Dealing with rapid development: Creation of the informal urban economy and gecekondu housing in Istanbul

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Dealing with rapid development: Creation of the informal urban economy and 

ducekondu housing in Istanbul

by

Gizem Akdoğan

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in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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Program of Study Committee:
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ABSTRACT

The late emergence of national industries in Turkey in the 20th century created various challenges for the country’s development, including architecture and urbanization. With reference to Lefebvre’s notion that “politics” has the “privilege to embrace” the spheres of architecture, urbanism, planning, and the economy, this study analyzes the spread of the informal economy and informal *gecekondu* housing in Istanbul by making connections to the outcomes of the political and economic shifts in the post-World War II period in Turkey.
CHAPTER 1 OVERVIEW

In 2003, nearly 65 percent of Turkey’s total population of 67.8 million resided in urban areas. Yet, a significant 49 percent of the total population was involved with agriculture, while rates of industry and commerce were only 14 percent and 10 percent, respectively. Additional data for the year 2003 estimated that 42.6 percent of the urbanites in Turkey were living in slums. Asymmetrically, some cities in Turkey have experienced an uncontrolled growth and sprawl via construction of unauthorized informal buildings termed ‘gecekondu.’ Due to gecekondu dwellers’ importance in the political elections, most of gecekondu houses were pardoned and even given legal titles by the authorities. Gecekondu houses often occupied public lands or lands in dispute which were in the proximity to highroads, factories, and the urban centers. However, only half a century ago the gecekondu rate of the urban population was only one tenth of its current condition. Hence, in light of previous studies on economic development and production of space, this study analyzes the motives behind the urban spatial transformation as an imprint of the social dynamics of Turkey with a special focus on Istanbul and the period of 1945-1960. It is first argued that rural to urban migration followed uneven regional development, which triggered a “marginalized” economic sector for the displaced workers. Second, this thesis maintains that

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2 Ibid.
3 This rate was derived from the 2003 UN-HABITAT case studies and an averaging of dozens of diverse sources Davis mentioned to be too numerous to cite. Mike Davis, “The Prevalence of Slums” in Planet of Slums, p.24, (New York: Verso, 2006).
4 “Gecekondu” may be directly translated from Turkish to English as “put at night,” meaning a dwelling built “over-night.” It is a term widely used in Turkish to describe illegal squatter housing.
it was the capitalist shift in the economic development model of Turkey combined with foreign aid from 1945s onward that caused rapid growth in *gecekondu* housing as a result of rural to urban migration.

**Introduction**

![Congested traffic in the European landing of the Bosphorus Bridge. Photo by Gizem Akdoğan.](image)

**Figure 1**- Congested traffic in the European landing of the Bosphorus Bridge. Photo by Gizem Akdoğan.

Drivers waiting for hours in congested traffic, passengers waiting in long queues at bus-stops, residents waiting for electricity blackouts or water shortages to end, students
waiting in their crowded school yard to be picked up by their shuttle to be transported back their distant homes, the retired and elderly waiting in long lines for hours to get their social security funds from the banks is a reality for the inhabitants of Istanbul and other major Turkish cities. The most intriguing observation that can be made regarding these daily scenes is the coexistence of everyday actors who symbolize different identities and different ways of life in the city. The street vendors selling pastries, flowers or toys accompany the hungry and exhausted drivers waiting in the traffic, the sellers behind the cotton candy carts choose where to stand strategically to attract young students before they get into their shuttles, and there can easily be a desperate pair of eyes that watch over the people withdrawing money from the bank which in some cases ends up as a robbery that is reported on prime time news.

The observation of coexistence of different actors is not only limited to spontaneous daily life interactions, but such urban scenes complicate the differentiation between the formal (institutionalized) and informal (spontaneous) activities. Indeed, the city includes various degrees of informal activities where a person that represents or works within the formal sector might be involved in informal activities and a person associated with informal sector may be involved with formal activities. For example, even if they work in the formal sector, the buyers from a street vendor become part of that “informality” as much as the street vendor himself, because both sides are involved in an “informal” exchange. Such ambiguity in the degrees of informality is not restricted to people’s exchanges but can include institutions as well. For instance, in Kuştepe -an Istanbul neighborhood that borders an area with the well-maintained skyscrapers and shopping malls with luxurious residential units nearby- the Municipality of Şişli developed an urban service where some housing units in the neighborhood that did not have municipal water supply were periodically provided
with drinkable water via mobile water tanks, which are known to be part of the informal economy. Another example of the indulgence of institutions in informal activities is done by the Municipality of Beyoğlu in Istanbul, which is the first municipality modified from Western models. During its administration in the 1980s, a roof addition was made to its own 19th century historical building by circumventing building codes and regulations. Hence, the ambiguity between being “formal” and “informal” in Turkey includes people, institutions, within various socio-economic classifications.

Even though formal and informal activities cannot be easily differentiated in daily practices, people tend to categorize people and places in the city according to physical qualities or representations that they mentally associate with informality. Thus, it is those (abstracted) mental representations of informality that exclusively associate the problems of informality to poverty and the urban poor, hence generating hatred/condemnation towards these communities. Needless to say, this is generated due to the limited understanding of the conditions of the urban poor and their marginalization within the capitalist world cycle.

Whether practiced by members of a concentrated power group or by the masses, the problem of urban economic and residential informality attached to the major cities remains as a burden to all members of society, especially in a city such as Istanbul where the city is divided by the Bosphorus Strait. For example, when the unauthorized skyscraper, the Sky-Cage, was constructed on a public parcel near the European shoreline of the Bosphorus, the residents facing Europe on the Asian side were forced to view a tall steel building that with its lack of concern for blending in with its geographical and historical location deteriorated

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5 The Sky-Cage is the popular name given to an international hotel chain’s building in Istanbul, which has a court order to be demolished, yet it still keeps functioning.
the coast line of Istanbul. Similarly, the spreading of the informal settlements toward the forest lands and water sources is a vital threat for the lives of each inhabitant in Istanbul. Thus, since there will always be a relation between a human being and his/her physical environment via seeing and/or other senses, lives of the urbanites are indeed interconnected no matter where they live and how they live. Life, as the late 19th century sociologist Emile Durkheim put it, works as a “unity” of which the division into disconnected elements is impossible. As a consequence, if there is an urban problem such as with the informal settlements, it will be evident in every component of “the city” and will not be solely limited to its site and to its local inhabitants.

Anthony King states that “…our daily lived experience of the city where we spent most of our time is, socially and spatially, exceedingly limited. We live for much of our lives, only in a fragment of the city.” Even though one live in a fragment of the city, it should be stressed that the city is not socially fragmented. The social confrontations that happen, actively or passively, between different individuals in the streets of a city, allows people to obtain insights into each other’s worlds. Asef Bayat sees these the “passive or active networks” established in public spaces as a part of what he calls as “street politics.” Such social confrontations are more likely to happen in less developed/developing countries, where informal practices are more prevail, hence interactions with street vendors, cart pushers, trash or paper collectors, and the like happen outside one’s front door.

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Consequently, the “fabric of human experience” in Istanbul “as a site of everyday practices”
cautions one to take a wider view beyond the architecture itself in order to understand the
macro-processes shaping life in a given city. It is argued here that the growth of the
traditionalist “informal” sector as a type of occupation and accommodation in Istanbul is
linked with uneven regional development within Turkey and transition from etatism to
capitalism in the 1950s.

Migration Process

The motivations vary according to the type of migration whether it is internal or
external and there would certainly be exceptions in the personal scale, but if focusing on the
reasons for massive internal migration in the developing world, it is a matter of uneven
development between different regions of the country. Yet even migration that is internal
might have international or global implications. For example, the introduction of new health
measures and spread of modern hygiene and medicine after the World War II significantly
reduced mortality rates, thus the widening of the gap between mortality and fertility rates

9 Anthropologist Setha Low states that “…city as a site of everyday practice provides valuable insights
into the linkages of macro-processes with the texture and fabric of human experience.” Setha M. Low, “The
Anthropology of Cities: Imagining and Theorizing the City,” Annual Review of Anthropology, vol. 25, (1996);
p. 384.

10 Etatism was an economic model that was used in Turkey from 1931 to 1950s and which projected
the existence of state-owned enterprises together with the private firms. More information will be given further
in the text.

11 Wolfgang Lutz and Ren Qiang, "Determinants of Human Population Growth," Philosophical
Transactions: Biological Sciences, vol. 357, no. 1425, Population Growth Rate: Determining Factors and Role
caused remarkable growth in world’s total population.\textsuperscript{12} In the more developed countries (MDC), the population growth based on the mortality decline was a result of two-centuries of “…better housing, improved sanitation, and progress in preventive and curative medicine;”\textsuperscript{13} but in the less developed countries (LDC), it was merely a quick response to the application of the “medical and public health technology to infectious, parasitic and diarrheal diseases.”\textsuperscript{14} Subsequently, when the demographic transitions were juxtaposed, it was seen that, at a comparable development stage, the LDCs had to deal with population growth that was three times more than that of the MDCs.\textsuperscript{15} In addition, the international migration map of the world also evolved after the Second World War, whereby “immigration became a truly global phenomenon as the number and variety of both sending and receiving countries increased”\textsuperscript{16} and the worldwide supply of immigrants experienced a shift from Europe to the Third World contradictory to the conditions before the Great Depression of 1929.\textsuperscript{17}

Indeed, while there were world-wide changes in the population and migration trends, the post-war period’s global effects were also to be seen in Turkey. In order to clarify the high rates of migration within Turkey, four questions shall be asked: “where” these immigrants were coming from, “who” these immigrants were, “how” they came to the big cities, and finally “why” they were migrating. Primarily, most of the immigrants came from rural areas or less industrialized cities that had economies largely depended upon on

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Lutz and Qiang, p. 1199.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Ibid. p. 1197.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Massey, p. 62.
\end{itemize}
agriculture as a source of income. The so-called rural to urban migration type is not limited to Turkey; it can be found in Egypt, in Iran or even in New Mexico in the United States as well. For example, in relation to the immigration from the countryside, Istanbul’s population increased from 860,000 in the beginning of the 20th century to 1.1 million by the mid 20th century and to 10 million by 2000 and then to 12.5 million by 2007. Similarly, due to the huge waves of rural immigrants between 1800 and 2000, Cairo’s population rose from some 200,000 to more than 12 million and Tehran’s population even more remarkably rose from 10,000 to more than 8 million. Casablanca suffered from rural to urban migration as well; its population increased from 20,000 people to 3 million between 1900 and 2000. The profile of the immigrants of rural to urban migration is generally an unskilled worker, likely lacking a secondary or tertiary school education. The general rural to urban migration pattern is as follows; a single man goes to the city and generally when it is understood that there is no chance of making a living in the countryside, the rest of his family follows him. In problematizing rural to urban migration, the developing world context is more complicated.

