An evaluation of agricultural development projects recently conducted in Uruguay: guidelines for extension

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An evaluation of agricultural development projects recently conducted in Uruguay: Guidelines for extension

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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

Marco Polo was describing a bridge, stone by stone. "But, which is the stone that supports the bridge?" asked Kublai Khan. "The bridge is not held up by one or another stone," replied Marco, "but rather by the arch line that they form." Kublai remained silent, thoughtful. Then he added, "Why do you talk to me of the stones? It is only the arch that I'm interested in." Polo answered, "Without the stones there is no arch." (Calvino, 1974, p. 82)

Background

The challenges of development have created problems to agricultural extension in less developed countries (LDCs), resulting in a growing criticism about its efficiency (Bordenave, 1980; Chaudry & Al-Haj, 1985; Higgs, 1976; Jiggins, 1978; Moore, 1984; Orivel, 1981; Rice, 1971; Röling & de Zeeuw, 1984; Woods, 1983). The fact that societies want to obtain the highest value for the public resources in which they invest, because of the increasing difficulty for governments to finance their budgets, is leading to question whether or not there is a place for extension (Nitsch, 1988; Persons, 1992). The limited success of extension in LDCs can be attributed to a wide range of factors. A common problem to effective extension in these countries is extension's lack of evaluation (Howes, 1992; Lacroix, 1985; Miller & Maung, 1990; Weddle, 1992). According to Poostchi (1986), extension needs evaluation to realize how effective the work has been. Evaluation provides a process for accountability and improvement of future extension projects; therefore, increasing efficiency.

Summative evaluation, aimed at assessing the overall impact of a given project from the technical/ economical perspective, is sometimes implemented in LDCs. This is closely related to the issue that extension has been considered primarily as an instrument for transfer
of technology (TOT). TOT's model of extension has been dominant until the 1980s in LDCs (Hoare, 1986). Under this model, development was understood in terms of spreading new technology into a social system. In practice, because the emphasis was being put on material objectives, the use of evaluation when practiced, was largely limited to analyzing the tangible results of extension: technical or economic outputs (Murphy & Marchant, 1988). Whether or not sociological objectives were stated, evaluation procedures ignored them, in virtue that they cannot be properly quantified. However, as Robins (1987) stated, it is largely by social considerations that projects succeed or fail in LDCs. By-passing social considerations goes hand in hand with concentrating in cognitive components (TOT tradition) while ignoring affective ones. Mager (1972) commented that, "... [cognitive components] have to do with what a person can do, (but) the affective with what he will do" (p. 14). As a result, extension has failed to adequately evaluate the reasons of project failure and to use that evaluation to improve current projects.

**Overview of Uruguay**

The following overview is based on a book published in 1992 by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. Uruguay, the smallest Spanish-speaking country in South America, lies in the southern part of the continent (Figure 1). It is bounded between two giants Brazil (on the north) and Argentina (on the west). The Atlantic Ocean forms the eastern boundary, while the broad estuary, Rio de la Plata (River Plate), forms the southern boundary. Its terrain is characterized by a smooth topography of plains and gently undulating hills. There are no mountains, deserts or jungles--features clearly favorable to communication
and transportation. Uruguay's climate is temperate, although the northwest can be considered subtropical. Rainfall nationally averages about 1,000 millimeters per year which is adequate for agricultural activities. Additionally, there are numerous lakes, lagoons and rivers.

Uruguay became an independent nation in 1828, after being a Spanish colony for a long while. The system and structure of government is democratic with three separate branches of government: Executive, Legislative, and Judicial. Uruguay is a presidential
republic whose constitution allows for a strong presidency which is subject to control from the other branches. Currently, the Colorado, National and Broad Front coalitions are the three major political entities. Uruguay's population is nearly three million and is basically derived from European countries, especially Spain and Italy. The small indigenous population was exterminated during the last century, after severely resisting Spanish colonization. Montevideo, the capital of the country, concentrates nearly 50% of the population and dominates the nation politically, economically and culturally. In this sense, Uruguay exhibits a pattern of extreme centralization, originating from colonial times. For administrative reasons, the national territory is divided into 19 departments which are subordinate to the central government located in the departmental capital. Nearly 90% of the population live in urban areas; the man-to-land ratio (inhabitants per square kilometer) is around one in rural areas, and 16 countrywide. The rate of population growth is very slow, just one per cent. This fact, and the heavy emigration of the last decades, explain the small population of the country. The long life expectancy, coupled with the rate of population growth and emigration, account for Uruguay's aging population.

In terms of its economy, Uruguay's history can be divided into two periods. During the first one, which continued until 1950s, the country achieved a remarkable economic growth through livestock exports (meat and wool). This growth helped to build a welfare system that raised the standard of living by redistributing wealth. Due to this, Uruguay and Argentina were considered the most egalitarian societies of Latin America (Feres & Léon, 1990). The second period began after the Korean war ended, and showed a decline of world
prices for Uruguay's principal exports, and growing protectionism of main external markets. Consequently, Uruguay's economy begun to unravel. Under these circumstances, the welfare system became an increasingly heavy burden for public sector. The growing external debt, very important if it is considered per capita, aggravated the situation after the 1970s. Nevertheless, the country's Gross Domestic Product per capita is traditionally one of the highest in Latin America. Uruguay belongs to the group of upper middle income countries of Latin America, which also includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico (Fujii, 1991). The primary sources of energy are imported petroleum and hydroelectricity. During the 1980s, the latter grew in importance.

Agriculture, especially livestock production, has historically been the main economic activity of the country. This is due to the fact that soil availability is very high; 85% of its total area, which is 16 million hectares, can be cultivated or devoted to pasture. It accounts for just 13 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employs relatively few people, but it is relevant in terms of exports. Annual rate of increase in total agricultural production and population growth are basically identical over the last decades, just one percent. This means that agricultural production has been stagnant. Large livestock farmers have relied on the bounties of the pastureland they owned, and have neglected to adopt or encourage new technologies that would have raised productivity. Although land tenure is highly concentrated in Uruguay, a trend which is expected to continue, land distribution was never a major political issue. In this sense, the central government played a great role by providing jobs to those who were expelled from rural areas.
Currently, reduction of public-sector deficit is constraining agricultural policies. Privatization of public services has become an issue open to heated debates. In order to reduce the national debt and the negative resource transfer, Uruguay has signed agreements with its creditor banks on a consensual basis. In addition to this, Uruguay has embarked on a policy of gradual openness of its internal market by eliminating excessive tariffs that have hindered exports for several decades.

Another area receiving attention in Uruguay, is the creation of a common market, the Southern Cone Common Market/Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Currently, a transitional period is taking place which is formally expected to end in 1995, after which the integration process will be completed. The industrial and agricultural sectors of Uruguay consider that the benefits of MERCOSUR are limited because the conditions of competition with Brazil are seen as unfavorable. Uruguay expects to become the financial and banking services center within MERCOSUR because of the well developed infrastructure in terms of facilities, communications and its position of political stability.

Statement of the Problem

Agricultural extension projects are formulated basically in Uruguay to increase agricultural production by using the TOT model and/or a modified TOT approach. These projects and their implementation methods lead to the use of high technology capital and intensive agricultural applications without really testing: a) which factors contributed or not to the successful implementation of these projects; and b) whether or not these applications
would be better than indigenous alternatives. Current evaluation methods assume that the high tech solutions are correct, and focuses on the impact of the identified technologies in terms of cost/benefit and rate of return. Consideration of the consequences of high tech solutions have not been taken into account. Since the late 1960's, there has been growing evidence that this conceptual framework failed in LDCs (Poostchi, 1986).

A review of this approach leads to the conclusion that there is a need in Uruguay, for those who are involved in agricultural extension, to acquire knowledge, skill, and competence relating to designing, implementing, and evaluating programs/projects. Additionally, more emphasis is needed in the exploration of factors outside the economical-technical tradition of evaluation. Otherwise, project results will continue to be non sustainable due to a lack of understanding of how to face the complexities within the social constraints affecting the projects.

According to Röling (1986a), extension has two main traditions: technical innovation (TI), and human resource development (HRD). Evaluation in extension has been highly influenced by the former. Robins (1987) recommended that, instead of achieving technological goals as the major objective, extension projects in LDCs should play an active role in relation to HRD. Human resource development is understood as a way to involve people in the process of identifying and solving their problems through the use of their own knowledge. In order to understand this approach, key words employed are capacity building, process-approach, and indigenous knowledge.

Evaluation in extension has been influenced by the technological tradition. As a result,
it has been practiced as a summative activity in which the focus was to evaluate how well objectives have been met (Coldevin, 1986; Lee & Schute, 1991; Steele, 1975). A new framework emerged on evaluation in extension in the 1970s. Bennett (1975) developed a hierarchy of evidence that became a key point for understanding evaluation. Bennett's framework suggests that it is relatively easy to compare inputs and outputs and determine the efficiency of resource use. But evaluation, especially from a HRD perspective, implies considering outputs (capacity building activities) and their results, the HRD competencies (levels five to seven of Bennett's hierarchy). This necessitates a close look at the implementation of the extension projects. Stufflebeam (1983) developed a model that considers both formative and summative evaluation. This model was called CIPP, an acronym that includes the first letters of four kind of evaluations: Context, Input, Process and Product. The CIPP model relies on the premise that evaluating results is not enough if the goal is to improve the project while it is in progress.

**Purpose**

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the implementation of a sample of recent agricultural extension projects in Uruguay. The evaluation methodology used a conceptual framework that takes into account the four key factors considered relevant from an HRD perspective--management, capacity-building, planning approach and external factors (Elliot, 1989; Rondinelli, 1986). Evaluating the impact of agricultural extension projects from this perspective, will help to examine the overall effectiveness of the technology transfer system in Uruguay, and to determine which factors facilitated or constrained a
successful strategy of agricultural extension. The limited information available on these topics magnified the need for conducting this research. There had been no tradition of evaluating the impact of agricultural extension by placing an emphasis on the formative aspects of the program planning process.

This evaluation was formative, not only because it assessed how projects were implemented, but also because it provided information for use in the orientation of future projects. In other words, evaluating probable past failures can provide information useful for future improvements. As a result of this study, hopefully, the next efforts relating to agricultural extension and rural development in Uruguay will have a greater likelihood of success. The potential beneficiaries will be agricultural policy-makers, project development managers, extension agents, researchers, and agricultural development agencies, both public and private.

**Objectives**

The specific objectives of this research were to:

1. design an evaluation framework capable to serve the needs of this study;
2. identify the degree of use of capacity building components in agricultural extension projects recently carried out in Uruguay;
3. identify the practices that hinder or facilitate the program planning process of agricultural extension projects from the HRD perspective; and
4. establish guidelines for future agricultural extension projects.
Assumptions

This study assumed that the data collected reflects the true perceptions of the interviewees.

Limitations

1. The study was local in nature. As a result, conclusions cannot be generalized to other geographical areas.
2. There was a limited amount of resources to conduct this research.

Definitions

Agricultural extension project: In this work, agricultural extension projects are viewed from a broader perspective, comprising not only those projects related to animal science or crops, but also those pursuing rural development, as health, nutrition, sanitation, education, etc. Project and program are used as synonymous.

Blueprint approach: An approach to extension program planning having assumptions that the "present is known, the future knowable, and that one can control events sufficiently to achieve a knowable future" (Röling, 1986, p. 112).

Capacity building: Refers to the activities aimed to increase capacity of individuals, groups, and organizations. Training and strengthening of existing local organizations are two basic activities of capacity building (Conyers, Warren, & van Tilburg, 1988). As a result of this process one should be able to identify sustained improvements of HRD components. The end result of capacity building, in terms of Bennett hierarchy of evidence, is sustained
improvements of HRD components. To reach this level, attitudinal change (level 5) is first required.

*Community development approach:* Projects having three components: social, infrastructure and productivity. In this context, social means provision of organization for the community; infrastructure, the formation of physical capital; and productivity, the supply of services to increase agricultural production (Lacroix, 1985). In this research, community, integrated and local rural development projects are synonymous.

*Development:* Since 1970, it became widely accepted, that development could not be reduced exclusively to economic growth and productivity. It has to take into account also, the distribution of this economic growth and the development of human resources. The latter is vital in order to achieve sustainability of the changes, and participation of the people (Poostchi, 1986). Due to this, development is regarded as a process of "increasing the capacity of the people to influence their future" (Bryant & White, 1982, p. 14).

*Evaluation:* The process "to provide a basis for decision making and policy formation" (Worthen & Sanders, 1987, p. 36). It implies to specify criteria against which to compare evidence so as to make judgments.

*Formative evaluation:* Evaluation that is performed before and during the implementation of the program in order to improve it (Worthen & Sanders, 1987).

*Human resource development (HRD):* One of the two dimensions that forms agricultural extension. Its objective is to develop, in a sustainable way, rural people and the social systems in which they live, so as to make a better use of the natural resources (Röling, 1986). HRD
competencies (levels five to seven in Bennet's hierarchy) emerge as a consequence of capacity building activities (level two of Bennett's hierarchy). Examples of HRD competencies are the following: greater participation of rural people, greater awareness of rural people about their problems, greater empowerment of rural people to face their problems, greater self-determination and self-reliance of rural people to influence their own future (Oakley, 1986). In Uruguay, HRD approach is called "extension" whereas the other dimension of extension is termed "technical assistance."

*Indigenous knowledge (IK):* The "sum of experience and knowledge for a given group that forms their basis for decision-making" (Titilola, 1990, p.3). In Uruguay, due to the fact that there are no indigenous people, local knowledge is a term that better describes the concept. According to the definition, local knowledge is the practices generated by Uruguayan farmers, which descend basically from Spanish, Italian, and other European immigrants (Field, 1991).

*Management:* The process of giving appropriate administrative procedures for managing resources so as to ensure that the tasks and objectives described in the project are efficiently accomplished (Rondinelli, 1986). It implies to organize and use the resources--administrative functions, and to evaluate the process and product--supervision functions.

*Process approach:* In contrast to the blueprint approach to extension program planning, the process approach relies more on flexibility and allows people's participation in order to receive their feedback for project adjustments (Röling, 1986).

*Revolving credit system:* A system in which the repayment of loan is to be made in a given number of physical units of products, regardless of market prices. The farmer knows in
advance how much must be given to the lender. The interest is low. In addition, all the target people are expected to get their loan because credit should be self-sustaining if well managed. This system combines credit with extension. It was introduced in Latin America during the 1960s, to complement efforts of land reform projects. The latter focused on landless laborers, seasonal workers and subsistence small farmers while the former focused on small farmers with production sufficient for their own families' subsistence plus a marketable surplus contributing to other family needs.

_Summative evaluation:_ Evaluation that is carried out at the end of the program in order to certify its utility (Worthen & Sanders, 1987).
CHAPTER II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This distinction between two different meanings of good and right (as having value in themselves or means to something else) is, it is claimed, so crucial for the whole theory of valuation and values that failure to make the distinction destroys the validity of the conclusions that have been set forth. (Dewey, 1939, p. 24)

Relevant literature was reviewed in order to provide a conceptual framework for this study. It has been divided into the following categories: 1) Rural Development; 2) Evaluation; 3) Human Resource Development; and 4) Extension in Uruguay.

Rural Development

Extension projects are aimed at helping bring about rural development (Antholt, 1992; Crouch & Chamala, 1980; Maalouf, Contado & Adhikarya, 1991; Molnar & Jolly, 1988). An evaluation of the implementation of rural development projects in LDCs and the constraints these projects faced has emerged lately, because of the failures detected during the 1970s and 1980s (Coleman, 1992). Gow and Morss (1988) identified some critical problems in project implementation that seriously impeded progress and their respective solutions or feasible ways to avoid them. These bottlenecks were: 1) macro constraints; 2) institutional realities; 3) personnel constraints and technical assistance shortcomings; 4) decentralization and participation; 5) timing; 6) information systems; 7) differing agendas, and 8) sustainability.

Macro constraints refers to the fact that projects are implemented in a broader context, part of which they form. This context imposes four categories of constraints: donor foreign policy, national politics, macroeconomic policy, and the local environment. Donor foreign
policy is often guided by potential conflicting interests; development assistance becomes a tool for political imperatives instead of being directed by developmental concerns. National politics may emphasize efficiency to achieve greater production for exports. This affects the implementation of projects aimed at bringing about rural development.

Macroeconomic policies in LDCs pay attention to reduce inflation and paying external debt, consequently, there is no room for concerns about small farmers' access to credit and extension. The local environment in which the project is carried out influences its implementation. For instance, historical patterns of collective action, demographic factors, natural resources may place severe constraints on the projects put into practice. These four macro constraints, often beyond management control, require their attention in order to cope with them. There are three options: a) accept the constraints and design the project accordingly; b) recognize the constraints and attempt to change them; and c) determine that constraints are not amenable to change and abandon the project.

Institutional realities means the institutional context in which projects are implemented. Capacity building, especially at the local level, should be strengthened if the project is expected to be self-sustainable over the long run. Institutional development should not be relegated to a secondary position below technology transfer. Project design must give attention to the role of local institutions, not only production increases. Links between local institutions and government agencies are crucial to provide assistance, permanent or temporary, to project capacity-building activities. Creating ad-hoc autonomous units to projects put into practice ends up in projects that fail to become self-sustaining after the
withdrawal of donor agencies, or changes in governmental policies.

Personnel constraints are related to shortages of personnel able to implement project activities. When this happens, there are four alternatives to consider: 1) make training a major project component; 2) simplify project activities; 3) do not initiate a new project; and 4) use foreign advisers. Training can be achieved basically by on-the-job activities and more formal training (Conyers, Warren, & Tilburg, 1987). The former is usually neglected although it is an important component of capacity-building; formal training should emerge, if needed, from on-the-job training. Training (workshops) can be used also as a way of bringing together people that normally do not interact with each other.

There is a growing criticism among donor agencies and governments of relying basically on foreign advisers to implement a project, because of the significant portion of the budget that is devoted to them, and dissatisfaction with the quality and/or roles performed by outside personnel. Too often, foreign advisers perform technical activities without attempting to build local capacity. Due to this, capacity building activities as training and strengthening local institutions have become an important part of project design.

The recognition of the importance of decentralization and participation is not only philosophical but also pragmatic. Decentralization facilitates participation of the people involved in order to let them make decisions based upon their own knowledge. In addition, decentralization can be understood as a way to promote efficiency of public institutions, such as research and extension, which are currently being questioned in Latin America for their scarce impact. This is due to increased users' control of institutions and possibilities for cost
sharing; thereby enhancing sustainability. Taking into account current trends towards privatization of technology generation and transfer systems in Latin America, decentralization can be considered a better alternative, especially if small farmers development is a concern. The move towards privatization came after the 1970s, when problems created by foreign debt obliged states to reorientate their public spending. In the face of these problems, Latin American states have been redefining the role of the private sector, considered more efficient, and handing over tasks to it.

National governments could promote some form of decentralization so as to promote people's participation at the grass-root level. But governments are reluctant to local empowerment, because they fear its consequences in terms of losing power. Therefore, instead of rhetoric, the real issue is to achieve some kind of mixture between central supervision and local autonomy. Participation is a concept not restricted to potential beneficiaries; it must include project staff, especially at local levels. This requires some kind of decentralized authority. In order to improve participation of rural people there are mainly three strategies: 1) strengthening existing organizations or creating new ones; 2) mobilizing local resources (using available local resources); and 3) using paraprofessionals (local people selected by local organizations and specially trained). Local organizations of producers can play a great role not only in lobbying local and national governments but also by providing links for research and extension.

Time lags interfere with the implementation of projects and may hinder their success. There are three types of delays: 1) between project identification and start-up; 2) during
project implementation; and 3) inappropriate time phasing of project activities. The more complex a project is, the more probable these delays will be experienced (Kettner, Daley, & Nichols, 1985). Administrative problems, design deficiencies and procurement delays are common sources of timing problems. Better planning and improved management by using formative evaluations are tools against these problems. Good overlap between planners and implementers can help to minimize delays.

Information systems are designed for improving planning and implementation of development projects. Nevertheless, project performance is generally not improved because the information generated by these systems is inadequate or not used. Common problems in this sense are: a) data are collected but never processed; b) results are made available to only a few persons; and c) information is too sophisticated. To develop an effective information system, it is important to identify the relevant information requirements of each group of decision makers involved in the project. Relevance and simplicity of information go hand in hand. Simple information systems have greater probabilities of being used by local management and people.

The principal actors in rural development projects usually have differing agendas. It is normal that the individuals and institutions involved have agendas of their own. If these agendas are significantly divergent, project success and benefits sustainability are scarcely achieved. There are no magic recipes to alleviate this problem. Two useful guidelines are: 1) making the potential dangers explicit to the major players; and 2) recognizing that the implementation has strong political implications at both macro and micro levels.
Although development activities are aimed at generation of self-sustaining results, too often they end when assistance terminates. There are three main reasons why this happens: 1) revenues are insufficient to cover costs; 2) political and economic context are not favorable; and 3) inadequate organizational capacity to carry on project activities. In order to deal with financial sustainability there are four alternatives: limiting costs; central government funding; user charges; and local government funding. There is agreement that the more the project gets people's participation, the better in terms of alleviating costs. Additionally, it is fair to introduce user charges taking into account different payment abilities. When viable, this alternative has positive effects on getting farmers' commitment to development activities.

The cornerstone to understand development is sustainability. In reaction to the failures of development projects in LDCs, a new approach has emerged which was labeled "sustainable development." The conventional approach of development can be characterized as by-passing capacity building activities. As a result, the envisaged 'trickle down' effect never occurred as initially expected in LDCs. Benefits from projects contributed to local inequities by enhancing rural societal stratification. The rich were able to make far more use of the projects than did the poor. An example were projects aimed at facilitating the development of cooperatives in the rural areas. The small farmers had little or no voice in the running of these organizations; they fell under the influence of the big farmers. Sustainable development is aimed at reconciling development projects with what is at stake for the intended beneficiaries, without compromising the rights of future generations.

Uphoff (1990) listed some of the weaknesses that characterize 'conventional projects':
1) awkwardly large and complex; 2) unnecessarily costly; 3) time-bound; 4) blueprint planning; and 5) designing and implementing in a unilateral manner. Projects should be smaller, more cost-effective, more open-ended, more flexible, and more participatory.

Coleman (1992) stated that projects fail to achieve results because they have: 1) unrealistic targets which depend on long procurement procedures; 2) unsupportive policy environments; and 3) very rigid planning—many bureaucratic structures are highly centralized with the decision-making process concentrated at the top level.

Avoiding the appearance of these problems calls for a new approach in project planning. There is agreement that planning has been an important cause of the failures of numerous projects (Coleman, 1992; Roe, 1991). This leads nicely to the management of projects as a crucial factor to take into account. According to Röling (1986), there are mainly two approaches in project planning: blueprint and process planning. Blueprint planning is associated with the modernization paradigm, in which LDCs through exogenous technology, loans and expertise coupled with new values, are supposed to take off and 'kick-start' the process of growth, which will later 'trickle down' to all the people involved (Howes, 1992). Projects are considered means to accomplish this vision. Features of this approach are these: environment is controlled; provision of inputs generates the intended outcomes; and evaluation is performed to determine if this has taken place. Assumptions for blueprint planning are similar to TI tradition in extension and hard systems methodology (HSM) of inquiring.

New paradigms (community development, land reform, integrated rural development,
and local development projects) were developed in Latin America since the 1960s, basically because projects aimed at helping 'the poor' failed to achieve results. This resulted in a need to move towards a process planning approach to encompass the new realities. The objective was to provide an active role for the so-called beneficiaries during the planning and implementation of projects. This greater participation will, in turn, create conditions for taking advantage of the indigenous knowledge the target people possess. Local people know their problems better, and how best to solve them. Consequently, their expertise should be exploited throughout the program planning process. The assumptions that form the framework for process planning are similar to HRD tradition in extension and soft systems methodology (SSM) of inquiring.

