The "new" enthymeme and the Toulmin model of argumentation: a comparison with pedagogical implications

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The "new" enthymeme and the Toulmin model of argumentation:
A comparison with pedagogical implications

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A Thesis Submitted to the
Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS

Department: English
Major: English (Rhetoric and Composition)

Signatures have been redacted for privacy

Iowa State University
Ames, Iowa
1993
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INTRODUCTION

Linda Flower, in "Cognition, Context, and Theory Building," calls for a better approach to communication than what is currently being taught in the composition classroom:

We need, I believe, a far more integrated theoretical vision which can explain how context cues cognition, which in its turn mediates and interprets the particular world that context provides. We might build such a vision by using what we have learned from arguments which problematize or reify this conflict but by also taking a step beyond them.

(282)

This "conflict" between context and cognition—between the shifting variables of rhetorical situations and the set ways in which people reason and think—is perhaps at the very core of our inability as rhetoricians and teachers to devise a more standardized curriculum for the basic freshman rhetoric/composition course. Twenty freshman rhetoric teachers in the same department are likely to design twenty significantly different syllabi; and, while I do not wish to eliminate diversity and professorial license—in fact, such flexibility is one of our greatest assets—I must question the very existence of the discipline of rhetorical writing pedagogy without at least a modicum of curricular standards. As it stands now, freshman rhetoric is being taught with a wide range of emphases: from formal logic to sophistry to Aristotelian philosophy to an emphasis on style to modern rhetorical theories and so forth. Clearly, there must be some way to firm up the nebulous nature of most composition courses.

One approach that has proven to be popular in recent decades is a return to a more classical pedagogy. It is often said that such figures as Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates, and Cicero established all that
we need to know about rhetoric, and that Quintilian set down all that we need to know about teaching it. E.P.J. Corbett seems to be at the front of this school of thought; his *Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student* (now in its third edition) has been one of the most popular freshman rhetoric texts since 1965. However, the classical approach has its drawbacks. For one, very few composition teachers have the classical background necessary to use Corbett's text, much less teach a classical composition course. For another, the rhetoric of Aristotle--by far the most influential of the classical approaches--is too obscure for effective teaching. Scholars have been arguing over Aristotle's rhetorical terms, rhetorical devices, and rhetorical philosophy for two thousand years now. Aristotle himself seems fundamentally confused in certain sections of his *Rhetoric*, and he does not provide clear instructions for those who would use his treatise as a kind of rhetoric textbook.

In his essay, "Enthymemes, Examples, and Rhetorical Method," James C. Raymond suggests that the absence of a consensus among scholars about the meanings of rhetorical terms accounts for the lack of attention given to classical rhetoric in the modern composition classroom (150). Currently, rhetoricians are waging a critical war in the scholarly journals over one of these terms: the enthymeme of Aristotle. Long dismissed as merely an abbreviated syllogism, the enthymeme has been revived in recent years by a series of rhetorical scholars who are redefining the term in light of Aristotle's overall rhetoric. But we still have not arrived at a canonical definition of the term within the discipline of rhetoric; as a result, the enthymeme
is still missing from composition textbooks, and teachers and students alike are missing out on its great potential to enhance the freshman rhetoric writing course.

Another popular approach is the movement toward modern rhetorical theorists, such as Kenneth Burke, I.A. Richards, Chaim Perelman, and Stephen Toulmin. In combining basic, classical rhetorical concepts with recent advances in semantics, cognitive psychology, and behavioral sciences, many composition teachers see this modern school as more applicable and relevant to the needs of today's students. I have been featuring Toulmin's rhetoric in my curriculum, but the big problem facing Toulmin as well as the others is that it is not yet clear how these modern theorists fit into the rhetorical tradition. For example, Toulmin is a philosopher, not a rhetorician; and his ideas about rhetoric were only formulated to answer philosophical problems.

As with Aristotle's enthymeme, the rhetoric of Stephen Toulmin, especially his model of argumentation, is also conspicuously missing from many composition textbooks, and most writing teachers seem unaware of his ideas as well. As with the enthymeme, some critics have dismissed his model as a syllogism turned on its side, and a host of others have failed to see the potential of his rhetoric for a variety of reasons. As a composition teacher at Iowa State University, I have been using the Toulmin model in my classroom with substantial success. Many of my colleagues have asked me to present a guest lecture to their students on the nuts and bolts of the Toulmin model, but still the model has not gained wide acceptance from most rhetoricians and composition teachers--here or most anywhere else.
With these problems in mind, this thesis will attempt to achieve three main objectives:

1) To characterize (not define) the enthymeme according to its characteristic, not necessary, features. Based on the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle, recent published research on the enthymeme, and my own ideas on the matter, I will attempt to end the gridlock that has kept the enthymeme in obscurity by devising a conception of the term that addresses its wide range of features and is broad enough to remain consistent with its persuasive function.

2) To place Stephen Toulmin within the rhetorical tradition by demonstrating that his "rhetoric" is actually an update of Aristotle and by establishing his model as a reconceptualization of, and modern expansion on, Aristotle's enthymeme. By using Toulmin's primary writings, critical articles by rhetoricians and, again, my own ideas, I will attempt to show how this new conception of the enthymeme unlocks the positive potential of the Toulmin model.

3) To present the wide range of pedagogical options and benefits that result from these new ways of looking at Aristotle's enthymeme and Toulmin's model. By calling on pedagogy scholars and my own store of teaching experience, I will attempt to show that the enthymeme and the Toulmin model, taken together, can be combined into a major theoretical component for the contemporary rhetoric-based composition classroom, thus providing that "integrated theoretical vision" which today's composition courses so desperately need.
To achieve the first objective, I will attempt to explain why the enthymeme has been so difficult to define, show how it fits into the overall rhetoric of Aristotle, and arrive at a broad and multiplex understanding of the term. I will look at the form versus function dilemma by examining the differences between the enthymeme and the syllogism. Then I will examine the relationship between the "deductive enthymeme" and the "inductive example." Next, I will look at the sources of enthymemes by turning to a discussion of the topics and the contingencies of context. Finally, I will investigate the role played by the audience in a discussion of the speaker-audience "dialectic" and how the artistic appeals of the pisteis grow out of this conversation.

To achieve my second goal of showing how Toulmin's model of argumentation is enthymemic in nature, I will take a brief look at Stephen Toulmin's philosophical and epistemological ideas and a more detailed look at his "informal logic," all of which is prerequisite to an understanding of the model itself. Then I will detail Toulmin's method for the social justification of claims, an approach that finds its basis in social constructionism. Next, I will turn to Toulmin's "argument fields," which attempt to describe how contextual variations change the process of claims justification. Finally, as with the previous chapter, I will explore the role of the audience and demonstrate that Toulmin's is an audience-sensitive rhetoric, one which can incorporate all three types of artistic appeals.

The final chapter will attempt to relate some of the many potential options and benefits the enthymeme and the Toulmin model can
provide the composition classroom. I will look at the enthymeme and Toulmin's model as a unified theoretical component which can serve as an evaluative framework, as an invention heuristic, as an organizational device, and as a diagnostic tool. I will then turn to the current rhetoric-based, composition textbooks to see how text writers are presenting the enthymeme and the Toulmin model to their student readers. And lastly, I will offer some of my own suggestions for using the enthymeme and the Toulmin model in the classroom; most of these suggestions were devised and tested by the trial-and-error of my own teaching experiences.
I. ARISTOTLE AND THE "NEW" ENTHYMEME

Before we examine the enthymeme as it is understood by Aristotle and presented in his *Rhetoric*, it may be useful to begin with the ultimate goal of the entire treatise. William M.A. Grimaldi suggests that that goal is "...an analysis of the nature of human discourse in all areas of knowledge" (1). Rhetoric, then, would encompass the communicative aspects of medicine, ethics, politics, science, and all other fields of inquiry while also existing as a distinct discipline in itself. However, it is the "nature of human discourse" that distinguishes Aristotle, for he would say (as Grimaldi does) that that nature incorporates the whole person. That is, Aristotle is primarily concerned with establishing an inseparable connection between the rational and affective components of human communication. If we accept that this relationship is at the heart of Aristotelian rhetoric, then the enthymeme—as the main instrument of rhetorical argument—comes to occupy a central role since it incorporates the interplay of reason and emotion in persuasive discourse (Grimaldi 16).

But is the enthymeme actually the main instrument of rhetorical argument? Aristotle himself says so in the *Rhetoric*: "Everyone who effects persuasion through proof does in fact use either enthymemes or examples: there is no other way" (1356b, Roberts translation). This quote acknowledges that there are two, and only two, forms of rhetorical proof. "Persuasion is clearly a sort of demonstration....The orator's demonstration is an enthymeme, and this is, in general, the most effective of the modes of persuasion" (1355a). Not only does this passage indicate that the enthymeme is more effective than the only
alternative form of proof (the example), it carries within it the logically-derived conclusion that the enthymeme is persuasion. Of course, I do not mean to prove the centrality of the enthymeme by means of such a loose syllogism; I only wish to make clear a relationship that pervades Aristotle's rhetoric: a relationship between the enthymeme and Aristotle's entire rhetorical system.

Not only is the place of the enthymeme set down by Aristotle himself, most rhetorical scholars also agree on the singular importance of the enthymeme to Aristotle's rhetoric. That the enthymeme is the basic unit of all persuasive discourse is, however, about the only thing that these same scholars agree upon. Ironically, twenty-five centuries after Aristotle, a canonical definition of the enthymeme has yet to be established despite the efforts of philosophers, logicians, and rhetoricians. The question is: Why not? Or: What, specifically, about the enthymeme is so elusive?

Perhaps the primary reason why the mystery of the enthymeme is still unsolved lies in the fact that Aristotle himself does not define the enthymeme in the Rhetoric in such a way that his understanding of it is made clear. Given that the enthymeme is so central to Aristotle's overall rhetoric, this omission is both surprising and perplexing; but, depending on one's perspective, this "mistake" could be construed as either a tragedy or a happy accident. On the one hand, we may never know with absolute certainty what Aristotle intended the enthymeme to mean; but, on the other, this ambiguity has led scholars to think about the term in new and interesting ways, and their findings may be more valuable to us than even Aristotle's intentions.
A second reason to explain why the enthymeme remains somewhat ambiguous is the fact that scholarly inquiry about the enthymeme is relatively recent. The enthymeme was essentially a dead and forgotten issue over the past two millennia because it was dismissed as merely a form of the syllogism. In his Rhetoric, Aristotle refers to the enthymeme as a "rhetorical syllogism" (1356b); rhetoricians, it seems, were content to call it a syllogism without investigating the implications of the adjective "rhetorical." This enthymeme-as-syllogism concept remained unchallenged for centuries until Lane Cooper, while working on his translation of the Rhetoric in 1932, noticed that not all of Aristotle's enthymemes were syllogisms with one of the three premises suppressed or omitted. In the field of logic, however, the enthymeme is still considered a form of the syllogism.

Cooper's discovery points to a third explanation for our difficulties with the enthymeme: critical interpretations of Aristotle are most often based on translations of the original Greek text. Languages, of course, do not translate without shifts in meaning, and some meanings do not translate at all. This may help explain how Nancy Harper, in examining the original Greek texts of the Rhetoric and the Prior Analytics, inductively identified ten different definitions of the enthymeme used by Aristotle (304). While some dismiss Harper's findings on the grounds that the enthymeme can only be defined deductively and then applied a priori (Poster), Harper's work does illustrate W.D. Ross's conclusion that a "completely consistent theory of [the enthymeme's] nature" cannot be drawn from the passages in which Aristotle discusses enthymemes (Ross 499). Ryan adds his voice to this choir.
when he notes that, when translated, Aristotle's examples of enthymemes do not fit our current theories about its nature; he argues that we should mold our theories to fit his examples, not vice-versa (19).

The final possible reason that I will offer here to explain our inability to define the enthymeme is the fact that there are exceptions and inconsistencies inherent in every potentially defining characteristic of the enthymeme. Controversies rage over such debates as form versus function, induction versus deduction, contingency versus absolutism, logic versus affect, and others. I will investigate some of these debates only inasmuch as they serve my ultimate purposes here, but the point may still be made that these conflicts over translations and interpretations have helped to obscure the importance of the enthymeme. One of my tasks here is to investigate these conflicts in such a way as to reveal the significance of what I take to be a very important rhetorical concept.

While examining these critical controversies about the enthymeme, I will be heeding the advice of three other scholars. Carol Poster, in arguing for the need for an etymology of the enthymeme, suggests that "The model of the enthymeme as a term possessed of a unique paraphrasable meaning irrespective of context is not only problematic in light of a general notion of how natural language functions, but also depends on an oversimplification of its history" (8). Hence, I will acknowledge that the enthymeme may not have a meaning that is fixed and outside language. This endeavor will attempt to arrive at a multidimensional and flexible understanding of the enthymeme--an understanding that, according to Wayne N. Thompson, gives the enthymeme
a broad definition consistent with its practical persuasive function. Thompson, in fact, argues that we do not need a definitive conception of the enthymeme, the search for which has only resulted in scholarly failure (76). Finally, I will attempt to arrive at a workable consensus about the enthymeme, the absence of which James C. Raymond cites as one of the reasons why classical rhetoric has been neglected in today's writing classroom. We cannot possibly have clarity in our textbooks as long as confusion and disagreement reign in the scholarly journals (Raymond 150).

The Enthymeme and the Syllogism: Form Versus Function

When Aristotle calls the enthymeme a "rhetorical syllogism" in the *Rhetoric*, he does not clarify whether he meant to base the connection on a formal or functional level. Until recently, the enthymeme had been commonly defined only by its formal difference from the syllogism, and textbook writers were content to describe the enthymeme as a syllogism with one of its premises suppressed. By so defining the enthymeme as merely another form of the syllogism, it is easy to see how the importance of the former could be obscured and neglected. One of my goals here is to recast the enthymeme as a second form of deductive reasoning apart from the syllogism, so that the enthymeme may have a life of its own, outside logic, in the field of rhetoric.

A syllogism is a formal logical construction that illustrates deductive reasoning. That is, it joins two known propositions (called "premises") to arrive at a conclusion containing "new" knowledge (although scholars disagree about the epistemological implications of
deductive reasoning). Here, for instance, is Aristotle's famous example of a syllogism:

Premise 1: All men are mortal.
Premise 2: Socrates is a man.
Conclusion: Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

If we recast this reasoning into an enthymemic form, the result is:

"Since Socrates is a man, he must also be mortal."

In the enthymeme, the general principle expressed in the first premise of the syllogism is left unstated.

We can be satisfied with the idea that the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism if we do not ask why one of the premises of a syllogism might be suppressed in the enthymeme. But I believe that the answer to that question is critical in proving that the enthymeme deserves a place of its own in rhetorical theory.

The answer is to be found in the way that humans naturally reason; that is, we do not usually argue with one another or write persuasive discourse with syllogisms; instead, we use enthymemes. Our minds may reason syllogistically on some level that we may not be aware of, but the expression of that reasoning is a natural act. As John Mackin so curtly put it, "no one, with the exception possibly of a logician, consciously does any suppressing of anything whatsoever when engaged in deducing conclusions" (122). Even on those rare occasions when we are aware of the syllogisms in our heads, we leave out the obvious premises so that we do not risk insulting the intelligence of our audience. Thus, we drop a premise in an enthymeme for practical reasons to serve our persuasive ends, not to conform to some restricting formal structure.
If the connection between the syllogism and the enthymeme is a formal one, and if all syllogisms can be expressed as enthymemes, it would logically follow that all enthymemes could be expressed in syllogistic structures. However, this is not the case. Many enthymemes can be restated as syllogisms, but many others cannot. For example, suppose I say to a friend: "Take your umbrella with you because the weatherman forecasted rain for later in the day." I base this enthymeme on the unexpressed premise that my friend and I agree that the weatherman in question is a reliable forecaster of the weather. No one is arguing whether it will or will not in fact rain later in the day; I am merely using a practical enthymeme for a persuasive end—which is to convince my friend to take an umbrella with him. The inferential process may be formally deficient, but the enthymeme is materially valid. Consequently, I believe that meaning should be the test of an argument's validity, not its form of external expression.

James McBurney and Lloyd Bitzer seem to agree that external form is not the defining quality distinguishing enthymemes from syllogisms. McBurney argues that enthymemes usually lack one or more of the propositions of a syllogism, but this is not a necessary condition of the enthymeme. In fact, he suggests that a three-part syllogism drawn from probable causes and signs (rather than necessary ones) is an enthymeme regardless of whether or not a premise is omitted (67). For Bitzer, the critical distinction between the syllogism and the enthymeme is based on how their premises are secured and what their goals are. Dialectical syllogisms are those in which premises are asked for in order to achieve criticism; enthymemes are rhetorical syllogisms in
which the premises are assumed by the rhetor in order to achieve persuasion (405). Though these two scholars draw different distinctions between the syllogism and the enthymeme, both would be likely to agree with my belief that defining these terms strictly by their forms would be to understate the importance of their functions.

Many other scholars have taken sides in this debate between the form and the function of rational constructions, and a few of them, like Richard Lanigan, have attempted to bridge the gap. According to Lanigan, most hypotheses that attempt to describe the enthymeme fall into one of two camps: the enthymeme as a syllogism that is formally valid but materially deficient since it uses signs or probabilities instead of absolutes; or, the enthymeme as a syllogism that is materially valid but formally deficient since one or more premises are unexpressed. As a synthesis, Lanigan defines the enthymeme as "an incomplete syllogistic form embodying the matter of signs and probabilities" (207-209). We will take up the matter of signs and probabilities in a later chapter, but the fact remains that Lanigan is still concentrating on form as a defining quality of the enthymeme. His choice of words is inadequate in my view because the enthymemic form is neither incomplete nor syllogistic; I would replace both words with the term "deductive."

