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Promoting the Heisman Trophy: coorientation as it applies to promoting Heisman Trophy candidates

Stephen Paul Warnke
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Promoting the Heisman Trophy:
Coorientation as it applies to promoting
Heisman Trophy candidates

by

Stephen-Paul Warnke

A Thesis Submitted to the
Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS

Department: English
Major: Business and Technical Communication

Iowa State University
Ames, Iowa
1992
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INTRODUCTION

The Heisman Trophy is college football's most coveted individual award. While it is given to an individual player, the benefits from winning the Heisman can be felt throughout the program of the player's school. As a result, colleges and universities will look to promote a player for the award. Some schools, relying on their traditions or media exposure, will not promote their candidate, while other schools with less name recognition and exposure will conduct an extensive campaign. My thesis is a study of how selected colleges and universities promote their candidates for college football's Heisman Trophy.

The methodology behind the selection of schools was to provide a cross-section of Division I universities based on their reputation and name-recognition as football powers. At one end of the spectrum stands the highly-recognized University of Florida, a perennial contender for the national championship. Their status as a football power is unquestioned, especially in recent years. Only Miami (Fla.) and Washington have more victories in the past three years, and Florida consistently appears on national television. The other extreme is the relatively obscure University of Pacific, the third smallest Division I school. Based on fourteen consecutive losing seasons, Pacific can not be considered a football power. The other schools represent several positions in between these two extremes. Notre Dame, the most
recognized football school in the country, is also referred to throughout the study. My goal is to better understand what these select universities did in the past and are doing now to promote their candidates. Also, I want to show how certain factors might affect the extent and types of promotional work done by sports information departments in the future.

Initially I will look at the history of the award and analyze the common characteristics shared by all previous winners. By looking at past winners, I will attempt to identify certain attributes that are necessary for a player to be considered a serious candidate. The opinions of sportswriters, unscientifically selected, were also used in identifying these attributes. While the sportswriters were selected randomly, they all voted in the 1991 Heisman election. They also represent respected newspapers and sports publications like *The Des Moines Register* and *Sports Illustrated*.

After identifying these attributes, I will convert them to variables whose values determine the extent and type of promotional work universities use for their candidates. I then plugged these variables into the coorientational model that S.L. Chaffee and J.M. McLeod developed to study the communication process between two groups and their environment for communication.
At this point, it must be understood that Chaffee and McLeod created their coorientation model as a planning tool to be used prior to the communication process. I will be using the model retroactively, superimposing it onto the communication process already conducted between sportswriters and sports information departments. Using the model after the fact will show a coorientation relationship between sportswriters and sports information departments.

After explaining the coorientation model as it applies to my study, I will use the model as a framework for studying these campaigns. I will filter the case studies through the lens of the coorientation model, establishing a relationship between measurements in the coorientation model and the promotional activity each school produces. The measurements derived from this coorientation analysis, as well as personal interviews from the sports information departments from the case study schools, will provide insights into why sports information departments promote their candidates the way they do and how they do it.

By filtering past campaigns through the lens of coorientation analysis, I hope to provide a framework that sports information departments could use to plan their future campaigns. The coorientation model and measurements derived from coorientation analysis will provide a better
understanding of the audience that the sports information departments are trying to reach.

This understanding could give the sports information departments insights as to how to plan the most effective campaign for their candidate. It will be especially helpful in the planning process that goes into producing promotional items that are completely controlled by sports information departments, referred to in this study as "controlled" media. By understanding the audience before the communication process begins, a communicator can be more effective in persuading the audience.

It will also help prepare the sports information departments for events that are not in their control, such as television appearances and print media exposure. These events will be referred to as "uncontrolled" media. A more detailed definition of "controlled" and "uncontrolled" media will be provided in the discussion of media exposure.
HISTORY OF THE HEISMAN

Since 1935, New York's Downtown Athletic Club has annually awarded the Heisman Trophy to the nation's outstanding college football player. Willard B. Prince, who founded the DAC Journal, served as the prime mover behind the establishment of this award. Prince chaired the Trophy committee from 1935 to 1948 and he, along with his son and daughter, personally counted the votes of sportswriters the first year. The next year the voting was placed in the hands of sectional representatives of the media. In the 1960s, the voter count, which began at 65 in 1935, rose as high as 1300 voters from all elements of sports journalism. It has since been reduced to 920 voters.

Some of the rules of the selection process, such as no DAC members participating in the vote, were established by Prince from the outset. Prince also wanted the vote to be conducted on a 3-2-1 basis—that is, three points for a first place vote, two for a second, and one for a third. He felt that this would eliminate any geographical domination and widen the possibilities for the candidates.

Initially, the award was called the Downtown Athletic Club Trophy given to the best college football player "east of the Mississippi" (Esposito 1989, 2). In October 1936, John W. Heisman, the DAC's first director of athletics, died. Heisman had attended the University of Pennsylvania, receiving his law
degree in 1892. Immediately after graduating, Heisman entered the coaching ranks, becoming the first football coach at Oberlin College in Ohio. His first team went undefeated and he continued to have success at a variety of colleges, including Georgia Tech (where his 1916 squad pummeled Cumberland 222-0) and his alma mater Pennsylvania. After his death, Prince and the committee named the trophy in his honor, despite Heisman's insistence that it was the "Award of the DAC" (Esposito 1989, 2).

Initially, Heisman had been opposed to an award of this type because he felt there were too many good football players on the scene. That sentiment is echoed today by sportswriters who vote for the winner. Maury White, retired sports editor and continuing contributor to The Des Moines Register, states that he does not know how to go about picking the best player: "Picking the best is as impossible a job as finding the most beautiful girl in the world or the prettiest shell on the beach. Comes down to a matter of judgment and no one's really right or wrong" (White 1981, 1D). Nevertheless, each year sportswriters like White attempt to pick "the prettiest shell" and a player is given a version of the original trophy that was created by sculptor Frank Eliscu, who used Ed Smith, a running back at New York University, as the model. The original trophy was, and still is, cast at the Roman Bronze Foundry in Corona Queens.
HEISMANN FACTORS

The criteria for selecting the Heisman Trophy winner varies slightly from voter to voter. As Maury White of The Des Moines Register stated, it comes down to a matter of individual judgment. Of the sportswriters interviewed for this study, all of whom voted for the 1991 Heisman, all stated that the winner has to win the award on the field based on his performance. In a perfect setting for electing a winner, all judgments concerning who performed the "best" would be the same and all variables would be equal so that a player's likelihood of winning the award would be determined by his performance. However, while an outstanding performance is an important requirement for Heisman candidates, media exposure is equally, if not more, important.

With the focus of this study being how colleges promote their Heisman candidates, media exposure will be explored more thoroughly than other factors in the Heisman vote because of its effect on the promotional activities of colleges. The importance of media exposure as a factor in the Heisman vote increased as the growing amount of television exposure for college football increased. With more and more games appearing on television, it is now necessary for a candidate to appear in some of these games or fall behind candidates who do.
Media exposure of a candidate, while influencing colleges' promotional work, is itself influenced by certain characteristics of the candidate. The most obvious factor is the candidate's performance. It goes without saying that an outstanding performance will receive more exposure than a poor performance.

By reviewing past Heisman winners in the Downtown Athletic Club's Heisman Handbook, I also identified several other common characteristics shared by past winners. These characteristics can be divided into two categories, individual and team. When I describe these characteristics in detail, I will show how each affects the media exposure a candidate receives.

First, however, I will describe media exposure in detail as it relates to the Heisman vote. A relationship between the amount of "uncontrolled" media and the use of "controlled" media will be established in this description.

 MediaPlayer

Media exposure for the Heisman comes in two forms: controlled and uncontrolled. In Public Relations: The Profession and the Practice, Otis Baskin and Craig Aronoff describe the main difference between the two. Controlled media allows a public relations practitioner, in this case a sports information director, to dictate what is published and how it is delivered to the primary audience (sportswriters).
Types of controlled media include newsletters, posters, handbooks, videos, faxes, and various gimmicks like neckties and badges. Sports information departments control the content of the promotional items.

Uncontrolled media can consist of newspaper and magazine articles, television and radio commentary, and television appearances. In these cases, a third party, perhaps a commentator, writer, editor, producer, or director, makes the decision about the content presented to the audience (Baskin and Aronoff 1988, 161).

