Arenas of social movement outcomes: accounting for political, cultural, and social outcomes of three land-use social movements

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Arenas of social movement outcomes: accounting for political, cultural, and social outcomes of three land-use social movements

by

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A dissertation submitted to the graduate faculty
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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Ames, Iowa
2009

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Social Movement Literature:
1. Social Movement Organization (SMO)
2. Political Opportunity Structures (POS)
3. New Social Movements (NSM)
4. National Farm Labor Union (NFLU) – from Jenkins and Perrow (1977)
5. United Farm Workers (UFW) – from Jenkins and Perrow (1977)
6. “Share Our Wealth” (SOW) – from Amenta, Dunleavy, and Bernstein (1994)
7. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)

Ames Smart Growth Alliance (ASGA)
1. Ames Smart Growth (ASG)
2. Land Use Policy Plan (LUPP)
3. Planning and Zoning Commission (PNZ)
4. Gateway Overlay Zoning District (GOZD)
5. Ames Citizens for Better Local Government (ACBLG)
6. Advocates for Responsible Urban Design (ARUD)

Brunswick Smart Growth (BSG)
1. Troy Area Labor Council (TALC)
2. Planned Development Districts (PDD)
3. Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS)
4. Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS)
5. State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA)

Citizens of Greater Centreville (CGC)
1. Critical Areas Act (CAA)
2. Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE)
3. Centreville Wharf Advisory Committee (CWAC)
4. Corsica River Conservancy (CRC)

Variable Names:
1. Organizational viability (VIABLE)
2. Tactics and strategies (TACTICS)
3. High levels of participation (HIGH PART)
4. Clearly defined diagnostic and prognostic frames (FRAMES)
5. Political opportunity structures (POS)
6. Indigenous organization (INDIG)
7. Media favorable toward development (MEDIA)
8. Public opinion favorable toward development (PUBLIC)
9. Political policy or process change (POLICY)
10. Representation (REPRESENT)
11. Stop development (STOP)
12. Social capital (SOCIAL)
13. Collective identity (IDENTITY)
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ABSTRACT

The study of social movement outcomes has started to resurface within social movement literature. This resurfacing of the study of the ultimate dependent variable has led to a stronger conceptualization of outcomes as well as better measures of outcomes. In this dissertation, I offer suggestions for how to further strengthen the conceptualization and operationalization of social movement outcomes by providing an analytical framework that views social movement outcomes as three overlapping arenas: political, cultural, and social. I use three cases of smart growth social movements to demonstrate the usefulness of the framework for the study of social movement outcomes. Following a recent program of study within social movement outcomes, the data is analyzed using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Ragin 1987). By conceptualizing these arenas as overlapping and influencing one another, social movement outcomes are not seen as occurring all at once at one point in time nor are they seen as resulting in a categorical outcome of success or failure. This conceptualization allows researchers to examine a multitude of outcomes, which will help at parsing apart how some causal factors relate to specific arenas of outcomes. Furthermore, this conceptual framework also offers insight into how gains in one arena may help or hinder gains in another arena.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, social movement research has returned to the study of social movement outcomes\(^1\) (Amenta and colleagues 1992, 1994, 1999, 2004; Andrews 1997, 2001, 2004; Cress and Snow 1996, 2000; Diani 1997; Earl 2000, 2004; Giugni 1998, 1999, 2004, 2007; Halebsky 2001, 2006; McCammon and colleagues 2001a, 2001b, 2007, 2008). When addressing social movement influence scholars often start by examining whether a given outcome would have occurred in absences of social movement activity (Amenta and Young 1999). The central issue then becomes empirically demonstrating a causal relationship between movement activity and specific outcomes (Giugni 1999; Earl 2000). In order to meet this task and to deal with social movement outcomes validly, we must answer a number of central questions. First, how do we define social movement outcomes? Likewise, how do we define whether an outcome is a success or not? Finally, how do we measure, precisely, social movement outcomes?

In this dissertation, I address these questions by examining three land-use social movements (also referred to as smart growth movements). Specifically, I explore the emergence, mobilization, and influence of three smart growth social movements located in Iowa, Maryland, and New York. I ask: do grassroots collective action efforts by localized community groups positively impact political, social, and/or cultural outcomes? Data come from a triangulation of methodologies including participant observation of

\(^1\) Outcomes, influences, and consequences will be used interchangeably throughout this paper. In all three cases, I am referring to the changes “caused” within social life that are due to social movement activity.
movement-related events and activities, in-depth interviews with key stakeholders, and content analysis of media coverage, city documents, and smart growth organizational literature. Furthermore, I offer suggestions for how to further strengthen the conceptualization and operationalization of social movement outcomes by providing an analytical framework that views social movement outcomes as three overlapping arenas: political, cultural, and social. I use three cases of smart growth social movements to demonstrate the usefulness of the framework for the study of social movement outcomes.

Following a recent program of study within social movement outcomes, the data is analyzed using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) (Ragin 1987). Ragin’s (1987) QCA is an inductive, quasi-experimental approach, which relies on the use of Boolean algebraic logic for small-N comparisons. Using the three case studies, I identify a complex list of possible causal indicators as well as outcome properties that span across the three arenas of movement outcomes. QCA is used to identify either the absence or presence of independent and dependent variables. Through an in-depth comparison of the three case studies, the most relevant causal factors are identified with specific social movement outcomes and irrelevant factors are removed from the equation.

The research findings suggest social movements experience success in a number of arenas including increasing social capital, influencing public policy, and swaying public opinion. Furthermore, successes and failures are strongly tied to the joint effects of internal social movement characteristics and external environmental factors. Additionally, by conceptualizing these arenas as overlapping and influencing one another, social movement outcomes are not seen as occurring all at once at one point in time nor are they seen as resulting in a categorical outcome of success or failure. This
conceptualization allows researchers to examine a multitude of outcomes, which will help at parsing apart how some causal factors relate to specific arenas of outcomes. Furthermore, this conceptual framework also offers insight into how gains in one arena may help or hinder gains in another arena.

DEFINING AND MEASURING SOCIAL MOVEMENT OUTCOMES

Gamson’s study ([1975] 1990) on 53 challenging groups is often identified as the seminal research study on social movement outcomes. In his study, Gamson examines the role of internal movement characteristics on social movement outcomes. The internal movement characteristics that Gamson emphasizes are organizational variables, specifically structure, goals, and tactics used by the challenging group. Gamson examines the influence of these internal movement characteristics on “successful” gains in two areas of outcomes: acceptance and new advantages. Acceptance is when the challenging group is seen by the antagonist as a legitimate set of interests. New advantages are in reference to the attainment of goals sought by the challenging group. What Gamson found was that single issue and nondisplacing (i.e., reformist not revolutionary) demands, the use of violent or disruptive tactics, and highly formalized organization (i.e., bureaucratic and centralized) were positively related to “acceptance” and “new advantages” by the challenging group.

Despite a number of consistent findings regarding Gamson’s claims (Frey, Dietz, and Kalof 1992; Giugni 1998), a reanalysis of Gamson’s data by Goldstone (1980) provided an alternative explanation to successful outcomes. In addition to examining internal social movement characteristics, Goldstone looked at the broader socio-political context and how this related to successful outcomes. What Goldstone found was that
internal movement characteristics identified by Gamson had no effect on the successful attainment of acceptance or new advantages. Rather, it was the timing of movement action during periods of “national crisis” that predicted successful gains by challenging groups. Gamson’s (1990) central findings were also challenged by Piven and Cloward (1979) who supported Gamson’s claim that disruptive tactics are important, but just as important is the opportunity that a divided elite provides for successful movement outcomes. Piven and Cloward (1979) also argued that “new advantages” were not useful measures of success for the poor people movements because new advantages may be beneficial to SMOs but rarely have any lasting or direct effect on the intended beneficiaries (i.e., disadvantaged and disenfranchised peoples). The extensive examination and subsequent discussion of Gamson’s work has led to a number of issues. The first issue is in relation to a number of conceptual problems including identifying what constitutes “success” or “failure” of a social movement outcome as well as differentiating between intended and unintended outcomes. The second issue is related to potential causal factors (internal movement characteristics or external environmental factors) that influence certain outcomes. I will start by identifying how outcomes have typically been addressed within social movement studies, and I will offer a conceptual framework for how to organize social movement outcomes for future study.

Defining what constitutes a social movement outcome is often a difficult task. The difficulty in defining an outcome is due in part to the fact that social movements can influence many different areas of social life simultaneously. As stated by Cress and Snow (2000), social movement outcomes can vary greatly “extending from state-level policy decisions to expansion of a movement’s social capital to changes in participants’
biographies” (2000: 1064). In addition, social movement outcomes can be intended or unintended. That is, did social movement actors intentionally target something as a preferable outcome (e.g., change in public policy), or was an outcome the result of unintentional consequences of social movement mobilization (e.g., collective identity)?

Related to whether the outcome is intended or unintended is the question of whether or not an outcome is able to be empirically investigated? Outcomes can be easily and directly measured as is the case with some public policy legislation and securing financial resources for at risk populations, or it can be much more difficult to empirically measure as is the case with changes in values and norms and changes in structural location within a social network.

Another important factor is related to what constitutes a “successful” outcome. Some social movements may get sympathetic individuals into important positions of power, may get favorable legislation passed, may secure valuable financial resources, and may have widespread support for their cause. However, the social movement may never demonstrate any actual changes to the beneficiary group (e.g., alleviating poverty). It could also be the case that outcomes are not realized until long after a social movement has demobilized. Because many social movements attack systemic problems within political and social structure, their influence is typically not realized until long after their mobilization. There may be evidence of short term successes as is the case with influencing the political agenda and getting favorable legislation passed, but the more systemic target of a social movement may not be realized until long after the social movement has come to an end. In some cases, evidence of short term successes never actually translates into systemic changes later on.
CHAPTER II

THE EFFECT: ARENAS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT OUTCOMES

INTRODUCTION

There are many different areas of social life that can be influenced by social movement activity (most notable summaries provided by Amenta and Caren 2004; Andrews 2004; Earl 2000, 2004; and Giugni 1998, 1999, 2004, 2007). However, the optimal strategy for defining and measuring the impact of social movements is to include a variety of outcome measures that span across different points in time and different arenas of social life (Andrews 2004). By having a multitude of outcome measures, researchers can move beyond successful or unsuccessful categorical outcomes and move closer to identifying outcomes as continuous measures that distinguish between levels of successful and unsuccessful outcomes. Examining outcome measures across time helps distinguish between short-term and long-term outcomes, which in turn also offers more accurate pictures of successful and unsuccessful outcomes. Finally, discriminating among “arenas” of social life offers crucial insight into intended and unintended outcomes, and more importantly, allows the analyst to examine how outcomes in different areas of social life relate to one another (Andrews 2004: 19). I discuss these areas of social life as “arenas” and divide them into: (1) political, (2) cultural, and (3) social outcomes² (see Figure 1).

² Although I have taken the advice of Andrews (2004) to look at outcomes as arenas of social life, the conceptual framework for the dividing outcomes into political, social, and cultural outcomes and depicting them as interacting and overlapping arenas of social life comes from Flora and Flora (2004, 2008) community capitals framework (CCF).
Political outcomes make up the overwhelming majority of research on social movement outcomes, and typically refer to changing or implementing public policy, setting or influencing political agendas, gaining important representations, and securing resources for beneficiaries (Amenta and Caren 2004). Cultural and social outcomes have been studied far less than political outcomes. Within the literature, cultural outcomes typically refer to one or a combination of the following: attitudes, opinions, values, knowledge, tactical repertoires, collective action frames, cultural narratives, and collective identities. Social outcomes usually include changes in individual and personal biographies, arrangements of social networks or social capital for mobilizing groups.

**POLITICAL OUTCOMES**

Gamson’s (1990) study of challenging groups was focused solely on political outcomes. Specifically, Gamson identified two potential outcomes: new advantages and acceptance. Using these two areas of political outcomes, he creates a two-by-two table that depicts a range of potential outcomes from complete success to complete failure. When challenging groups achieve both new advantages and acceptance, Gamson refers to this as “full response.” On the other side of the equation, for those groups that neither
achieves new advantages nor acceptance, he refers to this as a “collapse.” A combination of the two, or achieving one but not the other, is either “co-optation” (or acceptance without new advantages) or “preemption” (or new advantages without acceptance). As mentioned earlier, there have been a number of criticisms of Gamson’s study. Many researchers have commented on problems in the conceptualization of outcomes as well as how this framework differentiates complete success, partial success, and failure (Piven and Cloward 1979; Goldstone 1980; Amenta, Dunleavy, and Berstein 1994). For example, Amenta et al (1994) criticize Gamson’s conceptualization of success on a number of points. The main criticism, however, is that Gamson’s definition does not lend itself to thorough measurement of new advantages; specifically, gains in “collective benefits for beneficiary groups” (1994: 681). As a result, collective benefits do not consider gains made on behalf of the beneficiary group. According to Amenta et al (1994), it is gains made in ways of collective goods on behalf of the beneficiary group that directly measure “success.” The authors argue “that a challenger cannot be considered successful unless it wins some collective goods that aid its beneficiary group” (681).

Taking note of Amenta et al (1994) concerns, Cress and Snow (2000), in a study of 15 homeless social movement organizations in eight US cities, offer a measure that distinguishes between political outcomes that relate to the SMO and those that relate to the beneficiary group. Organizational outcomes are measures of whether or not the SMO gained important representation (similar to Gamson’s acceptance) within decision making bodies, and whether or not the SMO attained the necessary resources such as financial, human, and built capital to organize and mobilize potential adherents.
Beneficiary outcomes are measures that directly help in alleviating conditions of homeless populations; in other words, offer relief, or to protect the local homeless populations from discriminatory practices, or offer them rights. The distinction made by Cress and Snow (2000) deal with many of the concerns raised by Amenta and colleagues about successful political outcomes including some sort of measurement of direct beneficiary outcomes.

More recently, Amenta and Caren (2004) attempted to further remedy problems with the new advantages and acceptance distinction. With new advantages, the authors suggest that political outcomes need to include a multitude of outcome measures. They suggest outcomes that relate to actions against the state including (1) setting political agendas, (2) influencing legislative content, (3) passing and implementing legislation, and (4) influencing structural/systemic reforms. As for acceptance, Gamson (1990) argued acceptance was achieved if a challenging group was invited to testify in front of Congress. However, Amenta and Caren (2004) point out that acceptance also needs to move beyond simply testifying in front of a political body. Their suggestion is to distinguish among types of acceptance such as negotiation, formal recognition, and inclusion (gaining formal representation in decision-making organizations).

In sum, early studies of political outcomes focused on whether a group gained acceptance and/or new advantages from collective mobilization. Following a thorough examination of these two dimensions of outcomes, researchers have argued Gamson’s original conceptualization of acceptance and new advantages as political outcomes is insufficient. As a result, researchers have pushed for greater specificity by using multiple indicators for both acceptance and new advantages. In addition, measures of political
outcomes need to distinguish between those successes that relate to participants of the social movement and those successes that directly benefit the target group. Related to new advantages, measures should include a variety of outcomes including agenda setting, influencing legislative content, passing/implementing short-term legislative benefits (SMO and beneficiary), and influencing long-term systemic change (again differentiating between SMO and beneficiary). For acceptance, measures should include and differentiate between such outcomes as involvement in negotiations, formal recognition by political bodies, and inclusion or representation in decision making.

CULTURAL OUTCOMES

Another arena of social movement outcomes is cultural outcomes. Cultural outcomes have largely been ignored within the study of social movement outcomes (Earl 2000, 2004). One of the major problems with focusing almost exclusively on political outcomes is that other areas of social life influenced by social movement activity such as general public opinion and attitudes, social norms and values, knowledge and traditions, other social movements, and collective identities have been mostly excluded from theorizing on social movement outcomes (Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Poletta 1999; Earl 2000, 2004; Polletta and Jasper 2001). Like political outcomes, one of the main problems is clearly and adequately defining what constitutes a cultural outcome. This is complicated even more by the lack of theoretical coherence regarding definitions of culture (Earl 2004). For example, culture can be defined in social psychological terms as the meanings and symbols internal to the individual. Culture can also be seen as a negotiation of meanings and signs as well as how these symbols relate to one another. Or
culture can be described as larger macro level phenomenon that is both structural and constraining (Earl 2004).

As such, culture is not only within the minds of individuals and negotiated through micro level interactions but it is also embedded in social structure; not only in the way that we interpret structure but also how social structure shapes individuals’ values, attitudes, opinions, and beliefs. On the one hand, culture can be seen as the perceptions social movement participants have of objective structural opportunities as well as the subjective processes of participants that occur through ongoing social interactions and result in shared meanings. On the other hand, culture can be seen as structure in the form of “cultural traditions, ideological principles, institutional memories, and political taboos that create and limit political opportunities” (Poletta 1999: 63). Conceptualizing culture as both subjective meaning construction and objective structure can help with both defining and measuring social movement outcomes within the cultural arena.

Social movement studies on cultural outcomes, although limited and usually not defined as a “social movement outcome” per se, have been studied both at the micro and meso/macro levels of cultural change. The research focuses primarily on changes in attitudes and opinions, norms and values, knowledge and traditions, tactical repertoires, collective action frames, cultural narratives, and collective identities. For example, in a study of the abolitionist movement in England, d’Anjou and Van Male (1998) explore how activism by abolitionists influenced changes in the values, beliefs, and opinions of the broader general public. The authors show how activists link their message to generally accepted cultural values and relate them to new emerging cultural themes. By doing so, they are able to depict a gradual shift in how the general public viewed and
defined the slave trade. They found that the first wave of abolitionist activity, although it did not abolish slavery and the slave trade, did fundamentally change how these issues were viewed by the broader public. Furthermore, it was this early wave of activism that paved the way for the later abolition of slavery in England (d’Anjou 1996).

Similarly to his (1990) original study on political outcomes, Gamson (1998) also showed how successfully influence can occur within the cultural realm. Gamson (1998) addresses these outcomes by looking at cultural acceptance (i.e., being quoted regularly within the media) and new cultural advantages (i.e., movement frames being adopted over alternative frames). By following the logic that media affects public opinion, Gamson (1998) argues success within the cultural arena can be attained when movements gain cultural acceptance and new cultural advantages. This occurs when social movement frames are covered more readily by media outlets and when their frames are depicted more prominently than the frames of the antagonist. Social movements that gain access and coverage to media outlets are able to more successfully influence attitudes and opinions and values and norms of the general public.