Jesse Delia is even more concerned with form than Lanigan. With the principles of cognitive communication theory firmly in mind, Delia implies that the syllogism has more persuasive potential than the enthymeme because of the formal distinction between them, a distinction he illustrates with a syllogism:
Now if the rules of logical form correspond with the operation of the mental processes and if the form of the discourse corresponds with the rules of logical form, "reasoned discourse" results and "reason" is conveyed directly to the mind of the listener. Since form conveys reason directly to the mind of the receiver, an argument cogently laid down according to the rules of logical form inherently has the power to direct the human cognitive process, i.e., to persuade. The effectiveness of the reasoned argument is thus dependent on the form in which it is expressed—the nearer it comes to meeting the rules of logic, the more persuasive it will be. (140-141)

I will not deny that the human mind operates according to extremely logical forms (in fact, I have already stated that humans reason syllogistically although they are not naturally aware of it), but I challenge Delia's notion of what persuasion is. For Delia, persuasion is logos-centric and an argument's persuasive appeal is measured by its adherence to the forms and rules of logic. I am more inclined to buy Aristotle's idea of persuasion, in which the affective components of the human mind are just as important as the rational. If politicians and advertisers have anything to teach rhetoricians, it is that informal—and often non-rational—arguments are more persuasive than dry logical forms. The syllogism in the opening of Delia's passage, for example, I found to be rationally sound but not persuasive.

Although Aristotle himself called the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, I think we can safely substitute the term "deduction" for syllogism because it seems that this is the spirit of the enthymeme as it is used throughout his Rhetoric. That is, Aristotle does not appear to be equating the enthymeme with a rigid logical structure as much as a general form of deductive reasoning. In the field of logic, there is no difference between form and function, while there clearly is one in the field of rhetoric. This departure highlights the different aims
of logic and rhetoric: the goal of logic is demonstration; the goal of rhetoric is persuasion. To call the enthymeme a "syllogism" highlights the form of the reasoning over the function and the purpose; and, as we shall see later, there is more to Aristotle's understanding of the enthymeme than the number of its propositions and its shape. To consider the enthymeme as a deduction also serves to clarify its disputedly oppositional relationship to the inductive example.

The Enthymeme and the Example: Deduction Versus Induction

The controversial relationship between the enthymeme and the example merits further discussion here. Once again, Aristotle's own writings in the Rhetoric serve as a springboard for scholarly debate:

I call the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and the example a rhetorical induction. Every one who effects persuasion through proof does in fact use either enthymemes or examples: there is no other way....When we base the proof of a proposition on a number of similar cases, this is induction in dialectic, example in rhetoric; when it is shown that, certain propositions being true, a further and quite distinct proposition must also be true in consequence, whether invariably or usually, this is called syllogism in dialectic, enthymeme in rhetoric. (I,2,1356b,4-18)

Evidently, Aristotle is drawing clear parallels between the enthymeme and deductive reasoning, and between the example and inductive reasoning. This raises several questions: Is it valid to draw such clear relationships as these? Can we assume that enthymemes are always deductive? For that matter, can we assume that arguments from example are always inductive?

To answer our first question: no, it is not valid to lay down an oppositional relationship between deduction and induction. The truth
is that they are two sides of the same rational coin—the relationship is more accurately defined as complementary. Here, for instance, is an argument from example:

Example 1: Plato is mortal.
Example 2: Aristotle is mortal.
Example 3: Gorgias is mortal.
Example 4: Isocrates is mortal.
Conclusion: Therefore, all men are (probably) mortal.

This is an inductive argument because it reaches a tentative conclusion about all men in general based on a set of particular facts. I can now use that inductively-derived conclusion as a major premise of a deductive enthymeme, which moves from general to specific:

"Like all other men, Socrates is (probably) mortal."

If I wish, I can now use the conclusion of this deduction as another example for the above induction or for a different argument based on examples. As you can see, there is a kind of rational cycle between inductive and deductive reasoning. It has long been known that the major premises of deductions were derived by induction, but I think that the examples used in inductive arguments can often be arrived at deductively. Therefore, it is inaccurate to claim that deduction is the opposite of induction; likewise, the enthymeme is not the opposite of the example.

Sally Raphael argues that the enthymeme is an inductive form of argument rather than deductive, but her reasons for doing so differ from mine. To begin, Raphael defines the enthymeme as a syllogistic argument from probabilities; that is, they begin with major premises which are generally true instead of the absolutely true or necessarily true premises of syllogisms. Then, assuming that the essential feature
of deductive arguments is that they are logically conclusive, and, since most enthymemes cannot reach necessarily logical conclusions, Raphael consequently concludes that enthymemes are not deductive. If a form of argument is not deductive, it must be inductive (160).

I disagree with Raphael on two grounds. First, based on the cyclic relationship between deductive and inductive reasoning that I highlighted earlier, I do not accept Raphael's assumption that any argument that is not deductive must be inductive, or vice-versa. We cannot make such a clear either/or distinction. Secondly, I agree with Eugene Ryan's argument that a deduction with a probable major premise and a probable conclusion is, in fact, logically conclusive. If one accepts the premises, one has no choice but to accept the probable conclusion (17). Consider the following syllogism:

Major premise: "Most Italians are Catholic." (probability)
Minor premise: "Antonio is Italian." (fact)
Conclusion: "Therefore, Antonio is probably Catholic."

"Probably" is the key word here; if we accept the premises, we must also accept that Antonio is probably Catholic, even though he may not be Catholic in reality. Thus, the syllogism is logically conclusive.

While Raphael maintains that all arguments are inductive, it is also possible to argue that all arguments are deductive, based on a controversial passage in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*:

Enthymemes based upon example are those which proceed by induction from one or more similar cases, arrive at a general proposition, and then argue deductively to a particular inference. (II.25,1402b,15-18)

Although this passage indicates that the example can be a form of the enthymeme, I think such an interpretation misses Aristotle's point. I
believe that Aristotle is stating here the very thing I stated earlier: examples beget enthymemes beget examples (i.e., the potentially endless cycle of reasoning).

I called the 1402b passage quoted above "controversial" because it seems to contradict the oppositional relationship between the enthymeme and the example laid down by Aristotle in Book I. The problem can be resolved by a different translation of the original Greek text. In Book I, "example" refers to a form of inductive argument; while in Book II, it refers to one of four sources of enthymemes. James C. Raymond would substitute the term "paradigm" to mean an inductive argument, because that term more closely signifies the patterns of inference which constitute inductions (145-147). Raymond, of course, is assuming that our use of one term ("example") to represent two different concepts is the source of our confusion; and I believe that the assumption is valid.

The conclusion I wish to draw in this section is that the enthymeme is primarily a deductive form of rational proof. We cannot say absolutely that all enthymemes are deductive; nor does this fact demand that we label enthymemes inductive. Having established that a rational cycle exists between deductive and inductive arguments, I call the enthymeme primarily deductive because its external expression to an audience—not its internal generation in the rhetor—is what I take to be the distinguishing criterion. That is, the audience receiving an enthymeme will identify its premises and process their logical relationships by beginning with the general and working towards the specific—regardless of whether the rhetor works from the general to
the specific or from the specific to the general to the specific. Thus far, I hope to have shown that the enthymeme is an expression of natural reasoning, primarily deductive, used for persuasive ends.

The Enthymeme and the Topoi

Given that deductive arguments are perceived by an audience to work from general principles to specific conclusions, it would be easy to surmise that enthymemes are typically drawn from common topoi (or "topics") rather than specialized ones. For Aristotle, "common topics" refer to generalized lines of argument which can be used in almost any subject; "special topics" denote particular and material topics belonging to a specific discipline, such as mathematics or medicine (Kennedy 46).

Aristotle's Rhetoric contains several passages which seem to favor the common topics as the primary source of enthymemes. "[N]one of the arts theorize about individual cases...[which are] so infinitely various that no systematic knowledge of them is possible" (1,2,1356b). Aristotle cites medicine as an example, which is concerned not with individual cases but with what will help a given class of patients. If this is true of all disciplines, then the enthymemes which seek to argue about a class of subjects must be drawn from the common topoi.

"A statement is persuasive and credible because it is directly self-evident....[R]hetoric draws upon the regular subjects of debate" (1,2,1356b). It seems natural to me that these "regular subjects" do not deal with specific disciplines; and so rhetoric, as a discipline in itself which also has a place in all other disciplines, would utilize
the general lines of argument, or common topics. Also, I believe that it would be difficult for an enthymeme drawn from special topics to be "self-evident." Those statements that we deem self-evident are usually of a general nature and accepted by almost everyone. It is important to keep in mind that Aristotle was concerned with the nature of human communication in all arts; arguments based on specialized topics move further away from pure rhetoric and nearer to the disciplines with which they deal.

If we agree that a rhetorical discourse usually has as its audience a group rather than an individual, then Aristotle's passage has practical implications as well. First, enthymemes derived from common topics will be more easily understood by a diverse group because the premises will be sufficiently general and probable for everyone in that group to understand. Secondly, enthymemes with general premises will be more likely to touch on the shared assumptions of a diverse group than specialized ones. And thirdly, arguments from general premises are more likely to be self-evident. Critics may accuse me of confusing generalized premises with general lines of argument in my conception of the topics; however, I feel that the above implications are applicable for either view of the topics.

Once again, however, Aristotle seems to contradict himself in a later passage in his Rhetoric: "[W]e must know some, if not all, of the facts about the subject on which we are to speak or argue. Otherwise, we can have no materials out of which to construct arguments" (1396a). Assuming that we can substitute the word "enthymemes" in place of "arguments"--and I think we can--this passage seems to im-
ply that one who does not know the specific facts of an issue cannot conduct a rhetorical discourse since he or she does not possess the necessary knowledge to construct enthymemes. This much appears obvious, but others may counter that a sophist—who only pretends to know the truths involved in an issue—can still draw on a ready store of commonplaces as a source of enthymemes. Aristotle counters in 1396b that such enthymemes can be readily identified as lacking in specific knowledge of the subject. Enthymemes based on special knowledge are far more persuasive than those based on commonplaces; and such sophistic enthymemes are more likely to fall under Aristotle's nine categories of sham enthymemes.

Although Aristotle differentiates rhetoric from other disciplines, he nevertheless admits that "Most enthymemes are, in fact, based upon these particular or special Lines of Argument [sic]; comparatively few of the common or general kind" (1358a). This seems to present us with a contradiction between theory and practice: enthymemes should be drawn from common topics, but are actually drawn from special topics usually. What, then, are we to do? Should we change our practice to fit the theory or should we change our theory to fit the practice? James H. McBurney suggests that a kind of compromise position is necessary:

In other words, while rhetoric as a science is concerned generically with those broad principles of probability which can be adduced to lend cogency to an argument in any field, and, as a methodological science, cannot be expected to be conversant with the special topics of the various substantive fields with which it deals, nevertheless it is important that any speaker be as thoroughly informed as possible in that particular substantive area in which he chooses to speak. (61)
Ultimately, given the complex web of relationships among the various disciplines and the dynamics of modern audiences—who know more facts about more topics—we must content ourselves that the premises of enthymemes today cover the entire spectrum, from the most general to the most specific. Since we cannot make such clear distinctions today as Aristotle did between the common and the special topics, we cannot claim the specificity level of the premises as a distinguishing feature of enthymemes. Since enthymemes are based on the general assumptions of a given audience, we must look to the context of the rhetorical situation as the determining factor of the sources of enthymemes. That is, the specificity of the audience addressed determines the specificity of the topic level of the enthymemes used by a rhetor.

The Enthymeme and Contingency, Kairos, and Context

An important question logically follows from the previous section: From where are we to draw our enthymemes, if not the topics? The answer to the question is rather straightforward, but only if we first take the time to make clear distinctions between syllogistic absolutism and enthymemic probability. A few words about kairos and context will also help to resolve this problem.

"For it is about our actions that we deliberate and inquire, and all our actions have a contingent character...It is evident, therefore, that the propositions forming the basis of enthymemes...will most of them be only usually true" (Rhetoric I,2,1357a). This passage could be construed as Aristotle's admission of the obvious: events do not happen in a vacuum. Enthymemes dealing with our context-bound
actions must somehow deal with the specific elements of that context in which our actions are situated, such as time, place, culture, etc. While enthymemes can be formed from the "necessary" propositions of most formal syllogisms ("John is an American citizen because he was born in Maryland"), most of what we argue about depends on contingent matters for which there is no truth in the absolute, platonic sense: cause and effect, courses of action, assessments of value, etc. To illustrate, we cannot argue about whether or not Bill Clinton is president, but we can argue about whether he is an effective one.

Other scholars, however, have taken Aristotle's passages on the contingent nature of argument to make a case for probability as a feature of the enthymeme which might distinguish it from the syllogism. In the context of rhetoric, a probability is a proposition which is generally true and generally approved of by an audience. While Aristotle may have defined the enthymeme as a syllogism based on probabilities (in the Prior Analytics)—in which probability becomes the key distinction—he also recognizes that there are some necessary signs which may serve as the basis of enthymemes. We find this in passages of the Rhetoric which deal with fallible and infallible signs, which we may also call, respectively, probable and necessary (1357b).

I think we can rule out probability as a defining feature of the enthymeme for two reasons. First, since we argue about contingent matters and not facts (a fact in dispute is not a fact at all), our enthymemes characteristically make use of non-absolute knowledge. Since all arguments take place within contextual boundaries, it is only appropriate that our enthymemes take those contexts into account.
Enthymemes usually have their basis in probable knowledge, but it is not a rule or requirement that must be maintained. I support Thompson's assertion that rhetors should use whatever enthymemes they feel would best serve their persuasive ends, probable or absolute (69).

A second reason for discounting the value of probability in any definition of the enthymeme is that it assumes that absolute propositions exist with which probabilities may be contrasted. I do not mean to digress into a lengthy epistemological argument, but, in our previous discussion of induction and deduction, it was shown that the general premises of deductive arguments are derived inductively. The question then becomes: How often do inductive arguments arrive at conclusions which are absolutely and necessarily true? The answer is "very rarely": "There are few facts of the 'necessary' type that can form the basis of rhetorical syllogisms" (Rhetoric 1357a). Also: How will we know for certain if our inductive conclusions are absolutely true, even if we perceive them to be? Mudd says we cannot:

> With each new piece of information we have gathered, the older authoritative generalizations have become more and more suspect. Very rarely, the argument goes, do we find a case where perfect induction is possible. Lacking this, any generalization we make will necessarily be tentative. The most we can hope to know is what is probable. (411)

Consequently, I believe that almost all deductions are based on probable knowledge regardless of the form those deductions take, syllogistic or enthymemic.

I submit that an enthymeme is a valid form of deductive argument drawn from premises which are accepted by an audience as being true, whether necessarily or probably. To do so, however, invites
yet another controversy; universal premises are required if a deduction is to be valid, but we have just rejected the value of such universal, absolutist propositions. This trap is rather easily sidestepped in light of Mudd's distinctions between probable universal propositions and particular absolute propositions:

Admittedly, a statement qualified by "many" or "most" is no longer a universal, but it is not one whit less absolute for such a qualification can make a statement absolutely true. Thus, on the altar of material truth we sacrifice the probable universal in favor of the particular absolute. The conclusions we call "probable" are themselves absolute and not probable at all. (Mudd 412)

We can illustrate Mudd's distinctions by recalling our "Antonio" syllogism from an earlier section. The laws of deductive logic require that one reason from a universally true premise, such as "All Italians are Catholic." This major premise is a universal, but it is also not materially valid; we cannot use it to construct the enthymeme "Antonio is Catholic because he is Italian." But if we change the universal premise to a particular one by qualifying it, we make it materially true: "Most Italians are Catholic." We still cannot logically conclude that Antonio is Catholic, but we can validly conclude that Antonio is probably Catholic. Hence, we should not be concerned in our deductions with what is universally and absolutely true.

Now we may return to the original question which began this section: From what sources are we to draw the enthymemes for our arguments? Since all human actions have what Aristotle calls a "contingent character," it follows that all enthymemes that seek to persuasively direct those actions must be drawn from the contingencies of the situation rather than universally absolute propositions. These contingen-
cies are made up of the variables involved in an issue's situational context, or *kairos*. Since the *kairos* of every argument will be unique, it is these situational variables that are likely to contain the crucial issue of the argument as well as the best strategies for arguing it.

James L. Kinneavy defines *kairos* as "the appropriateness of the discourse to the particular circumstances of the time, place, speaker, and audience involved" (84). In this light, *kairos* may be considered synonymous with "rhetorical situation" or "situational context." But this conception falls short for my purposes because it involves only the elements involved in an argument's delivery; it does not take into account the significant variable of the argument itself. I believe that if we combine this notion of *kairos* with the status doctrine, then we arrive at the ultimate source of the most effective enthymemes. This observation may sound strange since neither "*kairos*" nor "status doctrine" are particularly Aristotelian terms. However, I never claimed that Aristotle alone provides us with all we need to know about the enthymeme; in fact, Aristotle does not explain the enthymeme very clearly at all. But if the two terms were in use in his time, I feel he may have made the same observation as I have made here.

