Jonathan Edwards: Christian oratory in the Lockean-Calvinist conversion process

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Lockean-Calvinist conversion process

by

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. THE CONTEXT</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. OF MAN AND MEANS</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. OF MAN AND ENDS</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. CHRISTIAN ORATORY</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. END NOTES</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PREFACE

Your consciences bear me witness, that while I had opportunity, I have not ceased to warn you, and set before you your danger. I have studied to represent the misery and necessity of your circumstances, in the clearest manner possible. I have tried all ways, that I could think of, tending to awaken your consciences, and make you sensible of the necessity of your improving your time and being speedy in fleeing from the wrath to come, and thorough in the use of means for your escape and safety. I have diligently endeavored to find out and use, the most powerful motives to persuade you to take care for your own welfare and salvation. I have not only endeavored to awaken you, that you might be moved with fear, but I have used my utmost endeavors to win you: I have sought out acceptable words. That if possible, I might prevail upon you to forsake sin, and turn to God, and accept of Christ as your Saviour and Lord. (Jonathan Edwards, "Farewell Sermon," ed. Vergilius Ferm, (New York: Library Publishers, 1953), p. 471.)
I. THE CONTEXT

Who was Johathan Edwards? That this is a difficult question is revealed in many ways. In his own time he was at the center of debate and controversy, meeting opponents whichever way he turned. Allies in the debate over one issue often became enemies on other issues. Today, the controversy still goes on. Although critics agree on the power of Edwards' intellect, they are in disagreement about the uses to which he put it and what he achieved with it, and this disagreement centers on the place of Enlightenment thought in Edwards' theological and philosophical systems.

Some critics see Edwards as the ultimate Calvinist, the brilliant, though largely unoriginal, defender of a lost theological cause. Vergilius Ferm sees him as "a prisoner of a set of alleged fundamental truths" whose thought was circumscribed by the rigid Calvinist doctrine that held his allegiance.¹ Alfred O. Aldridge believes that Edwards rose to his position of dominance among American theologians only because of the Calvinism that gave his thought direction and focus.² Edwards' works are, for Aldridge, the culmination of the systematic presentation of Calvinism and, in fact, Calvinism's last stand; yet Aldridge does not view his defense as creative: "Edwards' great talent was a destructive one; he demolished all the conventional arguments for free will and exposed the fallacies in most of the current systems of ethics[;] but he contributed little on the positive side."³ Perry Miller also sees Edwards' philosophical works as attacks that destroyed his
opponents' systems without a constructive explication of his own system. 4 Clarence Faust and Thomas Johnson, though their judgments are less negatively phrased, believe Edwards is "a representative product, both in background and temperament, of the elements of spiritual enlightenment for which all good Puritans yearned with a consuming ardor." 5 Yet is Edwards only the "complete" Calvinist?

Some critics believe that Edwards' thought is both brilliant and original, that his Calvinism, though limiting, is not the limit. For them Edwards' attempts to redefine and revitalize Calvinism through the science and philosophy of the Enlightenment is, in a large measure, successful. Miller believes that Edwards, though he speaks "from a primitive religious conception . . . hopelessly out of touch with even his own day," at the same time speaks "from an insight into science and technology so much ahead of his time that our own can hardly be said to have caught up with him." 6 Frankena, in his foreward to True Virtue, writes that Edwards "meant to propose an ethical theory that was consistent with Calvinism, but he meant to establish it on empirical and rational grounds," an effort that was a bold and independent one. 7 Heimert, too, sees his reconstruction of Calvinist philosophy as an outgrowth of the new science: "Edwards divested Calvinism of the language and conceptual apparatus of the 'covenant theology' and portrayed man's salvation (and the redemption of mankind) as part of the divinely-ordered sequence and 'attractions' of the universe," a reconstruction inspired by the Newtonian physics. 8 These critics see
Edwards as striving to incorporate Enlightenment thought into the threatened Calvinism of his day, but to what extent was he successful in striking a balance between the two?

Other critics believe that Edwards' thought went completely beyond the Calvinism he defended. For Gail Parker, Edwards' philosophy,

[by] insisting on a spontaneous flow between men's inner principles and their actions so that their spiritual state was constantly on trial and renewed, ... had explicitly rejected the rhetoric and do-good morality of a degenerate Puritanism[;] ... his conception of experiential religion [was based] on a psychology that denied either the possibility of getting outside oneself or of holding one's principles aloof from the ambiguities of action ... .

The Calvinist terminology Edwards redefined and the Lockean terminology he employed becomes, for critics such as Parker, indicative of an Edwardean philosophy that America did not and cannot escape.

Though critics disagree in their analysis of the degree to which Enlightenment thought influenced Edwards' theological writings, very little critical work has been done on how his thought, and the influences on it, are revealed in his ministry. There has, in fact, been a strong tendency to view Edwards the theologian separately from Edwards the minister. Yet his writings in defense of the Great Awakening and his treatises in defense of Calvinist doctrine can also be read as defenses of his ministry, since in the end, theology's primary purpose is to aid ministers and congregations in their pursuit of valid religious experience. The Enlightenment thinkers had redefined the nature of man and of experience, redefinitions that Edwards accepted as valid. Yet he also believed the Calvinist view that man was inherently corrupt and
incapable of attaining the highest good without God's intervention in his life. Were these views utterly disparate, or could they work together in an effective ministry? Within his lifetime, Edwards faced challenges both of these views and of the ministry he based on them. In his answers to these challenges, Edwards incorporated both Enlightenment thought such as Locke's and Calvinist thought. He described a ministerial practice that utilized Locke's theory of language and Calvinistic belief in reason and sound doctrine as means to move man to religious experience. He described a conversion process that relied both on Locke's view of experience and on the Calvinist belief in the role of God's grace in religious experience. And he defined a view of man that incorporated both Locke's psychology of learning and experience and the Calvinist view of depraved man.

"How," asked Alfred Aldridge in his critical study of Jonathan Edwards, "can a minister logically teach that a man's salvation or damnation has been irrevocably ordered from before the creation of the world and still appeal to him to change his way of life in order to accept the Christian plan of salvation?" It is a question Edwards would have recognized, for within it were the challenges he confronted in his own day. Taken in philosophical terms, it was a question generated by Enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke when they challenged the old notions about the nature of man and of the world and brought man to a re-examination of himself and his earthly and his spiritual experience. Taken in theological terms, it was the question generated by Calvinist thinkers as they re-examined and altered the fundamental doctrines of
Calvinism. In essence, Aldridge's question, with its implied accusation of a dichotomy within Calvinist thought and practice, had, in Edwards' own day, impelled him to an examination and defense of that thought and practice. Could the Calvinist and the Enlightenment views of the nature of man and his experience in the world be integrated? And, if so, in a Calvinist world where man's own efforts were of no avail in gaining salvation, how could he be convinced that he must still strive for it?

The New England of Edwards' day was in the process of a change that challenged the very foundations of the Calvinism that had dominated it for so long. As long as life had been a succession of hardships, the grim Calvinist view of the world and man's experience in it had seemed believable. But as the frontier life gradually grew easier, the rigid emotional and intellectual control that Calvinism had exercised began to weaken. The Puritans, as they established their religion and way of life in New England, had built on a contradictory base. Control had been exercised largely by the ministry, but the Puritan requirement that church members publicly profess conversion experiences ignored the church's and the minister's roles as intermediaries between God and man. God spoke directly to man on matters of conversion, could he not do so on other matters as well?

Calvinism had retained the belief in learning that was so much a part of the age, but that learning included the classics of the pagan world, as well as the Christian writings of the medieval church, the Reformation, and the Renaissance. Yet if pagan wisdom was to be accepted as valid, and if it had been attained without divine grace, then it
amounted to a confession that

[the Puritans] did not believe man was hopelessly corrupt or too abysmally sinful. Every such passage was by implication an acknowledgment that natural reason had its place in the scheme of things . . . that natural man, employing reason, was not quite a contemptible worm. 11

In view of the Calvinist doctrine of the total depravity of man, this was a large confession, though an unconscious one.

Acceptance of new scientific discoveries was also within the Puritan tradition, which saw no reason for science and reason to conflict, but acceptance was limited to the demonstrable facts. Puritan thinkers accepted the new science as containing nothing that would detract from God, but most of them took no part either in advancing the new theories or in retarding them.

These forces within Calvinism, operating in the atmosphere created by the Enlightenment's emphasis on reason, had generated both the internal changes and the external attacks that threatened Calvinist orthodoxy. C. C. Goen, editor of the Yale edition of Edwards' writings on the Great Awakening, estimates that "for at least half a century the whole basis for church life in New England had been shifting imperceptibly to human effort and moral striving," 12 challenging the doctrines that had stressed man's moral incapacity to achieve salvation without divine grace. The doctrine of conversion had been challenged by the appearance and acceptance of the Half-Way Covenant, which had made church membership available to all people of good reputation. On the surface New England kept to the tradition enough to protest, in dilatory fashion, against such deviations as Arminianism, but even the ministry had grown away
from rigid interpretation and enforcement of dogma. It was at this
point that Edwards challenged both the subtle shift of orthodoxy and
the open challenges of rationalists, attempting to reawaken men to true
religious experience, to reinstate that experience as the prerequisite
of church membership and its privileges, and to reinstate dogma in its
full meaning. He would find that his defense had placed him in "a
no-man's land between 'two opposing armies.' As a consequence . . .
his defense] drew fire from both sides." On the one side he was
rejected by those Calvinists who were unwilling truly to live and
experience their religion to the full, on the other, by those who
believed the new learning could lead only to dismissal of doctrines that
denied the worth and dignity of man. Ironically, Edwards' opponents
would argue their position from the scholastic psychology of the previous
age. And Edwards would employ a Lockean psychology with which, as Alan
Heimert says, "nothing the ["Old Lights"] had learned at Harvard had
prepared them to cope."

