,266</td>
<td>128,327</td>
<td>176,944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>17,483</td>
<td>27,063</td>
<td>118,780</td>
<td>163,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>18,900</td>
<td>28,597</td>
<td>127,429</td>
<td>174,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>24,881</td>
<td>28,455</td>
<td>171,872</td>
<td>225,208</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In short, Turkey is a multiethnic country which has long been a country of immigration, hence the inhabitant people help to have these multi-ethnic structure (Figure 4). In Turkey, according to the Turkish Statistical Institution report in 2006, there were 48,709,000 adults, and 6,524,000 of them stated their ethnicity as Kurds, while 38,043,000 were Turkish, while the

Figure 4: The Distribution of Ethnic Identity (Milliyet, 2007).
Apart from the general multi-ethnic society in Turkey, having a research in Istanbul and Nigde provide an interesting site to study ethnic identity and globalization, along with Kazakh identity. First, these two cities are different in terms of cosmopolitan characteristic. The population of Istanbul is approximately 15 million, although Nigde is house to 343 thousands. While Istanbul is highly a cosmopolitan city, which accommodates a large proportion of immigrants from all over the world, Nigde is a small and the immigrant population is also small.

**The Data Collection Process**

I had a sample of 93 (N=93) participants. The sample included four Kazakhstan-born, three Chinese-born, and eighty six Turkish-born Kazakhs who were selected using snowball (reputational) sampling. They are residents of Istanbul and Nigde. While thirteen participants stayed in Nigde, the rest – eighty – were from Istanbul. In order to include those of all groups in terms of age and gender, I had forty-four females and forty-nine males from three age groups—below-29, 30-49, and 50-63. Friends, family members, neighbors, acquaintances, social institution members, non-governmental organizations, ethnic associations, and village community members were also included in my study as participants. Chapter 5 presents the characteristics of the sample and overview of questions.

Finding participants and administering questionnaires were one of the hardest parts on writing this thesis. Moreover, determining the sample size required a big consideration since participants are the main component of studies. Having 93 participants from the Kazakh population in Turkey, which is approximately 15,000, enabled me to obtain medium sized data. Hence, it helped me observe my participants’ stories, while providing me with information to develop insights about the Kazakh society. In order to make my participants comfortable, I did
not to pay attention them when they were filling out the questionnaires and I let them ask questions about the questionnaire. I intend to obtain an extensive understanding about the characteristics of Kazakh ethnic identity formation in Turkey for examining whether a hybrid identity created. Information about questionnaires is included in Chapters 5 and 6.

Before the questionnaire, informed consent was provided in order to explain to participants about the context, the research purposes, interview length and the method of study (Appendix A). The survey was conducted during January and February of 2015. I encouraged participants to ask if there are some questions that not clear or need more explanations. I took notes when participants wanted to add more to the answers they were providing. Additional stories were recorded after participants requested to include their comments. I preferred not to include complex or long questions. On the other hand, open-ended questions help to elaborate information about participants’ view. Moreover, open-ended questions help participants to express their answers with their own words and it also provides to have more detailed information, while multiple choice questions provide quantitative data (Fontana & Frey, 2000:653).

A problem arises when the answers to open-ended questions are generalized. This is dangerous for qualitative research. (Erickson, 2009:73). “A single narrative vignette or interview quote, however illuminating it might be as a “telling case” (Ibid, 73). In order to eliminate that possibility, I applied, as Erickson (2009) suggested, the relative frequency of occurrence with similar answers. While some explanatory clarifications from participants were not similar to other participants’ responses, this revealed the variety of participants.

Questions were asked in Turkish. Some notes were also taken when participants were filling out the survey. Each interview approximately took twenty minutes. The completed
surveys were kept in a secured bag which has password. A special notebook for this study was organized in order to keep the stories of participants’ grandparents and historical information about exodus from China. A deep understanding was gained during interviews about the leather work, trade habits, and life style of Kazakhs.

**Data Analysis**

Analyzing the data was one of the primary concerns for researchers. For structured and open-ended questions, the SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) was used to analyze the data. Moreover, there were some codes for participants. There were mainly three groups: first one is the main demographic characteristic of participants, second is that ethnic identity retention and the third one is self-identification. In particular, the hybrid form of identity was examined through Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.

**Limitations**

Contacting wealthy Kazakhs was especially difficult. During the interviews in Istanbul, several attempts to include some wealthy Kazakhs were not finalized and complete questionnaires were not obtained so those are not included in this study. There are some participants who are relatively wealthy agreed to participate in the study.

---

23 In Chapter 6, “the section of Kazakh Ethnic Identity”, ‘P’ was used to code the participants, and each number shows a specified participants (the participants’ personal information was not required, and I did not take any distinguishing features of participants). For example, ‘P1’ was used to show one participant’s responses to open-ended question in his or her own word.
Ethics

Appendix A provided a written informed consent form for all interviewees in order to inform them about the concept of study and participants’ rights. They also informed about the sensitivity of ethnic identity studies.

I benefitted from a bunch of previous studies shed our way for conducting the questionnaire. Same questions were taken from both the Eurobarometer 71, and Chiu, (2003)’s study and then were applied. While Isajiw, (1990)’s methodology was this study’s main framework, I benefitted from Chiu (2003)’s study -- focuses on Hakka ethnic identity formation in Canada -- for ethnic identity retention.
CHAPTER 5

PARTICIPANTS’ DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILES AND RETENTION OF KAZAKH IDENTITY

Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 cover the empirical findings from a study consisting of a survey with Kazakhs in Turkey, in the cities of Istanbul and Nigde. The responses to multiple-choice questions and some open-ended questions were presented in the Chapter 5 that has three main objects. First, it explains some background information about the sample and examines different age groups based on self-identification with ethnic identity retention. Moreover, in this Chapter, three major themes: demography, media, and external and internal retention of Kazakh identity are examined. The sample helps us to have detailed information about Kazakhs in Turkey. Second, the chapter examines Kazakh participants in terms of gender, age and socio-economic status. Lastly, Chapter 5 concludes Kazakh identity retention of participants in terms of gender, socio-economic status, and age. In conclusion, Chapter 6 presents sample’s preferences for organized questions and also explains participants’ identity, in particular, the Turkic and Kazakh identity under three major globalization approaches: homogenization, polarization and hybridization.
Demographic Profile of Participants

The characteristics of participants were obtained through the information about the place of birth, gender, and socio-economic status and the summary of these answers are presented in Table 6. The participants from my study were born in Turkey, Kazakhstan, China-East-Turkestan, or Pakistan. Thus, Turkey was the primary country for 94% of the Kazakhs and the remaining 6% and was born in Kazakhstan, China, and Pakistan (Figure 5).

The gender representation was almost equal for the sample group consisting of 53% males and 47% females (see Table 6).

The age distribution of males is relatively extended while women in the study were younger than the average age. The mean age for man was 40 years old, while the mean age for women was 25 years old.

![Figure 5: Kazakh participants’ place of birth](image)

Both females and males were interviewed in three age groups: under 29, 30-49, and 50-68.
Table 6: Selected Demographic Characteristic of Kazakhs in Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Kazakhs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender (%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Group (%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-29</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-49</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-68</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of Born (%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China, East Turkestan</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Education (%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed Elementary School</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed High School</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s degree</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Degree</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Status (%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation (%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Sector</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private-Sector(as employee)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic or homecare</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-profit organization</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Monthly Income</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-320 (tl)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>321-950(tl)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>951-1500 (tl)</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1501-2500 (tl)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2501- above(tl)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Stated</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House Location (%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City-center</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Stated</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Room Number (%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Rooms</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Rooms</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Rooms</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Rooms</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Stated</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample Size (see note in page 78)</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Overall, the participants in this study tended to be younger Kazakhs. The first age group consisted of 15 to 29 (53%). 26% were between 30 and 49. Thus, most of the participants were relatively young (Figure 6), while elderly people also consisting of 21 percent of participants.