Planning should have pay-off in terms of evaluation. During the seventies, the International Development Agency (AID) development programs and donor agencies incorporated a planning instrument that helped to focus the evaluation. It was called logical framework or project framework (Cusworth & Franks, 1993). It is a tool highly oriented to management; this means it helps development managers make decisions regarding program monitoring and evaluation. The framework is mainly based on a four-link chain of stages: 1) inputs, which refers to whatever is required to make a project operational (financial resources, staff, supplies, etc.); 2) activities, which represent the transformation of inputs in outputs; 3) product, the direct results of input transformation in a project; and 4) effects, which means the results of a program's product on people. There are different variants of this model as well as names to call its components.
There are advantages in using this model. First, it helps to distinguish level of evidence to choose for evaluation purposes. Second, it helps to take into account the intervening linkages between the different stages. Finally, it helps to consider external factors (conditional assumptions) that may interact on the different stages. Although today no one admits to being an advocate of the blueprint approach because it is fashionable to talk about concepts like participation, the acceptance of process planning should be regarded with skepticism. The general philosophy that underlies process planning may be lost while designing and implementing development activities. The main feature of process planning is that environment is not controlled, it is unpredictable; therefore, a flexible approach is needed for adapting to the new emerging situations that occur during implementation. Howes (1992) highlighted the basic differences between blueprint and process planning. These differences are shown in Table 1.

The process planning approach may be seen as one of evolutionary progression. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have played a key role in developing or incorporating new procedures that were aimed at expanding participation of the audience and their different perspectives to the all phases of the program planning process. During the 1980s, Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) became an effective methodology for obtaining rapidly the existing information about the problems that people face (Chambers, 1983). Projects are conceived as a trial an error process whereby failures are ways of learning. The objective is to avoid the 'quick' of rural development tourism and the 'long' of some questionnaire surveys. RRA is useful in the first stages of the program planning process in order to determine a course of
Table 1. Differences between blueprint and process planning (Howes, 1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Blueprint</th>
<th>Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sequences</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idea originates in</td>
<td>Capital city</td>
<td>Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design</td>
<td>Static, by experts</td>
<td>Evolving, people involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>Rapid, widespread</td>
<td>Gradual, local, at people's pace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>External, intermittent</td>
<td>Internal, continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main resources</td>
<td>Central funds, technicians</td>
<td>Local people, their assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Existing, or built top-down</td>
<td>Built bottom-up, lateral spread</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Vertical</td>
<td>Lateral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Positional, changing</td>
<td>Personal, sustained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management forms</td>
<td>Spending budgets, completing</td>
<td>Sustained improvement and performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>projects on time</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff development</td>
<td>Classroom, didactic</td>
<td>Field-based, action learning</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

action. Moving into the 1990s, Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) was developed, as a continuation of RRA with advances in some areas. Basically, RRA developed a methodology in which rural people themselves elaborate the maps, diagrams, and charts that help to highlight their systems, the constraints and what needs to be done (Howes, 1992).

Current pressures for short-term and quantifiable considerations that characterizes LDCs macropolicies may discourage this move towards process planning. In that case, rather than regarding process planning as being incompatible with the macro-context, the challenge is: "... what do we do, as development practitioners, if blueprint development is here to stay
for the time being? How can we make the best of a bad situation?" (Roe, 1991, p. 287).

Assuming this, the question becomes one of how to improve blueprint planning rather than process planning.

**Evaluation**

As stated in Chapter 1, there is overwhelming evidence in LDCs that agricultural extension has not been overly successful. One of the perceived problems in relation to this situation is the neglect that agricultural extension has showed toward evaluating its activities. Too often, attempts to apply some kind of evaluation focused solely on macroprojects after their termination, and assessed the overall impact from the economical perspective by benefit-cost or internal rate of return analyses. The assumptions upon which these techniques are conducted: "... are often such as to vitiate the analysis" (Ellis, 1981, p. 251).

Extension operations in LCDs might prove more successful if they implement and integrate evaluation as a current practice through projects. In addition, LDCs should apply an evaluation framework not biased towards the technological (generally formative)/economical (generally summative) tradition.

Since the 1970s, extension has been under considerable pressure to elicit reliable evidence about its results. Policy-makers wanted to know whether or not extension was working properly in terms of priorities and using an increasingly reduced budget adequately. This situation, induced by a process of structural adjustment related to excessive levels of public spending, has begun to take place with different levels of intensity all over the world.
Extension needs more focused evaluation so as to determine its real impact; otherwise, answers to why should extension be supported by public funding are becoming problematic.

Evaluation is the act of determining the worth of something (Jones, 1990). By such a process evaluators compare certain evidence against predetermined criteria to make judgments. In this definition, evidence is considered the data which is relevant to the evaluation and criteria are the standards against which something can be judged. Criteria have also been called impact indicators. Bennett (1975) developed a useful model for creating impact indicators. This model is composed of seven levels of evidence by which to evaluate the impact of an extension program. These levels are: 1) inputs; 2) activities; 3) people involvement; 4) reactions; 5) KASA (Knowledge, Attitude, Skills, Aspirations) change; 6) practice change; and 7) end results. Generally, evaluation in extension has focused on the first three levels which represent the implementation of the program to attempt to answer these questions: a) how many resources did extension expend on the program; b) what kind of activities did extension use in the program, and c) how many people participated in the program. Although these levels are important, evaluation needs to be focused more from the perspective of the extension users as seen in levels four through seven (Chambers & Ghildyal, 1985). These levels represent the outcomes of the program. Some questions that may be stated regarding these levels are: 1) how much did the program activities appeal to participants? 2) how much did the participants change in their knowledge level? 3) how much did the participants apply that knowledge in their setting? and 4) how much did the program help participants to improve their situation?
In order to perform an evaluation using Bennett's model, one must select a level and quality of evidence. Quality of evidence refers to whether or not one is dealing with what Bennett refers to as hard or soft evidence. Hard evidence refers to data that reflects precise and verifiable characteristics of individuals, groups, and situations. The more one moves up the hierarchy or tries to increase quality of evidence, the stronger the evidence; however, at the same time, the more difficult it is to obtain this evidence.

As stated before, there are two main traditions in extension: TI and HRD. While TI is concerned with technology transfer, HRD focuses on developing rural people themselves and their social systems. Evaluation in extension under TI tradition has left its mark through levels one and two of Bennett's hierarchy of evidence. No doubt, this is much better than not evaluating extension projects, but leaves room for many questions regarding what happened as a result of these projects. Bennett's framework emphasizes taking into account the user's perspective. TI tradition focuses on inputs (resources for extension work) and outputs (activities performed by extension) which are levels one and two of Bennett's hierarchy. The focus is placed on comparing inputs and outputs to determine the resource use efficiency (Röling, 1992; Warner & Christenson, 1984).

Bennett's model redresses this imbalance by alerting that levels one and two of evidence tell little about the effects of extension projects. In order to know this, one should establish impact indicators that reflect the higher levels of Bennett's model. This does not mean that managers should not be concerned for extension expenditures; what it really means is that evaluating extension projects implies not only efficiency but also effectiveness (Prawl, Medlin
Dealing with effectiveness is related with levels four through seven of Bennett's hierarchy, which are the projects' outcomes. Effectiveness is the degree to which a program is achieving its outcomes; one should compare outputs and outcomes to determine it. For the sake of clarity, a distinction between efficiency and effectiveness is needed. Efficiency can be used as an indicator of effectiveness, but evaluation becomes stronger as the hierarchy is ascended (Bennett, 1975).

Patton (1983) emphasized that extension and evaluation have in common identical processes and principles aimed at obtaining useful information about people. These processes are: 1) determine who are the clients; 2) determine the needs of the clients; 3) gather the needed information; 4) deliver the information to clients; and 5) work with clients to apply the information. Additionally, extension and evaluation share similarities in relation to principles. These similarities are: 1) programs/designs should meet needs of specifically targeted audiences (utility); 2) programs/designs procedures should be selected with attention to constraints and limitations (feasibility); 3) extension workers/evaluators should show respect for the people they work with (propriety); and 4) extension/evaluation have to use the information, as accurately as possible, given the existing constraints.

What does the impact of extension mean? According to Feder and Slade (1986) evaluation in extension became an imprecise term because people tend to use different levels of evidence without making explicit the level on which they are focusing. Does it mean the changes, direct and indirect, that resulted from extension projects, or less deeply, the immediate effects on farmers of the activities that extension does.
Assessment of extension impact is constrained by several factors (Birkhaeuer, Evenson, & Feder, 1991): 1) the period in the diffusion process in which the evaluation is carried out; 2) the government policies; 3) research efforts; and 4) type of farmers. The period in the diffusion process in which the evaluation is carried out is an important factor. In earlier stages of the diffusion process extension may have a great impact whereas in later stages the impact may be considered as small. Government policies affect agriculture through incentives and prices; consequently, it affects extension impact. If research efforts are not successful, extension will not have a high payoff, because there is no knowledge to convey.

Type of farmers being analyzed affect evaluation in two ways. The first one, refers to endogeneity in extension-farmer interactions. This means that some farmers, innovators or first adopters in terms of diffusion theory (Rogers, 1983) are more willing to adopt technologies. Estimates of evaluation in the case of using these farmers are likely to be biased in favor of extension.

The second potential problem refers to the extent of inter-farmer communications. Farmers received information from different sources, not only extension. However, evaluation studies do not take into account this fact and assume that extension sources are the only ones being used. This is a risk that can bias the results in favor or against extension. In other words, the question that arises is: can outcomes be attributed to extension? According to Röling (1992), many evaluations in extension have faced this problem.

Not only has evaluation in extension been biased towards levels one and two of Bennett's model, but also towards summative evaluations. Most efforts have been directed at
evaluating extension projects by assessing the extent to which the original objectives were achieved. This type of evaluation is practiced after projects terminate. Formative evaluation, which is conducted before and during the program, has not received attention, especially in LDCs (Barlow, Jayasuriya & Price, 1983). The importance of formative evaluation stems from the fact that extension needs to determine whether or not projects show weak points that should be corrected at once. There is evidence that establishing regular formative evaluation procedures constitutes a critical ingredient of successful projects (Mc Laughin, 1976).

Evaluations taken soon after a program terminates are of scarce value from managers of extension projects, because they come too late to stop bad projects. Stufflebeam (1983) developed a model of evaluation, which is commonly called the CIPP model, that is concerned with providing useful information to those who are in positions to make decisions. Basically, the CIPP model attempts to answer the following questions: 1) which objectives should be established; 2) which procedures should be employed; 3) how adequate are these procedures working; and 4) how effective are the objectives being accomplished. According to these questions, there are four types of evaluation that can be performed. CIPP represents the first letters of these evaluations: context, input, process, and product. These four types of evaluation are related to each other; although it is possible to focus mainly on one aspect, a thorough evaluation of extension projects should include all four types. The CIPP model is based: "... on the view that the most important purpose of evaluation is not to prove but to improve" (Stufflebeam, 1983, p. 118). It was originally created in the late 1960s, as a move
against the predominant approaches at that time, which placed emphasis solely on whether or not objectives had been achieved. Later, during the 1980s, Stufflebeam updated his model.

According to Stufflebeam (1983), context evaluation is concerned with identifying the target population, assessing their needs, diagnosing their problems, and to judging whether objectives fit the assessed needs. Input evaluation is related to selecting the most appropriate plan of action from different alternatives taking into account resources, strategies, budgets, and schedules. Process evaluation refers to identifying whether the project is going according to the plan, and to detect defects in procedures and implementation. Product evaluation judges outcomes in relation to the objectives so as to determine if the program has met the needs of the audience.

Context and input levels of evaluation are performed before the program is implemented, process evaluation is undertaken after the program has been started, and product evaluation after the program terminated. Context evaluation provides a basis for judging outcomes by specifying the environment (type of social structure) in which the program is going to be carried out. Input evaluation provides a basis for judging implementation by providing information related to how the plan of action was chosen among others alternatives. Process evaluation provides a basis for judging outcomes by providing information related to what happened between inputs and products. Product evaluation provides a basis for decisions related to continuance, termination, or modification of the program being evaluated.
The Bennett and Stufflebeam models provide frameworks that help to plan evaluation in extension. No simple approach for evaluating extension projects is enough for all circumstances. It is important to draw upon different perspectives. Evaluation should not be restricted to assessing outcomes. The resulting picture of evaluating how closely outcomes approximate objectives may miss what really happened within the social system in which extension operates. These evaluations provide islands of certainty in a sea of uncertainty. The Bennett and Stufflebeam models emphasize a systemic perspective of evaluation, in which the different components of extension are treated equally in the wholeness of the situation. Levels one through three of Bennett's hierarchy of evidence are related to levels context, input and process of Stufflebeam's model. Levels four through seven of Bennett's approach fit with product evaluation in the CIPP model. What constitutes the evaluator task is to carefully identify levels and quality of evidence, taking into account the existing resources, and providing answers to the questions posed for the study. In doing so value judgements are unavoidable, because placing the worth of something is affected by the evaluator's beliefs and values. Making explicit these values, along with using a logical conceptual framework and empirical measurements are required for evaluating effectively (Fathy, 1980).

**Human Resource Development**

The realization that growth alone does not mean development, and that evaluating development by rate of growth does not convey the true picture in relation to the people's quality of life, is certainly not new. It was T. Shultz, an economist during the early 1960s, who showed the importance of such factors as education as a prerequisite for development.
In Shultz's (1964) point of view, these factors should be considered investments with returns, not consumption luxuries. After that, the economic perspective of development was abandoned in favor of a broader vision that took into account growth, distribution and recently participation. Nevertheless, economic difficulties of LDCs have been putting obstacles in the way to fully application of this vision. As a result, growth policies continue to be the driving forces which may lead to improvements in the people's quality of life (Emmerij, 1985).

Bryant and White (1982) defined development as a process of "...increasing the capacity of people to influence their future" (p. 14). To achieve development, one needs to pay attention to: 1) increasing people's capacity to determine their future; 2) distributing benefits evenly; 3) empowering people to be able to receive benefits; and 4) considering long-term results of the activities. This is a sociological definition of development that takes into account HRD.

Realizing the importance of the human elements in development presupposes taking into account the two sides of the coin: the human elements as means and ends of development. Too often the question of HRD turns out to be a question of means, but the human element is not only a resource but also the final objective of development (Nudler, 1986). There is a complex interrelatedness of these aspects; an exclusive consideration of human elements as resources (e.g., augmentation of human resources via education) misleads the whole meaning of HRD.
From a macro-perspective, HRD has been considered as means, and it is restricted to the satisfaction of basic needs as education, health, and nutrition. HRD in rural extension, which is close to the micro-perspective, pays attention to: 1) promoting participation of rural people in projects; 2) developing the organizational base of rural people; 3) creating awareness among rural people of their problems and building up solidarity to face them; and 4) encouraging self-determination and self-reliance to let rural people be able to influence their own future (Oakley, 1986). HRD is often ignored in extension (Molnar & Jolly, 1988; Röling, 1986a). Although it is a required step to achieve TI, these two dimensions function in opposition to one another instead of being mutually reinforcing.

At the present time, there is a consensus that, "... rural development theories emphasize the necessity for integrating decentralization, participation, and indigenous technological knowledge" (Sanford, 1988, p.64). A careful look at the task of integrating these three factors shows that this is a job for extension, understood from a wider perspective. Continuing an exclusively TI tradition in extension while neglecting HRD will exacerbate the problems that developing countries face, especially those related to small farmers such as expulsion of small producers from rural areas to urban ones. This is due to imperfections in the diffusion process when extension (TI) delivers technology to farmers.

During the early 1970s, it became clear in LDCs that instead of a trickle down effect, the diffusion process was characterized by a trickle across effect. Rogers (1983) stated that the consequences of introducing innovations to farmers often widen their socio-economic gaps. Farm size continues to grow because of the low returns per unit. New technology is
slowly adopted in the beginning; those few who adopt earn large profits. But when others
adopt in response to socioeconomic pressures, total production increases and prices go down.
Technology then yields a low return and farmers are compelled to expand their farm-sizes to
stay in business. The end of this process is that those who cannot afford the new technology
and compete effectively in a rapidly changing world, find it increasingly hard to survive as
farmers. There is agreement that in Latin America, one of the leading causes of rural poverty
is the current inequality among farmers, basically land-control (Altieri, 1989; Fliegel, 1993;
Rogers, 1983).

Because poverty is on the rise in Latin America (Sandstrom, 1993), there is an urgent
need for achieving a better balance between HRD and TI traditions in extension. A concern is
growing recently that overemphasis on either 'technology' or 'people' lead to disappointment
(Bennett, 1992; Lichtman, 1987; Maalouf, Contado & Adhikarya, 1991; Röling, 1986a;
Ruttan, 1984). Investments in HRD or TI without integrating these two traditions are often
wasted. Dewey (1939) envisioned this concern when stating that subject matter knowledge
(TI), "... needs to be supplemented by a 'higher' type of subject matter and knowledge
(HRD) in which value-categories are supreme over those of factual existence" (p. 3).

Failures of the diffusion process in LDCs led people to question the current
technology at that time, 'western' technology, as not appropriate for the socio-economic and
cultural context of LDCs. It was proper, however, to say that all technologies are
'appropriate'. But, as Dewey (1939) suggested, the question is: appropriate for what.
Technology is not good in itself, it causes intended and unintended effects, both desirable and
undesirable (landlessness, unemployment, etc). Western technology was appropriate for following the western style of development. As a result of this situation, project implementation in LDCs began to focus on other technologies, which were termed in several ways, e.g., intermediate technology, appropriate technology, and/or later ecologically-based technology. Although there is an impressive terminology for the same subject, each one of the terms is grounded in the fact that the new emerging technology is based on, or mixed with, indigenous knowledge (IK).

Indigenous knowledge is the local knowledge that people use to solve their problems. It is empirical, adapted to the whole environment, and transmitted by verbal tradition. This knowledge has proved to be useful for increasing agricultural production, at a time when there was no research stations or extension institutions, as the agricultural revolution in Britain showed (Pretty, 1991). Incorporating IK into agricultural extension projects has resulted in efficiency from an economic point of view and the results have been gratifying (Warren, 1991a; 1992). It is crucial for extension to take IK into account because it is the best short-cut to establish a participatory program planning process (Tully, 1981). For research, IK is the starting point, upon which new ways of improving problematic situations can be explored. Warren (1991b) summarized reasons for using IK, stating that: "... technical solutions to unperceived problems are not readily adopted, new technologies that duplicate indigenous ones are superfluous, and ignoring local approaches to local problems is wasteful" (p. 1). What really counts is the balance. A purist approach that excludes IK or the so called scientific knowledge is unlikely to solve all problems that may arise (Röling, 1988).
There are basic differences in stating objectives under TI or HRD traditions, especially around the degree of specificity that an extension program can establish. In the TI tradition, it is easier to formulate objectives indicating closely where the program is intended to lead, the time involved, the degree of change intended, and how the change will be measured. This is certainly not the case under the HRD tradition. Oakley (1986) stated that HRD objectives are non-material. As a result, measurement of these objectives in quantifiable form may not be possible. In this case one is concerned more with processes rather than results. However, in order to evaluate non-material objectives, one needs to describe and then interpret these processes.

At the heart of these divergences are the assumptions that underlie extension, understood as TI or HRD. There is more specificity under TI because it is assumed that, "... the present is known, the future knowable and that one can control events sufficiently to achieve a knowable future" (Röling, 1986, p. 111). These assumptions do not fit HRD's tradition of extension. In this case flexibility and uncertainty go together due to the complex interaction between the program and the environment which is difficult to predict.

The tradition of TI in extension is close to the reductionistic and/or hard systems methodology (HSM). Hard systems methodology means, "... the problems, goals, or end states addressed by inquiry are readily defined by the analyst, who then moves into stages of inquiry aimed at developing solutions" (Wilson & Morren, 1990, p. 355). In opposition to this, HRD tradition better reflects the soft systems methodology (SSM). Soft systems methodology means, "... the problems and goals are messy and complex and treated as not
easy to define because there is no general agreement on problems, goals, or purposes; the analyst is responsible for facilitating an inquiry process whereby the articulation of the complexity of the problematic situation and of improved future states is developed by and with the people involved" (p. 359). In the latter, the objective is more to improve situations, not to solve problems. The way of investigating the world (systems) becomes crucial: it is a participative process in which all the parts are active inquirers. This emerging paradigm will affect the whole program planning process of extension.

Traditionally, extension relied on reductionistic assumptions to develop and evaluate projects. According to Patterson (1993) these assumptions are the following: 1) problems and objectives can be identified; 2) the defined problem can be solved by people with appropriate expertise; 3) problems and objectives are put into operational or quantitative terms and solutions are modeled to achieve optimal performance; 4) improvements come from the implementation of solutions; and 5) the analyst is independent of the problem, a consultant who makes recommendations to a client. These assumptions may be useful for the extension program planning process under TI perspective, e.g., to eradicate mastitis in dairy cows, but will no longer work for problems that fall into the HRD tradition.

The complex problems that face extension today, such as environmental degradation, require another paradigm. HSM was an important step, but not enough to deal with ill-defined problems where there is no agreement on the desired outcomes. In this case, the new paradigm assumptions are the following: 1) problems and solutions are constructs of the mind; 2) people have different views of the same situation; (3) people disagree on what's the
actual state and desired state; 4) improvements result from discussion and debate; and 5) the analyst becomes part of the problem situation (Patterson, 1993).

There is agreement that non-material objectives are affective objectives; if affective objectives are stated in terms of describing a measurable performance, they can be considered objectives (Dewey, 1939; Mager, 1972). Mager recognized that there are differences between cognitive (TI) and affective (HRD) objectives. The challenge to meet the latter case is to find a, "... visible behavior that might be used as an indicator of an affective stage" (p. 117).

However, given the qualitative nature of HRD objectives, it is appropriate to complement this approach with other alternatives that fall into naturalistic evaluation. Oakley (1986) indicated that evaluation is just beginning to know more about formulating, monitoring, and evaluating non-material objectives. This is a challenge that should not remain without response.

When considering the roots of HRD concerns in extension, it is important to mention the humanistic position of Rogers (client-centered psychology), Maslow (third force), and Freire (liberating education) as relevant sources of conceptual support. Rogers (1983) stated that the goal of education should be the facilitation of change and learning. Only from an interpersonal relationship in which certain qualities are present, will this process of change arise. These qualities are: a) realness, or genuineness, of the facilitator of learning; b) acceptance of the learner as a trustworthy person; and c) empathetic understanding of the learner. As a result of this relationship, there will emerge, "... the kind of individuals who can live in a delicate but ever-changing balance between what is presently known and the flowing, moving, altering problems and facts of the future" (Rogers, 1983, p.121).
Maslow (1970) presented a hierarchy of basic needs which emphasizes that human beings are seeking fulfillment or self-actualization. Through this statement, Maslow wanted to react against psychoanalytic or behavioral theories and their views that human nature is driven by instinctual energy or environmental stimuli. In the order of simple to complex, the hierarchy of needs are comprised of: a) basic needs (physiological); b) safety needs (protection); c) belongingness and love needs (groupness); d) esteem needs (being valued); and e) the need for self-actualization (self-fulfillment). Maslow noted that most behavior is multi-motivated and that justification of needs plays an important role as a satisfied need is no longer a motivator.

Freire (1981) pointed out the idea that HRD can be achieved when extension agents and their audience are both engaged in a subject-subject relationship as opposed to a subject-object relationship. This relationship is placed into a context in which both parts are critically aware of their situation in the world in order to act on it. Freire also stated that, "... from a truly humanistic point of view, it is not for them (extension agents) to extend, entrust, or dictate their technical capacities ... in their role as educators, ... their task is communication" (p. 97). This communication arouses free, and non-restricted to facts. In terms of Freire's point of view, 'communication' rather than 'extension' describes HRD tradition. Freire understood the term 'extension' as close to the TI tradition. Freire stated as a foundational premise, that when educators and educatees are in communication, actions are started that add relevance and meaning to seeking solutions to problems.
Extension in Uruguay

A great part of the historical information about extension in Uruguay is based on The agricultural development of Uruguay by R. H. Brannon. It is useful to begin this description alerting about the different meanings and terms that currently relate to this topic in Uruguay. Basically, there are two meanings, extension as TI or HRD. People have tended to use the term 'technical assistance' when they wanted to define extension in terms of the spread of new technologies in a social system (TI). The term 'extension' is employed for the cases in which the work is focused on organizing farmers, and participation is viewed not only as a means of achieving something but also as an end in itself (empowering). The latter describes HRD tradition.

The history of agricultural extension in Uruguay began in 1926, when the Department of Extension and Technical Assistance (DETA) was created, under the Ministry of Livestock and Agriculture. Uruguay is organized around 19 local governments. Regional extension offices were established in each of these local governments by DETA. Throughout this century DETA suffered several changes, reorganizations and name-changes. Nevertheless, the field staff of DETA have received scarce support to perform their duties. Most of the budget has been designated for salaries; consequently, there has been a shortage for operational funds which limited severely the ability of the extension field staff to have impact on the audience. Within this context, the evaluation of extension activities did not show a positive impact; there was no reason to suppose that it would succeed. Routine paper work
and regulatory activities coupled with low levels of salary, motivation, operational funds, and research to extend, inhibited field staff performance and caused a desk-bound orientation.

