Navigating with an Ethical Rudder

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Architecture
Navigating with an Ethical Rudder

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A work of architecture... is as much determined by the aim which it is to serve as by the place that it is to take up in a total spatial context. ... Through this dual ordering the building presents a true increase of being: it is a work of art. It is not a work of art if it simply stands anywhere, as a building that is a blot on the landscape, but only if it represents the solution of a building problem. ... A building is never primarily a work of art. Its purpose, through which it belongs in the context of life, cannot be separated from itself without losing some of its reality. If it has become merely an object of the aesthetic consciousness, then it has merely a shadowy reality and lives a distorted life only in the degenerate form of an object of interest to tourists, or a subject for photography.

—Hans-Georg Gadamer

ETHICS: A NAVIGATIONAL RUDDER FOR ARCHITECTURE

“Draw it for me — I need to think about it for a year!” This quote from a client collects three ideas fundamental to architecture. The first is our human-ness: our capacity to invent, envision and represent (to Draw), and our desire to reflect upon things in making decisions (I Need To Think About It). The second is place: the It of the quote in both locations is an expansion to a garden and house, a change intended for betterment of the home — both the concept of it and the real thing. The third is time: in this case, a year. Architecture takes place in time — time for thought and construction and inhabitation — and endures through time. Collectively taken: human-ness, place and time comprise an underlying foundation to architecture.

The commonly received discourse of architecture today includes many change oriented, new practices and demands — those of progress: global practices and network practices that enable greater reach and expanded capabilities for design firms; emergent capabilities of the computer to drive design and the related concepts of bio-informatics; the changing dynamics of construction materials and systems; the changing roles of the architect as form giver and process leader; the merits of sustainability and the share and nature of work that involves re-using existing buildings as opposed to creating new buildings; an expanding range of fields in which persons with an architectural background find themselves; and commentary upon the inroads being made into architecture by ‘non-architects’. Yet, at the center of architecture remains designing the environment we inhabit, which, whatever its methods and results, for the foreseeable future demands human-ness, place and time for its validation.

Amid the progress dynamic that affects architectural practices and ideologies, these notes propose that a practice which has perhaps too infrequently been explicitly on the agenda of architects may be helpful in negotiating contemporary education and practice — the study of ethics as they may specially apply to architecture. While there may be no certain, fixed, unerring ethical truths, ethical reflection helps us to sharpen our focus in those endeavors that presumably address bettering the human condition — in the case here, architecture’s efforts to design and build better places for inhabitation on earth. It is ethics that bridges architectural design and human intents regarding place and time.

This paper explores the proposition that architectural ethics may be suspended between positions taken by Vitruvius and Immanuel Kant. The former asserts that beauty is as essential to architecture as are utility and durability, and the latter, that architecture finds its perfection in serving its social purposes and thus that beauty is contingent, compromising architecture as a fine art. This is a complex ethical matter — not to be quickly dismissed as a ‘Beauty versus Function’ subjective opinion debate or as a confusion between “aesthetics” and “ethics”.

A developmental line for architectural ethics and aesthetics’ position within it is sketched from Vitruvius’ “firmness-commodity-delight” triad, through Medieval consideration of the ranking of knowledge and the arts, to architecture in Kant’s Critique of Judgment, on to Hegel who also takes up the hierarchy of the arts including architecture, and then to Heidegger’s Building Dwelling Thinking. Four Precepts are proposed which collectively constitute a framework for exploring architecture’s special ethics, its ‘navigational rudder’: ? 1: Purposefulness; ? 2: Material Production; ?3: Aesthetic Virtue; ?4: Praxis. A concluding section proposes a course for continued development and case study exploration of the themes presented here, beyond the confines of this brief foundational paper.
THE BEGIN: VITRUVIUS TO HUME

We begin with a quote from the Morris Hicky Morgan translation of Vitruvius’ Ten Books on Architecture:

All these [buildings of all sorts from fortifications to temples to baths, theatres and promenades] must be built with due reference to durability, convenience and beauty.2

The later Granger translation is “strength, utility, grace.” Working backward in time from Morgan, Isaac Ware in his translation of Palladio’s reference to Vitruvius used: “utility or convenience, duration and beauty.” Sir Henry Wotton, referring to, but not translating, Vitruvius uses: “commodity, firmness and delight.”6