![Age groups of participants](image)

**Figure 6:** Age groups of participants

**Socio-economic Status**

The level of education, employment status, individual income, insurance information, and house ownership with the room number in the houses were used for understanding of participants’ socio-economic status (Table 6). In general, Kazakhs in Turkey tended to have lower education levels, although labor force participation is relatively high.

Rather than emphasizing on education, nomadic Kazakhs were prone to be traders. From the beginning of their settlement in Istanbul, Kazakhs have been involved in commerce. During their first year in Istanbul, Kazakhs dwelt in three camps: Sirkeci, Zeytinburnu, and Tuzla. Kazakhs were not allowed to work and not allowed to move out of the camps. The script below is from one of my participant’s memories of these early days:
“When we were in the Zeytinburnu camp, the rule did not let us to go outside. But we got bored; we wanted to do some good things for Turks because they helped us a lot. Then, we were escaping after breakfast and working in construction of Mosques for free. At around six pm, we were going back to camp. After a while, the workers in this construction area became dissatisfied because their bosses decreased their wages because of hardworking free Kazakhs. For these days, the Jews saw how hardworking Kazakhs were. They gave us free tablecloths which are made by plastic and relatively cheap. The Jews were so rich. Anyway, we started to earn more by selling those cloths in the streets of Istanbul, and then we paid our debt to Jews and the trade relations increased. Then after we become free of the camps, we tried to work in leather so we earned a lot. It was a crazy thing to go school – that just took time. For instance, when my brother become a school teacher, he spent his time in school, he was paid just 1 unit while I was earning 5 units by selling my leather hat in the streets within five hours a day”.24

Seventy-seven percent of participants had primary and high school degrees. However, only 23 % of the participants had a Bachelor’s or a Master’s degree (Figure 7).

---

24 I included this story because it is probably the most common among all Kazakhs in Turkey. I received similar stories from almost every participant.
In Turkey, 77\% of Kazakh participants aged 15-68 had earned at least a high-school degree, compared to only 32\% of adults aged 25-64. According to the OECD (2014), 36\% of males graduated from high-school compared with 27\% of female Turkish counterparts (Figure 7). However, new regulations ensured an increase in education levels in Turkey. The gender difference in educational attainment still continues, especially at the primary level. Women are less educated than males.

While a high school degree was the highest education for both two groups – female and male Kazakhs – the Kazakh males are able to pursue their education than Kazakh female in Turkey. In addition, Kazakhs in this study had at least completed grade school. Furthermore, only two males were able to acquire a Master’s degree, while there were nineteen Kazakhs who had a Bachelor’s degree. Hence, first generation Kazakhs in Turkey were not likely to pursue further education at university, while the profit in trade made older Kazakhs able to do so. Therefore, the high school education rate among the younger generation could be a step toward university education.

**Figure 7:** Education level according to gender
We cannot estimate the relationship for employment status between two groups—female and males—by looking the slight variation in educational levels. Therefore, I included questions into survey which ask participants’ jobs, salaries. Thirty-seven percent of participants were students, and 47% were employees. The Kazakhs are close to Turks (the employment rate—paid job-- among Turks 49% for aged 15 to 64), and the gender difference for Turks is similar. Almost 69% of Turkish had paid work, while 29% of Turkish females was able to earn their money (OECD Better Life Index, Turkey, 2014), while Kazakh women are able to find some space in the workplace: approximately 15% (Figure 8). Thirty-three percent of men gained full employed status in the labor force. Since a patriarchal family system still exists valid in both Turkish and Kazakh societies, the difference in employment between men and women was predictable. However, almost 10% of participants were retired, and 4% of women chose their occupational status as “housewife.” Two percent of participants were unemployed. Overall, in Turkey, low-skilled females and young people are still vulnerable.

![Bar Chart](image)

**Figure 8:** Work status according to gender
Self-employment among Kazakhs seems the main mode of occupation. Almost 6% of Kazakhs preferred to work within the public sector, while the private sector and self-employment were more preferred— the former 25% and the latter 15%.

“Moreover, maintaining a strong commitment to the culture of origin after immigration helped immigrants to get employment, when a well preserved knowledge of the mother tongue, maintained skills ethnic identity increases the possibility to find a job in host country” (Zimmermann, Constant, & Gataulina, 2006). Many Kazakhs were interested in leather, and solidarity is common among Kazakhs. And participants’ general tendency is having private sector on leather works. When a Kazakh needs a job, other Kazakhs are ready to offer one because of common ethnicity (Subanova, 2013:81).

Taking into account ownership, it is helpful to have information about the rooms and location of houses in order to gain a more extensive knowledge about the living standards of participants. An overwhelming 80% of Kazakhs owned their own homes while 16% of participants were tenants (Figure 9). Four percent of the participants did not state whether they owned a house. In order to have a better sense of life quality among Kazakhs, the number of rooms would be another factor to observe in order to decide about the well-being of participants. The question was asked: “How many rooms do you have?,” and answer choices were presented
as two rooms plus one living room, three rooms plus one living room, and so on (see Appendix B for a complete set of questions). It is clear that Kazakhs would like to live in homes or apartments with more rooms. Thus, 26% of the participants had four-room apartments (plus one living room) compared to 12% of residents who lived in five-room apartments. Only 18% had two-room apartments (see Table 6).

The location of houses helps us draw a general picture of Kazakh well-being. Seventy-seven percent of participants had homes in the center of the city, although 22.5% had homes in rural areas such as villages.25

By taking account of the monthly income of Kazakhs, we gain information about the economic performance of participants. Although the economic performance of immigrants takes 27 years to reach those of native-born, Turks26, we should focus on how their preferences about occupation were formed.

Thirty-one percent of the participant earned 846-1500 Turkish Liras, which is higher than the minimum subsistence level. While 11% were at this level, 5% of participants had the highest levels in this study, and 31% had in between earning levels.

The retirement plans of Kazakhs varied from SSK, the mandatory insurance for paid-workers which is provided by employers, and BAGKUR, which is also mandatory system that requires having insurance for employers. These two plans provide general retirement plans. And, some other retirement programs such as national bank program for retirement. Thirty-nine percent of participants had the SSK retirement plan which is mandatory for every employee. For the self-employed, BAGKUR was preferred by 21% of participants, compared to 3% who preferred individual retirement plans. On the other hand, house, earthquake, and automobile

25 The participants in Nigde have lived in Altay Village, so all of them dwell in rural areas.
26 Thomas & P., 1998, and Bloom, 1995 find that Canadian immigrants need 27 years to earn the same salary that is earned by native-born Canadian.
insurance are not common among participants. While 60% of participants did not want to answer this question, 10% of the rest had home insurance, and 5% had earthquake insurance. Automobile insurance was taken out by 13% of the participants. In sum, Kazakhs in this sample occupy average ranks on the socio-economic ladder. They possess average education that has allowed them to attain average individual incomes.

**External and Internal Retention of Kazakh Identity**

Taking into account varying everyday practices such as religious piety, using native language, traditional art, literature, leisure activities, clothing, and music, we can gain some idea of cultural identity (Bhugra, et al., 1999; Sobal, 1998).

In order to explore cultural hybridization among Kazakhs in Turkey, I needed to see how their identity had changed and how their identity carried new applications. As stated earlier, ethnic identity have external and internal aspects. The third part of this chapter describes findings on the retention of ethnic identity. In this, I aimed to link the effect of cultural globalization on Kazakh and Turkic identities. The findings on retention or non-retention are presented in Table 7. Questions were asked based on six cultural characteristics in order to analyze retention of ethnic identity; the questions revealed information about eating Kazakh food, country preferences for food\(^{27}\), speaking fluent Kazakh, attending Kazakh feasts, special gatherings ("toy")\(^{28}\), ethnic friendship, and media preferences (see Appendix B for a complete set of questions).

---

\(^{27}\) I did not look at shopping preferences since there are no Kazakh groceries in either Istanbul or Nigde and spent time to find out more about Kazakh was the level of knowledge of Kazakh history.