Due to this picture, several other extension services were created, generally one for each separate crop or livestock category, to improve extension performance. In this sense, the most important services created were The Comision Honoraria de Mejoramiento Ovino (CHMO) in 1934, and The Comision Honoraria del Plan Agropecuario (CHPA) in 1957, to support livestock ranchers. Extension was improved, because inhibiting factors were removed, but the price paid was that extension responsibilities were distributed among many different institutions, each one with a particular orientation as to how to approach extension. Because there was no coordination, producers became confused by the different kind of advice given to them. To make things worse, these institutions began to compete for an increasingly reduced budget. Institutional hierarchies located in the capital had scarce guidelines to operate in a context of increasing short term pressures and decreasing resources. As a result, initiatives from field staff frequently were ignored while institutions reinterpreted their mission according to the personal views of their administrators. Again, there was no other choice.

A big feature of Uruguay's extension system was not only the lack of links between extension institutions but also with research. An important missing link within Uruguayan extension staff was the subject matter specialist. He/she can help to bridge the gap between the local extension agent and the researcher. As a result, access to information was not easy for extension agents; they expended much energy in locating sources of information. Due to
this, reorganization of state extension services was undertaken during the early 1960s, in order
to achieve close coordination between research and extension. A Centro Nacional de
Extensión Agropecuaria (NAEC) was created, and its initial personnel housed in the same
building as the researchers, trying to promote a better understanding. This extension staff was
trained by the Instituto Interamericano de Cooperación para la Agricultura (IICA); the
philosophy that undergirded its work was close to the HRD tradition. The advance of the
agrarian cooperative system was due largely to the NAEC's strategy. The story of NAEC
ended up in 1967, when it was abruptly closed and its personnel fired. Behind the scenes, it
was assumed that different views about how to approach extension between policy makers
and NAEC's staff caused the dissolution of this institution.

Since then, HRD tradition is continued by the work of a rich network of NGOs.,
basically the Centro Cooperativista Uruguayo (CCU), and The Instituto de Promocion y
Desarrollo Economico Social del Uruguay (IPRU). These organizations are small-farmer
oriented; they provide leadership and skills training, and technical assistance to grassroots
organizations. More recently, the Asociación de Colonos del Uruguay (ACU) for small rural
settlers, and the Foro Juvenil (FJ) for young rural people, were created to provide specific
services: technical assistance, credit and empowerment.

Additionally, grassroots organizations (which include both cooperatives and small
farmer development societies) are also performing activities that can be identified as close to
HRD tradition. Basically these organizations provide agricultural supplies, credit, technical
and extension assistance, and marketing support. In some cases, much of the production is in
cooperative hands, which gives more strength to small farmers to hold onto their lands. This is the case of the milk sector, whose extension system is currently a good example of adequate balance between TI and HRD traditions (Crawford, 1990). The Cooperativa Nacional de Productores de Leche (CONAPROLE) has around 5,000 members and accounts for about 80 per cent of the Uruguayan milk production. Its extension service works not only providing technical advise to farmers, but also organizing them in groups to buy and use machinery together.

The tradition of TI in extension is currently carried out, basically, by the CHPA, the CHMO and the Federación Uruguaya de Grupos CREA (FUCREA). There has been a loaded debate around CHPA's effectiveness, because large livestock farmers have been reluctant to adopt technology, especially permanent artificial pastures. Despite the controversy, there can be no question that the CHPA has played a great role in disseminating innovations and making farmers more receptive to extension, both TI and HRD. Brennon (1968) described the CHPA as the most effective extension program operating during the 1960s. Large ranchers' rejection of introduction of technology was related to the fact that they earned profits by turning their cattle out to graze on natural pastureland. This implied lower risks as compared with adopting technology under uncertain conditions.

Since the 1960s, public funding of extension began to decline in Uruguay. Also, the use of the word was avoided in some circles, not only because it conveyed more than one meaning, but also for political implications with land reform and social changes. The private sector, in the form of medium or large scale innovator farmers gathered in FUCREA, began to
play a key role in developing extension systems oriented to their needs. According to Nogueira (1990), these efforts were highly effective. The reasons that contributed to this success were: a) the members' common social background; b) their economic resources; and c) their high level of technical competency.

Uruguay has only one Agriculture College which is public. Traditionally, the college has performed activities in teaching and research; extension is recently beginning to acquire importance. Due to this, attempts to transfer the Land Grant System Model to Uruguay were never intended, as they were in other Latin countries. Research is currently under a decentralized, semi-autonomous arrangement, which should provide better services to farmers by avoiding bureaucratic procedures. This fact and the consolidation of the extension private sector (grassroots organizations, farmers' groups, NGOs, etc.) coupled with macropolicies that are oriented toward reduction of state expenditures, will challenge public extension.

It is a reality, that the traditional model of a paternalistic-interventionist state has died in Latin America, and Uruguay. Excessive levels of public spending and the burden of the external debt have weakened the role of the state over the entire society. However, given the importance that agriculture has as a source of direct or indirect exports, there is enough evidence that macropolicies should concentrate on providing efficient public expenditures on research and extension (Ferrari, 1991; Janssen, 1991). Within this context, building interactive links with research, increasing decentralization, and recognizing the urgent need for a greater cooperation with the private sector, are among the major challenges that public extension needs to face in Uruguay during the 1990s (Nogueira, 1990).
Summary

The limited success of development projects in LDCs can be attributed to a wide range of factors. Too often there was no attempt to analyze successes and failures of these projects during their implementation. Evaluation was restricted to compare inputs and outputs; thereby establishing the resource use efficiency. This approach fits with TI tradition. On the other hand, HRD tradition requires other perspectives. In this case, one is more concerned for comparing outputs (capacity building activities) and outcomes (HRD components). In this way, two sides of the coin are addressed: human elements as both a means and end of development. Extension needs to keep a balance between TI and HRD traditions; investments in TI or HRD without integrating these two traditions are often wasted. Because projects' implementation in LDCs has not been effective in achieving their objectives, it needs to be improved. In order to be successful, projects' implementation should take into account several factors that may influence their success. These factors can be summarized in four key aspects: 1) management; 2) capacity building; 3) planning approach; and 4) external factors.

There has been no tradition of evaluating development projects from HRD perspective in Uruguay. The growing importance of the private sector in Uruguay, composed of NGOs and grass roots organizations, which work closely to this tradition, magnifies the need for that evaluation. The results of this study may benefit also public agricultural extension, taking into account that a closer cooperation between the private and public sector is required to improve extension effectiveness in Uruguay.
CHAPTER III. METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This study belongs to the naturalistic inquiry paradigm. Guba and Lincoln (1983) defined paradigms as: "... axiomatic systems characterized by their differing sets of assumptions about the phenomena into which they are designed to inquire" (p. 311). The basic features of naturalistic inquiry are: 1) it is conducted in a natural setting; 2) it relies basically on qualitative rather than quantitative methods; and 3) it utilizes a case-study format which involves relatively few cases.

Although these features are correct, in order to capture the full meaning of naturalistic inquiry one needs to consider its assumptions (Guba & Lincoln, 1983). There are five assumptions that characterize naturalistic inquiry. These assumptions refer to the nature of reality, the inquirer-objective relationship, the nature of truth statements, the attribution/explanation of action, and the role of values in inquiry.

The nature of reality refers to the fact that there are multiple, intangible realities which can be studied only holistically. Individuals see their realities phenomenologically. In naturalistic inquiry there is interaction between the inquirer and the object of inquiry. The nature of truth statements in social sciences is highly influenced for time and context. Generalizations are temporal. The search for plausible connections between phenomena characterizes naturalistic inquiry's way of explaining actions. Instead of causation, there is interaction among all the factors and conditions involved. The last assumption establishes that inquiry is value-bound. This means that the society value system--including the values of
inquirers and respondents—cannot be methodologically controlled and influences the course of inquiry.

Although the naturalistic inquiry is being increasingly used in the evaluation of development projects, the predominant paradigm is still the rationalistic, which focuses on objectives and their intended outcomes (Lee & Shute, 1991). On the contrary, a naturalistic inquiry in evaluation takes into account a holistic view of the situation to be evaluated, to ensure that the context and all the interested parties are not excluded. As stated previously, the case-study format constitutes a feature of naturalistic inquiry. The next section discusses the case-study method as a research-design and as a tool for evaluation.

The Case Study Method

Definition

The case-study method may involve the analysis of relatively few specific cases so as to get an in-depth understanding of these cases (Casley & Yury, 1981; Patton, 1980; Platt, 1992; Stoecker, 1991; Yin, 1989). Cases generally focus on those aspects that the researcher views as most relevant to the inquiry, e.g., individuals, organizations, programs, groups, cities, a role. According to Yin (1989), the distinguishing characteristic of case studies as research designs is that they attempt to investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and they use multiple sources of evidence. By this definition, case study is distinguished from history, experiment or survey.
Yin (1981) stated that people tend to link research strategy (e.g., case study) with types of evidence (e.g., qualitative data) and types of data collection methods (e.g., qualitative methods). According to Smith and Lincoln (1984), qualitative data describe actions without losing the original views of the individual respondents; collection methods are basically interviewing, participant and non-participant observation and content analysis of reports, records and other pertinent documents. Although the case study has been the traditional format of naturalistic inquiry, Yin (1989) made a point that the tendency to see case study as relying exclusively on qualitative data and qualitative methods of data collection is a misleading representation of the reality.

The case study is a suitable tool for conducting many evaluations (Yin, 1992). This suitability stems from the fact that a case study: 1) takes into account the context; 2) is not limited to either qualitative or quantitative data; 3) can assess outcomes and the implementation process; 4) can test hypothesis and develop new ones; 5) can test relationships between processes and outcomes; and 6) can develop ideas generalizable to the major substantive themes in a field. These features make the case-study valuable for evaluations that are based on the CIPP's model. For agriculture development problems in LDCs, experience suggests that case study findings are useful to improving development policies (Casley & Lury, 1981).

Components of Research Design

For case studies, Yin (1989) has identified five components of research design as being important. The first one is the study's questions. The case study approach is most likely
to be appropriate for 'how' and 'why' questions. The second one refers to the study propositions. If the study has propositions, each proposition directs attention to something that should be examined within the scope of study. However, case studies can be exploratory, in which there are no propositions; however there are still some purposes that help to collect information. This research was an exploratory case study. The purpose was to identify how management, capacity-building, planning and external factors (independent variables) might affect the implementation of projects (dependent variable) taking into account the HRD perspective.

The third component is related to the definition of the unit of analysis. For instance, a case may be an individual or something less well defined, such as a program. As a general guide, the definition of the unit of analysis—and, therefore, of the case—is related to the way the initial research questions have been defined. According to Patton (1980), the key issue in defining the unit of analysis is to decide about what one wants to say about something at the end of the study. In this research the unit of analysis was the selected agricultural extension projects (multiple-case design).

The last two components represent the data analysis steps. Analysis of data has been the least well developed in case studies. The fourth component refers to linking data to the study proposition, while the last one to criteria for interpreting the findings. The current state of the art does not provide detailed guidance in relation to these components. The definition of criteria for interpreting the findings has always been a major question in evaluation (Riecken, 1972). Nevertheless, in order for findings to provide insights in relation to the
purpose of the study, case studies should not be undertaken without a conceptual framework that helps to organize, compare, and accumulate the findings.

Types of Case Studies

Yin (1989) pointed out that there are two types of case study: a single-case design, and a multiple-case design. A single case design implies, as the name suggests, the use of a single case. The reasons for choosing this type are that it represents: a) the critical case in testing a theory; b) an extreme or unique case; and c) a revelatory case.

Multiple case designs are those in which the study contains more than a single case. The evidence that emerges from this type is often considered more compelling. This topic is related to sampling strategies. Patton (1980) stated a basic difference between random sampling and purposeful sampling. The latter is used "when one wants to learn something and come to understand something about certain select cases without needing to generalize to all such cases" (p. 100). If one wants to evaluate programs, with limited time and resources, the evaluation objective "becomes a question of understanding under what conditions programs get into trouble and under what conditions programs exemplify excellence" (p. 101). If this is the case, evaluators should select those cases from which they can learn the most.

Purposeful sampling can be viewed as a question of trade-off between detailed information and generalizations. According to Patton (1980), this is the most typical problem that evaluators have to face when using qualitative methods. Yin (1989) stated that criteria for sample size are irrelevant, because they depend on the particular circumstances. Nevertheless, Yin considered that a number might be between six to ten cases, depending on the sense of the
evaluator about the complexity of the realm of external validity. In this research, the projects were selected through purposeful sampling.

As stated previously, one should start research using case study with purposes grounded on the theoretical framework. Indeed, what constitutes the basic feature of case study method, as perceived by Yin, is that it is not conceived from an inductive perspective (cited in Platt, 1992). The conclusion to be drawn from this is straightforward. Priority should be placed on the development of a theoretical framework.

In the present study, decision makers and key informants were used to take advantage of their experience in knowing all phases of cases, from the average to the extreme. Criteria for choosing the agricultural projects were: 1) richness of information through documentation and/or key informants; 2) a component of extension; 3) some objectives related to HRD (stated or not); and 4) variation with respect to the type of organization in charge of implementing the project.

Sources of Evidence

Yin (1989) pointed out that case studies may be based on six different sources of evidence: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant observation, and physical artifacts. Documentary information including letters, agendas, administrative documents, formal studies, and articles appearing in the mass media. Archival records can be survey data, maps and charts, personal records, etc.

Interviews are one of the most important sources of evidence. Interviews may be structured or unstructured. In the latter the format is non-standardized and the respondents
answer in terms of their own frame of reference (Chambers et al., 1992). Some questions were used to begin the unstructured interviews. Direct observation means to observe some relevant behaviors or environmental conditions by making field visits. Direct observations can be made when conducting interviews. To increase reliability of observational evidence, a procedure is to include more than one observer. Participant observation occurs when the investigator takes different roles, apart from being an external observer. The investigator becomes involved in the situation by participating in the events being studied. A final source of evidence may be a physical or cultural artifacts collected during field work.

The present study used basically two sources of evidence: documentary data and interviews. Interviews with project staff and beneficiaries were unstructured. Direct observations were also employed with the assistance of one of the researcher's major professors. The initial questions used by the researcher were submitted to the Human Subjects Committee at Iowa State University. A copy of the signed approval form and the initial questions are found in Appendix A.

**Guidelines for Establishing the Trustworthiness of the Study**

Guba and Lincoln (1983) have pointed out criteria for establishing the trustworthiness of findings under a naturalistic inquiry. Such criteria are equivalent to their counterpart in rationalistic inquiry: credibility (internal validity), transferability (external validity), dependability (reliability), and confirmability (objectivity).

Case studies have been questioned for being subjective and lacking rigor (Ary, Jacobs, & Razavi, 1990; Platt, 1992; Stoecker, 1991; Yin, 1981; 1989). One response to these
critics has focused on setting up procedures to meet those four major traditional criteria, while another focused on establishing weaknesses of the quantitative approach (Stoecker, 1991).

The naturalistic concept of credibility (internal validity) implies to be confident with the researcher's analysis, formulations and interpretations because they adequately represent reality as it is perceived for the people involved in the study. Suggestions to increase credibility are: 1) prolonged engagement at a site; 2) persistent observation; 3) triangulation, which is the act of employing different methods or sources to gather and verify data; 4) referential adequacy materials; and 5) member checks. Transferability (external validity) is gained through providing sufficient description of the context that allows some degree of transferability to the particular conditions of the other researchers. A multiple case design increases transferability of the findings.

To increase dependability (reliability) of the study, one needs to specify all methodological steps and provide access to all data in their raw and processed stages. The objective is to provide enough guides that allow other researchers to replicate the study. Finally, naturalistic inquiry is interested in data confirmability. This means that findings can be traced back to the original data to verify if the interpretations were subject to bias.

This study used a variety of procedures to assure that these four criteria were met. To check credibility it used: prolonged engagement at the site (the researcher lives in Uruguay); triangulation (interviews were held with different informants so as to avoid having a one-sided picture of each project and get much more accurate results); and peer crosschecks (to receive feedback that interpretations are credible). The latter was achieved through interaction with
faculty members of Iowa State University (Agricultural Education and Technology and Social Change), the Agriculture College of Uruguay (Social Sciences Department), and staff from the Agriculture and Fishing Ministry of Uruguay, NGOs, and grass roots organizations.

Methodologically, it was particularly relevant to this study that the present researcher's co-advisor was present in Uruguay during the last two weeks of November, 1993. Therefore, interviews and direct observations were conducted during that time with the assistance of one of the researcher's major professors. This period of time was adequate to provide the researcher with opportunities to receive feedback about the emergent design and test emerging insights about the study. Inclusion of a multiple case design was used to achieve transferability along with providing a thick description of each case. Dependability and confirmability were achieved by providing an audit trail that shows how the study was conducted, including the conceptual framework, matrix and other steps taken. In addition, documentary data used for the evaluation of has been retained by the researcher.

**Analysis of the Data**

It is difficult to specify in advance the very detailed procedures for data collection and analysis used in a case study. This is due to the fact that each case is unique, and sources of evidence are likely to vary, sometimes by chance. In order to analyze the data, Yin (1989) observed that a general framework is very important, not only for the purpose of the study, but also for facilitating the data collection process. After that, an analytic technique is needed for manipulating data evidence. One technique is to build a matrix of categories and place the evidence within such categories. The evidence obtained was compared against a standard
criteria (Table 2) to evaluate whether or not they coincided. Analysis of documentary data, interviews, and direct observation were the main sources of evidence used in this study. A letter was send to the Institutions from which projects were selected, asking for permission to collect data (see Appendices B and C).

The conceptual framework that guided this study is depicted in Figure 2. For instrumentation, the collected evidence for each project was compared to a final standard matrix (Table 2). This matrix was grounded on the theoretical framework described in the literature review; and adapted from Rondinelli (1986) and Elliot (1989). The matrix takes into account: a) a set of four key factors (management, capacity building, planning approach and external factors) that the literature review indicates relevant for an appropriate project implementation in terms of HRD tradition; and b) the four stages of the CIPP model (context, input, process, product).

Methodologically, this case study treated appropriate project implementation (dependent variable) as a function of those four key factors (independent variables). It is recognized that the words appropriate, effective, or successful are open to different meanings depending on the tradition of extension used, TI or HRD. Effective implementation for the TI tradition may be interpreted as achieving the initially stated goals, whereas for HRD may be understood as achieving sustaining results on the target people, even if the implementation deviated from initial design. The purpose of the analysis was to identify how these factors affected the implementation of the project from HRD perspective. Nevertheless, consideration about how they influenced the results was also made.
Table 2. Final standard matrix used for evaluation (adapted from Rondinelli, 1986; & Elliot, 1989)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>Context (Objectives)</th>
<th>Input (Project)</th>
<th>Process (Implementation)</th>
<th>Product (Results)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>• What kind of goals did the project approach-TI or HRD?</td>
<td>• What was the strategy of the project?</td>
<td>• How was process monitoring conducted?</td>
<td>• What were the main results of the project from a TI perspective?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How were goals and objectives described?</td>
<td>• Was there an evaluation design?</td>
<td>• How was formative evaluation conducted?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Was needs assessment conducted?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td>• Were capacity building objectives defined with quantified goals, indicators, or time frames?</td>
<td>• Who was going to take an active role in implementation of capacity-building efforts?</td>
<td>• Was the project implemented through integration of local institutions and governments?</td>
<td>• What were the main results of the project from a HRD perspective?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Were there existing agencies or institutions with whom to work?</td>
<td>• Did implementation involve all entities?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning approach</td>
<td>• Were objectives expressed in a major framework?</td>
<td>• Was there a planning or blueprint approach of the project design (see Figure 2)?</td>
<td>• Did flexibility continue during this stage?</td>
<td>• Were long-term plans included for project continuance?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Was project formulated in terms of a logical frame?</td>
<td></td>
<td>• What kinds of factors constrained planning for project implementation?</td>
<td>• Was sustainability of the results achieved?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Was learning made possible through the lessons?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External factors</td>
<td>• What kind of external factors constrained the project during this stage?</td>
<td>• What kind of external factors constrained the project during this stage?</td>
<td>• What kinds of external factors constrained the project during this stage?</td>
<td>• What kinds of external factors constrained the project during this stage?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 3. Conceptual framework for the evaluation (adapted from Rondinelli, 1986; and Elliot, 1989)
The methodology used in this study does not imply that: a) these are all the factors to consider; b) all the factors have the same importance; and c) the factors always affect project's implementation and results in the same way. The findings drawn from the analysis can provide operational guidelines to extension managers so as to improve future projects. In addition, the findings can contribute to increasing the body of knowledge in relation to evaluation studies of extension or development projects in LDCs.

The process of developing the standard matrix (specific objective 1) had three sequential steps: 1) reviewing evaluation models and literature related to the topic; 2) developing the standard matrix to be used; 3) refining through review by selected professionals. The latter was done by personal visits. Professionals were sent personalized letters asking for collaboration and thanking for their participation (see Appendices D and E). A list of the professionals interviewed is provided in Appendix F. The average-length of each interview was three hours. The development of the standard matrix occurred over a period of ten months. Two months out of ten took place in Uruguay. During that period, the researcher received the reactions of his advisory committee in the United States (January, 1993-July, 1993) and from six professionals in Uruguay (August, 1993- October, 1993). Reaction to the standard matrix referred to both format and content. The suggestions concerning the standard matrix were considered and later incorporated into a more refined matrix which is presented in Table 2. This final matrix can be considered as a valuable tool for extension managers in developing countries to take into account factors that may affect project implementation.
Summary

The procedures followed to carry out this research were accomplished first by designing the evaluation framework through a literature review and peer validation from ISU and colleagues from Uruguay. Second, the selection of the projects was accomplished through a purposeful sample of six projects following the criteria as specified on page 51. According to the literature, a number between six and ten cases were found to be appropriate for a multiple case design. Key informants from Uruguay were identified to assist in project selection because of their experience and familiarity with projects that would provide the maximum benefit to this study. Third, data collection in Uruguay consisted of two stages: a) collecting administrative documents and records of the projects; and b) conducting unstructured interviews. Finally, data analyses involved the use of the matrix in two aspects: a) as a guide for categorizing the information gathered in each project; and b) as the criteria against which to compare the evidence collected in each case. Findings from all the projects were compared and synthesized in order to draw conclusions and guidelines.
CHAPTER IV. FINDINGS

This chapter considered the results of the evaluation of six projects on rural development recently carried out in Uruguay. The conceptual framework and methodology described in previous chapters were taken into account. Each project evaluation was followed by a short annotation labeled introduction, intending to provide a general view of the project setting, a description of the project, a matrix describing the project development process, and key findings related to this process.

Development Program for Small Livestock Producers of Cooperativa Agraria Minas de Corrales (COAMICOL)
Agency in Charge: Instituto de Promoción Económico y Social del Uruguay (IPRU)

Introduction

Most of the information provided was obtained from internal materials of the Instituto de Promoción Económico y Social del Uruguay (IPRU). A non governmental organization (NGO), IPRU was created in 1966 to provide technical assistance, training and credit to the poor both urban and rural. Several aspects of life conditions were showing a highly unsatisfactory trend. The poor lacked decent shelter, access to health, education, and other basic services, including availability of food. Rural-urban migration exacerbated the need to provide basic services and infrastructure to the lower strata of society.

To fulfill basic needs and foster social development, IPRU applies a participatory methodology based upon some principles: readiness to listen to the target people, respect for local culture, involvement of local people in the program planning process, and the
encouragement of a 'critical consciousness' among the less advantaged population groups (see Freire, page 39). Action by IPRU attempts to provide guidance and direction without controlling in detail every aspect of the groups being supported. The relation between IPRU and the target population is initiated by the latter through informal requests. This generates a close and mutually beneficial interaction between both parties with the aim of meeting those requests.

An analysis of IPRU's development actions can be done from three perspectives: a) time; b) type of support; and c) participation of the promoter in the solutions. With reference to time, the actions may be punctual or continual; type of result may be related to technical assistance (TI) or wider than that, including helping people organize themselves (HRD). Finally, with respect to the participation of the beneficiaries in the solutions, there is a continuum with three situations: 1) expert mediation; 2) supervision; and 3) process intervention. The participation of the beneficiaries is minimal in the first case (expert mediation) and results are expected in a short term. As one moves in the continuum, the participation of the client gradually increases as well as the complexities of the process and the foresight of its results.