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24 Peterson, p. 279.
because, first, it is in a greater scale than in the developed world, and second, the harshness awaiting the newcomers in the city is related to where the country stands in the world economy.

The macro-processes create a set of conditions with which the individuals have to contend. The linked conditions prepare and motivate people for immigrating and “push” people out of their rural hometowns to immigrate to the bigger cities where there are perceived to be numerous opportunities. Some of these push factors are high population growth-rate in the countryside, unavailability of arable land for all peasants, transition to a more mechanical agriculture and lack of the privileges associated with living in a city such as more social freedom, variety of economic activities, better health-care, and education. It is clear that migration has strong ties with the financial dissatisfaction, but in the rural to urban immigration model of the developing/underdeveloped world, it is more than a wage calculation.25 The decision maker’s economic condition is likely to be the outcome of a macro-process in which he is not given many options to act upon. For example, the growth-rate based on the births is an indicator that if the necessary investments in education, health-care, and transportation are not made and the new job opportunities are not created, eventually within a few decades, a group of people in that region will be forced to make a decision between moving or staying. If for some reason the authorities have not taken an

25 Macroeconomic theory states that “the balance of labor supply and demand within regional markets” causes migration until equilibrium between two regions is achieved. With this theory, breadwinners keep moving from the low-wage area to the higher one (if the high wages compensate the costs of movement and adaptation process) until the demand is excessively met. However, the increase in the workers available in the high-wage area will cause a slight decrease in the high wages in contrast to the increase in the wages in the low-wage area due to loss of workers. Michael J. Greenwood, Migration and Economic Growth in the United States, (New York, Academic Press, 1981). Quoted in: Massey, "The Social and Economic Origins of Immigration," p.64.
action upon population growth, the individual is left by himself in his prospective life-struggle.

The macro-processes also create a set of opportunities for the individuals which can “pull” people to the cities and allow them to settle down. For example, the agglomeration of investments made in specific regions in terms of industry, commerce and public services - health, education, transportation, or security- will be attracting new migrants. Besides the obvious pull factors, there can also be some unplanned and rather coincidental opportunities for the newcomers as well such as the “hand-me-down” housing. For example, when most of the non-Muslim minorities have left their homes due to various government policies and external conditions in some neighborhoods like Dolapdere, Fener, or Balat in Istanbul, the newcomers with limited financial sources can occupy the abandoned houses in these neighborhoods. Some post-colonial states also have similar examples, where the mansions and villas of ruling class were later used to house the desperate urban poor like the “palomares of Guatemala City,” “avenidas of Rio,” “conventillos of Buenos Aires and Santiago,” “quintas of Quito,” and “cuarterias of Old Havana.” Algier’s famous seaside district as a former colonial neighborhood, “Bab-el-Oued,” was also later on inhabited by the urban poor. Cairo’s “City of the Dead” is another significant example where the old Mameluke tombs are used as housing units by a population of one million.

26 The most significant government policy was the mutual population exchange policy that projected Greeks that reside in Turkey and Turks residing in Greece to be exchanged in the 1920s. Additionally, when new nation-states were established such as Greece and Bulgaria in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century and Israel in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the minorities have been attracted to out-migration toward their own nation-states. After the devastation of the Ottoman Empire, abolishment of capitulations, and founding of modern Turkey, various European nationals tended to leave Istanbul during the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.


28 Davis, p. 33.
Figure 2- Fener district and its “hand-me-down” type of houses, in Istanbul. Photos by Gizem Akdoğan.
Indeed, migration movements that were triggered with push and pull factors should not only be perceived as trends limited to population studies. Since generally urban birth rates are lower than that of rural, migration process should be regarded as the main motive shaping the spatial and social tension in Istanbul, to which shortage of housing, increase real estate values, inefficiency of urban services, and marginalization of informal activities can be attributed. Additionally, internal migration to Istanbul should be evaluated together with the political and economic dynamics’ impacts on regional development and redistribution of population between agricultural and industrial sectors. For example, in 1935 and after the war in 1945, Istanbul’s population was around 4.6 percent of Turkey’s total population for the respective years. However, Istanbul started to absorb more of Turkey’s total population starting with the 1950s. Istanbul’s share in Turkey’s total population was 5.27 percent in 1955; 5.29 percent in 1960; 5.55 percent in 1965; and a significant 14.75 percent in 2000. Therefore, a further examination on the political and economical developments in Turkey for the period of Post-War Era should be conducted in order to comprehend the catalysts that initiated the asymmetrical population growth of Istanbul in the 1950s. Yet, before analyzing the socio-political and economic developments for the given period, Istanbul’s regional potentials, historical and geographical advantages should be mentioned.

In addition to Istanbul serving as the major destination of rural immigrants in Turkey, the city has long been a center of attraction for different activity groups in the state.

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31 The post-war era will be restricted from 1945 to 1960.
economy. However, even as the capital of the Ottoman Empire back in the 19th century, it did not necessarily absorb the largest population; for example, in 1885 provinces of Aydın, Bursa, Trabzon, Kastamonu, and Konya were more populous than Istanbul.32

Yet the population and industrial growth of Istanbul was not unpredicted even though earlier in the 1930s the Kemalist policies33 favored an even development through all regions.34 First, there were already some workshops and factories in Istanbul together with some other cities in the Marmara and Aegean Regions (which are the coastal areas in the north-west and west of Turkey) when the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923. These factories were built mainly for supplying the demands of the Ottoman palace and due to the necessities that emerged after the westernization of the Ottoman army in the early 19th century,35 but also supplied some demands of the local inhabitants of Istanbul.36 Some of these Istanbul factories served to produce military uniforms, porcelain and glass in Beykoz,

33 Kemalist policies refer to the six arrows of development described by Turkey’s founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk; republicanism, populism, nationalism, etatism, reformism, and secularism. From these six arrows, two of them can be thought to be more related to spatial development of regions. Etatism is directly related to economic development, whereas populism projects equal social development without any social class. Etatism policy will be explained more in detail further in the text.
34 Robinson stated that much of Turkish state-owned industries were situated in poor locations, meaning places often far away from either markets or skilled labor sources, with the intention of providing “alternative employment to those who would one day be displaced from the land.” Richard D. Robinson, “Turkey’s Agrarian Revolution and the Problem of Urbanization,” The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol.22, No. 3, Special Issue on Attitude Research in Modernizing Areas, (Autumn, 1958): p.403.
36 Koksal and Ahunbay, p.131
and textiles in Zeytinburnu. However, the majority of the Istanbul factories of the 19th century operated for a period of time and then cancelled production; from the 256 factories in the beginning of the 20th century, there were only 43 left by 2005. One reason was the economic hardships and ethnic change of the social composition during the First World War (1914-1918). Due to mutual transferring of Greeks from Anatolia and Turks from Greece, the production and trade conditions varied before and after the war in Turkey. For example, in another major town, Bursa, there were 41 workshops that produced silk and a silk thread factory in 1914; however, the number of these workshops in Bursa decreased to 12 in 1926, while the displaced Anatolian Greeks increased the silk production in Greece. Other reasons for closing down the Istanbul factories of the 19th century in the 20th century were associated with the loss of function, being technologically out-of-date or polluting the city and so on.

Second, historically, Istanbul was a major port that had a railway connection to Europe and Asia. Apart from some towns in the west and in the south-eastern national border of Turkey, most of the Anatolian cities were inaccessible due to lack of rail connection.

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38 Gül Köksal’s study demonstrated the industrial heritage of Istanbul with the locations of the factories from the 19th and early 20th century together with their periods of functioning. From her listing, I have noted up to 31 factories producing/processing food, textile, leather, chemicals, earthenware, and timber and 8 factories processing metal that belonged to the pre-Republican era. For further research: Köksal and Ahunbay, p. 125-136.
39 Köksal and Ahunbay, p.132
40 The mutual population exchange policy was agreed in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 after the defeat of the Greek forces in the Greco-Turkish War of 1922 following the World War I.
42 Ibid.
Third, Istanbul was economically and strategically privileged in being located nearby a very important water body that connects the Black Sea countries with rest of the world, the Marmara Sea. The effect of Istanbul’s geographical condition on its over-population was not coincidental of course, as the most populous cities were observed to be by or around a main water body. Fourteen out of the largest 19 cities in the world are port cities that are either located along a coastline or in a river delta.44 Examples of large port cities include Tokyo with a population of 35.6 million, New York-Newark with a population of 19 million, Mumbai with a population of 18.9 million, Shanghai with a population of 14.9 million, Kolkata with a population of 14.7 million.45 Furthermore, Istanbul benefitted from “handling about half of the shipping”46 in the Ottoman ports and having a natural harbor (the Golden Horn) which is regarded as one of the world’s best harbors47 while the rest of “the coast line of modern Turkey on the Black, Aegean, and Mediterranean Seas suffers from a scarcity of natural harbors.”48

Therefore, due to local push and pull factors, and global trends like the population boom, Istanbul easily became a center of attraction for the rural to urban immigrants. Owing much to the country-scale and city-scale dynamics, Istanbul’s population almost doubled and increased dramatically from around 861,000 in 1945 to 1,467,000 in 1960.49 As mentioned earlier, in accordance with the magnitude of the internal migration that took place in the post-

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45 Ibid. p.6
47 Schoenberg, p. 359.
48 Ibid.
49 Munro, p. 648.
war period, the spatial and social stress in Istanbul was very severe, and appearance of the gecekondu settlements was inevitable.