A particularly interesting example of social movement activity influencing cultural outcomes can be seen in a study of AIDS activists (Epstein 1996). Epstein examines the role that AIDS activists played in shaping scientific practices and interpretations of HIV and AIDS; specifically how these activists challenged and shaped scientific procedures and knowledge. What he found was that activists played an extremely important role in challenging and eventually changing treatment and drug test protocols used in clinical trials of HIV/AIDS medications. The author also examined how activists tried but failed to influence an explanation for the cause of AIDS. Despite
their failure to influence the search for the cause of AIDS, activists played a central role in redefining the knowledge, or the know-how, for running, testing, and implementing clinical trial practices.

Another important area where social movements impact knowledge is related to what Tilly (1978) and Tarrow (1994) refer to as tactical repertoire. Tactical repertoire is the tactics and strategies available to social movements (Tilly 1978). Tactical repertoires change where new, innovative tactics emerge and old tactics are reused and reconfigured. The use of widespread and popular forms of tactics and strategies during peak cycles of protest are referred to as “repertoires of contention” (Tarrow 1994). In any cultural arena, social movements share and shape common repertoires of contention. This is because the tactics and strategies selected by SMOs and social movement actors are those that are culturally available and culturally acceptable. So, whether it is the white separatist movement holding a public demonstration on the steps of the state capital, pro-life activists singing “We Shall Overcome,” or a pro-growth countermovement organization using copycat framing techniques, social movements across the political spectrum share and influence a common tactical repertoire.

In addition to the social movements influencing one another’s tactical repertoire, they can also have a wide range of impacts on other movements including knowledge of effective organizational forms and effective collective action frames (Meyer and Whittier 1994). Meyer and Whittier argue that social movements mobilize and organize in reference to what other social movements have done. They refer to this as “spillover effects.” Spillover effects can include organizational forms, tactics and strategies, collective action frames and discourse, and identities. Each of these can be transferred
from one movement to another in a number of ways including shared membership, organizational coalitions, discourse within external environment, or by just sheer chance (Whittier 2004). What this means for the study of social movement outcomes, then, is that social movement mobilization not only influence attitudes, opinions, values, and norms of the general public, but they can also shape the tactics, strategies, organizational form, and framing techniques used by other social movements.

Regarding collective identity, researchers have suggested that the creation of new collective identities may be an outcome in and of itself, or it may be an unintentional consequence of movement activity (Polletta and Jasper 2001). In both cases, the creation of new social identities may have a lasting effect in shared collective identities that remain over time (usually tied to “abeyance structures,” see Taylor and Whittier 1992). I refer here to collective identity as “an individual’s cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution. It is a perception of a shared status or relation, which may be imagined rather than experienced directly…” (Polletta and Jasper 2001: 285). As such, collective identities can be represented in material and nonmaterial things including “names, narratives, symbols, verbal styles, rituals, clothing, and so on” (285). Collective identity as a cultural outcome can be either an intended outcomes, or they can be unintended outcome.

In summary, social movements have been found to have a wide array of impacts within the cultural arena. Social movement activity can and does result in fundamental changes in attitudes, opinions, values, and norms of the general public. Collective mobilization also influences systems of knowledge and traditions. Social movements also influence changes in the cultural arena through shaping how other social movements
decide to organize, mobilize, and act. Finally, social movements can and do influence how people identify not only themselves but others as well.

**SOCIAL OUTCOMES**

Similar to cultural outcomes, social outcomes have been a severely understudied area. With the exception of a handful of scholars (most notably Diani 1997, Andrews 2004, and Giugni 2004), components of social outcomes such as social networks/capital and social organization have been examined largely in relation to movement emergence and mobilization. There are a vast number of research studies that have explored the role of pre-existing or indigenous social organization as a precursor to successful emergence and mobilization (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Morris 1981; McAdam 1982). There are also a number of studies that have examined the role of social networks on successful recruitment and mobilization of potential movement adherents (Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980; Gould 1991; Diani 1997). However, here I am interested in research that focuses on the impact social movements have on the arena of social outcomes. More specifically, I refer to social outcomes as changes in individual and personal biographies and social networks/capital.

Within social movement literature, research suggests individuals who participate in social movements are greatly influenced by their experience. This is the case for core members as well as peripheral members (Polletta and Jasper 2001). This finding is also extended to aggregate level life-course patterns of individuals (e.g., the effect of the women’s movement on the roles of individual women in society) (Giugni 2004). For example, the biographical effects of New Left activists suggest individuals who participated in the movement showed strong leanings to leftist ideals later in life and
continued involvement in other social movements throughout their life (see Fendrich 1993 and Giugni 2004). In addition, individuals who participated in this movement were overwhelmingly represented in teaching professions, had higher rates of divorce, and had lower levels of income than those who of the same generation (McAdam 1988, 1989; also see Giugni 2004).

Another area of research, although very limited, is related to the effect of social movement activity on social networks and social capital. Diani (1997) views social capital as linkages among individuals and organizations that are made up of mutual trust and recognition. The formation of social capital is important to the study of social movements because it allows for explanation of both social movement emergence and subsequent mobilization efforts as well as explanation of successful or unsuccessful outcomes in other arenas of social life. These social ties allow for the social movement to gain traction early on and to increase chances for success later (Diani 1997). A main point of Diani (1997) is that social networks as a measure of social outcomes need to be analyzed and evaluated according to how much a SMO or movement actor changes in structural location of a social networks. In other words, by focusing on changes in social network location, social movement outcomes within the social arena “may be assessed in terms of the movements’ capacity to achieve more central positions in networks of social and political influence” (1997: 133).

In summary, social movement activity has been shown to influence both social movement participants as well as aggregate level life course patterns. Social movements are also linked to changes in social network, in the arrangement linkages and flow of social capital, and in social organization.
OVERLAPPING ARENAS OF OUTCOMES

Although political, cultural, and social outcome has been discussed individually, they should not be seen as separate. Rather, each arena should be seen as overlapping with one another. This suggests that gains in one arena may either help or hinder attempts to make gains in another. For example, researchers have shown that gains in the cultural arena such as changes in attitudes and opinions and norms and values play an important role in successful outcomes within the political arena such as changes to public policy (Burstein et al 1995; d’Anjou and Von Male 1998; Gamson 1998; Meyer 2006).

Researchers have also shown how successful gains in the cultural arena (e.g., sharing tactics) may impede progress within the political arena. For example, when groups tend to share tactics, or have tactical overlap, the movement sector becomes saturated increasing competition and decreasing legitimation of social movement actors (Olzak and Uhrig 2001).

Gains in the social arena may also influence success within the political arena. The creation of movement infrastructure (Andrews 2004), changes in structural location of movement actors and organizations within broader social networks (Diani 1997), or simply remaining in existence for long period time (Minkoff 1993) can influence mobilization efforts of the same social movement at a later point in time, or it may pave the way for different social movements later. Changes in structural locations in localized social networks may also strongly affect chances for success within the cultural arena as well (Diani 1997). Claims-makers in positions of authority and who hold legitimacy within the broader social and political environment have greater chance of having their stories stick (Meyer 2006) and their frames adopted over other competing frames.
(Benford and Snow 2000). In addition, strong social networks have also been shown to create salient collective identities and to socialize social movement participants (Passy 2001).

Finally, success within the political arena can influence changes in both the cultural and social arenas. For example, when groups gain acceptance, or are seen as legitimate actors within the political arena, they increase their chances of creating a collective identity recognized by both those within as well as outside of the movement. If the group is newly formed and still in the early stages of negotiation over collective identity, the recognition within the political arena can speed this process along and can draw in other potential adherents to the movement further solidifying a new collective identity (Amenta and Young 1999). Also, successes within the political arena may influence success within the social arena. For instance, when a social movement has success in the political arena such as gaining new advantages (e.g., opening up political opportunity structures), other social movements may begin to form and mobilize in areas of social life were they were not able to before (Whittier 2004).
CHAPTER III
THE CAUSE: SMO-CONTROLLED AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

INTRODUCTION

Equally as elusive as defining and measuring outcomes is identifying, conceptualizing, and operationalizing the potential causal factors that either facilitate or impede social movements in their quest to attain certain outcomes. The difficulty lies in both the amorphous nature of social movements and the vast areas of social life they target. Here the problem lies in identifying who is actually a part of the movement, who or what is the target of collective action, and who or what is actually influencing a given outcome. All three of these things make demonstrating causal influence very difficult.

Within the study of social movement outcomes, there are three schools of thought that attempt to explain successful and unsuccessful outcomes. The first school attributes success or failure of social movements to their organizational form (Gamson 1990), their strategies and tactics (McAdam 1983, Clemens 1993; Ganz 2000), their frame resonance (Cress and Snow 2000; Halebsky 2006), and their resources (McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977). A second school of thought suggests that success or failure is determined not by internal movement characteristics but rather environmental factors such as social strain, conflict, or breakdown (Goldstone 1991; Useem 1985), the strength of indigenous social organization (Morris 1981; McAdam 1982), political opportunities (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1982), and political and social context (Kitschelt 1986; Amenta et al 1992). The final school of thought attributes successful or unsuccessful outcomes to a combination of internal movement characteristics and external environmental factors (Amenta et al 1992, 1994, 1996, 1999; Giugni 2004, 2007).
SMO-CONTROLLED FACTORS

Much attention has been given to factors internal to the social movement that relate to successful outcomes\(^3\). The primary factors related to successful outcomes include organizational structure, movement goals, resources, leadership, tactics and strategies, framing techniques, and collective identity (see Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SMO Controlled Factors</th>
<th>Political Outcomes</th>
<th>Cultural Outcomes</th>
<th>Social Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Single issue and non-displacing (Gamson 1990)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resources</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Human capital (Cress &amp; Snow 2000; Halebsky 2006; McAdam 1988; McCarthy 1987; McCarthy &amp; Wolfson 1996; McCarthy &amp; Zald 1977; Polletta &amp; Jasper 2001)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Financial capital (McCarthy 1987; McCarthy &amp; Wolfson 1996; McCarthy &amp; Zald 1977; Rucht 1999)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Social capital (Diani 1997; Passy 2001; Snow et al 1980)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Possess high levels social capital (Ganz 2000; McCarthy &amp; Wolfson 1996; Morris 1984; Robnett 1996)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Experience, knowledge, repertoire (Ganz 2000; Nepstad &amp; Bob 2006)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy and tactics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Disruptive/innovative (Clemens 1993; Gamson 1990; McAdam 1983)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Strategic adaptation (McCammon et al 2008)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collective action frames</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Clear diagnostic framing (Cress &amp; Snow 2000; Snow &amp; Benford 1988)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Clear prognostic framing (Cress &amp; Snow 2000; Snow &amp; Benford 1988)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Broadly framed threat (Halebsky 2006; Walsh et al 1997)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Strategic frames (McCammon et al 2007)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Early research, most notably Gamson’s (1990) work, relates to issues of organizational form, movement goals, and resource mobilization. Gamson (1990) concludes the most successful challenging groups (e.g., gains in the political arena or

\(^3\) It is important to state that the vast majority of the research relates to successful political outcomes.
acceptance and new advantages) were highly formalized, had a single issue focus, and made “nondisplacing” demands. Cress and Snow (1996, 2000) also found evidence of formalized homeless movement organizations (referred to as organizational viability) as an indicator of successful gains in political representation. Although Cress and Snow (2000) do not discuss social outcomes as such, the outcome for SMO in relation to gaining important access to decision making bodies and mobilizing large numbers of supporter suggests a relationship between organization viability and social outcomes such as change in structural location. Organizational form can also influence outcomes in the cultural arena. For example, SMOs can maintain an organizational form that intentionally links itself to other link-minded organizations either transfer out or take in salient collective identities, collective action frames, or tactical repertoire (Meyer and Whittier 1994; Whittier 2004).

Although addressed in Gamson’s (1990) original assessment, it is resource mobilization that has devoted a great deal of attention to the role of human and financial capital in the successful attainment of social movement outcomes. Resource mobilization suggests mobilization and subsequent outcomes can be explained by the availability and attainment of valuable resources by SMOs. In other words, effective SMOs are ones that can attain goals through attracting and maintaining the adequate resources such as time, money, and movement adherents (Oberschall 1973; McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Tilly 1978). To demonstrate this point, McCarthy (1987) found that pro-life and pro-choice social movements both relied on valuable resources to successfully mobilize movement adherents. Pro-life organizations relied almost exclusively on committed volunteers; whereas pro-choice organizations had a much more extensive financial base. Both
played into mobilizing successful political outcomes such as gaining access to governmental officials and social outcomes such as increasing membership and influencing public opinion and attitudes. Most importantly, movements must have committed core members (McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977).

Diani (1997) suggests that social capital also plays a central role in the successful social movement outcomes. Social capital, or networks of exchange, trust, solidarity, and communication, not only influence if and when a social movement emerges, but it also plays a very important role in predicting how successful a movement is in the long run. SMOs, movement leadership, and movement participants that have open networks of communication and exchange, relationships based on trust and solidarity, connections to sympathetic elites, and overlapping membership with other organizations are much more likely to achieve successful social movement outcomes. For example, social networks help recruit and mobilize potential adherents quickly (Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980), which in turn can help the movement in the political arena. Open social networks can also act as crucial mechanisms of socialization helping create salient collective identities (Passy 2001).

Leadership of SMOs and social movements are of crucial importance as well. Leaders have a disproportionate amount of influence in deciding goals, strategies, tactics, and collective action frames. The movement’s leaders are usually embedded in structurally advantageous positions within broader networks of social capital. As a result, they can mobilize important resources quickly and can become seen as the legitimate spokesperson or claims-makers of the movement (Nepstad and Bob 2006). Leaders who are centrally located in social networks are more likely to be successful on the political
front because they can withstand cooptation (Morris 1984; Robnett 1996). McCarthy and Wolfson (1996) found a consistent predictor of large numbers of participants is related to the number of public appearances by leadership of anti-drunk driving groups. According to Ganz (2000), in addition to organizational form, differences in leadership biography, networks, and repertoires can lead to successful gains in the political arena (1041). By examining the leadership of four different social movements, Nepstad and Bob (2006) identify a combination of factors, together referred to as leadership capital, including cultural, social, and symbolic capital as positively related to successful political, cultural, and social outcomes.

Strategies and tactics used by social movements have also been linked to social movement outcomes. Gamson (1990) identified the use of disruptive tactics, specifically violent tactics, as a strong indicator of successful political outcomes regarding new advantages and acceptance. McAdam (1983) and Clemens (1993) also found disruptive tactics, although referred to as innovative or new tactics, as predictors of movement success. Clemens (1993) shows how women’s groups during the late 19th and early 20th century helped transform the educational lobbying system by using innovative tactics. By being barred from voting, Women’s Rights groups garnered the political, social, financial, and human capital to force important legislation. The use of innovative tactics also helped draw in broad based support and strengthen collective identity of women’s rights participants. Ganz’s (2000) “strategic capacity,” Andrews’ (2001) “strategic infrastructure, and more recently, McCammon et al (2008) “strategic adaptation,” all deal with the relationship between SMO strategies/tactics and social movement outcomes. McCammon and colleagues (2008) use of strategic adaptation incorporates an SMO’s
ability and willingness to perceive, evaluate, adapt, and implement changes in tactics that correspond with the environment. In a study of jury rights movements during the early part of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the authors found movement proponents succeed at a faster rate when they responded quickly following legislative defeat and in a way that drew on the social, cultural, and political cues from the environment (i.e., fostering political connections with sympathetic elites, mobilizing around political candidates, using wartime as a strategic frame for expanding the view of women as citizen).

Collective action frames, or frames intended to mobilize social movement supporters, have also been linked to social movement outcomes. According to Snow and Benford (1988), collective action frames have three framing tasks: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational. The authors argue the success of social movements is in part related to how well movement participants create and maintain these tasks in a way that resonates with target populations. Cress and Snow (2000) found that either diagnostic (those which clearly identify a problem), prognostic (those which clearly define a solution) frames, or both, are positively related to successful outcomes (i.e., representation, resources, relief, and rights). Although not specifically related to framing tasks, in a study of local land-use controversies over eight waste incinerators, Walsh, Warland, and Smith (1997) found controversies broadly framed (i.e., threat to local versus larger geographical area) were more successful and drew more supporters. Similarly, in a study of six different anti-Superstore movements, Halebsky (2006) found that broadly framed threats to the community acted as an important indicator of movement success as defined by drawing the support and either stopping or delaying the siting of Wal-Mart Superstores. Benford and Snow (2000) suggest that frames can be used as “strategic frames” that are
“developed and deployed to achieve specific purpose” (264). In a study of strategic frames used by women’s rights organizations during the early 20th to gain the right for women to sit on juries, McCammon et al (2007) found framing effectiveness must be considered with the social, cultural, and political context. That is, frames must tap into culturally, socially, and politically relevant factors that resonate with potential adherents (i.e., using a master frame such as equality to argue women were just as competent as men to serve on juries).

ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

The second school of thought focuses primarily on the environmental factors that help or hinder social movements in their attainment of social movement outcomes. Environmental factors include breakdown or strain, political opportunity structures, existing social organization, and political, social, and cultural context (see Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Environmental Factors and Social Movement Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Breakdown, strain, and conflict</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Crises (Goldstone 1980, 1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political opportunity structure</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Repression (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indigenous organization</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Prior leadership (Andrews 2004; McAdam 1982, 1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Other movements (Andrews 2004; McAdam 1982, 1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Networks of resources and communication (Andrews 2004; McAdam 1982, 1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social and political environment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Favorable public opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Media coverage (Halebsky 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Countermovement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As mentioned earlier, Goldstone’s (1980) reanalysis of Gamson’s data suggested that successful outcomes were related to timing of movement action and periods of national crisis. In his study of revolutions in Europe, China, and the Middle East, Goldstone (1991) found periods of state crises (specifically divisions over economic concerns) caused by rapid population growth helped fuel political revolutions. As such, it was not internal movement characteristics that lead to successful revolution; rather, it was periods of crisis. This sentiment is echoed in studies of political opportunity structures, or POS. The focus, however, is on favorable political conditions that are absolutely essential for successful movement outcomes (McAdam 1982, 1983). The ability for a social movement to attain successful outcomes is focused on the “exogenous factors enhance or inhibit a social movement’s prospects” (Meyer 2004: 126). Research that focuses on four factors:

1. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system
2. The stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity
3. The presence or absence of elite allies
4. The state’s capacity and propensity for repression (McAdam 1996: 27).