Uncontrolled media exposure, especially appearances on national television and in national magazines, plays a big role in the Heisman race. It is free publicity that reaches a vast audience, including sportswriters who vote for the Heisman. "Exposure, especially in nationally televised games, plays a big role," said Roger Valdiserri (Gillespie 1981, 32t). Valdiserri should know: he was sports information director at Notre Dame for six of the Irish's seven Heisman winners. However, Valdiserri notes, a bad performance on national television or playing night games that miss prime media coverage can have the opposite effect (Gillespie 1981, 32t).

John Keith, Oklahoma publicist when Billy Sims won the 1978 Heisman, agrees with Valdiserri on the power of national television, citing Sims as a prime example. Sims had not
played in 1977 due to injury and was not listed in the Oklahoma press book as a possible All-American. However, a fast start statistically and a tremendous performance on a nationally televised game early in the year put Sims in position to win. However, Keith thought Sims might have blown the Heisman in the final game of the season against Nebraska. A late fumble by Sims was costly in Oklahoma's loss. "I was afraid people wouldn't vote for Sims because of that fumble' (Schraeder 1983, 2D).

Another example of the power of television is 1980 winner George Rogers of South Carolina. Two early season favorites stumbled on national T.V. opening the door for Rogers (Gillespie 1981, 32t).

The 1990 winner, Brigham Young's Ty Detmer, had two outstanding national television appearances. The first came after the Heisman announcement for 1989 and served as a springboard for the next year's Heisman campaign. The second came in the third game of the 1990 season against defending champion Miami (Fla). As Maury White stated, "It was his Heisman to lose, and he didn't" (White 1991, interview).

The 1991 winner, Michigan's Desmond Howard, also had early season exposure on national T.V. and made the most of his opportunity as well. After earning Sports Illustrated's "Player of the Week" honors the first week of the year, Howard and Michigan faced Notre Dame on national television. Against
Notre Dame, Howard made a spectacular, fourth-down diving catch for a touchdown. The next week he appeared on the cover of *Sports Illustrated*.

Valdiserri's warning about a bad performance on national T.V. bears mentioning here because another prominent Heisman candidate, David Klingler of Houston, performed badly on national T.V. the same week Howard excelled against Notre Dame. Both games were featured in *Sports Illustrated*'s next issue in sharp contrast to each other. While Howard was being tabbed the "leading Heisman Trophy candidate" (Jenkins 1991, 16), Klingler was hardly mentioned and he quickly faded from the race.

As stated before, another form of uncontrolled media that is important to Heisman candidates is appearing in major sports magazines like *Sports Illustrated*. It is especially helpful to be on the cover. Houston's Klingler made the cover of *Sports Illustrated*'s 1991 preseason issue and began the season as the Heisman favorite. Desmond Howard appeared on *Sports Illustrated*'s cover twice. Both showed Howard in Heisman-like poses and the second proclaimed him a "cinch" to win the award.

The level of these kinds of media exposure will differ from school to school. Notre Dame, the most recognizable program in college football, relies entirely on uncontrolled media exposure to promote their candidates. They consistently
challenge for the national championship and have their own television contract with NBC. This guarantees that a Heisman candidate from Notre Dame will receive the kind of exposure that most other schools can only dream of receiving.

While Notre Dame, and certain other perennial powers, rely on uncontrolled media, the rest of college football tries to increase their exposure by using controlled media. In fact, the amount of controlled media a college uses is inversely related to the amount of uncontrolled media exposure they receive. That is, the more uncontrolled media exposure a school gets, the less controlled media they will use, and vice versa.

For example, four time defending champ Primetime University with six nationally televised games will not put out a video and four-color poster for its star quarterback Johnny Touchdown. The need for extra promotion is eliminated by the uncontrolled media exposure. At the same time, Backwater University, which has not even been heard on radio for six years, will look to put together a publicity campaign for their star running back D.U. Nomee. In this case, the lack of uncontrolled media exposure must be overcome by the use of controlled media.

Mathematically, this relationship can be portrayed as

\[
\frac{1}{M_c} = \frac{1}{M_u}
\]
with (Mc) being controlled media and (Mu) being uncontrolled media. As you can see, when uncontrolled media exposure increases, the need for controlled media decreases.

Now that a description of media exposure and its relationship to university promotional work has been presented, I will move on to a description of other factors that influence uncontrolled media exposure. As stated earlier, the factors that, along with performance, influence uncontrolled media can be divided into two categories: individual and team.

**Individual Factors**

The individual factors to be examined are position and year in school.

**Position**

Since the Heisman was first given in 1935, an important trend in the voting has been the dominance of offensive backs in winning the award. Of the 56 trophies awarded, all but four have gone to offensive backs -- that is, running backs and quarterbacks. The amount of media exposure these positions receive cannot be overlooked. These positions carry the football on every down. Television and photographers focus on where the ball is on every play just as every fan does. Playing an offensive back position is definitely an advantage in terms of media exposure.
Another way position influences media exposure is statistics. Offensive backs have more opportunities to produce quantifiable numbers than other players. Quarterbacks and running backs have numerous statistical categories that voters can use to compare each player's performance. Rushing yards, passing yards, receiving yards, completions, receptions, and touchdowns are just a few of the categories that the media use in describing games, both on television and in newspapers.

Defensive players, especially linemen (and offensive linemen) are restricted by the number of statistical categories that are devoted to them. In recent years, there have been more statistics kept for defensive players such as tackles for losses (sacks) but that is not enough. As Craig Ellenport, Managing Editor of *College and Pro Football Weekly* states, "Unfortunately for defensive players, linemen in particular, they cannot produce numbers. They don't score touchdowns or gain yards."

This does not mean that voters do not acknowledge defensive players. Hugh Green, a defensive end for Pittsburgh, finished second in the voting in 1980 and received 179 first place votes. Washington's Steve Emtman dominated at defensive tackle and finished fourth in this past year's voting. His 29 first place votes were second only to winner
Desmond Howard. Emtman also finished second in his home region, the Far West (Tables 1 and 2).

Could a defensive player win the award? "There is a possibility," said The Des Moines Register's Maury White, "but it would have to be an award given over a career. Emtman, if he had stayed for his senior year, had a chance. He played for a national champion (1991) and had a lot of media exposure, which would increase next year. He possibly could have won."

**Year in School**

In the past, The Heisman was almost exclusively given to the top senior collegiate football player. Up until 1982, 41 of the 47 Heisman winners were seniors. Since 1982, half the winners have been juniors, including the last four.

As an upperclassman, a player has the advantage of extra years of exposure. Maury White thinks that being an upperclassman is definitely an advantage. "There is no doubt that a career is taken into account when the voters vote. Juniors and seniors are more likely to be known to the voters than freshmen and sophomores."

Two recent developments, however, will give freshmen and sophomores more consideration in future Heisman voting. More of them, especially Heisman Trophy caliber players, will receive more playing time.
Table 1. Results of the 1991 Heisman Memorial Trophy Award balloting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Total Votes</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
<th>Total Points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Desmond Howard</td>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Casey Weldon</td>
<td>Florida St.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>96</td>
<td></td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ty Detmer</td>
<td>Brigham Young</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>130</td>
<td></td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Steve Emtman</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Shane Matthews</td>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Vaughan Dunbar</td>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Jeff Blake</td>
<td>E. Carolina</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Terrell Buckley</td>
<td>Florida St.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Marshall Faulk</td>
<td>San Diego St.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Bucky Richardson</td>
<td>Texas A&amp;M</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
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Table 2. Points and position of top five candidates in each region

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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Howard</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weldon</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detmer</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emtman</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthews</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>2</td>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Howard</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weldon</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detmer</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emtman</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Matthews</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
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The developments are the NCAA cutting back on the scholarships available to schools and more juniors declaring themselves eligible for the NFL draft. Colleges will reduce their scholarship totals from 95 to 85 by 1995 and nearly half the first-round draft choices in the 1992 draft were underclassmen.

"I think schools are playing freshmen more because of the scholarship limits," said Texas A&M offensive coordinator Bob Toledo. "And the NFL has developed to the point that if they're taking juniors, what's to hold them back from taking sophomores" (Bohls 26). Of Texas A&M's twenty-two starters in 1992, thirteen were freshmen and sophomores.