Figure 3- A digital camera picture of Istanbul as of April 16, 2004. Istanbul’s urban agglomeration, forest areas, the Bosphorus Strait, the Black Sea, and the Marmara Sea can be noticed from this image. Source: “Istanbul, Turkey: The Crossroads of Europe and Asia,” NASA Earth Observatory, http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=4466 (accessed April 16, 2009).
The Transition to The Gecekondu

Historically at first, the gecekondu type of housing in Turkey was an urban problem for Ankara, the capital of the newly founded Turkish Republic (Table 1). Right after Ankara being declared the capital in 1923, Ankara’s population grew by 6 percent in the same year. Even though there were some squatters here and there in the three major cities of Turkey (Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir), they were rarely perceived as a major urban problem until the end of the Second World War in 1945. The existence of gecekondu houses could have been related to extreme economic conditions in a war economy, yet these neighborhoods did not fade away in the post-war period. Şenyapılı noted that it was the 1950s that the governments in Turkey started to regard gecekondu type of housing as a political investment. A year before the elections of 1954, the Adnan Menderes government passed a statute on “Encouragement of Building Construction” and “Unauthorized Buildings” (No. 6188) which enabled municipalities to purchase state land and make modifications on their own land for construction of cheap and affordable housing to accommodate the gecekondu dwellers who lived in that city for two years or more. As the “pre-election investments” of the Democrat Party (DP) worked out, with the elections of 1954, Menderes formed the government again. Furthermore, when the initial model for “enacting a law to pardon and legitimize” the gecekondu and its dwellers was also repeated in 1959 which served to approve the existing

51 Tekeli and Okyay, p. 132.
53 Şenyapılı, p. 202-203.
gecekondu structures but prohibited the future constructions, the gecekondu existence in the cities was consolidated during the 1950s. Additionally, the critical period for the expansion of these informal settlements was the 1950s (as mentioned earlier) due to its acceleration in growth. As of 1955, the population living in gecekondu dwellings was estimated to be 250,000 people, which meant 4.7 percent of the urban population in Turkey. By 1960, the population living in gecekondu dwellings in Turkey increased up to 1.2 million, making 16.4 percent of the urban population gecekondu dwellers.

Table 1- Percentage of Population Increase in Turkish Cities with Populations more than 100,000 from 1935 to 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Increase 1935-65 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>İstanbul</td>
<td>637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İzmir</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bursa</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eskişehir</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaziantep</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konya</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kayseri</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sivas</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samsun</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erzurum</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malatya</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyarbakır</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Turkey, Prime Ministry, State Institute of Statistics, October 24, 1965 Census of Population: Social and Economic Characteristics of the Population (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 1969), Table 4, p.27. Referred to in: Munro, J., Migration in Turkey 1974, p.648. Listing was made from highest to the lowest city population for the cities that had more than 100,000 inhabitants in 1965.

The development of the gecekondu as an informal and unplanned way to deal with the accommodation problem in the Turkish cities shows similarities with the general definition of “slum,” which is used to describe an insecure, overcrowded, poor, and informal

54 Oktay Ekinci, Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Dosyaları [in English: Cases of Istanbul from Past to Present], p.21-30, (Istanbul: Anahtar Kitaplar Yayın, 1995).
type of housing without adequate access to water and sanitation\textsuperscript{56} or the recent definition in
which the household lacks one or more of the following five conditions: “durable housing,
sufficient living area, access to improved water, access to sanitation, and/or secure tenure” in
an urban area.\textsuperscript{57}

Nevertheless, it is still problematic to locate a direct translation in English or any
other language for the expression \textit{gecekondu}, a concept that has been nurtured under local
political, economical, social and geographical forces. \textit{Gecekondu}, if described as “squatter
houses/communities or shantytowns,” would be making references leading to inappropriate
imagery in English and other languages.\textsuperscript{58} This is so mainly because gecekondu as a
housing type was shaped in the Turkish society. With regard to Durkheim’s statement that
“…it is the land which bears the imprint of society,”\textsuperscript{59} it could further be claimed that the
\textit{gecekondu} landscape is an imprint of Turkish society on the land it occupies just as \textit{kampung}
is of Malaysian society and \textit{favela} is of Brazilian society. For that reason, giving them a
single name might be risky and abstractive. In a similar way, Ayse Öncü asserts that “the so-
called informal neighborhoods of Istanbul are by no means the shanty towns of Africa or the
\textit{favelas} of Latin America” due to the opportunities they create for “capitalizing on increasing
land values,” which enabled some “waves of immigrants” to acquire the legal rights of the
property they have occupied. After they had legal proof of ownership of their property, the
very valuable urban land they had previously taken over made them “owners of rentals,

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{56}]UN-HABITAT, The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements 2003, London 2003,
p.3. Quoted in: Davis, p.22-23.
\item[\textsuperscript{57}]United Nations Human Settlements Program:UN-HABITAT “State of the World’s Cities 2006/7,”
\item[\textsuperscript{58}]Kyle T. Evered, "Symbolizing a Modern Anatolia: Ankara as Capital in Turkey’s Early Republican
\item[\textsuperscript{59}]Durkheim, p. 88.
\end{itemize}
Consequently, even though any English translation might not be the exact definition of what comprises a gecekondu or favela is, the thesis will regard these housing types as sub-categories under the term urban “slum” in order to make comparisons.

Similar to what major cities in the other developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, Istanbul experienced a remarkable economic, social and spatial transition right after the Second World War to a city nicknamed by its inhabitants and the media as the “mega-village” of Turkey in the span of five to six decades time. The emergence of associating Istanbul as a mega-village can be attributed to local authorities’ inability to deal with the increasing informal urban residential settlements, rather than the fact that most of the immigrants were coming from the countryside or less developed towns. Moreover, it can be seen that the appreciative attitude of the DP government and the laws enacted in 1953 and 1959 to “prevent” the expansion of the gecekondu settlements proved to be inefficient in dealing with the gecekondu problem in the Turkish cities, since almost a four-fold increase in the population of the gecekondu dwellers from 1955 to 1960 indicated. In addition, starting with the DP’s policies, the laws that pardon and legitimize the gecekondu dwellings shifted comprehension of the gecekondu from a basic need for shelter for urban poor to a source of income with the rents earned by the owners via construction of additional rooms or floors to the existing gecekondu houses.

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CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Turkish National Industrialization versus Foreign Aid/Investment

In Turkey, problems regarding the lack of consistency with developing and consolidating national industrialization movement collided with receiving foreign aids/investments and borrowing loans from outside sources. Though, foreign investment in the developing world is thought to be nothing, but exploiting the resources and workforce of a country under the name of a “free-market economy” in the post-colonial age. Sullivan notes that some studies\(^{61}\) find that “many industrialized nations have gained their advantage by exploitation and at the expense of the underdeveloped world.” He mentions some other studies as well\(^{62}\) that explain the role of “military, technological, and financial dependence” on industrialized nations’ strong influence and even control over the policy-making and economic development process of the less-developed or the developing nations.\(^{63}\) In addition, Hey explains that the dependency theorists’ work disagree with the national specialization in production of certain commodities that liberal economic theory assumed would bring comparative advantage to both trading sides; disagreement was based on the


\(^{63}\) Sullivan, p. 203.
unfair trade pattern that functioned as a continuation of the former colonial trade model. Owing to the need for capital to implement infrastructure projects and Soviet pressure in the 1950s, Turkey aligned toward the U.S. and Western Europe. Thus, the state-owned enterprises gradually lost their reputation to initiate socio-economic development in Turkey among government projects, while more liberal investments that will encourage private sector and foreign investment gained importance.

Gerard Sullivan maintains that the expansion of the modern sector was thought to be a result of foreign investment in less developed countries; yet, he adds that various studies also “recognized” the linkage between “the corresponding stagnation and involution in other sectors, marginalization of displaced labor, and growth of the informal service sector within the same process. As mentioned earlier, in Istanbul, there exists a notion of overlapping dual lives in the city sphere. The duality in the city, which can be either defined as “formal and informal” or “modern and traditionalist” approaches of making a living and supplying the accommodation demand, thus, can be regarded as an outcome of the foreign investments in the less developed world.

In addition, the emergence of informal urban economy was previously addressed in this text and linked with migration to Istanbul or other major cities. The main reason of

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65 More detail will be given further in the text.
68 Sullivan, p. 205.
migration, the inequality of opportunities that exist between Istanbul and most of the cities in Anatolia\textsuperscript{69} can be attributed to the inefficient development of non-agrarian economic sectors throughout Anatolia such as, industry and commerce. Melvin Albaum and Christopher Davies notes that in Turkey, the distinctive regional disparities and “a socio-economic system with many dualisms in its structure” is a result of the uneven distribution of economic growth and capital expenditures for development which have steadily increased.\textsuperscript{70} In addition, it is also useful to refer back to the notion of \textit{gecekondu} as a sub-category of “slum,” and compare the impact of industrial and economic development on slum rates in the world. While residents of slums make up only the 6 percent of the urban population in the developed countries, it had been estimated that this rate rises up to 78.2 percent in the least-developed world.\textsuperscript{71} The rate of slum dwellers in the United States is 5.8 percent whereas in South Korea it is 37.0 percent, in Argentina 33.1 percent, in Turkey 42.6 percent; in India 55.5 percent and in some African countries such as Ethiopia and Tanzania more than 90.0 percent.\textsuperscript{72} Moreover, in a comparison made according to UN data, it has been found that “…the per-capita income differential between a rich city like Seattle and a very poor city like Ibadan” had an enormous gap of 739 to 1.\textsuperscript{73} As a consequence, it is argued here that there is a correlation of more developed countries having low levels of urban slum rates and less developed countries having higher urban slum rates.

\textsuperscript{69} Asia Minor.
\textsuperscript{71} Davis, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{72} Davis, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{73} Davis, pp. 25-26.
The huge gap of slum rates between the developed (industrialized) countries and the developing/underdeveloped can be perceived in relation to the increasing number of displaced laborers (the peasants) in a society, in which the distribution of workforce from agriculture to industry is taking place. Francois Nielsen refers to Kuznets’ work in which the early stage of industrialization was thought to consist of a very productive but small modern sector with high wages, and a large traditional agricultural sector with relatively low productivity and low wages; with growth of industry, a large number of the work force was to detach from the “low-income traditional sector” to the “high-income modern one.” Kuznets’ theory puts forth to explain that the population shifts from one sector to another so as to produce “as an automatic numerical consequence, a trajectory of income inequality that increases, levels off, and then decreases, with a peak at some intermediate stage of development.” Thus, while the social shift is taking place as the distribution of the workforce evolves, the income gap between the formal workforce (involved with industrial or agrarian production) and the informal workforce (the displaced workers involved with secondary urban jobs) broadens. Coming back to the Turkish case, after the expansion of industrial sector under the etatist economic policies, the emergence of a new bourgeoisie class in modern Turkey was predictable. However, the evolution of the new capitalist social class in Turkey has also ties with the high rates of inflation during the war period, which as Edwards claims caused the masses to suffer while “the industrialists, the farmers, the

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75 Nielsen, p. 658.