\(^{28}\) Toys are a king of group meetings, which aimed to share feeling with community. The major types of toys are wedding ceremonies, circumcision feasts, pilgrim celebrations, soldier sendoffs, and so on.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>External Aspects of Kazakh identity and Importance</strong></th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speaking Kazakh at home (%)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eat Kazakh food (%)</td>
<td>Kazak Manti</td>
<td>Toy Pilavi</td>
<td>Kazak Tea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing food (%)</td>
<td>Kazakh-Turkey</td>
<td>East Turkestan</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attending Kazakh associations, and meetings</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Often</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic friendship (%)</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>Kazakh</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media (%)</td>
<td>In Turkish</td>
<td>In Kazakh</td>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>70</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Internal Aspects of Kazakh Identity</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affective</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stronger attachment towards Kazakhs than other ethnic groups (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Fiducial** |
| Trust Kazakhs more than other ethnic groups(%) |
| Not Important | Very Impor. Charac. Imp.* |
| 3            | 17            | 80               |

| **Cognitive** |
| Spending effort to find out more about Kazakhs(%) |
| Good | Average | Poor |
| 30    | 36    | 26    |

| **Moral (Part 1)** |
| Speaking Kazakh (%) |
| Often | Sometimes | Never |
| 46    | 37        | 17    |

| **Moral (Part 2)** |
| Marry within the Kazakh community (%) |
| Not Important | Very important |
| 69            | 26             |

*Charac. Imp. Means Character of person is important for trust.
Eating habits

Since food is very important factor for identity (Fischler, 1988), eating habits have special importance. Therefore, it helps to examine food choices to determine external retention or non-retention of Kazakh identity. Benefitting from food choices is one of the cultural practices and preferences of participants. We may receive valuable insights about adaption, diversity, identification, distancing, and integration the levels of individual or collective tendencies (Koc & Welsh, 2003:46). Thirteen options were used to measure food preferences of Kazakhs-- Turkish Dumplings, Kazakh Dumplings, Ozbek Dumplings, Makrube, Imamayildi, Baklava, Cigkofte, Beshbarmak, Hamburger, Toy Pilavi, Turkish Tea, Turkish coffee, and Kazakh Tea. Immigrants feel at home when eating their national foods. People experience their identity through accessing food, especially the “comfort food”, but also to culturally appropriate foods (Koc & Welsh, 2003:47).

Turkish cuisine can offer much. Kazakh cuisine is welcoming and will provide you with many options if you like to eat meat. As pastoral nomads, the Kazakhs developed their cuisine directly from their animals, using milk and meat. Thus, Kazakh tea with added hot milk, black pepper, and other spices, is desirable. However, the diet of nomads cannot be reduced as animal products (Kunanbaeva, 2008). Even the style of presentation or the taste of the food could make a difference. I included three types of dumplings present in the distinct cuisines. Many Kazakhs in Turkey mentioned their special “Kazakh Dumplings,” which are very similar to “Turkish Dumplings” and “Ozbek Dumplings,” except in size. Kazakh cuisine is dominated by meat. While Kazakhs and other Turkic ethnic groups’ cuisines include similar ingredients, ingredients unique to the Kazakh cuisine were revealed along with questions about global meals such as hamburgers, Coca Cola, and iced Tea.
While dumplings seems to be the most delicious food of Kazakhs, 12% of participants chose it in Turkish style, although 17% preferred Kazakh style – Uzbek style was chosen by 16% of the participants. On the other hand, as an international food, hamburgers were chosen by 9% of the participants. Other Turkic delicacies were preferred by Kazakhs – 7% preferred “imambayildi”, which is meat with eggplant, 8% preferred Baklava, and 5% preferred Cigkofte; another Kazakh dish, Toy Pilavi was preferred by 1%. At the same time, Maklube, which is also common throughout the Turkic world, was only preferred by 9% of the participants.

When it comes to beverages, the traditional Kazakh tea was preferred more that Turkish tea, Turkish coffee, or Cola. Thus 2% of participants indicated both Turkish tea and coffee as their favorite beverage, while Kazakh tea was favored by 7%.

Country preferences for food

Again, the eating habits and creating one’s own cuisine are important indicators of cultural identity. According to Mintz (2008), African slaves in the Caribbean gained their masters’ awareness by their taste in food. Food and cooking are factors that create the building-blocks in reconstruction of culture and cultural identity (Mintz (2008) cited in Claxton, 2008:1) (Claxton, 2008). Having access to food from East Turkestan was an indicator of external aspects of Kazakh ethnic identity. At the same time this measure could provide a broader view of cultural globalization. The young generation’s preferences provided a more general cultural globalization pattern than Turkic ones.

Most of the Kazakhs are happy to be in Turkey regarding food. Turkish food is not unfamiliar to them. They are able to eat halal food, fresh vegetables, and so on. They also try new kinds chocolate made by Turkish chefs. They stated that there is no difference in food products. That is why they do not need to give order food from another country or open a local
grocery selling Kazakh products except ‘kimiz,’ or ‘kumiss’ which is a special Turkic drink that is more common in Central Asia. As long ago as Herodotus, kumiss made from fermented mare’s milk became an inseparable part of nomadic culture (Kunanbaeva, 2008:53). Therefore, except for this national food, most of the participants reported that their first choice was Turkish. Sixty percent of participants were only shopped for Turkish foods, while 38% needed products from Kazakhstan, with just 1% preferring Russia as a supplier. Kazakhs seemed happy regarding food products.

**The Kazakh language**

Kazakh is a Turkic language. Turkic languages include 25 closely related dialects or subgroups belonging to the Kipchak (or Northwestern Turkic) branch (Ataov, 1992:169). Therefore, it is closely related to other Turkic languages and there exists mutual understanding among them. According to Kessikbayeva and Cicekci (2014), words in Kazakh can be generated from root words recursively by adding proper Turkish suffixes.

Language may be a powerful indicator of ethnic identity, and most of the time language would separate people. Surprisingly, Kazakhs showed only weak a memory of the Kazakh dialect: eleven percent of participants said their mother tongue was Kazakh, while 73% spoke Turkish as their first language and 7% of participants said both Kazakh and Turkish were the native languages. (Ten percent of participants did not state their mother tongue).
On the one hand, the Kazakh language skill level is in the middle. Fifty percent of participants were fluent while 35% chose to rate their language skill as average (Figure 10). Lastly, 15 per cent were not fluent in Kazakh. On the other hand, participants who chose their native language as Turkish said they were fluent in Kazakh, while those who chose their native language as Kazakh were not fluent in Kazakh. Hence, percentage of speaking Kazakh at home also showed that participants were not speaking Kazakh at home frequently: Forty-six percentage of participants said often while 37 % stated ‘sometimes’ and 17 % stated ‘never’ (See Table 7).

Apart from the mother tongue, we must stress the relationship between Kazakh and Turkish. Kazakh and Turkish are closely related, and there is mutual intelligibility among them (Kessikbayeva & Cicekli, 2014). Twenty-four percent of participants thought that Kazakh and Turkish were very similar, while 68% thought they were relatively similar. In sum, 91% thought that these two languages were similar. Seven percent said the two languages were different and 3% said they were very different.
One of my participants included extra notes to the question asking how close Turkish and Kazakh language were:

*It is much the same, just climate had affected the Kazakh language in Asia, and the volume of the two languages became a little bit different. However, I should say when I went to Kazakhstan for a trip that I experienced some difficulties about understanding Kazakhstan’s Kazakh. I felt that I was completely able to understand them, but I hesitated to speak.*

**Attending Kazakh association meetings**

Social meetings among Kazakhs have ensured ethnic-racial socialization. Although some of these meetings provided transmissions of cultural values, knowledge, and practices, practicing some of the cultural practices led society to discriminate the younger generation. In the same way, ethnic-racial socialization influences the ethnic identity, self-esteem, and biases (Hughes et al., 2006:764) which could occur in activities of ethnic associations.