The view of development by IPRU is centered around two key dimensions: a) equity, because the persistence of poverty compromises the effectiveness of any development action; and b) empowering people to make decisions and to satisfy their basic human needs.

In order to reduce dispersion of funds, IPRU concentrated resources around a limited number of major geographical regions. These regions are: a) northwest part of the Country
(Salto and Artigas Departments); b) northeast (Rivera and Tacuarembó Departments); and c) the metropolitan area (Montevideo, Canelones, San José and Florida Departments). Within these areas there is a concentration of the greatest poverty index of the country. An indigent population is one whose family income level does not cover the cost of a subsistence food basket according to the needs estimated by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Feres & Léon, 1990). This commission established a value for the line of indigence in rural areas of Uruguay in 19.3 U.S. dollars (per capita monthly budget at 1988 prices). To attend the remote areas, the IPRU has initiated a decentralization process aimed at keeping the organization more responsive to the target population.

The basic areas of the IPRU's action are: a) support programs to the small enterprise, rural and urban; b) support programs to the cooperative sector; c) agroecological and environmental programs; and d) women's programs. The institution is composed of 33 members, 70% of them in a full-time arrangement. The activities developed by IPRU are financed basically by donor agencies. The annual operating budget of the IPRU totals approximately 400,000 American dollars. The NGO generates its operating capital through administrative fees charged within the proposals it helps to develop. In addition to the administrative fees, the IPRU attempts to establish longer term consultancy arrangements with the target population upon completion of the external project funding.
Project description

Most of the information provided in the present study came from internal documents, as the project itself, and reports from the project beneficiaries (Journal Caminando, No. 32, 1990 and No. 39, 1992). The present researcher also studied all final IPRU project documents that were submitted to the external funding agency (The Belgium Foundation for External Missions), as well as annual IPRU reports for 1991, 1992, and 1993. In addition, the present researcher conducted individual interviews with Luis Murias (IPRU director), Alicia Canapale (IPRU administrative coordinator) and Gustavo Canedo (IPRU field coordinator in charge of this project). Complementary, similar interviews were held with Aldo Scattolini (Coamicol’s member of the board) and Amilcar Acunha (Coamicol manager).

The project period extended from May, 1990 to May, 1993. Funds were provided by a Belgium Agency, The Belgium Foundation for External Missions. The beneficiary organization was the Cooperativa Agraria Minas de Corrales (COAMICOL), located in the Department of Rivera, at the northeast of the country.

The project goals were to: 1) increase the income of small sheep farmers as a result of technical assistance (TI tradition); and 2) increase farmers’ involvement in the cooperative by forming groups (HRD tradition). This project commenced with a baseline survey that provided data and facts from which to identify problems and needs. This study identified the existence of a significant number of small livestock farmers, with farm sizes of less than 200 hectares (449 acres). According to Uruguayan standards, this is a small scale of farm considering livestock production. The records of this study also indicated that small
subsistence farmers lacked an on-farm infrastructure needed to apply technology, for example, water supply. In addition, the farmers had very limited or no access to institutional credit. The scarce available supply of credit was skewed in favor of short-term credit. Lack of collateral security to obtain loans was one of the main reasons to explain this situation.

A major component of this project was to establish a revolving credit system for the small subsistence farmers. This system intended to provide a comprehensive package for the target population to raise its output and enter into the commercial sector. The package encouraged adoption of new technology or other improvements, along with access to credit, extension and delivery systems of the inputs required. The interest rate was low when compared with other rates paid for those who depend on the informal market. In addition, the system did not require ownership of property by the farmers in order to qualify for a loan. In reality, small subsistence farmers did not have collateral, except scarce and poor land, against which banks could take possession and sell in case of default. This land was not valuable for a bank as a source of rapid cash income.

Credit conditions were not the only feature of this system to consider. Small subsistence farmers were obligated to conform to farm projects elaborated jointly with extension agents. The delivery systems had to provide ready and timely availability of inputs, and market outlets on the products side. An important characteristic was that funds were not expected to be depleted. All the target people were expected to get their turn to receive the loan. The funds, if well managed, should be virtually self-sustaining. This meant the total volume of credit flowing into the target population was not expected to vary dramatically in
the medium run. Another feature was the way loans were repaid; it was in products rather than money. Small subsistence farmers perceived this way of repayment as well-adapted to their own frame of reference. Instead of money, they were accustomed to using quantities of product to borrow and return.

The revolving credit system put emphasis on close control of farm production and supervision of credit. This was done to prevent a misuse of funds. It operated through a well-funded and well-staffed special unit whose authority was located outside the social system. Therefore, it could avoid facing local large landowners’ power, who tend to be opposed to development actions that may threaten their power. Larger farmers have been using their influence to capture credit from the lending agency to buy additional land to displace small farmers.

In order to put this credit system into practice, a committee was formed comprised of representatives from each of three groups: a) the cooperative’s board of directors; b) the target population; and c) IPRU. This committee was in charge of approving the loans which were given annually. Loans were granted after studying the farm projects developed by the extension agents. The credit conditions were: 1) the maximum loan amount was US $1,700 per farmer; 2) the farmer debt was in outputs, not money; 3) the rate of interest was three percent per year on the balance; and 4) the term for paying back the loan was one year for crops and three years for investments and permanent pastures.

The specific objectives of the project were to: 1) develop 25 farm projects on an annual basis until completing 75 in the third and final year; 2) form eight cooperative groups in
which to give technical guidance through the project extension staff; 3) deliver technical
messages from extension staff to small farmers through use of mass media; and 4) visit small
farmers and other productive experiences (field days). The beneficiaries of this project were
all cooperative members who met the following conditions: 1) a farm size less than 200
hectares (449 acres); 2) a location of not more than 50 kilometers (31 miles) from Minas de
Corrales (headquarters of the cooperative); 3) residence on the farm; and 4) reliance on
farming operations as the principal source of income.

From IPRU's point of view, meeting these objectives would help to increase
agricultural production and to strengthen cooperative. This, in turn, would contribute to
raising standards of living and to making a reversal from rural-urban migration.

**Project development process**

The project development process is represented in Table 3. The overall goal was to
increase agricultural production (TI) and strengthen the local cooperative (HRD). This goal
was to be achieved through a strategy based upon: 1) the provision of loans using a revolving
credit system for the building of the infrastructure on-farm and the providing of inputs; and 2)
the provision of technical assistance from the project's extension staff. All development
operations were to be carried by a semi-autonomous unit which, at the end of the project, was
supposed to be incorporated to the cooperative. The cooperative would assume the
responsibility for the continuation of this project after its end. A needs-assessment study
carried out for a previous project and implemented in that cooperative, was used to provide a
baseline picture of the reality before implementing the project. The objectives were clearly
**Table 3. Evaluation of the project IPRU/small farmers of COAMICOL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>Context (Objectives)</th>
<th>Input (Project)</th>
<th>Process (Implementation)</th>
<th>Product (Results)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Management</strong></td>
<td>▪ Goals included to enhance living standards of small subsistence farmers by increasing agricultural production (TI) and strengthening the local cooperative (HRD). ▪ A recently conducted needs assessment study was used.</td>
<td>▪ Strategy based on revolving credit system involving provision of loans and technical assistance. ▪ Evaluation design included impact indicators against which to measure progress toward objectives.</td>
<td>▪ Evaluation design helped to monitor implementation from the unit. ▪ Reporting systems of evaluation design allowed comparison over time, checking progress of objectives. ▪ Adequate balance between monitoring TI and HRD aspects achieved due to clearly stated objectives.</td>
<td>▪ 1993: 50/75 small farmers reached with credit (objective was 75). ▪ High loan repayment rate (&gt;90%). ▪ Data kept on technologies adopted. ▪ Incomes for participants increased. ▪ Supply of inputs not always timely from cooperative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Planning approach</td>
<td>▪ No blueprint plan. ▪ Flexibility to review the project each year according to the monitoring.</td>
<td>▪ Permanence of project not achieved in original terms. ▪ No final evaluation made to allow learning from experience &amp; making suggestions for future plans. ▪ Not possible to replicate experience not only in the area but also in other regions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capacity building</strong></td>
<td>▪ Training activities were planned for small producers as an objective to achieve. ▪ HRD objectives were clearly stated in operational terms.</td>
<td>▪ Cooperative was to take an active role in implementation of project. ▪ Project conceived as a joint effort between IPRU through an ad hoc unit to be formed, an the cooperative.</td>
<td>▪ Cooperative groups formed; training activities to farmers, including field days, were successfully carried out. ▪ Emphasis on capacity building remained on small farmers. Cooperative staff not included.</td>
<td>▪ 1993: 4 cooperative groups formed (objective was 8). ▪ Failure to provide capacity building to cooperative staff hindered sustainability of outcomes to small farmers (credit system).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planning approach</strong></td>
<td>▪ Objectives were expressed in a causal chain: logical framework.</td>
<td>▪ No blueprint plan. ▪ Flexibility to review the project each year according to the monitoring.</td>
<td>▪ Project redesigned during implementation. ▪ Little coordination between unit and cooperative hindered planning and threatened sustainability.</td>
<td>▪ Permanence of project not achieved in original terms. ▪ No final evaluation made to allow learning from experience &amp; making suggestions for future plans. ▪ Not possible to replicate experience not only in the area but also in other regions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
stated in operational terms and timeframe, for both TI and HRD. They were expressed within a logical framework approach which was discussed on pages 21 and 22.

An evaluation-design was developed with the help of the donor agency. It included an extensive record of project implementation, and impact indicators against which to measure progress toward objectives being sought. This, as well as the initially clearly stated objectives, helped greatly to monitor the project. Impact indicators reflected both TI and HRD traditions; this meant there was a proper balance. The indicators of impact were: 1) number of producers reached; 2) number of producers reached that adopt technology, specifying which; 3) number of visits to the demonstration area; 4) number of formed groups and 5) how much use was given to credit and rate of repayment.

The revolving credit system functioned well; there was no reluctance on the part of the target population to borrow funds and adopt technology. The progress reports confirmed this. In addition, a planning process approach was employed. This meant that flexibility in the implementation allowed for modifications in response to changing circumstances. There were some examples that certified this. First, when the project was written for the donor agency seeking its approval, the market for wool was encouraging, but when the project was approved and implemented, wool prices declined significantly. The lack of wool profitability made it necessary to introduce livestock innovations as an alternative for small farmers. Second, loans were given to items that were not originally programmed in the project, but were requested by the target people. Sometimes these loans were more related to financing consumption rather than production. Failure to recognize that small subsistence farmers need
not only credit for financing inputs, but also for consuming, may jeopardize their capacity to perform well in the credit program. Third, loans were given to the board of cooperative directors. Originally, the argument over which members of the cooperative board should not be allowed to ask for a loan was related to the fact that they were wealthier farmers, more able to exert pressures in favor of their interests. It would have been difficult for the committee to resist and not succumb to such influences. On the other hand, the project sought to increase participation of small farmers in the cooperative, and eventually on its board of directors. Small subsistence farmers were reluctant to serve in the cooperative as directors because they could not be eligible borrowers within the program.

During project implementation, there was a very poor linkage between IPRU, through the created semi-autonomous unit, and the cooperative. This caused serious difficulties to the implementation of the project and the sustainability of results. Different views and hidden agendas about the role of extension and the project objectives may be argued to explain this situation. Extension should be an important part of a project which expects to tie revolving credit to technological innovations for small subsistence farmers. If the cooperative board understands this, but at the same time it considers it too costly to implement as originally planned, problems will arise from the very beginning. Credit becomes important to small farmers only after technology is available to, and understood by, the potential borrowers. The small subsistence farmers needed to perceive technology as profitable and not risky. The application of a revolving credit system weakening extension components would lead the project far from reaching its intended population.
An analysis was necessary to determine the nature of the observed hidden agenda. The cooperative board viewed this project much as a gift of free money from which to reallocate resources to other needs, than as a way for helping the poorer strata of farmers to gain access to credit and extension services. The latter implies that capacity building was needed for cooperative employees. Cooperatives are run by those farmers with enough resources of their own, so that they can afford to direct them from the board without receiving a salary. Their intentions may be the best, but their interests work in the opposite direction of those of the target population. Those who possess more resources are in a better position to benefit from development interventions.

On the other hand, IPRU saw this project as a way by which new technology would be translated to small subsistence livestock farmers in coordination with the provision of credit. Their vision was more concerned with equity (HRD), whereas the cooperative board's vision was concerned with efficiency (TI). As a result more exploration was needed to find a middle point between the two extremes, where the two goals might be found to conflict less; therefore, certain losses in one goal could be seen as a reasonable cost to pay for gains in the other goal. Extension managers have a lot to play in this tradeoff.

Under these circumstances controversies arose as to who was in charge of making budgetary decisions. When the cooperative board recognized that reallocating resources elsewhere was not possible, it withdrew its active support to the project. This affected the newly created unit, controlled initially by the central direction of IPRU. As stated previously, the strategy for this unit was to achieve the needed support from the cooperative without
generating too much dependence at the beginning. Later, as the unit acquired experience, IPRU gradually withdrew from its directive role.

At the end of the project cycle, it was expected that the cooperative would assume control. Far from this scheme, the unit was forced to act by itself, because of its frustration in trying to work through the cooperative. Little cooperation was established between these two entities. An arrangement emerged in which the cooperative was in charge of delivering inputs while the unit covered extension and credit activities. Obviously, this arrangement was anything but perfect. Experience was disappointing in the timeliness of input delivery from the cooperative. In addition, the target people could not understand who was directing the project, whether IPRU, COAMICOL, or the unit. Had this problem been grappled with seriously at the beginning by IPRU (input or context stage, not process), the unit might have planned a different strategy for project implementation.

For the cooperative, to assume the control of the project after the end of the cycle project implied a more active participation in the handling of credits, marketing of products, purchasing of inputs, and providing of extension services. The capacity of the cooperative to perform such a role was strongly limited due to the fact that capacity-building activities were not performed within it. The cooperative’s board of directors did not show an interest in assuming control. It was clear that skills were required that were unfamiliar to the cooperative staff: bookkeeping and accounting methods, knowledge of distant and volatile markets, technical knowledge, ability to plan, judgments of creditworthiness and how to deal
with defaults. Employees were poorly trained in these areas. As a result, the potential of the cooperative to sustain this project after its end was seriously questioned.

Evaluation of the program revealed that: a) capacity-building activities were performed successfully for the small farmers who were exposed to new experiences; and b) a community development process had been started because new cooperative groups were formed. This was due mostly to the high rapport established with the extension agents in this project. Sustaining these improvements as well as the credit system for the original target population became the issue after the departure of IPRU occurred in November, 1993.

Lack of a final summative internal evaluation to learn from the lessons must be mentioned, along with no long-term plans after the end of the project cycle. Non governmental organizations and donor agencies appear to be reluctant to tie up scarce human and financial resources in what might be regarded for them as not practical work. This also includes needs assessment studies. There is an urgent need to change this perception.

There were constraining external factors that must be borne in mind when considering the evaluation of this project. First, a recent financial problem in the cooperative that created a high debt. In addition, there was a 'boundary effect' that hindered the cooperative. Farmers tended to buy inputs in Brazil because they were cheaper. A further external problem is that government efforts to help small subsistence farmers have been scarce and considered lately undesirable welfarism. This was very much a function of their insignificant political importance to government leaders. The last external problem was a delay on the part of the donor agency in providing funds for the last year. These funds were never granted.
Rural Development Program for Pueblo Ansina (Ansina Village)
Agency in Charge: Grupo de Promoción del Desarrollo (GPDR)

Introduction

Most of the information presented came from the Grupo de Promoción del Desarrollo Regional (GPDR). The GPDR is a NGO established in Uruguay in 1987, and supported by donor agencies from Canada. The GPDR's original goals were to: 1) promote cooperation South-South and North-South; 2) support institutional development of other NGOs and cooperatives; 3) promote regional development; and 4) create awareness about women's and youth's conditions. In 1990 these goals were reviewed and the GPDR found it necessary to concentrate efforts to reduce dispersion of funds. The GPDR embarked on a strategy to promote regional development in the poorest region of the country. This region was composed of four departments: Tacuarembó, Rivera, Cerro Largo and Artigas. Even though Uruguay is a small and homogeneous country with only minor ethnic/income disparities as compared to other countries in Latin America, there are definite regional differences.

According to data gathered by national censuses, within this region (especially in rural areas) the provision of minimum standards of food, clothing, shelter, health, and education was minimal. The lowest-income rural groups, basically smallholders, tenants, and the landless, did not have access to services such as domestic water supply, electricity, waste disposal, etc. Even where such services were available, the poorer rural strata tended to benefit less from them than do other groups. The socioeconomic system operating in these areas was often hostile to development actions. The system tried to reinforce rural poverty instead of alleviating it.
The density of the rural population in this region was very low (1 inhabitant per square kilometer) due to the migration toward urban areas. The lack of rural work opportunities created this problem, but the urban areas presented a similar situation. Rural young and women were within the categories more exposed to migration. Moving to the cities or villages could provide some chance to escape from poverty. Some informal activities such as reduced scale smuggling (over the border with Brazil), seasonal agricultural employment or housekeeping were the only activities available. As a result, the wage rates were extremely low, often less than 50 dollars a month.

Livestock dominated agriculture in the four mentioned departments. Farmers grazed livestock on natural pastures with a few quality grasses. While grazing lands in common was not employed, there was, nevertheless, an important presence in this region of small livestock farmers, and an increasing process of land concentration. Moreover, those departments were lacking cooperative organizations. As a result, many local needs relating to the marketing of agricultural products, the purchase of farm supplies and equipment, and the provision of credit were not met.

Compared with other NGOs, the GPDR is a relatively small one. Its staff is composed of 10 members, the majority of them under a part-time arrangement. The headquarters is located in Montevideo, the capital of the country, from where the programs are coordinated, guided and controlled. There is a regional office in Tacuarembó but no GPDR staff is allocated there. There are weekly or monthly contacts between the general coordination and those responsible for each program as well as with the technicians affected by the programs.
Due to the scarce resources and the multiplicity of problems, it was virtually impossible for the GPDR to meet all the demands of the people involved in the target region. The current general strategy adopted by GPDR emphasizes: 1) helping local people select a project and organize to carry it out, providing skilled assistance when needed; and 2) bringing political pressure on the government and political forces to act on matters affecting the poorer rural strata.

**Project description**

The information provided in the present study came primarily from written internal documents of the institution, as reports and the project itself. In addition, the researcher conducted individual interviews with Gustavo Dans (GPDR director), José Pedro Nuñez (GPDR extension agent) and Norberto Rodriguez (GPDR extension agent). Complementary, similar interviews were held with two farmers who were involved in this project: Mr. Carlos Viera and Mrs. Miriam Rivero. The analysis was derived heavily from these interviews.

The evaluated project was called 'Ansina village rural development program.' Ansina village is located in Tacuarembo department, 60 km from the department capital. It was started in 1992 with a completion date of March, 1996. This program was a continuing activity to the GPDR projects that began in 1988 by the support of the local cooperative. A needs-assessment study was conducted within the project during 1992. According to the results of that study, the project objectives were to: 1) strengthen the poorest rural family capabilities to generate income; and 2) institutionalize a process of rural development through
the establishment of self-managed village organizations capable of assisting the poorest strata of rural families.

The reports from the needs-assessment study revealed that the local institution (cooperative of Ansina village) was not responsive to the requests of the poorer people. Experience showed that previous projects supported by the GPDR also failed to attain their original goals. The GPDR was then pacified with claims of a 'trickle down' effect which did not take place. The intended target population, composed of the poorest rural people that lived around Ansina village—landless and small subsistence farmers, was never reached. A parallel organization to overcome that constraint was created in 1993.

**Project development process**

The project development process is represented in Table 4. Although the program had overall goals derived from a needs-assessment study, it did not commence with quantified objectives, impact indicators or time-frames. Context heavily affects project implementation, and often changes violently in LDCs. Due to this, project objectives are established in a very broad way. As a result, managers and organizations actions are not restricted during project implementation. This project showed a lack of objectives, presenting just broad goals.

To build a degree of flexibility into a project so that modifications can be made later, requires an active involvement of development managers during implementation. They must set general directions that can be followed by those responsible at the local level. That was not the case here. Lack of clear guidelines led to uncertainty about the way to implement this program on the part of extension staff.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>Context (Objectives)</th>
<th>Input (Project)</th>
<th>Process (Implementation)</th>
<th>Product (Results)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>Program had only overall goals stated very broadly and vaguely.</td>
<td>Project strategy based on a revolving credit system.</td>
<td>Poor monitoring of process.</td>
<td>Project recently started with a good rapport between extension team and the target people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A needs assessment was conducted especially for this project.</td>
<td></td>
<td>High expectation raised at beginning among principal parties.</td>
<td>Trend for rate of loan repayment appeared to be good.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Poor linkages between GPDR high-level management located in Montevideo and the regional staff.</td>
<td>Limited resources were a bottleneck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Scarcie involvement of GPDR high level management in the implementation generated absence of leadership and confusion.</td>
<td>Crisis management affected process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td>Objectives for capacity building activities were never defined.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Failure to achieve coordination with local government.</td>
<td>Some leadership emerging; however, more capacity building is needed for transferring responsibilities to the new organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning approach</td>
<td>Goals were expressed without reference to a general frame, as the logical framework.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Planning approach highly flexible, explained by a lack of guidelines about the focus.</td>
<td>Role of the GDPR regional agency needs to be clarified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Planning constrained by a contradiction between the local approach of the project and the organization structure highly centralized in Montevideo.</td>
<td>Sustainability of expected results is in danger after 1996.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No long-term planning evolved as well as process evaluation to improve implementation and allow for replications in other areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External factors</td>
<td>Tension between local institution operating in area (Ansina cooperative) and the goals of the project.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of local government support.</td>
<td>Lack of local government support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tension between local institution operating in area (Ansina cooperative) and the goals of the project.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of government support to small farmers.</td>
<td>Reactions from donor agencies are unknown related to future funding after 1996.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The new organization created in 1993 was not strong enough in decision-making, allocating and using resources effectively, and managing its own development activities. Although that was expected, taking into account the program began in 1992 with a needs assessment study, the created organization must be able to sustain benefits as the life of the program come to close in March, 1996. This means a lot of work is still needed to increase its institutional capacity to negotiate with other organizations and lobby the local government.

The strategy followed by this project was to combine the revolving credit system with extension so that the same visit to target people served both purposes. As it was suggested earlier in the IPRU project, the advantage for the borrower that uses the revolving credit system is a relief from uncertainty about the price a farmer can receive to repay the loan in cash. The repayment is made in a given number of physical units of product, regardless of market prices, and the borrower knows in advance how much it will cost to repay the loan. Therefore, the borrower is less likely to feel that he/she is being exploited by the lender. The extension team established a good rapport with the target people. However, the modest size of the amount of credit available was a weak component of this adopted strategy.

The figure of 5,000 dollars a year appears clearly modest when viewed in the light of attacking global poverty in the region by narrowing the gap between rich and poor and meeting the basic social needs. Other factors that constrained the implementation stage were: a) the lack of transportation for extension purposes; and b) the scarce time allotted for extension work, just one week per month. Nevertheless, because of the extension team's good rapport, there was a trend toward a satisfactory repayment rate.
Other problems were encountered in the project. Objectives were not defined and there were poor linkages between GDPR regional staff, and the GDPR high-level management located in Montevideo; therefore, confusion arose over how to implement the project. In addition, there was a failure in the GDPR institutional framework. Center-local communications and coordination were a bottleneck. Sharing responsibility with local staff did not function because they were not knowledgeable about the total project. This was related to the fact that objectives were not defined. The GDPR high-level management did not provide a sense of direction for the regional staff, and beneficiaries of the program. Inadequate management and supervision produced a 'make-work' approach. Management style also had a critical influence in generating low motivation of the personnel toward the project.

The future of the program faces a danger in the sense that it concentrates resources on providing benefits to a small group (10 persons) in relation to the overall size of the region. Hence, it is a small-scale project and should be considered as being experimental in nature. Nevertheless, the smaller the project, the easier it may be to control it for ensuring high quality in its operation. The GDPR should define criteria for quality. Unless this project can be replicated more widely in the region, GDPR strategy will be unable to contribute significantly to reduce the region's problems. A corollary of this is that replication should be carried out cautiously, with attentive monitoring of the process itself. Continuing to the present time, GDPR's management style seems to be an obstacle to these purposes.
A new institutional arrangement must be found to resolve these issues. Experience shows that the implementation of rural development programs calls for an adequate institutional framework. This means a balance between central leadership and coordination with decentralization and participation. Development managers should provide leadership and must have a coordinating role during the different stages of program planning process. They need to be involved in monitoring ongoing programs.