76 Nielsen, p. 658.
speculators in every commodity waxed fat.”

Therefore by 1945, there was already a socio-economic polarization in Turkey due to the income inequalities and a small group with greater sources (and power) that managed to emerge from an economy which was previously heavily dependent upon agriculture.

The inequality as Nielsen perceives from similar studies is linked with a certain stage in the development process rather than “steady-state outcome of social change.” Nielsen also states that the issue of income inequalities in a specific country had been heavily analyzed together with the political democracy and functioning of the political rights, which as a result emerged the idea that “political democracy as a long-term consequence of industrialization” was to reduce inequality.

John Taylor and David Williams in regard to the “weak integration of national economies and the excessive differences in income, wealth, and opportunity,” claims them to be connected essentially with politics as they suggest that “…the political power is largely concentrated in the hands of the same wealthy elites who control the economy and who live chiefly in the larger urban centers, particularly in the primate cities.”

They add that decision-making becomes highly centralized which results in the replacement of democratically elected governments with “dictatorships ruled by one person or a small clique,” hence causing a “dangerous polarization” among the ruling elite’s and “those of the rural and urban peasantry’s interests.”

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78 Nielsen, p. 655.

79 Nielsen, p. 656-657.


81 Taylor and Williams, p. 10.
introduction of hegemony of one class, Henri Lefebvre asserts that the dictatorship of either the bourgeoisie or the proletariat is to be exercised over a society together with the inclusion of “culture and knowledge” far beyond the level of influence and even suppressive violence. The reason why Lefebvre uses the term violence could be linked to the idea that, by and large, the various different social sentiments and conditions escape the sphere of authority of the state, as the state was defined to be a group of officials formulating regulations involving the majority even though those regulations were not necessarily produced collectively.

Taylor and Williams argue that it was the government policies that cause a conflict between the two sectors of urban economy; one that is capital-intensive, the other that is labor-intensive. They further add that the governments direct most of their attention and support to the capital intensive modern sector while neglecting the labor-intensive informal sector which is the “chief source of employment.” Sullivan has similar views with Taylor and Williams in that he concludes that “the other sectors of the economy, including most of the service sector and traditional agriculture,” which do not receive foreign capital have suffered for lack of investment and thus “…have not increased their productivity levels, and have become stagnant” even though they “absorbed” much of the work force.

In light of this discussion, it can be argued that when Turkey became more open to the free-market economy instead of wedded to the semi-capitalist, semi-socialist former development policy of “etatism”, the emergence of high rural migration to urban centers and

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83 Durkheim, p. 192.
84 Taylor and Williams, p. 6-7.
85 Sullivan, p. 206-207.
the development of a “marginalized” informal sector was inevitable, as well as the consolidation of the new bourgeoisie class whose benefits were championed over the masses’ needs.

**Re/Production of Urbanscape**

For Lefebvre, the space in different levels and scales are bailiwicks of different social practices; human habitat is linked to architecture; urban space, containing towns and cities, is the major concern of urbanism; and larger territories either “regional, national, continental or worldwide” set the interest of planning and economy. Nevertheless, when spheres of architecture, urbanism, planning, and economy are not fragmented into different realms, only one practice is thought to embrace all in the most privileged way, politics. Politics in this context is related to the decision-making process of a manipulative power of group related to creation/production of space. However, David Harvey warns of the acute dangers of understanding urban process as an active aspect of political-economic development due to his view of urbanization as a “spatially grounded social process in which a wide range of different actors with quite different objectives and agendas interact through a particular configuration of interlocking spatial practices.” To link these ideas, it may be said that politics, or rather power, has the utmost influence on social practices (including, but not limited to architecture, urbanism, planning and economy), and urbanization as a spatial process is very much related to social processes that develop spatially. Indeed, the way

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86 Lefebvre, p. 12.
87 Ibid.
politics and power is exercised on space is generally realized in a passive way, in the form of something else, such as migration.

Migration in Turkey largely happened to be equated with “urbanization.” The urban landscape changed drastically and evolved through the following three phases: at first, new neighborhoods began to be formed in the proximity of historical urban core(s), government buildings, highways and/or industrial plants when the immigrant population was much more than expected. These people who hoped to find opportunity to work started to build up their own gecekondu dwellings on the outskirts of the city even though they did not necessarily find a job right away. In the second phase, these initial neighborhoods were no longer on the periphery of the city; they became surrounded by the newly implemented commercial, industrial, and residential neighborhoods. In the last stage, the first pattern was repeated; the excessive number of immigrants settled down around the regions close to the new work places, but on the other hand, with the price increase in real estate in the urban center, the initial gecekondu settlements either grew in height or were demolished to open space for the new developments.

The unregulated heterogeneous characteristics of the neighboring districts in the city inflicted a total trauma in the delivery of urban services; thus, while the city spread, it lacked the ability to function properly. For example; in Sabah -one of the mainstream newspapers in Turkey- the news about the flood and death of a person in the Esenler district of Istanbul due

to heavy rain was noted in 2007. The details of the news relate that the person died in the textile workshop where he was working while waiting to be rescued by the officials. His workmates who were saved also could not get official help but the help of the citizens. The same tragic rain fall story was also in the another mainstream newspaper, Milliyet, with the title “Flood Nightmare in Istanbul”; the numerous traffic accidents with more than 30 injuries and heavy congestion on the bridges connecting Asia and Europe were reported together with the floods in Gaziosmanpaşa, Esenler, Alibeyköy, and Bağcılar districts of Istanbul; all of these neighborhoods happened to be those in the early gecekondu districts that are no longer in the periphery of the city. This kind of disaster news is not very surprising due to the character of the gecekondu type of settlement, which occupies lands that would be legally impossible to initiate a construction due to “…the restrictions in the Reconstruction, Public Health or Forest Laws.” Thus, the large scale effect of gecekondu neighborhoods was this type of semi-planned cities which was inefficient to deliver public services and to provide its residents the facilities of a healthy and livable environment. Public response to inefficient delivery of urban services was to call Istanbul not a metropolis/megacity, but a “mega-village.” For example, before the local elections of March 28, 2004 one of the leading newspapers in Turkey, Hürriyet, noticed the worries of businessmen in Istanbul for the


selection of mayor candidates by the political parties. The main complain was on how “white
disasters” in Istanbul block the daily life, and how important it is to choose candidates that
will transform Istanbul from a “mega village” whose commerce, industry and customhouses
stop functioning with snow or rainfall into a modern world city that could compete with
cities like Paris, New York or London.

This urban typology, which Turkish folk term kir-kent or as mega-köy meaning rural-
city or mega-village is definitely not seen merely in Turkey. This “neither rural nor urban”
way of urban setting and the “collision between the rural and the urban” is also seen in
China, much of Southeast Asia, India, Egypt, and into some extent West Africa. Diffused
urbanism labelled as “Zwischendstadt” by Sieverts, meaning “in-between-city” was claimed
to be the “defining landscape” of cities in the 20th century regardless of economic power or
urbanism-history backgrounds of countries. Sieverts in his definition implies that the cities
no longer have traditional cores with “recognizable peripheries” but rather “polycentric
webs” that cannot be qualified as either core or periphery. Anthropologist Gregory Guldin,
however, regards this issue as the “blending of rural and urban,” but mostly emphasizes the
density of transactions and networks that connect large urban cores to their surroundings.
Furthermore, a rather ecological case study on urban growth in Argentina describes regions

94 In the original text the word “çağdaş” was used which can be translated as modern, but in this
context it mainly means civilized.
95 Sadi Özdemir, “6.7 katrilyona kanmayın ‘mega köy’ü unutmayın.”
27, 2009).
96 Davis, p. 9.
97 Ibid.
98 Davis, p. 9.
where urban and rural interactions were made as “periurban.”99 The periurban system was not evaluated as rural or urban but as an interface of both, where urban services such as drinking water, electricity, sewer system, pavement or garbage collection were not offered efficiently100 and rural benefits like “capacity to absorb carbon dioxide” or “to regulate water flows, to absorb, store, and distribute short-term river flooding” scarcely existed.101 Thus, nurturing of additional urban cores and spread of urban agglomeration threatening the natural borders of city development (forested areas and water sources), caused a shift in urbanscape of Istanbul from its historical urban core, the Golden Horn, to various others (Beşiktaş-Şişli-Kağıthane, Bakırköy, Kadıköy, Avcılar, Üsküdar, Kartal) during the second half of the 20th century (Fig. 11).

To sum up these ideas from various disciplines, it is necessary to examine the most dominant factors influencing the urban landscape in Turkish cities, the migration and gecekondu trend, together with the two different development policies that were followed in Turkey throughout the 20th century. With reference to Lefebvre’s hierarchical classification mentioned above, it is useful to compare how policies before and after the Second World war affected the city sphere while acknowledging Harvey on the importance of social tone in the urbanization process.


100 Rodriguez, A. F. 1997. Cambios de uso de suelos en el entorno periurbano del Gran Buenos Aires: Estudio de usos de neoeosistemas y ecosistemas residuales en al area no urbana del partido de Berazategui. Licenciatura Thesis, School of Philosophy and Literature, University of Buenos Aires. Quoted in: Morello, Matteucci, and Rodriguez, p.120.

101 Morello, Matteucci, and A. Rodriguez, p.120.
Figure 4- The various gecekondu settlements around the Istanbul Motorway. Photos by Gizem Akdoğan.
Figure 5- Zeyrek, an abandoned historical neighborhood in Istanbul with its new informal dwellers. Photos by Gizem Akdoğan.
Figure 6- An insight to a gecekondu neighborhood. The houses were built near the numerous small industries. Sanayi Mahallesi [Industry-Neighborhood] in Istanbul. Photos by Gizem Akdoğan.
CHAPTER 3 METHODS AND PROCEDURES

Two main arguments are put forward here. First, uneven development of Turkey due to the abandoning of etatist policies was the most important catalyst prompting the massive movement of people to urban centers. Second, the sprawl process of gecekondu neighborhoods and their evolution in Istanbul has been closely linked with the increasing foreign influence on Turkey and capitalist investments of the rightist DP and its ideological heirs. It is useful to provide some historical background on Turkey, including developments achieved in the first half of the 20th century, to be able to make comparisons with the achievements made in the period of 1945-1960, the post-war period.