The nomadic past of Kazaks has given special importance to group meetings, which are generally called “toys.” The major types of toys are wedding ceremonies, circumcision feasts, pilgrim celebrations, soldier sendoffs, and so on. Based on several studies and my own survey, it was clear that Kazakhs in Turkey are well organized communities that have come together in
ethnic associations; most of which are managed by Kazakhs. Kazakh Unions, organizations, and association have preserved cultural practices. For instance, playing the Dombira\(^{29}\) and Kazakh motifs on carpets – through carpet weaving courses – and leather courses. Hence, Kazakh toys, picnics, and traditional Kazakh dance groups are prominent events organized by these organizations. On the whole, Kazakhs gave greater emphasis to attending ethnic celebrations and festivities. Ninety-one percent of participants often attend Kazakh meetings and make an effort to have Kazakh events and activities. They raise money for cultural activities, courses, and lectures. They are also sensitive to teaching their traditional lifestyle to new generations via cultural unions and associations. None of the participants chose “I have never attended a Kazakh meeting” which shows that these meetings have great importance for Kazakhs.

**Ethnic friendship**

For Kazakhs, integration with both Turks and other ethnic groups was a key feature of question asked in this section, although being Kazakh is still an important consideration in choosing a friend. Almost every participant in the survey paused before answering the question about their best friend’s ethnicity. They stated that the ethnicity of a person does not matter, and they paid more attention to the personality of the friend. Figure 12 presents the ethnic friendship preferences of participants does not base on ethnic Kazakhness. As Figure 12 presents that for participants, having close friends from different ethnic groups is very common, while ethnically Turks and Kazakhs more popular. Forty-two percent of participants had very close Turkish friends, while 41% had Kazakh friends as very close friend. It also shows that integration with society can be seen through ethnic friendship, while it is an indicator for ethnic identity retention: if an immigrant has close friends from host country, it is a indicator to show ethnic identity retention is not strong.

\(^{29}\) Dombira is traditional Kazakh music instrument.
Participants had relationships with other Kazakhs living in Kazakhstan and East Turkestan. Sixty-three percent of participants had friends and relatives in Kazakhstan, while only 30% had friends in East Turkestan. Although 60% of the participants originally came from East Turkestan, Kazakhstan was their home country as well. The Kazakh government provided many rights to ‘Oralmans’. About 1 million ethnic Kazakhs have returned to Kazakhstan from neighboring countries owing to Kazakhstan’s returnee policies (Bokayev, 2013:791). The Kazakh government provided attractive incentives to returning ‘Oralmans’ such as covering transportation expenses, housing, and a guaranteed job. Kazakhstan is still their home country, although they may actually come from East Turkestan.

Media preferences

I included the participants’ media preferences to obtain a deeper understanding of ethnic identity retention. Media preferences are an indicator of identity. The literature concerning immigrants and the media of indigenous and ethnic communities illustrates that there is a need to
study more about immigrants the media (Spoonley, 2004:4). The media preferences of participants reveal the attraction of Turkic media for them. Turkic media dominates Kazakh media. In addition, Russian media is dominant in Kazakhstan and has also had an impact on Kazakh media preferences. For a long time, broadcasting in Kazakh was not possible or less preferred during the period of Russian language domination. Fifty-four percent of participants did not watch Kazakh TV, while 11% preferred to watch between 1 and 2 hours a week. Six percent preferred Kazakh channels for 2 to 3 hours, 3% watched TV in Kazakh for 10 hours a week, and only 2% of participants watched Kazakh channels for 30 hours.

Fifty-eight percent of the participants enjoyed both Turkish and Kazakh music. In addition, Kazakh music was listened by 17%, and only 10% of the participants listened only to Turkish music. While the Korean wave--the rising influence of South Korea in sector of media, music and fashion-- was favored by 3% of the participants, 8% listened to Kazakh, Turkish, and English music. Some of the participants also emphasized their preferences for English, while only two participants added German to their preferences. Young participants also noted that they favored Korean music. As expected, 70% of the participants chose to read Turkish newspapers and listen to Turkish radio, although 4% stated as that they preferred Kazakh media. In addition, 25% of the participants preferred a mix of Turkish and Kazakh media.

Overall, the importance of being Kazakh and the Kazakhs’ relationship to their Turkic roots were emphasized during this survey. Participants placed strong importance on consumption of Turkic food, while feeling unhappy about not being fluent in Kazakh. An estimate of 91% of the participants agreed that Turkish and Kazakh are similar languages. Moreover, Kazakh meetings are important factors for Kazakhs, as they are seen as preserving culture, heritage, and
Kazakh values. The main difference between young and old generations is the degree they speak Kazakh.

After considering the external retention of Kazakh identity; participants showed a weak ethnic identity retention in case of food preferences, speaking Kazakh at home and media, although ethnic friendship, and participating ethnic gatherings with associations’ activities provided a high ethnic identity retention. I turn to the internal aspects of Kazakh identity in the next section. The four dimensions are affective, fiducial, cognitive, and moral aspects of internal retention. Participants answered five questions in this section of the survey.

Affective dimension

It can be assumed that Kazakhs feel comfortable when interacting with other Kazakhs. If a participant feels that he or she will be more comfortable with a Kazakh, it is sufficient to say there are affective feelings. The question of measuring the affective dimension was asked as “Do you feel comfortable with Kazakhs rather than other groups.” Sixty-seven percent of participants said they would feel more comfortable in a relationship with a Kazakh, while 23% stated that ethnicity would not make a difference.

Fiducial dimension

The fiducial dimension is closely related to the affective dimension. Kazakhs have greater trust in other Kazakhs. There is an old saying *there are no friends for Turks except other Turks* and Kazakhs believe that ethnic Kazakhness is usually sufficient for a friend but trust is another issue. Thus, 17% of the participants agreed to trust someone because he or she is Kazakh, while individual personality was more important for 80% of the participants.
Cognitive dimension

Kazakhs are happy with their traditions such as narratives, stories, and historical past. The habits of keeping their historical past alive are an indicator of retention of identity. In short, how Kazakhs link their past with their future. Grandparents and their offspring have close relationships. The “Shezhyre” tradition is also one of the main characteristics of being Kazakh. Eighty-three percent of participants agreed they pay attention to these kinds of cognitive components of identity. Participants were willing to visit their ancestral country. Listening to stories from grandparents is not the only element in the cognitive dimension. Having friends and travelling to historical sites are also important. As a result, travel to China and Kazakhstan is common among the participants; thirty-nine percent had a chance to go, while 62% did not.

In the case of having friends from their historical country, 64% of participants had friends in Kazakhstan while 35% did not. Twenty-seven percent of participants had friends in East Turkestan while 65% did not. Again, most of the participants had originally come from East Turkestan (69%), but as stated earlier, Kazakhstan seems to be the country of all Kazakhs.

Moral dimension

Last but not least, the moral dimension determines the degree of importance and the sense of obligation participants have toward the community. I looked at three elements: Kazakh language skills, history, and marrying according to Kazakh ethnicity. Because of the moral dimension, the important point is the ability of a person to care for their historical roots and have a determination to pass them to their children, while marrying according to ethnicity.

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30 A shezhre is a document -genealogical family tree- which shows horde information and seven generations of their ancestry.
31 For this study, the term intermarriage refers to marriages between Kazakhs and Turks or Kurds.
As noted earlier, 23% of participants are fluent in the Kazakh language. Twenty-eight percent are good at it, 35% are not good at it, and 15% had poor Kazakh language skills. On the other hand, 73% of the participants cited Turkish as their mother tongue, 10% of the participants stated it was Kazakh, and 7% mentioned both when asked this question.

Interruption is another measure for assessing the moral dimension. In the questionnaire, I asked: “Are you married?” If the participant answered “yes,” the next question was: “What is the ethnicity of your spouse?” If the participant was not married, the following question was asked: “Is getting married to a Turk a problem for you? (Could you describe why or why not?).” It was hard to examine the answers of these questions during the survey and in the data analysis. Sixty-nine percent of participants were willing to marry a Turk, while 29% preferred to marry a Kazakh. On the other hand, several participants discussed the implications of this question. For instance, one of the participants told me he was married to a Kazakh. He continued by asking: “Why are you asking about marriage with a Turk? Is my Kazakh wife not a Turk?”

In conclusion, several similarities and differences were observed. Internally, Kazakhs displayed a stronger retention community involvement through participation in both associations and social events and meetings. Then, Kazakhs internally felt and retained their ethnic identity thanks to knowledge acquisition. In short, Kazakhs in Turkey presented a strong retention of affective and cognitive features while weakly retaining moral and fiducial dimensions.