Toledo's theory is already taking shape. Next year's Heisman Trophy candidates are instead becoming first-round draft picks in the NFL. For example, UCLA's Tommy Maddox, a possible front-runner in next year's Heisman race, gave up his final two college years and was the Denver Broncos first-round pick.

Added playing time means added exposure, something that upperclassmen held as an advantage in the past. However, the extra exposure in terms of years is something freshmen and sophomores can not make up.

Team Factors

The factors that are important to a candidate's team are the school's tradition and conference affiliation. Equally
important is the team's performance that year in terms of wins and losses and, in rare cases, the school's geography.

**School Tradition and Conference Affiliation**

In its history, the Heisman Trophy has gone to a team that played in an "elite" conference or for a marquee independent like Notre Dame 82% of the time (Table 3). The elite conferences include the Big 10, Pac-10, Big 8, the SEC, and the SWC. These power conferences and independents have produced 89% of the national champions since 1936, when the Associated Press began its national rankings (Table 4).

**Team Performance That Year**

Despite the fact that only six Heisman winners have played on national championship teams (the last being Tony Dorsett for Pittsburgh in 1976), 12 have played for undefeated teams and 20 played for teams with one loss. Only six Heisman winners have played for teams with four or more defeats.

These facts have not been influenced by dominant teams from the early years of the Heisman. Since 1970, only two Heisman winners, George Rogers (South Carolina, 1980) and Bo Jackson (Auburn, 1985) played for teams that did not finish the season ranked in the AP Top Twenty. Of the remaining teams, the average rank was 6th, with all Heisman teams since 1970 averaging 10 victories (Table 5). Playing for a winning team that is a contender for the national title gives the Heisman candidate a definite boost.
Table 3. Number of Heisman Trophies won by elite conferences and major independents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Conference or Independent</th>
<th>No. of Heismans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Big 10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Pacific 10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Notre Dame</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Big 8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Southeastern (SEC)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Southwest (SWC)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Miami (Fla.)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Pittsburgh</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Penn State</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>total 46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4. Number of national titles won by elite conferences or major independents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Conference or Independent</th>
<th>No. of titles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Big 10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Big 8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Southeastern (SEC)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Notre Dame</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Southwest (SWC)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Miami (Fla.)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Pacific 10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Pittsburgh</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Penn State</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>total 50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Media exposure is directly affected by the candidate's team. Television and print media follow the rankings closely. A top-ranked team from a marquee conference will obviously be followed more closely than a losing team from an obscure conference.

Geography

Only the West Coast might be at a disadvantage in geography because they play later and miss some of the prime media coverage. The regions as they are known (Figure 2) are given an equal number of voters and the winners have been divided fairly evenly. The Midwest region leads by a wide margin with 18, due to Notre Dame's record eight Heismans.

Part of this is because each region except the Northeast is host to either a power conference or to some of the power independents. In the Far West there is the Pac-10, the Southwest has the SWC and most of the Big 8, the South has most of the SEC and Miami (Fla), the Midwest has the Big Ten, and the Mid-Atlantic has Pittsburgh and Penn State.

The only way geography could play a role is in a wide-open race with no dominant candidates. In this case, the disadvantage of playing on the West Coast that was mentioned earlier could come into play.

Analysis of Factors

Performance (P) along with individual (I) and team (T) factors, if they are positive, magnify the amount of
Table 5: Records and final national ranking by the Associated Press of Heisman Trophy winning teams since 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Won-Lost-Tie</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Stanford</td>
<td>9-3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>Auburn</td>
<td>9-2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>9-2-1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>Penn State</td>
<td>12-0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Ohio State</td>
<td>10-2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Ohio State</td>
<td>11-1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>Pittsburgh</td>
<td>12-0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>11-1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>11-1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>Southern California</td>
<td>11-0-1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>8-4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>Southern California</td>
<td>9-3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>11-1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>12-1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>Boston College</td>
<td>10-2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>Auburn</td>
<td>8-4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>Miami (Fla.)</td>
<td>11-1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>Notre Dame</td>
<td>8-4</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>Oklahoma State</td>
<td>10-2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>9-2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Brigham Young</td>
<td>10-3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>10-2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>212-41-2</td>
<td>Avg. rank 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1. Geographical regions in Heisman vote
uncontrolled media that a candidate receives. For example, if a senior quarterback (I) averages 300 yards passing and four touchdowns a game (P) while playing for a nationally ranked team (T), he will have an increase in uncontrolled media exposure. Remembering that uncontrolled media is inversely proportional to controlled media

\[
\frac{1}{Mc} = \frac{1}{Mu}
\]

we can see that because the factors P, I, T magnify uncontrolled media, they will also affect the controlled media. The revised equation

\[
\frac{1}{Mc} = \frac{1}{(P + I + T)Mu}
\]

accounts for the effect the factors P, I, T, and Mu will have on controlled media. In other words, if the values of P, I, and T are low and uncontrolled media (Mu) decreases, the SID will probably have to use extensive controlled media (Mc) to promote a prospective candidate; if the values are high the use of Mc would decrease.
The focus of this study will now shift to the controlled media, or promotional work that universities do for their Heisman candidates. The case study schools offer a cross-section of universities that range from a small school lacking in reputation and name recognition (University of Pacific) to perennial power with national exposure (University of Florida). Although not included as a case study, Notre Dame will be referred to continually throughout the study because of their unique position as the most recognizable program in college football.

Coorientation Model

The approach I will be using to study the communication process is the coorientation model that S.L. Chaffee and J.M. McLeod have developed (Figure 3). This model is based on the communication process between two people or groups that are simultaneously cooriented to an environment of communication. For our purposes, the two groups, A and B, will be sportswriters and university sports information departments (SID). The environment of communication, X, corresponds to an abstract ideal of a Heisman Trophy winner.

A and B conceived this abstraction, X, from past Heisman winners and formulated an ideal "winner" based on previous recipients' attributes. Within this abstract framework of the ideal Heisman winner, candidates for the award compete against each other in the immediate context of a given year and not only against the ideal. Therefore, X includes the candidates
Figure 2. Conceptual model of coorientation
in a given year, as well as the Heisman ideal.

It is important to remember that for my study, the idea (X) of the Heisman Trophy winner is a given year's environment that is made up of candidates (0₁-₀ₙ) within the environment in a given year competing for the award. As Chaffee and McLeod assert, "A person does not orient himself to a single object in his environment, but to a discrimination between objects" (McLeod and Chaffee 1973, 479). In this environment, the sportswriters discriminate between the candidates (0₁-₀ₙ) for the Heisman.

In the communication process, the coorientation model illustrates the cognitions of A and B towards X and to each other. In my study, this translates to what sportswriters (A) and SIDs (B) think about when they compare the candidates for the Heisman Trophy (X) in a given year. In the coorientation model, A and B use the attributes a, b, c, and d to compare objects. In the Heisman selection process these attributes are the factors P, I, T, and Mu that the SIDs and sportswriters use to compare the various candidates.

For example, one candidate might be a senior quarterback (I) with only adequate statistics (P). However, he plays for a highly ranked team from a power conference (T). Another candidate might be a sophomore running back (I) with record-breaking statistics (P). However, his team has a losing record and plays in a weak conference (T).
The sportswriters will be making a discrimination between these two candidates, and any other candidates, based on the factors as they are presented to them. SIDs, by promoting their candidate, make discriminations between their candidates and the other candidates ($O_1-O_n$) within the environment of $X$, the ideal Heisman candidate in a given year.

Figure 4 illustrates the model of coorientation as it applies to the controlled media used by SIDs. Once again the sportswriters (A) and SIDs (B) coorient towards the Heisman Trophy winner environment (X). A discrimination is made between the candidates ($O_1-O_n$), such as the hypothetical quarterback and running back mentioned earlier. Sportswriters (A) and SIDs (B) base this discrimination on attributes ($P,I,T,Mu$) that the candidates possess.

Also important in the coorientation model is A's (sportswriters') and B's (SIDs') perceptions of the cognitions that A or B has towards X (the ideal Heisman candidate) -- that is, what A thinks B thinks about X and vice versa. In Figure 4, the solid lines indicate the group's own cognitions regarding the object indicated by the arrow. Dotted lines indicate the first group's perceptions of the other group's cognitions.