If the Enlightenment, by generating and maintaining an atmosphere
open to speculation and change, had encouraged the challenges of the
Calvinism Edwards was impelled to defend, it also provided him with both
the materials and the method to meet that challenge. Accepting Locke's
theories as scientific descriptions of the operations of mind, he based
his examination of the means through which, and the ends to which, man
experienced the Calvinist world on Locke's "full account of the ways
whereby [men's] understanding attain [their] notions," believing with
Locke "that the one legitimate field of both speculation and worship
[was] the content of the human mind." Yet that content was open to view only as it was communicated through language, and the relationship between language and reality was always precarious. There was "the ever-present danger of language getting cut off from reality and experience [which] had become an actuality in his own day." The moral and spiritual problems Calvinism faced were, in Edwards' view, created by the divorce of words from their true meaning. As language became more abstract, it allowed more room for misunderstandings and errors, since each man's use of language involved personal and private definitions of words, and it lost its ability to recall specific experiences and ideas to mind. But Locke's theory of language offered both the means to destroy the false structures of reason abstract language had created and the means to move man to real experience. If words could be reattached to original definitions, if definitions could be purged of extraneous meanings, then language could once again convey ideas clearly. If language could return to the concrete meanings it had held in earlier times, then it could excite sensations by recalling experiences to the mind. Only then could it affect the hearer powerfully enough with the force of ideas. And Edwards believed that language, clarified in this manner, could be an effective tool in the ministry.

If the way to make living impressions on the minds of men [was] through the senses, did it not follow that a Christian oratory which would put aside those vague and insignificant forms of speech, all those abuses of language that [had] passed for science, which would . . . 'break in upon the sanctuary of vanity and ignorance,' which would use words as God [used] objects, to force sensation and the ideas annexed to them into
men's minds through the only channel ideas can be carried to them, through the senses—would such an oratory not force upon New England the awakening that three generations of prophets had called for in vain.17

To establish and defend that oratory, Edwards had first to disprove the foundations of his opponents' arguments by an appeal to a radical and foreign psychology few of them had grasped.18 Ironically, his opponents, speaking from a science that had separated the operations of the human mind into a system of meshing gears, were considered the humanistic and liberal theologians; and Edwards, speaking from the contemporary, dynamic science that had reunified man, was considered the reactionary. In the confrontation, Edwards redefined the nature of man and his experience, for the ultimate issue was the meaning of man's endeavors as a moral agent in a moral universe.
Although Edwards had challenged the drift away from traditional Calvinist orthodoxy in early sermons, notably the election sermon in Boston in 1731, the occasion of his first open confrontation with the "Old Lights," as the opponents of the revivals came to be called, was the outbreak of emotional religion known as the Great Awakening. Edwards' own conversion had been a deeply emotional and inward experience, and it led him to reject the expressions of religion as mere formalities that had become dominant in his time. He made it his mission to awaken the sense of sin in the Puritans who were turning away from the deeper meanings of their religion, who were religious only in external appearance and not in belief. His sense of mission eventually led him into emotional and evangelical preaching that identified him with the revival.

The Great Awakening itself was the result of several factors. Northampton, under Edwards' grandfather, Solomon Stoddard, had had several awakenings during his tenure as minister, so there, at least, the pattern was strong. Stoddard had also been largely responsible for the Half-Way Covenant that had brought large numbers of the unconverted into the church, people who were, for the most part, in doubt concerning the state of their souls. When itinerant evangelists such as George Whitefield and Gilbert Tennant preached throughout the area, conditions were present for the mass conversions that soon occurred. Affectional preaching, gaining adherents as the revival grew, deliberately sought the
emotional responses of the congregations. To the Puritan traditionalists, however, the outbreak of revival preaching, emphasizing emotionalism over intellectualism, seemed a complete break with Puritan tradition. Strong opposition soon developed. Charles Chauncy, a leading Boston minister of the times and chief spokesman for the "Old Lights," warned that

Reasonable beings are not to be guided by Passion or Affection, though the Object of it should be GOD, and the Things of another World; They need, even in this Case, to be under the Government of the well instructed Judgment; Nay, when Men's Passions are raised to an extraordinary Height, if they have not, at the same Time, a due Balance of Light and Knowledge in their Minds, they are so far from being in a more desirable state on this Account, that they are in circumstances of extreme Hazard.19

Although the "Old Lights" did not openly reject the Calvinist doctrine of justification by faith alone, their reliance on reason and time to bring man to salvation implied at least a partial belief in justification by works. They did not have the sense of urgency about salvation that impelled Edwards and the revivalists to affectional preaching. To the revivalists, the reasonable religion of the "Old Lights" seemed a coldly unconvincing one that could not "speak living sense unto souls."20 The revivalists did not believe men could bring about their own salvation. Salvation would come in God's good time, if it came at all, and their hearers had to be brought to the realization that they stood in danger of damnation every minute. One of the foremost revivalists, Gilbert Tennant, saw the unconverted ministry as a threat to the hopes of their congregations; eventually, he warned such ministers to search their own souls for the marks of real conversion, "for no Cause [could] produce Effects above its power," or to face the loss of their pulpits.21
Whatever benefits the revivals had were soon threatened by the excesses into which both ministers and congregations fell. And the "Old Lights" were quick to use such excesses as evidence against the validity of the revival experience, using the demonstrably false affections as proof that all high affections were false. Chauncy warned that if man were converted, his new nature would not be contaminated, that "'twas a great Mistake to think, that the new Nature, or those Influences that produce it, however extraordinary, [were] apt to put Men upon making wrong or strange Judgments either of Persons or of Things: They have a contrary Tendency ..."22 The "Old Lights" were particularly concerned about the lay preaching practiced by evangelistic converts and about the attempts to establish separate churches, seeing in them a threat to church order. And they were openly critical of the excesses demonstrated in such bodily manifestations as the crying out, fainting, and convulsing that were becoming increasingly prevalent. Surely, the anti-revivalists felt, genuine conversion, coming of God's grace, would be free of such errors as were contaminating the revival. Surely genuine conversion would have its foundation in man's highest faculty, his reason, and not in his lowest, his emotions.

Edwards also became increasingly concerned about the excesses and errors that threatened the revival. Chauncy had challenged the affectional base of the revival, and the evangelistic preaching that created it, as the tools of the devil to delude men's minds and ensnare their souls. The only good to come out of the revival, he felt, had been the opportunity it provided for the defense of reason and its
re-establishment as the only true basis for religion. Edwards, however, saw the errors of the revival as the devil's attempt to bring down a true work of God:

Herein appears that subtlety of Satan . . . [K]nowing the greater part of the land were not versed in such things, and had not had much experience of great religious affections to enable them to judge well of them, and distinguish between true and false; then he knew [that] by sowing tares amongst the wheat, and mingling false affections with the works of God's Spirit [he could] bring all religion into disrepute.23

In Edwards' view, the opponents had been deluded into operating as the devil's tools, into propagating a formal and lifeless religion. Once it became apparent that many supposed conversions had been false, then

. . . the devil [saw] it to be for his interest . . . to endeavor to his utmost to propagate and establish a persuasion, that all affections and sensible emotions of the mind, in things of religion, are . . . to be avoided and carefully guarded against, as things of a pernicious tendency. This . . . is the way to bring all religion to a mere lifeless formality . . . .24

Chauncy and the "Old Lights" had erred, Edwards felt, in condemning the entire revival because of the errors into which some of its adherents had fallen. They had blinded themselves to the very real good demonstrated, whatever the imprudences and irregularities, by "a great increase of a spirit of seriousness, and sober consideration of the things of the internal world; . . . a disposition to treat matters of religion with solemnity, and as matters of great importance."25 The errors of the Awakening were not to be ignored, however, and Edwards undertook an examination of them in Thoughts and in Distinguishing Marks.26 But his real concern was that the "Old Lights" operated from a very basic misconception about the nature of man and of religious experience.
Chauncy and his supporters followed the scholastic psychology of the previous century in assuming that man's reason could and, ideally, should operate independently in controlling the other faculties. Therefore they could base religion on reason, to the exclusion of all affection. In Edwards' view, however, man could not exclude either reason or affection from religion without destroying it; for

[a]s on the one hand, there must be light in the understanding, as well as an affected fervent heart; where there is heat without light, there can be nothing divine or heavenly in that heart; so on the other hand, where there is a kind of light without heat, a head stored with notions and speculations, with a cold and unaffected heart, there can be nothing divine in that light, that knowledge is no true spiritual knowledge of divine things. If the great things of religion are rightly understood, they will affect the heart. 27

Edwards agreed with Locke that reason, operating independently, achieved very little in the world, especially in the moral world. Locke had said, "knowledge of morality, by mere natural light . . . makes but a slow progress, and little advance in the world," it being plain, in fact, "that human reason unassisted failed man, in its great and proper business of morality." 28 Edwards saw his own age as supreme proof of this failure:

how much has there been of [speculative and doctrinal] knowledge, in the Christian world, in this age? Was there ever an age wherein strength and penetration of reason, extent of learning, exactness of distinction, correctness of style, and clearness of expression did so abound? And yet was there ever an age wherein there has been so little sense of the evil of sin, so little love to God, heavenly-mindedness, and holiness of life, among the professors of the true religion? 29

Yet if religion could not rely on reason alone, neither could it operate only from affection without degenerating into the enthusiasm which Chauncy had accused the revival of encouraging. The affectional preaching
of Edwards and the other revivalists had come under heavy attack on this charge. Answering the accusation required the refutation of the scholastic psychology, with its fragmenting view of the operations of the human mind, a refutation that Edwards undertook in Religious Affections. 30