To be able to comprehend the impacts of the transitions from etatism and modernism in Turkey from 1950s onward, it is important to develop an understanding of the conditions prior to World War II and to locate where Turkey stood in relation to the global trends. Going back to the end of the seventeenth century, when the enlightened states of Europe were already “championing” the needs and interests of the urban population that consisted of merchants and manufacturers over the rural population of peasants and farmers, the Ottoman economy was still oriented forward the opportunities to come from winning on the battlefield, until the Ottomans lost to the Russians in 1699. Some Ottoman rulers in the 18th and 19th centuries had attempts to modernize the transportation system or the army, but they lacked to materialize a broader modernization scheme. The anticipated social change was initiated after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk came to power in the 1920s. Thus, socio-economic development of Turkey is very recent and quite a radical one that had to occur in a very short

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period of time. The observation Samuel Jameson made a decade after the founding of the Turkish Republic still keeps its reliability, for he noted that “it was impossible to know the real Turkey; even the Turks themselves do not know it. Turkey is a process; it is in the making; it is becoming.”\textsuperscript{103} As a consequence, the meanings of certain notions in the developing world is quite different from the developed world where the economic surpluses created by industries, development of cities, and the emergence of “modernization” is spread over the centuries and well-absorbed by their societies. According to the modernization theory by Black, the earlier the societies were to modernize, the easier it had been to “digest new knowledge and technology” and to “absorb the impact gradually.”\textsuperscript{104} Therefore, when examining the cases in the developing world, it should not be forgotten that it was the long history of the modern knowledge, ideas and techniques that prepared the ground for the Industrial Revolution in the West whereas the underdeveloped countries in the first half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century “imported” the Western achievements after realizing that they could not compete with the West economically and scientifically.

In Turkey, during the Atatürk era, what is observed is a struggle to catch up with the industrialized and modernized countries under the umbrella of Kemalist nationalism; the “etatism policy” aimed an economic and social catch up and the promotion of modernism aimed to strengthen the break with the traditionalistic life of an agrarian society. Hence, when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk died in November 1938, Turkey not only lost the first president of the Republic, it was definitely much more than that. Regarded as the genius of

\textsuperscript{104} Black, p. 69.
his century by many including the English Prime Minister David Lloyd George, Atatürk first came into the public sphere as a successful commander in the First World War. Following the division of the Ottoman land by the Allied Powers after the war, Atatürk became a leader to his people as he managed to unify Turks under the ideal of independence. Finally, Atatürk strove to achieve socio-political reforms by founding the Turkish Grand National Assembly on the way to establishing the Republic of Turkey and by abolishing the six century old Sultanate together with the Caliphate. The reforms, signifying the imprint of Atatürk and his political party, the Republican People’s Party (RPP), ranged from replacing of the traditional dress code with the modern one to changing of the Arabic script to Latin, and to the enactment of women’s suffrage and electoral rights even before most of the Western states had extended the vote to women. The reforms made by Atatürk’s leadership sought to minimize the social and physical structural differences among the citizens within Turkey as well as between the Turks and the developed societies of the West. The sick man of Europe was reborn by the first quarter of the twentieth century. This historic turning point was regarded as the awakening of the “dormant Turkoman” after the shock of World War I. Thus; this national awakening set the foundations of an increasing conscience to develop national industries that could compete with that of the developed nations’.

As exemplified in other revolutions in world history, the Turkish revolution, too, had an intellectual background established as early as 1878 with the formation of Jön Türkler [Jeune Turcs-Young Turks] whom were once tagged as “rebels” until the nationalistic

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105 British Prime Minister David Lloyd George statement on Atatürk was: “The centuries rarely produce a genius. It is our bad luck that the great genius of our era was granted to the Turkish nation.”

106 “The sick man of Europe” was a widely used term for the Ottoman Empire during its decline as a world power.

107 Jameson, p. 483.
policies of Mustafa Kemal Pasha began to be realized.\textsuperscript{108} Turkish nationalism was indeed a rebellion at the time; primarily because the Ottoman citizens were not classified by their ethnicities but by their religions under the Ottoman law. Furthermore, there was a distinctive European influence and support over Christian subjects living in the Ottoman Empire. The pressure of the European interference was so severe that the period of Regulations, \textit{Tanzimat}, had begun (in 1856) giving the non-Muslim minorities many rights and privileges. From this time onward, the European imperialists valued any excuse that they could use to interfere with the Ottoman Empire’s internal affairs under the name of protecting the rights of the minorities.\textsuperscript{109} Even though the European imperialists were interfering, not only were non-Muslim subjects already free to practice their religion and hold many rights, they were also by and large the merchants and tradesmen of the vast Ottoman Empire by custom whereas the Muslims were directed more toward agrarian activities, government or military services while some of them worked in industries.\textsuperscript{110}

During the \textit{Tanzimat Era}, the imperialist Europeans also extended their rights in the capitulations,\textsuperscript{,} which were forced to be given by the Ottoman state. The indulgences that were given with the capitulations were causing all manufactured goods to come to the Ottoman land tax-free from certain European countries, which in return blocked nurturing of

\textsuperscript{108} Jameson, p. 484.
\textsuperscript{109} Jameson, p. 485.
\textsuperscript{110} According to Shaw’s study on the occupation of the Istanbul’s residents as of 1885 showed that 95 percent of the state services were conducted by Muslims. In the same table, 62 percent of trade, commerce and industry was seemed to be the occupation of the non-Muslims. Stanford J. Shaw, "The Population of Istanbul in the Nineteenth Century," p. 271.
local industries. Therefore, in the pre-Republican Era, the Ottomans were under the direct influence of the more developed economies.

**From Etatism to Uneven Development**

By contrast to the general opinion that etatism approach in Turkish economy began in the 1920s, it actually did not. The early Republican economy had two phases; the first was between 1923 to the Great Depression of 1929 and the second was from 1929 to the beginning of the Second World War in 1939. In the first phase, Turkey was forced to function as a market economy due to its limited capital and experience but also because there was no other successful economic development model at that time other than Western capitalism. Furthermore, the Lausanne Treaty placed some restrictions (such as trade tariffs) on Turkey’s economy. The private-sector was encouraged to make investments and taxing the peasants was avoided to be able to realize industrial growth. However, the Turkish economy was still primarily dependent upon agriculture, exported “primary commodities” and kept importing “manufactured” items until the Great Depression. When the global Great Depression began in 1929, the “world-wide collapse of capitalism” gave a

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new direction to the Turkish administration.\textsuperscript{116} This new direction was also inevitable since Turkey’s major agricultural exports (cereals, tobacco, and cotton) had a significant price fall which in turn caused popular discontent.\textsuperscript{117} Additionally, the limitations of the Lausanne Treaty on Turkish economic development had expired by that time.\textsuperscript{118} However, during the first period of the early Republican economy, studies were also being made to improve economic conditions; an economic congress was held in Izmir in 1923 that was followed by the establishment of the Business Bank of Turkey\textsuperscript{119} in 1924 which gave credits to business owners, and a special law in 1927 that aimed to encourage industries was enacted.

The second phase of the economic era is marked by the Kemalist principle of etatism which was declared during Congress of the ruling Republican People’s Party in 1931 together with five other principles of nationalism, republicanism, secularism, populism and reformism which were also included in the Constitution later on in 1937. Etatism, as mentioned before, evolved in a new nation-state eager to establish its own industries and in a period when the capitalist model had experienced worldwide failure. Some argued that etatism was a socialist model; however, the large private firms’ value of output grew from 1932 to 1939 by a “factor of about 2.4.”\textsuperscript{120} Furthermore, even though there were state-owned enterprises for textile production, “65 percent of the output of cotton products, 40 percent of


\textsuperscript{118} Bayar, p. 775.

\textsuperscript{119} The original name of the bank in Turkish is \textit{Türkiye İş Bankası}.

wool products or 45 percent of cement” were due to private firms. Nonetheless, as a model it kept encouraging the private initiative while it also gave responsibility to the state to track development opportunities, and reach regions in which the private sector was not interested. Etatism was based on national industries and Turkish entrepreneurship. As such, some changes were deemed necessary to be made. For example, the railroad transportation, banking system, and industrial firms belonged to foreigners. Therefore, the economic agenda consisted of establishing state owned banks, building factories, and obtaining technical assistance from advanced countries. However, sociologically, the Turks by no means were an enterprising people; if there were some who were interested in entrepreneurialism, it was mostly commercial not industrial. Thus, the Turkish state had found it necessary to interfere with the industrialization process.

In order to mobilize the economy, Turkey’s first Five-Year Development Plan was devised in 1933, which initiated the realizations of the import-subsidy industries in iron and steel, textiles, paper, ceramics, glass, and chemical products. Nevertheless, what the Turkish administration had been longing for by 1933 was a wide-ranging economic survey from an expert team. That team leader selected for this special study was Walker D. Hines, a famous economic expert of his time as the director of the American railroads operations during World War I. Hines’ study included his legal associates Goldthwaite H. Dorr and H. Alexander Smith together with experts in fields of agriculture and engineering. However, since Hines died in 1934, Dorr took over his role and completed the survey with Edwin W. Hale, p. 111.

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121 Hale, p. 111.
122 Linke, p. 542.
123 Bayar, p. 775.
125 Bayar, p. 775.
Kemmerer of Princeton University in the same year. The long report had clarified achievements but also set goals to accomplish; according to this report, Turkey’s utmost need was to increase efficiency in production by implementing better transportation and communication systems, and to modernize agriculture and transportation, instead of extensive industrialization. Julian Gillespie, as the U.S. commercial attaché in Istanbul, heavily critiqued this report and urged governments to not to limit their efficiency and quality goals with agriculture alone. However, the implementations of the report’s goals would be seen later on in the 1950s in accordance to increasing American economic influence in Turkey.

The etatist development plan caused for creating work opportunities in different regions of the country. In the middle of Central Anatolia, Ankara was being transformed from a small town into a symbolic capital of Turkish modernization with its wide boulevards, cultural buildings and civil projects; furthermore, the government chose sites in Western and Central Anatolia to locate twelve of the fourteen new state owned investments instead of the former Ottoman capital of Istanbul. Yet because of its geographic and strategic superiority, Istanbul still received two state owned factories in addition to some others that already existed in the region.