For instance, a sportswriter thinking that a quarterback should always win the Heisman would be a solid line from A (sportswriter) to X (Heisman). This is an cognition of A
Figure 3. The conceptual model of coorientation as it applies to this study
towards X. However, an SID perceiving that a sportswriter thinks that a quarterback should always win, would be a dotted line from B (SID) to X (Heisman). This is B's perception of A's cognition towards X. In my study, I am concerned with SIDs' (B) perceptions of sportswriters' (A) cognitions towards the Heisman Trophy (X) in a given year and how these perceptions shape the communication that SIDs use to promote their candidates.

The conceptual model of coorientational analysis can be used to gauge the accuracy of SIDs in their perceptions of the sportswriters' cognitions about the concept of the Heisman Trophy winner. In Figure 5, the most important measurement in my study would be the "accuracy" of SIDs' (B) perceptions of sportswriters' (A) cognitions compared to sportswriters' (A) actual cognitions (Accuracy B). For example, if a SID perceived that sportswriters think that playing for a winning school (T) is more important than individual statistics (P), and the sportswriters actually do, then "Accuracy B" would be high. However, if sportswriters did not think that, "Accuracy B" would be low.

Complicating matters is that A (sportswriters) consists of many individuals with different cognitions. The challenge for SIDs is to predict a consensus among sportswriters. Looking at recent Heisman voting history can give an idea of what has impressed voters in the past. Also, keeping abreast
Figure 4. Coorientation measurement model
of the information being presented in the uncontrolled media will also help the SID conceive a perception with a greater chance of accuracy among a greater number of sportswriters' cognitions.

"Accuracy B" is important because the SIDs' perceptions of sportswriters' cognitions should have a direct effect on the type of promotional work done by the school. They should slant their campaign to highlight certain attributes they perceive as important to sportswriters. For instance, in the last example the SID could highlight the team's winning season more than the individual player's statistics. They could then present the player as being a catalyst in the team's success, such as a quarterback who leads the team to a last-second game-winning touchdown.

Also important would be the "congruency" of SIDs' (B) cognitions about the Heisman (X) and SIDs'(B) perception of sportswriters' (A) cognition (Congruency B). If a SID perceives that sportswriters give more importance to a team's record rather than individual statistics, the SID may or may not agree with the sportswriters. This depends on whether or not the SID's candidate is congruent with the sportswriters' cognitions. If so, as a communicator, the SID will reinforce the sportswriters' cognitions by slanting their campaign to agree with the sportswriters cognition. If the SID's candidate is not congruent, the SID as a communicator will
try, with a promotional or sales campaign, to persuade or change the sportswriters' cognitions to agree with his candidate.

Texas A&M used that tactic for John David Crow, the 1957 winner. Crow did not even lead his conference in rushing, gaining only 562 yards, not exactly the kind of numbers that would influence a Heisman voter. A sportswriter would probably expect a Heisman candidate to at least lead his conference, if not the country, in rushing. However, Texas A&M's coach, Paul "Bear" Bryant, invented a statistic called "Folks Run Over" (FRO). The school's sports publicist, Jones Ramsey began emphasizing their new statistic and Crow won in a landslide. Said Ramsey, "When you're winning by 3-2 and 8-7 and your man gains only 562 yards for the entire season, you've got to invent some stats" (Schraeder 1983, 2D). Texas A&M thought Crow was a legitimate candidate, but they did not think sportswriters would. Therefore, they directed their campaign to highlight their new statistic hoping to influence the sportswriters and legitimize Crow's candidacy.

Coorientational analysis is useful to my study because SIDs' promotional activities for their Heisman candidate make use of the same factors (P,I,T,Mu) that sportswriters use to compare Heisman candidates in a given year. In that sense, the sportswriters (A) and the SIDs (B) are cooriented towards the environment of the Heisman Trophy (X). They are
discriminating between candidates \(O_1 - O_n\) using the same criteria or attributes \(P, I, T, Mu\). SIDs, however, have to discriminate between candidates in order to persuade the sportswriters to consider their candidate to be the ideal Heisman candidate in the given year.

Now that a coorientation between SIDs and sportswriters has been established, my study can focus on the communication process between the two. The focus will be on how SIDs use the "accuracy" and "congruency" measurements of coorientation between themselves and sportswriters to guide them in the type of promotional material they use. In other words, the "accuracy" and "congruency" measurements influence the type of promotional materials SIDs use to persuade sportswriters to consider their candidate for the Heisman Trophy.
THE COMMUNICATION PROCESS

Promotional or publicity work for Heisman Trophy candidates can be roughly divided into two main categories: pre-season and in-season. Pre-season work in most cases tries to situate the candidate (O₁) in the environment (X) of the Heisman Trophy, while in-season work will attempt to maintain or reinforce the position of the candidate.

The schools selected as case studies represent a cross-section of universities in terms of name recognition and levels of uncontrolled media exposure. At the lower end of the spectrum is the University of Pacific, the third smallest Division I school in the country, while at the other end is the University of Florida, a perennial national championship contender. The rest of the selected schools fall in between these two extremes, but there is an emphasis on schools that have low uncontrolled media exposure (Mu), as they provide more examples of promotional work.

Pre-season work begins as early as immediately after the previous Heisman Trophy winner is announced. Some aspects of the pre-season campaign may not be seen, however, until well into the season and will overlap with the in-season work. With the luxury of a long off-season, the SIDs take a proactive approach to placing their candidate within the Heisman environment. With the proactive element involved in pre-season work there is a better chance to use the
coorientation model as a framework, as "Congruency B" and "Accuracy B" can be shown to have an effect on the promotional material.

In-season work, while still utilizing proactive approaches is forced to be more reactive as it deals with the unpredictable aspects of a football season. As discriminations take place within the Heisman environment (X), the SIDs will try to present material that will maintain or reinforce their candidate's position within the environment. While coorientation measurements can be used to study the pre-season materials, the framework of the conceptual model of coorientation is more effective to study in-season promotional work. As the objects (O_1, O_n) become fewer in number in the environment (X) of the Heisman Trophy due to discriminations among candidates, the factors (P, I, T, Mu) in the Heisman environment become the focus of the promotional work.

Pre-season

The goal for SIDs in their pre-season push for a Heisman candidate is to have their player recognized as a candidate prior to the beginning of the season. Jim Perry, the former SID at Southern California, agrees. "If we had a legitimate Heisman Trophy candidate," Perry said, "our goal in the off-season, before his senior year, is to make him accepted around the country as a legitimate candidate, make him as well known as we can" (Ostler 1981, 1C). Perry is a veteran of many
Heisman campaigns. During his tenure at USC, he had three Heisman winners and three runners-up.

As Perry suggests, having a player accepted as a legitimate candidate requires an accurate perception by the SID of the sportswriters' cognition, "Accuracy B." A high "Accuracy B" suggests that the SID knows what sportswriters are thinking regarding a legitimate or ideal Heisman candidate. If SIDs know what the sportswriters are thinking, they know if their candidate is congruent to the sportswriters' cognitions, "Congruency B". If the candidate is congruent to the sportswriters' ideal, then the SID can reinforce that ideal with promotional material. If not, then promotional material may be used to persuade the sportswriters to change their cognitions or at least persuade them to see a candidate (O_n) in a different light. The "Congruency B" measurement helps determine whether SIDs should use promotional material that reinforces the cognitions of sportswriters or tries to persuade them to change their cognitions.

In the following case studies, I will look at how SIDs use promotional material to reinforce or change the sportswriters' cognitions concerning the environment (X) of the Heisman Trophy.
Case 1: San Diego State

Now that the award is not the exclusive domain of seniors (juniors have won the last four), SIDs begin campaigns as early as a player's sophomore season. San Diego State's SID John Rosenthal is promoting their sophomore running back Marshall Faulk for the Heisman. Faulk exploded on to the college football scene as a freshman when he replaced an injured starter and ran for 386 yards and seven touchdowns against Pacific. Faulk finished the season as the nation's leading rusher (158.8 yards per game) and scorer (15.56 points per game) and eclipsed the 1,000 yard mark in only seven games. These accomplishments earned Faulk a seventh place finish in the Heisman balloting and first-team All-American honors.