If the scholastic conception of man had directed the thinking of "Old Lights," it was the Lockean conception that permeated Edwards' thought. Locke, in his Essay, had portrayed man as a being created without innate ideas, though with natural principles governing the operations of the mind. He believed the mind gained all ideas through experience:

In that all our knowledge [was] founded; and from that it ultimately [derived] itself. Our observation employed either, about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, [was] that which [supplied] our understanding with all the materials of thinking. 31

These two sources of ideas, sensation and reflection, were the materials upon which the mind operated, the two principal operations, also called faculties, being "the power of thinking . . . , called the Understanding, and the power of volition . . . , called the Will." 32 These two faculties together reacted to such sensations as pain or pleasure, uneasiness or satisfaction, which God in his wisdom attached to the objects of our senses, and the ideas and observations of our mind, so that man would not "pass his time only in a lazy, lethargic dream." 33 In Locke's view, the materials of experience could not be neutral, for if they were, we should have no reason to prefer one thought or action to another; negligence to attention, or motion to rest. And so we should neither stir our bodies, nor employ our minds, but let our thoughts . . . run adrift, without any direction or design . . . 34
Man had to take notice of the impressions made on him, for "whatever impressions [were] made on the outward parts, if they [were] not taken notice of within, there [was] no perception." Edwards echoed this conception of man in Religious Affections. Man's consciousness was in "the mind's perceiving what is in itself—ideas, actions, passions, and everything that is there perceptible." The mind had to "feel" in order to perceive. For Edwards, as for Locke, man had two faculties, "one . . . by which it [was] capable of perception and speculation . . . which [was] called the understanding," and another "by which the soul [did] not merely perceive and view things, but [was] . . . inclined to them, or disinclined or adverse from them . . . [which] is sometimes called the inclination." The inclination, called the will in its determination of actions, kept the soul from operating as an "indifferent unaffected spectator." And because he believed in this view of man, Edwards was able to assert not only that affections could co-exist with reason, in religious experience, but that they were indeed necessary, for "nothing [was] more manifest in fact, than that the things of religion take hold of men's souls, no further than they affect them." Man's nature was such that to be unaffected was to be inactive. Both Locke and Edwards observed that man's affections were commonly engaged in seeking worldly prosperity, that man's strongest efforts were directed to that goal, and both noted that such energies would be better directed to seeking assurance of the future world. Where, then, was affection to be better employed than in moving man to a concern for his soul?
Man could not, however, in either Locke's or Edwards' view, stop with the affections of experience; otherwise, he stood in danger of becoming an enthusiast. Chauncy and the "Old Lights" had erred in denying religion the affections of experience, but they had not erred in setting up reason as a judge of that experience. Edwards agreed with Locke that "laying by reason, would set up revelation without it [;]
[w]hereby it takes away both reason and revelation, and substitutes in the room of them the ungrounded fancies of a man's own brain . . . ." True revelation would enlarge natural reason, not deny it, whether that revelation was traditional or original. Locke had distinguished between original revelation, in which God spoke directly to each individual, and traditional revelation, which was the written record by which man knew of the original revelations made to others, and denied that traditional revelation, the written word of God, could engender any new simple ideas in man, though its truths could be examined through reason. Original revelation, however, could bring man to "that first impression which is made immediately by God on the mind of any man, to which we cannot set any bounds."

In Edwards' view divine grace, as the infusion of a new simple idea rather than as a new faculty, was that original revelation:

So this new spiritual sense is not a new faculty of understanding, but it is a new foundation laid in the nature of the soul, for a new kind of exercise of the same faculty of understanding. So that new holy disposition of heart that attends this new sense, is not a new faculty of will, but a foundation laid in the nature of the soul, for a new kind of exercises of the same faculty of will.
This new sense did not set up a faculty in opposition to the reason that had operated from a natural foundation; instead, it provided reason with the spiritual foundation that had been lost in the fall. Locke and Edwards viewed conversion as an affectional experience that could, and must, be confirmed through the inward intuitions and evidences of the mind. "No man," said Locke, "[could], if he would, conform his faith to the dictates of another[;] all the life and power of true religion consists in the inward and full persuasion of the mind; and faith is not faith without believing." Edwards, too, insisted that man's persuasion be "a conviction founded on real evidence," rather than on education and the opinions of others. Such evidences must be founded also on intuitive knowledge, since, for both Locke and Edwards, the more immediately knowledge was connected to original sensation and reflection, the more clearly its truths were perceived.

Edwards had expounded the psychology of Lockean man to justify the thought behind the Great Awakening and to warn against the errors in the practice of his fellow revivalists and their adherents, errors he began to view as an even greater threat than the "Old Lights." Underlying his own practice during the Awakening had been, as Loren Baritz, in his work on the Puritan belief in their role as God's chosen people, points out, "a highly refined and rationalistic philosophy of emotional religion," but the behavior of such preachers as George Whitefield and James Davenport "seemed to be nothing but a licentiousness which thrived on the odious impact of their bellowing." So while Edwards argued that the affectional base of the revival was valid, he also preached and wrote
against its excesses, and the revivalists began to feel he had betrayed them. Edwards had charged the "Old Lights" with unjustly and unwisely condemning all affections. But he also charged that he and his fellow revivalists had erred in injudiciously accepting all affections:

For . . . as we ought not to reject and condemn all affections, as though true religion did not at all consist in affection; so on the other hand, we ought not to approve of all, as though everyone that was religiously affected had true grace, and was therein the subject of the saving influences of the Spirit of God . . . .47

In the sense of urgency that sustained the revival, the evangelistic ministry had neglected the need of the newly awakened for disciplined instruction and guidance. The "Old Lights," Edwards believed, had misunderstood the effect conversion would have on natural man when they denied that a work of God could be attended by such error. Ironically, the revivalists had, at least in practice, fallen into the same error. But Edwards did not believe that regenerate man was safe from sin, let alone from other errors, and therefore, "the errors and irregularities [could] be accounted for, from the consideration of the infirmity and weakness and common corruption of mankind, together with the circumstances of the work, though we should suppose it to be the work of God."48 Though Edwards defended, and indeed urged, the evangelistic preaching which engaged the affections, he also believed that such preaching should be of sound doctrine and truth to engage the other faculties. He warned against the increasing practice among revivalists of preaching from supposed inspiration rather than careful preparation. Edwards held, with Locke, that God operated through common and spiritual influences on man, and
both influences were to be heeded. The ministry had access to "good commentaries and expositions of Scripture and other books of divinity" which must be the substance of all preaching. Otherwise, they manipulated the passions of the animal spirits through meaningless noise, rather than affecting the mind and heart with the substance and meaning of Christian experience.

By the time the Great Awakening ended, Edwards was under attack from both sides. Chauncy and the "Old Lights" had ignored the distinctions between true and false affections, seizing instead on his delineations of the errors to be guarded against and using them as weapons in their own arguments against the revival. And the revivalists, feeling he had betrayed them by publicizing such errors, also ignored his warnings and continued to exploit emotion at the expense of substance, and momentary experience at the expense of lasting effects. Their evangelistic descendants, continuing these abuses, would arrogate Edwards' sermons and his descriptions of conversion experiences to themselves, as models for manipulating emotion and experience in much the same way. Ironically, many hostile historians and critics would seize upon the abuses of the evangelists who came after Edwards as evidences of his responsibility for the establishment of the evangelistic tradition in America. Edwards had been challenged, by Chauncy and the "Old Lights," to defend the thought and practice of the revival, a defense that required him to justify his beliefs about the nature of man and the means that could best move man to religious experience. In the attempt, he admitted that he and others had been deluded and in error in their failure to allow for human excess and
error, in their failure to foresee where human affections, unguided by sound doctrine, would lead. Yet, without those errors and his examination of them, Edwards' conception of man and experience might have lacked the power and the depth he brought to it. In his works Edwards defined the Lockean man who, as the subject of the Christian oratory Edwards defended and practiced, might be moved to religious experience.

Chauncy and the "Old Lights" had objected to the affectional basis of this Christian oratory, Edwards believed, from confused notions about the manner in which the affections depended on the understanding, for all affections arose from some apprehension in the understanding. But those affections could be either truthful or delusive, and reason, therefore, could not deny all affections; it could only judge between them. If the immediate perceptions of experience were the purest forms of knowledge, then the purest religious experience and knowledge could only be through immediate perceptions, through the intuitive simple ideas that Locke had described. Only after these ideas became an indwelling principle of the soul, could reason, using this new foundation, confirm, expand, and direct a Christian understanding. For Edwards, "this new spiritual sense [was] not a new faculty of understanding, but it [was] a new foundation laid in the nature of the soul, for a new kind of exercises of the same faculty of understanding." He believed, therefore, that a Christian oratory could be the means both of bringing man to the attainment of that principle and of directing the applications the understanding made of it. And if man first perceived and acted only as he was affected, then that oratory must first engage his affections, though it
should not afterward neglect his reason. The errors of the revival had not been in the appeal to the affections, but in its failure to direct reason to judge between the true and the false.