In the first Five-Year Development Plan, Eastern Anatolia could not get enough attention. However, developing the east of Turkey was very essential for the new state due to strategic reasons; first, its general character was more nomadic due to lack of enough plains

127 Evered, p. 333-337.
128 Okyar, p. 329.
for agricultural production, less developed due to nomadic life style and retarded government investment, and politically attractive for external and internal agents’ manipulations due to existence of Kurdish ethnic groups. Moreover, Eastern Anatolia lacked an efficient transportation system, for the accessibility of the railroad system built during the Ottoman period was mainly limited to coastal regions. Thus, due to the fact that the railroad system in the South-eastern and Eastern Anatolia was underdeveloped, transportation of the necessary raw materials to the prospective industries or rather transportation of the manufactured goods to other Turkish cities and ports would not be possible. Additionally, the new Turkish state had very scarce capital to begin with; for that reason, the cities that were already within close proximity to a transportation link and nearby raw materials were given priority in the First-Five Year Development Plan. Yet the state did not lose time in making essential investments to encourage industrialization and further development of Anatolia. Without borrowing any external funds, the Kemalist regime of the Early-Republican Era achieved the extension of 1904.6 miles of the existing 2484.8 miles long railroad system which was previously built over the period of 1860-1918. This project finally made it possible to connect the major cities in the Central Anatolia, Black Sea, and Eastern Anatolia regions with the existing lines that were in the regions of Erzurum-Kars, the Iranian border, the Mediterranean, the Aegean, and the Marmara Coast. As a consequence, when the Second Five-Year Development was prepared for the period of 1938-1943, the main focus was

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129 Schoenberg, p. 368.
placed on the development of heavy-industries\textsuperscript{132} and the construction of more than one hundred state owned projects\textsuperscript{133} were foreseen to be located all around Turkey. However, since the war broke out, the Second-Five Year Plan was never truly implemented.

The industries of the Kemalist regime were more than being industrial facilities; they were the symbols of “modernization” and “secularization” of a society that was approximately 80 percent agrarian. Fräulein Lilo Linke as a European traveling to Turkey in 1935 noted that the \textit{Kayseri Bez Fabrikasi} [Kayseri Textile Factory]-the first state owned plant-\textsuperscript{134} was a very pleasant place which was “very well lighted, well-aired, and with all modern conveniences of showers, baths, cloak-rooms, canteens with well-cooked cheap food.” Linke also added that there were housing units that could give accommodation to seven hundred workers’ families together with “an enormous sports ground, football fields, tennis-courts, a swimming-pool, riding grounds, a gymnasium and so on.”\textsuperscript{135} Asiliskender states that there were also public-spaces like an infirmary, cinema, markets, and schools

\textbf{Figure 5.-} A Perspective Drawing of the Powerhouse in the Kayseri Textile Factory. \textbf{Source:} Asiliskender, p.222.

\textsuperscript{132} Hale, p. 101.
\textsuperscript{133} Bayar, p. 775.
\textsuperscript{135} Linke, p. 544.
and small agricultural plots left to be planted by the families of the laborers but noted that the residences were to accommodate one hundred 55 officials and 2,100 workers with their families. When Linke discussed her concerns about the usability of these facilities with the director of the factory, the director explained to her that their purpose of building these facilities was not to turn the workers “into robots nor into a class-conscious proletariat, but into self-respecting citizens who would be aware of the fact that the factory was owned by the State, and therefore was their property, and that the better they worked, the better they would live themselves.” From the observations Linke made of special classes, social and educational clubs, and various sports activities, she then agreed with the optimism of prediction of the director. Kayseri Textile Factory building or rather the industrial complex was used as an example of an ideal “modern” settlement where the facilities and planning scheme aimed to create a healthy work and living environment both physically and psychologically. This insistence on “modernity” was also evident in architecture of the buildings in the industry complex; they were very modern with the extensive use of strict geometric forms, lack of ornaments, and material choices. However, the use of modern architecture by the state-hand was not only limited to industry plants and their regional development schemes. Since “modern” architecture was regarded as a symbol of “national independence, pride and progress,” the general character of the government buildings built in that period mostly tended to be modern.

136 Asiliskender, p. 221.
137 Linke, p. 545.
138 Linke, p. 545.
The economic expectation behind these state owned industries, which were to substitute essential imports (import-subsidy industry model), was to reduce the amount and variety of imported goods from abroad. Hale’s study showed that before the new tariffs were introduced in 1929, textiles, clothing, and sugar made up 44.7 percent of Turkey’s imports, whereas metals, machinery, and vehicles were only 20.2 percent. In 1939, the share of the imported goods reversed to 19.2 percent and 42.5 percent respectively because, the import substituting industries enabled the state to keep its foreign exchange for the import of “investment goods” such as metals, machinery, and vehicles. From 1932 to 1939, the industry’s contribution to GDP grew from 16 percent to 18 percent while Turkey’s real GDP itself grew by an average of 8 percent a year. Consequently, the numbers indicate that the etatism policy worked efficiently until 1939. By contrast, when there was severe shortage of “imported machinery, spare parts, and raw materials, which the industrialized countries were reserving for their own” following the outbreak of World War II, the growth trend in the Turkish economy was reversed, causing an average of 6.9 percent GDP decline per annum during the war period. The reflection of the state economy was also felt in the city scale. It was noted that the cost of living index for Istanbul, increased from a base of 100 in 1939 to 354 in 1945.

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140 Hale, p. 108.
141 Hale, p. 108.
142 Hale, p. 109.
143 Hale, p. 109.
144 Hale, p. 109.
Foreign Influence and the Capitalist Shift

Since Turkey’s import-substituting industrialization policy’s first part had commenced when Atatürk was alive, the state continued the production in the state-owned enterprises and made the essential products available in the Turkish market during World War II. Yet, the private sector’s productivity both in agriculture and industry declined during the war, causing a reduction in supply and increase in demand for goods and services by the government which resulted with a “four-fold rise in price levels” during the war years. By 1941, the government had to use the “karne” system as a way to control the public demand for certain goods such as bread, flour, or sugar, which as a social memory is still told to new generations in Turkey. Therefore, the economic conditions worsened by the war together with other political pressures made the single-party rule in Turkey more problematic both for the people and the RPP government.

Even though there was a single party rule in Turkey, President Atatürk had made attempts to encourage the foundation of opposition parties, especially when the country was struck by the global financial crisis. By that time, economist Fethi Okyar, who was in favor of greater free enterprise rather than less, became the first leader of an opposition party, the

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145 Singer, p. 156.
146 Singer, p. 156.
147 Following the death of Atatürk in November 1938, İsmet İnönü—the former prime minister and a most relied upon friend Atatürk took the president’s seat near the time the World War II began. As a military officer who took major roles in the Turkish War of Independence, İnönü avoided entering Turkey into another war. This was also due to the motto of Turkish foreign policy; a famous statement of Atatürk, “peace at home, peace in the world.” However, the increasing pressure from the Allies for Turkey to stop trading with Germany and the expectations of Great Britain and the U.S. for Turkey to act as an ally resulted with Turkey’s entrance to WWII in 1945.
148 Karne in Turkish is used for describing the “voucher” system used during World War II, by the İnönü government, which aimed to control the public demand and supply of certain commodities. However, the voucher system resulted in high demand for the black market during the war era.
149 The empty shelves in the grocery stores or long queues in front of the bakeries are such memories.
Free Party, in 1930. However, the party’s political life did not last long because it became a party for people who were against the Kemalist social secularization projects which symbolized the essential values of the Republic. When once again the country’s economy was badly affected from another global crisis, the Second World War, President İsmet İnönü approved the opening of other political parties as well. The DP, just like the short-lived Free Party, had a capitalist orientation rather than etatist. In the elections of 1946, the DP could only win one seventh of the votes, but in four years, the party was able to form the government. Thus, Atatürk’s initial goal of implementing the multi-party system in order to achieve greater democracy was finally realized in 1946.

The post-World War II era was quite a challenge for Turkey, first due to the Soviet pressure and territorial claims on the control of the Straits and on the north-eastern border towns of Kars and Ardahan and second due to the economic devastation of Germany, Turkey’s major trade partner. Hence, under these circumstances, Turkey chose to align with the United States and Western Europe. At that point, to prevent further spread of communism and block Soviet pressure in Turkey (and Greece), the U.S. Congress signed Public Law 75 in 1947, commonly known as the Truman Doctrine, which proposed a military and economic aid package for Greece and Turkey. Soon after the U.S. Secretary of State Marshall announced an economic plan and the Economic Recovery Act for Western Europe, aid was

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150 Hale, p. 103.  
151 Hale, p. 103.  
152 Bayar, p. 776.  
154 A. C. Edwards notes that “the war has brought another serious economic injury to Turkey- it has deprived her of her best customer and most effective supplier.” Edwards, p. 390.  
155 Satterthwaite, p. 74.
also approved for Turkey (together with Greece) in 1948.\textsuperscript{156} This aid which proposed
technical expertise and financial means for Turkey would also accelerate internal migration
pattern in Turkey.

The “Marshall Aid” projected the introduction of more farm machinery and
technological methods in order “to achieve a level somewhat higher than is possible under a
subsistence village economy.”\textsuperscript{157} Three months prior to the Marshall Aid’s arrival in July
1948, Turkey became a member of Organization for European Economic Cooperation
(OEEC). With the acceptance of the foreign aid, Hershlag (a well-known writer on Turkish
economics) asserts that “a country full of nationalist apprehensions and feelings of isolation”
experienced a fundamental shift in the theoretical framework of the etatism of the thirties.\textsuperscript{158}
Mustafa Aydin notes that in terms of economics and foreign policy, the era of 1945-1960 was
marked with Turkey’s total dependence on the West.\textsuperscript{159} Therefore, the transition from the
period of etatism to a more Western influenced economy model was initiated in respect to
global changes.

However, if referring back to the American experts’ report on the Turkish
economy,\textsuperscript{160} Trask mentions that when Dorr visited Turkey again in 1949 and in 1950, he
learnt from the officials that Hines-Dorr-Kemmerer report had been the Turkish

\textsuperscript{156} Satterthwaite, p. 81.
\textsuperscript{157} Robinson, p. 397.
\textsuperscript{160} As mentioned earlier, the report had highlighted that Turkey should mechanize agriculture, increase productiviy, and improve the road network.
government’s “Bible.” The appreciation of this report in the post-war period was not surprising at all, given the political and economic shift of Turkey to the Western bloc.

Furthermore, the appreciation of Turkish government officials is strongly related to the new class formation composed of industrialists and traders that evolved with the industrialization of Turkey, under the “etatism” policies. As Parvin and Hiç notes the new economic class had challenged the “supremacy of the bureaucrats and the military” while the “large landowners, who occupied a considerable number of seats in the parliament” alienated themselves from the “intensified” etatism policies after Atatürk’s death. The Prime Minister Menderes was one of those landowners in the parliament and was quite displeased with the Republicans’ land distribution law of the mid 1940s; thus, his government altered the law for the distribution of public lands but not the redistribution of the private ones. Therefore, the Democrat Party denounced etatism in favor of more liberal economic policies, rejected land reform but promoted agricultural reform.