Generating successful enthymemes is now a two-step procedure. First, we employ the status doctrine to determine the key issues under dispute in any case. One of the values of the status doctrine in the invention process is that it identifies what a rhetor needs to discover based on the conflict between his knowledge and the knowledge of others. After discovering the essential issue or conflict, the rhetor can then create and adapt enthymemes to fit the rhetorical context.
The Enthymeme and the Speaker-Audience Relationship

Although a speaker is responsible for taking all of the variables of a rhetorical context into consideration, the audience of an argumentative discourse is by far the most important determiner of that argument's ultimate goal and overall shape. This is not to deny the speakers their authority over the texts they create, nor do I wish to suggest that writers simply mold texts to pre-determined argumentative forms. What I am suggesting is merely what scholars of Aristotelian rhetoric have long believed:

[The speaker or the writer today has, as in the past, one object—to make his sense of the truth prevail in the minds and hearts of his audience, by means of words, composed for this purpose, in speech or in writing. His aim is communication, not self-expression. (Clark 49)]

One of the embedded assumptions in Clark's passage is the idea that rhetorical discourse, as communication, is very much like a conversation—a two-way interchange of thoughts, feelings, and ideas. As such, rhetoric itself cannot exist without both a speaker and an audience, and neither party is more or less important than the other. We know that such things as actions, reality, and truth do not exist in vacuums, but Delia argues that even pure logic itself cannot exist independently of an audience (141). Therefore, it would be foolish for a rhetor to conceive of an argument without considering his or her audience and then expect that resulting argument to be effective.

The second assumption voiced by Clark is one that many other rhetorical scholars believe to be true: that a consideration of the rhetorical dynamics of audience is the most significant and most distinguishing feature of Aristotelian rhetoric. Consequently, the enthym-
meme, as Aristotle's key rhetorical device, must be an audience-specific argumentative tool. To our developing definition of the enthymeme, we should therefore add this feature; but first we must determine the relationship between the audience and the enthymeme.

"We must not, therefore, start from any and every accepted opinion, but only from those we have defined—those accepted by our judges or by those whose authority they recognize" (Rhetoric II.22, 1396a). This passage comes from the chapter in the Rhetoric that contains Aristotle's suggestions for how we should construct and use enthymemes. I cite it here because it indicates that the audience is critical to the invention process. We do not pull enthymemes out of thin air; we begin by determining what "our judges" believe about the subject of our argument. Having determined that, we then build enthymemes out of those prevailing beliefs and assumptions or we mold our enthymemes to suit them. In my mind, the term "judges" calls up an image of a courtroom, which in turn summons the attendant metaphor of an argument as a trial. If we imagine the ways in which a lawyer adapts his line of questioning to persuade his chosen target audience, the jury, it should become clear what Aristotle means here.

The critical implication of this idea is that it requires of the speaker a knowledge of the audience to be addressed. Before we can invent an enthymeme to make our arguments suit an audience's predispositions, we must first analyze our intended audience to determine what they know, what they believe, what they value, and what they will accept, among other things. Since they are the "judges" of the efficacy of our arguments, what they believe will, to some extent, be
more important to our enthymemes than what we may wish to persuade them to believe.

Lloyd F. Bitzer argues that a speaker who wishes to use enthymemes must engage in a kind of implicit dialectic with the audience, not only to discover what its members collectively believe, but also to include them in the communicative act:

To say that the enthymeme is an "incomplete syllogism"... means that the speaker does not *lay down* his premises but lets his audience supply them out of its stock of opinion and knowledge....Whether or not premises are verbalized is of no logical importance. What is of great rhetorical importance, however, is that the premises of enthymemes be supplied by the audience. (Bitzer's italics, 407).

John T. Gage seems to agree with Bitzer's implicit dialectic as the means by which rhetors find the mutually agreeable grounds on which to build enthymemes, but his view seems to involve a closer working relationship between speaker and audience:

The enthymeme cannot be constructed in the absence of a dialectical relation with the audience, since it is only through what the audience contributes that the enthymeme exists as such. It is, in one sense, a necessary compromise between what one who wishes to persuade may want to say and what an audience will allow to be said. But it is, in another sense, an adjustment of what one who wishes to "discover the means" of persuasion knows to what is known by others. (157)

As you can see, Gage is less confident of the audience's ability to supply the desired premises than Bitzer. I find Gage's compromise idea to be more in tune with the spirit of rhetoric as communication.

Even though we may accept that enthymemes are constructed from the beliefs and assumptions that are understood as givens for a particular audience, and even though we may accept that enthymemes are somewhat self-persuasive since they are formed from premises supplied
by the audience itself, we must still learn how to conduct this dia-
lectic and compromise before we can make use of these concepts in the
creation of enthymemes. It helps to begin with the idea that enthym-
emes consist of two types of propositions: premises—which are shared
by both speaker and audience--and conclusions--which are not shared.
Therefore, the speaker should pull premises from his own store of
knowledge and opinion and then, after having engaged in audience
analysis, test those premises on the audience to see if there exists
the necessary agreement to prove the conclusion. This is the "dia-
logue." Compromise occurs if the speaker finds that the agreement is
not there; then, he or she must adapt the original premises to take
the audience's differences into consideration.

For example, suppose that a friend and I disagree as to which
baseball team would be most likely to win the next World Series. He
claims that the Chicago White Sox will be the next world champions
while I argue for the Atlanta Braves. Hence, we have different con-
clusions at the outset. In order to engineer his acceptance of my
conclusion, I would identify the premises I am working under and ask
myself whether or not my opponent (the audience) would agree with
them. Those premises are: 1) the team with the best pitching has the
best chance to win the championship, and 2) Atlanta has the best
pitching. Since my friend is very knowledgeable about baseball prin-
ciples generally and the character of various teams specifically, I
can be fairly certain that an enthymeme would be effective if it were
so stated: "The Atlanta Braves will win the next World Series because
they have the best pitching staff."
But what if I am arguing the same issue with a different audience—a Chicago Cubs fan who, like most Cubs fans, maintains a fervid loyalty to his team that cannot be swayed by such a rational argument as the one that worked so well for the White Sox fan. He may agree to the same premises as the White Sox fan, yet not accept the conclusion. Under the rules of syllogistic logic, this is impossible. However, enthymemes are not syllogisms, and the fundamental difference between their goals is analogous to the difference between logical demonstration and persuasion. Returning to the Cubs fan, I now find it necessary to develop an enthymeme on a different premise, an assumption he will accept as given: "The Cubs will not win half of their games, let alone the World Series, because that would be out of character." Although this enthymeme does not prove my conclusion as much as it disproves his, I can at least be fairly certain of this level of agreement.

The case for the enthymeme as potentially the strongest rhetorical device is bolstered by new research in cognitive psychology. Jesse G. Delia suggests that arguments received by an audience are evaluated by that audience through both rational and affective frameworks based on their own internalized knowledge and values (143). Arguments that do not harmonize with those internalized frameworks are perceived as illogical, unacceptable, or simply nonsensical. The test of a premise's validity, then, is not whether it is logically derived or logically connected to other premises but whether or not the audience will simply accept it. This is based on the tendency of rational people to accept most readily the conclusions of their own premises (Delia 144-147).
The upshot of this discussion of the role of the speaker-audience relationship to the enthymeme is that it is not just recommended but necessary for the speaker to analyze, or "know," his or her audience and to construct enthymemes that are appropriate to that audience. That is, the rhetor's aims must work with the audience's assumptions. Effective speakers consciously construct enthymemes from the assumptions that are shared by an audience and then present those assumptions in a manner that allows the members of that audience to reach the speaker's conclusions on their own--to allow them to participate in their own persuasion. Bitzer lends added authority to this view:

"Enthymemes occur only when speaker and audience jointly produce them. Because they are jointly produced, enthymemes intimately unite speaker and audience and provide the strongest possible proofs. Owing to the skill of the speaker, the audience itself helps construct the proofs by which it is persuaded. I believe this is the reason Aristotle calls enthymemes the "substance of rhetorical persuasion." (408)

Obviously, we are not talking about attaining agreement in just the strictly rational sense; many scholars would support my claim that affective assent is equally important to successful enthymemes—perhaps even more so.

**The Enthymeme and the Pisteis**

In Book I, chapter 2 of the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle introduces his three modes of artistic proof, which are often referred to as the "pisteis" by rhetoric scholars or "Aristotle's rhetorical triangle" by composition teachers. These include appeals to the speaker's character (*ethos*), appeals to the values, beliefs, and emotions of the audience (*pathos*), and the rational appeals of the speech or argument itself.
(logos). The good rhetor must be adept at all three modes of proof for if true persuasion seeks to effect the whole person, as Grimaldi suggests, then reason alone is not enough. Clearly, then, if the enthymeme is central to Aristotle's idea of persuasion, he cannot have meant it to be a mechanism of logic alone. If the enthymeme were simply a truncated syllogism, one could construct proofs based solely on a scientific, certain, and platonic form of knowledge that is universal to all people in all situations. But such is not the case with the contingent matters we habitually find ourselves discussing with contextually bound, thinking and feeling audiences. Aristotle understood, even in his time, that only in an ideal world are people motivated by reason alone. "The enthymeme brings together the logical and psychological reasons which convey meaning to an auditor, and thus Aristotle recognizes that person speaks to person not only with the mind but with the emotions and feelings as well" (Grimaldi 17).

To say that the enthymeme, like its deductive cousin the syllogism, is a mechanism of rational proof is again to highlight the form and obscure the function. It is true that the premises of an enthymeme often share a logical connection between themselves and their attendant conclusions, but, on their own, these propositions may also contain ethical and pathetical elements. Consider the following:

1) "Since Bosnia could be the Vietnam of the 90's, we must not commit American troops to the civil war there."

2) "Convenience stores should be prohibited from displaying and selling pornographic magazines to protect our children from exposure to such indecent materials."
3) "Having served in the U.S. Army for over three decades, I've found that women are unfit for the military."

4) "You should wear Nike Air Jordans because you should want to be like the world's best basketball player."

These enthymemes cannot be recast into syllogistic form, but they do reason deductively from various general principles that the audience is likely to accept as true. But what is more important to my point here is that these premises have values and beliefs embedded within them; they are not just statements of fact or opinion. Enthymemes 1 and 2 are primarily appeals to pathos: the first appeals to the audience's fear of reliving the horrors of Vietnam; the second appeals to the belief of parents that children should never be exposed to pornography at any cost. Enthymemes 3 and 4 are primarily appeals to ethos: the third appeals to the idea that a life-long soldier has the authority to make judgements in military matters; the fourth appeals to the authority and personality of Michael Jordan, as well as our culture's tendency to value its sports heroes and elevate them as role models for our children.

While most scholars over the past two thousand years have been guilty of categorizing the enthymeme as a logical structure of rational proof, Miller and Bee claim that "the affective component inherent in the enthymeme is the essence of Aristotle's concept of the enthymeme as practical reasoning" (their italics; 201). We can logically demonstrate our arguments to an audience, but this does not guarantee persuasion. The speaker achieves persuasion by motivating the audience to accept his or her conclusions, which requires both reasoning and
desire. Miller and Bee look to the etymology of the word "enthymeme" to further support their claim—"thymos" meaning "soul, spirit, feeling and thought" (201). They also look to the Rhetoric for indications of the primacy of the affective in persuasion:

Aristotle states that "persuasion may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions." Aristotle's emphasis on persuasion in relation to hearers permeates every sinew of the body of the Rhetoric and helps to explicate the relationship between pathos and persuasion and thus between pathos and the enthymeme as the "substance of rhetorical persuasion." (Miller and Bee's italics; 211)

I value the arguments presented by Miller and Bee because they provide persuasive voices to refute the notion of the enthymeme as a logical device. However, I do not wish to swing to their affective extreme any more than I would wish to accept the rational extreme. The enthymeme is the unifying structure in Aristotelian rhetoric; it draws its persuasive power from the pisteis as a whole. We cannot draw clear distinctions between each of the three modes as they are used in enthymemes because all three are received and processed by an audience using the same psychological system (Delia 147) but are interpreted differently by the individual members of that audience. Many scholars today also accept that the enthymeme incorporates all three forms of proof (Conley, Gage, Grimaldi, Raymond).

Conclusion

By now it should be apparent that the enthymeme is a rhetorical concept that eludes and resists any attempts to positively identify its necessary features. All scholars who have sought to define the term along the spectrum of issues involved here have found themselves re-
butted and criticized by other scholars—and I am sure this attempt will be received no differently. However, I do feel that my venture here differs significantly from previous scholarship in that I have attempted to identify its characteristic, not its necessary, features; and I have attempted to identify as many of these features as I possibly could. My reasons for doing so I must attribute largely to Wayne N. Thompson.

Thompson suggests that any "characterization of the enthymeme should be multidimensional." The enthymeme has several important features and our discussions of the term should take all of these features into account. Thompson also argues that the search for the essential feature of the enthymeme is unnecessary and has only led scholars into trouble. This may be true, but I feel that the search for these essential features has at least resulted in much of the new knowledge we now have about the enthymeme as well as our admission as a discipline that a positivistic definition is impossible. Finally, Thompson posits that any definition of the enthymeme must be broad enough to be consistent with its persuasive function, and so he calls the enthymeme "any deductive argument employed to further the communicator's persuasive ends" (68-77). Even if this "definition" is in harmony with Aristotle's intentions, I feel it is too simplistic to be of any practical value for scholars, teachers, and, most of all, today's students.

Based on the research contained in this chapter, I have arrived at a conception, not a definition, of the enthymeme that identifies its primary, not necessarily essential, qualities so that we may have a
working understanding of what an enthymeme is—a description that we can work with in our libraries and our classrooms:

The enthymeme is a functional expression of natural reasoning, primarily deductive, which is formed in response to contextual situations and deals primarily with probable knowledge. It is formed from the shared assumptions of the speaker and the audience and may draw its appeals from all three elements of the pisteis.

We will look at the pedagogical implications of this conception of the enthymeme in chapter 3, but, before we move on to Stephen E. Toulmin's model of argumentation, it would be helpful to bring in Nancy Harper and her findings to serve as a bridge here. Though the enthymeme has no set form like the syllogism, Harper has nonetheless identified three types of propositions which operate within an enthymeme: 1) an observation, 2) a generalization, and 3) an inference (306). While this is probably the order in which people reason and not a formula, I will nonetheless lay out one of the fundamental enthymemes driving this paper in that order:

1) Since the enthymeme is central to the overall theory and practice of Aristotelian rhetoric and 2) because modern composition classes focus mainly on Aristotelian rhetoric, 3) composition classes would be best served by featuring the enthymeme and/or a modern version of it.

The first element, the observation, serves as the grounds for my reasoning. The second element, the generalization, is the assumption that I believe my audience shares with me. The third element, the inference, is the conclusion which I have reason to believe my audience does not accept at the outset.

Toulmin, by way of his model of argumentation, will rename and expand on these three elements as the "data," the "warrant," and the
"claim," respectively. Toulmin will not only recast Aristotle's enthymeme into modern terms, he will also incorporate it as a fundamental rational process working within epistemology, cognitive psychology, social constructionism, modern argument fields, and the recent movement towards the "informal logic" that has been gaining in popularity since the 1950's.
II. TOULMIN AND HIS MODEL OF ARGUMENTATION

Stephen Edelston Toulmin is a philosopher who is primarily concerned with human rationality and reasoning processes. He is neither a rhetorician, a psychologist, nor a communication theorist, which may explain why his work has not received the attention it deserves outside of philosophy. Another reason may be that Toulmin himself never claimed an interest in rhetorical theory until late in his career when he was made aware of the importance of rhetoric to his own ideas about philosophy (Foss 88).

Today, over three decades after the publication of The Uses of Argument (1958), we still do not have what may be called a comprehensive Toulmin rhetoric. There are many reasons for this, but I believe that the primary reason is that Toulmin's model of argumentation has not been reevaluated in light of recent scholarship about the enthymeme. Many scholars (Cooley, Mancias, Trent) dismiss the Toulmin model on the grounds that it is nothing more than a glorified syllogism. Toulmin himself talks about syllogisms and Aristotle often in his writings, but, strangely enough, the word "enthymeme" never appears—even while he attacks the syllogism with an "informal logic" that is enthymemetic in nature.

My connection between recent scholarship on the enthymeme and the Toulmin model may, I believe, present us with the long-awaited key by which we might unlock the potential of Toulmin's ideas for rhetorical theory and pedagogy. Such is the driving force behind this entire thesis. Having established a working conception of the enthymeme, this chapter specifically will present the multiple dimensions
of the Toulmin model to illustrate its enthymemic nature. To this end, we will examine Toulmin's overall rhetorical philosophy and epistemology, his informal logic, the social nature of claims justification, his concept of argument fields, the role of the audience in argument, and the utilization of the pisteis within the Toulmin model. I will often refer to the previous chapter in order to show that the Toulmin model is not a new take on the syllogism, but rather a modern reformulation of, and expansion on, Aristotle's enthymeme. Central to this goal is an understanding between the readers and myself that the enthymeme is a rich and useful rhetorical tool that has less in common with the syllogism than was previously acknowledged.

Philosophical and Epistemological Background

Many of Toulmin's philosophical ideas--especially his "rhetorical" ones--grew out of a fundamental rejection of Cartesian philosophy. He cites Descartes' separation of the "observer" from the "world observed" as the source of a 300-year trend favoring universal principles and absolute certainty and a rejection of probability (Cosmopolis 167). What followed was an era of analytic thinking (the Enlightenment) which featured the syllogism as the model of cognitive reasoning; this analytic mode still pervades the sciences today. Analytic rhetoric favored Plato's ideal formal logic in which claims are grounded in universal abstracts to deductively arrive at decontextualized universal truths. The most troubling problem with syllogistic reasoning is that it cannot produce new knowledge--the conclusions can go no further than the truths contained in the premises. This tradition of analytic
thought, I believe, helps explain why the enthymeme was so neglected until recently. The new scholarship on the enthymeme and the rhetoric of Stephen Toulmin are united in a common movement away from the syllogism and formal analytic logic.