It was the minister, as one of God's chief means, who was to lead men to experience the precariousness of the position in which their natures placed them and to see the insecurity of the defenses they erected with their false use of reason. To accomplish this, a minister would have to rely on affectional means, since such means could better overcome the dangers into which reason had already led:

When ministers preach of hell and warn sinners to avoid it, in a cold manner, though they may say in words that it is infinitely terrible; . . . yet they contradict themselves; . . . at the same time that such a preacher's words represent the sinner's state as infinitely dreadful, his behavior and manner of speaking contradict it . . . .51

Man's danger had to be presented in a moving manner; if he was to be convinced, he had to be affected. Once affected, however, he must be led to understand the meaning of his experience and guided in his application of it, since a true Christian oratory could not abandon man once he was saved.
III. OF MAN AND ENDS

Although the Great Awakening had been, to a large extent, the occasion of Edwards' first confrontation with religious rationalists, the issues involved in the revival were not the substance of that confrontation. The "Old Lights" had challenged his view of man and the validity of his ministerial practice, but they had not challenged the Calvinistic doctrine from which he operated nor the Calvinist goal for which he aimed. Chauncy and his supporters were, in Edwards' view, drifting away from that doctrine, but that drift was subtle. However, by the time Edwards was settled in Stockbridge, following his ouster from the Northampton pulpit, Arminian divines had made attacks on such doctrines as predestination, original sin, and justification by faith alone. Clyde A. Holbrook, in his introduction to the Yale edition of *Original Sin*, asserts that the eighteenth-century controversy over these issues was more than "an intramural squabble among theologians," that it was an important step in the emerging postulate that man was "a fundamentally rational, benevolently inclined individual." The Arminians, as Edwards called his opponents, expressed a growing dissatisfaction with doctrines that took no notice of a man's character, that left nothing to the individual and everything to God. This dissatisfaction took the form of concessions that man's freedom of choice and action could influence his salvation. As Calvinism and Arminianism squared off, the ensuing battle assumed the proportions of dogma face-to-face with rationalism.
The rationalists, or Arminians, claimed that such Calvinist doctrines as predestination and original sin were no longer tenable, for, if they were true, man was incapable of acting as a moral agent who had both virtue and vice equally in his power, and who was therefore subject to both praise and blame.\textsuperscript{56} And if man were not a moral agent, then of what use were such means as the gospel and the ministry, with their invitations, exhortations, and commands, since his actions in regard to them were foreknown? Unable to accept such a view of man's experience in the world, the Arminians "denied . . . that some men were absolutely predestined for heaven while others were absolutely doomed to hell, laying down as one of the chief foundations of their argument the principle of the freedom of man's will."\textsuperscript{57} They also challenged the Calvinist doctrine of original sin, conceding that "as a result of Adam's sin men were subject to sorrow, labor, and physical death, but that they were not thereby made guilty of sin, nor totally corrupted."\textsuperscript{58} Man "inherited" the conditions and "paid" the debts created by Adam's fall, but was not himself depraved because of it. Because the Arminians believed man's will was free and his nature uncorrupted, they viewed man's works as a factor in determining whether or not he achieved salvation. Though God had, following Adam's fall, withdrawn his spiritual image from man, he had not thereby condemned him. The Arminians' beliefs put man's struggle for salvation back into his own hands. Though God still foreknew, he did not fororder; though man lacked a spiritual principle after the Fall,
the natural principles of his nature were not inherently corrupt. Man could both seek and find salvation, a possibility that the Arminians believed Calvinism denied him.

During the Great Awakening of the late 1730s and early 1740s, the "Old Lights" had challenged the methods of Edwards' ministerial practice. Now, in the decade following, the Arminians challenged his thought and the ends to which that thought directed his practice. In Religious Affections, Edwards had expounded the Lockean psychology of man to justify affectional means. To justify the ends toward which such means were directed, he had both to destroy the Arminian position and to invalidate the attack on his own. And, as in his answer to the accusations of the "Old Lights," Edwards would operate from a Lockean base.

The Arminian system rested, Edwards believed, on the concept of the Will as an indifferent power. The Arminians viewed the Will as a power that was in equilibrium before each act of choice, for only then could that act be a free one. Their refutation of original sin and justification by faith was an outgrowth of their concept of the Will, since for man's destiny to be within his power, his nature and his possibilities for action could not be predetermined. The Arminians believed that man, in order to act as a moral agent, must have a liberty consisting of three things:

1. ... a certain sovereignty the will has over itself, and its own acts, whereby it determines its own volitions; so as not to be dependent ... on any cause without itself ... .
2. Indifference ... previous to the act of volition ... .
3. Contingence ... as opposed to all necessity, or any fixed and certain connection with some previous ground or reason of its existence.59
To Edwards, this view of liberty was anathema, for he saw clearly that if it could be proved, the whole Arminian system would have to be accepted.

In *Freedom of the Will*, Edwards attacked the Arminian notions in several ways. He began with definition, believing that, as Locke had stated,

One part of these disadvantages in moral ideas, which has made them be thought not capable of demonstration, may in a good measure be remedied by definitions, setting down that collection of simple ideas, which every term shall stand for, and then using the terms steadily and constantly for that precise collection.60

Edwards believed that the metaphysical debates of his own time and of the preceding century had resulted in confused definitions, the result of ignoring common meanings and therefore misusing language. The Arminians' failure both to define their terms carefully and to recognize the implications of their definitions was the starting point for Edwards' attack. After establishing his own definitions in the opening sections of his treatise, he challenged the Arminian notion of the will. Edwards accepted Locke's definition of the will as a power rather than an agent, but the Arminians had made the will both power and agent when they defined it as self-determining. However, Edwards somewhat sarcastically asserted that even Arminians could not mean what they seemed to be saying:

But I shall suppose that the Arminians, when they speak of the Will's determining itself, do by the Will mean the soul willing. I shall take it for granted, that when they speak of the Will, as the determiner, they mean the soul in the exercise of a power of willing, or acting voluntarily. I shall suppose this to be their meaning, because nothing else can be meant, without the grossest and plainest absurdity.61
The gross and plain absurdity was, in Edwards' view, easily demonstrated, for "[i]f the Will determines the Will, then choice orders and determines choice." Through the reductio ad absurdum technique, Edwards followed the determinations of the Will back to a "first" choice which could not be a first choice because, according to the Arminian terminology, it in turn either had to be chosen by the Will, which demanded yet more choice in an endless train, or had to be an act determined outside the Will, which therefore could not be a free act. And, as Edwards said, "if the first act in the train, determining and fixing the rest, be not free, none of them all can be free." In his view, the Arminians could not avoid being brought to that unfree first act if they meant that the Will determined itself rather than that the soul, as an agent, determined the Will, as a power.

The Arminian argument for self-determination of the Will, whatever was intended by the terms, was an outgrowth of the need to prove man's actions were not caused or determined outside himself. To Edwards, such a view could only lead to a Godless universe, for if it should once be allowed, that things may come to pass without a cause, we should not only have no proof of the being of God, but we should be without evidence of the existence of anything whatsoever, but our own immediately present ideas and consciousness. Only by arguing from effects to causes could man prove the existence of anything external to himself. Edwards believed that part of the Arminian error lay in a limited view of the term "cause" which included only positive, productive influence. By Edwards' own definition, "cause" also included a conditional, antecedent influence in the nature of "a ground
or reason why some things are, rather than others; or why they are as they are, rather than otherwise." 65 All things that are not self-existent from eternity came into being from some foundation outside themselves. To deny cause in that sense, Edwards said, was to deny "the first dictate of common and natural sense" that God had given men; it was to deny "the main foundation of all man's reasoning about the existence of things . . . ." 66 Anticipating that the Arminians might argue that they did not deny cause for the world at large, that man's Will was simply different by nature from other existences, Edwards pointed out that the term "by nature" implied a conditional influence operating as a cause, thereby invalidating their argument:

> If any should imagine . . . that the free acts of the Will are existences of an exceeding different nature from other things; by reasons of which they may come into existence without any previous ground or reason of it, though other things cannot; . . . it would be an evidence of their strangely forgetting themselves; for they would be giving an account of some ground of the existence of a thing, when at the same time they would maintain there is no ground of its existence. 67

Thus the Arminians could not argue that the acts of a man's Will were uncaused and therefore free from necessity by reason of his nature, for they then argued his nature was the cause.

Edwards believed that the Arminian argument against the doctrine of original sin was also the result of a narrow definition of cause. The Arminians had argued that man could not be inherently corrupt, since, if he were, he could not have accomplished as much good in the world as he had. They asserted that the Calvinists had erred in their belief that vice prevailed in the world. The Calvinists had looked in all the wrong
places, "as if a court of justice was a proper place to make an estimate of the morals of mankind." The Arminians believed, with George Turnbull, the author of a 1740 work on moral philosophy, that

Upon a fair computation, the fact does indeed come out, that the very great villainies have been very uncommon in all ages, and looked upon as monstrous; so general is the sense and esteem of virtue.

Edwards denied that such a computation would prove man's nature tended to good. The Arminians erred in assuming the great villainies of the world were the chief record of man's sins. Sin was more than observable violations of moral law; it was, in Edwards' view, an inward unholiness that might or might not reveal itself in outward action. True good could be produced only from causes that were, by their nature, holy. The natural faculties of man without the spiritual principles were capable only of limited and private good. Thus man's self-love might direct him to conform to the rules of a society without any conviction that those rules were right, and God might cause him to behave properly within limited societies such as the family or state, convincing him that such systems were right and good. But unless his behavior was caused by a perception of the excellence of God's rules, it did not, and could not, escape corruption. Real good could come only when God instilled that perception in man:

That is to be looked upon as the true tendency of the natural or innate disposition of man's heart, which appears to be its tendency, when we consider things as they are in themselves, or in their own nature, without the interposition of divine grace.

The evidence of the world did not, therefore, prove that man's nature was good, but that God's effective grace was operative in the world.
The Arminians had also challenged the Calvinist doctrine of the depravity of man on the grounds that such a view would, in effect, make God the author of sin and corruption in the world. But, Edwards said, they misunderstood the nature of man before the fall:

when God made man at first, he implanted in him two kinds of principles. There was an inferior kind, which may be called natural, being the principles of mere human nature; such as self-love, with those natural appetites and passions, which belong to the nature of man,

Besides these, there were superior principles ..., wherein consisted the spiritual image of God, and man's righteousness and true holiness; which are called in Scripture the divine nature.