The economy under the DP went through two phases as well. In the first phase, due to the increased rate of the lands in cultivation, the agricultural sector managed to produce surpluses. Owing much to the good weather conditions during 1948-1953, the mechanization of agriculture, and the elimination of taxes, the agriculture grew at an annual

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161 Curti and Birr, Prelude to Point Four, p.184; William Phillips to General Douglas A. MacArthur (Chief of Staff), April 11, 1933, DS 867.50A/ 14A (about Somervell). Quoted in: Trask, p.75.  
163 Singer, p. 157.  
164 Parvin, Hic, p.212.  
166 Okyar, p. 331.
rate of 11.5%\textsuperscript{167} in the period of 1950-1953.\textsuperscript{168} After OEEC membership, due to the regulations, the Menderes government enabled free-trade with the other member countries, which rose by 75 percent. Since there were agricultural surpluses and new trade regulations, Turkey’s export rate increased in this period. What is more, despite the import rate increasing more than that of the export rate, there was an overall growth in the economy.\textsuperscript{169} Morris Singer notes the expansion of the Turkish economy as a whole to be 11 percent per annum between 1950 and 1953.\textsuperscript{170} In 1954, Turkish parliament passed a law to encourage foreign investment (Code no. 6224) in Turkey which was regarded to be a very liberal policy, because with this law (that was prepared by the American experts), the Turkish market allowed foreign investments not only as capital but also in the form of machinery, equipment, license and even as patent rights.\textsuperscript{171} However, in the second phase, agricultural production fell and so did the export rate of Turkey. Moreover, due to huge international loans previously used in the first stage of the DP administration, the economy underwent into a serious crisis because Turkey was no longer able to borrow any more funds from abroad.\textsuperscript{172}

After damaging its reputation, spending all the foreign exchange that was not spent during the war, digging Turkey into foreign debt, politicizing religion, and with the rise of anti-Americanism within Turkey, the DP government was removed from the parliament with the military coup of 1960.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[167] Singer gave a close figure stating that the agricultural growth for the period of 1950-1953 was 12 percent a year. Singer, p. 158.
\item[168] Bayar, p. 776.
\item[170] Singer, p. 158.
\item[172] Bayar, p. 777.
\end{footnotes}
CHAPTER 4 RESULTS

It is evident that during the period of 1945-1960, the American technical and economic help sped up the technological development of the Turkish army, the construction of all-weather roads, which increased accessibility, and the progress of especially the machinery industry in Turkey. Osman Okyar mentions that since the military financial burden on the Turkish economy was lessened as a result of the U.S. aid, the “flow of resources available for investment” whether directly or indirectly increased.173 However, in the 1950s, the income distribution gap was widened as the “share of the wage-earners in the G.N.P.” fell by 7 percent for agriculture and by 22 percent for the employees working in state enterprises.174 Similar to Kuznets’ industrialization theory that was mentioned earlier for an agrarian society, the liberalization era’s first outcome would be the income inequality following the economic growth of some sectors. Since there was widening income inequality, the next step of the social transition in the form of the rural-to-urban migration pattern would then commence in modern Turkey.

Easing Migration in the 1950s

During the DP governance, the state began to direct its attention more towards the infrastructure projects and mechanization of agriculture.175 This outcome was not unexpected in the given economic approach of the DP. Previously, the DP criticized the direct state interference with productive activities as the party argued that the involvement of the state

173 Okyar, p. 331.
174 Eastham, p. 132-133.
175 Bayar, p. 776.
should be limited to infrastructure investments for energy, water, communications, and transport.\(^{176}\) Thus, in the public construction priority was given to the construction of power plants which enabled Turkey to almost triple its energy production in the 1950s.\(^{177}\) Investing in the energy sector (like the road constructions) aimed to attract the private sector’s interest. However, one of the most significant and debated projects of the 1950s was the “reconstruction” of Istanbul, which contradicted with the former governments’ attention toward Ankara, the new capital. Some 7,000 houses were demolished in Istanbul\(^{178}\) in order to install public squares or widen the existing roads; however, the state did not provide housing for the owners of the demolished houses and failed to compensate the owner’s economic loss. It was again during Istanbul’s “reconstruction” that many historical buildings and public fountains were removed elsewhere within Istanbul from their original locations or were demolished completely. Menderes’ “reconstruction” project also had negative effects on the poor due to the rise of the real estate prices.

The other major change during the 1950s in Turkey was the augmentation of the farm machinery and motorized vehicles which as an outcome sped up the detachment of rural work force and migration to urban centers. In the mid 1920s, the state encouraged farmers to purchase tractors and other kinds of farm machinery, but as mentioned earlier and as can be seen from the figures below, the significant increase in the number of farm machinery

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\(^{176}\) Okyar, p. 332.

\(^{177}\) Ibid.

occurred when Turkey started to receive external aids and credits (Table-2). In addition, the number of motorized vehicles in 1950 was 36,000 but in 1960 it reached up to 100,000.\footnote{Yurt Ansiklopedisi [Encylopedia of the Country], 1984 ed., s.v., “Yerleşme Düzeni ve Kentleşme [in English: Planning and Urbanization]: Nüfusun Kır-Kent Birleşimi [in English: The Population’s Rural-Urban Combination].”}

### Table 2—Total Farm Machinery in Turkey, by Type, for the Years 1948, 1952, 1954

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Machines</th>
<th>1948</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1954</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tractors</td>
<td>1,756</td>
<td>31,415</td>
<td>37,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plows (tractor drawn)</td>
<td>1,472</td>
<td>30,766</td>
<td>38,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disc harrows (tractor drawn)</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>9,623</td>
<td>14,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivators (tractor drawn)</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>4,028</td>
<td>5,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailers</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>12,982</td>
<td>18,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>1,178</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The outcome of augmenting farm machinery was to be seen in the following years with the decrease of labor demand in agriculture. If a tractor would be able to substitute up to 10 workers and if the number of tractors used in agriculture increased from 961 in 1936 to 40,282 in 1955,\footnote{Şenyapılı, p. 118.} Robinson optimistically estimated that at least 2 of every 10 families that made a living from agriculture could find a job in the rural areas by opening a small store- a “coffee shop” for example, if the competition allows, “a service station if he could get a franchise,” if he has any specific skill maybe a “craft shop” of some kind and maybe a
“restaurant” if his village is by the highway. This estimation leaves out the majority of 8 families without a job in the rural areas who were tempted by the big cities opportunities.

In addition to the labor force that worked in the farms, the futures of another group of people also changed with the introduction of tractors and other machinery in agriculture. This group was the small farm owners who were not able to get credits from Ziraat [Agricultural] Bank in order to own a tractor because their properties were often too little to be counted as an economic guaranty. Furthermore, the operation of a tractor in a small field would not be very feasible in economical sense. As a result, the small farmers who could not compete with the big farm owners with machinery found the solution in selling their properties and using that money for migrating into big cities.

Related to the developments in transportation, the passenger traffic “dramatically” increased as well; there was almost a seven-fold increase in the number of passengers travelling by road (Table-3). With respect to the governments’ investment policies, the trends in the transportation system tended to change in favor of the road network starting with the 1950s; for this reason, the railroad’s share in passenger traffic sharply fell (Table-4). The decrease in the passenger numbers travelling by railroad also fell due to the limited government spending on the construction of new railroads and technical upkeep. Since the governments changed their economic orientation after the Second World War, the railroads

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181 Robinson, p. 398.
182 Şenyaplı, p. 118.
183 Şenyaplı, p. 118.
184 Robinson, p. 400.
of the Early-Republican Era, which connected the different cities in the country, gradually lost their importance. The map showing the construction of the railroads and their construction periods clearly explains the ideological shift (Table-5).

### Table 3- Increase in the Passenger Traffic, for the Years 1948, 1955

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1948</th>
<th>1955</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Passenger-kms. by rail</td>
<td>2,545,800</td>
<td>3,917,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger-kms. by road</td>
<td>1,211,070</td>
<td>8,090,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Robinson, “Turkey’s Agrarian Revolution and the Problem of Urbanization,” p.400.

### Table 4- Passenger Transportation Trends, for the Years 1955, 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1955</th>
<th>1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Road</td>
<td>73.1%</td>
<td>93.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sealine*</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airline*</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Domestic


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186 In the “Tenth Year March” composed for the tenth year celebrations of the Turkish Republic the railroads were also mentioned: “…Led by the Chief Commander who is respected by the whole world,‘We weaved the motherland from all sides with the iron nets…”
Figure 6. Map of Turkey showing mainline railroad constructions in different time periods. Produced by Gizem Akdoğan.

Sources: State Railroads of Turkish Republic, http://www.tcdd.gov.tr/genel/aciлистархleri.htm; Kolars and Malin, p.239.
To give some sort of hope to the unemployed rural workers, the “Marshall Aid” that helped enlarging the road network in Turkey, thus, made it easier to migrate to urban centers from the villages and little towns. Hence, the state road network length increased from 47,080 km in 1950 to 61,542 km in 1960.\textsuperscript{187} All-weather roads were only 37 percent of the road network in 1952 and by 1960 it reached up to 63 percent.\textsuperscript{188} On the other hand, it had been stated by George McGhee,\textsuperscript{189} the U.S. government’s total contribution to Turkish road development by providing equipment and expertise from the U.S. Public Road Administration had been $27,600,000 the by the end of 1953 and with Turks’ own expenditure of $293,000,000 some thirteen thousand miles of all-weather road network was constructed by 1954.\textsuperscript{190} The expenditure by the Turkish government depended on outside sources and during the 1950s; five-million dollars from the total external debt would be the cost of the road construction machines alone.\textsuperscript{191} Thus, the rapid growth actually depended a lot on the foreign loans.

The rapid mechanization process in agriculture and the dramatic increase in the transportation network and passenger traffic led to rapid growth in urban centers; Robinson estimated that when the birth and death rates were assumed to remain the same during the five year period from 1950 to 1955, the increase in the percentage of people living in cities

\textsuperscript{189} George McGhee was the first Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey and later on he became the Ambassador to Turkey (1951-1953).
\textsuperscript{190} Satterthwaite, p. 82.
from 25.2 percent\textsuperscript{192} to 28.5 percent would be equal to 800,000 individuals.\textsuperscript{193} However, two years after his estimation in 1958, the final official figures showed that the actual increase in the urban population was from 22 percent in 1950 to 28.8 percent in 1955; from 4,593,261 urbanites in 1950 to 6,927,343 urbanites in 1950.\textsuperscript{194} Therefore, the figures from the UN database, an additional some 2,300,000 individuals (not 800,000), make Robinson’s theory for the displaced breadwinners even more pessimistic.