In the introduction to The Uses of Argument, Toulmin intimates that we should return to the original purpose of logic as put forth by Aristotle: "For him, questions about apodeixis [i.e. the way in which conclusions are to be established] just were questions about the proving, making good or justification—in an everyday sense—of claims and conclusions of a kind that anyone might have occasion to make" (2). Formal logic, however, lost its focus over the centuries and came to have little connection to the problems of knowledge in most intellectual disciplines and the practical reasoning of everyday life (Bizzell and Herzberg 1104). Toulmin developed his "informal logic" as a means of returning logic to a concern for practical matters and toward a more natural means of justifying claims.

For Toulmin, reasoning—and its outward expression in argument—is primarily concerned with how people justify their actions, not with how we make inferences:

Reasoning is thus not a way of arriving at ideas but rather a way of testing ideas critically....It is a collective and continuing human transaction, in which we present ideas or claims to particular sets of people within particular situations or contexts and offer the appropriate kinds of reasons in their support. (Toulmin's italics; Introduction 9)

This passage contains several embedded implications that are worth exploring. One is that syllogistic reasoning is inadequate since it usually ignores particular audiences, situational contexts, and kairos.
A second is that reasoning is an inherently social process; we can always rationalize for ourselves, of course, but the test of a valid reasoning depends on whether or not we can justify our conclusions for others. We will look at these two implications in the next two sections, but a third that will be dealt with now is the notion that reasoning is a way of arriving at knowledge by "testing ideas critically."

Toulmin sees rhetoric as epistemic: "the means by which we know whatever it is that can be known to whatever degree of certainty is possible" (Secor 338). When we debate an issue, we do not just spew forth a stream of beliefs and claims; we must answer the social demand to back up those claims with sound reasons (i.e. to justify our claims in such a way that others accept them as truths). What the individual holds as true is a belief; when others accept that belief, it becomes knowledge. Argument, to be more specific, is the process by which we socially construct knowledge. This idea is similar to the Hegelian dialectic: what we call knowledge survives as knowledge until it is challenged by a conflicting idea; the ensuing argument results in a synthesis which we then call knowledge. This "synthesis" may be the survival of the original knowledge, the rejection of it in favor of the new idea, or some degree of compromise between the two, but the upshot is that argument, as the process of justifying claims, both produces and tests knowledge.

Although argument is a social activity, we cannot forget that we reason as individuals; individuals arguing together make up the social contexts in which discourse occurs. This is only possible if we
acknowledge that individuals argue and reason in similar ways. To do so is to accept, even tentatively, the claim of cognitive psychologists that there exists a reasoning process common to all people. It is my contention that the enthymeme is a manifestation of this quasi-universal reasoning process because all argument is essentially enthymemetic in nature—it is primarily concerned with the justification of claims through the use of sound evidence and the shared assumptions of an audience. And this is the same fundamental principle behind the Toulmin model.

The Toulmin model of argument (see Appendix A), I believe, is isomorphic with the natural human reasoning process. "Natural" is a key word because for years the syllogism was accepted as the model for testing the validity of reasoning. As we argued in the previous chapter, the syllogism is an artificial construct: no one naturally thinks or argues in categorical syllogistic form and syllogisms cannot adequately deal with the context-sensitive contingent matters we typically debate. So Toulmin developed his model with an eye towards the ways in which we naturally reason and with another eye towards developing a standardized schema by which arguments could be critiqued and evaluated (Brockriede and Ehninger 44).

We can say, with some minor reservations, that the Toulmin model is "quasi-universal" because it describes the ways in which people in all fields of inquiry may justify most claims in most situations. I am speaking here of the basic framework and not the particular ways in which various people utilize it. That is, we absorb and evaluate evidence—such as statistics, personal observations, the scholarship of
others—and combine the evidence at hand with general principles or assumptions that serve to justify an inferential leap to a new conclusion. When we wish to convince others to accept this conclusion, the conclusion becomes a claim, and we then present the evidence at hand and apply the assumptions that we believe our audience accepts in order to lead them through the same inferential process to arrive at the same conclusion. This reasoning process is similar regardless of the contextual factors involved: speaker, audience, situation, topic, etc. Whether one uses enthymemnic terms (observation, generalization, inference) or Toulmin’s terms (evidence, warrant, claim), the process is virtually the same:

\[
\text{Warrant/Generalization} \\
\text{Evidence/Observation} \rightarrow \text{Claim/Inference}
\]

Suppose, for example, that I am a meteorologist preparing a forecast for the evening news. I begin by examining the evidence at my disposal: satellite pictures, radar readings, weather service reports, etc. Suppose I notice that a cold air mass and a warm air mass are converging over the area. By itself, this observation does not allow me to predict rain. But once I connect the evidence with the proper assumption—that the collision of a cold air mass with a warm one almost always produces precipitation—then I am justified in making the inferential leap to the conclusion: it is likely to rain. During the newscast, the onus falls on me to justify this conclusion for the viewing audience, and this is done by presenting the relevant evidence and connecting it with the appropriate meteorological principles.
in such a way that the conclusion/forecast seems plausible. That is, I lead the audience through my reasoning process so that they may arrive at the same conclusion as I:

**Warrant:** The collision of cold and warm air masses usually produces precipitation.

**Evidence:** Satellite pictures

(Therefore) **Claim:** It is likely to rain that a cold air mass will collide with a warm one over the area.

Since Stephen Toulmin is primarily a philosopher, it would be easy to expand further on his philosophical background, but that would not serve my purposes here. I only hope that this section will suffice as an introduction to the rest of this chapter. Many of the ideas expressed in this section will be explored in more detail over the next five sections.

**Toulmin's "Informal Logic"**

Toulmin developed his model of argumentation to describe natural and practical human reasoning. In this way, his model came to be aligned with a philosophical movement against the restricting and nonpragmatic nature of formal logic—a movement which is identified as "informal logic." Toulmin rejected formal logic and its primary device, the syllogism, as the preferred mode of reasoning for a variety of reasons. For one, formal logic could not adequately deal with the contingent and dynamic nature of real-life situations. For another, Toulmin found severe flaws in the syllogism: it can have hidden
ambiguities (see Uses 107-113); it can be formally valid and materially false; it may be logically demonstrative but not persuasive; and it does not produce new knowledge. Yet another problem with formal logic is that it suffers under the weight of absolutism—a weight that we can just as easily do without given the perpetually uncertain state of most non-mathematical knowledge. The Uses of Argument was a ground-breaking work because it illustrated these limitations of formal logic while it legitimized, and provided a rhetoric for, the informal logic that speech teachers in America found so liberating.

Perhaps the most significant excerpt in Toulmin’s corpus (as far as rhetoric is concerned) is his explication of analytic and substantial forms of argument in chapter 3. Toulmin breaks all arguments into these two camps, and, in many ways, the distinctions between them summarizes fairly accurately the momentous shift from formal to informal logic. Analytic arguments are characterized by an adherence to the rules of formal logic: the premises contain the information in the conclusion, claims are grounded in universal abstracts, and form is the criteria for evaluation. Substantial arguments, conversely, are characterized by an inferential leap between the evidence and the conclusion (i.e. the "premises" do not contain the conclusion), claims which are grounded in context and probability, and substance is the measure of validity (Foss 90-91). The Toulmin model, as a layout of substantial argument, illustrates the shift to a more Aristotelian form of reasoning which looks to jurisprudence, not mathematics, as the appropriate model for analyzing rational procedures (Uses 7-8). While he may not have been aware of it at the time, Toulmin was, in fact,
Table 2.1 Analytic and Substantial Argumentation Compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analytic</th>
<th>Substantial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Idealized formal logic</td>
<td>Practical everyday reasoning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Tautologous: conclusion is embedded within premises</td>
<td>Non-tautologous: conclusion involves an inferential leap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Claims grounded in universal abstracts</td>
<td>Claims grounded in context and probability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Evaluated by form</td>
<td>Evaluated by substance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Mathematics as model--static</td>
<td>Jurisprudence as model--dynamic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Platonic</td>
<td>Aristotelian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Syllogistic</td>
<td>Enthymemic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

moving toward a rhetoric that is enthymemic in nature—although he was certainly aware of his assaults on the syllogism (see Table 2.1)

Perhaps Toulmin's strongest objection to formal logic is that it is too restricting and rule-bound to be of any practical value; it does little to explain how real-world arguments actually work. Toulmin's conception of rhetoric is more dynamic, encompassing the complexities of context and probability, the inferential nature of reasoning, the web of relationships among propositions, and the unstable condition of most knowledge. Formal logic, with its emphasis on universality and certainty, cannot reflect the the means by which we come to "know" reality or the language we use to describe it (Secor 339). Also, since there are so few universals to build arguments upon, Toulmin wants to expand the realm of reasoning and logic to incorporate almost any case where claims are supported by reasons according to some contextual standards; hence, the jurisprudential analogy.

The Toulmin model of argumentation reflects the jurisprudential nature of substantial reasoning rather than the mathematical nature
of analytic reasoning because Toulmin does not view logic as a theoretical science with *a priori* laws; rather, he sees logic as a group of practical skills and context-bound rules for successful inferences (Abelson 333). Naturally, the formal logicians counter-attacked in order to defend logic as a legitimate intellectual discipline. Jimmie Trent, for example, argues that the Toulmin model is based on the syllogism: the major premise is the warrant; the minor premise is the evidence; and the conclusion is the claim (253). In my view, this is a gross oversimplification which does not account for context, the non-tautalogous inference, or much of the recent scholarship on the enthymeme. Trent goes on to argue that one cannot construct a Toulmin model without first knowing the structure of the syllogism (255). However, just because some syllogisms can be plotted on the model does not justify Trent's claim; remember that *some* syllogisms can be restructured into enthymemes, but the differences between them depend on much more than external form, as was shown in the previous chapter. I would be more likely to accept that one must understand the enthymeme in order to construct a Toulmin model because the two are essentially the same in both form and function.

Foss et al. interpret Toulmin's distinction between analytic and substantial argument in a way I find troubling. They suggest that "Inference...refers to the uses of reasons to arrive at a claim and is the province of analytic argumentation" (98). How is this possible? While we may use reasons to support a claim in a syllogism, the fact remains that analytic arguments are tautologous (i.e. there are no inference involved). Perhaps even Toulmin himself is confused on this
point when he states repeatedly in *The Uses of Argument* that the business of reasoning is retrospective justification. Nonetheless, analytic arguments produce no new knowledge; to suggest that tautologous reasoning is the means of prospectively inferring claims is to doom us to an endless circle of knowledge that never evolves. Brant Burleson supports this view in suggesting that any argument which does not involve an inferential leap is not usually called an argument at all (A-142). To argue that Socrates is mortal because he is a man is to do no more than to state the same proposition twice. Such a syllogism may be logical, but one of the defining qualities of argument is its dynamic nature—arguments, as inferences, move. Toulmin supports this view (and contradicts his earlier statement) in chapter 3 of *The Uses of Argument*:

> If the purpose of an argument is to establish conclusions about which we are not entirely confident by relating them back to other information about which we have greater assurance, it begins to be a little doubtful whether any genuine, practical argument could ever be properly analytic. (126-127)

Charles Arthur Willard presents the harshest attacks on Toulmin in arguing that the Toulmin model cannot serve as an effective tool for the analysis of arguments. His claims are that the Toulmin model cannot represent the dynamic and complex nature of argumentative interaction, and that it can only display arguments linguistically, thereby assuming that arguments possess certain characteristics independent of the people doing the arguing (309). My response to Willard hinges on my notion that the Toulmin model has two distinct purposes: argument generation (inferring) and argument analysis. The former is
a dynamic, interactive process involving the kind of self-contained dialectic I argued for in the chapter on the enthymeme. The latter involves the parsing and evaluation of the argument itself, as it is on the printed page per se. O'Keefe clearly defines these two senses of the term "argument": argument as a speech act is referred to as "argument_1"; argument as social interaction is called "argument_2" (121). The Toulmin diagram as a tool for analysis can only describe argument_1; the person arguing can use the Toulmin model as a means of working out the argumentative interaction, or argument_2, but the diagram itself can only illustrate the speech act. Willard repeatedly confuses these two senses of argument throughout his criticism of the Toulmin model (Burleson-A 139). The process of creating an argument is enthymemetic and dynamic (argument_2); the Toulmin diagram lays out the argument-as-product and is static (argument_1).

Toulmin's informal logic, as reflected in his substantial rhetoric and his model of argumentation, was intended to serve as a compromise between the absolutism of the analytic Cartesian position and the extreme relativism of the social constructionism that was coming into vogue during the middle of this century. Toulmin developed his informal logic as a means of loosening up the restrictive nature of formal logic while still allowing for some objective standards of argument assessment to hedge against relativism.

As intimated earlier, Toulmin ultimately rejected absolutism for several reasons. For one, the things we typically find ourselves arguing about everyday are grounded in the contexts of particular situations; there are very few uses for universal, context-free prin-
ciples in either our academic disciplines or our daily lives. Secondly, formal logic mistakenly assumes that concepts do not change over time (Uses 184); knowledge rarely exists in a certain state, and we cannot know for certain when we have achieved certainty anyway. Lastly, absolutism cannot account for differences among argument fields; it assumes that all communities, such as law, medicine, and science, share a methodology of argument whose various aspects are universal (Foss 93). While the rational process as laid out by the Toulmin model might be considered quasi-universal, the ways in which the social contexts and the communities shape that process is not.

Toulmin also rejects relativism because it contains no standards. We must have some standards for evaluating arguments or else we will not be able to distinguish good reasoning from bad. Also, simply because there may not be any foundations upon which knowledge is based does not mean that knowledge changes willy-nilly. Meanings have the potential to change at any time, but discourse communities provide relatively stable forums in which knowledge is maintained. Even when changes in knowledge do occur, such changes are arrived at and conducted in an orderly manner. Lastly, the absence of universal standards does not deny the existence of any standards at all. Rather, each intellectual discipline or field sets its own standards and agendas for evaluating arguments, and these field-dependent standards allow for analysis and criticism while avoiding both absolutism and relativism (Zarefsky 202-203).

The Toulmin model avoids the pitfalls of formal logic without resorting to relativism. It acknowledges that there is a fundamental
reasoning process that is similar for almost everyone, but that this process also takes contextual variables and the differences among communities into account. It rejects the overly formal cognitive formulas of deductive reasoning and the oppressive standards of formal logic; instead, it places the emphasis on function and allows each community to develop its own standards. Finally, it combines the absolute and the relative by bringing together field-dependent and field-invariant variables into one common rational framework. Since we have already discussed at length the absolutism of formal logic and the syllogism, perhaps we should look at the relativistic nature of social constructionism before moving on to Toulmin's conception of argument fields. I believe that recent scholarship on social constructionism has much to offer here, since I am arguing that the enthy-meme and the Toulmin model utilize the more dynamic and socially interactive nature of substantial argumentation.

The Toulmin Model and the Social Justification of Claims

Earlier, it was argued that Toulmin views rhetoric as epistemic and, by extension, social. Since we do not argue with ourselves, the knowledge-building nature of argument is inherently social, involving other individuals, other communities, and even the world at large. But regardless of the size of the parties involved, Toulmin's view of rhetoric can be seen as a means of socially justifying belief since it is concerned with how knowledge is established and maintained among groups with shared interests and concerns. His conception of the role of logic also fits this idea of social justification:
"its primary business is a retrospective, justificatory one—with the arguments we can put forward afterwards to make good our claim that the conclusions arrived at are acceptable, because justifiable, conclusions" (Uses 6).

One of the values of the Toulmin model is that it illustrates how an argument can be constructed to lead the audience through the cognitive process of reasoning. This means that I share Delia's assumption that an argument is more likely to be persuasive if it corresponds with the operation of the mental processes (141), but neither I nor Toulmin share his strict adherence to formal logic. Toulmin designed his model as a natural alternative to syllogistic reasoning—an alternative that reflects as accurately as possible our natural self-justification of belief. Knowledge, however, results from the social justification of belief; after all, we can easily justify our claims to ourselves because our reasoning is unchallenged, but that does not make our claims knowledge. Jürgen Habermas suggests that a claim is not necessarily true or valid at all unless a community accepts the claim by way of a consensual decision (Burleson-B 120).

This social process of claims justification via the Toulmin model is much more involved than the simple three-part syllogism. One begins by putting forth a claim which he or she believes should be accepted as knowledge. Proving a claim requires evidence and it is the job of the rhetor to present whatever evidence he or she thinks is necessary to allow the audience to make the same inferential leap from the evidence to the claim/conclusion as the rhetor did. Evidence, however, is not comprised of the objective, Cartesian, out-in-the-world
artifacts we might like to imagine. The information presented as evidence must be accepted as valid evidence by the community addressed; if the community does not consensually agree that a particular piece of information is valid evidence, then that information cannot be employed as a unit of proof at all (Ehninger and Brockriede 100).

Next, the rhetor must base his or her argument on an assumption (or "warrant" in Toulmin terms) which the rhetor and the audience may use as an inference-license to make the leap from the evidence offered as proof to the claim offered as a conclusion. This assumption may justify the rhetor to move from evidence to claim in his or her own mind, but, just like the evidence, the community serving as the body-to-be-persuaded must accept this assumption or else the inferential leap will be dismissed as invalid, or unwarranted. Thus, in some cases, the onus falls on the rhetor to provide additional support for the evidence and the warrant, for it is not until the community accepts these elements that they can be used to prove the claim—and make it knowledge. The upshot of this complex interaction is that a belief offered as a claim does not become knowledge unless the community or audience accepts both the reasoning and the means by which that claim is justified.