The creation of a GPDR regional development agency in the outskirts of Tacuarembo city with a good infrastructure is a clear example of the situation described above. Although it was built in 1991, there is no indication of its purposes from the high management level: a center for training local people, a center for conducting research on appropriate technologies for smallholdings, a center for gathering and providing information for the rural poor, or a center for generating local incomes to supplement GPDR central funds. An institutional framework in which authority is concentrated at the top, and little attention is paid to local level staff produces little incentives for their initiative and motivation. The goals of this project ran counter to the GPDR's institutional framework. A real doubt can be raised concerning its sustainability after 1996, if the institutional framework does not change. Also, reactions from donor agencies to continuing funding are unknown yet.

In addition to this picture, coordination with local government of Tacuarembó was not achieved. The GDPR began to work raising high expectations about project resources in a move to induce local government support. Because expectations were not met, GDPR suffered a lack of credibility on the part of local government. Working with local
governments is not easy but necessary. Local governments filter demands of cooperation in terms of their own agendas. Too often local politicians are afraid of NGOs development actions because they threaten their own power. But local governments perform intermediary functions which make it possible or not for NGOs to achieve their goals (for example, to build internal roads). It is hard to establish the right balance in this relationship between local governments and NGOs; nevertheless, it should be done.

The lack of objectives induced the absence of evaluation systems in order to monitor the fit between program activities in relation to the pre-specified objectives. The lack of gathering information and making observations about the ongoing project should be overcome. Again, this requires a change in the observed management style; otherwise, it would not be too greatly exaggerated to affirm that this program will have little effects on the target people.

Credit Program for Small Farmers of San José
Agency in Charge-Asociación de Colonos del Uruguay (ACU)

Introduction

Most of the information provided in this introduction was obtained from internal materials of the Asociación de Colonos del Uruguay (ACU). The ACU came about due to a series of historical events. The 1950s brought forth a heated debate on the necessity for land reform in Latin American countries. In this context, land reform was generally driven by agrarian movements. It was an issue associated with revolutionary changes in the existing order. In Uruguay, colonization and settlement were considered an alternative to land reform.
Precisely, the Uruguayan Land Reform Institute is called the Instituto Nacional de Colonizacion (INC). It was created in 1948 by Law 11,029 in order to induce the settlement of very small farmers who possessed few resources. The idea was that small farmers who were granted land were able to raise their incomes and general welfare by increasing their production. The government agreed to pay for land through the INC, which, in turn, would split that into small parcels, all of very nearly to less than 100 hectares (224.5 acres).

The beneficiaries of these small parcels, for which they must pay rent to the INC, are called colonists (colonos). Beneficiaries do not have the possibility of renting their parcels to others. The term colono refers to an individual who is a beneficiary of a small parcel in accordance with the INC rules. The total number of colonos that receive land, together with their families, constitutes a colony (colonia). It must be noted that these land parcels contained no land improvements such as fences, drainage ditches, granaries, shelters, roads, etc. In this sense, the new occupants faced great problems aggravated by their lack of financial resources. The INC was supposed to help settling colonists by providing extension agencies on the settlements. There are currently 30 extension agents located in these agencies to work with a total of 4,600 colonists distributed around 195 colonies throughout the country. The colonized surface represents approximately three percent of the total surface of the country.

The original selection of new colonists was made according to their work aptitude. Because the colonists did not have properties, credit was not available for them. In addition, they were generally not free of debt to the INC which originated because of unpaid rents. The
convergence of these factors, coupled with the small holdings, accounted for the current bad situation of colonists. The colonists actually represent the poorer rural strata of Uruguay. Investment in their parcels in durable farm capital goods such as livestock, buildings, and equipment, is very low. Dependence on hand tools coupled with low level use of nondurable capital such as seed and fertilizers, explain why colonists continue to have low-incomes.

The INC has failed to incorporate as many colonists as possible into a commercial and modestly productive agriculture. To some extent, this is not a fault of the INC. Except for a few privileged elite, the great majority of parcels had no economical viability. Also, colonists receiving small parcels decided to operate their land individually and there was no tradition of working in common through a collective management system. Colonies could have played a more active role if expanding the participation of small farmers in total national agricultural production were a real concern. They remain well situated as an instrument through which a development program might be structured. For these reasons, there has been little helpful advice extension agents could provide to colonists. In addition, government commitment to allocate funds to INC was never been considered important. There have been scarce financial resources to buy land, support extension agencies, and help colonists build not only on-farm but also off-farm, a minimal infrastructure required to raise productivity.

In a sense, there was never a peasant call for land in Uruguay, as in other Latin American countries. The INC was created more for political reasons. Small farmers who are given land tend to become government supporters. The political party that created the INC (traditionally strong in urban areas) was interested in rebuilding its rural political base of
support in preparation for national elections. Central to explain INC failure was also the active involvement of large farmer organizations against government aids to INC. This prevented society from discussing issues surrounding land reform.

During the 1970s, when deplorable living conditions became even worse, a growing concern emerged among the colonists to found an association for defending their rights and lobbying for the need to formulate a national land policy. There was also a deep lack of confidence on the part of colonists as to where they might fit into the picture of Uruguay’s modern agriculture. The nascent organization was called the ACU. Through the years the ACU has evolved from an organization that focused on raising demands to one that became a vehicle through which development programs were channelized. By 1994, of the 4,600 colonists, 1,200 joined the organization which is located in Montevideo. The principal limiting factor for ACU’s strategy was economical. For most colonists, incomes have been very low. Because of this, savings were limited and the capacity to support ACU was severely curtailed. The degree of interaction between ACU’s headquarter and its members located in colonies was also low. This meant there was little interaction between both parts.

As stated previously, the ACU has been currently functioning as a channel for administering development programs to colonists. The ACU has also been active in mobilizing foreign aid from donor agencies. Credit was always an important component of the developed programs. Since colonists had very little collateral, commercial institutions including governmental agencies, had not been willing to consider giving rural credit to the colonists. Credit was closely supervised by extension field workers. Inputs were delivered
promptly to colonies by truckloads avoiding failures by arriving on time. The ACU rapidly drew checks for the colonists to pay for machinery rental, land preparation, paying day labor and subsistence payments. These checks had to be signed by an extension agent. This strategy appeared to work successfully. The ACU also used these programs to reward its leaders, support its growing infrastructure, and gain new members.

Some of the basic demands required by ACU were to: 1) provide economic support from the government to INC to buy more land; 2) provide additional land for settlers to retain family members and make individual plots profitable; 3) provide an adequate credit system for colonists; and 4) obtain a place in the INC’s board of directors in representation of colonists.

Working through development programs was a way for the ACU to show that programs tailored to small-farm conditions were feasible to implement. These programs had four characteristics in common: 1) promote the organization of the colonists through groups; 2) increase the flow of communication between the colony and the ACU; 3) impart training for colonists in both, social and productive subjects; and 4) develop credit systems adapted to colonists situation. In summation, these programs included a revolving credit system with input supply and extension.

**Project description**

This information in this section originated from written internal documents which included ACU annual reports and the project itself. The researcher also studied the final evaluation that was submitted to the external funding agency (BID/Interamerican Bank of Development). In addition, the researcher conducted individual interviews with the persons
who were in charge of elaborating the final evaluation (Leonardo Mesa and Cecilia Gandolfo). Complementary, similar interviews were held with the field coordinator of this project (Mr. Fernando Battegazore), and the ACU directors (Mr. Alvaro Ferreira and Mr. Alberto Queijo).

The project to be evaluated was 'the credit program for colonists of San José Department.' It began in January, 1987, and finished in December, 1989. This US $713,000 project, funded in part by a US $450,000 grant from BID, was designed to increase agricultural production of colonies located in San José Department through a revolving credit system. The project attempted to improve input delivery and extension services. It followed the pattern described previously (see the four characteristics). The beneficiaries of this project were 250 families who had an average farm size of 50 hectares (123 acres) with an average family annual income of 900 dollars.

The revolving credit was used to finance: a) individual credits for farm machinery and equipment; 2) individual credits for land improvements; and 3) group credits to buy machinery for its use in common, such as equipment for forage conservation. This source of credit was also used for colony's infrastructure development. Finally, another use for these funds was the acquisition of two vehicles for ACU extension staff in charge of this project. This staff was composed of four field extension agents, and one administrative agent with expertise in dealing with credit.

Project development process

The project development process is represented in Table 5. The overall goal was to increase agricultural production (milk) and to help organize colonists in their colonies.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>Context (Objectives)</th>
<th>Input (Project)</th>
<th>Process (Implementation)</th>
<th>Product (Results)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>• Goals to increase milk production and enhance living standards of colonists.</td>
<td>• Project strategy based on revolving credit system.</td>
<td>• Implementation started focusing on spread of loans without paying attention to HRD aspects.</td>
<td>• TI objectives were accomplished: 139/250 colonists reached with credits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Objectives not well documented, making analysis difficult.</td>
<td>• No evaluation design.</td>
<td>• Maintenance of accurate repayment records and selection of borrowers were ignored.</td>
<td>• Production capacity and income increased.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• No needs assessment study conducted.</td>
<td>• Final external evaluation requested by the donor agency.</td>
<td>• Monitoring was biased against TI objectives.</td>
<td>• Many colonists could have access to conventional lines of credit after this project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Misuse of funds and reallocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Ex-post external evaluation was well designed and conducted for donor agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td>• There were CB objectives related to the organization of colonies through groups.</td>
<td>• Coordination with the Instituto Nacional de Colonización (INC) and the colonies.</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Emphasis on TI overshadowed capacity building activities and results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning approach</td>
<td>• Objectives were not expressed in a causal chain, as the logical framework.</td>
<td>• Blueprint approach was to be evolved.</td>
<td>• Capacity build activities by-passed, not only for the target people but also for the credit agency (ACU).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• INC and other agencies were not involved in project implementation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External factors</td>
<td>• Lack of national policy regarding land issues due to powerful vested interests.</td>
<td>• Lack of national policy regarding land issues due to powerful vested interests.</td>
<td>• Strategy to create sustainable revolving credit system failed due to weakness of ACU to administer funds.</td>
<td>• Lack of national policy regarding land issues due to powerful vested interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Poor linkages between ACU and INC.</td>
<td>• Poor linkages and vested interests.</td>
<td>• No process evaluation made to allow learning from experience, hindering attempts to replicate this experience in other colonies.</td>
<td>• Poor linkages and tension between ACU and INC.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Objectives were not clearly developed, nor were they incorporated into a general framework. The project sought to facilitate the development of a viable small farming sector that could serve as a model for other regions. Therefore, if the project worked and failures could be avoided, it was intended to be undertaken in different areas. In this sense it was a pilot project, from which replication was going to be made. This was a call for systematic and formalized procedures of evaluation. Nevertheless, no such procedures were included in the project design. A final external evaluation was requested by the BID.

Colonies selected for the project had a much broader mandate to participate than that of merely handling farm credit for their members. The colonies were supposed to be, in effect, production units that constituted the administrative structure of each parcel belonging to them. An administrative commission had to be elected by the colony membership to be responsible for the management of the colony. This commission, in turn, was in charge of electing from its membership a chief delegate who was the principal administrative officer of the colony. This person would play an active role as a liaison officer between the colony and the ACU extension staff.

The overall goal was to be achieved through an strategy based on the revolving credit system. The project had to face numerous problems in its beginning. It had to develop a new organization for small farmers traditionally accustomed to working individually; to involve members of widely varied backgrounds and capacities as productive members, and to set up new relationships with other farming interests, political pressure groups, governmental agencies, and the ACU. These tasks, under a HRD tradition, provided a serious challenge to
the ACU extension staff. In addition, there were those responsibilities that came from
supervising credit operations to colonists.

Although capacity-building activities appeared to be very necessary in order to
consolidate a cooperative farming structure within the colony, they were almost nonexistent.
Attention was given to allocating credit rapidly to colonists instead of stressing colony
organization. Those small farmers who wanted to be involved in the project were more
tempted to work in the traditional individual way. From the initial impetus to a rapid
completion of credit-coverage there was a misconception about the intent of the original
project. This was aborted before it could prove itself in action.

Whether by choice or by necessity, extension agents discussed farming alternatives
with each farmer, and the whole plan with its associated inputs before approval for credit.
There were some efforts to organize groups around common machinery use. Although
extension agents fully gained the confidence of the colony members, the methodology used
(short visits on the farm) was not appropriate for consolidation of these groups. More time
was spent covering those aspects related strictly to lending operations than those related to
HRD components. The ACU, as the credit agency, was interested in making credit available
to the target people without paying attention to the creditworthiness of individual members,
accountable management, and how to use credit in conjunction with other services. The main
focus of the ACU was to use the project as a way to introduce itself within the colony rather
than as an instrument for developing small producers on a sustainable basis.
Behind the scenes, building a political base of support became a relevant consideration in the ACU leaders' mind (hidden agenda). The ACU devoted part of the original budget to building up a bureaucracy that quickly became a costly burden. To overcome this problem, resources were reallocated from the original purposes. The managerial incompetence of the ACU to administer the project aggravated this situation. Although this was a bottleneck from the very beginning, it was never improved during project implementation. The ACU's administrative staff was poorly trained and overburdened by too many functions so that loan supervision aspects were given little attention. For example, efforts in the selection of borrowers and maintenance of accurate repayment records were weak. Political incentives guided the ACU leaders to spread the project's credit program resources widely and flexibly. This could be seen in the fact that lending costs did not include extension services.

The impact of 'soft' tactic applications was that the credit system could not be sustained after project termination. The extension team was fired because revenues did not cover their costs. The lack of records and the way project was handled in the accounts of ACU were so weak that measuring defaults or misallocations turned out to be difficult. The pressure for maintaining infrastructure made the ACU develop new proposals in hopes of getting more funds from which reallocate resources.

For the ACU's future, it appears to be important to differentiate political functions from developmental ones. An organization with a solid base in political bargaining (approximating a union) may be dysfunctional as the requirements change. A different type of leadership is needed for the administrative tasks that managing development projects requires.
When leaders who utilize bases of power through political connections and charisma are chosen to administer development projects, the results may reflect inefficiency, favoritism, and paternalism as seen in this case. The political roles performed by the leaders discourage emergencies of managerial capacities. Doubtless, the unit in charge of implementing development projects should be kept outside of this type of organization. A cooperative structure fits much more closely with development actions. This process usually takes a number of years, so that partial steps could be taken in that direction, with the creation of a semi-autonomous unit.

**Local Development Program for Colonia Lavalleja**

*Agency in Charge: Centro Cooperativista Uruguayo (CCU)*

### Introduction

Most of the information provided in this introduction was obtained from: *El sistema de transferencia de tecnología agraria en el Uruguay*, by M. Vassallo (1987), Chapter 22:

The agricultural technology transfer system of Uruguay. The Centro Cooperativista Uruguayo (CCU) was created in 1961, with the overall mission of developing cooperativism within Uruguayan society. The cooperative organization was found to be an adequate self-sustaining instrument aimed at helping 'the poor' by reducing existing inequalities. Since the late 1950s, Uruguay’s economy began to unravel; per capita income rates declined so that people became poorer than they were previously. The country was beginning to show the first symptoms of the threat that economical stagnation posed to political stability. That process ended abruptly in the 1970s with the collapse of the democratic system.
Initially, the CCU's development interventions were related to the agricultural sector to support an important network of cooperatives that already existed. These efforts were crucial for establishing the CCU's credibility. Later, as the demands from other sectors expanded, the CCU redirected its focus to consider them. It was a fact that the urban poor were badly housed, clothed and underfed with access to housing as the most pressing need expressed. The CCU designed a system which provided housing through cooperatives that used their members' labor capacity for building.

Originally, CCU programs were based upon concerns expressed by the target people. The CCU refrained from suggesting a project unless the people first requested help. Broadly, the CCU's way of operating in relation to the agricultural sector was as follows: 1) identify relevant projects based on a careful understanding of what people feel they need through genuine dialogue; 2) organize local consultation meetings between intended beneficiaries, related supporting organization members and external donor agencies; and 3) develop a proposal, solicit funds, and implement the project. An important feature of the CCU's rural development strategy was to organize macro cooperative entities (second grade cooperatives) that pooled meager resources to create effective purchasing power. These entities have played a critical role in policing the markets and combating market distortions. Another feature was the strong dependence of these programs upon the funding of foreign donor agencies.

The CCU is a self-managed organization that follows the cooperative organizational structure. The key decisions regarding strategic planning are the prerogative of the general
assembly which is composed of all the CCU employees with more than two years in the organization. The CCU is divided into functional departments such as production (agriculture), marketing, financial, human resources, and others. Each department develops its own managerial planning combining resources to fulfill the overall mission of the organization. The agriculture department specific objectives are to: 1) take an active part in fostering creation of agrarian cooperatives that can supply critical agricultural inputs and extension services; 2) give special consideration to the poorer strata so that they can enjoy an equitable sharing of project benefits; and 3) increase members' participation in their cooperatives. The agricultural department consists of four interrelated units responsible for: a) maintaining relationships with the whole cooperative movement; b) implementing HRD field programs; c) implementing TI field programs; and d) designing projects and needs-assessment studies. The department is composed of 13 members, 12 of whom are technicians with expertise in agriculture. The CCU has also played a great role in developing appropriated forms of profitable dairy small-farm technology.

The global experience of the CCU in the promotion of rural cooperatives has been successful. It is a fact that some projects have failed and ceased to operate. In other cases, cooperatives continued to exist but produced less than was expected of them. However, in an important number of cases on a national scale, second grade cooperatives have performed an overlooked function by governments, that of creating and policing markets. On the whole, there was consensus that the impact of the CCU was found to be significant.
**Project description**

Most of the information provided to the researcher was obtained from written internal documents which included CCU annual reports and the project itself. In addition, the researcher conducted individual interviews with Jorge Artageveytia (CCU manager) and Eduardo Maldini (CCU field coordinator in charge of this project). Complementary, a similar interview was held with the representative of the donor agency (NCOS/Belgium) in Uruguay and responsible for project's final evaluation (Mrs. Kristin Minne). The analysis draws heavily on documents obtained from the institution.

The project evaluated was the 'Local development program for Lavalleja Colony.' The Lavalleja Colony is located in the northwest of the country, Department of Salto. As stated earlier, a colony is a type of agrarian community whose members (colonists) received and held land under conditions established by the INC. Lavalleja colony belonged to a region that illustrated many aspects of Uruguay's traditional agricultural structure. In this respect, the zone had a low rural population density as a consequence of an outdated structure, with a few of the farms well above 1,000 hectares (2,245 acres) and the majority of small farms with less than 100 hectares (224.5 acres) surrounding these big ranches. Livestock production was the main activity. Large-scale livestock ranchers have tended not to raise crops on any of their land, allowing livestock to graze openly on natural pasture. This provided enough earnings, but with less than 100 hectares, the system was not efficient in providing colonists a minimal welfare. Land was the major impeding factor. As a result, colonists' families could not hold their children to continue on the farm.
In addition, colonists were forced to turn to off-farm sources to supplement their scarce incomes. Off-farm occupations were largely confined to traditional activities, as seasonal employment in big livestock ranches. Modern activities come as a result of improved communication and the development of large cities, commercial firms, and governmental offices. General conditions in that region have remained unchanged for at least several decades, impeding the emerging of modern activities. Because of Lavalleja Colony's isolation and distance from the department capital, the zone lacked public sector services operating within it. Normally, public administration rationality is guided by heavy political influence on the determination of delivering services to remote areas.

Project development process

The project development process is represented in Table 6. The overall goal of this project was to achieve an improvement of living standards of the men, women, and children of the Lavalleja Colony. To reach this overall goal, a community development strategy was designed based upon the formation of two local organizations in the colony. These organizations were in charge of coordinating development actions to different audiences within the zone: the urban population (an ad hoc local council) and the small-farm population (a cooperative). The local council was conceived to act as catalyst of local development. The cooperative was to provide delivery inputs and extension services with the intention of consolidating these local structures by developing their institutional capacity. In addition, there was another program whose goal was a widespread replication of the project to other surrounding regions. This project was started in 1989 with three sectoral programs
Table 6. Evaluation of the project CCU-Lavalleja colony

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>Context (Objectives)</th>
<th>Input (Project)</th>
<th>Process (Implementation)</th>
<th>Product (Results)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Management      | • Overall goal was to develop self-sustaining community councils capable of implementing programs in sheep production, infrastructure & basic services, and to replicate the project.  
• A recently conducted needs assessment study was used.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | • Project strategy was based on a community development approach.  
• Guidelines for conducting evaluation were annual reports to the donor agency.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | • Project started by providing development actions for the local council and cooperative. Later, the emphasis changed to the program which focused on the local council.  
• Formative evaluations were not carried out.  
• Project follow-up became constrained when extension agent moved away from the colony.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | • No effect were seen in relation to strengthening cooperative for small sheep farmers. His program failed to achieve results. No available technology was found to be conveyed to the farmers. |
| Capacity building| • Capacity-building objectives included development of two organizational structures needed to undertake the project: a local council and a cooperative.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | • Training activities were specified in 2 levels: a) formal- for increasing productivity in sheep raising; & b) informal- for better management of the local council and cooperative.                                                                                                                                                                | • Local council was legitimized for the local people but lacked a sense of ownership and was not given many training activities.  
• Groups were formed with an emphasis on youth and women.  
• Poor linkage with local government affected capacity-building activities.                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | • Some infrastructure and services provided to the community: electricity, new water system built, housing, health services (ambulance).  
• Results could have been increased with more support from the local government.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| Planning approach| • Objectives were expressed within a general causal chain.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | • Flexibility was granted because objectives were stated only for the first year. Future planning was to be evolved by the local people.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | • Process approach wherein local council and cooperative board gave information on perceived needs to help planning final 2 years of project implementation.  
• Field staff enjoyed relative independence in project decisions at local level.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | • No process evaluation was made to allow learning from experience, hindering replication in other areas (a stated goal of the project)  
• No long-term planning evolved. (The local council's role would be crucial in this.)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| External factors | • Constraining factors included traditional leadership in the zone and remoteness of the area.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | • Constraining factors included traditional leadership in the zone and remoteness of the area.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | • Constraining factors included low prices for wool, traditional leadership, and tension between project staff and local government.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | • Constraining factors included low prices for wool, traditional leadership, and tension between project staff and local government.                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
aimed at: a) supporting the local council; b) supporting the cooperative; and c) replicating the project. There was no evaluation design added to the project.

The project was designed with flexibility from the very beginning. Specific objectives and effects were only established for the first year, and expressed in a logical framework approach. No blueprint planning approach was employed. This left managers some discretion to make modifications later when factors affecting project implementation may change. Most of these changes, especially contextual factors, cannot be predicted accurately during the early stages of the design phase. The flexible design led to increasing participation of the people involved in the local organizations, especially women and youth.

There was a loose coordination with the CCU headquarters in Montevideo which also permitted flexibility among extension field staff, allowing them to respond to local conditions. The agricultural department manager of CCU delegated daily operations and managerial decisions to the staff located in the region. This staff was not subject to constraining external regulations which left the unit in charge of implementing the project for all practical purposes, allowing it to operate as an independent organization. A lack of distractions in the region provided the extension staff with the motivation to work far longer than usual (similar to the first project evaluated in this chapter). Due to the fact that the department capital was too far from the implementation site to commute daily, a resident village level extension agent was allocated in Colonia Lavalleja. This facilitated acceptance of the extension staff by the target people.
Experience shows that project interventions accurately address the real constraints on intended beneficiaries if project personnel live in the same communities as the target people. This project provided clear evidence of that. During the first year of project implementation, the extension agent worked hard, talking over problems, listening to grievances, and urging villagers to do more about satisfying their perceived needs. He developed knowledge about local conditions and was sensitive to local needs. Consequently, he got the community support to the project. The agent later married and moved to the department capital which was located at a distance of 100 km (62 miles). After that, for many people, the project was better described in terms of 'pre this' and 'post that.' The change produced tangible results in terms of hindering an effective rapport with the target people. Therefore, it affected project implementation.