The spiritual principles were to reign over the natural principles, as they did until Adam fell. But, according to Edwards, after Adam fell, God withdrew his spiritual principles from Adam, though he left the natural principles unchanged. The Arminian view that man's nature was changed after Adam's sin, that "something ... was infused into human nature; some quality ... like a taint, tincture, or infection, altering the natural constitution, faculties, and dispositions of [men's] souls," was therefore in error. The natural principles, without spiritual guidance, could only be directed by man's self-love and his natural appetites, and these led man away from God since they were concerned with the body rather than the spirit. The possibility for corruption that had been present, even in innocence, in the natural principles was realized once the spiritual principles were withdrawn. And because men were one with Adam, God also withheld the spiritual principles from them as they came into existence, "whereby they [came] into the world mere flesh, and
entirely under the government of natural and inferior principles; and so [became] wholly corrupt as Adam did." 73 God was therefore not the positive, productive cause of evil, though his withdrawal created the conditions that allowed evil.

The Arminians had also challenged the imputation of Adam's sin to his descendants, whereby God treated all men as one. This challenge, to Edwards, was an attempt to ignore fact, since all the evidence showed that God did indeed deal with men as one with Adam, and he would do so only "because he looks upon them as one with their first father and so treats them as sinful and guilty by his apostasy," for even the Arminians could not believe that God would treat men as one "without viewing them as at all concerned in the affair," yet still subjecting them "to this infinitely dreadful calamity." 74 God could, in Edwards' view, treat Adam and man as one because all existences from moment to moment depended on God's decree governing their constitution. Thus a tree was the same existence from seed to mature tree, a man the same existence from infant to old man, though substance continually changed:

A father, according to the course of nature begets a child; an oak, according to the course of nature, produces an acorn, or a bud; so, according to the course of nature, the former existence of the trunk of the tree is followed by its new or present existence. In the one case and the other, the new effect is consequent on the former, only by the established laws and settled course of nature, which is . . . nothing but the continued immediate efficiency of God, according to a constitution he has been pleased to establish. 75

All successive new effects, Edwards believed, are treated as one by God in creating like properties in them, and likewise man treats external existences as one by assigning qualities observed in one thing to other
things similar in nature. All things were arbitrarily constituted in the sense that all things existed at any given moment through divine will. The Arminian objection, said Edwards, supposed "a oneness ... distinct from and prior to any oneness ... founded on divine constitution." But John Taylor, in his 1738 treatise rejecting the doctrine of original sin, had himself written, "God, the Original of all Being, is the Only Cause of all natural effects," and so, Edwards believed, had conceded the point before it was argued. Thus man was one with Adam and operated in the world without the spiritual principles that could have held him from corruption.

The Arminian arguments against predestination and original sin had grown out of a belief that man, in such circumstances, could not act as a moral agent, since his actions were then necessarily determined and therefore not subject to praise or blame. George Whitby, one of the leading Arminians, had said:

If all human actions are necessary, virtue and vice must be empty names; we being capable of nothing that is blameworthy, or deserve praise; for who can blame a person for doing only what he could not help, or judge that he deserve praise only for what he could not avoid?

But, as Edwards said, to deny that actions necessitated by man's nature could be praised or blamed was to deny God praise, for God's nature necessitated holy actions. The Arminians had erred in assuming that their own definitions of action and agency had released man from necessity. They had not eliminated necessity in their own system; they had simply failed to recognize it, a fact to which Edwards quickly drew attention in his discussion of the Arminian writer Chubb's discussion.
of action and agency:

[T]he meaning of the word "action," as Mr. Chubb and others use it, is utterly unintelligible and inconsistent, . . . because it belongs to their notion of an action, that . . . it is under the power, influence or action of no cause; . . . and yet they hold, that the mind's action is the effect of its own determination . . . .

The Arminian notion of a free act of the will, Edwards said, was self-contradictory, since it was essential of that act that it should be necessary and not necessary; that it should be from a cause, and no cause; that it should be the fruit of choice and design, and not the fruit of choice and design; that it should be the beginning of motion or exertion, and yet consequent on previous exertion; that it should be before it is . . . .

Arminianism had attempted to establish man's liberty to act as a moral agent in the concept of a self-determined and indifferent will, operating through contingent actions. It had issued a challenge to a Calvinism it perceived as denying man moral agency which made all use of means worthless, since their effectiveness or lack of it was foreknown. Edwards believed, however, that he had shown that the Arminian objections to the Calvinist system were "vain and frivolous, being maintained in an inconsistency with themselves, and in like manner against their own doctrine, as against the doctrines of Calvinism." They had argued a system in which a man's works, in all justice, had to be considered in the issue of his salvation, yet denied man was corrupted and in need of salvation. If, Edwards challenged, man would achieve virtue through works, what need was there of Christ and salvation? And if the Arminians admitted a need of Christ in salvation, then
the argument from justice is given up; for it is to suppose that their liableness to misery and ruin comes in a way of justice; otherwise there would be no need of the interposition of divine grace to save them. 82

The issue was not whether an undeserving few received grace, but what all merited through justice.

Locke had warned "he that uses words without any clear steady meaning, what does he but lead himself and others into errors." 83 The Arminians, as Edwards showed, had fallen into this error and provided him with a point of attack. Yet the fact that their own system could not withstand the very charges they hurled at Calvinism was not proof that Calvinism could withstand them. Edwards appeared to have proved that the Arminian position was untenable, but had he proved that his own was? In defining and defending the Calvinistic system, could he keep his own Christian oratory from the logical weaknesses that had made the Arminian system vulnerable to attack?

Since this oratory could operate on man only if he were a moral agent, Edwards' first task was to define what man required to be a moral agent:

A moral agent is a being that is capable of those actions that have a moral quality, and which can properly be denominated good or evil in a moral sense, virtuous or vicious, commendable or faulty. To moral agency belongs a moral faculty, or sense of moral good and evil, or of such a thing as desert or worthiness of praise or blame, reward or punishment; and a capacity which an agent has of being influenced in his actions by moral inducements or motives, exhibited to the view of understanding and reason, to engage to a conduct agreeable to the moral faculty. 84
In order to be a moral agent, then, man required three things: a capability for actions that could be morally judged, an awareness of what judgment such action would receive, and a susceptibility to moral persuasions. Did Calvinist man possess them?

The Arminians had asserted that man's actions could be morally judged only if his will determined itself, for only then was man free from necessity. Though Edwards felt he had successfully refuted that notion, he had to prove that man possessed sufficient liberty to be held morally responsible in a predestined world. Definition of terms was the first step. As James Carse, author of a 1967 critical study of Edwards, says, Edwards had learned "that imprecision in the basic presuppositions would bring great confusion into a theological system." In the first sections of Freedom of the Will, Edwards had defined the terms necessary for his challenge of the Arminian arguments, accusing his opponents of various misuses of language. Their first error had been to define the Will as a self-determiner, as an agent capable of action. It was an error Edwards avoided in his own definition:

the Will is plainly, that by which the mind chooses anything. The faculty of the Will is that faculty or power or principle of mind by which it is capable of choosing; an act of the Will is the same as an act of choosing or choice.

The Will, then, was a power of the mind, not an agent in itself; and as a power, it was determined by something outside itself. Locke had asked, "what is it that determines the will?" and answered, "The mind." Edwards answered, "that motive, which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest," The Will, therefore, as a power of the mind,
was determined by the mind, not by the Will itself. And to ask whether
the Will was free was, in Locke's words, "the unintelligible question."89

Edwards, too, saw the question as meaningless:

to talk of Liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the very
will itself, is not to speak good sense . . . . That which has
the power of volition or choice is the man or the soul, and not
the power of volition itself.90

Thus, the Arminian notion placing liberty in the will was meaningless.
The question was the amount of liberty the man, as agent, had.

The Arminians had placed liberty in indifference. Edwards and Locke
placed it in man's ability to do as he willed, regardless of the manner
in which his Will was determined. Man could not refuse to will; there-
fore he could not be indifferent in any action. And to ask if he was
free to will as he pleased was, for both men, meaningless. Locke be-
lieved that those who made a question of it "must suppose one will to
determine the acts of another, and another to determine that, and so on
ad infinitum,"91 a sentiment echoed by Edwards in his argument against
the Arminian notion of the self-determined will. The only indifference
that either Locke or Edwards admitted to their definitions of liberty
rested in "that power and opportunity for one to do and conduct as he
will, or according to his choice,"92 regardless of the cause of that
choice. As long as man could choose between action and forbearance, both
being in his power to do, he was free.93 And if he was free to act as he
chose, he was the proper subject of blame and praise.

Man was, according to Edwards, himself aware of a desert of praise
or blame, without regard to his nature:
Yea, if it be supposed that good or evil dispositions are implanted in the hearts of men by nature itself . . . yet it is not commonly supposed that men are worthy of no praise or dispraise for such dispositions; although what is natural is undoubtedly necessary, nature being prior to all acts of the will whatsoever.94

Thus man, in his daily dealings, judged the actions of others without viewing their natures as an excuse. Thus man accepted the judgment of others with a consciousness that he would judge accordingly if the circumstances were reversed, "and thus men's consciences may justify God's anger and condemnation."95 Man, therefore, was capable of knowing his moral culpability, and since he was, the aim of Christian oratory was to move him to a knowledge of his sinfulness in the eyes of God.
IV. CHRISTIAN ORATORY

In answer to the opposition of the "Old Lights" during the Great Awakening, and again to the challenges of the Arminians during the debate over the Calvinist doctrines of predestination and original sin, Edwards had denied the sufficiency of man's natural faculties, reason included, as guides to salvation. He had defended the use of an affectional Christian oratory as a means of persuasion to bring man to moral action and religious experience in the struggle to achieve salvation. He had established a view of human nature in which man, though naturally corrupt, had moral action in his power and was therefore still subject to persuasion and to judgment. But if the conversion experience itself was not in man's power to bring about, if it were not in response to his works, then what role could Christian oratory have in the conversion process?