This social conception of rhetoric has embedded within it a rejection of the Cartesian conception of knowledge which holds that "knowledge is information impressed upon the individual mind by some outside source" (Bruffee 646). That all knowledge is generated and maintained by a community and not an external world—even the evidence we use to support our claims—is one of the central tenets of social
constructionism. The entire enterprise of proving that a claim should be accepted as knowledge, then, involves socially justifying beliefs by using as evidence other beliefs that have already been socially justified. As a result, social factors shape the very perception of evidence (see, for example, Winsor's discussion of the ways in which various communities perceived evidence in the Challenger accident).

To accept that all knowledge is socially constructed is also to accept that there are no foundations for knowledge--i.e., there is no such thing as absolute truth. (Even Plato acknowledged that we may not have access to the realm of absolutes even if it exists [Jacobi 281].) Thus, we cannot rely on any truly objective standards for testing the truth or validity of our claims, evidences, and warrants. The community decides everything. Platonic notions of validity, then, must be ruled out as the standard by which we find "the available means of persuasion" for a particular piece of discourse aimed at a particular community. For Toulmin, the criteria for deciding which evidences and assumptions would be most effective in a given case are dependent upon contextual factors: "Given the current repertory of concepts and available variants, would this particular conceptual variant improve our explanatory power more than its rivals?" (his italics; Understanding 225).

Given that there are no foundations for knowledge and that the community decides what is and what is not knowledge, it is easy to see how such a social approach might be construed as too relativistic. It is not too far of a stretch to see that almost anything can be considered knowledge if the community so deems. For example, if the
community of lexicographers decided that felines would now be called "dogs" and canines "cats," there is really no reason why the next edition of the dictionary might not reflect this change (other than rebellion by the populace). After all, there is no foundational reason why a domesticated quadruped mammal that goes "meow" is signified by the word "cat"—language is arbitrary. This example oversimplifies the problem, of course, but it does reflect the structuralist notion that meaning is arbitrary since the language that expresses meaning in arbitrary as well.

Perhaps the most significant implication of this social approach to argument is that—as with the enthymeme—the creator of an argument must engage his or her audience in a kind of dialectic to determine what it collectively knows, what it will collectively accept, and the means by which it will be collectively persuaded. In short, the rhetor must confront the community. Since the goal of a persuasive discourse is always to change, even in some small way, another's knowledge, policies, opinions, or some other piece of their reality, the process of inventing arguments must be weighed heavily toward the audience as the key contextual variable. Consequently, rhetorical invention cannot occur in a vacuum or from the viewpoint of the rhetor alone; rather, it is inherently collaborative: "rhetorical invention is an act initiated by a writer and completed by readers, extending over time through a series of transactions and texts" (LeFevre 1).

Most persuasive discourse is, therefore, enthymemetic in nature. We do not argue about ideas that everyone accepts as knowledge; conversely, we cannot argue about ideas without some common ground
upon which to build arguments. Enthymemic dialectic—even if only engaged within the mind of the rhetor—plays an important role in socially constructed rhetoric. In engaging our audience in a kind of dialogue, we take part in a process of exchange by which we might establish agreements that we can consider knowledge. Naturally, we can also discover significant disagreements, or stasis, the resolution of which might serve as the ultimate goal of our argument. The enthymeme is a crucial part of this process; it is a means of testing propositions collaboratively:

It does so by affirming the knowledge that rhetor and audience currently share and by asserting on that basis a potential extension or application of that knowledge. If the audience accepts that assertion, they are persuaded; if they do not, the rhetor must modify the proposition in terms of their response. (Clark 28)

Clark’s passage helps illuminate the essential implication of this connection between the enthymeme and the Toulmin model: constructing persuasive discourse is a negotiative exchange between a speaker and the community to be addressed in which the speaker determines what consensus is, builds onto that consensus, and adapts to gaps in that consensus when necessary (see Appendix B).

One beneficial sidelight to this social process of claims justification, as illustrated by the Toulmin model, is the elimination of the confusing induction/deduction dilemma that has so many enthymeme scholars needlessly concerned. In the previous chapter, I argued that induction and deduction are but two complementary rational processes for which clear-cut distinctions are hard to come by. One of the many benefits of the Toulmin model is that it can free us from such logi-
cally linear approaches by providing a framework for justifying claims which illustrates the fundamental rational process underlying both induction and deduction.

Toulmin does away with the terms "induction" and "deduction" and classifies arguments according to the acceptability of the warrant. What we normally call deductive arguments are those which operate on a warrant that is assumed to be accepted by an audience. This warrant, or inference license, is employed to prove the claim—which is assumed not to be accepted by an audience. An argument of this type is called a "warrant-using" argument simply because its warrant is not in question and is used to prove the claim (Uses 120).

By contrast, some warrants must be made acceptable to an audience before they can be used to prove a claim. This is a preliminary step which involves proving, defending, or establishing the validity of the warrant so that it may then be used as an inference license. Arguments of this type are called "warrant-establishing" because the goal is to gain the audience's acceptance of the warrant (Stratman 724). This is done by making effective use of backing—propositions which support a warrant in much the same way that evidence supports a claim. However, no one has yet argued for an inferential step between the backing and warrant; that is, what "warrants" warrants in a warrant-establishing argument? It would seem that one must use a warrant-using argument to establish a questionable warrant; in which case we might say that all arguments are argument-using. But to do so would be to entertain the notion that perhaps all arguments are deductive, and that would lead us back to the same conundrum that
Toulmin's distinction sought to avoid in the first place. More useful is the notion that the audience determines the shape of an argument.

The distinction between argument types, according to Toulmin, depends not on the linear process of arriving at conclusions (general to specific, or vice-versa), but on how the audience responds to the warrant in an argument. Warrants are either used or established—then-used in the move from evidence to claim. The distinction does not depend on the goal of the warrant within an argument because that never changes: to provide a valid inference bridge from the evidence to the claim. We might say that any warrant which requires backing before serving as a valid inference bridge operates within a warrant-establishing argument, while an argument in which anything but the warrant is challenged is a warrant-using one.

It may be argued that Toulmin's distinctions between warrant-using and warrant-establishing arguments are just as needless and confusing as those between deductive and inductive arguments, but it must be admitted that an analysis of the warrant is more useful to the overall evaluation of an argument than that argument's linear logical form. The upshot of the Toulmin model is that it illustrates that all arguments are enthymemic, employing an inference license in order to move from evidence to claim. This is not just true of traditional deductive arguments in which the major premise used is beyond dispute, but also of inductive arguments using examples and instances as grounds to establish premises. Now, however, the focus of criticism is shifted from an analysis of logical form to an evaluation of the function of the warrant, which is the key element of an argument.
The Toulmin Model in Context: Argument Fields

Up to this point, I have been arguing that the Toulmin model illustrates a kind of universalized rational process, one that operates in most disciplines and argumentative endeavors. This, however, does not imply that context is irrelevant. To reduce all argumentative procedures to a series of decontextualized operations would be to commit the very same failures of the formal logicians, who abstracted logic and reasoning from the social world in which it occurs and the social actors who utilize it. Toulmin designed his model not only to reflect the ways in which most people reason, but also the social factors that shape, influence, and modify that reasoning. Toulmin's conception of "argument fields" helps to shed some light on the role of context in the social justification of claims.

In the previous chapter, we discussed this interactive process called "social justification" with a significant emphasis on the role of the "community." But what is a "community?" We know the various duties of the community in the social approach to communication—as judge for reasoning, as filter for evidence and warrants, as audience addressed—but do we know how to define the parameters of this body? In professional communication, "discourse communities" are identified by a body of consensual knowledge, shared concerns and values, and a set of norms and conventions. But how are we to identify communities outside of the professional sphere? How do we evaluate the context of an argument involving a diverse, "multi-community" audience?

Toulmin developed his concept of "argument fields" as a means of identifying the context of an argument and the ways in which that
context shapes the overall justification process. Initially, Toulmin defined fields by "logical type": "Two arguments will be said to belong to the same field when the data and conclusions in each of the two arguments are, respectively, of the same logical type" (Uses 14). These fields were construed as intellectual disciplines by critics, and Toulmin's continued discussion of fields in Human Understanding seems to bear this out (Zarefsky 191). Each discipline—law, art, science, medicine, mathematics, etc.—has its own body of knowledge and conventions for justifying their various types of claims, but sometimes it is not so easy to determine the boundaries of a field. For example, sociology and psychology are generally considered two distinct disciplines, but are they so easily distinguished by subject matter and methodology?

Later, in An Introduction to Reasoning, Toulmin attempted to circumvent this problem by modifying his idea of argument fields to take purpose into consideration: "the modes of practical reasoning we expect to find in any particular field...will once again reflect the general purposes and practical demands of the enterprise under consideration" (200). This reformulation helps us to conceive of community in situations that cross disciplinary boundaries. For example, the typical hospital consists of doctors, lawyers, administrators and other large categories of employees. Though each discipline—medicine, law, business—operates as a distinct community within the hospital, their shared purposes and goals within the hospital as a whole unite them in a larger community. By making these shared purposes the unifying factor, these various disciplines can communicate by maintaining these
purposes as the ultimate source of consensus for inter-disciplinary discourse. This potential use of purpose is my idea, not Toulmin's.

Toulmin's way of thinking about purpose within argument fields is significantly different from mine. His conception of fields is more immediate, dealing with the purpose of the singular argument itself. Few of us are politicians, for instance, but we do commonly argue over such political matters as the president's latest economic policy, local ordinances, and pending elections. Since the purpose of our arguments in such contexts is to evaluate or effect policies in some way, our arguments can be considered within the field of political argument. Whether we are in the Senate or in the local coffee shop, this political purpose places certain contextual constraints on our arguments, such as the degree of logical formality, the standards for evaluating evidence and warrants, and the modes of resolution (Introduction 195-202).

The study of fields is important because every field has its own standards for evaluating arguments. This can easily be demonstrated by following the typical high school student through his or her day. In geometry class, the student learns that problems are solved only through the use of established theorems and proofs and formal procedures. Then, in literature class, the student finds that interpretations and evaluations of poetry and novels are almost universally justified so long as they meet with approval from the teacher. Next, the student can perform chemical experiments and combine the hands-on observations with scientific laws to justify previous hypotheses. By the end of the day, the student may have encountered any number
of argument fields in which the criteria for successful reasoning changes according to purpose and context.

In real life, however, it is not so easy to identify the field of an argument; we cannot tell how we should argue in a given situation by looking at the clock. Thus, it is up to the rhetor in any given context to situate himself in the appropriate argument field as a preliminary to the generation of enthymemes. This is necessary because the field serves as a filter by which the evidences and assumptions relevant to the ultimate purpose of an argument can be separated from all the available evidences and assumptions. Since the social view of rhetoric rejects the Cartesian split between the observer and the world observed, there can be no universal standards for evaluating evidence; evidence can only be evaluated in terms of accepted standards within a given field (Abelson 334).

For example, suppose a lawyer and a doctor arrive at the scene of an automobile accident. Both will evaluate and use evidence from the same event, but the evidence they select will be determined by their ultimate goals and the conventions of their disciplines. In justifying the claim, "John caused the accident," in a court of law, the lawyer will note that John's blood-alcohol level exceeded legal limits and will base his enthymeme on the legal precedent (and the jury's accepted assumption) that an intoxicated driver is generally presumed to be at fault in an accident. The doctor, on the other hand, is not concerned with John's guilt or innocence but rather with his physical condition. He will observe John and combine the first-hand evidence with a more scientifically certain warrant to justify his diagnosis
that John is in shock and needs to be transported to the nearest hospital immediately. Changing the field of an argument changes the evidence and warrants available to justify a claim, as well as the standards by which that justification is evaluated (Stygall 98). Yet, regardless of the field-dependent propositions and standards involved in any argument, the relationships among those propositions will hold to the fundamental enthymemic structure: observation, generalization, inference.

What we have in Toulmin's argument fields is an attempt to join the rational rigor of formal logic with the contextual variations that we encounter in our daily lives. By illustrating a quasi-universal process of claims justification and by showing how context shapes and affects that process, Toulmin bridges the void between absolutism and relativism. A monkey can be rational if there are no standards for reasoning among language users; conversely, a standard calculator can be considered rational if we disavow context in favor of formal logic. With Toulmin's argument fields and his model of argumentation, he redefines rationality as the ability to adapt to the demands of a field rather than adherence to the rules of formal logic—or an outright rejection of them (Burleson-B 114).

With his concept of argument fields, "Toulmin is searching for ways to explain how some portions of arguments remain the same, regardless of field, while other portions of argument vary from field to field" (Foss 99). Given the role that context plays in argument, it is impossible to formulate a universal, field-invariant framework. For example, the degree of force expressed in a qualified claim does
not depend on the field, but the criteria used to justify that claim is field-dependent (Secor 340). Similarly, with regards to evidence, the rules by which evidence is used to prove a claim are field-invariant, while the evaluation of that evidence depends on the accepted standards within a given field (Abelson 334). The very nature of evidence in the Toulmin model demands that it be very specifically tied to the subject matter, while the warrant—as a general assumption shared by an audience—is relatively content-free. The critical distinction seems to lie between criteria and force: "all the canons for the criticism and assessment of arguments, I conclude, are in practice field-dependent, while all our terms of assessment are field-invariant in their force" (Toulmin's italics; Uses 38).

The Toulmin Model as Audience-Sensitive Rhetoric

After having discussed Toulmin's informal logic, the social justification of claims, and his conception of argument fields, it is easy to conclude that Toulmin's rhetoric places a great deal of emphasis on the role of the audience. In fact, the audience can be considered the most important factor within any given rhetorical context because, as was established in the previous chapter, it is the audience who determines whether or not our arguments are successful. In fact, everything that was established in the previous chapter regarding the speaker-audience relationship in the enthymeme applies to the Toulmin model as well, and so we will not need to repeat ourselves here. Rather, I hope to further the case that the Toulmin model is audience directed by discussing the model's value as a descriptive tool which
illustrates the "audience sensitivity" of enthymemic argument. To that end, we will look at each of the six elements of the Toulmin model individually and show how each is shaped by the audience for whom the argument as a whole is intended.

The claim is the contingent statement that serves as the goal of any argumentative move. "Contingent" is a key word because we do not argue about those things that are factual, certain, or otherwise not in dispute. Claims are easily identified by an audience because they state propositions that will clash with the audience's predispositions in some way. Whether the claim makes a policy recommendation, expresses an opinion or value, argues for a causal relationship of some kind, or defines the nature of something, the claim must always express a proposition that elicits a social demand for explanation. Statements which are factual or self-evident are not claims because they do not evoke the question, "Why do you believe that?" What is or is not a claim depends on the audience: to argue that ethanol is a feasible fuel alternative is to express an opinion, but an audience of corn farmers will not dispute it. There can be no argument without reasoned disagreement—the source of the disagreement must be expressed in the claim along with the speaker's position. The argument is neither complete nor successful until the audience accepts the claim.

The evidence answers the social demand for proof once the claim is given; it answers the question, "What have you got to go on?" We have already established the anti-Cartesian nature of evidence in the Toulmin model: evidence is only valid if the audience accepts it. To
this, we can add that the evidence selected in any given argument must respect the field in which that argument operates. And the last defining criterion of evidence is that it must be specific and relevant to the claim it purports to prove. Whether it takes the form of hard statistical data, personal observation, expert testimony, analogies, or whatever, the evidence must not consist of generalities, theories, or principles.

Ehninger and Brockriede define evidence as "an informative statement believed by the audience and employed by an arguer to secure belief in another statement" (100). This accurately articulates the enthymemetic process by which we generate knowledge by building new knowledge onto previously accepted knowledge. Yet we know that evidence is often challenged by the audience, and Trent criticizes the Toulmin diagram because it makes no provisions for such challenges to evidence (254). Trent acknowledges that even Toulmin never claimed his model was complete. I, on the other hand, would argue that the model is complete, but not fixed; that is, the six elements as they are presented represent the six different functions of argumentative propositions, and these elements may be diagrammed accordingly. To answer Trent's criticism, I would suggest that "backing" statements could be supplied and diagrammed with the evidence just as it is with the warrant.

The warrant expresses the underlying assumption, shared by rhetor and audience, which authorizes the inferential leap from the evidence to the claim. Whereas evidence is specific, warrants are much more general and occasionally self-evident; they often entail theories,
generalizations, cultural values and beliefs, and common knowledge. As was shown with the enthymeme, the warrant contains the common ground and shared assumptions of the speaker and the audience, and asserts the claim on that basis. We can only discover warrants by way of a dialectical relationship with that audience. For example, a teenager who argues with her mother that she should be allotted a midnight curfew because "all the other mothers let their kids stay out until midnight" is basing that argument on a warrant that her audience—her mother—is not likely to accept: "All the other mothers know what's acceptable for me." She is more likely to win acceptance of her claim if she bases her argument on an assumption that her audience is more likely to accept, such as "A later curfew will prepare me for the responsibilities I'll face when I go away to college."

**Backing** is commonly described as any statement which lends additional support to the warrant. (I would argue that backing statements can support the evidence and the rebuttal as well.) Sometimes the general assumption in the warrant is not self-evident, solid, or accepted by some members of a diverse audience. In such cases, the rhetor needs to make a case for the warrant—the assumption itself or its relationship to the evidence-claim connection—because an argument cannot stand without a firm basis of agreement. Thus, the audience determines whether or not backing for the warrant is needed as well as whether or not the backing and the warrant need to be expressed.