Vitruvius continues on to describe his meaning:

Durability will be assured when foundations are carried down to the solid ground and materials wisely and liberally selected; convenience, when the arrangement of the apartments is faultless and presents no hindrance to use, and when each class of building is assigned to its suitable and appropriate exposure; and beauty, when the appearance of the work is pleasing and in good taste, and when its members are in due proportion to correct principles of symmetry:7

In the first quote, Vitruvius posits that it is venustas (beauty), that elevates mere construction and building to ‘architecture,’ and that it is architecture that is the proper order of building for public purposes. Thus, architecture includes an essential, intrinsic manifestation of beauty in conjunction with its human purposes to be ‘architecture.’ If there is a chance that this requirement is misread, Palladio makes it explicit that all three are simultaneously required for proper architecture:

That work cannot be called perfect, which should be useful and not durable, or durable and not useful, or having both these should be without beauty.8 (italics mine)

The translations have captured the central essence without fixedness of each of Vitruvius’ three terms:

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<tr>
<th>[having or possessing]</th>
<th>convenience</th>
<th>durability</th>
<th>beauty</th>
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<tr>
<td>commodity</td>
<td>firmness</td>
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<td>utility</td>
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<td>[being]</td>
<td>useful</td>
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<td>commodious</td>
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<tr>
<td>convenient</td>
<td>strong</td>
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<td>graceful</td>
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Utilitas is not interpreted as minimal functionality; there is a component of amleness, of comfort; there are demands for appropriate disposition of parts, relationships of one place to another; of shade and rest and repose balancing minimal utility. Utility in this sense also includes the symbolic civic role that may attach to building ‘type.’ Firmitas entails solid founding upon the earth, structural integrity and a capacity to ‘endure’ through time, to weather. This demands a certain quality of material, constructional method and engineering integrity. Beauty, venustas, which is a delight to the mind and senses, is defined in terms of harmony, symmetry, proportion of part to part, etc. Beauty is an aspect of art, and its appreciation an element of human well being or flourishing. For Vitruvius and Palladio (and for the generations that have studied architecture to the current day), the discipline of architecture entails knowledge and practices incorporating durability, firmness, convenience, utility, commodity and beauty, delight, grace.

Architecture cannot be ‘good architecture’ without these qualities. Another quote from Palladio’s discussion of houses:

That the houses may be commodious for the use of the family, without which they would be greatly blameworthy, far from being commendable, great care ought to be taken . . .10 (italics added)

The context in Wotton’s essay also speaks to doing things well, in a sense of goodness:

In architecture as in all other operative arts, the end must direct the operation. The end is to build well. Well building hath three conditions. Commodity, firmness and delight.11 (italics added)

In a non-architectural context discussing moral virtues and vices, employing architecture among other examples such as personal character and the written word, David Hume provides a view of the independence and interdependence of beauty, commodity, and durability as virtues:

... where any object, in all its parts, is fitted to attain any agreeable end, it naturally gives us pleasure and is esteemed beautiful, even though some external circumstances be wanting to render it altogether ineffectual. ...

... A house that is contrived with great judgment for all the commodities of life pleases us upon that account, though [we sense] that no one will ever dwell in it. ...

... A house may displease . . . by being ill-contrived for the convenience of the owner . . . When a building seems clumsy and tottering to the eye, it is ugly and disagreeable, though we may be fully assured of the solidity of the workmanship.12

Linking Hume’s observations, for a work of architecture to be whole, possessing virtue in the sense he is describing, beauty/pleasure (delight), commodity/convenience, and solidity of workmanship must simultaneously exist in the work.