Despite these impressive credentials, Rosenthal wants sportswriters to get better acquainted with Faulk this off-season. Faulk missed three games last year with injuries and San Diego State played a number of games at night, missing prime media coverage. As a result, an aspect of uncontrolled media exposure (Mu), national television coverage, has been virtually non-existent, which restricts the number of voters who have seen Faulk play. To remedy this, Rosenthal will distribute a highlight video, giving voters a visual reference to make the numbers that Faulk produced more impressive.
This is a good example of a team without the advantages of, for example, Notre Dame, and having to utilize extensive controlled media (Mc) to compensate. Notre Dame with its massive amount of uncontrolled media exposure, including their television contract with NBC, has no need to produce a video to get a player better known.

Before making the video, Rosenthal consulted sportswriters across the country on effective ways to promote a Heisman candidate. The consensus he received is that "a glitzy promotional blitz generally turns off the voters and that a more informational approach is more effective" (Rosenthal 1992, interview). In coorientation terms, by consulting sportswriters, Rosenthal is looking to increase his "Accuracy B" measurement. Rosenthal (B) formed the perception, "no glitzy promotional blitz", after receiving a consensus from sportswriters. The environment (X) that Rosenthal (B) and sportswriters (A) are cooriented towards, while still contained within the larger environment of the Heisman Trophy, has slightly changed its focus from the attributes of an ideal Heisman candidate to how a candidate should be promoted. The video, reflecting what Rosenthal has learned, will consist of straightforward highlights and information with no glitz.

The slight shift of the environment is interesting because it suggests that Faulk has already been accepted as a
legitimate candidate by Rosenthal and the sportswriters. They are not concerned at this point with establishing the attributes that a Heisman candidate has; it is assumed that Faulk possesses enough of them to be considered for the award. Rosenthal and the sportswriters are more concerned with the best way to promote Faulk as a candidate with these attributes. The video should be persuasive on two levels because of the slight shift in the environment. First, it will fit the environment of promoting a candidate for the Heisman. Second, as the environment shifts back to the attributes of an ideal candidate, the video will reinforce the sportswriters' cognition towards that environment and will situate Faulk in it.

In this case study, Rosenthal's perception of sportswriters' cognitions on the most effective way to promote a Heisman candidate is accurate and by using the highlight film will reinforce the congruency between the sportswriters' cognitions of an ideal candidate and Faulk as an ideal Heisman candidate.

Case 2: University of Pacific, 1991

In this example, the University of Pacific's SID attempted to change the sportswriters' cognitions to include their candidate, quarterback Troy Kopp, in the environment (X) of ideal Heisman candidates. Again, "Congruency B" is the coorientation measurement that influenced the promotional
material. The SID's perception of sportswriters' cognitions was not the same as SID's own cognitions towards the environment, X, of the ideal Heisman candidate resulting in a low level of "Congruency B." That is, Kevin Messenger, Pacific's SID, perceived that sportswriters did not think a quarterback from Pacific, with its less than stellar tradition, deserved to be considered a Heisman candidate regardless of his statistics. Messenger, on the other hand, believed that Kopp was a legitimate candidate. The promotional material he presented tried to persuade the sportswriters to change their cognitions and include Kopp in their environment of the ideal Heisman candidate.

Messenger considered Kopp to be a legitimate Heisman candidate despite playing for the third smallest Division I school in the country. Kopp had other obstacles standing between him and acceptance as a legitimate Heisman candidate. For instance, Pacific plays in a conference not known for football (Big West) and, to compound this, Pacific had 14 consecutive losing seasons heading into 1991 (T). The obscurity of the program meant that they received virtually no uncontrolled media exposure (Mu). Messenger admits that there are significant disadvantages in trying to promote Kopp. Said Messenger, "You can't replace the lack of media coverage, especially television" (Messenger 1992, interview).
Kopp's statistics were certainly worthy of Heisman consideration. He averaged 367 passing yards a game and threw for 31 touchdowns. These numbers are what Messenger focused on when he put out a handbook titled "The Book on Troy Kopp: Heisman Trophy Candidate" (Figure 6).

In the book, which was sent to 2,000 sportswriters, Kopp is compared favorably to quarterbacks that have finished first or second in the Heisman balloting since 1982 (Figure 7). With this line-by-line comparison of Kopp's and the others' statistics, Messenger attempted to situate Kopp in the abstract environment of the ideal Heisman candidate. However, Messenger reduced the scope of the abstract environment, X, to include only the candidate's performance (P). There was no mention of team records, rankings, conferences, or competition (T). This is an example of controlled media in its purest form. Messenger completely controls the content of the material and uses it to present his candidate in the best possible way. Based on past votes, Messenger showed the sportswriters the Heisman standards for performance they had set. The perception was that if a quarterback met these Heisman standards, then he should be considered a candidate. Kopp, on the basis of his statistics or performance (P), should have been considered a legitimate candidate. Because Messenger controlled the content of the material, he was able
Figure 5. Cover of Troy Kopp handbook
Figure 6. Comparision of Kopp to past Heisman candidates
to disregard information that was damaging and focus on information that was positive. At the same time, he gives his readers the sense that the information is totally factual with no hype.

It must be noted that Kopp was not ranked first in any statistical category. Messenger did not invent statistics that showed Kopp to be the top quarterback. Instead, Kopp was unobtrusively, except for the bold type, situated both rhetorically and visually in the middle of past Heisman candidates. Messenger made it seem natural that Kopp was included in this list.

While succeeding in placing Kopp in the abstract Heisman environment, Messenger did not neglect the immediate context of the 1991 Heisman race. Also included in the list were 1990 winner Ty Detmer and Houston's David Klingler. Both were considered front-runners for the 1991 Heisman. By including two of Kopp's rivals, Messenger showed that Kopp met the standards of contemporary candidates, as well as those of the past.

Messenger's goal was to change the sportswriters' cognitions towards the environment of the Heisman candidate, X, by reducing the environment to include only a player's personal performance. If that occurred, Troy Kopp would be situated comfortably in the environment and mentioned in the same breath as other quarterbacks in the environment. Was he
successful with this strategy? I would say yes. Kopp was featured in College and Pro Football Weekly as a Heisman candidate, and he also made the first 1991 "Heisman Watch" list of The Sporting News.

Case 3: University of Pittsburgh, 1980

In 1980, the University of Pittsburgh's SID Dean Billick faced the same general problem that Pacific's Messenger faced in 1991. He wanted to change the sportswriters' cognitions so that his candidate would be included in the environment, X, of Heisman candidates for 1980.

Billick felt that Hugh Green was a legitimate candidate for the Heisman Trophy. However, his perception of sportswriters' cognitions were that Green would not be considered because he played defense. This was an understandable conclusion considering that no purely defensive player had ever won the award. The coorientation measurement, "Accuracy B" can safely be assumed to be high. That is, Billick's perception of the sportswriters' cognitions was the same as the sportswriters actual cognitions. However, because Billick thought Green was a legitimate candidate and he perceived that sportswriters did not, "Congruency B" was low. Therefore, Billick's promotional material tried to change the sportswriters' cognitions that only offensive players were deserving of the Heisman Trophy.
The centerpiece of the Green campaign was a 24-inch by 36-inch four-color poster titled, "Green is the Name, Defense is the Game, Heisman will be the Fame". Billick sent 2,500 of them to writers and broadcasters. "Our main thrust had to be that a defensive player had never won," said Billick. "So we reminded people that Hugh was considered one of the greatest defenders in college history" (Gillespie 1981, 32t). The poster tried to draw the audience into the line of thinking that a defensive player can win the Heisman. The words, "Hugh Green," "Defense," and "Heisman" are all in the same large type, an obvious attempt to connect those three ideas in the minds of the voters.