The **rebuttal** states the conditions under which the claim will not hold true. This is an essential element in substantial arguments because of the very nature of the contingent claims they entail. Only
analytic arguments, by definition, cannot be disputed; a syllogism that has a potential rebuttal is not absolute and is, then, an enthymeme. Students often ask why a rhetor would want to admit that his argument has weaknesses, and the best answer I know of is that an argument is considered successful if it can withstand all serious objections raised against it. Therefore, it is in the rhetor's best interests to look at an issue from several perspectives, anticipate the possible objections of the audience, and answer those objections as successfully as possible. Rebuttal statements can minimize opposition to an argument by heading off the opponents "at the pass." Rebuttals are never voiced if they are dealt with during the initial argument.

Qualifiers, statements which limit the strength of a claim, are also essential to any substantial argument. An argument dealing with a context-bound contingent matter cannot make a claim which is absolutely certain or universal. Most arguments have a potential rebuttal which places limitations on the claim. Qualifiers indicate the degree of force the writer believes the claim holds and this degree is usually dependent on the number and the strength of the potential rebuttals. Qualifiers also express the degree to which the audience should accept the claim; such admissions of fallibility can protect the speaker from undue responsibility. To return to our weather example, all meteorologists predict rain, but, given the unpredictable nature of weather, they rarely guarantee rain, even when it seems imminent. By forecasting an 80% chance of rain, they acknowledge that conditions are favorable for rain but could change. Such a qualified claim can also help preserve their jobs because they are never really wrong.
Critics have raised a wide variety of objections to the Toulmin model and I find it illuminating that some can be resolved by going back to our understanding of the enthymeme. Richard Crable argues that the backing which supports a warrant can also be challenged and that the subsequent backing for the backing, per se, can also be challenged; this can potentially go on ad infinitum, and accepting all such challenges could possibly lead to an infinite regress (73). Avoiding such a regress is a matter of discretion on the part of the rhetor; he must analyze his audience and determine how much backing is required to shore up the warrant. Or, to quote Aristotle, "we must not carry [the enthymeme's] reasoning too far back, or the length of our argument will cause obscurity: nor must we put in all the steps that lead to our conclusion, or we shall waste words in saying what is manifest" (Rhetoric II,22,1395b,24-26).

Jimmie Trent correctly points out that the Toulmin model is more accessible to audiences because it eliminates the demands of logical rigor by emphasizing material validity over formal validity, but he criticizes the model because it cannot demonstrate material validity (255). I would like to ask Mr. Trent how it is possible for any argumentative structure or diagram to demonstrate material validity. The very nature of material validity requires an analysis of the content of a proposition; substantial arguments cannot be plugged into any type of "rhetorical equation" or formula such as the syllogism. The Toulmin model of argumentation helps to identify the important elements of an argument according to function and to see how these elements are related to one another. With regards to material validity,
this is probably the best we can hope for; and the Toulmin model is the best framework I know of for evaluating, not mathematically testing, material validity. To test material validity to any formal degree would be to impose the very logical rigor that the Toulmin model and the enthymeme successfully circumvent.

Clearly, the audience must be addressed in a kind of rhetorical dialogue if anyone is to construct a successful enthymeme or a successful Toulmin construction. We should do away with such analytic concepts as formal validity and material validity, and focus our attention instead on "audience validity." Since it is the audience who decides whether an argument succeeds as a means of persuasion, we should concern ourselves only with what the audience accepts as valid reasoning--if the audience accepts it, it is valid (McCroskey 94). Such a loose and flexible conception of argument validity permits us to use all of the available forms of proof according to a combination of audience analysis and rhetorical discretion.

The Toulmin Model and the Pisteis

In the previous chapter, it was established that the enthymeme is a particularly Aristotelian rhetorical device because it brings together the rational and affective components of persuasion. Likewise, the Toulmin conception of substantial argument also allows for greater flexibility in terms of artistic proofs whereas analytic arguments rely solely on logical demonstration. If the Toulmin model is a modern diagram of enthymemetic rhetoric, it follows that it would have the potential to employ all three types of artistic proof--Aristotle's pisteis.
Because the warrant is so crucial to the persuasive force of any substantial argument, Ehninger and Brockriede correctly assert that rhetorical proofs can be identified by the general relationships expressed in the warrant (105). Just as the assumption in an enthymeme may express ethological and pathological propositions as well as statements of fact, the warrant too can entail any of the three modes of artistic proof. Ehninger and Brockriede classify arguments with logical warrants as "substantive"; arguments with ethological warrants as "authoritative"; and arguments with pathological warrants as "motivational" (125-126).

The warrant of a substantive argument expresses the rational/logical relationship between the evidence and the claim. Suppose that I am conducting a survey of Iowa farmers to see how this class of people would respond to a hypothetical new energy bill that would dramatically increase the production and consumption of ethanol. The results of my survey may allow me to make the claim that most Iowa corn farmers are in favor of the new legislation based on my evidence that 85% of the random polling sample expressed approval of the bill. Although it may not have been logistically possible to survey all Iowa corn farmers, I can nonetheless make a claim which generalizes about the entire class based on an inference license which asserts that the sample group is representative of the entire class.

In a similar yet significantly different example, Peter Jennings may announce on the evening news that the Gallup organization predicts that candidate X will win the next election based on their poll results. The relationship between the poll results and the claim is
the same type of generalization as in the ethanol example, but this claim is supported by a different type of proof as well: "candidate X is likely to win the election because the Gallup organization forecasts that result." Now the warrant serves to assert the authority of the person/group that makes the claim rather than the logical relationship between the evidence and the claim: "the Gallup organization is (and has been) a reliable forecaster of election results." Since the warrant asserts the authority (ethos) of the source of the evidence, such an argument is called "authoritative" (Brockriede and Ehninger 51).

The third type of artistic proof-based argument, those in which the warrant asserts a pathological reason for accepting a claim, is called "motivational." Warrants of such arguments may express the audiences's needs, desires, emotions, cultural values, or any other audience-based, non-logical reason for accepting a claim. For example, we can return to a previous enthymeme: "Since Bosnia could be the Vietnam of the 90's, we must not commit American troops to the civil war there." The unexpressed warrant entails the prevailing belief of the American people that Vietnam was a terrible tragedy that should not be repeated. Such a warrant may need additional backing to make this cultural assumption more acceptable to the generation of young people who did not experience the war outside of history class. To be effective, I also think that the evidence ("Bosnia could be the Vietnam of the 90's") needs further backing to show how the situation in Bosnia is similar to the situation in Vietnam. The additional backing for the evidence shores up the analogy while the warrant's backing reinforces the crucial emotionally-charged assumption.
The enthymeme and the Toulmin model both depend on assumptions that the rhetor believes will justify his or her claims. But while the argument as it is delivered—in speech or on paper—often leaves these key assumptions unstated, the Toulmin diagram provides a means by which these implied warrants are brought to light and analyzed. This model is more valuable than most people realize because many base their entire arguments on faulty assumptions of which they could have been alerted had they used the Toulmin diagram as a diagnostic tool.

Dan Quayle, for instance, in his criticism of the "Murphy Brown" sit-com character, once issued this enthymeme: "'Murphy Brown' is not a good role model for young women today because she has chosen to become a mother without the benefit of a father." On the surface this seems like a plausible argument, but critics quickly pounced on what they perceived to be the underlying warrant: single mothers cannot be good parents. Dan Quayle did not actually say this, but the fact that the audience perceived this warrant to be implicit in his statement is sufficient to render his enthymeme invalid; his enthymeme did not meet audience validity simply because the audience rejected the warrant. A corollary to Anderson and Mortensen's notion that the warrant can be persuasive in itself (149) is the idea that the warrant can also be "dissuasive," either by voicing an invalid assumption or by its questionable connection to the evidence-claim construct. Had Dan Quayle made an attempt to identity the emotionally charged warrant that the audience may believe exists he could have saved himself from a great deal of criticism from women's organizations, bad press, and late night lampooning.
Conclusion

Chapter I was almost entirely devoted to defining, or at least characterizing, a difficult and much neglected rhetorical term: the enthymeme. While the Toulmin model is not a rhetorical term in need of defining, per se, I do believe that a complete understanding of the enthymeme is a necessary prerequisite to any attempt to appreciate the Toulmin model of argumentation. Therefore, my responsibilities in this chapter centered on establishing the Toulmin model as enthymemic and not necessarily on "defining" the Toulmin model. Nonetheless, I find it rather illuminating that the definition of the enthymeme advanced at the close of chapter I could conceivably serve as a "definition" of the Toulmin form of argument:

"The enthymeme is a functional expression of natural reasoning..."

Toulmin designed his model with an eye towards illustrating the ways in which people naturally reason in everyday situations. We do not commonly use the analytic forms of formal logic, but rather the more substantial methods of informal logic. And we do not do so for the purpose of scientific demonstration, but for more functional reasons—to get things done and to persuade people in daily contexts.

"...primarily deductive..." I was careful to include the qualifier "primarily" because it was shown that inductive and deductive forms of reasoning are not so distinct from each other as was once thought. Enthymemes can be either inductive or deductive, though their external expression in argument usually reflects a deductive move. Likewise, the Toulmin model cannot be so easily identified as deductive because it also makes allowances for inductive-like "warrant-estab-
lishing" arguments as well as deductive "warrant-using" ones. In
effect, Toulmin simply does away with the induction/deduction dis-
tinction by shifting the analysis of reasoning from a linear move to
a more dynamic, holistic one.

"...which is formed in response to contextual situations and deals
primarily with probable knowledge..." Toulmin developed his informal
logic, his substantial rhetoric, and his argument fields as a means of
contextualizing the abstract nature of formal logic while also allevi-
ating the constrictions of arguing from absolutes. We typically argue
about specific events and phenomena within the contexts in which they
arise and to argue about them with decontextualized, absolute formal
logic accomplishes very little at all. The Toulmin model depicts the
influences of contextual factors on our reasoning and also reflects the
contingent nature of our common arguments.

"...It is formed from the shared assumptions of the speaker and
the audience and may draw its appeals from all three elements of the
pisteis." The Toulmin model is an audience-centered form of rhetoric.
Reasoning is based on the assumptions of an audience (warrants), and
this is the model's most important element. Unlike analytic argument,
the Toulmin model allows for affective as well as rational proofs and
the key warrant can utilize whichever form of artistic proof is most
likely to serve the rhetor's persuasive ends. All of the remaining five
argumentative functions also reflect the influence of the audience on
the way an argument is constructed. This is crucial because the Toul-
min model does away with the complexities of formal and material va-
idity in favor of the only true test of reasoning: audience validity.
To sum up my observations by simply equating the Toulmin model with Aristotle's enthymeme, however, would not do justice to either. While both may be travelling the same rhetorical road, so to speak, the Toulmin model makes some very significant changes to Aristotle's device to make it somewhat more dynamic, applicable, and workable for the rhetorical demands of the twentieth century. For one, Toulmin averts the charge of relativism often levelled at Aristotle, who sometimes seems more concerned with countering the absolutism of Plato than with developing an effective *techne*. Toulmin presents a more effective compromise between absolutism and relativism by introducing a model of argument which illustrates both the stable nature of rational procedures and the contextual factors which shape them.

Toulmin's conception of argument fields may also be seen as an updating on the enthymeme. Although Aristotle did concern himself with the methods of reasoning in medicine, law, politics, and various other arts, it is Toulmin who expands Aristotle's brief comments into a more complete and modern methodology for reasoning and arguing in a wider range of argument fields according to the demands of the present century. Much of what Aristotle says is still true today, but we need scholars like Toulmin to adapt the classics to the needs of modern students.

Finally, Toulmin helps us to accomplish what Aristotle cannot: a clear and accessible pedagogy for the rhetoric classroom. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is too obscure and difficult to use as a kind of textbook; but Toulmin, in presenting a modern rhetoric that is very much Aristotelian, can be readily incorporated into the rhetoric and/or composi-
tion classroom (in fact, Toulmin has published a textbook which features his rhetoric—*An Introduction to Reasoning*—although the word "enthymeme" is conspicuously absent). His layout of argument, in particular, has innumerable benefits and uses for students who have difficulty grasping the nebulous nature of Aristotle's rhetoric.

Now we are ready to explore these pedagogical implications, though I feel it necessary to offer this preliminary caveat: Aristotle's enthymeme and Toulmin's model, when combined into an effective pedagogy, contains a wide variety of options for the teacher and benefits for the student; however, they cannot function as a complete pedagogy alone. Aristotle and Toulmin may serve as a major theoretical component in a rhetoric course, but they, like any other rhetorical theorists, need to be supplemented by other approaches, other lessons, and the teachers' personal contributions. It would be wonderful to think that a single approach could serve all the needs of the freshman rhetoric classroom, but that would not only be too idealistic, it would also deny the greater educational value of a wide variety of rhetorical voices.
Now that we have arrived at a working conception of the "new" enthymeme and have shown the Toulmin model to be a modernization and expansion of that enthymeme, it is time to address the attendant question: What are we, as teachers of rhetoric, to do with this new knowledge? This is the fundamental question that will drive this chapter, and the answers to it will flesh out the basic enthymeme of this chapter: Because the enthymeme and the Toulmin model provide rhetoric teachers with a wealth of pedagogical options and benefits, such teachers should feature them together as a major theoretical component of their courses. To advance this thesis, I will look their potential as an evaluative framework, as an invention heuristic, as an organizational device, and as a diagnostic tool. Then I will look at some of the major rhetoric textbooks to see how the field is dealing with the enthymeme and Toulmin today. And finally, I will offer some of my own methods for incorporating these elements into the classroom.

Before that, however, I feel that there are certain prerequisites that students and teachers should cover before handling substantial argument (from this moment on, the term "substantial argument" will be used to refer to the enthymeme and the Toulmin model together). Since the basic rhetoric course is typically made up of students who have no prior experience with rhetoric, it would be inappropriate to jump right into the principles of substantial argument without first laying some groundwork.

First, students should be introduced to, or refreshed of, the process approach to writing. Not only is this the current trend of most
writing scholars and texts, it is also necessary to see that the con-
struction of substantial arguments involves a series of steps including
audience analysis, creating and testing propositions, stylistic adap-
tation, and others. I will look more closely at the process of gener-
atating substantial arguments a little later, but for now it is important
to note that recent research shows that an awareness of the processes
involved in composing a text significantly improves students' reading
comprehension (To-Dutka 201).

Next, students should be introduced to the fundamentals of argu-
mentative discourse. In high school, most students are required to
write papers of an expository nature, such as personal essays and
term papers. Fulkerson suggests that most expository writing is argu-
mentative since it often involves supporting claims with other claims
serving as reasons (436). This is not much different from Burleson's
conception of argument as "reason-giving discourse" (141). By alerting
students to the broad range of argumentative discourse in everyday
life, we may lead them to see that substantial argument has some
applicability to their own lives and majors. Hopefully, this will
increase their receptivity to the material (whereas abstract formal
logic will likely seem irrelevant to most majors).

Teachers may also find it beneficial to further divorce their ma-
terial from formal logic since it is the inability of formal logic to
relate to students' lives that accounts for its demise in the rhetoric
classroom (Stygall 95). This can be done by stressing the inferential,
dynamic, and contingent nature of real-life argumentation; that is,
teachers should introduce the enthymemic nature of argument and
demonstrate the differences between substantial argument and formal logic. It may come as a shock to some students that, as far as rhetoric is concerned, there is no "Truth" in the platonic sense, or "fact" in the Cartesian sense, or even "meaning" in the fixed, dictionary sense; but such concepts must be made clear before substantial rhetoric can be introduced.

Lastly, students must be introduced to the social nature of argumentation. Substantial rhetoric is nothing if not a process by which writers and readers work together in the construction of arguments and knowledge. Up until the time they enter the rhetoric classroom, most students have only known writing to be a solitary process of putting their own internal thoughts on paper for others to read. Now, however, they must learn the conversational nature of most discourse, especially the dialogic nature of argument and the implied dialectic of rhetoric. This will certainly promote the necessity of audience analysis as well as an awareness of what Linda Flower calls the "bounded purpose" of writing:

Purpose in writing is always a bounded purpose. Whether one is constrained by the assumptions of one's culture, the material realities of the publishing industry, the demands of one's job, or the terms of an assignment, purpose takes shape in a context that both demands and entices the writer to walk into the embrace of purposes that are in some sense not his or her own....Forming a rhetorical purpose is a complex and creative act of negotiation. (292)

These, I believe, are the necessary prerequisites to the study of substantial argument, although an overview of the basics of Aristotelian rhetoric also seems in order. The bottom line is that the background material taught depends on the overall context of the course.
As Evaluative Framework

In the previous chapter, it was argued that the Toulmin model could be considered "quasi-universal" because it reflects the ways in which people in most fields justify their claims in most situations—which is to say that Toulmin sought to illustrate the particularly enthymemetic nature of human reasoning. Now if all people reason in a similar and predictable way, it follows that any model illustrating this reasoning process could be used as a standardized framework for the evaluation and criticism of arguments. This was Toulmin's goal in developing his model; he wanted to describe a universal means of testing ideas critically:

A main task of jurisprudence is to characterise the essentials of the legal process: the procedures by which claims-at-law are put forward, disputed and determined, and the categories in terms of which this is done. Our own inquiry is a parallel one: we shall aim, in a similar way, to characterise what may be called "the rational process," the procedures and categories by using which claims-in-general can be argued for and settled. (Uses 7)

So Toulmin developed his model with one eye towards the ways in which we naturally reason and with another eye towards developing a standardized schema by which arguments could be critiqued and evaluated.

The idea that the Toulmin model--and the enthymeme--describes a rational process that is shared by everyone is significant to the basic rhetoric course because the rosters of such courses typically consist of students from a wide variety of fields and majors. It should be relatively easy for the teacher to show them that this framework has some value for them in their personal lives and in their majors—which is
usually the criterion by which students decide whether or not to take an active interest in a course. Furthermore, if the course is cross-curricular, the Toulmin model can serve as a springboard to investigate how this reasoning process is modified by the various disciplines and argument fields.