This project also showed that contextual factors influence project implementation. Program activities to support the cooperative were affected by the declining world prices for wool. During project design the prices were highly favorable; nevertheless, during the implementation phase, the sheep breeding enterprise was much less profitable than before. The crisis weakened efforts to increase productivity in sheep raising among small farmers of Lavalleja Colony. These problems were exacerbated by the absence of other technologies appropriated for small farmers in the colony. These factors, coupled with the absence of local extension staff living on-colony, severely limited the implementation of the program that supported the local cooperative. As the project progressed, there was a shift to emphasize program activities aimed at supporting the local committee. These activities were small in
scale and more related to perceived needs in the areas of health, education, nutrition, and infrastructure. As stated earlier, the lack of government services present made this area poor in terms of infrastructure and basic services.

Program activities did not involve local Government services. It was a real problem to elicit cooperation and coordination of activities between local Government and the CCU. Too often, local governments do not perceive the NGO's actions as theirs, or they perceive them as a part of a continuing effort to erode their power. On the other hand, the NGOs still look to governments more as an obstacle to by-pass, rather than as a collaborating partner. Local governments can provide services that far exceed the NGO's possibilities, for example in road construction. Had the local government and the CCU been working closer, the project could have been implemented with greater success. It is also important to institutionalize the degree of linkage between both parts so that the beneficiaries can continue to be served after external aid ceases. This is an issue related to sustainability of benefits.

Political context was also critical. A project aimed at promoting community development in a remote zone is likely to be constrained by local traditional political leadership. The leadership functions in accordance with the regional and national political systems. Leaders can block a project or delay decisions on urgent issues affecting its implementation. Project management strategy to this situation was to play a very low profile in the region during the period of elections. Normally, during campaign-time political conflicts arise rapidly, interfering or slowing the decision-making process regarding project implementation.
Integral Development Program for the Zone of Cuchilla del Ombú  
Agency in Charge - Dirección de Agronomías Regionales/Instituto Interamericano para la Cooperacion en Agricultura (RAA/IICA)

Introduction

Most of the information provided in this introduction was obtained from chapter 5 of *El sistema de transferencia de tecnología agraria en el Uruguay*, (Vassallo, 1987). Extension as a function became institutionalized within the Ministerio de Agricultura (MOA) in 1925. At that time, the DETA was the original agency in charge of executing extension programs (see page 39). Since then, there have been several name changes reconstituting the existing institution. The list of names included Dirección de Agronomías Regionales (RAA), and Dirección de Extensión (EA). The Dirección de Promoción y Desarrollo Local (DIPRODEL) was the last name-change throughout this process, created in 1990. The emphasis of the DIPRODEL has been placed on promoting and supporting local development actions. Extension agents are now supposed to investigate possible community projects and prepare communities for acceptance of their financial obligations. There has been a conflict between this new mission and the traditional task of conveying technology. The identification on the part extension agents must perform if DIPRODEL is to fulfill its new mission has remained as a challenge.

Throughout this century, from DETA to DIPRODEL, extension agencies have carried out their functions without paying close attention to timely and flexible coordination with other public or private extension organizations. Extension activities were performed as
separate activities not embodied in a unified lasting effort of extension and/or research.

Recently, there has also been a proliferation of ad hoc units in the MOA whose tasks overlap and bypass those of DIPRODEL and other extension agencies. These units can sometimes show surprisingly fast results under heavy financial support, but results often become diluted and the initially good performances fall off after the financial support leaves. This approach raises serious questions in terms of sustainability of results. These events have implied that duplication of efforts was encouraged, thus, wasting scarce public available resources. At the same time, public extension organizations had found their operational resources shrunk to pay costs of personnel, travel, materials, and equipment.

The internal structure of DIPRODEL was similar to its predecessors. It has been a centralized organization in which the key authority and decision-making role about the future directions of the organization was focused on the MOA headquarters located in the capital of the country. The external linkages of DIPRODEL included a network that extends nationally and is composed of thirty-two local extension agencies. Although manifest power was concentrated in the hierarchies, local offices had a potential power to undertake their program planning process. This was due, in part, to the fact that they were isolated from the national headquarters. Nevertheless, a firm commitment on the part of local offices was needed. Capability to fire incompetent staff from the state did not exist in Uruguay. However, a lack of resources was evident at the local level through the infrequency with which extension staff visited farmers on-farm. This undermined motivation among extension agents, thus, skepticism emerged.
The methodology used by the organization to establish relationships with the target people was based upon two features: 1) emphasis on the need for planning extension activities annually on a project basis; and 2) emphasis on the need for implementing projects through group methods. Projects can be annual or pluriannual, and may be a vehicle for TI or HRD purposes. Generally, projects were designed without conducting needs-assessment studies. Along with this, evaluation of the results and/or process was almost never carried out. Establishing clear objectives and listing impact indicators were two bottlenecks for introducing the evaluation part in the program planning process.

Project description

Most of the information provided in this section came from written internal documents which included the extension organization annual reports and the project itself. In addition, the researcher conducted individual interviews with Mrs. Beatriz Sales (RAA field coordinator in charge of this project), Mrs. Alicia Cabral (RAA social worker), Mr. Pedro Bergeret (DIPRODEL manager), and Mr. Domingo Quintans (RAA manager).

The project to be evaluated was the Integral Development Program for the zone of Cuchilla del Ombú. This zone is located in the northern part of the country, Department of Tacuarembó, close to its capital. The area is characterized by predominantly small size farms, significant quantities of subsistence production, little enterprise diversification, use of low levels of technology, and a lack of infrastructure and basic services. Adjacent areas surrounding the zone are composed of larger livestock farms. Physical determinants of the
zone brought about a cropping pattern in which the majority of the total cultivated acreage was devoted to growing potatoes.

This project began in 1983 and finished abruptly in 1986. The overall goal was to promote the integral development of the area through a community development approach. The project was formulated during a period in which the country was in the midst of a transition from dictatorship to democracy. As a result, uncertainties created by the changing environment were frequent and policies lacked coherence and direction. People were accustomed to following orders rather than taking their own initiative. The agency in charge of the project was the MOA, through the RAA and its local office located in Tacuarembo. Subsequently, the RAA evolved to become the DIPRODEL.

It is important to mention that Tacuarembo had, during that time, a very active extension department within the local Government. This department worked in conjunction with the Instituto Interamericano para la Cooperacion en Agricultura (IICA). An idealistic spirit and motivation coupled with good personal capabilities were combined to an attentive supervision from the IICA to produce high standards of performance. There was a general atmosphere in Tacuarembó that reinforced a consideration for rural development projects. This factor, the strong commitment of the MOA’s local office toward extension, understood as HRD, along with an important informal network of cooperation and interaction among different extension agents in that area, set a favorable framework within which the project was started.
The IICA is a specialized organization of the Organization of American States (OEA), working for agricultural development on the continent to improve the living conditions of the farmers and the rural population as a whole. It was founded in 1942 by the countries of the Americas, and it is headquartered in San José, Costa Rica. The IICA’s work around the hemisphere is funded with resources from a number of different sources. First, quota funds are paid annually by the member countries. In addition, the Institute sustains agreements, contracts, contributions and donations with other international organizations. With these resources member countries implement specific projects through the IICA offices located in all the countries of the Americas.

**Project development process**

The project development process is represented in Table 7. The overall goal of this project was to speed up an effective rural development process for the small farmers of Cuchilla del Ombu. To reach this goal, a community development approach was employed. The project aimed to increase the income of small farmers by improving their ability to produce potatoes and develop a cooperative that could help small landholders to purchase inputs and sell products in the market. Additionally, this cooperative intended to provide storage facilities. The project also sought to provide an infrastructure for village living and meet basic needs of the people involved. The idea behind the local community development approach was to combine the resources of the department government and the local community so that a more rapid development could be achieved than could be accomplished by either set of resources alone. Because Cuchilla del Ombu was closest to the
Table 7. Evaluation of the project RAA-IICA/Cuchilla del Ombu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>Context (Objectives)</th>
<th>Input (Project)</th>
<th>Process (Implementation)</th>
<th>Product (Results)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>◦ Overall goal was to achieve integrated rural development in the zone (HRD).</td>
<td>◦ Strategy was based on a community development approach.</td>
<td>◦ Project staff were two temporarily hired professional headed by a supervisor.</td>
<td>◦ Much of major infrastructural work was completed: road network &amp; water supply systems were built, and machinery groups were formed for their common use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◦ Needs and objectives were to be evolved from a participatory needs assessment.</td>
<td>◦ No evaluation design was included.</td>
<td>◦ Funds to pay salaries for hires came from the IICA.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>◦ Permanent monitoring of the project with staff acting as facilitators.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>◦ Poor linkages with the MOA's national headquarters in the capital.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td>◦ Capacity-building objectives were to be evolved from a participatory needs assessment.</td>
<td>◦ Provision was made to work with other local institutions through informal network of technicians.</td>
<td>◦ During the 2nd stage, short-term reachable capacity-building activities were implemented to obtain credibility among the target people.</td>
<td>◦ New leadership emerged which became sustained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning approach</td>
<td>◦ Objectives were to be evolved without reference to a general frame.</td>
<td>◦ Planning process approach consisted of an evolving design with a high involvement of beneficiaries.</td>
<td>◦ Participatory methodology composed of three stages: data assembly, analysis, and discussion with target people.</td>
<td>◦ Stronger involvement of the community during and after project's termination.</td>
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<td>◦ From the last stage, plans were developed annually by the involved people.</td>
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<td>Methodology used was rich in implications but no evaluation was made to allow learning from experience, hindering attempts to replicate this experience in other local offices of the MOA.</td>
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<tr>
<td>External factors</td>
<td>◦ National policies were not conducive to the project.</td>
<td>◦ National policies were not conducive to the project.</td>
<td>◦ National policies were not conducive to the project.</td>
<td>◦ No deadline established for project completion. Project expected to continue, but MOA's headquarters decision rejecting to absorb temporarily hired personnel caused the project to end in 1986.</td>
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department capital, the government placed the bulk of its resources into that region first.

The MOA was particularly affected at that time by the loss of competent professional staff necessary for the project. In addition, there was a personnel shortage within the Tacuarembo office. Due to this, the project received the IICA's support for hiring two temporary professionals, an agronomist and a social worker. They were allocated in the RAA local office under supervision of the local chief.

From the beginning, the project used a participatory methodology for the whole program planning process. The needs assessment stage was composed of three phases: 1) data assembly to provide general background information necessary to help design the project; 2) analysis of assembled information to detect main problems and their solutions; and 3) sharing the results with the target people to improve tentative solutions. The extension team played a great role in facilitating the community process of establishing their needs by a problem-solving approach. They encouraged people to look into the future via short term reachable actions to win confidence and obtain credibility while withholding the true objectives of the project. It was crucial for the success of the project to quickly gain support from the target population. Short-term actions, beginning in phase two, that show visible results may be a necessary first step in community development projects. Project extension staff performed remarkably well in implementing the project by close monitoring. Actions were carried out through the formation of groups and their monitoring by regular site visits. These actions were geared toward building roads and meeting the basic needs of the community.
As stated previously, the country environment during that time was not favorable for a project aimed at promoting self-help and participation of the target people. To overcome this constraint project managers who were located at the local level and belonged to the MOA, had to consider a tradeoff between relying on more safety (at the local level) or on more resources (at the national level). The latter meant to establish supportive linkages with the MOA’s headquarters located in the capital of the country. However, this would also facilitate the involvement of MOA officials in the project.

It would have been extremely difficult for the officials to support a project whose conceptual framework did not fit within government policies. Given this situation, project managers realized that project could only proceed by remaining isolated from the national headquarters. Some formal procedures and channels were used for the project staff to interact subtly at the national level, attempting to get the IICA’s cooperation and satisfying its reporting requirements. The IICA contributed largely to the legitimacy of and support for the project. Project performance was vulnerable to backsliding if this support slackened. Attempts to work jointly with other institutions, although successful, remained highly dependent upon informal connections. Certainly, if the project were to continue with this arrangement, it would be ill-prepared for the problems to come in the medium run.

During 1985, when democracy in Uruguay was re-established, a new administration began to rule the country following elections which were held the year before. The IICA’s commitment to the project slowed as its resources became more limited. The local office chief of the MOA wanted to retain both trained professionals. These people began to divert
their attention to finding other work positions long before the project was finished as they knew they could be out of work. The remoteness of the area and project's weak linkages with national headquarters gave it an unfavorable image among the MOA's new policy makers. They did not see the project as their own; consequently, they rejected to absorb the staff.

The orientation of the national government was a constraint to the continuation of the project. However, some efforts were made through the local extension agency of the MOA to continue supporting that village after 1985, but project performance could not be maintained at the levels demonstrated in the past. Certainly, the intent to by-pass national headquarters raised a resistance to the project that should have been anticipated by the project managers.

Looking at the results of the project from the standpoint of its objectives, there can be no doubt that it has contributed substantially to organizing the community around new leadership and organizations. The project did not transform that society, but it led to incremental and sustained participation of its members as was not seen before. This allowed for a change in attitude within the community toward joint action which resulted tangible successes witnessed in a road network and water systems which were built. The fact that the project was implemented by a public office, instead of a NGO, made this experience unique. Traditionally, the MOA has focused mainly on rich resource farmers. Formative or summative evaluations were not conducted nor was there any long-term planning; thus, it was not possible to learn from the experience and transfer lessons to other agencies of the RAA and MOA.
Agrarian Cooperatives Youth Program
Agency in Charge - Foro Juvenil/Cooperativas Agrarias Federadas (FJ/CAF)

Introduction

Most of the information provided in this introduction was obtained from internal materials from Foro Juvenil (FJ). In the case of Cooperativas Agrarias Federadas (CAF), information came from El sistema de transferencia de tecnologia agraria en el Uruguay, (Vassallo, 1987), chapter 21. Also used were Entre muchos (Among many), (CAF/FJ, 1991) and CAF's bulletins (1986-1993), entitled Cooperative Youth.

The FJ was an NGO which originated in 1981 for the purpose of improving living conditions of youth in the country. Its unique feature was that personnel were trained young people. Working through peers turned out to be key to the task of developing youths' skills and abilities needed to become responsible members of society. Only young people had the enthusiasm required for that job. Although urban youth were the major component of the FJ programs, an emphasis on rural youth has been placed since 1985. In that year, the FJ began to design a strategy to meet needs of the rural youth.

It was understood that the FJ should take the lead in development of programs, working jointly with other institutions, to meet those needs with high degree of priority among the rural youth. The task to choose the organization to work with was too important to be left to chance. It became clear for the FJ, that the agrarian cooperative movement and its organizations could assist in meeting that challenge. Cooperatives were well distributed in the country, and they could also provide some inputs for the project.
The agrarian cooperative movement started on a modest scale in Uruguay during the first decades of this century. Later, it grew larger, not only in number of cooperatives but also in the range of the activities they could undertake as their experience increased. Thus, the need for some kind of national federation to deal with government and exercise overall supervision arose. The CAF, a second-grade organization, was created in 1984 to fulfill that goal. From the beginning, the CAF understood that its mission was much broader than that of merely lobbying in favor of cooperativism interests. The CAF was, in effect, an organization with concerns for issues such as technology generation and transference, sustainable agriculture, rural women and youth situations, management innovations, etc. Its membership was composed of 60 primary agrarian cooperatives and it operated following the democratic principles that characterized the cooperativism ideology. Nevertheless, as the scale and complexity of the operations performed by the cooperatives increased, a pragmatic approach was indicated.

The basic choice to make implied a tradeoff between the issue of efficiency and of equity. Ultimate authority for decisions rested in the board of directors that ruled CAF, where actions were taken by majority vote with each member having one vote. The CAF represented those interests coming from the middle rural strata. These sectors had enough background to understand the advantages of cooperative action, especially in commercial areas. The CAF has placed great importance on achieving results in two areas: a) competent management of primary cooperatives locating qualified managers for the job to give better service to members; and b) an increase in membership participation in the management of the
cooperative. Both results are related; it cannot be taken for granted that, just because members are involved in the administration of the cooperative, it would be easy for them to improve services.

The members often have little or no knowledge of how to lead the cooperatives as enterprises. While trained managers have a role in leading, members alone will not accomplish it. However, members should control managers through the board and assembly. This is seldom done. Consequently, assets of cooperatives were exposed to be taken over by their administrators. Sometimes, cooperatives served their administrators as a stepping-stone to better opportunities in other private firms.

Since 1990, with the creation of a major free market with Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay, agrarian cooperatives were exposed to an overwhelming competition outside that severely injured their performance. Due to this, sooner or later cooperatives would stand or fall as a business organization. If cooperatives were to survive and flourish, the quality of services given to members would become a key point. This also was thought to increase participation, a traditional bottleneck in Uruguay.

During 1985, designated Youth International Year by the United Nations, the CAF and FJ started to design a program to organize groups of rural youth within the agrarian cooperatives. The originality of the program lay among its target people as there were few former experiences aimed at reaching the rural youth. Although extension agents recognized that youth may be used as avenues to introduce technology to farmers, it was seldom
practiced. A major impediment of previous programs was that the promoters were older than the intended beneficiaries and they worked for the rural youth rather than with the youth.

**Project description**

The majority of the information provided in this section came from written internal documents which included annual reports and the project itself. In addition, the researcher conducted individual interviews with Mr. Pablo Scremini (CAF president), Mr. Gaston Rico (CAF manager), Mrs. Silvia Rivero (CAF technician), Mr. Hugo Espindola (FJ technician), Mr. Anibal Nuñez (FJ former technician), Mrs. Pierina Germán (cooperative extension agent) and Ms. Laura Rossi (cooperative extension agent). In addition interviews were held with several young people who participated in this project at the cooperative level: Freddy Fripp, Gianella Fonte, Adrian Ruiz, Juan Pablo Parrachon, Wilde Raimondo, and Eduardo Pastre.

The project evaluated was the 'Youth Cooperative Members Program'. It was started in 1986 and was to run for several years. The overall goal of the program was to promote the development of rural youth who belonged to the agrarian cooperatives by fostering leadership skills. Groups were to be developed and emerging leaders identified to replace old cooperative board members. The lack of trained members to run the cooperatives was continually a severe obstacle that undermined efforts to develop agrarian cooperativism in Uruguay. Taking into account the increasing external competition, future projections suggested this lack would become even more important. When current board members did receive training it was usually due to a trial and error approach. This was considered by the CAF to be an expensive and dangerous system that did not fulfill its expectations. For the FJ,
an urban NGO, the program presented a great opportunity to expand its coverage by integrating rural youth into its programs.

The specific objectives of the program were to: 1) develop a new effective relationship between the rural youth and the cooperative boards of directors; 2) broaden the vision of the cooperative's boards of directors in relation to the roles that rural youth can play within cooperatives; 3) provide rural youth social skills; 4) help rural youth with self development; and 5) provide specific training in agriculture, management, and other topics such as drugs and AIDS awareness, early pregnancy, etc.

The program intended to provide the means through which these objectives could be enhanced. Formal training courses, recreational activities, competitions, site visits, workshops, and internships were the most frequently used techniques. In all cases, groups were encouraged to be formed within cooperatives. Some assistance to these groups was planned through mass media (under CAF/FJ responsibility) and the use of cooperative extension agents (under the responsibility of cooperative's board of directors). The range of ages within groups were from 14 to 25 years. A concern of this program was to avoid reverting to the traditional programs of formal education that tended to induce rural youth to leave the countryside.

**Project development process**

The project development process is represented in Table 8. The goal of the program was to change the capacity of the rural youth to enable them to take a leadership role within cooperatives and local communities. This goal was to be achieved through an intensive
<table>
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<th>Perspective</th>
<th>Context (Objectives)</th>
<th>Input (Project)</th>
<th>Process (Implementation)</th>
<th>Product (Results)</th>
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| Management             | • Overall goal was to provide educative experiences for rural youth enabling them to fill places in the cooperative boards of directors (HRD).  
• Also encouraged was incorporating the rural youth issue into public consideration (HRD).                                             | • Program strategy was based on the generation of centrally-planned experiences (meetings, courses, etc.) able to stimulate the formation of groups within the cooperatives.  
• Guidelines for establishing annual evaluation were incorporated in the project.                                                                                                                                         | • Centrally-planned activities were implemented by CAF-FJ.  
• Youth groups were formed and monitored by extension agents from the cooperatives.  
• Extension agent involvement was the key for the project performance in the west where there was a network of groups created within a centralized system controlled by the CAF-FJ.  
• Little GPDR high level management in the implementation generated absence of leadership and confusion.                                                                                                           | • There were 14 youth groups in function and 10 inactive groups in the west of the country.  
• New young people served in the cooperatives' boards of directors (new leadership).  
• Issue of rural youth was incorporated into public consideration.  
• Efficient use of scarce available resources.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| Capacity building      | • Although capacity building was the main component of the project, objectives were not stated in this area.                                                                                                             | • Training activities were to focus on general topics and specific subjects raised at the group level.  
• Activities were to be coordinated with the primary agrarian cooperatives.                                                                                                                                                      | • A wide variety of techniques were used: national meetings, formal courses, internships, encampments, plays, competitions, etc.  
• Supportive bulletins were published at the central level.                                                                                                                                                                          | • Positive effects in west cooperatives of country with new, emerging leadership.  
• There is an urgent need to begin economic activities within the groups. Future training should focus on supporting that role.                                                                                                         |
| Planning approach      | • No general frame was devised to link objectives in operative terms.                                                                                                                                                   | • Close to a blueprint approach.  
• Centralized planning from the headquarters of CAF-FJ in the capital of the country.  
• An annual plenary with the presence of rural youth group delegates to advise on planning.                                                                                                                                  | • 1986-1990/First Period: centralized planning with CAF-FJ controlling the program.  
• Later, it evolved to a decentralized structure, with CAF-FJ acting as advisors as a result of demands made by the target population. Planning process approach underway.                                                                 | • New structure showed evidence of evaluation by beneficiaries, thus, as more sustainable structure.  
• New challenges to face were to nationally expand the program and generate income within groups in order to have an impact.  
• A lack of evaluation hindered learning from experience and national replication.                                                                                                                                                                          |
| External factors        | • Lack of awareness of rural youth problems by different social participants.                                                                                                                                              | • Lack of awareness of rural youth problems by different social participants.                                                                                                                                                          | • Lack of awareness of rural youth problems by organizational leaders.  
• Increasing difficulties of the agrarian cooperative system due to external competition.                                                                                                                                                                             | • Lack of awareness of rural youth problems among organizational leaders.  
• Increasing difficulties of the agrarian cooperative system due to external competition.                                                                                                                                                                                  |
educational program under a HRD tradition. The CAF/FJ strategy was to promote the formation of cooperative youth groups; cooperative extension agents were to act as facilitators in the follow-up activities. The effectiveness of this strategy depended in the end, on how well these extension agents could monitor the activities.

The extension agents were subjected to pressures from cooperative boards to pay attention to cooperative affairs and keep administrative costs down. Resources for monitoring young groups would come from the primary cooperatives. One obvious way to reduce costs was to limit the range of cooperative services supplied. This meant that little could be accomplished by promoting groups in situations where the cooperatives' boards of directors were not oriented toward youth.

A lack of orientation toward youth was the case in the traditional rural areas where agriculture was dominated by livestock extensive production. Such areas were located in the central and eastern regions of the country, where local communities were the poorest. Here, the possibility of community action on a minimum scale to succeed was hindered by difficult barriers. Cooperatives even did not exist and the community system often had a highly authoritarian structure that militated against development actions.

An analysis of project implementation showed there were basically three periods: 1) 1986-1990; 2) 1990-1992; and 3) 1993 to present day. During the first period, the program was capable of reaching cooperatives located in the west of the country. Twenty-four locally initiated groups were formed. Numerous meetings and training activities were conducted covering a wide range of subjects, and a replacement of old cooperative board members by
younger people took place. It should also be noted that the issue of rural youth was incorporated into the consideration of several cooperatives, government offices, and NGOs. In general, the program operated better when the cooperatives were already 'tuned in', and/or if their extension offices could influence them favorably.

The role played by the cooperative extension agents was crucial, not only in lobbying within cooperatives but also in supporting and monitoring the groups. Apart from two isolated success stories (Minas de Corrales in the North-East and Aigua in the East), the program failed to achieve results in the other regions of the country. The structure of the program relied heavily on the central direction of CAF/FJ. There was scarce autonomy for the young who were too often told what to do. The FJ's role was to provide a sense of direction to the program while the CAF legitimized that role to the different actors involved and exerted pressures over the cooperatives' boards of directors to change their attitudes toward the program, if opposed to it.