Before the 1950s, the rural and urban population growth rates tended to be more or less close to each other. As a result of the rural to urban migration in the 1950s and onward, the population growth in the rural areas had not been able to surpass the urban rates (Table-5).

\textsuperscript{192} With reference to \textit{Annuaire Statistique} for 1951, publication no.332 of the Central Office of Statistics at Ankara [with the exception of Brice, authors generally translate it as State Institute of Statics], Brice also notes the percentage of the urban population as 25.2 percent. W. C. Brice, “The Population of Turkey in 1950,” \textit{The Geographical Journal}, Vol.120, No. 3, (September, 1954): p.347.

\textsuperscript{193} Robinson, p. 399.

Migration indicates the unequal distribution of public services. Eastham notes that for the 1950s, there was one doctor for 675 persons in Istanbul, but for some eastern provinces, the rate could be as low as one doctor for 15,000;\footnote{Eastham, p. 133.} the same type of inequalities were also seen for “water, sanitation, electricity, health and transport services.”\footnote{Eastham, p. 133.} The State Planning Department’s study demonstrated the development levels of cities in Turkey for the year 2003 (Fig. 9); various factors such as economic indicators, literacy rate, health, transportation, and sanitation coverage and such were included during the estimations.\footnote{Dinçer, Özalsan and Kavasoğlu, p. 79.} In terms of development, there may be differences in real numbers for each year, but since this
map is a reflection of a longer period, the assumption may be made that the general boundaries of the development levels on a regional scale will not be likely to differ. There are also maps showing the migration pattern from other cities to Istanbul between, based on the population censuses, 1980 and 1985 (Fig.10-11-12). If the immigration maps to Istanbul are compared with the map showing the development levels of the cities, the relation between uneven development and migration would be seen. As expected, the least developed cities are the major sources of rural out-migration (Fig.11). Apart from the rural out-migration, the significant urban out-migration pattern is from the developed cities of Ankara, Izmir, Antalya or Bursa to Istanbul. The migration from one developed city to another is generally urban-to-urban (Fig. 12); this can be attributed to migration of students and the middle strata (government officials, scholars, skilled workers, and so on), but also to the “chain migration” model where the migrant uses some cities as stepping stones toward his/her intended destination.
Figure 7. The Development Levels of the Turkish Cities for the year 2003. Addition of a numbering by Gizem Akdoğan.

Figure 8. Map of Turkey showing the cities that provided the highest number of migrants from 1980 to 1985. Produced by the Gizem Akdoğan.

Figure 9. Map of Turkey showing the cities that experienced the highest rate of rural out-migration to Istanbul from 1980 to 1985. Produced by Gizem Akdoğan. Source: State Institute of Statistics Prime Ministry Republic of Turkey, *Census of Population, 1985: Internal Migration by Permanent Residence*, publication no. 1381, p.199-204.
Figure 10. Map of Turkey showing the cities that experienced the highest rate of urban out-migration to Istanbul from 1980 to 1985. Produced by Gizem Akdoğan. Source: State Institute of Statistics Prime Ministry Republic of Turkey, Census of Population, 1985: Internal Migration by Permanent Residence, publication no. 1381, p.199-204.
In terms of the housing policies in the period of 1945-1960, there was a relaxation of the government’s concern with and insistence upon the modern and healthy housing model and region planning as a reflection of the liberal orientation of the DP. The new private factories were established mostly in Istanbul; foreign investors chose the most accessible zones for their industries and firms in contrast to former state policy which aimed to offer “equal” opportunity of development to each region within Turkey. Since the immigration rates were high and there was an accommodation problem in the cities, the DP government tried to solve the housing problem for the poor with allowing gecekondu houses, and permitting densification of the existing neighborhoods or building of dense suburbs for the middle income groups via construction of multi-storey apartment buildings. The outcomes of densification and expanding human print, and the pattern of sprawl from the historical urban core toward some distant settlements in the outskirts of Istanbul, which was initiated in the 1950s, can be seen for the years 1975, 1990, and 2005.

198 Ekinci, p. 19.
Figure 11 - Urban Spatial Development of Istanbul. Modified by Gizem Akdoğan.

CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

The Turkish case, as it is related to the informal economic sector and *gecekondu* sprawl in Istanbul, displays some strong connections between the political and economic agenda of the government’s impact on the urbanization process. As some previous studies also have suggested and argued, the significant rise of some modern sectors with foreign investment created a new class of people whose benefits were highly protected by the help of politics. After World War II, a “protective hand” reached from the other side of the world in order to “protect” Turkey from Soviet territorial and ideological “pressure.” The U.S. aid had tremendous positive influence in terms of training military personnel, providing up-to-date military equipment, and expanding regional accessibility within Turkey. Furthermore, the financial aid directed towards agriculture and infrastructure encouraged the private sector’s rise in Turkey starting from the 1950s.

However, while these policies were realized, the human factor was largely neglected; there were lack of investments for the displaced peasants, in terms of creating jobs or housing options. The former urbanites had to share the urban resources with the newcomers: the parks, buildings, streets, schools, hospitals, cinemas, busses, ferries; and even the electricity, drinking water and air in the city. Hence, it is debatable whether or not the very liberal policies of the DP were economically or politically sound decisions. As the expansions of *gecekondu* housing during the last few decades is observable, however, the liberal policies of the DP and other rightist-parties caused a major deterioration of Istanbul in terms of its historical architecture, historical urban core, urban planning, and natural environment. Istanbul has been polished up, promoted to be the dreamy capital of the Ottomans to attract foreigners; however, as a city, it has already turned out to be a nightmare for the
Istanbullu.\textsuperscript{200} There is also the inefficiency of governments to include all groups of the society in the decision-making process; as Taylor and Williams already mentioned, the lack of direct political involvement of the masses may turn democracies into dictatorships. Even though it is not within the scope of this paper, it is hereby mentioned that the lack of direct involvement in politics and decision-making also may cause the neglected people to orient toward other power groups and be a subject of other power groups. As a result, the burden of the rapid economic growth of a group of people in Turkey has been put on the shoulders of the masses and the cities.

By making political and economic connections, it is not very difficult to predict the future of Istanbul. Recently, the media in Turkey mentioned the construction of a third bridge in Istanbul to connect the city from the north. As north of Istanbul is presently still a forested area and since it is public land, it does not require much imagination to assume that the last piece of forest in Istanbul might be gone with the bridge and the linking highway construction.

From a more global and cultural perspective, informal solutions to solve the housing problem is not likely to fade away easily due to transmitting of worldviews to new generations. Whenever a baby is born in a “slum” neighborhood in the developing/underdeveloped world, just like elsewhere the existing worldviews, beliefs, symbols, and myths together with the survival patterns in the city will be transmitted to the newborn. Therefore the way the newborn will comprehend the conditions will be different than someone from outside his locale. Durkheim once stated that for the church-member the

\textsuperscript{200} “Istanbullu” means one who is from Istanbul in Turkish.
beliefs and practices of his religious life were already there for him when he was born and if these beliefs and practices existed before him, they were external to him.\textsuperscript{201} Hence, whether these conditions are named as “politics,” “economics,” “religion,” “custom,” or “law,” they are all external to the individual whose comprehension of these conditions depend on where he/she was born. To this point, cities have been hosting two-thirds of the global population growth as the target destinations since 1950\textsuperscript{202} and witnessing the emergence of more than 200,000 so called slums\textsuperscript{203} in their landscape. When Durkheim’s notion of externality is applied to the current trend of informal settlements -the most distinctive feature of the cities in the developing world- the existing patterns of life is likely to shape the next generations as well. Therefore, unless a major social change occurs that would make a sharp break with the past, it would not be very wrong to make a prediction that the sprawl of \textit{gecekondu} neighborhoods is likely to continue or get even worse.

\textit{Gecekondu} as a housing problem and informal economic activities (carried out by the displaced workforce) can be a stage in Turkey’s socio-economic development. However, the liberal policies of the Post-Second World War Era demonstrated that neither pardoning/legitimiting the existing \textit{gecekondu} dwellings nor giving local authorities more power to deal with this matter could not prevent the expansion of the informal housing and economic sector. Furthermore, it is not hard to predict that legitimizing squatters will not improve their existing physical quality. Therefore, instead of giving power to the municipalities, the regulations should have formulated different solution mechanisms to the \textit{gecekondu} problem and provided a direct connection with the ones that are in need and that

\textsuperscript{201} Durkheim, p.64.
\textsuperscript{202} Davis, pp.1-2.
\textsuperscript{203} Davis, p.26.
are taking advantage of gecekondu housing. These mechanisms could range from making more investment in the Turkish countryside, in relation to each region’s socio-economic activity, to creating job opportunities for the new urban residents. In addition, since the literacy rates are lower in rural Turkey than that of urban, the ways to attract intellectuals and more literate groups to reside in the countryside should be explored; for example, activities such as cultural tourism (since Asia Minor is very rich in terms of historical ruins from ancient civilizations), or organic agriculture can be promoted for the regions of Central Anatolia, Black Sea and the Eastern Anatolia.

To conclude, this thesis attempted to clarify how various development processes of different scopes and scales that were not actively related to urban planning of Istanbul from 1945 to 1960 resulted in with the growth of the gecekondu neighborhoods and informal urban economy following World War II.
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FIGURE SOURCES

Fig.1  Author’s collection: (January, 2009).

Fig.2  Author’s collection: (September, 2004).


Fig.4  Author’s collection: (January, 2009).

Fig.5  Author’s collection: (April, 2007).

Fig.6  Author’s collection: (February, 2009).


Fig.10  Graphics by the author. State Institute of Statistics Prime Ministry Republic of Turkey, Census of Population, 1985: Internal Migration by Permanent Residence, publication no. 1381, p.199-204.

Fig.11  Graphics by the author. Source: State Institute of Statistics Prime Ministry Republic of Turkey, Census of Population, 1985: Internal Migration by Permanent Residence, publication no. 1381, p.199-204.
Fig.12 Graphics by the author. Source: State Institute of Statistics Prime Ministry Republic of Turkey, Census of Population, 1985: Internal Migration by Permanent Residence, publication no. 1381, p.199-204.

### TABLE SOURCES


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