Like Goldstone (1991), Kriesi and Wisler (1999) found democratic social movements influenced institutional level change within the US and Switzerland political system during periods of crisis. Additionally, in both cases, there were weak state institutions, credible alternative institutions, divided elites and diminished political parties. In his study of anti-nuclear movements in four democracies (United States, Sweden, France, and Germany), Kitschelt (1986) found that POS that are more open (US and Sweden) allow social movements to have a better chance of gaining acceptance and to have more procedural gains than social movements in countries with domestic POS that are closed
(France and West Germany). The author also suggests the ability of the state to repress political demands reduces chances for social movements to influence the political domain. These findings were later supported by Kriesi (1995) in a study of new social movements (NSM) in France, Germany, Netherlands and Switzerland. Kriesi suggests the success of NSMs is dependent in large part on POS; specifically open democratic political structure, divided elites, and a unified Left.

Jenkins and Perrow (1977) found that the National Farm Labor Union (NFLU) and the United Farm Workers (UFW) experienced vastly different levels of success. For the NFLU, the political environment was not at all supportive. The group received little financial support, had very few political allies, and confronted strong partisan opposition in favor of agribusiness. Whereas the UFW had steady a stream of financial and political support, fairly neutral political officials open and responsive to the group’s concerns, strong political allies in labor unions, and divided governmental elites. Similarly, Jenkins, Jacobs, and Agnone (2003) in a study of Civil Rights protests between 1948 and 1997 found that both frequency of Civil Rights protest and successful attainment of movement goals were more likely to occur when northern Democrats increased in political strength and Republican presidential incumbents experienced Cold War pressures.

McCright and Clark (2006) take a broader view of POS by including state-oriented institutionalized opportunities (i.e., presences of political parties and sympathetic elites) as well as noninstitutional aspects of localized political and social environments (i.e., presence or absence of other social movements) in an examination of local environmental movements in the Midwest. The authors found non-institutional factors
better predictors of positive political outcomes than institutional factors and sympathetic allies were found to be more important to successful political outcomes than weak antagonists. Meyer and Minkoff (2004) found that a consistent predictor of positive political outcomes within the Civil Rights movement (1955-1985) is whether or not a Democratic President is in office. The authors suggest Democratic presidential administrations are more sympathetic to concerns of Civil Rights organizations and therefore open important POS. These strong findings have led a number of researchers to conclude that in spite of strong mobilization (well funded, formalized SMOs, diverse coalitions, and many participants), the ultimate factor that influences whether a social movement successfully attains a given outcome is largely dependent on the socio-political environment. A major problem with POS, as discussed by a number of scholars (most notably Goodwin and Jasper 1999 and Polletta 1999), is it severely under-theorizes social and cultural components of exogenous environmental factors.

Another important factor in explaining social movement outcomes is the strength of prior organization, or indigenous social organization. Much of this research is related to successful emergence and mobilization. However, some researchers have suggested that successful social movement outcomes are more likely to occur where preexisting indigenous organization is strong. Morris (1981) examination of 1960 sit-in movements found both black churches and colleges to be crucial to successful mobilization. Within urban sociology, a number of research studies have found a strong relationship between successful political outcomes within land-use movements and high levels of socio-

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4 Although it could be argued that “social opportunity structures” fall under broad categories such as indigenous social organization, mobilizing structures, and movement infrastructure, these areas have been studied much more thoroughly than cultural factors.
economic status (see Logan, Whaley, and Crowder 1997). Preexisting indigenous organization not only offers important access to leadership, but it also helps with communication and recruitment (Snow et al 1980; Gould 1991; Passy 2001). A similar finding by Stearns and Almeida (2004) in a study of anti-pollution efforts in Japan suggests that sympathetic elites are important, but more specifically, it is collaborative relationships with important state actors (political parties, local government, key court officials, and state-level agencies) that allow for positive political outcomes.

A number of scholars have commented that even together political opportunity structures and social organization do not capture the complexity of the environment that social movements operate within. For example, Goldstone (2004) suggests that researchers need to account for political, economic, and social structure as well as political authorities, actors, and elites. However, there are many other factors that are left out of the equation including cultural opportunities, other movements and countermovements, general public opinion, attitudes, values and norms, and critical events.

Important theoretical advancements have been made over the last ten years with regards to cultural factors, however. Specifically, the work by McCammon and colleagues (2001a, 2001b, 2007, 2008) has begun to uncover the role of cultural opportunities, “gendered opportunity structures,” as they relate to political outcomes. Essentially, the authors argue that political as well as social and cultural opportunities help or hinder successful outcomes. McCammon, Campbell, Granberg, and Mowery (2001b) argue “shifting gender relations produced a gendered opportunity for women’s suffrage by altering attitudes among political decision-makers about the appropriate roles
of women in society” (51). In other words, changes in the socio-cultural realm related to women’s political participation offered “gendered opportunity” for success in the political arena. McCammon and Campbell (2001a) offer a similar argument in explaining the emergence, mobilization, and successful political outcomes of early women’s suffrage in thirteen western states. A combination of political and gendered opportunities helped foster important gains within the political arena specifically passing women’s voting rights legislation prior to the enactment of the 19th amendment.

Researchers have found the media to be an important environmental factor that may help or hinder the movement success (Gamson 1990; Molotch 1977). Lipsky (1968) stated this quite succinctly: “If protest tactics are not considered significant by the media, or if newspapers and television reporters or editors decide to overlook protest tactics, protest organizations will not succeed” (1151). Halebsky (2006) found that anti-superstore movements were more successful at stopping the development of Wal-Mart Superstores when the media reflected favorably on the movement or came out against the zoning of the land to commercial.

Another important factor is the role of public opinion. Burstein (1999) suggests SMOs face great difficulties when it comes to influencing public policy because of the competition by an array of stakeholders vying for legislative attention. The ability to influence public policy becomes even more complicated when SMO objectives conflict with majority interests. The author does, however, suggest that SMOs can attain positive political outcomes when public opinion is ambiguous and by successfully linking SMO concerns to governmental officials and agencies. In a meta-analysis of sociological and political science journals (1990-2000), Burstein and Linton (2002) found particular
credence in successful policy attainment by SMOs and their ability to link their concerns to concerns of elected officials during election cycles. Furthermore, research analysis of policy outcomes show SMO impact is reduced significantly when public opinion is included. To put it simply, social movements typically do not meet their objectives unless the public is supportive or indifferent. Even in examples where there is clear evidence that social movements influence policy changes, it is usually the case that the impact was felt during the early stages of policy process (Soule and King 2006). Social movement concerns tend to be overlooked in the later stages over concerns of public opinion. Burstein (2006) does offer caution, however, not to overstate the impact of public opinion on policy outcomes. This is due to selection bias by researchers, or choosing policy debates that are popular, and therefore governmental officials are more likely to be concerned with public opinion.

Social movement research has also explored the role of countermovements in relation to mobilization and social movement outcomes (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). Countermovements are “networks of individuals and organizations that share many of the same objects of concern as the social movements that they oppose…[but]…make competing claims on the state of matters of policy and politics and vie for attention from the mass media and broader public” (1996: 1632). Interaction between movement and countermovement strongly influence and shape the political environment where “the opposing movements create ongoing opportunities and obstacles for one another” (1643). The relationship between movement and countermovement is one where the success of one side sparks the other side and so on, effectively prolonging the conflict. However, without successes, neither movement nor countermovement can sustain mobilization and
will experience a decline (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996: 1647). In short, social
movements that experience countermovements are at a severe disadvantage for successful
social movement outcomes, specifically within the political arena. This was one of the
major predictors of successful political outcomes among anti-superstore movements
(Halebsky 2006). Outcomes within the social and cultural arenas, however, are not as
clear. Although research would suggest at least with regards to cultural outcomes (e.g.,
collective identity as an outcome), social movement that experience countermovements
may develop a stronger collective identity due to outside threats (Polletta and Jasper
2001).

COMBINATION OF SMO AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

Although discussed separately, there are a number of research studies that use a
combination of factors (both internal movement and environmental characteristics) that
explore the effect on social movement outcomes. For example, Burstein et al (1995)
suggest that positive political outcomes are dependent on the interaction among “SMOs,
their targets, and the political context” (284). Andrews (2004) identifies the importance
of preexisting leadership, social networks, and indigenous resources and organizations in
building and improving movement infrastructure in order to positively impact political
outcomes. Cress and Snow (1996, 2000) found clear diagnostic and prognostic frames in
combination with the viability of SMO important for political and social outcomes.
Halebsky (2006) found successful outcomes positively associated with broadly framed
threats, evidence of broad based support, and positive coverage of the movement by the
media. McVeigh, Welch, and Bjarason (2003) found SMOs devoted to hate crime
enforcement must rely on steady flow of resources and clear framing processes as well as
clearly show political incentive for elite support and capitalize on POS. In a study of attempts by gay and lesbian activists to overturn state sodomy laws, Kane (2003) found a combination of SMO characteristics, POS, and socio-cultural context all impact the chances for positive political outcomes, but the importance of the joint effects of SMO characteristics and POS are the strongest indicator of political outcomes (i.e., activists experienced greater rates of success during high levels of mobilization and openings in POS). McCammon and colleagues (2001a, 2001b, 2007, 2008) social movements must not only have the needed resources and emerge in favorable political, social, and cultural milieu, but social movement leaders, participants, and organization must actively view, adapt, and engage the local context as it changes.

Two models that exemplify the interaction and combinatorial nature of internal movement characteristics and environmental context are Amenta and colleagues (1992, 1994, 1996, 1999) political mediation model and Giugni’s (2007) joint effect model. The political mediation model identifies the importance of internal movement characteristics and environmental factors on movement success or failure. However, in this model, environmental factors, specifically POS, act as the mediating variable through which social movements succeed (1992). More specifically, social movements must have strong organizations and function within a politically favorable context to succeed (1992, 1994, 1996). For example, in a study of Townsend Movement (elderly rights and pension movement) during the Great Depression, Amenta and Zylan (1991) found the movement was most successful in areas of the country where the Democratic Party was prominent but not in power. Again, Amenta, Caruthers, and Zylan (1992) found the Townsend Movement was successful in areas where the social movement operated in a
sympathetic environment (i.e., political allies and elite connections). More importantly, the authors found a relationship between changes in the strength of the Townsend Movement and congressional action. Congressional action occurred, although slightly lagging behind peaks in mobilization.

In a study of another early 20th century social movement, Amenta, Dunleavy, and Bernstein (1994) use the economic redistribution campaign of Huey Long’s “Share Our Wealth” (SOW) movement to demonstrate the model’s usefulness. Using two other contemporary movements (Father Couglin’s National Union of Social Justice and the Townsend Movement) as comparators, the authors test the impact of SOW on the Roosevelt administration’s New Deal Policies. The findings suggest SOW had more influence (and successes) than the other neopopulist movement, which the authors attribute to strength and extent of SOW mobilization. However, the necessary condition for SOW success was the favorable political environment from which the movement operated; specifically, sympathetic Democratic elites and highly competitive and divided political parties. Amenta, Caren, and Olasky (2005), more recently, applied the political mediation model to the Townsend Movement, this time controlling for public opinion. The authors still found strong evidence for the model.

More recently, Giugni (2007) suggested a slightly modified version referred to joint effect model. The difference is in distinguishing between whether the social and political context are the mediating factor between social movement mobilization and successful outcomes or whether social movement mobilization and the socio-political context acting jointly in determining success. In a time-series analysis of the impact of three US movements (ecology, antinuclear, and peace movements), Giugni (2007)
examines the joint effect of either political allies, public opinion, or both with the internal characteristics of the social movement. Giugni (2007) also suggests the importance of identifying the level of the targeted outcome (local, national, or transnational) and the likelihood of success (especially when it comes to policy change). What he found was strong social movements must either have widespread public support or key political allies or both to successfully influence positive political outcomes. In all three cases, the author found social movements have little to no impact on public policy unless they engage in disruptive protest to pursue viable claims (i.e., local versus transnational level policy outcomes), push issues that are either publicly favorable or reveal public indifference, and have widespread public support, connections to political elites, or both.

In the following chapter, the SMO controlled variables and environmental variables identified from the literature are used to inform data analysis. Operational definitions are provided and draw on existing literature that links internal movement characteristics, environmental factors, or both to specific arenas of outcomes.
CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH DESIGN

INTRODUCTION

The objective of this research is to identify the organizational and environmental factors that help in the successful attainment of social movement outcomes by smart growth social movements. By exploring three separate case studies of social movement emergence, mobilization, and influence, I have developed an exhaustive list of potential casual factors that influence social movement outcomes.

SELECTING CASES

The three cases used for this study are: (1) Ames Smart Growth Alliance (ASGA) in Ames, IA, (2) Brunswick Smart Growth (BSG) in Brunswick, NY, and (3) Citizens of Greater Centreville (CGC) in Centreville, MD (see Table 3).

Table 3: Descriptive information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ames Smart Growth Alliance (ASGA)</td>
<td>Ames, IA</td>
<td>52319</td>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>2002-Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunswick Smart Growth (BSG)</td>
<td>Brunswick, NY</td>
<td>11696</td>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>2005-Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens for Greater Centreville (CGC)</td>
<td>Centreville, MD</td>
<td>2662</td>
<td>Residential</td>
<td>2001-Present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These three cases were selected for a list of 67 “smart growth” movements based on willingness to participate, geographical location, and mobilizing event (commercial, residential, or other).

More specifically, selection of these three cases was completed as follows. First, ASG was the first case selected. Originally, the research design included ten cases with three separate tiers. The three tiers indicated difference in methodologies employed during the data collection procedure as well as the amount time spent in the field at each case study location. ASG was to act as the sole case in the first tier of the research design.
helping inform inductively (and theoretically) derived hypotheses to test in the second and third tier cases.

As for second tier cases, first, a list of 66 SMOs was compiled by identifying organizations that subscribe to smart growth principles and have at least the organizational structure of a website. Key words used in search queries included “smart growth,” “responsible growth,” “concerned citizens,” “citizen participation,” and “land-use planning.” Second, of the 66 SMOs, 54 of the 66 organization’s website were researched and contacted via email expressing interest in the organization, movement, mobilizing issue, and the community. Of the 55 contacted, 31 responded, and 22 (out of 31 that responded) were interviewed either by email or phone depending on preference (see Appendix A). Ten cases were originally chosen from the list of 66 SMOs (see Table 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4. Original SMO Selections</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Case:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Smart Growth Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Tier Cases:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Citizens for Effective Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Our Community First</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Citizens for Centreville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Citizens for Responsible Growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Tier Cases:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Fortuna First</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates county level data

The ten cases were reduced to three for a number of reasons including practicality in terms of time, money and scope. After deciding to narrow the number of cases down to three, the three tier research design was no longer applicable and county level
organizations were removed from contention. The two other cases were selected on the basis of willingness to participate, mobilizing event (residential and commercial), size of community, geographical location, and cost of travel. The case selections were determined by attempts to vary answers to the initial six interview questions.

**DEFINING CASES**

The use of the case study approach is particularly useful in explaining the emergence, mobilization, and outcomes of social movement activity (Ragin 1987). Case studies are constructed to provide a narrative of what transpired within each community, how the group organized, and what the result of the collective mobilization was. Each case traces the development of social movement activity, the main actors and organizations, the tactics and strategies, the social, political, and cultural context, and the outcomes targeted as well as achieved. Multiple cases are used to identify common themes and patterns. A case is defined as a group of citizens who mobilize in response to a localized contentious land-use issue and who adopt smart growth principles as part of their mobilizing philosophy.

**DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE**

Data come from a triangulation of methodologies including (1) participant observation of movement-related events and activities, (2) in-depth interviews with key stakeholders, and (3) content analysis of media coverage, city documents, and organizational literature. Each one of the three cases involved the exact same data collection procedure. However, the length of time and the amount of data collected differed. For participant observations, fieldnotes were taken and transcribed, and corresponding memos were written. Memos acted as reflections not only on the
observations and interviews but also help relate the data collected within and across cases and are used to draw on existing social movement theories. For ASGA, I observed the group on numerous occasions (over 35 hours) from June 2005 to February 2007 at general meetings, executive board meetings, no new mall subcommittee meetings, city council meetings, protests and rallies, and SMO sponsored events. For both BSG and CGC, I had conducted an extensive three day field visit to each location (August 2007 for BSG and November 2007 for CGC). During the field visit, I met with key stakeholders for each group, toured the local community, and visited development site locations.

For each of three cases, a content analysis of organizational literature, media coverage, and governmental records are used to develop the movements contextual narrative creating a historical timeline of events, actions, and outcomes. Archival and historical data are also used to compare stories covered in the newspaper with the stories described by social movement participants. For ASGA, every newspaper account, every city and legal document, all organizational literature (SMO and counter-SMO) created between 2002 and 2008, SMO financial records, membership lists and internal correspondence from SMO were compiled and analyzed. For BSG, the majority of letters to the editor, key newspaper articles, all organizational literature (since February 2005), and all city and legal documents were compiled and analyzed. For CGC, key letters to the editor and newspaper articles, all organizational literature (since April 2003), video of key public meetings, and all city and legal documents were also compiled and analyzed.

Finally, in depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with stakeholders from each group. Participants were asked the same set of 16 questions regarding three
areas: personal involvement, internal organization operations, and local environmental context. A purposive sampling technique was used to identify key organizers from each SMO, specifically individuals in leadership positions. After interviewing key stakeholders, a snowball sampling technique was administered to contact other social movement actors. Interview length ranged from twenty minutes just under two hours. The interviews averaged between 30-40 minutes. A total of 24 interviews were conducted. Eight of the interviews were conducted in person. The remaining 16 were conducted over the telephone. Nine from ASGA (five female, four male), nine from BSG (four female, five male), and six from CGC (zero female, six male). The participants held an array of occupations including: PhD holders (8) from diverse fields such as economics, accounting, math, environmental science, psychology, and communications; professionals including business, law, engineering, education, and military (9); small business owners (2); stay at home mothers (2); farmers (2); and artist (1). Overall, all of the participants interviewed had high levels of education.