In the second period, the program shifted toward favoring a decentralized structure with youth acquiring more responsibility over the program. The creation of an ad hoc youth council with project managerial functions began to be considered. The CAF/FJ would assume more of a support function of this council rather than the former control. What made this course of action relevant was the fact that it came as a demand from 'below'. The youth were not forced to follow this course of action. It came about as a part of an informal evaluation of the program where the youth gave their input.
This process represented one of the best arguments to make in favor of the program. A program is performing well when its target people are actively involved. There is no universal formula that prescribes the success or failure in development projects. It is a complex matter which requires knowledge of both relevant facts of the program's performance and the use of a set of criteria against which the facts can be judged. An important criteria is suggested here: organizational changes demanded by the target people in order to assume more responsibilities for directing the program. The last period is currently taking place. The new organizational structure has been functioning since March, 1993.

An evaluation of the program to date showed that the program faced two problems: 1) efforts to replicate it widely continued to fail; and 2) conflicting intra-group interests surfaced and some initial groups ceased to operate. These problems magnified the need for an evaluation design which allowed one to learn from experience, evolve guidelines, and replicate the project. The annual evaluation focused mainly on the number of activities performed both at central and local level. The intra-group conflict was related to the fact that some group members tended to lose motivation in recreational activities as they became older. These members who were usually the group leaders, needed economic activities to earn incomes and become independent from parents. Therefore, they abandoned their groups (turnover). How could income-raising activities be attained through youth groups? This is a current challenge which remains unsolved.

Some tension between the two agencies arose during implementation. The CAF's mission was related to cooperativism development whereas the FJ's mission to youth
development. It appeared natural that different hidden agendas evolved from these missions. But they never reached a point of becoming divergent for one another. The FJ argued that the CAF’s board of directors was not very involved in the handling of the project. This fact could not be denied as the CAF’s board was overburdened with so many problems that they could not pay attention to this program, at least with the intensity expected by both parties.

Summary

Six projects were evaluated using a matrix consisting of four key factors considered relevant in facilitating or constraining successful implementation of development projects, and the CIPP model of evaluation. The four key factors were management, capacity-building, planning approach and external factors.

A naturalistic, qualitative documentary analysis of the administrative records of the six projects was performed. To gain additional information, several interviews were also conducted with the staff related to the project, beneficiaries and other qualified informants.
CHAPTER V. DISCUSSION

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the implementation of a sample of six agricultural extension projects recently conducted in Uruguay. The evaluation method employed a conceptual framework that took into account four key factors considered relevant from an HRD perspective: management, capacity-building, planning approach, and external factors. Methodologically, effective project implementation was the dependent variable, and the four key factors became the independent variables. These factors formed a dynamic system, interacting with each other and with the project in ways that were difficult to anticipate. Too often, the factors become intertwined during project implementation. For these reasons, the importance of having a conceptual framework was evident.

The findings from the selected projects could be more than individual insights on unique experiences if there were a conceptual framework that helped to organize, compare, and cumulate the findings. This chapter presents a summary of the results of the six projects selected. These results represent judgements synthesized from the diverse types of evidence employed. The evaluator gathered information from project documents and conducted interviews with project staff, beneficiaries, and other informants to gain a greater depth of information. A list of the persons who were interviewed is found in Appendix H.

When performing evaluations, value judgments were inevitable because judgement is at the heart of the evaluation process. This may encourage controversies because worth was assigned. It would appear that the need to learn from experience is increasingly recognized as
an important concern. If such controversies may help academics and practitioners find solutions to problems, this study will prove useful. Project failures are far more costly than value judgements; the latter are easier to correct. The study is to be read with this in mind.

A comparison of the six projects' development processes is provided in Tables 9 and 10. Emphasis was placed on several key points as follows. The use of a matrix tool enabled a comparison of different implementations and their relationship to one another. In the analysis the stages of context, input, process, and product were used to guide the discussion. Rather than giving 'bad' or 'good' marks to the projects, the evaluation process carried out focused on implications for future projects. In particular, the concern was: How could future programs be improved? All programs provided useful insights for approaching some of the problems related to the management of development projects. The following general discussion ties together a number of important points which have implications for future project implementations.

In this chapter no attempt was made to raise all the issues or to resolve all the issues that were raised; some aspects will need more research before conclusions can be drawn. However, enough information was available on many of the issues to generate operational guidelines for future activities. These guidelines should not be considered as universal rules that fit in all cases. For example, some of them may be more appropriated for Uruguay but not for other countries, or they may have opposite effects in different regions of the same country. A corollary of this is that replication should be taken cautiously and will require additional attention to new variables which need to be carefully considered.
Table 9. Main characteristics of the selected projects

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<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Output</th>
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| IPRU/Small farmers of COAMICOL—a development program for small livestock producers | • Increase livestock production (TI).  
• Strengthen the local cooperative (HRD).                                                    | Revolving credit system.                      | 50/75 small farmers were reached (TI).                                                     |
| GPDR-Ansina village—a rural development program                          | • Improve family incomes of the zone (TI).  
• Consolidate communal organization (HRD).                                                   | Revolving credit system.                      | Project recently started.                                                                 |
| ACU-Small farmers of San Jose—a credit program for small farmers         | • Increase milk production (TI).  
• Enhance the organization of the colony (HRD).                                               | Revolving credit system.                      | 139/250 small farmers were reached (TI).                                                   |
| CCU-Lavalleja colony—a local development program                         | • Develop local councils capable of implementing development programs (HRD).                   | Community development approach.               | Local council was formed (HRD).  
Some infrastructure was provided (HRD).                                                     |
| RRA/IICA-Cuchilla del Ombu—an integral development program               | • Integrate rural development in the zone (HRD).                                               | Community development approach.               | Achieved a sustaining community participation.                                             |
| CAF/FJ-Agrarian youth cooperatives                                        | • Provide experiences for rural youth to enable them to fill places in the cooperative boards of directors (HRD). | Youth education program.                      | 14 rural youth groups formed.  
Increased access to cooperative boards.                                                    |
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<tr>
<th>Project/Source of Funds</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>Insight</th>
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</table>
| IPRU/COAMICOL External donor agency from Belgium | •TI components were achieved.  
•Capacity-building (CB) activities to COAMICOL were never performed due to poor linkages between the IPRU and COAMICOL; thus, a lack of trained COAMICOL staff affected sustaining benefits of revolving credit system. | •Evaluation design was well-planned toward achieving TI & HRD objectives. It used quantified goals, impact indicators and timeframes. Reporting systems allowed for comparisons over time to check progress toward objectives. |
| GPDR/Ansina village External donor agency from Canada | •Project was small in scale, aimed at reaching a restricted area. This invited a high quality management; however the GPDR defined quality. That was not the case here. There was a management crisis, with poor involvement in the zone and no leadership given to the local staff. | •A new organization was created to bypass the existing one which proved to be unresponsive to the requests of the poorer people. |
| ACU/San Jose colonists External donor was the BID | •TI components were achieved.  
•CB activities to ACU were never performed. The managerial incompetence of the ACU to administer the project led to failures in its sustainability. | •The revolving credit system was used as an introduction of the ACU to the target population rather than as an instrument for developing small farmers on a sustainable basis. |
| CCU/Lavalleja colony External donor agency from Belgium | •TI components were not achieved basically due to external factors (wool prices).  
•CB activities were performed; as a result, a local council was formed and some infrastructure and services were provided. | •Project's broadly stated objectives, activities and some outputs for the first year. After that, The community councils developed by the project provided information for the ongoing program planning process. |
| RAA-IICA/Cuchilla del Ombu IICA and the local government | •Project well-initiated in 1983, having positive effects in TI and HRD components but abruptly ended in 1986. Project was expected to continue, but tension arose between the local staff of RAA and national government, terminating the project. | •A participatory planning approach was immediately implemented. It had 3 stages: (1) data assembly; (2) analysis; & (3) discussion with target population. During the 2nd stage, short-term, reachable activities were successfully implemented to gain credibility among the target population. |
| FJ-CAF/Agrarian cooperatives youth program A mixture of local sources (cooperatives) and external donor agencies | •In view of the intended objectives, the project had positive effects. The main obstacles to having an impact were: a) it was not expanded throughout the country (only to the west); b) it did not generate economical benefits to the youth who were involved. | •The project itself evolved to a decentralized structure through demands of the target population. The fact that the youth (target population) requested organizational changes represented a good indicator of success. |
Context Evaluation

Almost all the projects involved the pairing of TI (efficiency) and HRD (equity) goals. Combining these two goals may be easy at the design stage but not at a latter stage of the program planning process. Although the interdependence of both goals (TI and HRD) is academically recognized, one reason for pairing them stems from the fact that development projects need to be presented in clear and comprehensive way to gain support (marketing). In addition, the majority of cases showed objectives stated very broadly, especially HRD. They were defined as 'improvement objectives'. This can be explained as a way to prevent manipulation of contextual factors. Otherwise, development managers may have found themselves very restricted to specific objectives, without enough room to maneuver.

Project IPRU/COAMICOL was a remarkable exception. The stated goals and objectives were clearly defined for both HRD and TI. This helped to devise an evaluation design, coupled with expressing the objectives into a general frame (logical framework). The shortcoming of stating objectives broadly was that it hindered the evaluation design from the very beginning. An interesting approach was observed in project CCU/Ansina Village. It established ample objectives only for the first year; later, community councils were in charge of channeling people needs and reformulating program.

Needs-assessment studies were conducted in several cases. In general, these studies gave the impression of follow-up activities to projects that began before. Perhaps this may be related to the diminishing of funds from donor agencies. From the very beginning, the project RAA-IICA/Cuchilla del Ombu showed a participatory approach to needs assessment. The
Methodology was composed of three stages: 1) data assembly, which took just three months; 2) analysis of the assembled data; and 3) sharing conclusions and interaction with the target people so as to jointly determine the needs. During the second stage, short-term reachable capacity-building activities were implemented to quickly gain credibility in the target people. That proved to be particularly successful in terms of: a) achieving early sustained participation of the community; b) establishing a healthy balance between extension staffs' perceptions of needs and those from the target people; and c) developing an internal capacity to generate, process, and present information.

Development projects are aimed at alleviation or reduction of rural poverty by sustained increases in TI/HRD objectives. The emphasis is placed on sustained increases. Results from a project must extend beyond its termination. In order for the project to become self-sustaining, it is of special importance that end-users participate in the program planning process from the very beginning. This happened in project RAA-IICA/Cuchilla del Ombu.

Logical framework was not used as a planning-tool except in project IPRU/COAMICOL. Thus, evaluation designs have been inadequate, non-existing, or less than they could have been. Logical framework helps to evaluate by emphasizing the identification and quantification of indicators which measure achievement of the different parts that make up a project, basically, inputs, outputs, and effects. Too often, enough output is considered as a measure of project success without really knowing what were the effects. In addition, logical framework takes into account assumptions about things that may or may not occur while the project is being conducted. They are important because of the influence they
can exert over the project; the project ultimately will depend on assumptions for achieving effects.

Broad capacity-building activities were included in the project design but not as objectives. When the project design implied a revolving credit system, its implementation rested heavily on the credit agency in charge of administering it. Limiting the scope of capacity-building activities to the target people or extension staff without including all represented agencies was counterproductive. Sustainability of development efforts was, thus, severely injured. Projects IPRU/COAMICOL and ACU/San José colonists were examples in this regard.

External factors affected available options for projects throughout the four stages, from process to product. When selected projects were designed, the country was on the path towards a democracy (1983: project RAA-IICA/Cuchilla del Ombu) or in a democracy (after 1985: projects IPRU/COAMICOL; GPDR/Ansina Village; ACU/San Jose Colonists; CCU/Lavalleja Colony; and FJ-CAF/Agrarian Cooperatives Youth Program).

Linkages between government and the NGOs were very weak before 1985. However, the re-democratization process has done little to resolve that weakness and the lack of support to NGO activities. The government and NGOs continued to regard each other as a threat, rather than as a partner to work with. The highly centralized structure of the state, in the capital of the country and big cities of the countryside, posed serious problems for projects aimed at strengthening local development. The latter was observed in all the stages, not only context.
Input Evaluation

Basic strategies of the selected projects involved two types: a) revolving credit system; and b) community development approach. The purpose of revolving credit system was to provide available credit and extension for small farmers, using simple application procedures with no hidden charges. The extension component should be approached from HRD perspective due to the characteristics of the target people. The value of the product received was the market price. The common practice of undervaluing farmers' commodities did not apply here. The farmer asked for credit directly, and the lender accepted or rejected the request immediately, depending on the extension agent's opinion. Loans were to be repaid in product rather than money. All the target people should get their turn to receive a loan because the funds, if well managed, are almost self-sustaining.

Community development approaches followed the HRD tradition. They paid attention to the development of human competence and social organizations within a community-oriented process. This process was based on the premise that for the solution of development problems, a project had to tackle them in their true complexity, promoting a more integrated effort in coping with those problems. Empowering people and their organizations were understood as a goal in itself, and as a condition sine qua non to put TI programs into practice. Locating resident village level extension agents was implied in this approach, to investigate possible community projects and prepare communities for action by self-help methods. The target people, in the case of the revolving credit system, were composed of small farmers while in community development programs it involved also villagers. Project FJ-
CAF/Agrarian Cooperative Youth Program can be defined as a youth education program close to the HRD tradition.

Project IPRU/COAMICOL showed a specific design for evaluation. The remaining projects included vague references toward evaluation, but very distant from specific designs. The cited project included reporting systems to allow comparisons over time to check progress toward objectives. This significantly helped to monitor the project. Nevertheless, there is a further consideration. Evaluation designs should also contribute to the providing of information in relation to the weaknesses and strengths of the implementation process (the learning from the experience). This becomes crucial for replication of projects, an objective formally stated in project CCU/Lavalleja Colony, but underlying all the cases. This aspect was lacking in all six of the projects evaluated. The first four projects depended exclusively on foreign funding. It was surprising that donor agencies did not stress those missing evaluative activities. The lack of concern in this sense leaves much to be desired.

Project designs included the commitment to work jointly with other institutions to reach the target people. It was to the advantage of different agencies to develop a close collaboration scheme. This is due to the fact that budgets declined and projects fell in an area in where there was a convergence of the agencies mandates. To make commitments feasible and enduring, it is of vital importance that cooperation linkages be established formally, before project implementation. This reflected the fact that relying on informal networks did not assure sustainability of the cooperation, as it happened in project RAA-IICA/Cuchilla del Ombu. It is wise to work through the existing organizations and avoid the so-common by-
passing. However, a conflict may be found between the local institution which will undertake the project and the objectives being pursued for the project, as it is showed in project GPDR/Ansina Village. In a large number of cases, local organizations have been taken over by a few rich members for their own purposes. Under such circumstances, using these organizations as a vehicle for reaching the target people, will end up in more privileges for prominent farmers over service to a wider group. To overcome this, new organizations should be devised before the execution of the project. Vested interests may grow up against this idea. If a strong capacity-building process is undertaken the skills imparted to people from the new created organization will have a pay-off.

Process Evaluation

What started out as broad and rather ambiguous objectives in previous stages, needed to be redefined into more usable guides to activity. The most important functions of managers emerged here. They must be skilled in giving leadership, judgement, experience, and creativity to minimize ambiguity during implementation process. They should provide extension field staff a sense of direction of movement, indicating where they were (present situation) and where they wanted to go (improved situation). If managers failed to exhibit these behaviors as was evident in project GPDR/Ansina Village, extension staff became frustrated because no one knew which directions to follow. The monitoring of the project needed not only an evaluation design but also involvement of managers. Administrative systems highly centralized (project GPDR/ANsina Village), operated as a barrier for managers to be involved in the implementation. In this case, authority flow from the top down, and
there was no delegation of power to staff who were in touch with the target people. This staff developed informal means of circumventing the requirements of managers.

The more remote was the zone where the project was being implemented, the greater the call for a decentralized structure. For example, a unit was created in project CCU to implement it, highly independent from its headquarters. The unit with its manager was located close to the project area. The extension agent was a resident in the project area during the first year and this facilitated first hand knowledge gathering and stimulated community actions. The withdrawal of the extension agent after the first year severely injured project implementation. To address accurately the real constraints on intended beneficiaries, and to reach stated objectives community development projects need their staff to live in the same communities as the target people.

Not only remoteness but also the lack of local organizations capable of implementing a project, obliged to make provisions for creating a unit for coordinating the project at the local level. The emphasis should be placed on coordinating efforts, rather than undertaking the project. The project IPRU/COAMICOL illustrated this dichotomy. The IPRU created a unit to operate at local level by supporting the existing cooperative. For different reasons this unit undertook control of the project. That was the fastest way to implement the project, but interfered with the improvement of capabilities in the cooperative to administer the revolving credit system by its own. As a result, currently institutions to handle this project either do not exist, since the unit ceased to operate when project ended, or do not have the administrative
capability to manage the project. All of this has raised difficult questions related to the maintenance of the project and future allocation of the available funds.

The majority of the projects were conceived in terms of TI and HRD objectives, but their implementation showed a diversion from original goals. In general, the emphasis was put on providing TI activities; losses in HRD were the cost to pay for gains in TI. The principal weakness of TI rapid gains was that they did not last even in the medium-run perspective (as the ACU/San José project illustrated). To reach a better balance between TI and HRD during implementation of the project was difficult to achieve. Care should be taken, especially in projects involving credit, that the short-run purpose of pushing out loans to the maximum number of target people in the minimum time, did not obscure HRD objectives. The ACU/San José colonists project showed, that such a strategy invited financial losses as well as prevented the establishment of a sustainable credit system. Emphasizing the HRD components in this project should result in a durable structure that could extend beyond the project life. Instead of using the credit system as a tool for gaining political support, ACU needed to gain banking-capacity to be able to deal with its clients. A look at credit programs through rapid coverage 'lenses', without considering the institutional viability of the organization through which funds are administered, must be avoided at all costs.

A program can be stated in TI/HRD or TI terms, but the way to reach it is through capacity-building activities. The question of how much HRD or TI can be put aside, is, in part, not answerable for managers. What should be avoided is the total absence of HRD components. The kind of balance that may work better is unpredictable and dependent upon
the particular circumstances of the setting. Managers are obliged to face these tradeoffs.

The tension between TI and HRD objectives during implementation was requiring of experienced managers, to explore different alternatives where TI and HRD might be found to conflict less. However, project organizations were quite often managed by people with very little management skills. For example, whenever original program goals were being laid out, managers should have been able to alter the chronological sequence of the program design to work out the reconciliation of the two objectives. They lacked expertise because their background came from other disciplines (agronomy). The way to increase their income was to fill higher administrative positions. Additionally, they soon became overburdened by bureaucratic procedures, regulations, and routine desk tasks. This is rapidly becoming a problem in Uruguay that limits the efficiency with which scarce resources are allocated and managed, as well as the effectiveness with which those organizations reach their goals.

It is important to point out that goal displacement occurred, generally against HRD. In addition, reevaluation of initially stated objectives was observed. This occurred when implementation was hindered by excessive adherence to them. Project CCU/Colonia Lavalleja was originally designed for improving sheep performance among small farmers. The shift to cattle grazing due to the external low prices of wool, could not be looked on as a step backward. In the midstream of project CCU/Colonia Lavalleja, it was realized there were not clear opportunities for economic gain from adoption of suitable technology; thus, emphasis was changed toward more HRD activities. Modifications in the implementation due to unexpected variations must be made frequently.
Adoption of technology should be given a first priority in projects based upon credit, but that concern was not observed. The reason is straightforward. Adoption of technology leads to income generation for repaying the loans. Otherwise, a project is inducing its target people to use credit ignoring that people need to pay back principal and interests, regardless of the credit conditions. Under these circumstances, projects force small farmers to get into debt, and lenders to have high rates of delinquency. Credit must be readily available after the technology becomes accessible for the target people. Controversy still exists as to whether or not available technology exists for small farmers. Although not at all conclusive, the evidence from projects based upon revolving credit system implied that: 1) technology was conceived as the innovations not previously used in a given area; 2) extension was understood as any program directly tied to introducing that technology in the area in question.

There is much to be gained by understanding that technology also means the local practices (IK) that may be adapted or supported before prescribing the dissemination of technologies from outside. Too often, technology is assumed to mean just the output increasing techniques without really testing availability and profitability to the target people's conditions. Extension services should focus on whether or not profitable traditional technology (IK) exists. If that is not the case, technologies from outside the local area need to be identified or developed, carried and adapted to meet the local conditions. The latter implies testing technology, physically and socio-economically, under plots similar to those of the audience. Obviously, if all of this is to be done, it requires sufficient extension trained staff. However, projects faced problems resulting from low salaries received by extension
agents as well as their poor training in subject-matter areas and extension methodologies. Serious attention should be given to providing adequate training to extension agents to ensure that IK is not by-passed, and that they are understood and trusted by small farmers. In addition, performance incentives for extension agents should be set up to increase salaries tied to their work effectiveness.

In all cases, the project designs included references of working jointly with other institutions to achieve objectives. Nevertheless, when projects were implemented the intended coordination did not work. To some extent, public rhetoric did not transfer into action. Managers, planners, and policy-makers from public or private organizations, strongly defended the need of coordination among different agencies as an essential feature of development projects. Actual implementation turned out to be a quite different issue. Hidden agendas appeared, especially in community development projects. If local governments and political systems perceived their own interests were threatened by the project, cooperation did not take place as was the case in project CCU/Colonia Lavalleja.

Despite numerous efforts given to the ways in which development programs could be evaluated, the estimation of success or failure remains a complex matter. Standard criteria by which these programs are judged play an important part in evaluation of whatever approach is used. The criteria to judge TI components have been more developed. This is a consequence of giving the first priority to the pursuit of production increases over other concerns in development programs. For example, production gains, farmer profits, percent-covered of the target people, default rate, were some of the criteria used to evaluate TI components. They
covered three aspects: 1) the impact on small farm productivity or income; 2) the outreach-capacity of the program; and 3) the institutional viability of the organization that administered the funds. Usually, program goals and objectives are to be used as criteria for doing evaluation. They form the basis of which programs are to be evaluated. Those aspects of the process and/or product not related to the stated purposes are neglected.

The criteria to judge HRD components have been less developed because project designs either do not include HRD objectives or define them rather vaguely. In addition, from the HRD perspective, it may be possible to find results that are goal-unrelated achievements which deserve recognition. Project FJ/CAF gave useful insights in relation to criteria for evaluating from HRD perspective. One can assume that organizational changes demanded by the target people, in the sense of acquiring more responsibilities over the implementation of the project, constitute an impact indicator of great relevance. In essence, three major phases were found in this project. In phase 1, the project began under close supervision of the NGOs in charge of its implementation. Participation of the target people was low, because they were still evaluating the project. There was little reason for them to become involved and participate in greater scale. Somewhere during this phase, the intended beneficiaries informally and not systematically explored probable implications of the project. The proposition here is that this kind of 'hidden' internal evaluation of the audience became a good impact indicator of the project success. The indicator that this evaluation really took place was the existence of phases 2 and 3.
In phase 2, increases in the participation of the beneficiaries brought forth substantial demands for new organizational arrangements and the role of the NGOs became less directive. In phase 3, the preceding demands on new organizational changes were put into practice which were a desirable change in terms of bringing about a more enduring organization. An advisory-role for the NGOs emerged while the project was driven by its beneficiaries. The planning approach evolved from blueprint to process. Shifts from one phase to another were signalled by the changes in the participation of the beneficiaries and phase 3 might be regarded as representing a rather advanced stage of participation. In this example, the time period covered by the first phase was five years, and two years by the second. The third phase began in 1993 and was supposed to run a very long time period.

Of course, this three-phase process may vary depending on the particular setting, resulting in reactions which are difficult to anticipate. What should be kept in mind is that the lack of participation of target people in a project, commonly considered a tradition-bound decision, may be a rational decision based upon a 'hidden' negative evaluation of that project.

**Product Evaluation**

Projects based upon revolving credit systems failed to achieve enduring results for their TI components because the HRD perspective through capacity-building activities was overlooked. Basically, efforts to impart training to the credit agency were not taken into account, neither in the design stage nor in the implementation. As a result, problems arose in the operations of the credit bureaucracy and the monitoring system, which, in turn, led to misuse of funds (project ACU/San José colonists) and the risk that the funds are going to be
absorbed by a few rural elite (project IPRU/COAMICOL). The basic constraint was the weakness of the credit agency which affected its viability to manage the credit system after the departure of the donor agencies. In other words, projects provided temporary services; TI gains at the end were nullified by a lack of project permanence.