This “rational reconstruction” and juxtaposition of these translations and perspectives through time, though limited in historical contextualization, illustrates the sustained interest in, persistence, and depth of Vitruvius’ position, reifying it. The language of the authors is moral in tone: Thus, beauty cannot be separated from architecture’s virtue for the Western mind. Architecture’s excellence/virtue is dependent upon the proper practice of architecture in the virtue terms ‘blameworthy’, ‘perfection’, ‘good’, and ‘blot’ put forth from Vitruvius to Hume (and Gadamer).13
MEDIEVAL ORDER, KANT AND HEGEL

In contrast to architecture’s claims for being an art through its beauty, there is a second lineage that positions architecture as a lesser, compromised art and science than sculpture, painting or poetry, mathematics and metaphysics, precisely because of its being craft and utility bound. In Medieval times, the branches of knowledge and education were divided in ascending hierarchy from the *ars mechanicae* (those associated with craft and making, material and functional purpose, i.e., architecture and engineering), to the *ars liberales* (the trivium: grammar, logic and rhetoric; the higher order quadrivium: geometry, astronomy, arithmetic and music), to the highest order, *scientiae* (those of theoretical speculation: physics, mathematics, religion and metaphysics).

It is Immanuel Kant more than half a millennium later, building upon Baumgarten, who crystallizes the conception of aesthetics as a particular branch of knowledge rooted in art, art not in the classic mimetic or representational sense, but art existing as itself without additional purpose or function: “pure” or “fine” art: “Hence there can be purposiveness [as an art object] without purpose [a willed utility or function] ...”14 He establishes a hierarchy with architecture inhabiting a lower rung of the fine arts, below the speech arts of poetry and rhetoric, and the art of painting; naming it, along with sculpture, a “plastic .. formative art.”15 (Kant’s italics) Architecture occupies this rank because its essential being lies in purpose and use other than its beauty:

Architecture is the art of exhibiting concepts of things that are possible only through art, those things whose form does not have nature as its determining basis but instead has a chosen purpose, and of doing so in order to carry out that aim and yet also with aesthetic purposiveness. In architecture the main concern is what use is to be made of the artistic object ... temples, magnificent buildings for public gatherings, or again residences, triumphal arches, columns, cenotaphs, and so on, erected as honorary memorials, belong to architecture: ... For what is essential in a work of architecture is the product’s adequacy for a certain use.17 (Kant’s italics)

Architecture’s beauty is thus adherent rather than its essence, its perfection lying in purpose:

... the beauty of a house or a building (such as a church, palace, armory, or summer house) does presuppose the concept of the purpose that determines what the thing is [meant] to be, and hence a concept of its perfection, and so it is merely adherent beauty. Now just as a connection of beauty, which properly only concerns form, with the agreeable (the sensation) prevented the judgment of taste from being pure, so does a connection of beauty with the good (i.e., as to how, in terms of the thing’s purpose, the manifold is good for the thing itself), impair the purity of a judgment of taste.18

While included as an art through which human expectations are met, the “good” of architecture, its virtue, stems primarily from purpose, and secondarily from beauty. Following Kant, Hegel grants architecture status as an art, but positions it as the lowest rung of the fine arts:

Such we may take to be the articulated totality of the particular arts, viz., the external art of architecture, the objective art of sculpture and the subjective art of painting, music and poetry [the highest art]. ...19

... [The] material of architecture is matter itself .. mass subject to mechanical laws .. merely set in order in conformity of relations of the abstract understanding, i.e., with relations of symmetry. In this material and in such forms, the ideal as concrete spirituality does not admit of being realized.20

From Medieval education and knowledge foundations, through Kant to Hegel, we see an interpretation of two modes — that of purpose or utility and that of matter/material/mechanics — both of which militate against architecture’s capacity as a pure fine, or speculative, art. As Hegel puts it, when it transgresses its ground as intentional place “... it has already overstepped its own boundary, and is leaning to sculpture, the phase above it.”21 (emphasis mine) In this view, while sculpture is above architecture as a fine art, for architecture to transgress into becoming sculpture is to lose its validity as architecture, just as for Kant, architecture demands for its perfection the perfection of its concept as place of inhabitation for human purpose.

It is this “lesser art” concept that Gadamer attempts to redress in the opening quote: architecture’s art exists in the resolution of circumstance and intent.

CONVERGENCE AND HEIDEGGER

In this brief exposition, we arrive at a point where Kant/Hegel and Vitruvius/Palladio converge. For Vitruvius architecture is an art, a complex praxis (which he distinguishes from painting and sculpture which are also complex practices22) distinguished by its demands to serve human purpose, drawing together diverse bodies of knowledge to accomplish this objective, including those of geometry harmonics and beauty. For Kant and Hegel, the perfection of architecture lies not in its abstraction as beauty, or aesthetic art object, but in its first nature as serving human purposes. It may (and ought) to do so with artfulness, but its art is never independent of its utilitarian and material necessities; without these, it is something else.