The poster also included captions that tried to change the sportswriters' cognitions. The first two asked, "Why not a defensive player this year?" and "Why only offensive players?" The questions disputed the tradition that defensive players can not win the Heisman, while at the same time gave reasons why in 1980 the tradition should be broken. The questions directly confronted the issue of defensive players winning the Heisman, and by doing so, hoped to enlarge the environment of the ideal Heisman candidate to include at least one defensive player. The final three captions presented the audience with a candidate, Green, who deserved the opportunity to break the tradition.
Billick admitted that "the poster generated about as much comment as Hugh's play" (Gillespie 1981, 32t). It may also have played a part in changing the sportswriters cognitions toward defensive players being considered legitimate Heisman candidates, if only for one year. Green finished second behind South Carolina's George Rogers and his 861 points were the highest point total ever for a defensive player.

**In-season**

Whereas the pre-season approach looks to place the candidate in the environment of the Heisman Trophy, an in-season campaign goal is to maintain the position of the candidate within the environment of the Heisman Trophy.

In general, Heisman Trophy winners establish themselves as Heisman candidates due to publicity campaigns and their performance a few games into the season. Publicity campaigns during the season will try to reinforce or maintain the candidate's position within the environment of the Heisman Trophy.

Most SIDs who promote candidates in-season campaigns assume that the candidate is already accepted within the environment of ideal Heisman candidates, X. However, once the season begins, discriminations take place between the candidates as the environment is reduced from candidates for the Heisman Trophy to the winner of the award in the given year. In most cases, a few clear-cut favorites will distance
themselves from the field early in the year. The last two Heisman races were exceptions as Ty Detmer and Desmond Howard alone established themselves as favorites by the third game of their winning seasons and were never seriously challenged the rest of the year.

With the environment (X) reduced, promotional campaigns will try to keep their candidate situated in the environment. Most in-season campaigns are information based and focus on the different factors, most often P and T, that make up the environment, X. However, gimmicks are also used to remind the voters and keep the candidate in the environment. These gimmicks are usually introduced due to a lack of uncontrolled media exposure (Mu). The strategy is to create a promotional item that compensates for the lack of uncontrolled media exposure (Mu) by creating name recognition.

In the following case studies, I will study gimmicks and other methods that SIDs have used to keep their candidate situated in the Heisman environment. The schools profiled in this section represent three cases (San Diego State, Houston, Iowa State) where lack of uncontrolled media exposure (Mu) influenced their controlled media (Mc) responses. The final case (Florida) is an example of how a school utilizes an abundance of uncontrolled media exposure (Mu).
Case 1: San Diego State

While in-season campaigns generally are more reactive compared to the pre-season proactive approach, there are still opportunities to utilize proactive strategies after the season begins. One such opportunity is playing on national television.

San Diego State has the possibility of playing on television five times in 1992. The most important of these television games, in terms of Marshall Faulk's Heisman candidacy, is their nationally televised, primetime Thursday game on ESPN against Brigham Young. The advantages of playing on Thursday night are numerous. Besides not being in competition with other games, a Thursday night game is seen by more Heisman voters. Heisman voters are usually assigned to a game on Saturdays and seldom see any other games that day.

These facts have not been lost on Rosenthal. Prior to the game, Rosenthal plans to distribute silver badges with the inscription "Marshall for Heisman." We won't be passing them out to the media," said Rosenthal. "But I'm sure that they will show up on camera at some point" (Rosenthal 1992, interview).

While the badges are a gimmick and not information-based, they will serve the purpose of reinforcing Faulk's position in the environment of the Heisman. When the badges appear on television, as they inevitably will, the announcers will
undoubtedly open up a discussion concerning the Heisman Trophy and mention Faulk in the process. The announcers will most likely provide the information that the badges do not contain. The badges, therefore, while not containing information that could influence voters, causes information, in the form of uncontrolled media exposure, to be presented to the voters.

Rosenthal can not, however, rely on uncontrolled media exposure handling all of the information based promotions. He will also release a weekly statistics sheet titled, "The Marshall Chronicles" (Figure 9), which will detail Faulk's weekly game statistics. It will also serve as a tabloid designed to update readers throughout the season. The first installment, which has already been issued, lists the records Faulk set during his freshmen year (Figure 6).

This stat sheet will give the sportswriters information corresponding to the performance factor (P) in the Heisman environment. It will also help compensate for San Diego State's relative lack of uncontrolled media exposure (Mu) that comes with playing on the West Coast. As stated before, that results in later starting times and less exposure on highlight shows. The weekly updates and the use of his name in the title will help compensate for that lack of exposure by providing a "Marshall Faulk for Heisman" reminder every week. Using a clever play on words with the candidate's name is not without precedent. Brigham Young, used a promotional ploy for their
The Marshall Chronicles

(Record information on SDSU running back Marshall Faulk)

NCAA Records

Rushing:
Most yards gained in a game by a freshman - Was held by Greg Allen of Florida St., 222 yards vs. Western Carolina, Oct. 31, 1991.
Most yards gained in a game by two opposing players -255 yards Faulk vs. Ryan Benjamin of Pacific (159 yards). Was held by Frank Morris of Vanderbilt (121) and Shadly Ball of Air Force (74), Nov. 18, 1978.
Most touchdown scored by a freshman in a season -7 by Faulk vs. Pacific. Was held by Mike Northington of Purdue vs. Iowa, Nov. 3, 1973.

All-Purpose Running:

Scoring:
Most points scored by a freshman in a game - 11 by Faulk (7 touchdowns and 2 point conversions) vs. Pacific, Nov. 1989. Was held by Mike Northington of Purdue vs. Iowa, Nov. 3, 1973.
Most points scored against a Division I-A team - Was 42 held by Arnold "Showboat" Boykin of Mississippi vs. Mississippi St. on Dec. 1, 1951.

Western Athletic Conference Records

Rushing:
Most yards gained in a game - Was 221 held by Tony Alford of Colorado St. vs. Utah in 1989.

All-Purpose Running:
Most yards gained in a season - Was 645 held by Terence Mais of New Mexico vs. San Diego State in 1989.

San Diego State Records

Scoring:
Most rushing touchdowns scored in a season - 19 Touchdowns for Marshall Faulk in 1987
(Marshall also holds the SDSU single-game mark for rushing yards, touchdowns, and points)

Rushing:
Most yards rushing in a season - 1,252 yards by David "Deacon" Turner in 1977

Figure 7. Weekly statistics sheet on Marshall Faulk
1990 Heisman winner Ty Detmer. Prior to an early season ESPN Thursday night game, Brigham Young's SID Bruce Zobell distributed thousands of neckties with the inscription "Official Heisman Ty." ESPN featured the neckties during the telecast, as well as a handbook Zobell released titled "Five Good Reasons the Heisman Race Should End in a Ty" (Figure 10). The handbook was shaped like a tie and opened up to reveal persuasive information corresponding to the factors (P,T) in the Heisman environment, X. Detmer then proceeded to have a brilliant game against defending national champion Miami (Fla.), further reinforcing the promotional material. The flurry of uncontrolled media exposure (Mu) and Detmer's continued brilliance (P) that followed turned the 1990 Heisman race into a runaway victory for Detmer.

The badges and ties, by themselves, are not information based. However, put in the proper setting, such as a nationally televised game, they can generate discussion that situates their candidate in the Heisman environment. The gimmick accomplishes its goal of reinforcing the candidate's presence in the environment.

A secondary audience for these promotional ploys are potential recruits. The main purpose of the gimmicks is, indeed, to generate discussion that will connect the Heisman candidate and the award, but coaches and recruiting
Figure 8. Brigham Young's "Heisman Tie" promoting Ty Detmer
coordinators also use these types of gimmicks as recruiting tools. The promotional items are often highlighted on recruiting trips, showing prospective student-athletes that the school promotes candidate's for post-season awards.

The gimmicks San Diego State and Brigham Young devised for their candidates are reminiscent of the innovative "name game" played by Notre Dame in 1969. Roger Valdiserri, SID at Notre Dame at the time, changed the pronunciation of Joe Theismann's name to rhyme with Heisman. The correct pronunciation had been Thees-man, but at a practice Valdiserri said, "There goes Joe Theismann, as in Heisman." The uncontrolled media exposure was so great that Theismann and his parents now go by the new pronunciation (Nissenson 1991, 60). However, a gimmick does not guarantee a Heisman Trophy. Theismann finished second to Stanford's Jim Plunkett.

As stated before, the gimmicks presented here by themselves will not persuade the voters. However, by generating discussion concerning the candidate in the environment of the Heisman Trophy, the gimmicks can compensate for the lack of uncontrolled media exposure (Mu) and reinforce the candidate's position, helping him remain situated within the environment.