Projects based upon a community development approach showed a pattern in which capacity building activities were performed to create ad hoc local councils. Although TI components were focused on the designs, external factors such as the international market price for wool, left them aside during implementation (project CCU/Colonia Lavalleja). Project RAA-IICA/Cuchilla del Ombu had a lasting impact. Although it was terminated abruptly in 1986, its results in terms of organizing community to increase its participation in the public affairs can be seen currently. Project CCU/Colonia Lavalleja ended in November, 1993. It created a local council which now has to articulate and channel community demands. The results were significant in terms of improved infrastructure. However, there was reason to believe that these results could have accomplished a great deal more if cooperation between local government and agencies in charge of the projects could have been induced.

The community development projects and their implementation processes revealed the basic tension between local governments interests and project purposes. Attempts to tackle community problems met considerable resistance owing to the local government and political structure. Resistance would have been even more pronounced in an electoral situation where efforts to entice the votes of community members and small farmers compete dangerously with the NGOs' development actions. For example, the project GPDR/Ansina village will
show a very low profile after July, 1994, due to the national elections that will be held in

Doubtless, community development projects urgently needed to develop deep linkages
with local governments. Meeting basic needs and infrastructure demands of local
communities on a sustainable basis went beyond the NGOs' possibilities. There has been a
long history of distrust between the NGOs and government agencies in Uruguay, often rooted
in political differences that must be put aside. The NGOs have placed a great value in their
autonomy from the government. Local governments were opposed to NGOs actions because
they threatened their power. Although both parts endorsed the need for collaboration, it did
not emerge. Clearly, what was needed here was an educative process in which both parts
dialogue empathically with one another; otherwise, projects will continue to fail at achieving
better and more enduring results.

Project FJ-CAF, whose goal was to provide educational experiences to rural youth
belonging to cooperatives, yielded important effects. They were two-fold. First, a new
organizational structure that represented an advanced stage of participation of the target
people. The evolution of this process, described earlier, was highly satisfying and continuing
participation was envisaged in a better self-sustaining arrangement. Second, the development
of a significant number of cooperative youth groups in the west of the country. Groups were
understood to be a catalyst for bringing peers together and introducing new attitudes in the
cooperatives and communities.
In social/economic terms, although important these effects have not yet significantly impacted the target population. That is a crucial distinction in evaluation. Bennett's framework (see page 25) may help to explain the difference. Bennett developed a model composed of seven levels of evidence which can be used to evaluate projects. Level six of this model refers to 'practice change', which means adoption. The last level, which is called 'end results', refers to the consequences of the adoption in the target people. To have an impact this project needed to be replicated in a wider scale, covering the main regions of the country. Until now, it is a project concentrated only in the west. After spreading nationally (level 6), the project should be able to generate incomes to youth within the groups (level 7). Were there ways that could stimulate youth involvement in agriculture activities? That was a significant question, sufficiently complex to challenge some of the better minds among those who could take an interest in the subject.

There was an urgent need to learn more about the dynamics of each project's process implementation. Systematic observations need to be conducted during and after project completion to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the strategies. A critical look at the past performance of extension merits more serious consideration for evaluation in Uruguay than it has received. Allowing extension managers and agents to learn from different experiences through comparisons will help to detect the conditions in which particular tactics can be expected to work better. It will yield useful findings for practitioners and academicians. In addition, it is a required step for any widespread project replications as shown in the projects GPDR/Ansina village and FJ-CAF/rural youth.
It is more difficult to conduct evaluation procedures than merely to acknowledge their importance. The experience of these six projects, though not lacking in successes, has been characterized by disappointments and bafflements as to their causes and probable cures. The latter suggests the value of evaluation in extension. In fact, evaluation is the cornerstone to improve agricultural extension and development projects. Guidelines emerging from successful experiences may be incorporated in different settings so as to check their validity under different circumstances. Widespread discussion among practitioners and rigorous research among academicians will be the most effective means. Practices to attempt may include the so-called scientific knowledge as well as local knowledge (IK).

The objective of such practices is to build an extension methodology appropriate for Uruguay. As a result, foreseeing problems and cures will be easier for development managers. However, the exact results will not come about in different settings. Rural development implies people interacting and this process is harder to identify in advance. Efforts to put into practice development actions set in motion many social processes, only some of which are foreseen by managers. It is important to remember that the complexities of this process should not mean rural development is a hopeless cause.
CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY, GUIDELINES, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

The purpose of this study was to evaluate how effective the implementation of a sample of agricultural extension projects recently carried out in Uruguay have been. The researcher designed an evaluation framework (specific objective 1) that took into account four key factors considered relevant from the body of literature related to agricultural extension and evaluation. These factors were: management, capacity building (specific objective 2), planning approach and external factors. In addition, these factors were considered through Stufflebeam's CIPP model of evaluation, consisting of context, input, process, and product. A matrix was formed combining the four key factors and the CIPP model of evaluation. The matrix was refined by consultation with the researcher's peers. This matrix became the standard criteria for evaluating the selected projects.

The study used qualitative methods to collect and analyze the data. As a result, concepts emerged that may have been missed using strictly quantitative research methodology. A naturalistic, qualitative documentary analysis of the administrative records of the six projects was performed. Interviews and direct observation were conducted to gain a greater depth of information. In all cases there were goals related to the Human Resource Development (HRD) tradition. The contents of the records (projects and related documents) were analyzed and categorized using the cited matrix. The literature review in Chapter 2 identified the practices that facilitated or hindered the program-planning process of development projects from the HRD perspective (specific objective 3). These practices were
placed within each cell of the matrix. The evaluation was performed by comparing evidence from the selected projects to the criteria standards of the matrix. The matrix proved to be a valuable tool in order to achieve the objectives of the study. Such a matrix is relevant for extension managers in order to ensure that important factors affecting project successful implementation are not to be ignored at any stage in the program planning process. Consequently, managers should use the matrix before the implementation process.

Although this research was of a naturalistic nature, steps were taken to guarantee its authenticity. To enhance credibility (internal validity) the study employed triangulation. Transferability (external validity) was provided by including a multiple case design, and providing sufficient description of the context. Dependability (reliability) was ensured by the use of an 'audit trail' in the form of the conceptual framework, the matrix, the initial questions, and other steps taken. Finally, confirmability (objectivity) was achieved by analyzing documentary data which were in an unaltered form and, thus, less subject to bias.

The units of analysis were the selected projects, which were selected on purpose, rather than at random. It must be borne in mind that deriving universal rules from these cases can be dangerous. Implementation of development projects is as much an art as a science. For example, some practices may achieve better results for some settings but could be inappropriate for another ones. Extension managers must determine how their own projects differ from these cases, and decide the more suitable way to meet the goals of the project. Findings play the role of propositions that are aids to the decision making process for extension managers. Careful attention should be given by extension managers and field agents
to the four factors that affect project implementation (management, capacity-building, planning approach, and external factors).

**Guidelines**

The last specific objective of this study was to establish guidelines for future agricultural extension projects. These guidelines will be helpful for development managers as well as for planners and evaluators in LDCs. The guidelines, which are in accordance with the solutions identified in Chapter 2, are as follows:

1. *Managers should build a degree of flexibility into project design for its successful implementation because contextual factors tend to change drastically in LDCs.*

   This is due to the fact that managers deal with unknown and unstable environments. Establishing broad goals and objectives is a way to provide flexibility.

2. *Managers must be involved on site during implementation, especially when objectives are broadly stated, to set general directions and orientations.*

   Otherwise, extension staff become frustrated because a project degenerates into ill-defined vagueness and directionless trial and error. This, in turn, will lead to timing problems. Experience so far seems to indicate in Uruguay that managers designed projects but later they were not involved in their implementation. On the other hand, extension agents had responsibilities for projects without being present fairly early in the preparation stage. A good overlap between planners and implementers becomes relevant.
Managers need to devise formative and summative evaluation systems so that the people involved in the project can learn the lessons of the experience. Modifications during project implementation (capacity to redesign) can be made as experience is gained. But experience alone does not lead to spontaneous evaluation. Experience can aid evaluation activities, not on its own, but as a part of the evaluation design previously planned. Currently, the absence of evaluation systems implies that findings from one project cannot be imported and exported between projects (replication).

Managers need to establish clearly stated objectives and goals in measurable terms that lead to an evaluation design, which, in turn, guides the successful implementation of the project.

These factors are related to each other. If the HRD objectives are not stated or they are established in rather vague terms, implementation and evaluation of the HRD components is hindered. Managers must realize that the HRD components and their related capacity-building activities cannot be overlooked.

Managers need to elicit active participation of the intended beneficiaries from the early stages of the program planning process.

The project design should be flexible enough to allow such participation. To elicit participation some investment in reachable short-term actions, perceived as important for the local decision-makers and the people, may be a necessary first step.
6. **When leading projects, managers should be aware of the size of resources available in relation to the magnitude of the problem.**

Resources to face all the problems are usually scarce. In this situation, rather than being concerned for diffused results, projects may try things out on a limited scale to gain experience. High quality management will be more likely to occur if the project is small in scale. After that, replication to other areas could be done so that improved practices can prove themselves in action.

7. **Managers should approach revolving credit systems avoiding a faster outreach attainable for the institution, which is less enduring, in the long term.**

If strategy from the beginning is clearly geared toward fast completion of coverage in a short period of time, attentive monitoring of the implementation process itself is less likely to happen. The latter will lead the process in directions that are highly vulnerable to mistakes.

8. **Managers need to combine their expertise with the local feedback to come up with appropriate decisions.**

The organizational structure plays an important role in shaping or not shaping opportunities for managers to interact with local extension staff and people involved in project implementation. Centralized structures do not allow managers to receive local feedbacks, at least in a timely fashion. As a result, managers are faced with complex tradeoffs with little information in support. Expertise of managers is understood as their capacity to deal with the four sets of factors that were identified in affecting
project implementation (management, capacity building, planning approach, and external factors). Proper sequencing, timing and priorities to recognize when some factor is of more importance than another are related to managers expertise.

9. Managers need to approach revolving credit systems with a focus on the intended beneficiaries.

When the focus is to use the credit as a political tool to gain institutional support, the contribution of the system to the welfare of the target people is not enduring. For a credit revolving system to be self-sustaining it needs to be: 1) channeled through an organization adequate for the task; and 2) tied to suitable technology that becomes available for target people through extension services. The former implies that the organization knows how to deal with interest rates, lending costs including those from extension services (not only orthodox costs), defaults, keeping accurate records, and so on. The latter implies that technology generation and transference is a central concern which goes before lending credit. Otherwise, how could small farmer gain incomes to pay back the loan? Consequences of not paying attention to this are debt for farmers and default for credit organizations.

10. Managers of development projects should blend the IK-based technologies and the output-increasing technology (II).

There was enough evidence from the projects to suggest that the technologies conveyed to small farmers were those so-termed output-increasing. Some small farmers adopted the technological package, but the high risk associated was an
impediment for massive adoption. As is widely known, this strata of farmers make decisions attempting to reduce risks and increase security, due to their family survival. The output increasing technology was designed for the medium and large-sized farms, not small holders. A purist approach that excludes IK or TI is unlikely to solve all the problems. This, in turn, will lead to the assumption that successful development programs may have to rely on more modest but sustainable production gains.

11. *Managers of community development projects should get public agencies involvement from the beginning.*

It is difficult to imagine sustaining and significant improvements in the areas where projects are located if public and private resources are not mixed together well to meet local demands. The design of these projects should start from the premise that getting public agencies involvement is crucial. Long term planning should be incorporated in the project clarifying the government's role after withdrawal of donor agencies and NGOs.

12. *Managers should be aware of the existence of hidden agendas.*

It is expected that the principal actors in development projects have agendas of their own: local governments, NGOs, beneficiaries, cooperative's board of directors, and donor agencies. Hidden agendas can be managed by making them explicit from the beginning. But if those agendas become clearly divergent, they will affect adversely the whole process and its results.

13. *Managers should provide opportunities for training the local extension agents.*
Training objectives should be determined by needs assessment studies and not by the managers alone. In addition, training should be regarded as a continuing process in which the major component is accomplished through on-the-job activities. Finally, training must be adapted to local conditions. This means, for example, the learning materials must be drawn from the local culture of the trainees to be relevant for them. Some areas wherein training activities for extension staff are suggested as important are: 1) indigenous knowledge (IK), basically techniques to identify, record and test IK; 2) evaluation, basically techniques to establish impact indicators; and 3) the use of modern technologies in extension, basically computers and information networks.

Conclusions

The following conclusions were made based on the research findings. They are related to the specific objectives that guided the study.

1. *Design an evaluation framework capable to serve the needs of this study.*

The evaluation framework used for conducting this study proved to be a valuable tool for ensuring that relevant factors affecting the implementation of the projects were not overlooked in the different phases of their development and implementation. The matrix provides basic points upon which planners, managers, evaluators and field agents should focus their attention to facilitate successful project implementation as well as ensure enduring results.

2. *Identify the degree of use of capacity building components in agricultural extension projects recently carried out in Uruguay.*
The degree of use of capacity building components in the selected projects varied in accordance with the basic strategy used in their implementation. Results of projects based on the revolving credit system were not sustainable, because capacity building activities to the credit organization were by-passed. Community development projects tended to achieve results lasting beyond completion of the projects. They relied more on the process planning approach that allowed participation of the target population from the very beginning.

3. **Identify the practices that hinder or facilitate the program planning process of agricultural extension projects from the HRD perspective.**

Practices that hinder or facilitate the program planning process of development projects were identified from the literature review and incorporated into the matrix. Evaluation of the selected projects identified some practices which hindered the implementation of the projects: a) the communication gap between managers and field extension staff; b) the emergence of divergent hidden agendas; c) the lack of formative and summative evaluation.

4. **Establish guidelines for future agricultural extension projects.**

A set of 13 guidelines were proposed for utilization in developing viable and longer lasting projects. Managers should consider these guidelines taking into account that specific details may vary depending on the particular setting. Specifically, the three particular settings were: a) the local level (cooperatives, NGOs, government); b) the national level (headquarters); and c) the international (donor agencies).
Recommendations for Further Study

Two recommendations are made for further study:

1. A study should be conducted to examine application of the matrix to local, national and international settings, focusing on different organizational and managerial levels within the settings. This study should identify and compare the perceptions of the people involved in those settings regarding the use of the matrix.

2. A study should be conducted to identify strategically selected impact indicators of human resource development (HRD) objectives in development projects. This study should develop the most appropriate methods for collecting evidence in relation to those impact indicators.
REFERENCES


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APPENDIX A. HUMAN SUBJECTS APPROVAL FORM AND QUESTIONS
Checklist for Attachments and Time Schedule

The following are attached (please check):

12. A letter or written statement to subjects indicating clearly:
   a) purpose of the research
   b) the use of any identifier codes (names, #s), how they will be used, and when they will be removed (see Item 17)
   c) an estimate of time needed for participation in the research and the place
   d) if applicable, location of the research activity
   e) how you will ensure confidentiality
   f) in a longitudinal study, note when and how you will contact subjects later
   g) participation is voluntary; nonparticipation will not affect evaluations of the subject

13. □ Consent form (if applicable)

14. □ Letter of approval for research from cooperating organizations or institutions (if applicable)

15. ✓ Data-gathering instruments: Interviewer is data-gathering instrument.

16. Anticipated dates for contact with subjects:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Contact</th>
<th>Last Contact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October-December 1993</td>
<td>same</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. If applicable: anticipated date that identifiers will be removed from completed survey instruments and/or audio or visual tapes will be erased:

   N.A. |
   Month / Day / Year

18. Signature of Departmental Executive Officer:

   Richard L. Allen  4-14-94  Agricultural Education and Studies

19. Decision of the University Human Subjects Review Committee:

   △ Project Approved  □ Project Not Approved  □ No Action Required

   Patricia M. Keith  4-14-94  Signature of Committee Chairperson

   This research would have been approved pending inclusion of elements of informed consent in the letter to participants.
Questions

1. Context (objectives)

a) What kind of goals did the project approach?

b) How were goals and objectives described?

c) Was needs assessment conducted?

d) Were capacity-building objectives defined with quantified goals, indicators, or time frames?

e) Were objectives expressed in a major framework?

f) Was project formulated in terms of the logical framework?

g) What kind of external factors constrained the project during this stage?

2. Input (project)

a) What was the strategy of the project?

b) Was there an evaluation design?

c) Who was going to take an active role in implementation of capacity-building efforts?

d) Were there existing agencies or institutions with whom to work?

e) Was there a planning or blueprint approach of the project design?

f) What kind of external factors constrained the project during this stage?
3. Process (implementation)

a) How was process monitoring conducted?
b) How was formative evaluation conducted?
c) Was the project implemented through integration of local institutions and governments?
d) Did implementation involve all entities?
e) Did capacity-building activities take place?
f) Did flexibility continue during this stage?
g) What kind of external factors constrained planning for project implementation?
h) What kind of external factors constrained the project during this stage?

4. Product (results)

a) What were the main results of the project from a TI perspective?
b) What were the main results of the project from a HRD perspective?
c) Were long-term plans included for project continuance?
d) Was sustainability of the results achieved?
e) Was learning made possible through the lessons?
f) What kind of external factors constrained the project during this stage?
APPENDIX B. CORRESPONDENCE
Dear

First of all let me introduce myself. My name is Pedro de Hegedus and I am conducting a research whose topic is "Evaluation of agricultural extension projects in Uruguay: Implications for Agricultural Extension". This research is carried out thanks to a Research Assistantship given to me by Iowa State University (EEUU) in this year. The Agriculture College and the Ministry of Agriculture of Uruguay, and CEDESUR (NGO) are also supporting this research.

Evaluating agricultural extension projects recently carried out in Uruguay will provide useful information to administrators, supervisors, and extension agents from the public and private sector so as to improve future extension activities.

In order to accomplish this purpose I will need to collect data from your institution by means of interviewing technical staff and reviewing documentary data. Your cooperation and assistance will be greatly appreciated.

I thank you for your help.

Sincerely,

Ing. Agr. Pedro de Hegedus (M.Sc)
APPENDIX C. CORRESPONDENCE IN SPANISH
Estimado/a

Antes de todo me gustaría presentarme. Mi nombre es Pedro de Hegedús y estoy realizando una investigación cuyo tema es "Evaluación de proyectos de extensión rural en Uruguay: Implicaciones para Extensión Rural". Esta investigación es apoyada por la Universidad Estatal de Iowa (EEUU), a través de una beca que me fue otorgada durante este año. Colaboran también para la realización de este trabajo, la Facultad de Agronomía y el Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pesca del Uruguay, y CEDESUR, una organización no gubernamental.

Evaluar recientes proyectos de extensión rural en Uruguay va a proveer de información útil para administradores y técnicos extensionistas, tanto del sector público como privado, a los efectos de mejorar futuras actividades en extensión.

Para lograr este propósito es necesario recoger información de su institución, a través de entrevistas al personal técnico y revisión de documentos relacionados. Su cooperación y asistencia en esta tarea será muy apreciada.

Desde ya, agradezco por la ayuda y quedo a vuestras gratas órdenes.

Ing.Agr.Pedro de Hegedus (M.Sc)
APPENDIX D. LETTER ASKING ASSISTANCE
Dear

First of all let me introduce myself. My name is Pedro de Hegedus and I am conducting a research whose topic is "Evaluation of agricultural extension projects in Uruguay: Implications for Agricultural Extension". This research is carried out thanks to a Research Assistantship given to me by Iowa State University (EEUU) in this year. The Agriculture College and the Ministry of Agriculture of Uruguay, and CEDESUR (NGO) are also supporting this research.

Evaluating probable past weaknesses and strengths of agricultural extension projects will provide useful information to administrators, supervisors, and extension agents from the public and private sector so as to improve future extension activities.

In order to accomplish this purpose it will be needed to design an evaluation framework able to serve the needs of this study. Would you consent to serve on a "panel of experts" to aid in establishing evaluative criteria and development of an evaluation framework? Your cooperation and assistance in providing information for this study will be greatly appreciated.

I thank you for your help.

Sincerely,

Ing. Agr. Pedro de Hegedus (M.Sc)
APPENDIX E. LETTER ASKING ASSISTANCE IN SPANISH
Estimado/a

Antes de todo me gustaría presentarme. Mi nombre es Pedro de Hegedüs y estoy realizando una investigación cuyo tema es "Evaluación de proyectos de extensión rural en Uruguay: Implicancias para Extensión Rural". Esta investigación es apoyada por la Universidad Estatal de Iowa (EEUU) a través de una beca que me fue otorgada durante este año. Colaboran también para la realización de este trabajo, la Facultad de Agronomía y el Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pesca del Uruguay, y CEDESUR, una organización no gubernamental.

Evaluar recientes proyectos de extensión rural en Uruguay va a proveer de información útil para administradores, y técnicos extensionistas, tanto del sector público como privado, a los efectos de mejorar futuras actividades en extensión.

Para lograr este propósito es necesario elaborar un marco conceptual con criterios de evaluación que se ajusten al objetivo previamente estipulado. Dada su experiencia en la materia, su colaboración para el diseño de este marco sería de gran valor. La idea es entrevistar a Ud. para obtener aportes y sugerencias que permitan desarrollar el citado marco. Su cooperación y asistencia en esta tarea será muy apreciada.

Desde ya, agradezco por la ayuda y quedo a vuestras gratas ordenes.

Ing. Agr. Pedro de Hegedüs (M.Sc)
APPENDIX F. LIST OF PROFESSIONALS INTERVIEWED
Mario Costa (Extension specialist, M.Sc. expected 1994, Agriculture College)

Gustavo Olveyra (Extension specialist, former Head Extension Department of the Agriculture College)

Norberto Rodriguez (Extension department member, Agriculture College)

Miguel Vassallo (Rural development specialist, Dr., Agriculture College)

Alicia Canapale (Extension manager, NGO)

Gustavo Pardo (Extension field agent, NGO)
APPENDIX G. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACU</td>
<td>Colonists Organization of Uruguay/NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AID</td>
<td>International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BID</td>
<td>Development Interamerican Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Agrarian Cooperatives Joined/NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CB</td>
<td>Capacity building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCU</td>
<td>Uruguayan Cooperative Center/NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDESUR</td>
<td>Development studies centre-Uruguay/NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEPAL</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean/UNO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHMO</td>
<td>Honorary Commission for Sheep Improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHPA</td>
<td>Honorary Commission for Cattle Improvement/MOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIPP</td>
<td>Context, input, process, product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONAPROLE</td>
<td>National Cooperative of Milk Producers/NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COAMICOL</td>
<td>Agrarian Cooperative 'Minas de Corrales'/NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DETA</td>
<td>Extension Department and Technical Assistance/MOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIPRODEL</td>
<td>Local Development and Promotion Agency/MOA</td>
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<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>Extension Agency/MOA</td>
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<tr>
<td>FJ</td>
<td>Youth Forum/NGO</td>
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<tr>
<td>FUCREA</td>
<td>Federation of Farmer Groups of Uruguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPDR</td>
<td>Promotion Group of Regional Development/NGO</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRD</td>
<td>Human resource development</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSM</td>
<td>Hard systems methodology</td>
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<tr>
<td>IICA</td>
<td>Inter-American Institute for Cooperation in Agriculture/OEA</td>
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<tr>
<td>IK</td>
<td>Indigenous knowledge</td>
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<tr>
<td>INC</td>
<td>Land Reform Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPRU</td>
<td>Economical and Social Promotion Institution of Uruguay/NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KASA</td>
<td>Knowledge, Attitude, Skills, Aspirations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>Less developed country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERCOSUR</td>
<td>Southern Cone Common Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOA</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAEC</td>
<td>National Agricultural Extension Center/MOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEA</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRA</td>
<td>Participatory rural appraisal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAA</td>
<td>Regional Agronomies Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRA</td>
<td>Rapid rural appraisal</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSM</td>
<td>Soft systems methodology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TI</td>
<td>Technical innovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOT</td>
<td>Transfer of technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX H. LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED
IPRU Project
Luis Murias
Alicia Canapale
Gustavo Canedo
Aldo Scattolini
Amilcar Acunha

GPDR Project
Gustavo Dans
José Pedro Nuñez
Norberto Rodriguez
Carlos Viera
Míriam Rivero

ACU Project
Leonardo Mesa
Cecilia Gondolfo
Fernando Battegazore
Alvaro Ferreira
Alberto Queijo

CCU Project
Jorge Artagaveytia
Eduardo Maldini
Kristin Minne

RAA-IICA Project
Pedro Bergeret
Domingo Quintans
Beatriz Sales
Alicia Cabral

CAF-FJ Project
Pablo Scremini
Gaston Rico
Silvia Rivero
Hugo Espindola
Aníbal Nuñez
Pierina Germán
Laura Rossi
Freddy Fripp
Gianella Fonte
Adrian Ruiz
Juan Pablo Parrachon
Wilde Raimondo
Eduardo Pastre