Heidegger in his analysis of the linguistic and historic roots of building (*bauern*) and dwelling (*baun*) in *Building Dwelling Thinking*, arrives at a similar point; that building (architecture) has validation as construct(ed)ing dwelling (in the sense of being on earth). We make, are within, and are shaped by places made for dwelling:

... We attain to dwelling, so it seems, only by means of building. The latter, building, has the former, dwelling, as its goal. ...
... Accordingly, spaces receive their essential being from locales (built places; stemming from boundary, not as “that at which something stops,” but at which “something begins”) and not from [undifferentiated] “space.” ...

... Building and thinking are, each in its own way, inescapable for dwelling so long as each busies itself with its own affairs in separation, instead of listening to the other. They are able to listen if both — building and thinking — belong to dwelling, if they remain within their limits and realize that the one as much as the other comes from the workshop of long experience and incessant practice. (Heidegger’s italics; material in [—] has been inserted from Heidegger’s immediately preceding sentences to clarify sense of the quotes)

Heidegger firmly anchors building as a praxis that entails dwelling and thinking. The title of his essay has no conjunctions that would create an opportunity or demand to inquire into ‘and’ of ‘within’, etc., the three are. This Heideggerian thread is taken up by Norberg-Schulz and most recently by Karsten Harries.

How do the positions outlined lead to the initial proposition in these notes that the essential threads of architectural ethics can be unraveled from them?

THE ETHICAL NATURE AND ACTION OF ARCHITECTURE

Ethics appears to be a wholly different field than architecture, concerned with such things as: How shall I live? What is the right thing to do? What is it to be or do well, to do good, to be just or fair? It is a field that is argued through conceptions of the positive beneficial results of actions (teleology, utility theory and, arguably, pragmatism); of the determination of how to act based upon moral principles (deontics); of how we ought to perform things well with respect to ourselves and others (virtue); and of how we can reach reasoned agreement without resorting to conflict as a means for coexisting so that we may each independently pursue our own ends relatively unencumbered (contract theory). It has its own meta-ethical world of argument which inquires into the nature of values, how we come to define or know ‘good’ or ‘justice’ for instance, and whether or not these values are permanent or relative or subjective, how we come to hold them, or how they could possibly have any binding force upon us for action.

Ethics seems a wholly reflective business; that is, of course, until we have to choose to act — to decide upon such issues as: euthanasia, abortion, feeding the starving, helping the poor, invoking capital punishment, being truthful when to do so may be damaging, or expending public resources on various projects (such as building schools and courthouses, defense complexes, housing for the homeless, leisure space and parks, or a new downtown district) with the expectation that somehow they will benefit ourselves and society. It is this expectation of positive benefit that is at the heart of progress. The shaping of our environment through architecture, the use of public resources to do so, the private use of land and resources that affect the common good, etc., bring building and architecture into the realm of applied ethics. It is then that we turn to ethical thought for insight into a choice dilemma.

Architecture’s specific ethical nature and actions, can be set within the larger field of ethics. The Vitruvius/Palladio/Kant/Hegel/Heidegger line and Gadamer in his essay, define architecture as a unity: purposeful ● material ● place ● possessing/being art and thought. These are not additive aspects but simultaneously occurring and they are essential to the pace made. They are the terms of architecture’s virtue. In these terms, architecture is conceptualized as the study of, speculation about, design of, and construction of humanity’s places of inhabitation. Those inhabitation’s utilize resources, frame spaces for various uses, shelter us from the elements, and symbolize our institutions, e.g., religion, state, and education. Four Precepts are proposed through which to examine that ethical nature:

1. Purposefulness. Architecture is grounded in human intention and purpose. It is therefore subject, as are other human affairs, to judgment with respect to its intentions; who and what purposes are served by those intentions, how well those intentions are met. These are not only practical or utilitarian judgments, but also ethical. For example, intentions and purposes may be beneficial or good (a day care center) or harmful or evil (a genocide machine). They may serve the interests of despots, dictators, military junta, or democracies; they may serve the interests of powerful individuals against the public interest; and they may displace or marginalize the weak, or the discriminated against (ghettos still exist). Ethical judgment may need to be reached in evaluating architectural project intentions and purposes. Beyond intent and purpose, judgment of how well intentions and purposes are met through architecture is a measure of relative merit or goodness of the built result — ‘goodness’, in this sense, being the ethical virtue of the work.