**FUNDING DISCLOSURE AND RESEARCH APPROVAL**

A small grant from the Midwest Sociological Society helped fund travel to both Brunswick, New York and Centreville, Maryland for extensive field visits. Funding was also used to finance part of the transcribing of interviews. Human Subjects approval was granted by the Institutional Review Board at Iowa State University November 2006 and reapproval was granted November 2007.

**OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS**

To organize and analyze the data, Ragin’s (1987) Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is used. QCA is an inductive, quasi-experimental approach, which relies
on the use of Boolean algebraic logic for small-N comparisons. This method is derived from John Stuart Mill’s attempts to establish empirical generalizations from inductive, case-oriented research. QCA requires the identification of all possible causal conditions (IV) as well as outcome properties (DV). In each case, the researcher must identify either the absence or presence of each factor. By comparing multiple cases, the researcher can identify similar combinations of causal conditions and can remove different, and therefore irrelevant factors essentially simplifying complex social phenomenon. Falling in line with social movement research on social movement outcomes, a list of theoretically and inductively derived causal variables are separated into SMO-controlled and environmental factors. All independent variables and operationalizations are listed in Table 5.

There are four SMO-controlled variables including organizational viability (VIABLE), tactics and strategies (TACTICS), high levels of participation (HIGH PART), and clearly defined diagnostic and prognostic frames (FRAMES). There are eight environmental factors including political opportunity structures as defined by experiencing some form of crisis, relative openness of institutionalized political system, sympathetic elite allies, state level smart growth policies (POS), indigenous organization (INDIG), media favorable toward development (MEDIA), and public opinion favorable toward development (PUBLIC) (see Table 5).
Table 5. Causal Conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SMO Factors</th>
<th>Environmental Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A = Viable</strong></td>
<td><strong>A = POS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Adopted from Cress and Snow 2000)</td>
<td>1 – Crisis such as rapid development pressures or environmental degradation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 – SMO-existed for one year or more</td>
<td>2 – Open political system such as non-partisan opposition, responsive elected officials to social movement concerns, or little to no evidence of support for real estate interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 – Regular meetings at least once a month</td>
<td>3 – At least one sympathetic elected or appointed official in this position before the group emerged (i.e., speaking publicly in support of smart growth or attending SMO meetings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 – Ongoing campaigns</td>
<td>4 – Evidence of support within the business community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 – Incorporated</td>
<td>5 – State adopted smart growth policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 – Clear leadership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 – Committees or sub-committees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 – Raised more than $5000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 – Diverse range of professional occupations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 – Committed core of 5 or more individuals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B = Tactics</strong></td>
<td><strong>B = INDIG</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 – Disruptive or innovative tactics such as the intentional use of tactics to disrupt land-use process</td>
<td>1 – Leadership from other land-use issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 – Political tactics such as rallies, petitions, lobbying, or speaking at meetings</td>
<td>2 – Established organization in place that helped movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 – Legal tactic such as hiring lawyer or file suit against city</td>
<td>3 – Other movement activity in the area such as environmental and/or labor groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C = High Part</strong></td>
<td><strong>C = MEDIA</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Part of measure adopted from Halebsky 2001, 2006)</td>
<td>1 – Evidence of support for development such as editorials in support of development, favorable coverage of the contentious land-use issue, or unfavorable coverage of SMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 – More than 50 people at one or more SMO sponsored event</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 – More than 50 people at one or more city meeting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 – More than 30 letters to the editor in a given calendar year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 – Petition with more than 400 signatures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 – Active attempts at ongoing recruitment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D = Frames</strong></td>
<td><strong>D = Public</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Adopted from Cress and Snow 2000)</td>
<td>1 – Evidence of support for development such as letters to editor, formal opinion polls, petitions, or election outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 – Clearly defined problem and who/what is to blame</td>
<td>2 – Countermovement emerged in response to smart growth movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 – Use of diagnostic frame(s) by individuals or organizations not involved in the movement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 – Clearly define solutions to the problem</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 – Use of prognostic frame(s) by individuals or organizations not involved in the movement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If all indicators are satisfied, then the causal condition is present and is coded “1” except for POS where meeting four of the five indicators are required to be coded.
present. If a causal condition has not been identified, or is absent, it is coded “0.” Similarly to causal variables, a list of theoretically and inductively derived outcome properties (dependent variables) is displayed for each of outcomes. These outcome variables are provided in Table 6.

Table 6. Outcome Properties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Outcomes</th>
<th>Social Outcomes</th>
<th>Cultural Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X = POLICY</td>
<td>Z = SOCIAL</td>
<td>Z = IDENTITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 – Changes to comprehensive plan; OR 2 – Changes to development plans; OR 3 – Enact smart growth initiative or an initiative that aligns with smart growth principles 4 – Open call for public input on subsequent development proposals 5 – Make land-use issues more accessible to general public</td>
<td>1 – Interorganizational cooperation with existing organization(s) 2 – New groups emerge that are supportive of smart growth principles 3 – Smart growth leadership in other community leadership positions</td>
<td>1 – Evidence participants have adopted “smart growth” or “empowered citizen” identity 2 – Evidence participation in the movement has shaped how others see them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y = REPRESENT</td>
<td>Z = STOP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Gamson 1990; Cress and Snow 2000)</td>
<td>1 – Stop development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variable names and operational definitions are offered for each outcome property. There are four political outcomes identified including political policy or process change (POLICY), representation (REPRESENT), and stop development (STOP). There is one social outcome: changes in social capital (SOCIAL). Finally, there is one cultural outcome: collective identity (IDENTITY). For each of the outcome properties, all of the
measures needed to be present to be marked as present ("1") with the sole exception of POLICY, which requires at least two of the first three indicators plus four and five satisfied to be considered present. Again, if the outcome is absent, it is coded as “0.”

As an important side note, it should be cautioned that the research findings from this project are limited regarding empirical generalizations. Even when using QCA, researchers typically incorporate a larger sample size than three. Despite the small number of cases, the use of QCA is still warranted and useful. First, this method of analysis has been used by a number of social movement researchers over the last fifteen years when studying social movement outcomes. As a result, there is a solid foundation of social movement research, which has helped establish this program of study. Second, a number of social movement scholars have noted the level of complexity involved in analyzing social movement outcomes. QCA is an appropriate method of organization and analysis for social movement outcomes because it lends itself to including multiple measures for both the cause and effect as well as accounting for change over time. QCA as a method of analysis can be used to resolve all of these issues. Finally, as is the case with most sociological research, QCA is well-suited for finding multiple paths to the same outcome. In the study of social movement outcomes, research has shown that there are a number of paths that can lead to successful outcomes.

The next three chapters explore three land-use movements that mobilized in response to contentious land-use decisions. Each one of the case studies are analyzed using QCA. Key variables identified as either part of SMO controlled factors, environmental factors, and outcome properties are inserted into each of case study
signifying the presence (or absence if noted) of the variable. When discussed, variables are identified by placing their abbreviations in parentheses.
CHAPTER V
AMES, IOWA: AMES SMART GROWTH ALLIANCE

Late in 2000, an out of state developer made his first visit to Ames, Iowa to scout 320 acres of land just outside the northeast corner of the city for a new commercial development\(^5\). In 2002, the developer formally submitted a letter expressing interest in developing a new mall and met with key city officials making it public knowledge.

There were a number of political and legal steps the developer and the city needed to take before the development could come to fruition (e.g., amending the city’s land use policy plan, voluntary annexation of land for the proposed site, and numerous impact studies related to market, traffic and growth). The first sign of opposition appeared in 2002 when two early smart growth proponents and later key founders of ASGA were quoted in the local newspaper speaking out against the project stating environmental issues and poor city planning. One of the members was a local county commissioner of the soil and water conservation district and key organizer of Friends of Hallett’s Quarry\(^6\) and the other the co-founder of a group called the Quality of Life Network\(^7\) and a participant in both the 1997 Land Use Policy Plan (LUPP) and Vision Ames 2002 (INDIG). Shortly after, local Iowa State University economist and retail sales expert, Ken Stone, formally

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\(^5\) Originally, the development was proposed as a 750,000 square foot enclosed mall with four anchor stores. The project is currently divided into two parcels of land: a 640,000 square foot “Lifestyle Center” or an open air strip mall and a “Power Center” or Big Box retailers.

\(^6\) The group, Friends of Hallett’s Quarry, was formed during the fall of 1999 when a local developer proposed a large residential development around an old sand and gravel quarry. The group was successful at forcing the city to annex the land and eventually was asked by the city to lead a campaign for a bond issue to raise money to purchase the land and develop a public park, now referred to as Ada Hayden Park.

\(^7\) The Quality of Life Network organized as a way to be formally recognized by the city and to offer input to the Land-Use Policy Plan during the mid-1990s; in particular, the group was opposed to the composition of the city’s task force and the lack of environmental perspective by committee members. The group was successful at getting a local naturalist to serve on the task force.
presented to the city council retail sales statistics and future projections, which cast serious doubt as to the viability of building a second mall and the threat it would pose to nearby towns, the downtown, and the existing mall (POS) (Grebe 2002).

Ames is a town of just over 50,000 with roughly half of the population coming from the student body of Iowa State University. Ames is located just over thirty miles north of Des Moines, Iowa. The community is very isolated from other metropolitan areas and is the largest city in Story County. The median family income for the city is just over $56,000. The two largest employers are public organizations, Iowa State University (INDIG) and Iowa Department of Transportation. Ames has a number of commercial areas including an existing mall, a commercial district with Big Box retailers and restaurants, a downtown area made up of various niche shops, restaurants, and bars, and Campus Town, which is comprised mostly of restaurants, bars, and retail for university students.

Although contentious from the moment the new mall plans became public, substantial opposition did not begin to mount until February of 2003. It was at this point a new formed group, ASGA\(^8\), and 1000 Friends of Iowa (INDIG), a state level organization against sprawl and for sustainable development practices, began a petition drive opposing a change to the city’s LUPP (TACTICS). A change to the LUPP was required to clear the way for the next steps in constructing the new mall. By July 2003, the petition drive had over 1500 signatures from local residents. In November of the same year, hundreds of yard signs stating “Smart Growth: No New Mall” started showing

\(^8\) Originally, ASGA was called the Ames Smart Growth Committee, then Ames Smart Growth, and finally incorporated in 2006 as the Ames Smart Growth Alliance.
up around town, and the petition drive resulted in more than 2500 signatures from Ames residents (HIGH PART) (Anderson 2003). At numerous points during 2003, the owners of the existing mall announced plans for expansion and spoke out publically against the proposed mall (POS); on many occasions the owners stated they supported a “smart growth approach” to development (Krapfl 2003).

Early on, a number of prominent groups and individuals came out in favor of building a new mall including the local chamber of commerce and economic development commission. In a survey of local business conducted by the chamber of commerce, it was reported seventy percent were in favor of a new mall (PUBLIC). In a number of articles, the local newspaper also touted the economic benefits of building a new mall, discussed some of the developer’s past and present developments, and reported on pressure from two nearby towns and their attempts to attract the developer and the new mall (MEDIA). Despite the local newspaper’s pro-mall stance, ASGA, its leadership, and smart growth supporters found a voice in the local newspaper from articles related to ASGA’s political and legal tactics and input on the land-use issues to guest editorials on smart growth and letters to the editor. Also, one columnist from the newspaper wrote a number of tongue and cheek editorials about the mall such as “Putting Lipstick on a Pig,” “The Smart Growth Menace,” and “Deadlines? What Deadlines.” In addition, from early on smart growth supporters found allies in parts of the business community (namely the existing mall) and within the ranks of city government (POS).

In December 2003, the developer submitted an application to change the city’s LUPP to city staff, which was then recommended to the city Planning and Zoning Commission (PNZ). The PNZ voted against (5 to 2) the developer’s proposal denying
the request for a map change and suggested the removal of the regional commercial site option from the 1997 LUPP (POS). Despite the recommendation to deny the map change by the PNZ, the city council voted January of 2004 in favor of (4 to 2) changing the map allowing the developer to move ahead in the process. At the meeting, nearly 100 people spoke during the public forum with the vast majority of the speakers opposed to the mall and the map change (HIGH PART). A number of those who spoke in favor of the map change included a local developer, a future city council member and PNZ member, and the owner of natural gas company who would supply power to the development site. Those who spoke in opposition to the development included members of ASGA and 1000 Friends of Iowa, the general manager of the existing mall, a member of the County Conservation Board, a representative of a housing association adjacent to the existing mall, and the co-president of the local League of Women Voters (INDIG) (Anderson 2004a).

A couple of weeks prior to the vote, the local newspaper hired an independent research company to conduct an opinion poll regarding the mall. Of the 402 randomly sampled participants, 50 percent (n=201) of the respondents were opposed, 35 percent (n=141) were in favor, and 15 percent (n=60) undecided. Three days prior to the vote, ASGA sponsored a smart growth symposium that attracted more than 100 participants focused on integrated urban growth (HIGH PART). In March of 2004, following the city council’s vote to change the land-use map, 1000 Friends of Iowa pulled out of local city affairs (Anderson 2004b). Because of the level of public outcry against the development, this same month, the city decided to pursue a new zoning option, Gateway Overlay Zoning District (GOZD), which would make the commercial development
subject to more city oversight, stricter regulations, and broader public input (POLICY) (Anderson 2004c). In six input sessions from May to August 2004, Ames residents helped establish guidelines for regulating the proposed development\(^9\) (POLICY). The next step in the process was for the city to annex part of the proposed land in question. The annexation of proposed land and talk of changing its classification from agriculture to commercial fueled speculation that the move was simply a step to open up future development to local developers. The first attempt by the city council to pass the land annexation drew a protest of over 100 local citizens outside of city hall (HIGH PART). The vote was delayed until the end of May 2004 when the city council unanimously voted to annex the land\(^10\) (Anderson 2004d).

A battle over the financial impact the new mall would have on the local economy also emerged during this time (POS). The mall’s developer had issued a market feasibility study which touted the new mall’s ability to stymie leakage of retail dollars out of the Ames market, draw in consumers from outside the city and meet a growing demand for greater retail options. The report did discuss the negative impact the new mall would have on the existing mall (namely relocation of anchor stores to the new mall). The report down played the impact of the power center on existing big box retail in town and from the surrounding areas and stated only “minimal impact” on the downtown. The report was countered by a study paid for by the ownership group of the

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\(^9\) It should be noted that the leadership of ASGA was extremely unhappy with this process. Many felt that the public input session was just paying lip-service to the political process and citizen involvement. Furthermore, the purpose the sessions was to help set guidelines for the development. Many members of the community were still strongly opposed to the development and were working hard to stop it because the change to the land-use map was only one step in many that need to be completed.

\(^10\) Despite two of the six city council members being against the mall, the land annexation still passed with a unanimous decision because the land annexation was seen as a good planning move.
existing mall. The focus of the report was on the adverse effect the new mall would have on existing businesses in and around town (specifically the existing mall). In addition, the report attempted to show despite the existing mall’s “physically dated” status, it was still performing at above the average sales-per-square-foot ratios. In addition, retail expert Ken Stone, on a number of occasions discussed the viability of the new mall and offered scathing critique of the market feasibility study conducted by the developer of the new mall stating the report uses old data and grossly overestimates sales projections (Peterson 2004; Stone 2004). A core member of ASGA with expertise in this area offered further critique of the developer’s study citing the cost of new infrastructure to taxpayers and further uncovering the discrepancies in the developer’s sales projections.

In September of 2004 after concerns over lack of responsiveness from city officials (i.e., voting in favor of land-use map change, annexing land, and moving ahead with GOZD committee meetings despite growing opposition to the project), a political action committee, Ames Citizens for Better Local Government (ACBLG), was formed to influence city elections (SOCIAL) (TACTICS). In October of 2004, the developer filed a rezoning request to change the land-use classification from agriculture industrial to commercial. In February 2005, the final reading of the design ordinance, which was in part the result of citizen input on GOZD, passed 5 to 1 by city council. The impact of smart growth supporters could be seen in a couple of concessions, albeit small, related to protecting the adjacent marsh, bulking up energy conservation standards, and limiting lighting and signage (POLICY). Despite these small concessions, a group of six area residents, Advocates for Responsible Urban Design (ARUD) (SOCIAL), under advisement from legal counsel sent a letter to the city identifying problems with design
standard guidelines (i.e., lack of specified territory that design standards apply, lack of conformity to city’s comprehensive plan, a violation of Iowa law and proper city council procedures) (TACTICS). This same month the developer submitted a proposal for a zoning agreement.\footnote{The zoning agreement deals with such things as proof of financing and leases by tenants as well as timeline for construction.}

During the summer of 2005, the first signs of opposition to smart growth and unified pro-mall front emerged (PUBLIC). Opposition picked up, mostly in the form of letters to the editor and comments posted online, when the former ASGA chairperson announced his intention of running for city council. Shortly after the announcement, two other smart growth candidates announced their candidacy. The first to announce was a fringe member of ASGA and a former member of the planning and zoning commission. The other smart growth candidate made his announcement and came from the ranks of the local University. All three smart growth candidates faced pro-mall challengers (two of whom were sitting incumbents and one who was running for a vacant seat).\footnote{During the 2005 election cycle, smart growth candidates outraised the pro-mall candidates by almost 2 to 1 ($14,834 to $8,631). The former chairperson of ASGA raised roughly half of the total contributions collected by smart growth candidates.}

It was around this same time that attacks on the credibility of the smart growth movement by pro-growth supporters started. Mostly found in letters to the editor and online comments, pro-growth supporters attempted to frame the group as a “vocal minority,” “elitist,” “special interests,” and “against progress.” Although there is ample evidence of pro-growth supporters framing smart growth supporters as such, this was no evidence that this was something that caught on within the local media nor was there strong evidence of this within city government. Additionally, out of the nine in-depth
interviews with smart growth organizers, four of them stated they felt their involvement with ASGA has influenced how others in the community see them. However, when probed on how their involvement changed how others view them, the results were mixed ranging from making enemies within the community to gaining respect from others. Also, four of the nine interviewees stated that they felt their involvement in the movement has changed how they view themselves. The four who stated their involvement has changed how they view themselves explained that they felt empowered as a citizen and felt that they were a part of something important. Although there is some evidence of attempt to both impose an identity on smart growth members as well as weak evidence of a smart growth and an empowered citizen identity, the majority of the respondents still stated they did not feel their involvement changed how other view them nor did it change how they view themselves.