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32 Intermarriage is not only considered one of the most definitive measures of the dissolution of social and cultural barriers, but also integration of different races, because it is the result of close social interactions between people of two different races and ethnicities (Kalmijin & Flap, 2001:.)
Kazakh Identity and Demographic Characteristics

To understand Kazakh identity, the mean values of six dimensions of ethnic identity were identified. These included gender, age, and socio-economic status. Each of these three subjects was divided into subcategories. Female and male were categories for gender, and three groups, 15-29, 30-49, and 50-68 were subcategories for age. In order to examine socio-economic status, education level, type of occupation, landownership, and insurance information were looked at. Then, I analyzed whether retention of Kazakh ethnic identity could be observed in participants. The six prominent ethnic identity dimensions (Chiu, 2003:111) were used in order to measure in what extent of Kazakhs retained their ethnic identity. These six ethnic identity aspects were whether or not the participant spoke the Kazakh language, attended Kazakh functions, had Kazakh friends and strong ties with the Kazakh community, providing Kazakh food, and attending Kazakh meetings.

Kazakh identity according to gender

Table 8 shows the average score of the six dimensions. Kazakh males exhibited a score of 1.7 and Kazakh females a score of 1.8. Some measures were close in value: Kazakh meetings (1.0 for males and 1.1 for females) and ethnic friendship (1.4 for males and 1.5 females). On the other hand, the variation in each mean score among four dimensions was very small (the variation from 0.1 to 0.3 was common except in ethnic friendship, which was 0.9). These findings support the conclusion that there is no relationship between ethnic identity and gender.
Table 8: Ethnic Identity Means according to Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Identity dimension</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaking Kazakh Language at home</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attending Kazakh Meetings</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic friendship</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Sense of Attachment towards Kazakhs</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The knowledge about Kazakh History</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average (6 Dimension)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=93</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kazakh identity according to age

Table 9 presents that the likelihood of individuals acquired an ethnic identity with increasing age – argued by Phinney (1989) – was not the use for Kazakhs in Turkey. The average scores are close among the three age groups. Furthermore, younger participants (aged under 29 and 30-49) had a value of 1.7, very close to the oldest group in retaining of Kazakh identity. The oldest group (50-68) had a value of 1.8.

Table 9: Ethnic Identity Means according to three Age Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Identity dimension</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaking Kazakh Language at home</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attending Kazakh Meetings</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic friendship</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Sense of Attachment towards Kazakhs</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The knowledge about Kazakh History</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average (6 Dimension)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=93</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Kazakh identity according to socio-economic status

As can be seen in Table 10, each group had similar mean scores for education, 1.7 for non-university graduates and 1.8 for university graduates. The mean scores of attending Kazakh meetings and media are also close. The variations in the mean scores among three ethnic identity dimensions (attending Kazakh meetings, strong sense of attachment toward Kazakhs, and media preferences) were relatively small (a difference of 0.1-02). As a result, we could not reach a relationship between ethnic identity and education.

Table 10: Ethnic Identity Means according to Socio-Economic Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Identity Dimension</th>
<th>Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-University Graduates (Elementary and High School)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaking Kazakh at home</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attending Kazakh Meetings</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic friendship</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Sense of Attachment towards Kazakhs</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The knowledge about Kazakh History</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average (6 Dimension)</td>
<td><strong>1.7</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=93</td>
<td><strong>72</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By examining the Kazakhs in Turkey, what we found is this study bolstered previous studies in terms of gender and socio-economic status, while it did not support the previous studies for age.
CHAPTER 6

KAZAKH IDENTITY IN TURKEY AND THREE PROMINENT GLOBALIZATION APPROACHES

Since ethnic identity retention among participants present a half ethnic identity retention, defining new identity of participants requires a new points to examine. Therefore, self-identification is beneficial to place individual’ himself in an ethnicity.

Self-Ethnic Identification

The ethnic activities could help us to analyze ethnic identity as Breton et al (1990: 25) stressed. According to him, self-identification and using language are very important characteristics for ethnic identity. Since the sample showed that Kazakhs in Turkey have retained their ethnic identity in middle, we need to explore how they define themselves. In this chapter, the sample’ ethnic identification is discussed. We found that thirty-nine percent of participants in this study identified themselves by multiple/hybrid ethnic identities. Fifty-two percent of participants asserted a single identity: Kazakh (36%) or Turkish (16%).

The declaration of multiple responses was not surprising since there was ethnic proximity between Kazakhs and Turks historically and linguistically. As noted in Chapter 3, ethnicity is not a static and exclusive treat. It also depends on the assumption of belief in shared ancestry, common history, and self-identification.

In addition to self-ethnic identification, we examined the importance of self-identification with Turkey and being Kazakh. The findings were remarkable. Seventy-two percent of participants stated that being Turkish was “very important” when they define themselves, while 22% stated it to be “important.” Only 4% acquired average importance to it, and 1% said it was
“not important.” “Not only can dispersed ethnic communities possess intense feelings of place attachment for regions outside of the ‘ancestral homeland,’ but they may also display cultural practices and attitudes hybridized with those of their ‘host’ society” (Diener, 2013:465).

Figure 13: Self-identification with Turkey and being Kazakh

The answers and their respective percentages to the question of importance of self-identification with being Kazakh are as follows: “very important” for 66%, “important” for 27%, “average” for 4%, “does not matter” for 1%, and “not important” for 1%.

Seventy-three percent of participants stated Turkish was their mother tongue. Ten percent listed the Kazakh language, and 7% declared both Turkish and Kazakh language as their mother tongue.

To the question “do you feel assimilated?” Twenty-six percent of participants said “yes,” Sixty-nine percent said no. Moreover, the sample embraced a various identities: there were three types of responses. Five percent of participants did not state their thoughts. The question “to which ethnic group do you belong?” Sixteen percent of the sample answered “Turk,” 36% answered “Kazakh” and 39% answered “Kazakh Turk.”
Alternatively, 25% of the sample declared that culture and religion were the most important factors in nationality, 20% stated language and religion, 16% stated culture and language, 15% stated language and nation, 13% stated culture and nation, and 8% stated nation and religion.

Kazakh Ethnic Identity

Overall, 93% of the Kazakhs in Turkey attached importance to a Kazakh identity for several reasons. For example, one of the participants stated: “It was given by Allah, and
profoundly I am very happy with being Kazakh Turkish.” Considering the source of ethnic identity is religion can work for Kazakh community in Turkey. The question “what are the two important components of nationality?” Fifty-three percent of participants paid more attention the religion with other characteristics of ethnicity such as culture, language or race. For example, “culture and religion” was favored by 25%. “Language and religion” also were the second highest option for twenty percent of participants, and third was “nation and religion” eight percent. Kazakhs in Turkey presented a faithful side to Islam and stated religion as an important factor of identity. Furthermore, “How do you feel being in Turkey?” was the other question which sought to answer of self-identification of the participants and was replied:

P1: It is the country where one Muslim can live comfortably that is why I feel good to be here. Our view of life and ideologies are similar, maybe I feel it in this way because I was raised here. I am very happy.

P9: Praise be to God, I am here.

P2: I am very thankful to God, and fortunately, my parent came to Turkey. First, praise to God then to my parents.

P3: I am pleased because I am free to speak and pray in Turkey.

P4: I think that for benefits of our nation and our religion, Turkey is the best country.

P5: I am a Turk, because of I was raised in Turkey, although my homeland is Kazakhstan. I praise to God. I am pleased.

Participants emphasized the importance of religion and their happiness of being in Turkey within different emotions and feelings.

33 P represents participant.
The Kazakh identity is also supported by ethnic consciousness. Some of participants stated their plans for future when asked the question “what is your future citizenship and residency plan? Do you want to go back? What do you do for retention your ethnic identity”

Some of the responses are:

P 3: I will stay in Turkey, because Kazakhstan Kazakhs sees us as other type of Kazakhs, and their officials act as if we are different. In here, I am Kazakh so I will not go.