The Toulmin model is particularly useful because it combines the necessary elements of an argument with the contextual variations that each rhetorical situation brings to bear on those elements. This may be perhaps the most useful benefit of the model because it provides the rhetoric classroom with a flexible framework and a lexicon by which students might articulate their evaluations. Without a standard for evaluation, it has been my experience that students have trouble verbalizing their misgivings about an argument ("Well, it seems reasonable to me"; "How can you say something like that?"). After some practice with the model--its terms and relationships--students learn to identify problems in an argument more readily and to articulate them in a way that makes sense for everyone in the academic community ("Dan Quayle is basing his claim that Murphy Brown is a poor role model for young mothers on the unwarranted assumption that single mothers cannot be good parents").

As Brockriede and Ehninger point out, the Toulmin model is simple and accessible to students as an evaluative tool because it lays out the parts of an argument spatially (47). Such a diagram helps students by highlighting the dynamic interactions and relationships among the various parts--including the suppressed assumptions--thus increasing the likelihood that weaknesses will be spotted. For example
the diagram (see Appendix A) shows how the relationship between the
backing and the warrant is analogous to that between the evidence
and the claim; it shows how the evidence-claim connection hinges on
the inferential leap as licensed by the warrant; it shows how the
strength of the rebuttal affects the degree of force of the claim as
indicated by the qualifier. It shows other relationships as well, but
the upshot is that these relationships may not be identified for evalu-
ation by students if left in standard paragraph form; "the diagram
displays a connection between the sentences which is not present in
text but was tacitly understood by all participants to the interaction"
(Burleson-A 144).

These dynamic interactions among the elements of an argument are
a distinguishing feature of substantial rhetoric. Unlike formal logic,
which arrives at conclusions by way of such linear processes an in-
duction and deduction, substantial rhetoric requires a more holistic
approach. Since arguments are structured around the presentation
and defense of a claim, one who wishes to analyze an argument must
begin with the claim and then examine the argument surrounding it
to see how the material in the discourse develops and supports that
claim (Kneupper 240). The Toulmin model depicts arguments holisti-
cally and shows how the propositions of an argument eventually lead
to the establishment of a conclusion/claim.

The Toulmin model can also provide a means of identifying and
categorizing logical fallacies. Richard Fulkerson presents three prob-
lems with current fallacy theory: 1) It is inherently incomplete--there
is no limit to the number of ways reasoning can go astray; 2) it is
inherently negative—it tells what errors to avoid, but not how to reason well; and 3) fallacies are not clearly defined and distinguished from one another (443). The Toulmin model cannot solve all of these problems completely, but it can help significantly. Fallacy theory will always be incomplete, I believe, because each rhetorical situation presents a new set of potential errors; but the Toulmin model can include contextual factors in such a way that makes fallacies easier to identify. The Toulmin model as it is does not teach anyone how to reason correctly, but it does provide a means by which reasoning can be tested and evaluated for correctness. The Toulmin model can also help define and distinguish the various fallacies by relating them to broader categories of failure in Toulminian terms. Stuart Hirschberg does just that in his text, Strategies of Argument. Hirschberg, for example, unites the red herring, the straw man, the ad hominem, and others under the category of "Fallacies that result when the evidence is not relevant to the claim." Errors such as the slippery slope, the either/or fallacy, and the false cause are categorized as "Fallacies that result from unwarranted assumptions" (148-162).

Lastly, the lexicon of substantial rhetoric can serve evaluative purposes in peer review groups. I regularly conduct workshop groups of four or five students in which I direct the discussion of their drafts while they provide the criticism and analysis. Before I used the Toulmin model, I must confess that I was a rather ambiguous director, asking questions such as "What do you think of John's argument?" or "Do you agree with Beth's thesis after finishing the paper?" Naturally, their responses to such questions were equally ambiguous.
With the Toulmin model, I was able to ask more detailed questions that probed into specific relationships among the parts of their arguments with a lexicon and a framework that all of us understood: "Do you accept the implied warrant on which that evidence is based? How strongly does the rebuttal undermine the force of the claim?" The answers to questions such as these are more useful in building a stronger argument for the next draft. In this regard, the Toulmin model provides us all with the same playing field and the same rules for evaluating arguments, something that most textbooks do not yet provide.

As Invention Heuristic

Substantial rhetoric not only has valuable uses as an evaluative tool, it also has the potential to serve as an invention heuristic as well. Since the Toulmin model describes the essential argumentative elements of a discourse and how they relate to one another, it easily follows that these same elements should provide a guide for how a sound argument is put together. Learning the rules of almost anything often leads to a natural learning of how to use the rules well; the chess player, to cite but one example, first learns the rules of the game and how the pieces move, and, before long, he or she is able to formulate, or "invent," strategies which utilize those rules to best advantage. The same principle applies to the Toulmin model, and its value to the freshman rhetoric class is doubled if it can be effectively used in both the production and assessment of persuasive discourse.
What I am proposing is something of an unusual idea because, until recently, the Toulmin model was perceived as an evaluative tool only—even Toulmin thought that reasoning was concerned with testing ideas, not arriving at them (Introduction 9). Few rhetoricians have conceived of the model as an invention heuristic and none that I have encountered has yet to devote serious attention to the idea. Fulkerson supports this observation but also notes that the Toulmin model at least has the potential to aid invention—a potential that formal logic does not have (446). He converts the six functions of the Toulmin model into a heuristic for students to follow (see Appendix E); if they answer each question well, they should end up with a series of statements that fulfill those six essential features:

1. What do I want to prove? (i.e. What is my claim?)
2. What evidence do I have to support that claim?
3. What assumption could warrant my move from the evidence to the claim?
4. How can I back up that warrant further?
5. What objections/rebuttals should my argument take into consideration?
6. How much should I qualify the strength of the claim?

To Fulkerson's heuristic, I would add a seventh question: How much does the intended audience know about the topic or issue? I feel that this is a crucial question because the answer will set the level of the argument, which must be appropriate to the level of the audience. As with the enthymeme, the level of the audience determines whether or not certain assumptions and facts need to be stated explicitly in an argument; and what is not said can be just as important as what is.
This seventh question requires that the writer engage in audience analysis, which is a critical step in the invention process when constructing persuasive discourse. We cannot begin to write an argument without a very clear idea of who it is we are attempting to persuade, what they know and believe, and what types of argument they are likely to find most acceptable. In fact, what the audience believes is, in some ways, more important to the overall shape of an argument than what we would like to persuade them to believe, since it is the audience who determines whether an argument is valid or not. Thus, it is not just helpful, but necessary, for the speaker to analyze and understand the audience and to construct enthymemes that are appropriate to that audience. That is, the rhetor's aims must work with the audience's assumptions. Effective rhetors consciously construct enthymemes from the shared assumptions of an audience and then present those assumptions in a manner that allows the members of that audience to participate in their own persuasion (Bitzer 408).

By illustrating this enthymemic principle of rhetoric, the Toulmin model can help students see how important the role of the audience is to the invention process. Similarly, a consideration of the pisteis is intimately connected with notions of audience. Once students estimate which types of argumentative strategies are likely to be most effective for a given audience, they can shape their appeals to fit those strategies. Toulmin's diagram allows them the opportunity to distance themselves from their arguments and to see how their audiences are likely to evaluate them. Students must be mindful that what they find persuasive is not necessarily what their audiences find persuasive.
The warrant—as the expression of an audience-held, inference-licensing assumption—may be considered the most critical element in the invention process. As stated earlier, the audience decides what counts as valid evidence and valid assumptions, but it is the warrant that serves as the foundation upon which the argumentative justification of a claim rests. Since an argument cannot be effective without audience validity, the writer must not only be able to know what an audience knows, but what means of moving from evidence to claim the audience will accept.

By itself, however, the Toulmin model provides no methodology for determining what assumptions an audience holds, but it is useful for testing the assumptions that a rhetor eventually derives through audience analysis. According to McCroskey, the Toulmin model brings audience analysis into the invention process rather than treating it as a discrete step. Such a combination leads students to ask the right questions; it does not provide the right answers:

If the student speaker can learn to evaluate his resources by beginning with his claim and then proceeding to find the data and warrant needed to establish that claim with his particular audience, he will determine what he needs to know about that audience. (McCroskey 94-96)

By plotting the argument in a Toulmin diagram, the student should be able to tell if the argument hangs together when the warrant contains one of the audience’s assumptions. Of course, I am basing this line of reasoning on the assumption that the critical testing of our "inventions" is in itself implicit in the invention process.

The rebuttal in the Toulmin model is also important to an audience-centered invention process because, like the warrant, it is de-
rived almost entirely from the audience. A rebuttal anticipates the possible objections of the audience and forces the writer to look at the issue in question from another viewpoint. This is useful in the classroom because too often our students argue from personal beliefs and prejudices without considering the myriad other ways to look at an issue. The rebuttal forces the student to place himself in the shoes of the audience and to evaluate the persuasive force of his argumentative move. Students will be forced to do this if the teacher works under Toulmin's maxim that an argument is successful if it can survive all attacks against it. By learning to anticipate potential weaknesses, students will learn to devise new lines of argument if the rebuttal is strong and counter-rebuttals if the objections are not so strong.

The enthymeme is also particularly useful to the invention of the thesis statement and the teaching of it. An effective thesis statement should be expressed in enthymemetic form: it should present the main claim, the primary reasons for accepting the claim, and an implied assumption which ties the two together. The thesis of this chapter is enthymemetic in that it expresses a claim which I believe my audience does not share with me at the outset ("Rhetoric teachers should feature the enthymeme and the Toulmin model together as a major theoretical component of their courses..."), the intended means of arguing for the claim and the primary reasons for accepting it ("...because the enthymeme and the Toulmin model provide rhetoric teachers with a wealth of pedagogical options and benefits"), and the implied warrant which I believe my audience shares with me without question ("Any
theoretical component which provides rhetoric teachers with a wealth of pedagogical options and benefits should be featured in the rhetoric classroom). This is what Lawrence D. Green calls the "fundamental enthymeme," and it aids the invention process by calling attention to the "strategic necessities" that must be fulfilled before we can be satisfied that our main claim has been proven (625).

While it is true that the Toulmin model can only illustrate a single inferential move, it can indicate what further argumentative moves will be required to support the fundamental enthymeme. This is a new twist on the old adage, "You must prove everything in the thesis statement." That is, the fundamental enthymeme, as laid out with the Toulmin model, spells out all of the propositions that must be further discussed with secondary enthymemes. This is because the thesis statement not only indicates the claim that the whole argument seeks to prove, but also the assumptions that must be defended, the evidences that must be proven as valid, and the rebuttals which must be dealt with. Fortunately for me, my fundamental enthymeme only requires that I support my means of proving the claim by specifying what those pedagogical options and benefits are (though it may behoove me to show that substantial rhetoric provides quality benefits and options for the rhetoric teacher, not just a quantity of them).

**As Organizational Device**

Green's fundamental enthymeme is a device that can impose the necessary ordering of ideas that is so often missing from students' essays. It is a means of combining the processes of invention and
arrangement by cueing students to the materials required in an argument as well as the structure those ideas should take. Unlike the traditional thesis statement—which usually articulates an issue and the writer's position only—Green's fundamental enthymeme "shapes the movement of the entire discourse through its control of the overall logical and rhetorical relations within the discourse" (623).

For example, suppose one were to write an argument in support of the following fundamental enthymeme: "Composition classes would be significantly improved by focusing on the enthymeme because it is central to the overall theory and practice of Aristotle's rhetoric"—based on the assumption that audience and writer share a belief in the primacy of Aristotelian rhetoric in composition pedagogy. Following Green's model, it would be necessary to first prove that composition courses are in need of a better approach. Next, the writer must show that the enthymeme is central to the rhetoric of Aristotle. Lastly, the writer would have to show that an approach based on the enthymeme is superior to other possible solutions to the problem. Consequently, this one enthymeme not only suggests the materials that must be invented to prove the claim, but also the series of logical relationships and their arrangement throughout the essay as well.

As the title of his essay indicates, Jeffrey Porter advances a use for the enthymeme from the reader's perspective in "The Reasonable Reader." Porter's goal is to show how the enthymeme can organize the reader's participation in the text (332). Porter seems to be operating under an assumption—which I find agreeable—that a writer considers his audience before inventing an argument, but the text itself
engages the reader directly in a kind of conversation. Subsequently, the fundamental enthymeme can guide the reader through a text by implying a logical and orderly arrangement—the same order which guides the writer in the arrangement of his ideas; after all, writers are readers of their texts too.

Borrowing from Green, Porter also discusses the parts of a fundamental enthymeme as a conclusive assertion plus three requirements: 1) the question at issue, or *stasis*; 2) a clause that functions as the main reason for accepting the assertion; and 3) an assumption acceptable to a certain audience (336). But Porter goes a little further by arguing that the dominant enthymeme controls both the rhetorical and logical relationships within an argument by implying an ethos, symbolic strategies, and the premises assumed by the reader—whether the writer is aware of the controlling enthymeme or not (332-333). Thus, teachers should encourage their students to probe texts for these relationships that are implied by the enthymeme:

Aristotle's idea of the enthymeme can be understood as a device for discovering connections....If critical reading can be defined as the art of understanding discourse, and if discourse is determined by enthymemic relations, then I believe we have a right to say that critical reading involves comprehending the inferential order of a particular text and, further, understanding how the affective strategies implied by that order work to fulfill it. (Porter 336)

The Toulmin model can also aid in this enthymemetic arrangement, of course, but its terminology presents another way to organize the material in an essay. Charles W. Kneupper argues that the model can easily be employed as a tool to teach the logical outline (240). By arranging propositions in a kind of hierarchy from claims down to
warrants and finally to evidence and backing, students should be able to see the relationships among these propositions and to test to determine the best possible ordering of these relationships. Kneupper suggests that such an outline might look something like this (240):

CLAIM: 1. A national health care program should be adopted.

WARRANT: A. A national program is necessary to deal with the magnitude of the problem.

EVIDENCE: 1. Millions of people cannot afford adequate health care.

EVIDENCE: 2. States, localities, and charities cannot afford to provide for so many people.

WARRANT: B. A national program is a moral imperative.

EVIDENCE: 1. The results of inadequate health care are unnecessary death and suffering for millions.

BACKING: 2. Failing to act to correct this problem when we are capable of doing so leaves us morally responsible.

As Diagnostic Tool

When Toulmin says that his model serves as a means of testing ideas critically, he is implicitly saying that his model has diagnostic value. Naturally, any framework that lays out arguments for analysis and criticism can be used by teachers to analyze the arguments of their students. But the Toulmin model, with its spatial diagram and its particular lexicon, allows teachers to be more specific in their evaluations of student papers and it also provides a workable standard that both student and teacher can use. Too often, students complain that they do not know how their teachers go about the busi-
ness of evaluating their work; by using the Toulmin model as both an evaluative and diagnostic tool, students can be made aware of what their teachers hold as the qualities of a good argument and not worry so much about "giving teachers what they want." The Toulmin model can help add some standards to the traditionally arbitrary process of evaluating writing.

Substantial rhetoric provides writing teachers with a variety of diagnostic options. For one, they can use Kneupper's outline to plot the major propositions in a student's paper. By removing statements from their surrounding paragraphs, teachers should be better able to test the logical ordering of ideas and suggest better or alternative orders. Such an outline may also be used to test paragraph unity, assuming that every paragraph contains a claim serving as a topic sentence and a series of facts and warrants to support that claim. To put it another way, an outline of an entire argument can test paragraph unity as well as the logical relationships among those paragraphs.

The fundamental enthymeme can also serve diagnostic purposes. By identifying the logical and necessary steps of an argument that grow out of the driving enthymeme, teachers can anticipate the moves that a student will--or should--make and also anticipate where that student might have difficulty (Green 624). This can be helpful both for the evaluation of finished papers and the evaluations of thesis statements alone. Teachers can ask that students submit a thesis statement as a first step in the writing process, then offer suggestions based on what that fundamental thesis demands and foreshadows.
All teachers are required to diagnose the problems in student papers, but the teacher who can help his or her students learn self-diagnosis will produce the better writers. The students who simply revise their work according to the teacher's comments will not learn as much as the students who can revise their work based on their own diagnoses. Substantial rhetoric can help achieve this end by showing students that an argument is made up of a series of smaller arguments. Every inferential move is an enthymeme, the collection of which serve to support a fundamental enthymeme. By breaking their arguments down into their constituent argumentative moves, and then by plotting and evaluating these moves according to the Toulmin diagram, students will be better able to detect weaknesses in their reasoning and revise them in such a way that they succeed in themselves and in relation to the fundamental enthymeme. Fixing and improving the parts of an argument can substantially improve the whole.

The Toulmin model also has significant self-diagnostic potential simply because it provides another way of looking at arguments. As Schultz and Laine point out, the Toulmin model allows students to distance themselves from their arguments by separating the rational moves from the stylistic filler and then plotting those moves on an objective framework (88). This helps students to see their arguments from a different, more rational perspective—one that is closer to the way an intended reader might see it. This schema for self-evaluation can help promote students' sense of control over their own writing (Schultz & Laine 88); they can identify problems and make changes in their work without waiting for the teacher to "pronounce judgment."
The Textbooks

Given the abundance of pedagogical options and benefits provided by substantial rhetoric, one would think that the current crop of rhetoric textbooks for the writing classroom would feature the enthymeme and the Toulmin model as a major theoretical base. Sadly, this is not the case. While some texts do devote serious attention to substantial rhetoric, many do not. Formal logic, despite its inability to relate to students' majors and everyday lives, still thrives in the texts today; and those texts which do feature the enthymeme and the Toulmin model habitually favor one and ignore the other. My review of some of today's texts have led me to three conclusions: 1) most texts do not reflect recent research in the study of the enthymeme; 2) most texts do not make a significant connection between the enthymeme and the Toulmin model; and 3) a text which unlocks the enormous potential of substantial rhetoric for the basic writing classroom has yet to be developed. Correcting these shortcomings has been one of the driving forces behind the thesis you are now reading.