2. Material Production. While the architectural discipline includes (indeed, would be impoverished without) speculative thought, architecture as experienced daily is a material production. The built inhabited landscape tends to be large and demands many resources for its accomplishment. Once having been built, even ephemeral portable architecture such as teepee’s or yurts have a physical and enduring presence, even if only for a short period of time at any one place. Material production at all scales uses communal resources; those resources may be used well or wastefully (more than one society has made itself extinct due to desertification of its locale). Constructions may be built safely to endure winds and rain, and earthquakes, and gravity, or they may be constructed poorly endangering our lives (the penalty in Hammurabi’s 17th-C BCE Code, Section 229, for building collapse killing someone was for the builder to be killed). When designing and building, an ethical duty is incurred with respect to resources utilized.
and sustainable conceptions of life, and with respect to personal physical safety.

3. **Aesthetic Virtue.** The third precept is that of aesthetics: architecture's relationship to art, its being an art, and its relationship to the philosophy of art and aesthetics, the beautiful and the sublime, and human flourishing. This may be the most debated issue of ethics in architecture, because for many it is the self-aware 'art'fulness of architecture, the desire to make 'beautiful' buildings, that differentiates 'architecture' from 'mere building'. In its role of giving form, appearance, image and meaning to societal expectations, aspirations or needs, we look to discern architecture's aesthetic virtue.

Architecture, being a material production, results in things, artifacts. One might say that by its very existence and inhabitation, by its duration, even if brief, that a building's practical intents have been met. What differentiates buildings — architecture — as what differentiates other artificial productions, then, is not the level of service but their aesthetic character, their beauty, aesthetics being: supportive of and/or essential to human well being and/or a discrete presentation of reality or being (depending upon the philosophical position being taken).

In all cases, aesthetics and beauty matter: either as art per se, or as a beneficial contribution to happiness or flourishing in the Classical Greek concept of *eudaimonia*. Thus, a building's aesthetic embodiment is a part of its virtue, its ethical value. In the developmental line sketched in this paper, a building's perfection is interdependent upon purpose, material and aesthetic goodness in the ethical sense of virtue/excellence, *areté*.

4. **Praxis.** (action, practice; *spec.* the practice of a technical subject or art, as opp. to arising out of the theory of it:...) Architecture is a practice, or a collection of practices, of art technologies and conduct. As such, the practitioner is obliged to master the discipline: its history and theory, its technological foundations, its order of beauty and formal conception, the order of designing and speculation which is part of architecture, its impact on human well-being and the satisfaction of intended purpose, processes of involvement and contribution, and its representational and symbolizing capacity. To do otherwise is to not practice architecture well; to practice without virtue. Virtue is here used in the sense that MacIntyre has reactivated from Aristotle: that of the virtuous practice of a discipline which defines its content, quality and ends, and which therefore can be judged regarding its ethical merit. This applies to both the actions of practice and the resultant works of practice.

Many seemingly everyday events in architectural practices are ethical in their import: business and marketing choices (deciding on what projects to undertake, with whom to work, the values of each etc.); design deliberations and critiques (function, aesthetics, concepts); budgets (durability of architecture, value for expenditure); client and contractor interactions (honoring contracts, fairness, trust and advising); contracts (equitable conditions, value for service, mutual respect and duties); public presentations (who has the right to know and be advised about projects); and staff development and recognition. Embedded within these events are ethical questions. Duties to self, the client, the general public, and to the discipline itself can clearly be traced. They are ethical, and demand an ethics. It is in the particular questions, in particular circumstances, that architecture's ethics are shaped. When we pull the threads on one of these everyday concerns what unravels are the deepest questions and premises of the discipline.