P 8: I pay more attention to cooking our own food.

P 6: I organized the weddings in the Kazakh traditional way.

P 4: By speaking Kazakh dialect and practicing religion frequently.

P 10: I am attending cultural trips, associations’ activities, language courses. I am willing to teach our culture to our Turkish daughter-in-law.

P 11: Speaking Kazakh dialect, and teaching culture to Kazakh child.

P12: There is no oppression, so I do not have any problems with preserving the values.

P 13: I try to save our traditional exercises a lot. I can play the Dombira.

The response to the question “what do you think about the relationship between Kazakhs and Turks” the participants: “we are the same,” “we have kinship,” “we have the same origins,” and “our ancestry is mutual” 42% of the time, while about 10% though that the culture is the same.

Many responses of participants supported that, on the whole, hybridization theory can explain the formation of Kazakh ethnic identity. Moreover, Kazakhs called Turkey their ‘fatherland.’ This idea will be explained in chapter 7. The participants created a new form of identity which stemmed from beliefs coming from the same ancestry, culture, and religion.
Kazakh Identity and Homogenization

The pieces of a universal culture and features of a newly created modern life can be traced among young generations of Kazakhs. Adolescents tend to be more open to innovations than their parents. The controversy between the view that adolescents are more global than their local families and the conservativeness of the first generation immigrants has attracted scholars (Zimmerman, 2006). It is fair to say that young generations embrace the practices of their host country. In doing so, they create a hybrid form, although the older generation preserves its distinct ethnic identity. The idea is that adolescents are a group “which is increasingly form multicultural identities they grow up knowing diverse cultural beliefs and behaviors” (Jensen, 2003). Phinney (2000) found the gap between adolescents and their parents among Armenian and Vietnamese immigrants, while Mexican immigrants’ ethnic identity retention did not vary between generations.

McDonaldisation is a form of homogenization that relies on spreading the values of fast-food restaurants that increasingly control not only the rest of the world, as well as America’s system (Pieterse, 1996). The most prominent form of homogenization is daily practices that are the products of Western values, ideas, or ideologies. Eating fast food at “McDonald’s has certainly become a ‘sign’ that, among other things, one is in tune with contemporary lifestyle” (Ritzer, 2004:12). Nine percent of participants stated their favorite food as hamburgers. Twelve percent of participants would like to watch and listen to Turkish, Kazakh, and English, although 3% provided that South Korean music and TV programs. Homogenization theory or Westernization does not fit Kazakh ethnic identity.
Kazakh identity and Polarization

Polarization, also called heterogenization and differentiation, relates focus in barriers that prevent flows that would influence cultures to become similar (Ritzer, 2010). The intensification of local cultures that are transnational makes those local cultures part of the globe. Heterogenization, as does homogenization, underestimates the fact that globalization is a process of flow of goods, ideas, and individuals. Robertson (2001) stresses that the increasing global flows do not mean the world becoming similar. The globalization process does not completely eradicate local cultures. In time, different cultural groups create separate heterogenous entities that are very different. Kazakhs in Turkey emphasize that they belong to a world which is dominantly Muslim and has Turkic roots. There are two reasons that make them happy in Turkey. First, Turkey is an Islamic country. Second, Turkey is an ethnically Turkic country. Data shows that kinship and religion were enough to ensure nationality. However, the effort to protect Kazakh culture, ethnicity, and traditions with the desire to preserve this heritage could support that there is, to some extent, a polarization among Kazakhs in Turkey.

Kazakhs belong to Islamic civilization and in the capitalist dominated world, they wish to keep their nationality, language, and religious. According to polarization, “Mc World” is harmful to local cultures until it raises “Jihad” as an awareness to protect local identity and belong to a particular group, whether national, ethnic, or religious (Barber B. R., 1995). This seems to apply to Kazakhs in Turkey as well. One of my participants told me why we should not try to be more Western by following the European Union. He said: “We need to stay together, as Kazakhs and Turks. The outside, the West, is against us. They will not let us breathe. You see how they do not like Turkey. We are barbarians for them, it will never change. So, we need to stay together.”
Kazakhs defined themselves as belonging to a broader cultural and ethnic entity, but this is not an indication that they are part of a civilizational conflict. Even if the homogenization and polarization perspectives are significant to a certain extent, they do not to answer how a hybrid Kazakh ethnic identity constructed and what is its scope of Kazakh and Turkish cultural elements on this identity.

**Kazakh Identity and Hybridization**

Hybridization is different but related to integration in which interdependence develops while antecedents remain the same (Dear & Burried, 2005). The Kazakhs of Turkey, created a new identity. When they encountered Turkish societal customs, they embraced the new culture and its traditions.

Pieterse’s approach considers hybridity as the cultural product of globalization. It is correct in some aspects. It fair to say that hybridity stems from globalization, and the help international migration is very crucial factor for hybridity. On the other hand, she considers hybridization in a global context insdead of in-between space. Bhabha explains that it is almost impossible to find some fixid identities. He considers hybridity as an “in-between” space. He also points out a “Third Space” where negotiation and recreation of identities takes place (Bhabha 1996; Bhabha 1994).

Cultural hybridization emphasizes that homogenization and polarization theories need to pay attention to both fragmentation and unification, simultaneously reinforcing a consciousness of cultural difference as well as common identity. In addition, intercultural relations and incorporation of diverse cultures must be considered in a more comprehensive approach, like hybridization. After two different cultures encounter, individuals first select particular elements,
practices, and values from the new culture. Then they replace or combine these with older cultural values and characteristics, leading to a new cultural experience. This is called hybridization.

On the other hand, some cultural norms could not always able to find a space in new cultural hybridization. Since hybridization focuses on how a new features could embrace new components with previous one, the some prominent features of cultural attributes can be found after the integration of new culture. Moreover, immigrants tend to crate new form and combine their identity and host country’s identity as hybridization.

Cultural globalization, or hybridization, means the blurred relationships among cultures. The cross-cultural relations between different cultures when they interact and select particular points from each other, and then reinterpret the new particular side which is a product of both different cultures (Cohen, 2007:2). In respect to this, multiple directions of cultural flows are the main characteristic side of universal culture. Cultural convergence cannot be reduced as Western and American values.

**Cultural globalization as hybridization and Kazakhs in Turkey**

Historically, it is difficult explain Kazakh culture regarding territorial bonds using Kazakhs living in Turkey as subjects. Since immigrants have a deterritorialized position, they struggle to construct their cultural heritage. This makes Kazakhs retain softer cultural characteristics such as traditional stories, and traditional narratives. One example is the construct of ‘shezhyres’ – family threes in the Kazakh language, which include seven generations of family member and allow Kazakhs to keep track of relatives in order to obtain permission to marriage. In the Kazakh culture, must provide a ‘shezhyre’ in order to prove that you do not have
a kinship relationship with the person you want to marry. Kazakhs are allowed to marry people only outside their clan, which includes seven generations of their family. This is an important tradition for Kazakhs in Turkey. Another example would be Kazakh tea, which is an important part of being Kazakh in Turkey. Kazakh tea is served with hot milk and black pepper – without any sugar. Kazakhs give historical and emotional meaning to it.

We gain new understanding of hybridization by examining the Kazakhs in Turkey. As rational creature, individuals balance the ascription of ethnic identity and social situations. The sample also fits rational-choice theory. They give legitimacy to their actions by emphasizing their Turkic values in both culture and ancestry. Their willingness to emphasize Turkic roots could be an assurance that different hybridization processes are going on. Forty-six participants stated that Turks and Kazakhs are ethnically the same, while 6 participants stated that they are brother countries. Territorial relations require special attention because participants referred to Turkey as their ‘fatherland’ while calling Xinjiang an Autonomous Region, and Kazakhstan their ‘motherland.’

The linguistic features and eating habits of Kazakhs suggest how hybrid identity is constructed through creolization of popular culture. Thirty-four percent of participants stated their favorite dishes were included Turkish cuisine (Turkish Dumplings 12 %, Imambayildi 7 %, Baklava 8%, Cigkofte 5 %, and Turkish tea 2 %), while traditional Kazakh foods were favored by 24% (Kazakh Dumplings 17%, Kazakh tea 7 %).