In September 2005, the city council attempted to pass the first of three readings of the rezoning and zoning agreements. The meeting was met with a rally and protest (over 80 protesters) outside city hall and packed city council chambers (more than 100 people attended the meeting) (HIGH PART). The first attempt fell short, however, because an adjacent landowner to the proposed land filed an official protest\(^{13}\) with the city thereby forcing the developer to renegotiate the land purchasing agreement (TACTICS).

After renegotiating the land purchasing agreement to overcome the protest, the city council rescheduled the first of three readings for election night (Raasch 2005a). The

\(^{13}\) The official protest stated that the adjacent landowner owned more than 20 percent of the land within 200 feet of the land that was up for rezoning. A supermajority (five of the six city council members) was required to overturn the protest.
city council voted and passed 4-2 the first reading of both the rezoning agreement\textsuperscript{14} and later the zoning agreement. The vote took place after two hours of public input where seventeen citizens spoke (16 in opposition and 1 in favor). Over 100 citizens were in attendance with most being in opposition to the mall; this was based on the applause and cheers to dissenting votes and the sighs when consenting votes were cast (HIGH PART). The sixteen smart growth advocates spoke on many different issues. One common concern, however, was that the council table the vote until after the election. The outcome of the election was overwhelmingly in favor of the smart growth candidates. The former ASGA chairperson won with 56 percent of the votes to the pro-mall incumbents 44 percent. In the competition for the vacant council seat, the smart growth candidate received 59 percent to the pro-mall candidates 41 percent. The third smart growth candidate received 14 votes shy of gaining the majority in a three way race. This forced a runoff election where the student challenger won with 57.6 percent of the vote to the incumbents 42.2 percent (REPRESENT). The final reading for both the rezoning and zoning agreements was passed in December. This same month Dillard’s Department store became the first store to commit to the mall (Raasch 2005b).

In January 2006, the new city council took office (now 4-2 smart growth majority). This same month ARUD filed a lawsuit against the city stating the vote on election night broke “state and local laws before passing an ordinance that rezoned land for the shopping center,” and “contends that the council unlawfully changed the rezoning agreement during a public hearing and failed to collect signatures from owners of the

\textsuperscript{14} The purpose of the rezoning agreement is to change the land-use designation from agricultural-industrial to commercial.
land in question” (TACTICS). With the new composition of the city council favoring the smart growth supporters, the new city council began the process of rescinding the rezoning and zoning agreements. Without a supermajority, the council could not overturn the ordinance outright, so other tactics were employed including sending the new ordinance back to the PNZ, changing the land designation back to agriculture, and suspending the ordinance indefinitely.

With the filing of the lawsuit by ARUD, the out-of-state developer and the owners of the 320 acres of land joined the city in defense of the rezoning agreement. It was also during this time that the out-of-state developer announced he was investing $40,000 into a local public relations firm. Although never explicitly stated by either the developer or the public relations firm, it was during this time that a “citizen’s group” called YesProgress emerged. YesProgress conducted a city wide mailing of pamphlets stating the benefits of building a new mall. The group also held a petition drive and sent out YesProgress yard signs. The citizen group’s main spokesperson was an employee of the public relations firm and one of the main organizers was a member of the planning and zoning commission (PUBLIC).

With the new city council moving to rescind the land-use change, the out-of-state developer and the landowners filed a “defensive” lawsuit against the city. Finally, as the new city council members took office, the major economic development groups became much more visible as well as vocal proponents of the mall. In a joint letter, the Chamber of Commerce, the Economic Development Commission, the Home Builders Association, and the Young Professionals, urged the city council to “end the debate over the proposed mall” meaning “letting a new mall move forward.” Additionally, more and more pro-
growth supporters started attending city council meetings and writing letters to the editor. This was exemplified by a crucial city council meeting in May of 2006 where the smart growth council voted to table the mall issue indefinitely. At this meeting over 300 residents attended, many of whom were wearing YesProgress buttons. The majority of the speakers during public forum spoke in opposition to the vote or in favor of the mall (PUBLIC). At the meeting, the city council voted 4 to 2 to postpone indefinitely zoning for the land\textsuperscript{15}.

With smart growth supporters seemingly having the upper hand, a major blow was dealt to anti-mall proponents. Stating concerns over ethical tactics, one of smart growth city council members decided to not continue to vote in favor of indefinitely suspending the land-use designation. This changed the required majority (4-2) to a split (3-3) city council. As a result, the vote would be overturned and the mall would be allowed to move forward. In an attempt to force some sort of compromise, the former ASGA chairperson and new city council member wrote a letter stating his willingness to allow the mall to move forward under the following conditions: (1) designate land east of the development to industrial use and to specifically target bio-based technology and energy production; (2) have the developer commit to an environmental buffer to the north; (3) secure additional monies from the developer to offset infrastructure costs related to bus, bike, and pedestrian traffic; (4) develop a welcome center that provided information about the city in an attempt to connect the mall with the existing community; and (5) a commitment to a tax increment financing district by the city to use a portion of

\textsuperscript{15} The postponement was passed to wait for a judge’s ruling on the whether or not a supermajority was required to overturn unpublished ordinances.
the expected increased tax revenue for specific revitalization projects in downtown, Campustown, community facilities, and industrial development opportunities. This move caused major turmoil within ASGA leadership and eventually led to the reconfiguration of city council members who supported smart growth issues.

Following the compromise a pro-mall city council member stepped down from his post and was temporarily replaced by the mayor until a November 2006 special election. A member of the PNZ and a supporter of the mall and another major organizer of ASGA were the respective candidates for this open city council seat. The theme of the smart growth candidate was sustainable development and community consensus. From June to November 2006, the mall issue was fairly quiet. However, the special election filled in the void. The pro-mall candidate won the election by a margin of 62 percent to 37 percent (PUBLIC). The pro-mall candidate raised $11,290 to the smart growth candidate’s $8,837. According to the Iowa Ethics and Campaign Disclosure Board, a number of local developers, an influential businessperson\(^1\), pro-mall PNZ members, the former pro-mall mayor, and Republican candidates for county and state positions contributed to the pro-mall candidate. In December, the mall master plan was approved by the PNZ and then on to the city council where it was approved.

At the beginning of 2007, the city council invited a number of local interest groups to participate in a series of six forums on growth. The forums were led by local Iowa State University professors, a board member of ASGA, the executive director of the Chamber of Commerce and Economic Development Commission, the local

\(^{16}\) Nearly a year early, this local business person had paid for a number of billboard and newspaper advertisements
Superintendent of Ames Community School District, and a representative from the local Hospital, and moderated by an editor of the local newspaper (SOCIAL). The forums were open to Ames residents and were an attempt to bring differing opinions to the table and to help build community consensus (POLICY).

In May 2007, the city council identified establishing Ames as a environmentally sustainable community by signing the US Mayor’s Climate Protection Act and therefore dedicated the city to “EcoSmart” programs such as meeting LEED building standards, upgrading the city owned electrical power plant to increase efficiency, buying city owned hybrid vehicles, and promoting energy and water conservation (POLICY). More controversy emerged with the blocking of the mayor’s appointee for the vacant PNZ spot. The appointee was an outspoken advocate for large scale economic growth initiatives. Further concerns were raised because a number of the other applicants who were overlooked by the mayor either had ties to ASGA, had spoke passionately about sustainability and energy efficiency, or had spoke critically about sprawl. The original nominee was never appointed.

In August 2007, the developer released site plans for the eastern part of the commercial development (135 of 320 acres), which included two major anchor stores and space for a movie theater. Site plans for the mall were approved by city council (5-1). The following November another election became largely defined by the unresolved mall. One smart growth incumbent was challenged by a pro-mall supporter, and one pro-mall incumbent was challenged by a smart growth candidate. Both incumbents were reelected by narrow margins. The pro-mall incumbent won with 54 percent of the vote and the smart growth incumbent won with 51 percent (PUBLIC). The developer was
also approaching another deadline regarding the development agreement, which required the acquisition of 287 of the 320 acres, proof of financing for the project, and proof of leasing agreements with potential tenants. Although all three of these requirements were eventually met, there were problems with all three. Smart growth proponents urged city council to cancel the developer’s agreement on grounds the developer was not meeting the requirements by the city. The developer blamed his lack of progress on delays due to the drawn out process of receiving site plan approval. In late December 2007, ARUD suit was dismissed.

Over the next two months ARUD attempted to acquire through Iowa’s Open Records Law the lease agreement information provided by the developer. However, in each case they were denied. To date, this information has not been made public. In February 2008, ASGA requested $17,000 from the city to help develop a sustainability plan for the community. The request was the result of other pro-mall groups (e.g., the chamber of commerce and economic development group) receiving public financing from the city to employ various economic development strategies within Ames. ASGA’s request was denied, but it led the city council to appropriate $20,000 for sustainability research and community education on global warming (POLICY). From January to May 2008, ASGA was formally invited by the city to partake in discussions of future growth and annexation strategies (SOCIAL).

Currently the mall sits where it did in December of 2007. Besides the correspondence between the city and the developer over off-site infrastructure

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17 The third requirement, proof of lease agreements, was the most problematic because the developer provided one actual lease agreement, 22 letters of intent, and 16 proposed lease agreements.
improvement construction plans, the city attorney has still not received additional lease agreements. The developer has stated publicly that he remains committed to the project but has attributed the lack of progress to the downturn in the economy. Rumors have been circulating that the one and only retailer to officially sign a lease agreement, Dillard’s Department Stores, may be pulling out of the agreement because of recent financial problems and stockholder discontent with the company’s financial performance.

The mall has been approved to move ahead but nothing has happened as of August 2008.
CHAPTER VI

BRUNSWICK, NEW YORK: BRUNSWICK SMART GROWTH

In December of 2004, a local newspaper published an article about the construction of a new Wal-Mart Supercenter in the center of the town of Brunswick. The town already had an existing Wal-Mart located less than half a mile from the proposed location for the new Wal-Mart. At the next town board meeting (January 2005) a small group of Brunswick residents showed up voicing concern over the proposal. Residents who attended the town board meeting to learn more about the Wal-Mart proposal were stunned to find out that the town also had four large residential developments under consideration. The combined residential developments, if built, would significantly change the rural landscape and increase the population. This small group of residents ended up exchanging contact information and decided to meet informally for a potluck supper in February. Seventeen people showed up for this meeting, and the result of the meeting was Brunswick Smart Growth (BSG). From the beginning, both the Wal-Mart Superstore and the proposed residential developments were seen as contradictory to the “town’s rural character” (FRAME). As indicated by a 1999 survey of local Brunswick residents, many members of the community valued the rural setting of the community preferring open spaces of the countryside and the community’s strong farming tradition (absence of PUBLIC).

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18 Since BSG formed there have been two additional major residential developments that have been proposed bringing the total of six plus a Wal-Mart Supercenter. In total, it is estimated that cumulative effect of all six proposals (an estimated 1,124 residential units – 756 of which have already been approved) could increase the town’s population by approximately 20 percent. The town of Brunswick currently has roughly 5000 residential units and a population of 11,696.
Brunswick, New York is composed of an array of winding, two lane roads that connect various hamlets and new developments. There is no grid pattern to the community. This is due in part to how the community was settled as well as the natural terrain of the area. The community is located approximately 20 miles from both Massachusetts and Vermont and is located on the rolling hills prior to the Taconic Mountain range. The city is spread out and has no city center, and it is divided into various zoning districts that regulate appropriate use of property. However, the community has different areas devoted to residential, commercial, industrial, and agricultural land-use. The community has strong roots in farming and maintains a strong agriculture sector, but the majority of residents work outside of the community.

Brunswick is roughly fifteen minutes northeast of the state capitol, Albany, New York. Troy is a city immediately adjacent to Brunswick’s west side and is approximately 50,000. Troy is more or less landlocked, which has resulted on pressure to develop open, cheaper land in Brunswick. Troy also houses Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, a well-known private research university (INDIG). Troy has an urban feel and is much more densely populated. Whereas, Brunswick is by and large a fairly homogenous community: white (about 96 percent) and middle class (median household income just over $56,000). A large portion of Brunswick’s residents have lived in the community their entire life. There is also a substantial aging population (roughly 15 percent of the overall population is considered senior citizens)\(^\text{19}\). Local town elections are all decided by partisan elections, and the community has a history of voting Republican\(^\text{20}\). As a result, the Town

\(^{19}\) A number of the developments are being proposed as “empty nester” developments.

\(^{20}\) Republicans have held the majority of local, county, and state offices for over a decade.
Board Members (four) and Supervisor (one) are currently comprised of all Republicans (Absence of POS).

Following the original meeting in February 2005, BSG began organizing quickly and engaged a number of strategies to fight the Wal-Mart. Shortly after the group formed, they distributed hundreds of yard signs stating “Preserve Brunswick’s Character” (TACTIC). The signs were financed by a local union, the Troy Area Labor Council (TALC) (INDIG), a group also interested in fighting the Wal-Mart proposal. By April 2005, BSG had formally incorporated as a nonprofit corporation. Today, BSG has roughly 230 members, 40 of whom are considered regular or active members (VIABLE). In addition to yard signs, the group circulated a petition against the flurry of development proposals before the Town Board and the effect these would have on already congested traffic patterns, school district and infrastructure costs, loss of open spaces and farmland, threat to air and water quality, and increase in light and noise pollution (FRAMES).

Ultimately, it was BSG’s goal to halt all the development proposals to “conduct extensive public hearings to revise and improve Brunswick’s Comprehensive Plan to provide for appropriate and affordable growth that would preserve the Town’s essentially rural character” (FRAMES). By December 2007, BSG collected 2028 signatures from local residents (approximately 23 percent of town residents over 18 years of age) (HIGH PART).

In 2001, the town of Brunswick created a Comprehensive Plan, which identifies key values of the community and offers guidance for future growth. A major component 21

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21 The Town Supervisor is a very successful local farmer and owns the largest dairy farm in the county. He is also one of the largest landowner in the county. The most influential Town Board member works for the State of New York Senate Majority Leader, Senator Joe Bruno. Senator Bruno is also a Brunswick resident and successful developer.
of the document is its focus on maintaining Brunswick’s quality of life by promoting steady growth that reflects the town’s rural character. The Comprehensive Plan recognizes the pressure for future development and states the town needs to embrace growth, but it also specifically states growth in residential units should not outpace economic growth, specifically employment opportunities. One of the major limitations of the Comprehensive Plan is that it lacks any sort of requirement for periodic review. Since the adoption of the document in 2001, it had never been reviewed nor amended. Instead of adhering to zoning ordinances in place, the Town Board has employed the use of Planned Development Districts (PDD)\textsuperscript{22}.

When enacted, PDD is amended to the existing zoning, which gives the selected parcel of land its own, new zone with separate standards and regulations for development. However, the surrounding area, or the original zoning district remains the same (e.g., a piece of land within an area zoned agriculture in the Comprehensive Plan essentially applies PDD and reclassifies it at the discretion of the Town Board). The result is patchwork zoning where seemingly contradictory land designations are found one next to another. PPDs were approved for two of the residential developments\textsuperscript{23}, and the Wal-Mart Supercenter and the other residential developments were at some point, are currently at, or are in the planning stages of a PDD process.

\textsuperscript{22} PDDs are intended to allow more flexibility with design and layout of new developments than allowed by current zoning regulations (e.g., zones with low density requirements could be amended to force certain areas to have higher density allowing for open/green space in other areas). However, it is often employed as a way to skirt zoning regulations.

\textsuperscript{23} One proposed development is for 284 units (106 single-family homes and 178 senior citizen apartments) on 217 acres previously zoned part recreational and part residential. The other for 162 single family homes on 210 acres previously zoned agriculture.
In addition to the yard signs and a petition against the proposed developments, BSG engaged in public relations efforts through distributing informational flyers door-to-door throughout the local community, writing letters to the editor to local and regional newspapers, and press releases. Many core members became regular fixtures at Town Board meetings (HIGH PART). The group also created a number of specialized committees to divide up the labor. One committee formed was a research committee that has worked extensively on responding to draft scoping statement and Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS)\textsuperscript{24} as part of the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA)\textsuperscript{25} process (VIABLE).

The first development that brought the group together was the Wal-Mart Superstore proposed by a local developer from a nearby town. The development was for a new Superstore on 33 acres less than a half mile from an existing Wal-Mart. The store itself was proposed as a 200,000 square foot, 5 acre store with a 12-pump gas station and over 1000 parking spaces. In addition to the close proximity of the existing Wal-Mart, there were also major concerns over the effect the development would have on adjacent federal wetland, increased traffic congestion on an already busy route, and blatant contradiction to the Comprehensive Plans call for commercial growth that is limited in size and scope (FRAMES).

\textsuperscript{24} Document prepared by the developer to address the project’s potential impact on the environment.

\textsuperscript{25} Any project identified as having significant environmental impact is required by the town board to complete the SEQRA review. The first step is to develop the Draft scope (outline of the items to be discussed in the DEIS). After city feedback, a revised or Final Scope is submitted. Then the DEIS is submitted. This is followed a Final Environmental Impact Statement (a revised DEIS, or FEIS). The public can comment on the Draft Scope (step one) and DEIS (step three) only.
The initial development proposal was submitted to the Town Board in February of 2005, and over the next two years BSG fought the development proposal. After incorporating, members of the group visited a nearby community, Ballston Spa, where residents were fighting a Wal-Mart Superstore as well (INDIG). The group also followed the organizational plan outlined in Al Norman’s *Sprawl-Busters*, and engaged in a formal membership drive and fundraising efforts. In November 2005, supporters of smart growth took part in a large anti-Wal-Mart rally organized by Capital District Wal-Mart Accountability Coalition and co-sponsored by BSG (TACTIC) (Sanzone 2005). Although the Wal-Mart proposal was always a concern for smart growth supporters, in a lot of ways, it simply opened the door to many more pressing issues including threats to the town’s rural character, contradictions between the Comprehensive Plan and the actual development process, and lack of consensus decision making and governmental transparency (POS). Eventually, Wal-Mart withdrew its application in the Fall 2007. Many members feel this was in part due to the efforts of BSG, but the ultimate decision was left to New York’s Department of Environmental Conservation (STOP). The Department would not grant Wal-Mart permits to build under their new storm water management regulation.