During the Awakening, Edwards had seen many religious experiences that he viewed as genuine conversions. And though he commented on the variety of ways in which conversion experiences occurred, there was an apparent pattern in the steps to conversion. The actual conversion experience, that moment when faith, justification, and salvation met, was not in man's power to bring about, but could Christian oratory be the guide to move man through the preceding steps to an emotional and reasonable preparedness for conversion if it ever came? Edwards believed that it could, that the means God provided in the world were to that end. How else could His commands and invitations, as given in the gospel and through His ministers, be explained? The fact that man's salvation or damnation was foreknown did not rule out God's use of means in preparing
man for the infusion of divine grace, for the immediate, perceptual experience of conversion:

God makes use of means; but it is not as mediate causes to produce this effect. There are not truly any second causes of it; but it is produced by God immediately. The word of God is no proper cause of this effect; but is made use of only to convey to the mind the subject-matter of this saving instruction: And this indeed it doth convey to us by natural force or influence.  

Though such means could not produce the immediate sense of the excellency of divine things that Edwards viewed as the moment of conversion, they could prepare the mind for that moment and raise the affections of the heart in expectation of it. Christian oratory, then, could lead men "to do something about their salvation, at least by way of preparation, since God, with whom the ultimate initiative lay, had opened the way to him."  

Edwards was not unaware of the problems that had to be overcome in the Christian oratory he proposed, for he had identified the abuses to which it was subject during the Great Awakening and had warned against them. Locke had said that words could not excite new simple ideas; they could only recall to mind ideas already held, because words, by their immediate operation on us, cause no other ideas, but their natural sounds: and it is by the custom of using them for signs, that they excite and revive in our minds latent ideas . . . .  

Edwards agreed with this view, perceiving the special hardships it imposed on ministerial and theological concerns. Language, the primary tool for moving man to religious experience, was at a particular disadvantage when it must convey abstract truths:

Language is indeed very deficient in regard of terms to express precise truth concerning our own minds, and their faculties and operations. Words were first formed to express external things; and those that are applied to express things internal and
spiritual, are almost all borrowed, and used in a sort of figu­
tive sense. Whence they are most of 'em attended with a great
deal of ambiguity and unfixedness in their signification, occa­
sioning innumerable doubts, difficulties and confusions in in­
quiries and controversies about things of this nature.99

How was this disadvantage to be overcome in the effort to move man to the
conviction of his own sinfulness and the danger in which it placed him?
How could a man be brought to a convincing perception, or experience, of a
future experience? Edwards believed it was possible only through a de­
scription of the future that equated it with the ideas held in a man's
mind, through common, daily experiences. As Miller writes:

If a sermon was to work an effect, it had to impart the sensible
idea in all immediacy; in the new psychology, it must become, not
an astrologer's prediction, but an actual descent into hell.100

Though words could never be the sufficient productive cause of saving re­
ligious experience, they could prepare an emotional readiness by estab­
lishing relationships within the mind between ideas already experienced
and future possibilities. It was to this end that Edwards directed his
own thought and practice with such power. Though Christian oratory could
not convey experiential religious truths to man, it could create the con­
ditions in which he might experience those truths and understand them.
Errors such as the Arminians had fallen into through using words in
senses divergent from common usage would have to be avoided through careful
definition. And above all, words were not to be used as sounds without
substance to raise man's affections, since such affections were to no
purpose. Only when this error was avoided could language successfully
create in man an experiential readiness as part of the conversion
process.
An experiential readiness for conversion consisted in both natural and spiritual knowledge of divine things. Natural knowledge, concerned with a rational understanding of doctrine and of God's word, was the result of man's natural reason assisted by God's nonsaving means, while spiritual knowledge, concerned with a heart-felt sense of the divine excellency of doctrine and God's word, was the result of man's natural affections. It was, according to Edwards, a minister's responsibility to help the members of his congregation to achieve both forms of knowledge. These could only be achieved when ministers combined sound doctrine and affectional means in their ministry:

If a minister has light without heat, and entertains his auditory with learned discourses, without a savor of the power of godliness, or any appearance of fervency of spirit, and zeal for God and the good of souls, he may gratify itching ears, and fill the heads of his people with empty notions; but it will not be likely to reach their hearts, or save their souls. And if, on the other hand, he be driven on with a fierce and intemperate zeal, and vehement heat, without light, he will be likely to kindle the like unhallowed flame in his people, and to fire their corrupt passions and affections; but will make them never the better, nor lead them a step towards heaven, but drive them apace the other way. 101

Edwards combined both heat and light in his labors with his own congregation, believing that he must both engage the affections of his parishioners and guide their rational understanding in order to lead them through the steps of the conversion process.

The first step Edwards identified in the conversion process was the need for man to come to an utter conviction of his own hopeless and immense sinfulness:
when the minds of sinners are affected with some concern for their souls, and they are stirred up to seek their salvation[,] nothing is more necessary for men . . . than thorough conviction and humiliation; than that their consciences should be properly convinced of their real guilt and sinfulness in the sight of God and their deserving of wrath.\textsuperscript{102}

It was at this step that the reasoning of the "Old Rights" and the Arminians posed the greatest threat to man's salvation. The "Old Lights" argued that man's natural reason was uncorrupted and could guide man to salvation. The Arminians argued that man was not inherently corrupt, that if free, he could do good in the world, but if necessitated, his actions were not subject to moral judgment. Thus encouraged, man was only too prone to excuse his conduct and endanger his salvation:

It is of great importance, that they, that are seeking their own salvation, should be brought off from all dependence on their own righteousness: but these notions above all prevent it. They justify themselves, in the sincerity of their endeavors. They say to themselves that they do what they can; they take great pains; and though there be great imperfection in what they do, yet these they cannot help: here moral necessity, or inability, comes in as an excuse.\textsuperscript{103}

Reasoning such as the Arminians offered served men ill, for it became "their stronghold, their sheet-anchor," against all exhortations to recognize their sinfulness.\textsuperscript{104} Man had to be brought away from the false reasoning by which he had judged himself secure to an affective perception that he stood in danger.

Man had, first of all, to recognize that his sinfulness, though inherent was his own; his failure to live by the law to which God commanded him was not excusable. Though he might accomplish some good through God's
intervention, God was not obliged to intervene:

> It is unreasonable to suppose, that God should be obliged, if he makes a reasonable creature capable of knowing his will, and receiving a law from him, and being subject to his moral government, at the same time to make it impossible for him to sin, or break his law.  

And he had to recognize that he was the author of that sin, rather than resorting to the Arminian argument that God was the author of sin because He withdrew his influences:

> It would be strange arguing indeed, because men never commit sin, but only when God leaves 'em to themselves, and necessarily sin, when he does so, that therefore their sin is not from themselves, but from God; and so, that God must be a sinful being.

Man had to recognize that he had not restrained himself from sin except as God's influences had restrained him:

> The corruption of the heart of man is immoderate and boundless in its fury; and while wicked men live here, it is like fire pent up by God's restraints, whereas if it were let loose, it would set on fire the course of nature; and as the heart is now a sink of sin, so if sin was not restrained, it would immediately turn the soul into a fiery oven, or a furnace of fire and brimstone.

Only when such false comforts were removed could man be moved to the emotional conviction that he stood in need of salvation, for otherwise he minimized the sinfulness to which Edwards sought to awaken him:

> Doth it seem to thee not real that thou shalt suffer such a dreadful destruction, because it seems to thee thou dost not deserve it? And because thou dost not see anything so horrid in thyself, as to answer such a dreadful punishment? Why is it that thy wickedness doth not seem bad enough to deserve this punishment?

Man deceived himself if he believed his sins were small, for all sins kept man from a justification by works, which demanded total obedience to God's law. And justification by faith required man to recognize his failure to live by that law. "How," demanded Edwards, "can you be willing to have
Christ for a Savior from a desert of hell, if you be not sensible that you have a desert of hell?"\(^{109}\)

It was at this point in the conversion process, where man could be brought to realize his sinfulness and his danger, that Edwards' affectional oratory was at its most powerful. He strove to create in his hearers an intuitional perception of what awaited the unconverted by recalling common experiences to their minds and investing those experiences with spiritual implications:

We find it easy to tread on and crush a worm that we see crawling on the earth; so it is easy for us to cut and singe a slender thread that anything hangs by; thus easy is it for God, when he pleases to cast his enemies down to hell.\(^{110}\)

Thus Edwards, in portraying man's precarious position, sought to engender in his hearers the emotions involved in any situation of imminent danger and establish a relevance to spiritual danger:

O sinner! Consider the fearful danger you are in: it is a great furnace of wrath, a wide and bottomless pit, full of the fire of wrath, that you are held over in the hand of that God, whose wrath is provoked and incensed as much against you, as against many of the damned in hell. You hang by a slender thread, with the flames of divine wrath flashing about it, and ready every moment to singe it, and burn it asunder; and you have no interest in any Mediator, and nothing to lay hold of to save yourself, nothing to keep off the flames of wrath, nothing of your own, nothing you have ever done, nothing that you can do, to induce God to spare you one moment.\(^{111}\)

Edwards' words were calculated to make man experience the helplessness and hopelessness of such a position in the face of God's wrath, which was portrayed as constantly increasing until it reached that moment when it poured out on the sinner:
The wrath of God is like great waters that are dammed for the present; they increase more and more, and rise higher and higher, till an outlet is given; and the longer the stream is stopped, the more rapid and mighty is its course, when once it is let loose. It is true, that judgment against your evil work has not been executed hitherto; the floods of God's vengeance have been withheld; but your guilt in the meantime is constantly increasing, and you are every day treasuring up more wrath; the waters are continually rising, and waxing more and more mighty; and there is nothing but the mere pleasure of God, that holds the waters back, that are unwilling to be stopped, and press hard to go forward. If God should only withdraw his hand from the floodgate, it would immediately fly open, and the fiery floods of the fierceness and wrath of God, would rush forth with inconceivable fury, and would come upon you with omnipotent power; and if your strength were ten thousand times greater than it is, yea, ten thousand times greater than the strength of the stoutest, sturdiest devil in hell, it would be nothing to withstand and endure it.