Religion is also a characteristic feature of Kazakhs in Turkey. Their views make them more at home in Turkey. Thus it is very understandable that their immigration was triggered by the religionist limitations of the Manchu Dynasty. Religion by itself was not the only
determining factor that led them to migrate to Turkey. Thus, they did choose to stay in Pakistan where Islam is the predominant religion. However, the effects are not negligible and have had an impact the Kazakhs’ hybridization with Turks in Turkey.

**Furniture and the new “Fatherland” as an example of hybrid forms**

As Cancline (2003: 279) states, since 1980s, the term ‘hybridity’ stresses a new kind of creation which embraces features from someone’ past while it is also consisting of new implications which could be similar with previous form. It is fair to say that humans, architecture and furniture are subject for globalization. The tension between anti-global and pro-global forces effects architectural globalization (Eldemery, 2009). While opponent of globalization forces try to safeguard and cooperate with indigenous architectural traditions, forms, and decorative motives, pro-globalization forces encourage innovative tools, technologies, and new fashions. Globalization is often seen as homogenization. Because hybridization is emphasized, it can also be considered as heterogeneity. The furniture preference of Kazakhs exhibits a hybridized form. Seventy-five percent of participants placed both Turkish-style sofas and traditional ground sofas in the same room – a very visible hybrid form of globalization. Nine percent of participants only owned Turkish sofas, while 16% owned Kazakh ground sofas.
On the other hand, both individual and group experience can obtain new meaning (Isajiw 1993); new visible ethnic patterns, new collected experiences, especially in the case of creating a new meaning for the community. This process involves reconstruction of ethnic identity (Isajiw 1993:16). Therefore, labelling the new county as their fatherland, the participants created a new kind of legitimacy for their migration. By giving it a new meaning, fatherland, the participants reinterpreted their position in society while ethnic identity was still developing. Eighty-seven percent of the sample answered the question “how do you define Turkey?” by saying that they viewed it as their fatherland. Below this question, three multiple choice answers were provided: “host country,” “homeland,” and “please write.” While 87% of the participants wrote fatherland, 10% preferred to call Turkey as their homeland.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

Turkey is a country with paths to other places for immigrants, where major migrations have taken place during the last 150 years. Kazakhs, representing a very small group have rarely been included in field studies. Such studies have been largely conducted by non-Turkish foreigners who consider Kazakhs as refugees in Turkey. Turkish researchers, on the other hand, have preferred to study their entrepreneurship and economic efforts. In the current study, Kazakhs’ distinctive ethnic status was investigated. Indeed, my Kazakh friends’ opinion of being Turkish helped me research the issue and my curiosity about the Turkic world played a role in my selection of the issue. The empirical findings about ethnic identity formation of Kazakhs in Turkey ensured to understand hybrid identity formation. The following section briefly describes the study.

The three prominent approaches the homogenization, polarization and hybridization perspectives, and their explanatory power on Kazakh ethnic identity in Turkey was examined. The sample of 93 Kazakhs were chosen based on snowball-sampling. Empirical data were collected through questionnaire which on average took twenty minutes. Multiple-choice questions were asked, and several open-ended questions were also asked. Having open-ended question provided some qualitative data on ethnic identity. Participants’ profile characteristics, ethnic identity retention, and self-identification were also explored.

In short, even though Kazakhs living in Turkey lack proper education, the new generation is very involved in acquiring education. Most of the participants were born in Turkey, while some was born in Kazakhstan, China or Pakistan. Their exodus occurred in the 1950s. The key
factor in coming to Turkey was the ethnicity of the Turks. Believing in shared ancestry among Kazakhs and Turks made their final destination preferences favor Turkey.

Kazakh ethnic identity was retained by attending Kazakh associations’ functions, spending time trying to find about Kazakhs’ past, and speaking the Kazakh language at home. Although Kazakhs give special importance to their culture, food preferences, media, ethnic friendship preferences among participants suggests there is less Kazakh ethnic identity retention. The most common ethnic identity retention involved attending Kazakh meetings. Ethnic-marriage, however, was the most un-important factor for 69 per cent of the sample. Surprisingly, generation differentiation did not appear.

**Kazakh Identity and Turkey**

The notion of a “transnational network of immigrant communities” was coined by Lusia Veronis (2006) to conceptualize a group that cuts across multiple-borders but that is situated within one particular locale. She explains that this concept, “undercores the multiple layers of transnational experiences, practices, and identities that compose this group” (pg.18). Society is a homogenous community and consists of a variety of subgroups. Some are formed along national lines, while others are based on common interests regardless of nationality such as refugees, women, youth, and seniors (Veronis, 2006:19). The cross-border relations among these subgroups help us to understand the structure of the Kazakh community in Turkey and how its identity is constructed. We need to pay more attention is to influence of hosty county on identity formation, Kazakhs’ self-identification involves three different identities. These three sided relations: the Kazakh self-identification for sub-group identity, religionist identity and a hybrid
identity can be found. The boundaries has changed by moving a different country which influence these three sided ethnic identity.

Kazakh identity in Turkey can be explained by hybridization theory. In short, Kazakhs attached a new kind of hybrid identity with more emphasis on Turkic roots. The Kazakhs in Turkey reconstructed their ethnic identity which is not a product of assimilated fragile identity through globalization trends, but it is a new form of a living cultural and ethnic identity which carries its own values, preferences and historical treasures from its past but acquires new traits from its Turkic identity at the same time. Kazakhs obtained a comprehensive identity which can be explained by hybrid identity construction; ethnic identity retention and self-identification as Turkish-Kazakh.

The hyphenated furniture concept could be seen in every Kazakh living room. Most of the sample combined the Turkish style sofa with Kazakh ground sofa in the same room, showing how individuals construct a new kind of form by combining one’s own historical features with a host culture’s life style. One less visible evidence was also found among participants--fatherland. This hybrid idea occurred with rational choice theory which argues that individuals recreate their identities according to their benefits. We can also present the fatherland notion with one participants’ own world “We came to our fatherland after you, Turk, came. Our differences are just 1300 years, you came earlier that’s all. Here is our fatherland.”

**Direction for Further Research**

This study’s research about one of the Turkic groups will help me to research more about ethnic identity formation among other Turkic groups. For further research, the Kirgiz group that migrated to Turkey in the 1950s merits study, especially the ethnic identity formation of the
Kirgiz group. A research in particular in the city of Van where many Kirgiz group are located and the issues Kirgiz experienced with Kurdish citizens in the city may provide different findings. In addition, new insights information may be gained in studying ethnic Kirgiz in Istanbul.
REFERENCES


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APPENDIX A- INFORMED CONSENT FROM

You are invited to participate in a research study titled “The Kazakhs in Turkey”. This study is being conducted by Aslihan Yeniceri, for master thesis at Iowa State University to investigate the Kazakh immigration integration process in Turkey.

Participation in this study is entirely voluntary at all time. You can choose not to participate at all or to leave the study at any time. Regardless of your decision, there will be no effect on your relationship with the researcher or any other consequences.

You are being asked to take in this study because you are Kazakh who are living in Turkey as a home country.

If you are agreeing to participate, you will be asked to take a survey which consists of questions and gaps for your answers. You will try to write your answers. This survey should last around one hour.

What you write during this survey will remain anonymous and cannot be linked to you in any way. No identifying information about you will be collected at any point during the study. Once your survey is over, there will be no way to withdraw your response from the study because the survey will contain no identifying information.

Study data will be kept in paper format in the researcher’s locked bag. Access to the paper data will be protected the investigator. Only the investigator will have access to the data.

There are no risks associated with this study. If you are agree to participate, you will not receive a gift.

If you have any questions regarding to the survey or this research project in general, please contact the principal investigator, Aslihan Yeniceri, at 515-817-3947 or via e-mail at yeniceri@iastate.edu. If you have any question about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Iowa State University IRB at IRB@iastate.edu

By taking part in this survey, you are indicating your consent to participate in this study.