**Case 2: University of Houston, 1989**

In most cases, the Heisman Trophy winner will be established as a candidate, if not before the season starts,
then within the first few games. Seldom does the winner suddenly appear to claim the award. However, when it does happen, it usually points to the fact that no other candidates established themselves as favorites after the first few games. That can open the door for a relatively unknown candidate who catches the fancy of the voters.

In 1989 Houston's Andre Ware entered the season as an anonymous quarterback who played for a team that ran a passing dominated offense called the "run and shoot." He was not featured in any pre-season publications as a Heisman candidate, nor was he promoted by Houston's SID Ted Nance. "There was nothing to indicate that Andre would have the kind of year he had," said Nance. "Nothing prior to the season warranted any publicity campaign, plus we had the television ban" (Nance 1992, interview). The television ban came from being on NCAA probation for rules violation and prevented Houston from appearing on national television.

However, after three games, with no candidates establishing themselves as favorites, Nance and rest of the country began to take notice of the impressive statistics Ware had compiled. By the end of the season, Ware broke several NCAA records while passing for nearly 4,700 yards and 46 touchdowns. "By the third game we couldn't ignore his numbers," said Nance. "We figured he deserved to be pushed
for the Heisman, whether we were on T.V. or not" (Nance 1992, interview).

Nance's campaign emphasized Ware's numbers as well as Houston's innovative offense, the "run and shoot." He distributed weekly flyers to Heisman voters in the format of an airline timetable. The airline was called "AirWare" and borrowed the design of the TWA logo listing upcoming games as destinations and his statistics in the arrivals and departures sections.

The selection of the name "Air Ware" is interesting in that it invites the audience to make two very different connections with Andre Ware. First, the airplane metaphor helps identify Ware as the most prolific passer among the Heisman candidates. In that way it invites sportswriters to make comparisons between candidates that will be favorable to Ware. The second connection is to Michael "Air" Jordan of basketball fame. This kind of reference can be persuasive in that it makes a connection between the candidate and another athlete considered the best in his sport.

Despite entering the race after the season started, Nance still had to take the approach that his candidate was already accepted in the environment of the Heisman Trophy. The flyers did not try to alter any cognitions of the sportswriters, but they did give information in a clever visual presentation. That, plus the fact that they were distributed weekly is
another example of a school, such as San Diego State and Brigham Young, trying to compensate for a relative lack of uncontrolled media exposure ($\text{Mu}$). In this case, the lack of uncontrolled media exposure ($\text{Mu}$) was not due to any geographical or small market syndrome, it was strictly the result of the television ban.

As the season progressed, Nance began including comparisons to legendary pro quarterbacks to accentuate Ware's statistics. There were two reasons behind this strategy. First, the other quarterbacks considered Heisman candidates that year were playing in conservative offenses that would never produce the numbers Houston's offense did. A comparison between candidates might work against Ware as voters discount his numbers as a by-product of Houston's offense. Second, Nance assumed that most sportswriters were of an age that a comparison between Ware and past legends might prove beneficial (Nance 1992, interview). It is unlikely that the comparison persuaded voters to rate Ware higher than other candidates, but it probably did serve the purpose, like Faulk's badge and Detmer's tie, of opening the discussion of the Heisman and situating Ware in that environment.

The "run and shoot" offense, as stated before, presented Nance with a problem. The passing-dominated offense was relatively new and generated as much interest as Ware's numbers. Hence, Nance had to walk a fine line as he tried to
get Ware the uncontrolled media exposure that the television ban denied him. The danger was that the offense almost has its own identity and could overshadow the candidate.

Nance encountered that sentiment the very next year as Ware's successor, David Klingler, put up even greater numbers than Ware. Without the television ban, voters were able to see more of the "run and shoot," which resulted in some negative publicity for Klingler. Bruce Newman of *Sports Illustrated* cited critics who suggested that despite throwing for over 5,000 yards and 54 touchdowns, Klingler should not win the Heisman because "the system is so perfectly designed that any bumbler could run it" (Newman 1991, 52).

It might have been to Ware's advantage that he did not appear on television. He may have suffered the same fate as Klingler. With the television ban, Nance had more control of the information being presented to the voters and could highlight Ware as the catalyst behind the innovative offense.

**Case 3: Iowa State, 1990**

Iowa State's promotional campaign for their 1990 Heisman candidate Blaise Bryant did not involve any gimmicks or clever "name games." Instead, to compensate for their lack of uncontrolled media exposure, SID Dave Starr relied on getting a constant flow of information on Bryant to the sportswriters as soon as possible.
Starr called the technique he used the "Fax Attack." The process began immediately following a Saturday game with Starr and his staff putting together a press release that was faxed to newspapers and Heisman voters on Sunday. Starr hoped that the result of this quick dispersement of information resulted in the release being read and re-read throughout the week by media members. Unfortunately for Bryant, a shoulder injury ended his season prematurely and a more extensive campaign never got off the ground. "We had planned to do a few more things for Blaise, including a four-color poster," said Starr (Starr 1991, interview).

The initial fax released by Starr (Figure 11) does, however, provide another interesting study in how a school looks to overcome a lack of uncontrolled media exposure (Mu). On one level, it showcased Bryant's performance in the season opener against Northern Iowa, mentioning that his performance earned him Big Eight Player-of-the-Week honors.

The schedule of weekly releases served the same purpose as the "Marshall Chronicles" and the "AirWare" releases from San Diego State and Houston, but without the "name game" aspect. That is, a consistent source of information on Bryant's performance factor (P) to sportswriters that places Bryant in the environment of the Heisman Trophy (X).

If not for Bryant's injury the weekly releases would have kept the sportswriters up to date on Bryant's performance (P),
Bryant Explodes for 177 Yards, 4 TD's; Selected Big Eight Player-of-the-Week

Ames, Iowa — Iowa State Heisman Trophy candidate Blaise Bryant christened the 1990 season by rushing for 177 yards and scoring four touchdowns, leading the Cyclones to a 35-6 win over Northern Iowa. Bryant, Division I football's leading returning rusher, sat out most of the fourth quarter, but still tied a school record with his four rushing touchdowns. He was chosen as the Big Eight's Offensive Player-of-the-Week.

A native of Huntington Beach, Calif., Bryant also caught three passes for 38 yards and totaled 215 all-purpose yards. His 36 missing attempts marked the third-highest total of his career, and his 177 yards rank as his fourth-highest rushing output. He ran for 213 yards in his major college debut last season against Ohio University, the best first-game rushing performance by any player in Big Eight history.

Bryant finished last season as the nation's fourth-leading rusher.
something that would not have occurred if left to uncontrolled media exposure. "We don't have the luxury that some teams do that appear on national television frequently," said Starr. "We can't afford to sit around and wait for exposure, we had to create some of our own" (Starr 1991, interview).

On another level, the initial fax introduced Bryant to the Heisman voters. A majority of the release dealt with Bryant's performance in 1989 when he was selected a third-team All-American and consensus first-team All-Big Eight. That was necessary due to Iowa State's lack of uncontrolled media exposure (Mu). Iowa State did not appear on national television at all in 1989 and would not again in 1990. Couple that with Iowa State's small market setting and it would not be surprising, in spite of Bryant's credentials, if he was virtually unknown to Heisman voters.

The review of Bryant's 1989 season did not try to change any cognitions of the sportswriters, but it did want to place Bryant within the environment of the Heisman Trophy. Starr accomplished that goal by mentioning in the release that Bryant was the leading returning rusher in Division I (P) and by referring to the Big Eight (T) repeatedly. The references to a quality performance and playing in one of the marquee conferences reinforced the sportswriters' cognitions concerning the Heisman ideal environment (X) that sportswriters established with their previous votes.
Describing Bryant while repeatedly making those references placed Bryant in the environment and invited sportswriters to include him in the discriminations between candidates $(O_1-O_n)$.

**Case 4: University of Florida**

The past three case studies showed how schools compensated for relatively low uncontrolled media exposure $(Mu)$ by utilizing controlled media $(Mc)$. Their campaigns were directly geared towards promoting a specific player for the Heisman. In this final case study, I will show how a school, the University of Florida, with a legitimate Heisman candidate and high uncontrolled media exposure indirectly promotes the candidate.