At the original Wal-Mart Supercenter meeting (January 2005), the Final Scope for 77 luxury multi-family garden apartment buildings was proposed by the same developer of the Wal-Mart and passed by the Town Board. The proposal was for 1116 units on 215 acres of land previously zone agricultural. The developer argued the need for the

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26 The project was originally introduced to the town board in December of 2004.
development to meet an increasingly diverse labor force in the Capital District\textsuperscript{27} as well as offer an alternative to buying a home. The town accepted the DEIS in June 2005. In August 2005, the Town Board held a public hearing on the proposed apartment complex. The room was filled to capacity (easily over a hundred attendees) with local residents, many of whom were members of BSG (HIGH PART). The meeting ended with the Town Supervisor commenting the concerns raised by local residents would be addressed by the developer in future draft proposals. The final steps of the SEQRA process was adopted by the town board two years later in August 2007. Throughout the process, BSG and smart growth supporters stated their concern over the proposed developments effect on the “rural character” of town as well as the inconsistent nature of development with the Comprehensive Plan (FRAMES). The final proposal had been scaled down significantly from 1116 units to 250 units, the addition of two baseball fields, and a conservation easement\textsuperscript{28}. Many BSG members view the significant reduction in the number of residential units as a result of pressure from the group (POLICY).

In June 2004, a proposal for a 284 residential unit development (101 homes and 7 senior citizen apartments) on 217 acres of land zoned part residential and part recreational was submitted to the Town Board. The development proposal was submitted by a development group from Troy. BSG became interested in this project shortly after organizing in February 2005. The Town Board accepted the DEIS in November 2005. The FEIS was accepted August 2006, and the Town Board approved the project a month later. The project could not officially go through until a water and sewer district for the

\textsuperscript{27} Capital District refers to the four counties (Albany, Schenectady, Rensselaer, and Saratoga) that surround the capital of the state of New York, Albany.

\textsuperscript{28} An agreement not to develop part of the property.
PDD was created. The water and sewer district was completed June 2007. Smart growth proponents were present at Town Board meetings, and BSG commented on DEIS. Despite the Town Board asserting the project was in line with the Comprehensive Plan, concerns with the project related to its inconsistency with the Comprehensive Plan, and the fact that it, along with the other developments, lacks any meaningful discussion of the cumulative effects of all the developments (Absence of POS). One major concern of the development is the increased infrastructure costs and the burden being placed on taxpayers. It is estimated the development would require more than 2 miles of new sewer as well as new sewer and water districts.

One of the most controversial developments was for 190 family homes on 210 acres of land. The land was originally zoned agricultural before it was rezoned as a PDD. In February 2005, the project was first introduced by a developer from Albany to the Town Board. In November 2005, the Town Board accepted the DEIS. This was followed by the acceptance of the FEIS in April 2006 and the town adopting the SEQRA findings and unanimously approving the project. Like the other developments, BSG commented at various points in the SEQRA process about the project’s environmental impact and the effect it would have on the rural character of the town. Again, the proposal claimed to be consistent with the 2001 Comprehensive Plan, but smart growth supporters were very concerned with the cumulative effects of all the projects. In addition, traffic patterns and additional costs to the taxpayer for infrastructure and schools were also concerns (FRAMES).

The biggest problem with the development, however, was not its size. The problem was the potential conflict of interest between the development and the Town
Supervisor (POS). The land in question is owned by the Town Supervisor and his brother, a Rensselaer County Legislator. In conflict of interest, it is estimated by the Town Supervisor that if the land is cleared for development by the Town Board, the Albany-based developer will purchase the land for nearly 2 million dollars. At the November 2005 Town Board meeting regarding the DEIS\textsuperscript{29}, smart growth supporters packed the Town Hall to voice opposition to the development. Although the Town Supervisor recused himself from voting, the public hearing on the project attracted well over 180 attendees within the building. A large crowd also congregated outside the building next to open windows to listen to the public hearing (HIGH PART). BSG leadership spoke out stating not enough time was given to the public to respond to the plan (Charniga 2005).

Other concerns were raised on the proposed density of the development and the conflict with the rural character of the town. The project would preserve 135 acres of the 210 for open space (60 acres of wetland). The remaining land would hold 21 luxury manor homes, 29 single family homes, and 130 side-by-side carriage homes for empty nesters. Shortly after the Town Board passed a resolution approving the PDD, a number of local residents and BSG brought suit against the town (TACTICS). The group hired a local land-use attorney to review the Town Board’s actions for legal compliance and argued that the Town Board did not follow proper procedure when approving by resolution the PDD in land zoned agricultural. The suit was dismissed in January 2007.

During this same period of time from 2005 to 2007, the Town Board was in the process of reviewing and implementing a number of other residential developments. One

\textsuperscript{29} Earlier public hearings about the project also drew quite a bit of attention from local residents.
project was for the expansion of already existing apartments in town. The project called for an additional five new buildings (12 units each) by extending the current PDD to include the targeted expansion area zoned agricultural. The application for this project was approved May 2007. The town has also considered two additional residential developments. The first of the two is for a 136 unit condominium community on roughly 16 acres of land (mostly agricultural). The Town Board accepted a DEIS in April 2007. The other project is for 232 units including 120 condominium units, 39 townhouses, 48 senior apartments, and 25 single family homes on 100 acres of land zoned agricultural.

After the approval a number of the developments by the Town Board and the perception elected officials were not listening to the concerns of local residents, another lawsuit was filed against the town (TACTICS). In December 2007, BSG and a number of local residents filed suit against the town stating the cumulative effect of new developments either approved or in review did not comply with the 2001 Comprehensive Plan. The lawsuit calls for the Town to amend the comprehensive plan to have periodic reviews and updates of the plan, to adopt land-use regulations consistent with the plan (rather then the ad hoc use of PDD), to assess of the cumulative effects of all of the proposed developments on the town, and to consider whether or not the cumulative effect of the proposals is consistent with the existing Comprehensive Plan (FRAMES). As of August 2008, the lawsuit is still under review.

Throughout this struggle, many supporters of smart growth became much more involved in local politics. As a result of the partisan election for Town Board and Town Supervisor, BSG and smart growth supporters naturally gravitated toward the challenging political party. BSG from the beginning of the organization intended to remain non-
partisan. However, with Republicans in all elected positions, new candidates from BSG ranks and established Democratic Party locals begin to run for office using smart growth as a major part of their platform (SOCIAL). Shortly after BSG was formed in 2005, they endorsed a local democrat running for Town Board. The challenger was defeated in November 2005 by a 146 vote margin. BSG also attempted to host a number of candidate debates. In the Fall of 2005, the group tried to host a candidates’ debate with the League of Women Voters (INDIG) as the official sponsor and moderator, but all incumbents refused to participate. In November 2007, two Town Board positions and the Town Supervisor office were up for reelection. All three spots were challenged by Democrats who ran on smart growth principles. Again, all challengers fell short of victory and the Town Board (one incumbent and one new Republican candidate) and Town Supervisor (incumbent) remained in the hands of the Republicans\(^{30}\) (Absences of REPRESENT). However, it was the largest voter turnout for local election ever.

Since the beginning of the conflict, pro-development supporters have attempted to paint BSG and smart growth supporters as anti-growth. All of the key organizers who were interviewed stated that the group was being painted as an anti-growth group. Five out of the nine interviewed state they felt their participation in the group has changed how others within community see them. Even more prominent, all of the key organizers, with the exception of one, stated their participation has changed how they view themselves. In particular, eight of the nine respondents stated involvement with BSG has shaped how they identify themselves as feeling empowered or being an empowered citizen (IDENTITY).

\(^{30}\) Roughly 25 percent of registered voters in Brunswick are identified as Democrat.
During election cycles, there have also been attempts to link BSG with the local Democratic Party suggesting unethical political connections, and democratic challengers who embrace smart growth principles would raise property taxes. Since BSG formed, the Town of Brunswick’s website had very little information on it. However, after two years of sustained opposition to the proposed developments by smart growth supporters, the town website has improved significantly (POLICY). Now all meeting transcripts, minutes, and documents are posted online. Smart growth proponents have influenced the development process by slowing it down from previous approvals on all seven of the developments. However, the group’s efforts cannot be directly linked to either outright stopping the Wal-Mart proposal (STOP) or stopping the approval of any of the other residential developments. Although none of the development proposals have been stopped, many have scaled down significantly (POLICY).

One of the main issues that smart growth supporters have fought for is to follow the 2001 Comprehensive Plan and to approve developments that enhance not contradict or degrade the rural character of the town. To this day, there is still no active planning and no zoning map to accompany the Comprehensive Plan. Another major focus of the group is to raise public awareness of the cumulative effects of the developments and to promote an alternative view of development. Generally speaking, many of the group members feel that the efforts of BSG have had a significant impact on raising public consciousness. This is evident from a hugely successful petition drive, the record crowds at Town Board meetings, and the large number of letters to the editor in the two local newspapers voicing opposition to the developments and support for smart growth. The group has also been very successful at raising financial support for its efforts including
developing and distributing a newsletter and hiring legal advice for the two lawsuits (SOCIAL).
CHAPTER VII

CENTREVILLE, MARYLAND: CITIZENS FOR GREATER CENTREVILLE

In the early 1980s, a local developer bought 6.5 acres of land at the headwaters of the Corsica River\(^{31}\) in Centreville, Maryland. The Wharf, as it is called, is traversed by a narrow road and bridge that split the land into two parcels. The front 5 acres of land located directly next to a tributary of Chesapeake Bay had previously been used as a fertilizer depot. The back 1.5 acres of land held tidal wetlands and had never been developed\(^{32}\). Both pieces of land are considered to be in a floodplain. The developer proposed to build roughly 15 townhouses on the property. However, a group of local residents considered the land crucial to the town and the Chesapeake Bay and felt the influx in residents to this specific area would result traffic congestion and safety issues (FRAMES). As a result, the group fought the development by arguing the road and bridge, neither of which could be expanded because of the landscape, could not handle the traffic and would not provide the needed access to the area in case of emergency. The group repeatedly brought suit against the town and the developer losing over and over again (TACTICS). However, the project was delayed long enough to the point where the economy took a downturn and the developer could not finance it (POS). The developer sat on the land for over fifteen years until the late 1990s when he put it on the market for $600,000.

\(^{31}\) The Corsica River is a tidal river and one of the main tributaries to the Chesapeake Bay. The river is currently on the Environmental Protection Agency’s Impaired Rivers List.

\(^{32}\) Currently, the property is roughly 4 acres including the back 1.5 acres and 2.39 acres on the waterfront. The other portion of the land has a small private commercial development and a parking lot/boat launch area owned by the county.
Around the same time, a group of local citizens encouraged the Queen Anne’s County Commissioners to purchase the land for a public park and access point to the water (INDIG). First, the land immediately next to the Wharf Property was already owned and operated by the county. Second, under the county’s Parks and Recreation Department, the county could apply for both federal and state monies to purchase the land outright. The county refused to act. The group also tried to encourage the Town Council (comprised of three members) to get involved in the process. However, the President of the Town Council was not receptive to the idea and refused to take action. The land sat on the market for a couple of years, and in 2001, a group by the name of the Centreville Wharf, LLC bought the Wharf property for $1.1 million. The development corporation originally proposed 30 condominiums on 2.39 acres of land on the waterfront portion. The development corporation argued the property was considered derelict and in need of redevelopment to make the land productive again. From the moment the project was proposed, the development faced a number of difficulties including the land’s location in a floodplain, the land set within 1000 feet of the Chesapeake Bay waterways, and the need for substantial variance to the natural landscape (three feet of infill to raise the land). In addition, the proposed development would be significantly higher than any of the surrounding buildings in town and the town’s comprehensive plan had the area designated for public use (POS).

Centreville was formed in 1792 as a planned community and has basically remained the same size over the last two centuries. According to the 2000 census, Centreville has a population of 1,970. As of 2004, Centreville’s population is estimated to be 2,534 persons. During this four year time period, Centreville experienced the
greatest rate of population growth in its history (POS). Centreville is located in Queen Anne’s County (population 40,563) and is the county seat. It was chosen as the county seat because of its access to the wharf. Centreville is located on the Eastern Shore of Maryland, roughly 15 minutes from the Chesapeake Bay Bridge, which is the only access to this part of the Eastern Shore, and is approximately one hour from the Annapolis/Baltimore area. The Eastern Shore and the Centreville area considered rural with the primary use of land being agricultural. In addition, Centreville, like many other towns on the Eastern Shore, is tidal waterways and is known for fishing, crabbing, and transportation access to the Chesapeake Bay.

Over the last few decades, Centreville has become a bedroom community for people who work in the Annapolis-Baltimore area with roughly 60 percent of the population commuting to work. There is one main road into town from the Interstate. The road splits into two once within city limits and encompasses the heart of the town. The highway joins again on the other side of the town and eventually leads to the town of Chestertown. The community has a downtown with a number of special niche stores, restaurants, and legal firms. Many of these businesses remain open and thrive due to the district court house located downtown.

In 2001, when the wharf development was first proposed, a group of citizens\textsuperscript{33} came together, organized and incorporated as Citizens for Greater Centreville (CGC). Approximately sixty people showed up at the initial meeting (HIGH PART). In July 2001, despite major opposition by CGC, Centreville’s Planning Commission

\textsuperscript{33} This group, which became CGC, included two of the main organizers from the early 1980’s Wharf property dispute as well as a number of the citizens from the late 1990’s who pushed for the county to buy the property.
recommended Wharf zoning changes with three minor stipulations\textsuperscript{34} to the Town Council. The front 5 acres of land was zoned C2, which is commercial/industrial. However, the land needed to be rezoned for residential use, or R3, a classification allowing for the densest residential development. The zoning changes were set for the Town Council’s vote during the early fall of 2001. However, CGC, under the guidance of legal counsel, successfully convinced the Town Council to reject rezoning (TACTICS).

In a letter submitted to the Town Council by the group’s lawyer, a number of problems, many procedural, were identified. For example, the town must satisfy a number of state and town laws and requirements in relation to the development including rectifying inconsistencies between the town’s Comprehensive Plan and proposed use of the land. In particular, smart growth state policy requires all local development to focus on commercial growth. The town of Centreville had 42 (4 percent) out of its 1048 acres designated commercial use. The rezoning of the front portion of the land to R3 would essentially eliminate 16 percent of the town’s commercial land-use designation. Also, according to the town’s Comprehensive Plan, “The wharf provides a unique opportunity…to create a small scale, mixed use waterfront development that could include improved public landing, marina facility, passive waterfront park area, a small outdoor amphitheater/bandstand for public festivals and events and a small restaurant and tourist/boat supply store.” None of these were being proposed in the project (POS).

\textsuperscript{34} The three stipulations included slight changes in density with concern for traffic patterns on the road/bridge, allowing public access to the water, and the number of variances required to build the project as originally proposed.
Under state law and according to the town’s own plan, all developments are required to follow “community-based development” in the development process, which the development process had not done to this point. This was a particular point of contention because the Wharf property sits on land at the edge of the incorporated town and roughly half of CGC’s active membership are individuals who live either on land contiguous to or within sight of the proposed development. Politically, under Centreville’s town law, these individuals had no say in the development. Also, the development must be compatible with the surrounding environment. Another problem was the project did not take into consideration the historical significance of this piece of property, and the project did not incorporate nearby historic landmarks (POS). Finally, the cumulative impacts of two already approved developments (395 age restricted homes and 485 one-third acre homes) with the condominiums had not been considered (POS).

The state of Maryland was the first state in the nation to adopt and implement smart growth policies. Under the leadership of Governor Glendening, the 1997 General Assembly passed smart growth legislation. Essentially, smart growth legislation was instituted as a way to combat development pressures from the sprawling east coast. A unique quality of Maryland is that it has a history of progressive state level land-use

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35 Any stakeholder involved (whether property owner or nearby citizen) should have some input in what happens with the land.
36 In 1997, Maryland’s General Assembly passed five pieces of legislation and budget initiatives referred to as “Smart Growth.” The legislation dealt with focusing development in areas where infrastructure already exists, protecting natural resources, protecting taxpayers from subsidizing infrastructure costs accrued from sprawling developments, and improving quality of life for communities by preserving rural, suburban, or urban character. More specifically, legislation dealt with Brownfields, Job Creation Tax Credits, Priority Funding Areas Act, Live Near Your Work, and Rural Legacy. The state promotes ten principles including mixed land uses, compact building design, diverse housing choices, walkable communities, well-planned, attractive, and distinctive communities, natural resource preservation, diverse transportation options, use of existing infrastructure, predictable, fair, and cost effective development decisions, and collaborative development decisions.
policies. Many of these policies have played a crucial role in setting the stage for smart growth legislation including a state level intervention policy (1974) allowing Maryland’s Department of Planning to partake in any land-use proceeding at local, county, or state level; the 1992 Economic Growth, Resource Protection, and Planning Act, which promotes focused development, natural areas protection, and funding for planned development and requires local comprehensive plans to address these issues; and the Critical Areas Program (also known as the Critical Areas Act, or CAA) enacted in 1984 (amended in 2002) under the Chesapeake Bay Protection Act, which monitors 1000-foot buffer inland from the shoreline of the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries and adjacent tidal wetlands37 (POS).

Prior to the enactment of CAA, there was a major push by land owners within this buffer to plat land in small parcels (under 65 acres) to be grandfathered into the new law. CAA has been very important for citizen groups fighting development. Because the Wharf was previously developed, the land is exempt from Critical Areas. However, the law still gave CGC leverage because CAA required the preservation of the natural health and beauty of the Chesapeake Bay and its major waterways. Additionally, the law states only 600 cubic yards of infill for landscape variance can be used per lot. The Wharf required much more than the allotted 600 cubic yards of infill (POS).

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37 The purpose of the Critical Areas Act (CAA) is to regulate land use within the buffer by forcing local officials to mitigate the negative effects of development on water quality and natural habitat. CAA, however, does still allow for development. Any lot zoned or rezoned on or before December 1, 1985 held a grandfathered status retaining its land-use designation regardless if the use conflicts with CAA. However, there are still circumstances in which the land in question is subject to CAA oversight (e.g., significant variance, or more than 600 cubic yards of infill, to the land).
Despite many of these state level policies, over the last decade, Centreville has experienced a push for major development. Part of the problem was Centreville’s inability to properly deal with and manage the type of rapid expansion being presented. Around the same time the Wharf property was bought, the town had a number of major developments under construction. The Town Council had annexed a piece of farm land contiguous to the town borders. The annexation was supposed to be for a number of five acre luxury homes with a golf course. However, in the original agreement, there was a clause that if the right golf course design could not be arranged with an architect then the land can be changed to something else. The something else turned into 485 one-third acre homes on the outskirts of town. At the time, Centreville had a population of 1,970 and 866 residential units (of which approximately 250 considered single-family homes) in the entire town. On the other side of town, a Maryland-based developer built an age restricted development (over the age of 55) with 395 homes. This development is very isolated and insular from the town (POS).