Aslihan Yeniceri
Master student in Political Science
Iowa State University
yeniceri@iastate.edu
APPENDIX B-KAZAKH IMMIGRANT BACKGROUND QUESTIONNAIRE

Before the survey, please fill out the following background information:

1. Age: _________

2. Gender: Female ☐ Male ☐

3. Marital Status: Single ☐ Married ☐

4. Mother Tongue: _________________

5. Which languages
   Kazakh ☐
   Turkish ☐
   Russian ☐
   Arabic ☐
   Chinese ☐
   English ☐

6. Which degree did you complete?
   Elementary School ☐ High School ☐ Bachelor Degree ☐
   Master Degree ☐ PhD ☐

7. At what age did you begin studying Turkish?_____

8. How long have you been in Turkey?_____

9. Where were you born?_____________

10. Have you ever visited a Turkish-speaking country except Turkey?
    Yes ☐
    No ☐
    If so, what was your trip’s aim?

11. Where was your country, before Turkey?
    Kazakhstan ☐
    East Turkestan ☐
    Other (please write) _________________

Thank you!

Now, please turn over and start the survey.

(This 11 questions was prepared to get background information about participants, and survey questions are above)

Survey Questionnaires
1) Are you working/ studying?
   Student  [ ]
   Employee  [ ]
   Retired  [ ]

If employee, in what sector do you work/ if retired, in what sector did you work? (Please, chose)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Sector</th>
<th>Private Sector</th>
<th>Self-employment</th>
<th>Non-for-profit organization</th>
<th>Domestic or Homecare</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) Did you have problems finding a job?
   Yes  [ ]
   No  [ ]

If so, what problems have you encountered when looking for work?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Qualification</th>
<th>Discrimination</th>
<th>No legal job</th>
<th>Limited right to work</th>
<th>Sickness</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3) How many years have you worked?
   ____

4) How much money do you earn monthly?
   □ 0- 320tl  □ 320-846tl  □ 846-1500tl  □ 1500-2500tl
   □ 2500- Above

5) In your opinion, does your current job match with your skills and training?
   Yes  [ ]
   No  [ ]
6) Do you have a pension/retirement plans?
   SSK
   BAGKUR
   Individual retirement plan
   I don’t have
   Other (please write) ______________________________

7) Do you have special insurance?
   House
   Earthquake
   Automobile
   Other (please write) ______________________________

8) Are you staying your own house?
   Yes
   No, rent

9) How many rooms are there in your house?
   __________

10) If you are a tenant, how much money is your rent?
    __________

11) What is your house location?
    Central
    Rural

12) In your house, in the living rooms which furniture you have?
    Kazakh ground traditional sofa group
    Turkish style sofa group
    Both in the same room

13) Do you have a T.C citizenship?
    Yes
    No
14) Did you have a problem learning Turkish?

Yes  

No

If your answer is yes, what were the major problems learning Turkish? (please mark)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motivation</th>
<th>Time to study</th>
<th>Information</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

15) In your opinion, are Turkish and Kazakh languages close language linguistically?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very close</th>
<th>Close</th>
<th>Different</th>
<th>Very different</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

16)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How well do you speak Turkish?</th>
<th>Very Good</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>Very poor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How well do you speak Kazakh language?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How well do you speak Russian?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How well do you speak Chinese?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How well do you speak Arabic?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How well do you know Turkey and Turkish History?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How well do you know Kazak History</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
16) How do you often engage in Kazakhs Associations’ meetings (toys, weddings, picnics, concerts, etc.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How frequently do you speak Kazakh language at home?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>No matter</th>
<th>Not important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17) Are you married?

Yes [ ] , what is ethnicity of your spouse?________________________

No [ ]

If no, Is getting married to a Turk problem for you? (Could you describe why?)

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
18) Do you vote for Turkish elections?
   Yes, in every elections
   Yes, sometimes
   I don’t prefer to vote

19) Do Kazakh immigrants have adequate political rights in Turkey?
   Yes
   No

20) In your opinion, could a Kazak be elected?
   Yes
   No

21) In your opinion, is a Kazakh in Turkey elected as a following?
   Member of Parliament
   Mayor
   Local representative
   None

22) Do you think you are able to equally access to rights of the institution of welfare state?
   Health
   Education
   Religionist Services
   Housing
   Employment
   Freedom of religion
   Political decision making
   Social rights
   Sport

23) Is there anything you have to abandon because of your immigration?
   Cultural values
   Religion Rituals
   Dress code
   Food preferences
   None
   Do you think Turkish government’s policies have an impact on that?
24) Where your food is came from?
- Turkey
- Kazakhstan
- China/East Turkestan
- Russia
- Germany
- Other (please write) ___________________________

25) Could you rank the foods from your favorite?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Food</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Manti (Turkiskish Dumplings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Kazak Mantisi (Kazakh Dumplings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Ozbek Mantisi (Uzbek Dumplings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Makrube</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Imambayildi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Baklava</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Cigkofte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Beshbarmak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Hamburger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Toy pilavi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Turkish tea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Turkish coffee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Kazakh tea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Ice tea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26) What are the ethnic origins of your closest friends?
1. :_____________________
2. :_____________________
3. :_____________________

27) Do you have close Turkish friend?
- Yes
- No

28) Do you have close friends who live in Kazakhstan?
- Yes
- No
29) Do you have close friends who live in China/East Turkestan?
   Yes [ ]
   No [ ]

30) Do you feel a stronger attachment towards Kazakhs than other ethnic groups?
   Yes [ ]
   No [ ]
   Character [ ]

31) Do you feel more comfortable among Kazakhs than other ethnic groups?
   Strongly disagree [ ]
   Somewhat disagree [ ]
   Somewhat agree [ ]
   Strongly agree [ ]

32) In your opinion, in what extent some traditions such as narratives, grandma stories and Shezhyre have importance?
   Important [ ]
   Average [ ]
   Not Important [ ]

33) How do you protect you ethnic identity?
   ___________________________________________________________
   ___________________________________________________________
   ___________________________________________________________
   ___________________________________________________________
   ___________________________________________________________

30) Do you feel ethnically assimilated?
   Yes [ ]
   No [ ]
31) Do you define yourself as a Kazakh or Turk?

32) Do you feel there are anti-immigrant attitudes in Turkey?
   Yes  □
   No   □
   If so, please could you describe it?
   ___________________________________________________________
   ___________________________________________________________
   ___________________________________________________________
   ___________________________________________________________

33) How many hours in a week do you watch television in Turkish? __________

34) How many hours in a week do you watch television in Kazakh? __________

35) For newspaper, magazine and radio which languages do you prefer?
   Turkish □
   Kazakh □

36) In your opinion, do Turkish media cover Kazakhs’ way?
   Yes □
   No  □

37) What is your preferred music?
   Kazakh music □
   Turkish music □
   Other (please write) ________________________________

38) How do you feel about being in Turkey?
   ___________________________________________________________
   ___________________________________________________________
   ___________________________________________________________
   ___________________________________________________________
   ___________________________________________________________
39) How do you define Turkey?
   Homeland   ☐
   Host country ☐
   Other (please write) ________________

40) In your opinion, which of the following are the two most important elements that go to make up a national identity?
(Chose 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Religion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

41) In your opinion, what do you think about the most important features of Turkness, (What makes someone Turks?), please number them according to importance degree from 1 to 10 (Write 1 for the most important, 10 to less important feature).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To feel as a Turk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To born in Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To share Turkic culture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To master in both Turkish and other Turkic languages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To exercise citizens’ rights in Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To immigrate to Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To have at least one nationality parents (One Turkish father or mother)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be Muslim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To know Turkish history</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To know OGUZ KAGAN (the oldest Turkic khan)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To distinguish the general Turkic notion (is being Turkic related to be Turkey Turk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Please write)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
42) In your opinion, what is relationship between being a Kazakh and being a Turk?
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
43) What is your future citizenship and residency plan? (Do you want to go back?)
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
44) In your opinion, is the Turkic Union possible? (Could you define your ideas)
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
If so, what could be the role of Turkey’s role in this union?
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
45) Do you think, are there irritating questions in this survey?
____________________________________________________________
Thank you for your attendance.