Many rhetoric-based writing textbooks fail to give substantial rhetoric the attention it deserves. Miller's *Motives for Writing*, for example, defines the enthymeme as a "two-part deductive argument from which the major premise has been omitted" (189). Nothing more is said about the enthymeme, and the section which immediately follows, "Substantive Reasoning," devotes less than two pages to Toulmin and seems to suggest that his model is a logical construction like the syllogism. Spurgin's *The Power to Persuade* is not much different. She defines the enthymeme as "a core argument consisting of an asser-
tion and a 'because' clause justifying that assertion" (46). She does, however, discuss the enthymeme's potential as a thesis statement in the spirit of Green's fundamental enthymeme. Like Miller, Spurgin gives the Toulmin model less than two pages and, again, no connection is made with the enthymeme—even though Spurgin returns to the enthymeme immediately after Toulmin. Similarly, *Current Issues and Enduring Questions* by Barnet and Bedau commit the most grievous error of describing the enthymeme by its nineteenth century definition: "An incomplete or abbreviated syllogism, in which one of the premises is left unstated" (36). This text devotes more time to Toulmin—seven pages—but relegates his model to a large appendix called "Further Perspectives." Toulmin's lexicon is detailed and a sample analysis of an argument is given, but, like the others, no connection is made with the enthymeme and no diagram illustrating the dynamic relations among the six elements is provided.

Fortunately, some rhetoric texts do rely on Toulmin's substantial rhetoric as a theoretical base. Ramage and Bean's *Writing Arguments* also conceives of the enthymeme as an incomplete syllogism, but to this inadequate definition they have at least added the concept of the unstated premise as drawn from the assumptions of the audience (56). Still, no connection is made between the enthymeme and Toulmin's rhetoric; but Toulmin, the social approach to communication, and a few chapters devoted to audience are all fairly well handled. Teachers and students alike may find that Ramage and Bean present the basics of Toulmin's rhetoric in a way that is more accessible and digestible than even Toulmin's own *Introduction to Reasoning*. 
As far as the enthymeme is concerned, Rottenberg's *Elements of Argument* is no better than the other texts: the enthymeme is "a syllogism in which one of the premises is implicit" (522). I do not mean to keep repeating myself, but this text, like the others, says nothing else of substance about the enthymeme. I bring Rottenberg's text into this survey because she features Toulmin as the major theoretical base and uses the elements of his model as an organizing device for her chapters:

Toulmin's model of argument does not guarantee a classroom of skilled arguers, but his questions about the parts of an argument and their relationship are precisely the ones that students must ask and answer in writing their own essays and analyzing those of others. They lead students naturally into the formulation and development of their claims. (vi)

To Toulmin, she adds a concern for motivational appeals (which may imply that Rottenberg views the Toulmin model as a logical rubric only) and she stresses the audience-centered approach to argument using audience validity as the measurement of a good argument.

The text I had been using for several semesters, Hirschberg's *Strategies of Argument*, has much in common with Rottenberg's text. Hirschberg as well (and this is the last time I'll say it) defines the enthymeme as an abbreviated syllogism (146); and he makes no connection between it and either the social approach to argument or the informal logic of Toulmin. Like Rottenberg, Hirschberg uses Toulmin as the theoretical base, and he gives a detailed description of the three main parts; but he puts his own mark on the model by detailing four classes of claims, five types of evidence, and six categories of warrants—which provide an even more thorough lexicon for analysis.
Hirschberg also brings Toulmin's argument fields directly into a text like no other, detailing the differences in argumentative procedures among the fields of ethics, business, law, history, the sciences, the social sciences, and the arts. Hirschberg also uses the Toulmin model to classify the logical fallacies in a uniquely orderly manner.

Nonetheless, the teacher who wishes to use the Hirschberg text would be well-advised to study and understand Toulmin's rhetoric before attempting to teach the model to students. This text falls short in my mind because it does not present a holistic view of the Toulmin model. We do not get a description of how the six parts of the model work together in the creation and analysis of arguments. The three major parts--claim, evidence, warrant--are given individual, detailed attention; but the three minor parts--backing, rebuttal, qualifier--are discussed briefly and lumped under a subchapter on audience. The author of the text seems to assume that students and teachers alike will be able to understand the complex interactions among the parts by studying the parts individually. Personal experience and study has led me to believe that such a part-by-part approach cannot convey the web of dynamic interactions that a holistic view can. I found it necessary to create a series of overheads that illustrate this network after discovering that my students consistently failed to grasp Toulmin after reading what Hirschberg has to say. Consequently, I feel that Hirschberg's text does not do justice to Toulmin's substantial rhetoric; the teacher who can make Strategies "work" is the one who understands the Toulmin model better that Hirschberg, and can communicate that knowledge effectively.
The last text I would like to call attention to is John T. Gage's *The Shape of Reason*, and I mention it last because it seems to be the only text that almost "gets it right." Gage's discussion of the enthymeme is the only one that is current with the latest research on the enthymeme. His delineation of the differences between the enthymeme and the syllogism contains many of the same features that my own multiplex "definition" articulated (on page 30). He also devotes serious attention to the "structural enthymeme," which is similar to the fundamental enthymeme in that it serves as a thesis which helps invent material and guides the organization and presentation of that material. Gage's text is also the only text to make a direct connection between the enthymeme and the Toulmin model, although that connection is very brief and does not involve the same level of comparison as this thesis. Gage also connects the entire *pisteis* to the model, thus acknowledging that substantial rhetoric is more than just an informal kind of logic. I would recommend this text to any teacher who makes extensive use of the enthymeme in their rhetoric class, but the text falls short for my purposes because it does not cover the Toulmin model with the depth and complexity that it requires.

Readers may wonder why I chose not to promote Toulmin's own text, *An Introduction to Reasoning*. My primary reason for not doing so is that it does not fit the needs of the particular environment with which this thesis is concerned: the basic rhetorical writing classroom. Toulmin's text is more suited to the concerns of a basic philosophy or logic course; it does not address the written communication of the brand of reasoning it details. Another reason is that this text makes
no connections with Aristotle or the enthymeme—neither gets so much as a mention in the entire book. And still another reason why this text is not recommended for the writing classroom, in my opinion, is because it does not address the wide range of important rhetorical issues and developments as does his earlier work, The Uses of Argument. Since Toulmin is not a communication theorist, a rhetorician, a writing teacher, or anything other than a philosopher, his ideas can only have value for the basic writing course when given the proper pedagogical attention in a writing text, accompanied by an engaging and current reader, and presented by an effective and rhetoric-oriented writing teacher.

Some Final Suggestions

Since there is not yet a current writing textbook for the freshman rhetoric course that successfully and comprehensively features the rhetoric of Aristotle and Toulmin in general, and their argumentative devices in particular, bringing the enthymeme and the Toulmin model into the classroom places certain obligations on the teacher. First, I would suggest that the teacher brush up on recent research on the enthymeme and the Toulmin model before the semester begins. Many teachers take some sort of satisfaction in learning something along with their students; trust me when I say that such an approach will not work well here (I speak from experience). Substantial rhetoric can be rather easy for students for grasp, but only if the teacher is fully prepared and knowledgeable enough to present the material effectively. There are no texts that will sufficiently teach the teacher
about the massive potential of the new enthymeme and the Toulmin model. So, teachers, read Toulmin's primary works, read Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, and read the recent research on both. I will not pretend that this thesis can serve as the only reading one needs to do to understand substantial rhetoric, but that was one of my goals here.

Once one feels that they have performed the necessary preparations and is ready to teach, I would suggest designing the freshman rhetoric course around a logical progression of lectures and exercises to teach substantial rhetoric cumulatively. For starters, one should begin with a series of lectures that lay out the background material. Such lectures might include the basics of Aristotelian rhetoric, the social constructionist approach to communication, and Toulmin's philosophical ideas underlying his rhetoric, among others. The enthymeme and the Toulmin model can seem quite complex and difficult without this firm foundation. And, as I suggested earlier, it would also be a good idea to design overheads which cover some topics that the texts do not (some of my own look very much like the appendices at the end of this thesis).

Next, I would suggest using substantial rhetoric as an evaluative device in a series of simple sample arguments. In my course, I have my students analyze a simple text, such as an advertisement or a newspaper editorial, to identify the primary enthymeme operating there followed by an evaluation of the reasoning according to the Toulmin model. I have found that students must first become conscious of the enthymemes and the reasonings in others' arguments before they can practice using them on their own.
Lastly, I have found significant success using a syllabus whose material and writing assignments focus on substantial rhetoric and progress by steps from the simple to the more complex. For example, the first writing assignment involves a summary of a published essay; this introduces students to the business of picking out the major enthymemes and argumentative moves that support a claim. Next, my students write a rhetorical analysis of an essay, which attaches to the previous assignment the evaluation of argumentative moves using the Toulmin model. In the third assignment, students write a simple argument using a fundamental enthymeme and Toulmin to turn the tide of the course towards the invention and arrangement of their own arguments. The fourth assignment stresses the importance of audience; here, students add stylistic elements to the skeletal argument and learn to adapt more sensitively to the concerns of a specific audience by using the various appeals of the *pisteis*. Finally, the last writing assignment combines everything the students have learned throughout the semester and adds an emphasis on secondary research to arrive at a fully-developed, rhetorical argument.

While the Toulmin model and the enthymeme may seem like a Godsend to teachers of freshman rhetoric, the truth is that the jury is still out. Very few textbooks deal with Toulmin in any significant way and many rhetoric teachers are still unfamiliar with him. That I am so often asked by other teachers at Iowa State to guest lecture on the Toulmin model is just one indication of this. Toulmin's place in rhetorical theory and a definitive conception of the enthymeme have yet to be established in the field; thus, teachers are free to tinker,
mold, utilize, and experiment with substantial rhetoric in any way that might advance one's pedagogical objectives. Many of the ideas presented in this chapter are the result of armchair theorizing which are contingent upon further study and classroom use. But I must admit that these pedagogical options and potential benefits are very exciting to me as a teacher of freshman rhetoric.

It must also be noted that I do not wish to suggest that the Toulmin model—and substantial rhetoric in general—should serve as the only basis for freshman rhetoric courses. It would be nice, and very idealistic, to think that this one body of ideas could serve as the only theory a student needs to know—something so simple and flexible that all students can grasp it and springboard from it to all other significant rhetorical principles. But the truth is that no such universal theory exists (yet); even the enthymeme, which rhetoricians believe to be the main means of persuasion for the Aristotelian rhetoric so many of us teach, cannot handle everything. Matters of tone, style, expression, grammar, and whatnot still must be taught as if the enthymeme and the Toulmin model were not yet developed.

However, I hope I have justified my own use of substantial rhetoric as one of the major theoretical approaches for freshman rhetoric courses. This was my primary goal in this thesis. I spend the larger part of each semester teaching substantial rhetoric in all its diverse aspects because I believe that the benefits of doing so far outweigh the negatives. Because substantial rhetoric is so simple and flexible and applicable to all fields; because it reflects the ways in which people naturally justify their claims about contingent matters;
because it provides a set of standards by which arguments may be laid out, evaluated, and diagnosed; because it illustrates how writers and their audiences "work together" in the creation and presentation of arguments; because it can incorporate all three types of artistic appeals; because it can serve as a multiplex heuristic strategy for the invention of arguments; because it can be employed as an organizational device and diagnostic tool for both students and teachers; because it is less complicated, less restrictive, and much more practical than the rules of formal logic; and because it can benefit myself and my students in many other ways left unstated or yet unseen, I will continue to feature Aristotle's enthymeme and Toulmin's model in my classroom and study it as a scholar until someone can prove to me that there is something much better out there on the rhetorical horizon.


Burleson (B), Brant R., "On the Foundations of Rationality: Toulmin, Habermas, and the a Priori of Reason." *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, 16 (Fall 1979): 112-127.


APPENDIX A

SCHEMATIC OF THE TOULMIN MODEL OF ARGUMENTATION

CLAIM: The contingent statement the writer seeks to prove; the conclusion put forth by the writer as the goal of the argument.

EVIDENCE: Anything the writer brings forth to prove the claim.
(Sometimes called "grounds," "support," or "data")

WARRANT: The underlying assumption, shared by the writer and audience, that authorizes the inferential leap from the evidence to the conclusion/claim.

BACKING: Additional support for the assumption expressed in the warrant, often implied and not always necessary.

REBUTTAL: States the conditions under which the claim will not hold true; anticipates the possible objections and challenges of the audience.

QUALIFIER: Limitations placed on the strength of the claim; indicates the degree of force the writer believes the claim holds.
An enthymeme process asks students first to conduct a preparatory analysis of the writing context to determine the shared question at issue for themselves and their audience and to determine the assumptions they and their audience share. They then articulate a tentative assertion that will achieve their ends. Based on this tentative assertion they look for adequate evidence, adequacy being determined not only by quantity and factual veracity but also by the audience’s attitude towards it and by the logical relationship of the support to the assertion. This relationship is the assumption; without an acceptable assumption, the writer may collect an impressive body of supporting material but not persuade the audience. For example, a writer may want to assert that he or she should be reimbursed by a supplier, and think of including as support for that assertion the fact that the supplier provides the writer’s competitors, who have a better distribution system, with the means to undercut the writer’s prices and so cost him or her sales and profit. While the writer may make perfectly understandable these reasons for lost profit, he or she can come to see, or come to be shown, that this line of development requires the supplier to accept the assumption that it should restrict its business activity to that which won’t harm the writer financially. The writer realizes that the audience is being asked to agree to something he or she wouldn’t agree to, and, as it stands, that the written assumption is unwarranted;
if the writer still wants to argue for reimbursement, he or she must find support for this assumption [backing] or else find a new line of argument. If the context provides no other means of supporting the assumption, the writer is left with two options: to abandon the request for reimbursement, or to produce an argument that can clearly be seen to be sophistic.

Throughout the process of enthymemic development, students should keep in mind the prejudices and needs of their readers: Should they qualify their claims? Do they need to rebut potential alternatives? Do they need additional support for their assumptions and do the data and definitions they select remain acceptable? Throughout the process of drafting the product, students are continually confronted with the limits of what they can say and what they are willing to say.
APPENDIX C

A SAMPLE ARGUMENT WITH SCHEMATIC

The Argument:

"Unless they have some kind of an understanding that no one else knows about, it seems to me that Jim treats Betty pretty inconsiderately. Jim often leaves Betty at home baby-sitting while he goes out drinking with his friends, and he never even bothers to ask her if that's okay. I mean, this is the 90's! A husband has no business leaving his wife to spend all her evenings tied to the house and kids while he goes out without her."

The Schematic:

BACKING: This is the 90's!

[Present-day understanding of equity in gender relationships]

WARRANT: A husband has no business leaving his wife to spend all her evenings tied to the house and kids while he goes out without her.

(Value Warrant)

SUPPORT: Jim often leaves—>QUALIFIER: It—>CLAIM: Jim treats Betty at home with the kids while he goes out drinking with his friends, and he never bothers to ask her if that's okay.

(Personal Experience)

REBUTTAL: Unless they have some kind of an understanding that no one else knows about.

APPENDIX D

A SAMPLE ADVERTISEMENT WITH SCHEMATIC

Implied kernel argument in Nike ad campaign:

"You should wear Nike Air Jordan basketball shoes because Michael Jordan wears them."

Expanded Toulmin version:

"If you're a serious basketball player, you should be wearing Nike Air Jordan's on the court because Michael has worn them to six NBA scoring titles and two NBA championships. Maybe you'll still have the skills of Ross Perot, but at least you'll look like you can play the game."

The argument diagrammed:

BACKING: Michael Jordan has won
six NBA scoring titles and
two NBA championships.

lijk)

WARRANT: Michael Jordan is the best basketball player, and you should want to be like him. Authority W. + Value W.

SUPPORT: Michael Jordan wears them. (Expert Testimony)

QUALIFIER: If you're a serious basketball player. (Policy C.)

CLAIM: You should be wearing Nike Air Jordan's on the court.

REBUTTAL: Maybe you'll still have the skills of Ross Perot, but at least you'll look like you can play the game.
A SIX STEP HEURISTIC FOR CONSTRUCTING ARGUMENTS

Heuristic:

I. What do I want to prove?
II. What evidence do I have to support that claim?
III. What assumption could warrant my move from support to claim?
IV. How can I back up that warrant?
V. What objections should I take into consideration?
VI. How much should I limit the strength of the claim?

Example:

The Dallas Cowboys will return to the Super Bowl in 1994.

Dallas has the strongest combination of offense and defense in the NFC right now.

The team with the strongest combination of offense and defense usually wins the NFC.

Past history of the NFC over the last decade shows that... 

Dallas could be plagued by injuries or another team could trade and draft very well.

What I claim is very likely and is my informed opinion.

Final form: "Unless they are plagued by injuries or the San Francisco 49ers significantly improve their pass defense, it is my informed opinion that the Dallas Cowboys will very likely return to the Super Bowl in 1994 because they have the strongest combination of offense and defense in the NFC."

This argument assumes that the audience (say, readers of Sports Illustrated) understands and accepts the warrant and the backing and so they are not explicitly stated. As a possible seventh question, you should ask yourself whether or not your intended audience is likely to grasp your warrant if left unstated.