In April 2004, a local Baltimore area television news station broke a major story over Centreville’s wastewater treatment plan dumping excess sewage directly into the Corsica River. With the help of a local Centreville area resident and CGC member, the news station had conducted an investigative report coming from a former employee of the wastewater plant who alleged the company knew about possible violations. The cause of the pollution was due to increased development in the area and the Wastewater Plant’s inability to handle the volume of waste coming through it. As a result, the plant regularly pumped hazardous sewage directly into the Corsica River (in excess of 30
percent of the plants operating ability). Furthermore, there were times the pumps would
shutdown altogether and raw sewage was spit directly into the river and were never
reported to state authorities.

Making the issue even worse, the whistleblower had raised concerns to his
superior and also written a letter to the Town Council in January 2004 stating his
concerns over plant’s capacity to handle increased sewage (POS) (WBAL-TV11 2004a).
He was fired from his post two days prior the news story uncovering the sewage problem.
His firing occurred when he made public comments at a Town Council meeting stating
that the Town Manager had not dealt with the sewage problem despite being told the
plant was regularly exceeding capacity (WBAL-TV11 2004b). The town manager and
the plant superintendent were the same person and was the whistleblower’s immediate
supervisor. He was fired less than a week after the story broke (WBAL-TV11 2004c).
Allegations over falsifying records of the sewage spills were leveled against the town and
the Town manager stating that the sewage numbers needed to be low to continue
development in town. When the story broke, a number of environmental organizations,
state officials and agencies, and federal agencies investigated the plant. Investigations
uncovered a number of issues and resulted in a number of sanctions. The local television
station news team uncovered records that the Maryland Department of the Environment
(MDE) had ordered the town to fix the plant as early as October of 2001. At the
following Town Council meeting after the story broke, the Town Council imposed a 30-
day moratorium on all new development (stopping the immediate construction of roughly

38 From January to March 2003, the plant exceeded sewage flow by 588 percent. However,
documents show that sewage spills had been occurring for the last decade.
650 new homes) (POS). The council president, also the vice president of a local
development corporation, lost a re-election bid around the time that story broke and was
accused of knowing about the problem well before the story was made public\textsuperscript{39}. The
Maryland Attorney General’s office Environmental Crime Unit investigated the
allegations. For the first time in the state’s history, the state of Maryland imposed an
indefinite suspension of building new homes and businesses in Centreville\textsuperscript{40} (POS). A
lawsuit was filed against the town of Centreville because of the imposed building
moratorium (WBAL-TV11 2004d).

The combination of state level smart growth policies, rapid development in the
area, and uncovering of sewage problems due to overdevelopment gave CGC
considerable leverage in fighting the Wharf Development. As a result, a couple of CGC
supporters and proponents of controlled growth practices had gained access to local
office. One CGC member was appointed to Planning Commission and another had won
election for Town Council (REPRESENT). Also, following petition drives\textsuperscript{41}, letters to
the editor, public statements at Town Council meetings, and litigation, CGC had
successfully stalled the Wharf project. Many CGC members were still actively lobbying
the county to purchase the land. In June 2005, the Wharf development received approval
from the Centreville Board of Zoning Appeals for significant variance to the landscape.
It was not until January 2006, however, that the Planning Commission granted Final
Approval of the project. A number of CGC members spoke out against the development

\textsuperscript{39} The development company of the President of the Town Council had worked on engineering
plans for some of the new developments in town.
\textsuperscript{40} The ban was lifted in February 2005 following the completion of a new sewage treatment
facility.
\textsuperscript{41} One petition drive resulted in over 400 signatures urging the county to purchase the land.
and argued the need for the land to be used for public use (HIGH PART). The Town Council meeting this same month ended with a unanimous vote giving the Town Manager the right to meet with the developer of the property and to discuss the potential purchasing of all or a portion of the land (TACTICS). After continued pressure by CGC through public relations campaign, lawsuits against the developer, and economic pressure, the Wharf LLC decided to put the property on the market and the town eventually bought part of the land. In 2007, the town floated a bond issue to buy the waterfront property for $2 million from the development group (STOP). The town officially received deed to the front part of the Wharf property on June 7th, 2007.

The town bought the property with the idea of turning it into a gateway to the waterfront and to the town center. After the town purchased the land, a committee of local citizens called the Centreville Wharf Advisory Committee (CWAC) was created to evaluate what the best use for the property would be. CWAC recommended a number of uses for the property including adding additional transient slips, a floating dock, a fishing pier, a two-story cultural and heritage center, recreational rental center, offices, observation deck, a playground, commercial space, residential units, native wetlands and living shoreline, additional parking, a boardwalk with railings, open space, and a bandstand (POLICY). In September 2007, CWAC voted unanimously to forward a number of recommendations to the Town Council including conducting an environmental analysis of the land, performing substantial clean up of the area (removing concrete foundation and filling in large open pits), and stabilizing the shoreline. In December

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42 The housing market in the area also started to slow during this time as well.  
43 The result of the bond issue is that Centreville residents are now paying an additional 10 percent on local city taxes. The land could have been bought originally for $600,000 with state and federal grant money by the county.
2007, the Town Council adopted the recommendations for the CWAC. The town is looking to add ten slips for public use, a trail that connects with an existing trail in town, and a boardwalk with two observation/fishing piers. There is no timeline for construction to begin and the town is seeking grant money to fund the project. The property will be used by the public for a number of years and the city will decide what to do with it later. As of July 2008, the town is actively seeking a professional planner for the site.

Currently, the Town Council is split about how to proceed: one member wants to pursue grant money through the state’s Open Spaces Fund and the other two want to sell it back to a private owner⁴⁴ (POS). The property is still vacant today and has been for over the last 30 years.

Throughout this land-use dispute, CGC has worked in a fairly welcoming community. The Wharf property has been an area of concern and contention for local residents for many years. Many of the local area residents have been supportive of using at least some part of the land for public use. This is evident both in the town’s 1998 Community Plan and in a 1995 needs assessment survey conducted by the Centreville Community Plan Citizen Advisory Committee. The results of the survey found that the second most identified goal for the community was to “improve public access and utilization of the Corsica River waterfront” (Absence of PUBLIC). CGC and its leadership has also developed working relationships with other non-profit and advocacy groups in the area including Corsica River Conservancy (CRC), Queen Anne’s Conservation Association, and Citizens Alliance to Save Our County (SOCIAL). The

⁴⁴ One of the main points of contention is regarding pursuing state money through the Open Spaces Fund. The fund is used for the preservation of open space to be used for public access. A stipulation of receiving the money, however, is that it precludes any future development on parcels of land that receive and use funding.
CRC has been a particularly useful alliance to CGC. CRC has publicly spoke out against the development of Wharf property and urged county commissioners and Centreville Town Council to buy the land for public use and to protect the Corsica River (INDIG). The CRC also played a role in advising the Town Council since the town purchased the land.

Support by the broader public has seemed to be split down the middle. A number of CGC members have stated that community members who have been in Centreville their whole life, the “locals,” are put off by CGC standing up to the developers and the local government. Also, many of the locals have the mindset that only those born and raised in Centreville should have the right to say what should and should not happen. Where this split really became evident was over the wastewater plant dumping allegations. The negative press coverage of the town and the ensuing criminal investigations by EPA angered many local residents and saw groups like CGC as troublemakers giving the town a bad reputation.

This sentiment was echoed in interviews by a few of the respondents (three of the six) stating that their involvement has influence how others view them. More specifically, respondents stated they felt that some within the community viewed them as “activists” who were part of a “secret organization.” A similar finding can be seen regarding how respondents view themselves after participating in CGC. Again, three of the six respondents mentioned their involvement has changed how they view them self stating a feeling of empowerment or having the ability to make a difference (lack of IDENTITY).
At its peak, CGC had approximately 100 members with roughly half within the town and the other half just outside of the town. The group raised approximately $30,000 to fight the Wharf development (VIABLE). The majority of the money has been used for legal fees. CGC has really evolved into a group that distributes information regarding land-use, development, and growth issues. According to many of the member of CGC, there is a shared feeling that the group’s nonpartisan stance helped garner more support from the local community. From this apolitical stance, CGC has gained respect from the local residents and is recognized as a spokesperson for local area residents. From the beginning, CGC has mobilized around preserving the Wharf for public use. Additional collective action frames related to environmental degradation and protection of the Corsica River, historic preservation, and maintenance of a small town atmosphere have been major themes put forth by CGC advocates. To a lesser extent, but still prominent, a theme of open government, governmental responsiveness and accountability has emerged. One of the main successes of the CGC is related to the providing of a wealth of information related to local land-use decisions to the local public. In many ways, CGC has become an information broker to the greater Centreville area. Not only does CGC provide regular updates on town actions and concerns, but since the group that has organized, the town of Centreville has upgraded its website significantly offering much more information to the public (POLICY).

The historical importance of the waterways to this area has been one of the things that have lead to such widespread support of CGC and its fight against the Wharf side condominium development. Maryland’s role in local level land-use rules and regulations and its leadership in the nation as a smart growth state also offer an unparalleled level of
public awareness of land-use planning and development. This is felt very strongly on the Eastern Shore because of its geographical location. The Eastern Shore remains predominately rural in an area experiencing major development pressures (with Wilmington, Philadelphia, and New York City to the North, Baltimore, Annapolis, and Washington DC to the West, and Virginia Beach to the South).
CHAPTER VIII

QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Briefly, QCA is an inductive approach used for small-N comparison. QCA allows the researcher to start with a complex social phenomenon looking for causal and outcome properties. If a causal factor or outcome property is found to be present, then it is coded “1.” If the variable is absent, it is coded “0.” Through the process of comparing and contrasting multiple cases by identifying either the presence or absence of a given factor, similar combinations of factors are identified and irrelevant factors are dropped. Simplified paths of causal conditions are connected to outcome properties.

Table 7 incorporates all causal variables and outcome variables. Political outcomes are listed as the ultimate dependent variable and social and cultural outcomes are listed as intermediate outcome.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SMO</th>
<th>SMO Factors</th>
<th>Causal Variables</th>
<th>Environmental Factors</th>
<th>Intermediate Outcomes</th>
<th>Political Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 0</td>
<td>1 1 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSG</td>
<td>1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>0 0 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGC</td>
<td>1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A = VIABLE
B = TACTICS
C = HIGH PART
D = FRAMES
E = POS
F = INDIG
G = MEDIA
H = PUBLIC
I = SOCIAL
J = IDENTITY
X = POLICY
Y = REPRESENT
Z = STOP
The reason political outcomes remains the dependent variable and social and cultural outcomes are moved to the independent variables are twofold. First, although researchers have suggested that there are an array of areas social movement can influence change, the overwhelming majority ultimately work within the political milieu; that is, social movements typically make their demands and target individuals, groups, and institutions within the political arena. This is not the case for all social movements (most notably religious based movements), but for land-based social movements such as smart growth movements, the focus is to change political process and to implement systemic political change. Second, although viewed as overlapping arenas of outcomes, the analytical framework used in this project suggests in most cases social and cultural outcomes, whether intentional or unintentional, precede political outcomes. Furthermore, there is strong evidence which suggests gains in the social and cultural arena may either help or hinder outcomes in the political arena.

A number of things can be deduced from Table 7. For the Ames Smart Growth movement (ASG), three QCA equations are displayed for the outcomes of SOCIAL, POLICY and REPRESENT. The equations can be displayed (see Table 8) as \( X = ABCdEFGHIj \), \( Y = ABCdEFGHIj \), and \( I = ABCdEFGH \) or:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VIABLE * TACTICS * HIGH PART * frames * POS * INDIG * MEDIA * PUBLIC * SOCIAL * identity</td>
<td>POLICY and REPRESENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIABLE * TACTICS * HIGH PART * frames * POS * INDIG * MEDIA * PUBLIC</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When presenting results, variables in capital letters suggest the presence of a causal condition and lowercase letters suggest the absence of the variable. Furthermore, an asterisk (*) indicates “and.”

For ASG, there is evidence of a strong lead SMO (VIABLE), the employment of disruptive and legal and political tactics (TACTICS), the mobilization of a large number of participants (HIGH PART), evidence of a relatively open and supportive political climate (POS), and the presence of experienced leadership and SMOs from previous land-use struggles (INDIG). Also, ASG supporters became a legitimate voice within the broader community and had new connections with other local organizations within the community (SOCIAL). ASGA as an organization became a broker of information for other groups in town and a number of the movement leadership gained access to other important community positions. ASG did not develop a strong negative collective identity, as perceived by bystanders.

There has been evidence smart growth supporters have influenced both the dialogue and outcomes of local policies and processes (POLICY) and local city elections (REPRESENT). The pro-mall mayor even included components of environmental sustainability, responsible development and consensus decision making in the “State of the City” address. First, there have been a number of concessions made on the mall proposal including limiting growth in the designated area, securing money for infrastructure costs such as bike, pedestrian and bus, creating an environmental buffer to protect the marsh, developing a welcome center, and committing tax revenue to redevelopment issues. The group also opened the development process up, or at least made it much more visible within the local community. City Council has intentionally
made subsequent development proposals much more accessible and in some cases has actively sought public input. Pressure from ASGA has also helped push the City Council to appropriate money for sustainability issues in 2008-2009 as well as helped influence the city to sign onto the US Mayors’ Climate Protection Agreement\(^45\). In addition, over the time period of the mall controversy, three smart growth candidates were elected to city council and a number of ASGA core members have been included on committees related to the mall development plans, the GOZD, and future growth discussions.

Although there has been some divisions among smart growth leadership and smart growth city council members regarding the mall compromise, the city council still leans strongly toward smart growth (two solidly smart growth supporters and two others supportive of smart growth policies).

Despite the group’s success related to social outcomes and political outcomes, specifically related to POLICY and REPRESENT, ASG did not form a strong collective identity (IDENTITY) nor did the movement ultimately stop the development (STOP). The lack of outcomes on these two fronts could be attributed to a couple of negative factors working against them. First, from the beginning, ASGA and movement participants clearly identified a common problem (diagnostic frames), or the mall. However, the group had difficulty clearly defining a solution (prognostic frames) to the problem. Some of the earliest collective action frames dealt with the threat the mall posed to built capital (downtown and the existing mall), natural capital (loss of farmland and environmental impact on an adjacent marsh), and social capital (reducing quality of

\(^{45}\) The agreement includes list of environmental issues that cities can do to help combat Global Warming such as land-use, energy production and conservation, recycling, waste reduction, and transportation.
life). Later, common themes related to political capital (city council representing elite interests and not following political process) and cultural capital (critique of consumerism and unregulated growth) also emerged. In each case, a fairly consistent message of what was wrong (diagnostic frames) with the new mall was being communicated. Almost all organizational literature, position papers, interviewees, court petitions, and so on represented some variation of the proposed new mall being a threat to the community and environment. However, a common, clearly defined prognostic frame was not present. There were divisions in message related to outright stopping the mall to finding a more suitable location to completely overhauling the LUPP, changing the political process, and removing political officials.

Also, ASG participants ran into problems within the broader socio-political environment. From the beginning the local newspaper came out in favor of the proposed mall touting the benefits of building a new mall, doing spotlight pieces about the developer and the success of his other developments, and regularly editorializing about the need for growth and the need to build the mall to resolve a divided city. Finally, although ASG amassed a large following, there was also strong evidence of substantial public support for the mall as evident by the number of pro-mall supporters who came out in favor of the mall (i.e., attendance at city meetings, letters to the editor, and election outcomes) after smart growth candidates took office.

For the Brunswick Smart Growth movement (BSG), three equations for social movement outcomes in all three arenas, specifically SOCIAL, IDENTITY, and STOP (see Table 9), are $I = AbCDefGhj$, $J = AbCDefGhi$, and $Z = AbCDefGhIJ$, or:
Table 9. Pathway to Outcomes: Brunswick Smart Growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VIABLE * tactics * HIGH PART * FRAMES * pos * indig * MEDIA * public * SOCIAL * IDENTITY</td>
<td>STOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIABLE * tactics * HIGH PART * FRAMES * pos * indig * MEDIA * public * IDENTITY</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIABLE * tactics * HIGH PART * FRAMES * pos * indig * MEDIA * public * SOCIAL</td>
<td>IDENTITY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The political success related to stopping the Wal-Mart Supercenter, impacting at least some of the development plans, and forcing the town to make development proposals much more accessible to the public can be attributed to a number of factors. Internally, BSG was a formidable opponent with a viable lead organization (VIABLE), high levels of sustained participation (HIGH PART), and clear diagnostic and prognostic frames (FRAMES). Also, within the community of Brunswick, although there is obvious support from certain segments of the population, there is no strong evidence of broad based support (PUBLIC) for any or all of the developments. BSG also became a legitimate voice of opposition to the developments and were looked at as information brokers to the broader community. In addition, BSG as an organization had developed a fairly broad reaching coalition of supporters and collaborators including Troy-based group, county level organizations, and local political parties (SOCIAL). Although SOCIAL as an outcome is weaker than ASGA, BSG did develop many new connections with other organizations in the area. However, BSG has yet to gain leadership roles within the community. This is partly due to the group’s inability to gain important representation within the town government.
This success seems to be attributable to viable organization, high levels of sustained visual participation by movement supporters, and a clear and consistent message. Out of the three groups, BSG was the only one to develop a distinct collective identity broadly identified by members’ consistently stating a feeling of empowered citizen and committed smart growth supporter (IDENTITY). This was further exemplified by many of the interviewees stating how they felt BSG was being portrayed as an anti-growth group.

Although collective identity helped empower a committed core group, which in turn may have helped with gains within the political realm, this may have also hurt the group in its attempts to influence policy change and gain representation within the local government. Also, and perhaps more importantly, one of the distinct features of Brunswick’s broader socio-political environment is the combination of little to no political opportunity structures and obvious support for the developments by a local area newspaper. For POS, the community had not directly experienced massive developments or any blatant environmental degradation due to overdevelopment. Also, the local town officials are elected through partisan elections in a predominately republican area. As a result, the town government has been extremely unresponsive to the concerns of BSG. Furthermore, BSG has had no sympathetic elite allies within the town government and did not have any outright support from local business leaders. In fact, the Town Board was very supportive of all the developments. Finally, the state of New York has only recently been looking to adopt smart growth policies. The combination of all these factors made it very difficult for smart growth proponents to gain any sort of
representation in town government and made it nearly impossible to influence any policy level changes.