Man faced death and damnation every minute, for "the bow of God's wrath" was drawn, the arrow aimed, and it was nothing but God's pleasure that kept the arrow "from being made drunk" with man's blood. Edwards warned man that he could count on neither time nor any plans of his own to escape the impending wrath, and put into words the hopeless excuses man would make when time and plans at last failed. If living man could ask those who had gone to hell whether they had expected that end to their planning, Edwards said, they would answer:

'No, I never intended to come here: I had laid out matters otherwise in my mind; I thought I should contrive well for myself: I thought my scheme good: I intended to take effectual care; but it came upon me unexpectedly; I did not look for it at that time, and in that manner; it came as a thief: death outwitted me: God's wrath was too quick for me: O my cursed foolishness!'

Man could not expect to escape hell through any contrivances of his own, for his wickedness made him "heavy as lead," and pulled him ever toward hell, where his contrivances would no more stop his plunge than "a
spider's web would . . . stop a falling rock."115 Nor could man hope to
bear that wrath when it came, however well he might bear the pains of an
earthly world:

what will it signify for a worm, which is about to be pressed
under the weight of some great rock, to be let fall with its
whole weight upon it, to collect its strength, to set itself to
bear up the weight of the rock, and to preserve itself from being
crushed by it?116

Man could have no hopes of bearing the torments of hell, for "it [was] in
vain to set the briars and thorns in battle array against glowing flames;
the points of thorns, though sharp, do nothing to withstand the fire."117

Again in vivid imagery related to everyday experience, Edwards portrayed
the torments of hell as beyond any man's capacity to face courageously:

We can conceive but little of the matter; we cannot conceive
what that sinking of the soul in such a case is. But to help
your conception, imagine yourself to be cast into a fiery oven,
all of a glowing heat, or into the midst of a glowing brick­
kiln, or of a great furnace, where your pain would be as much
greater than that occasioned by accidentally touching a coal
of fire, as the heat is greater. Imagine also that your body
were to be there for a quarter of an hour . . . ; how long
would that quarter hour seem to you! . . . But what would be
the effect on your soul, if you knew you must lie there
enduring that torment for twenty-four hours! And how much
greater would be the effect if you knew you must endure it
for a thousand years! . . . and that you never, never should
be delivered!118

Edwards knew that an eternity of torments was impossible for man to com-
pletely comprehend, but man was capable of enough comprehension to under-
stand the despair such an eternity would involve:

How dismal will it be when you are under these raging torments,
to know assuredly that you never, never shall be delivered
from them; to have no hope: when you shall wish that you might
but be turned into nothing, but shall have no hope of it; when
you shall wish that you might be turned into a toad or a
serpent, but shall have no hope of it . . . .119
It was only through such vivid imagery that Edwards believed man could be moved to an emotional conviction of his sinfulness and the dangers in which it placed him, although sound doctrine was also required to make that conviction a lasting one. Once convinced, however, man could then move to the next step of the conversion process.

Once a man was convinced he deserved damnation, his mind was prepared to seek a genuine salvation, and he was to be urged to make use of the means available to him, for the time was coming, and would soon come, when he would pass out of time into eternity; "and so [would] pass from under all means of grace whatsoever." Nor was he to question the efficiency of means, for what man was commanded to do was within his power to do, if he willed to do it. "Persons ought to be so resolved for heaven," said Edwards, "that if by any means they can obtain, they will obtain," regardless of the means required. Man was concerned in his worldly affairs with providing for the future, seizing opportunities, and securing gains he had already made. These same concerns could also be applied man's spiritual life where God had provided even greater means of success than were available in the worldly life, these means being nothing less, said Edwards, "then the abundant instruction of perfect and divine wisdom itself." Edwards urged his hearers to make use of such means in their struggle for salvation, for only if they sought, could they prepare themselves to receive:

Such a manner of seeking is needful to prepare for the kingdom of God. Such earnestness and thoroughness of endeavors, is the ordinary means that God makes use of to bring persons to an acquaintance with themselves, to a sight of their own hearts, to a sense of their own helplessness, and to a despair in their own strength and righteousness.
Man could not argue that the search was useless, or even that it was too difficult, for "if . . . no difficulties attended seeking salvation, there would be no occasion for striving, a man would have nothing to strive about."\(^\text{124}\) In Edwards' view, though man's struggle to achieve salvation on his own, without God's intervention, was hopeless, in the struggle man gained more knowledge of his insufficient nature, and would be therefore more responsive to the chance of salvation if it came because he no longer would depend on himself. Thus man did not declare God's perfections and omnipotence and his own unworthiness in order to prevail upon God for mercy, but to affect his own heart with these truths and thus be prepared to receive mercy if it were offered. If he should not be granted grace, man had to be prepared to acknowledge the justice of his own damnation, but Edwards believed the struggle for salvation itself was necessary. God's ordinary method was "to give grace to those that are much concerned about it, and earnestly and for a considerable time seek it or continue to do things in order to it."\(^\text{125}\) Man could only near the moment of immediate perception that was conversion through seeking it, though that moment might never come.

Edwards believed that man had to be urged to seek salvation, to be convinced that it was necessary. And again, conviction had to be brought about by vividly establishing relationships between experiences already present in the mind and spiritual realities. Man had to realize that seeking God was his primary goal in life:
All other ends of man are subordinate to this. There are inferior ends for which man was made. Men were made for one another; made for their friends and neighbors, and for the good of the public. But all these inferior ends are designed to be subordinate to the higher end of glorifying God; and therefore man may not be actively useful, or actively answer any purpose, otherwise than by actively glorifying God, or bringing forth fruit to God.126

Man, without God, was empty, a point Edwards made in the image of an uninhabited house:

The subordinate end of the underpinning of a house is to support the house; and the subordinate end of the windows is to let in the light. But the ultimate end of the whole is the benefit of the inhabitants. Therefore, if the house be never inhabited, the whole is in vain.127

Man without God was useless, as Edwards pointed out in another image:

As in a clock one wheel moves another, and that another, till at last the motion comes to the hand and hammer, which immediately respect the eye and the ear, otherwise all the motions are in vain.128

Man was made to be useful to other men, to his family and to his communities, but first of all to God. His whole use was "to bring glory to God the maker, or all else [was] in vain; and however a man [might] serve among his fellow creatures, in a private or public capacity, upon the whole he [was] in vain."129 However, man had to realize that seeking salvation would not be easy, since it would also be a struggle against man's sinful inclinations and interests:

The way to heaven is ascending; we must be content to travel up hill, though it be hard and tiresome, though it be contrary to the natural tendency and bias of our flesh that tends down to earth.130

He had also to realize that his lifetime would be a never-ending process of seeking the influences of salvation in his life:
We ought to travel on in this way with assiduity. It ought
to be the work of every day to travel on towards heaven . . . .
As he that is on a journey is often thinking on the place
that he is going to and it is his care and business every day
to get along; to improve his time, to get towards his journey's
end. He spends the day in it; it is the work of the day,
whilst the sun serves him.131

The man who believed his seeking was at an end was "in a great measure
satisfied and quieted with his own works and performances."132 But the
man who continued to seek grew in self-knowledge, which Edwards believed
was the reason God commanded man to seek salvation:

In this way persons gain much more knowledge of themselves, and
acquaintance with their own hearts, than in a negligent, slight
way of seeking; for they have a great deal more experience of
themselves. It is experience of ourselves, and finding what we
are, that God commonly makes use of means of bringing us off
from all dependence on ourselves. But men never get acquaintance
with themselves so fast, as in the most earnest way of seeking.133

As man grew in knowledge of himself, he learned that he could have no
hope in his own abilities; his only hope rested in God's grace. God
alone "could take him out of the miry clay and horrible pit [and] set
him upon a rock."134 Edwards believed that a persevering search for
salvation was, to some extent at least, attractive of God's grace,
though not because the search itself was meritorious, since it must fall
far short of the perfect obedience justification by works required.

Conversion, Edwards believed, was an immediate, intuitional percep-
tion of God's divine excellence, quite apart from any good man might
expect. It was this perception that constituted the faith by which man
was justified, for it was an acceptance of the divine plan of salvation
as offered through Christ without man's considering his personal interest
in it. Edwards chose to portray this experience to his parishioners in
the familiar terms of Adam's experience. As Adam's sin had been imputed to man, so would man's sin be imputed to Christ, and Christ's death would pay for man's sins. As Adam's sin was imputed to man, so would Christ's goodness be imputed to man, and Christ's goodness would justify him.

Faith was man's acceptance of Christ, an acceptance that Edwards portrayed in the image of a marriage union:

we are not united to Christ as a reward of our faith, but have union with him by faith, only as faith is the very act of uniting or closing on our part. As when a man offers himself to a woman in marriage, he does not give himself to her as a reward of her receiving him in marriage: her receiving him is not considered as a worthy deed in her, for which he rewards her by giving himself to her; but it is by her receiving him that the union is made, by which she hath him for her husband: it is on her part the uniting itself.\textsuperscript{135}

Man was justified by faith as he was, by that act of faith, one with Christ and therefore deserving of salvation through Christ's works and perfections. Yet the moment of conversion, the immediate intuitional perception of the true meaning of Christ's offer and the acceptance of that offer, did not release the new "saint" from his human nature, against which he must still struggle.