**SUMMARY: TRACING ARCHITECTURAL ETHICAL DILEMMAS**

The opening of these notes boldly asserted that the essential content of architectural ethics was embedded in the space between Vitruvian and Kantian starting points. And, that those ethics may serve as a “navigational rudder” for architecture in an era of progress that has paradoxical nature: “... where advances in one area seem to bring decline in others?” The ensuing exploration included four architectural ethical Precepts: ?1-Purposefulness; ?2-Material Production; ?3-Aesthetic Virtue; ?4-Praxis. The Precepts define architecture's special ethical demands.

A test of this schema is its capacity to serve as an ethical key for dilemmas that arise in contemporary architectural practices. It is possible to envision a matrix with each of the four Precepts arrayed across fundamental ethical constructs: consequences/utilitarian principles/deontics; social contract; and virtue. Test cases, both analytical with respect to historical and contemporary practices (which are dynamic and changing), and conjectural based upon future modes of practices (emerging new practices), may be constructed to inform the assessment of, and choices to be made in, those practices. There is a need for a broad understanding of ethics and professionalism in conjunction with that of varying cultural/social/political circumstances within which architecture is practiced and taught.

While full development of the envisioned matrix and test cases, and their potential for case analysis in architectural education are beyond the reach of this brief paper, the outline of the central thesis establishes an initial position for continued development.

**NOTES**


2. While “Western” ethics is not the only ethical tradition at work in world, and while “design”, “place”, “inhabitation”, and “betterment” and its implicit idea of the “good”, are subjects of inquiry and argument, they share broad similarities in addressing the improvement of life. Consideration of “improvement”, “betterment”, and “the good,” are among the classic concerns of Western ethics. Although significant critiques have been leveled against their formulation and the literature and reasoning that supports their debate, e.g., feminism and Continental philosophy, all
ethical quests including those of the critiques are concerned with what manner to live and act ethically. From that shared objective, these questions continue to have validity, and serve as the departure point for the remainder of these notes.


7 Vitruvius, op. cit. @ Note 4, Bk.I, Ch.III, ¶2, 17.

8 Palladio, op. cit. @ Note 5, Bk.I, Ch.I, 1.

9 Vitruvius, op. cit. @ Note 4, e.g., see Book V, where Vitruvius discusses the planning and design of public places and major public buildings by type.

10 Palladio, op. cit. @ Note 5, Bk.II, Ch.II, 38.

11 Wotton, op. cit. @ Note 6.


13 A) For a brief exegesis of historiographical genres see David H. Hall, Richard Roarty: Prophet and Poet of the New Pragmatism (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), 12-13; B) The compound term excellents/virtue has its roots in the Greek word aretē. Aretē embodies both the concepts of personal virtues such as generosity or steadfastness, and the concept of excellence. Excellence extends from personal behavior and one’s practices, and also to qualities or attributes of those practices and of things. Thus, a knife blade may possess aretē with regard to its strength and sharpness as a knife. In the remainder of the text, virtue will be used in this compound sense of excellence, that may apply to persons, objects, and practices. The knife example is from C. C. W. Taylor’s definition of aretē in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. Ted Honderich (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). This concept is a central issue in Alasdair Maclntyre’s discussion of the nature of virtues in After Virtue: A Study in Moral Philosophy, 2nd. ed. (London: Duckworth, 1984), particularly Chapter 14 “The Nature of Virtues.”


18 Kant, op. cit. @ Note 15, ¶16: A Judgment of Taste by Which We Declare an Object Beautiful under the Condition of a Determinate Concept Is Not Pure, 77.


20 Hegel, ibid., 90.

21 Hegel, op. cit., 91.

22 Vitruvius, op. cit. @ Note 4, Bk.I, Ch.1, ¶11-13, 10-11.


26 Gregory Palermo, The four precepts outlined here have been adapted and condensed from material originally developed by Palermo for Ethics and the Practice of Architecture, Barry Wasseman, Patrick Sullivan and Gregory Palermo (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2000), pp. 80-91.


299th ACSA Annual Meeting theme challenge: “Can we, in other words, improve the lives of people, the health of cities, the condition of the environment, and the quality of architecture without reductive, one-size-fits-all solutions of the past? Can we control the paradoxical nature of progress, where advances in one area seem to bring decline in others?..."