Finally, Citizens for Greater Centreville (CGC) was successful in all three areas of political outcomes, or POLICY, REPRESENT, and STOP (see Table 10). These successful outcomes can be attributed to $X = \text{AbcDEfghij}$, $Y = \text{AbcDEfghij}$, and $Z = \text{AbcDEfghij}$, or:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Political Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ORG VIABLE * tactics * high part * FRAMES * POS * indig * media * public * social * identity</td>
<td>POLICY, REPRESENT, and STOP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Like the other two groups, CGC developed a fairly viable organization. The group had particular success at raising money to hire a lawyer and fight the development in court. Also, from the very beginning, the group’s message was very straightforward: do not develop the Wharf Property because of its historical and environmental significance (diagnostic frames). Additionally, a plausible solution was to have the county purchase the property and turn it into a space for public use (prognostic frames). One of the group’s main goals has been to remain non-partisan acting as a watchdog group, a public voice, and an information broker to the broader public. And although CGC has become a legitimate voice within the community, it has not been painted as an anti-growth, partisan, or polarizing group. As a result, a strong collective identity has not been developed by supporters of CGC and the antagonists have not been successful at finding an identity that sticks to the group and its members.

Within the community of Centreville and the state of Maryland, CGC supporters have had a number of political opportunities that were not present in the other two cases.
First, the state of Maryland has fairly stringent requirements for development and community planning. Development is particularly restrictive along the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries. This offered considerable leverage for the group. Second, throughout the conflict, CGC had a number of sympathetic individuals both on the Town Council and Planning Commission. Third, the local newspaper has not come out in favor of the Wharf development, and it has printed all letters to the editor unedited. There is also no strong evidence that a significant portion of the local community support private development on the property. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, at a critical juncture in the Wharf property dispute, the town of Centreville underwent a number of significant developments. These developments also led to something far more problematic for the community, which was raw sewage being pumped directly into the Corsica River. The months following the sewage story key town officials lost their jobs, state and federal environmental agencies investigated the pollution allegations, the town and state imposed moratoriums on all local developments, and the local television news station continued to report on the sewage problem attributing it to overdevelopment. The combination of these factors in particular caused major turmoil within the local town government.

Despite the group’s political successes, CGC and its supporters did not have any significant gains in SOCIAL or IDENTITY. There has not been much evidence that CGC and its leadership have made any significant changes in structural location, and it is fairly evident CGC supporters have not formed a cohesive social identity. These two shortcomings may influence the group’s ability to mobilize high levels of support for other local land-use issues. The movement has almost entirely been defined by its opposition to the Wharf. The group may have difficulty redefining its image and
amassing the financial and human capital necessary to create broader policy changes and to gain representation within the town government.

When the cases are combined identifying similarities and differences using QCA, a simplified path is found for each of the outcome properties. Little can be added to the discussion about cultural outcomes, specifically IDENTITY, because there is only one case that had a fairly clear outcome of collective identity. The simplest combination is \( J = AbCD\text{DefGhi} \) (see Table 11).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 11. Pathway to Cultural Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pathways</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIABLE * tactics * HIGH PART * FRAMES * pos * indig * MEDIA * public</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It appears the combination of a strong and highly organized SMO, evidence of broad-based support, and clearly defined frames with little support from government officials, local business members, and the media have created prime conditions for a cohesive collective identity to form.

When looking at the social outcome of social capital (SOCIAL), both Ames and Brunswick displayed evidence of changes in structural location in broader social networks and increases in social capital. Using QCA and the process of simplification, the following can be deduced through Boolean addition: \( I = ABCdEFGH \) (Ames) + AbCDefGh (Brunswick) MINIMIZATION \( I = ACG \) (see Table 12).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 12. Pathway to Social Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pathways</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIABLE * HIGH PART * MEDIA</td>
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</table>

The results suggest that a combination of a viable SMO, high levels of participation, and favorable media coverage for the development help increase social capital. This result
could be attributed to combination of factors. First, SMOs that are organized, or at least are perceived as being organized may be seen as legitimate by actors within the broader context. A viable organization could also be helpful in drawing in supporters both because it is seen as legitimate but also because it is organized enough to quickly mobilize important resources, in this case, human capital to sustain a large number of supporters. Finally, although it could be looked at as a negative to have the local media come out in support of a development proposal, it could also be argued any coverage by the media is potentially advantageous for social movement supporters.

For both ASG and BSG proponents, their participation in the land-use dispute, whether covered in a positive light or not, puts the social movement’s message and concerns out to the broader public. This coverage by the media may help legitimize the group and its concerns within the broader community. As a result, lead SMOs and movement leadership may become an attractive group for other citizen groups to go to for help or information. These SMOs and leaders may also be seen as the voice of opposing views and therefore a group to go to for at least the appearance of diverse viewpoints by social and political organizations.

Finally, related to political outcomes, there are three measures included: POLICY, REPRESENT, and STOP. Table 13 displays the simplest paths to the three different outcomes.

| Table 13. Pathways to Political Outcomes |
| Pathways | Political Outcomes |
| VIABLE * POS * identity | POLICY |
| VIABLE * POS * identity | REPRESENT |
| VIABLE * tactics * FRAMES * public | STOP |
Using the same process of minimization, the simplest combination of causal factors for POLICY is $X = \text{ABCdEFGHIj (Ames)} + \text{AbcDEfghij (Centreville)}$ MINIMIZATION $X = \text{AEj}$. The findings reveal the combination of viable organization, favorable political opportunity structures, and lack of collective identity act jointly to help successful policy political outcomes. As suggested by a number of research studies, this finding suggests a combination of internal movement characteristics and environmental factors are important to influence changes in the political arena. This is also the same combination of factors related to positive political outcomes as they relate to gaining representation within the political arena. For REPRESENT, $Y = \text{ABCdEFGHIj (Ames)} + \text{AbcDEfghij (Centreville)}$ MINIMIZATION $Y = \text{AEj}$. Furthermore, in the case of land-use movements, the lack of cohesive collective identity may ultimately help the social movement in the political arena specifically as it relates to policy changes and gaining representation. One reason for this could be, as depicted in these three case studies, the claim that the movement represents the concerns of the broader community. However, if the group is either painted as partisan, issue-oriented, or unresponsive to others, this could negatively affect the chance for changing policies or gaining representation.

Finally, both Brunswick and Centreville helped stop the mobilizing development. Again, when QCA is applied, the following equation is $Z = \text{AbCDefGhIJ (Brunswick)} + \text{AbcDEfghij (Centreville)}$ MINIMIZATION $Z = \text{AbDh}$. Because INDIG appears, in this case, to be an irrelevant factor, it has been removed to simplify the equation even more to $Z = \text{AbDh}$. The finding suggests, first, the importance of a viable SMO and clearly defined collective action frames. Both BSG and CGC proved to have a formidable lead SMO and maintained a consistent message of the problem and solution. Second,
although both groups engaged in political and legal tactics, neither used disruptive tactics to stop a development proposal. This finding does go against a body of literature, which suggests that disruptive (specifically violent) and innovative tactics are positively related to political outcomes. This discrepancy could be attributed to a small sample size, or it could be attributed to the type of conflict being engaged. Land-use issues, and specifically movements related to growth management and land-use planning and development, are usually fought (and won) in communities with high levels of socio-economic status and are usually not viewed as life and death issues. Finally, one of the most revealing factors is the lack of broad-based support for the development(s). For both BSG and CGC, there was no evidence of major opposition to smart growth, whether organized or unorganized. If anything, public opinion seemed to be strongly opposed to the each of the developments that were eventually stopped. Public meetings were disproportionately in favor of the protagonists. Letters to the editors were strongly in support of these respective movements or in opposition to the development(s).
CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

There are a number of important findings derived from multiple sources of data, which included field observations, in-depth interviews, newspaper articles, and SMO literature. First, related to the outcome of collective identity within the cultural arena, only one of the three cases displayed the emergence of a cohesive collective identity. This finding suggests the emergence of a collective identity resulted from an adversarial environment, lack of opportunity, highly organized SMO, and a clear message (see Table 14).

| Table 14. SMO Controlled Factors, Environmental Factors, and Cultural Outcomes |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|
| **BSG** | **Cultural Outcome** |
| Viable organization | BSG Cultural Outcome |
| Viable organization: regular meetings, ongoing campaigns, clear leadership, committed core members, effective fundraising efforts, diverse range of professional occupations. |
| Clear message: clearly identified problem (diagnostic frame) and solution (prognostic frame). |
| Emergence of collective identity: evidence of smart growth and activist identity. |
| Lack of political opportunity structure: no recent periods of crisis related to development, partisan elections, no sympathetic elites, stability in Republican leadership. |

There is evidence of two types of identities that emerged in all three cases, but especially prominent in BSG: an “organizational” and an “activist” identity (Jasper
The organizational identity is one that is connected to an individual organization and its members. All three of the cases displayed some commitment to organization. For BSG, it was a smart growth identity. However, even more prominent was the activist identity, or an identity created through sustained political involvement. Furthermore, there is evidence, especially with BSG, of other community members attempting to frame the group and shape a negative image. For BSG, this could have made it difficult to recruit widespread opposition to the developments, get candidates elected to local town government, connect with other important organizations and businesses, and make gains in the policy realm (Polletta and Jasper 2001).

Second, the social outcome of increases in social capital is found in both ASG and BSG. Changes in structural location or increasing connections with other individuals and groups within the community can be attributed to a viable SMO, sustained participation, and coverage by the media (see table 15). For both of the lead SMOs in ASG and BSG, there is evidence of changes in structural location within local community social networks. Both groups have formed new relationships with existing local organizations, businesses, and political groups. Additionally, both groups have been sought out by local groups and media sources for input on land-use issues and decisions, usually to represent an alternative view. Finally, especially evident in the ASG case, a number of the movement leaders have taken up other leadership posts within the community. What this suggests is social movements can be successful within the social arena, specifically making and maintaining new social bonds, which strengthens and broadens a social movement social network. This also results in changes in structural location. Changes in
structural location as well as forging new social bonds can open up chances for success within the political arena later (Diani 1997).

Table 15. SMO Controlled Factors, Environmental Factors, and Social Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SMO Controlled Factors</th>
<th>ASGA &amp; BSG</th>
<th>Social Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Viable organization</strong>:</td>
<td>regular meetings, ongoing campaigns, clear leadership, committed core members, effective fundraising efforts, diverse range of professional occupations.</td>
<td><strong>Increase in social capital</strong>: interorganizational cooperation with existing organization, smart growth leadership in other community leadership positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustained participation</strong>:</td>
<td>large number of participants at SMO sponsored events and meetings, large quantity of supportive letters to the editor and petition signatures.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Media coverage</strong>:</td>
<td>coverage of the development and the group in the local newspaper.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, a couple of major points relate to successful political outcomes. First, this research offers further evidence successful political outcomes appear to be related to a combination of internal movement characteristics and environmental factors. More specifically, all three cases had various levels of political success ranging from outright stopping the mobilizing development to gaining important representation within decision making bodies to influencing policy changes. There is evidence of the necessity of a viable SMO and clear message (at least clear identification of the problem). Furthermore, there is strong evidence the political context must be favorable for successful outcomes whether this involves periods of crisis, sympathetic elites, open and
responsive officials, state level policies, or supportive (or potential ambiguous) public opinion (see table 16).

Table 16. SMO Controlled Factors, Environmental Factors, and Political Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SMO Controlled Factors</th>
<th>Environmental Factors</th>
<th>ASGA, BSG, &amp; CGC</th>
<th>Political Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Viable organization:</td>
<td>Periods of crisis:</td>
<td></td>
<td>Policy changes:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regular meetings,</td>
<td>experience rapid</td>
<td></td>
<td>changes to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ongoing campaigns,</td>
<td>development or</td>
<td></td>
<td>comprehensive plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clear leadership,</td>
<td>environmental hazard.</td>
<td></td>
<td>and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>committed core members,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>plans, smart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>effective fundraising</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>growth initiative,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>efforts, diverse range</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>open call for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of professional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>public input.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>occupations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear message:</td>
<td>Political opportunity</td>
<td></td>
<td>Represent:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clearly identified</td>
<td>structures:</td>
<td></td>
<td>gain access to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>problem (diagnostic</td>
<td>experience rapid</td>
<td></td>
<td>decision making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>frame) and solution</td>
<td>development,</td>
<td></td>
<td>body such as city/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(prognostic frame)</td>
<td>open and</td>
<td></td>
<td>town council or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>responsive officials,</td>
<td></td>
<td>planning and zoning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>state level policies,</td>
<td></td>
<td>commission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>nonpartisan elections,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sympathetic</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stop development:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>elites, instability</td>
<td></td>
<td>stop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in elite alignments,</td>
<td></td>
<td>development(s).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public opinion:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>supportive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(or potential ambiguous)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public opinion.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For both ASG and CGC, the importance of periods of crises and political opportunity structures, and the lack of crisis and POS for BSG, appears to be a decisive factor in how successful the social movement is within the political arena (e.g., all three
outcomes present for CGC, two for ASG, and only one for BSG). As a final point, there is evidence that the role of public opinion in stopping the development is important for this political outcome. For BSG and CGC, the lack of broad based public support for the development(s) in combination with state level policy may have stopped the development from occurring.

More broadly, identifying multiple measures of outcomes from different arenas of social life offers a more precise and accurate description of “successful” social movement outcomes. The analytical framework of three overlapping arenas of social movement outcomes could be helpful in examining other social movements. More specifically, the framework could be helpful in identifying which arena is placed as the ultimate dependent variable and which arenas act as intermediate outcome variables. Furthermore, by conceptualizing these arenas as overlapping and influencing one another, social movement outcomes are not seen as occurring all at once at one point in time. Nor are they seen as resulting in either a categorical outcome of success or failure. By including multiple indicators of social movement outcomes, social movement analysts can more accurately judge and differentiate between levels of success. This is especially the case for social movements of similar size and purpose. It does not do social movement researchers much good by simply stating that a social movement has either succeeded or failed because like most phenomenon in the social world, the answer is usually much more complex and requires more nuanced analyses and discussions. Also, this conceptualization allows researchers to examine a multitude of outcomes, which will help at parsing apart how some causal factors relate to specific arenas of outcomes and
how others lead elsewhere. Furthermore, this conceptual framework also offers insight into how gains in one arena may help or hinder gains in another arena.

**SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH**

This research points toward two additional areas of research. The first is related to additional study of land-use social movement such as the ones presented in this dissertation. Because there are only three case studies, it would be useful and worthwhile to add more case studies to the analyses to further examine how internal SMO characteristics and external environmental factors relate to social movement outcomes for land-use social movements such as smart growth social movements.

The second point is related to general methodological and theoretical issues of social movement outcomes. More specifically, because this dissertation strictly focuses on one type of social movement, land-use or smart growth movements, it may have limited generalizability to other types of social movements. As a result, future research using the analytical framework outlined in this dissertation could be applied to a number of different social movements to examine how specific variables relate to specific arenas of social movement outcomes and how this may or may not differ according to the type of social movement. As discussed earlier, although many, in fact, probably the majority, of social movements target political outcomes as their primary target, there are cases where either social outcomes or cultural outcomes are either equally as important or are considered the ultimate outcome of the social movement. By examining other social movements that either fall outside the realm of contentious land-use issues or that focus on different outcomes, social movement researchers can better come to an agreement regarding social movement outcomes.
APPENDIX A: INITIAL QUESTIONS FOR SMO

I. How did [the group] start? What year did [the group] form?

II. How has [the group] changed since it began?

III. What initiatives/campaigns is [the group] currently working on?

IV. What tactics (i.e.-lobbying of elected officials, letters to the editor, litigation, etc.) has [the group] taken to push smart growth principles?

V. How has the general public of [the city] responded to [the group]? To smart growth principles?

VI. How has the local city government responded? How have local developers responded? And how has the local media (newspaper or otherwise) responded?
APPENDIX B: INTERVIEWING INSTRUMENT

Formal Interviewing Instrument

I. Personal Involvement (Self)

A. When did you join [the organization]?

B. Why did you join the [organization]? How did you get involved?

C. Have you ever been involved with local city politics (specifically related land-use issues) prior to joining [the group]? If so, can you explain what you were involved in?

D. In general, have you ever participated in social movement activity before (e.g., lobbied elected officials, written letters to the editor or elected officials, participated in protest events or civil disobedience, etc)?

E. Do you think that your participation in [the group] changed how others view you? If so, how?

F. Has participation in [the group] changed how you think about yourself? If so, how?

II. Internal Organizational Operations (SMO)

A. What do you consider the main purpose(s) of [the organization]?

B. How successful do you consider the [organization] at achieving the goals you have identified? How so?

C. What do you consider the strongest part of the [organization]?

D. What do you consider the weakest part of the [organization]?

III. Local Environmental Context

A. In general, how do you think the local community has responded [the organization] (positively or negatively)?

B. Similarly, how do you think city officials have responded to [the organization] (positively or negatively)?

C. Finally, how do you think [local media] has responded to [the organization] (positively or negatively)?
D. Overall, where do you feel [the organization] has been most influential (e.g., community, political process)?

E. Within the [the city], what do you consider to be the biggest hurdles when it comes to the success of [the organization]?

F. Similarly, what do you consider to be the most useful/helpful part of [the city] when it comes to the success of [the organization]?

G. Do you have any questions or comments?
REFERENCES


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Betty A. Dobratz for her help and guidance conducting, analyzing, and writing this dissertation. Throughout this process, her input and supervision has been invaluable. I would also like to offer special thanks to Cornelia Flora for her help in developing this research project. Finally, I would also like to thank Gloria Jones Johnson, Daniel Krier, and Tara Lynne Clapp for their assistance on helping develop this manuscript.

Thank you to my friends and family for their support. Most importantly, thank you to my wife, Petra, and my two wonderful children, Cora and Owen. Not only have they offered love and support, but they have also kept me grounded throughout this process.

Finally, thank you to the Midwest Sociological Society and the MSS Endowment Committee for their financial support.