Once man experienced conversion, according to Edwards, he could not give up seeking God's influences, though his focus changed. The oratory Edwards proposed must then guide man's understanding, for though he had received a new spiritual principle to guide him, he still had to struggle against his corrupt nature:

a Christian's life may be attended with many and exceeding great imperfections, and yet be a holy life, or a truly Christian life. It may be such a life as to clearly and even necessarily show, that the grace which the individual has, is of the kind which has a tendency to holy practice.\textsuperscript{136}
If the conversion—experience a man attested to were genuine, that genuineness would reveal itself in Christian practice. Though the new "saint" might fall into error, a Christian oratory and his own awareness of his infirmities would guide him back to true Christian behavior. Christ's influences were a new principle of the "saint's" being and could not but affect every facet of his life:

the sap of the true vine is not only conveyed into them, as the sap of a tree may be conveyed into a vessel, but is conveyed as sap is from a tree into one of its living branches, where it becomes principle of life. The Spirit of God being thus communicated and united to the saints, they are from thence . . . called spiritual.137

True conversion would, therefore, be visible in regenerate man's actions, though weakly at first. But as the new "saint" grew in Christian knowledge through making use of the means available to him in God's word, in the church and its ministers, and in the new spiritual principle directing the use of his natural faculties, his Christian practice would increasingly reveal his inward holiness.

As Edwards attempted to guide his parishioners through the conversion process, he strove to vivify experience through the force of his language. His sermons, and to some extent his theological writings, reveal his constant concern with expressing ideas that relied on reason and sound doctrine in such a way as to touch on the experiences of his auditors and awaken the responses those experiences created. Edwards described and practiced a Christian oratory, and in the process defined man and the means and ends of that oratory. He thus answered the questions critics such as Aldridge, quoted earlier, and
opponents had posed: why should man struggle for salvation in the Calvinist world, where the outcome of that struggle is known before it begins? Because, says Edwards, the struggle is necessary in order for man to know himself and his place in the world, and that knowledge is necessary if there is a possibility that he is to be saved. Though man's works could not gain him consideration with God, his struggles could bring him to realize the insufficiency of his own efforts and the necessity of Christ's sacrifice and therefore prepare him to receive grace if it came. His struggle did not, of course, guarantee him salvation, which was offered only by God's free choice. Why should man be exhorted to strive since his response to such exhortations was foreknown? Because, said Edwards, God's foreknowledge did not produce the effect. Man's response was in his own power. God knew what his choice would be because all time was visible to God, but to foreknow was not to compel or direct that response. Why should man struggle when to struggle did not guarantee success? Because, said Edwards, not to struggle was to guarantee failure. And though God did not necessarily give grace to any one who struggled, it was in his power to do so if he chose.

In the end, Edwards believed, the Calvinist doctrines he defended came closer to the reality of experience than the systems his opponents had proposed. Man recognized causal relationships in nature and in society. He could not then exempt himself from those relationships and still believe in God's design in the external universe, a universe that would therefore depend upon his and other men's free acts of will. And if the world were contingent on his actions, then God could have no end
in view for his creation, since to have an end in view would imply, at least, foreknowledge if not foreordering. And, in a foreknown world, man's actions were as certain as in a foreordered one, unless God's foreknowledge could be in error. But however certain his actions in God's view, man himself considered and made choices; his own nature determined those choices and was the cause of his sinful actions. Man, therefore, was subject to praise and blame.

Because man could act as he chose, he was the proper subject of a Christian oratory that could guide him to a self knowledge by which he could begin to change his nature. Common means were also available to this end in the laws of society, the church, and most importantly, in God's word. The Lockean man Edwards described was open to such means through sensation and reflection. Once man experienced conversion, those sensations and reflections would be guided by spiritual principles. Edwards had constructed a Christian oratory in answer to the challenges posed by views of man held by the "Old Lights" and the Arminians. He described and defended a view that placed Lockean man squarely within the Calvinist world as the subject on whom that oratory would operate in moving him to seek his own salvation. During the Great Awakening, he had defended the use of affectional means to move man, and in response to the Arminian challenge, he had defended the use of means in a foreknown world. In so doing, he had described a conversion process that utilized the best science and philosophy of his day while defending a theology that was becoming outmoded. But, though he accepted the Calvinist theology, he was not content with its traditional professions. He tested
each for evidence of its accord with reality and then redefined it in the
terminology of Locke. For his efforts he found himself attacked from all
sides. The traditionalists attacked him for participating in, and de­
fending, the Awakening. The revivalists attacked him for challenging
the excesses of the revivals. The Arminians attacked him for attempting
to reinstate the Calvinist doctrines that the churches were either
mitigating or abandoning. And eventually his congregation expelled him
from his pulpit for attempting to reinstate traditional practices. In
his own time Edwards was forever at the center of controversy.

He had, in his examinations of the nature of man and man's experi­
ence, operated from a Calvinist base that is, today, in disrepute because
of its harsh view of man and his limited possibilities. America turned
away from that view to a belief in the limitless possibilities of the
individual, and Edwards is often condemned for failing to read the temper
of his times. Yet Edwards did not deny the importance of the individual.
Though he believed that man could accomplish good only with God's help,
he believed man could be brought to accept that help. He focused his
oratory on moving the individual to a perception of the true nature of
that help and of his own need of it. Although Edwards' oratory was the
tool of his Calvinist ministry, his definition of man as its subject and
language as its chief tool went beyond the Calvinism of his theology.
It was no longer the established Calvinist doctrines of original sin and
predestination, based on dogma and Scripture, that future ages would have
to accept, adapt, or refute, but Edwards' examinations of the nature of man and his reasons and capabilities for action in the world and for spiritual regeneration.
V. END NOTES


3 Aldridge, p. 164.


6 Miller, Jonathan Edwards, p. xiii.


10 Aldridge, p. 96.


13 Goen, p. 80.

14 Heimert and Miller, p. lvi.

15 Perry Miller, Jonathan Edwards, p. 53-54.


18 Heimert and Miller, p. xl.


21 Gilbert Tennant, "Dangers of an Unconverted Ministry," ed. Heimert and Miller, p. 76.


25 Goen, ed., p. 325.

26 Edwards' *Thoughts on the Revival* (1742) examined religious conversions he believed to be genuine, and *Distinguishing Marks* (1741) warned against excesses and established a group of marks by which the people were to measure their own experiences.


Edwards' *Religious Affections* is considered by some critics to be his only original work, even though it detailed a psychology of religious man that was becoming accepted during his own time.


The *Empiricists*, p. 21.

The *Empiricists*, p. 22.

The *Empiricists*, p. 22.

The *Empiricists*, p. 31.


Locke, in *The Locke Reader*, p. 201; Edwards, eds. Faust and Johnson, p. 225.

The *Empiricists*, p. 119.

The *Empiricists*, p. 119.


*The Locke Reader*, p. 246.

46. Loren Baritz, "Theology: Jonathan Edwards," City on a Hill (New York: John Wiley, 1964), p. 66. Whitefield was an itinerant preacher who attracted vast numbers of people with sermons delivered with highly dramatic intonations of voice and sweeping physical gestures. He came to be in such disrepute with the orthodox ministry that he was denied admission to several pulpits. James Davenport was also an itinerant evangelist whose increasingly bizarre behavior twice caused authorities to judge him insane. He was persuaded to publish a confession and retraction of his excessive evangelistic behavior which the "Old Lights" used as a further weapon against the revival.


52. Chauncy later endorsed Taylor's attack on the doctrine of original sin and defended it in the debate that followed.

53. Edwards was expelled from the Northampton pulpit in 1750 for his attempts to reinstate public professions of conversion experiences.


55. Edwards used the label Arminian for those who challenged the doctrines of predestination and original sin as I will do.

56. The Arminian arguments are taken in passing from the introductions to Freedom of the Will and Original Sin.

57. Faust and Johnson, p. xl.

58. Faust and Johnson, p. lxvi.

60. Locke, The Locke Reader, p. 71.


68. Turnbull, as quoted by Edwards, Original Sin, eds. Faust and Johnson, p. 318.

69. Turnbull, as quoted by Edwards, Original Sin, eds. Faust and Johnson, p. 318.


71. Original Sin, eds. Faust and Johnson, p. 324.

72. Original Sin, eds. Faust and Johnson, p. 324.

73. Original Sin, eds. Faust and Johnson, p. 327.

74. Original Sin, eds. Faust and Johnson, p. 328.

75. Original Sin, eds. Faust and Johnson, p. 334.

76. Original Sin, eds. Faust and Johnson, p. 331.

77. Original Sin, eds. Faust and Johnson, p. 331.

78. Whitby, as quoted by Edwards, Freedom of the Will, eds. Faust and Johnson, p. 292.


82 *Original Sin*, eds. Faust and Johnson, p. 320.


86 *Freedom of the Will*, eds. Faust and Johnson, p. 263.

87 Locke, in *The Empiricists*, p. 48.


89 Locke, in *The Empiricists*, p. 46.


91 Locke, in *The Empiricists*, p. 48.


93 Locke also included suspension, but Edwards denied the distinction, since the will must choose action or forbearance in regard to suspension.


97 Holbrook, p. 6.


100 Miller, Jonathan Edwards, p. 156.


113 Works, Vol. 4, p. 318.

114 Works, Vol. 4, p. 316.


"Future Punishment of the Wicked," eds. Faust and Johnson, p. 146.


Original Sin, ed. Holbrook, p. 156.


Davidson, p. 109.


Works, Vol. 4, p. 303.

Works, Vol. 4, p. 303.

Works, Vol. 4, p. 575.

Works, Vol. 4, p. 575.

Works, Vol. 4, p. 388.

Works, Vol. 4, p. 388.

135 Works, Vol. 4, p. 102.


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