Florida's SID John Humenik has in quarterback Shane Matthews the closest thing to the perfect Heisman candidate. All the factors $(P,I,T,Mu)$ are in Matthew's favor after a junior season that saw him finish fifth in the Heisman balloting. The senior quarterback $(I)$ has set numerous conference and school records $(P)$ while playing for a dominant team from a marquee conference $(T)$. Add to that the fact that of the twenty-three games Matthews has started for Florida sixteen have been televised $(Mu)$ and there is not much for Humenik to do as far as promotions.

Humenik realizes that with all the uncontrolled media exposure his job is clear. "Of the top twelve newspapers from Florida to Washington D.C., seven are in Florida. My job is
to make a player, in this case Matthews, available," said Humenik. "We don't need gimmicks to get his name known. The media and television exposure takes care of that" (Humenik 1992, interview).

A sample press release distributed prior to a 1991 game is indeed devoid of any gimmicks that were present in some of the previous promotional material studied. While Matthews is featured on numerous occasions (Figure 12), it is an not without reason. He is, after all, the star quarterback and deserves to be featured in proportion with that status. The focus of the release, however, is the University of Florida, not Shane Matthews. As a matter of fact, the Heisman Trophy is not mentioned once in the 27-page release.

It is true that the focus of the release is the university, but there are some subtle and indirect attempts to place Matthews in the Heisman Trophy environment (X). In Figure 12, for instance, the caption under Matthews' photo gives information that corresponds to the two main factors, P and T, used by sportswriters in discriminations between candidates. Humenik indirectly outlines the Heisman environment, X, established by the sportswriters and then invites the sportswriters to place Matthews in it. The outline consists of a junior or senior offensive back (I) playing for a team from a marquee conference contending for the national title. The general description is then made
FLORIDA VS. KENTUCKY

Saturday, November 16
1:30 p.m. ET
Ben Hill Griffin Stadium
at Florida Field (83,000)
Gainesville, Fla.

A sellout crowd of more than 84,000 will be on hand as Florida seeks to clinch the outright Southeastern Conference title with a perfect 7-0 league mark and tie the 1990 team for the school's best record after 10 games (9-1). Kickoff is set for 1:30 p.m. ET. SportsChannel Florida will televise the game statewide on a delay basis Saturday beginning at 11:30 p.m. ET. Larry Venet and Jim Yarbough will handle the play-by-play and color analysis, respectively. The Gator Radio Network will broadcast the game live over a 65-station network. Mick Hubert will call the play-by-play with Lee McEnroth and Steve Babik with sideline reports. The "Tailgator" pregame show begins 90 minutes before kickoff.

TOP GAME NOTES

This will be the 42nd time that Florida and Kentucky have met on the football field. This game has marked the end of the SEC season for Florida every year but once (1972) since the 1967 campaign. Starting in 1992, Kentucky will be Florida's first SEC opponent. Florida, which clinched at least a share of its first official title last week, will try to win the title outright and become the first Gator team in history to post an unbeaten and untied SEC league ledger. If it defeats Kentucky, the '91 Gator team will be the first unbeaten and untied SEC title holder since Auburn in 1983 (6-0) and the first SEC team to win seven league games since Alabama in 1977 (7-0). No UF team has ever won seven SEC games in a season and the '91 squad is trying to match the '70 squad as the only Gator team in history to win three of its first 10 games. Further game notes, depth charts and stats can be found inside this packet. We also encourage you to review the special media services that the University of Florida and the Southeastern Conference provide to assist you in covering this game and the entire season.

Shane Matthews, who set an SEC record with his ninth career 300-yard passing game in UF's 45-13 victory over Georgia, and the Gator squad seeks to gain the outright SEC title with a win over Kentucky Saturday. The 1991 squad, which will be attempting to tie the school record for best start (9-1 after 10 games), could become the first team in UF history to post an unbeaten and untied conference record as well as the first UF team to win seven conference games in a season. No SEC team has posted a perfect league record since Auburn went 6-0 in 1983 and no SEC team has gone 9-1 since Alabama in 1977. Matthews, who already has an SEC record-tying 26 TD passes, will set an SEC record with his next scoring toss.

Figure 10. Shane Matthews featured in press release
specific with the addition of Matthews and his statistics (P).

This technique can be very effective as it reinforces the sportswriters' cognitions by allowing them to situate Matthews in the environment themselves. It is much different from some of the other examples that challenge or alter the environment in some way and then situate the candidate in the new environment. Of course, the other examples do not have the luxury of unlimited uncontrolled media exposure (Mu) that Florida has at its disposal.
CONCLUSION

Promotional activity by universities for Heisman Trophy candidates will not decide who should win the award. The sportswriters' decision is, as stated from the beginning, based mainly on the performance of the candidates. Most Heisman Trophy winners distinguish themselves to the extent that they are the clear-cut choice. With that in mind, and the fact that there can indeed be only one winner, it would be wrong to assume that a promotional campaign failed if the candidate did not win the award. The campaigns, then, should not be viewed in terms of trying to alter the outcome of the vote, but rather to influence or persuade the sportswriters to situate the candidate within the Heisman Trophy environment. A top five or ten finish should be considered a successful campaign for a school such as Pacific. If that is accomplished, the benefits to the school and the player are widespread. The school's football reputation will be enhanced, which will help in recruiting. At the same time, the player's reputation will also be improved, which should improve his prospects in professional football.

However, because this decision is based on individual judgments and opinions with no set guidelines, there is an opportunity for persuasion in the communication process. As shown in the study, the use of controlled media to promote a candidate is inversely proportional to the amount of
uncontrolled media exposure. The schools without much uncontrolled media exposure are more likely to use extensive controlled media to increase the candidate's exposure.

Schools who fall into this category generally have a candidate who is not ideally situated in the environment of the Heisman candidate. For instance, Troy Kopp only fits into the environment of the Heisman candidate in two categories -- performance (P) and individual attributes (I). Those factors are shared by virtually every other candidate. The need for promotional work arises from the fact that the other factors, T and Mu, are not in Kopp's favor. Looking back at the other case studies, if one or more of the factors in the ideal Heisman environment were not met by the candidate, then more controlled media (Mc) was required. Hugh Green playing defense (I) and Andre Ware being banned from television (Mu), are more examples of candidates who were deficient in at least one factor. These deficiencies required more promotional activity to situate the candidate in the environment, X. Shane Matthews, on the other hand, had all the factors in his favor and, therefore, did not need any extra promotional work beyond being mentioned in his school's weekly press release.

By superimposing the coorientation model after the communications have taken place, my study showed that SIDs have an opportunity to use their promotional work in a persuasive way. Once again, it is important to remember that
my use of the coorientation model is not its intended application. Chaffee and McLeod intended the model to be applied in the planning process before communication takes place. However, by using the model after the communication process is complete, we can see how it can be effective in the planning stages of communication. If future SIDs want to promote a candidate who does not fit the ideal of a Heisman candidate, my study can provide them with a model that they can use prior to beginning the communication process. It can help them be more persuasive in their communications to their audience and, therefore, more effective.

Although there are limitations to this study due to the small sample of schools used as cases, I think a sound base has been established that could be built on through further study using the coorientation model. Detailed questionnaires and surveys could be used to provide a better audience analysis of sportswriters in terms of their cognitions and perceptions concerning the Heisman Trophy. This could provide an even more detailed and concrete environment of the ideal Heisman candidate. Also, a clearer picture of the audience can provide SIDs with insights into what will persuade the audience. San Diego State's Rosenthal did that type of audience analysis on a small scale when he consulted the media on what would be the most effective type of promotional campaign.
In the case of Houston's Nance, when he compared Ware to NFL quarterbacks, he did so under the assumption that the sportswriters would be persuaded by that comparison. With a framework to refer to prior to the communication, Nance would not have assumed anything. He would have known whether or not that type of comparison would be persuasive to the sportswriters.

Both these examples show the possibilities that further research can provide greater understanding prior to the communication process. I tried to present a base of the framework that sports information departments might use to guide future campaigns. Future research can build on this base and improve even more the effectiveness of SIDs' communication process with sportswriters concerning Heisman Trophy candidates.
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