The impact of the Law of Justice and Peace on the growth of victims' movements in Colombia

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The impact of the Law of Justice and Peace on the growth of victims’ movements in Colombia

by

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Program of Study Committee:
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ABSTRACT

This study is about social movements (SM) of victims in Colombia and how both legal and political opportunities opened by the Law of Justice and Peace in 2005 led to their visibility as social actors in the political arena. This research investigates the relationship of these organizations with political parties and the state in light of the internal conflict as a relevant variable. To illustrate my argument I build a narrative of the Colombian history analyzing the social, political, and economic circumstances that provoke the escalating violence, and in consequence the victims’ existence. Then, I evaluate and classified the scholarship about SM, political parties, and the state, in three types: SM that aspire to become a political party, SM that try to re-write the state – society relationship from below, and SM that negotiate and cooperate with political parties but maintain their autonomy and independence. I used data from the National Prosecutor office and the Reparation and Reconciliation Commission, to prove the connections of the victims’ organizations growth the peace and justice process carried out by the presidency of Álvaro Uribe with the paramilitaries. Data prove a significant increase of victims as both individuals and organizations since 2005. Findings demonstrate how political parties have systematically failed to address victims’ claims, and the state stands as sole support of the victims’ reparation. As a consequence, victims’ organizations play a relevant role addressing this population needs negotiating directly with the state and the parties. Therefore, both political parties and the government have to undertake deliberate and straightforward policies and programs in favor of any form of social movements of victims.
CHAPTER I

Introduction

This research is about social movements of victims (SMV) in Colombia and how both legal and political opportunities opened by the Law of Justice and Peace (Ley de Justicia y Paz, LJP, or L-975/05) led to their growth and relevance as social actors. This study brings out two parallel issues: first, it proves the dependency of the victims’ visibility on the government’s deliberate decisions; and second, it evidences the lack of interest of the traditional political parties in the victims as relevant social actors.

Scholarship has provided different reasons to explain social movements’ (SM) emergence like activists’ strategies, the organization’s maturity, the demands’ appealing to the international community, the political and economic structures of the state and the relationship with other actors in the political arena such as political parties or interest groups. But the scope of these reasons varies according to the autonomy and the development degree of the country (Archetti, Fossum and Reinton 1970; Casas-Cortés, Osterweil, and Powell 2008; Davies 1962; Guidry 2003; Huizer 1972; Keck 1992; Ondetti 2008; Sklair 1997; Snow et al. 1986; Tarrow 1994; Van Cott 2005a).

I argue that in Colombia the institutional design, the role of other actors and the international atmosphere are determinant factors for the social organizations’ failure or success. In particular, SMV growth has depended mainly on government peace policies and political parties lack of attention to the victims’ problems. So, in order to avoid government cooptation, the state must be mindful about its role as sole support of the SMV and political parties must
redefine how they address victims’ issues and include them in a broader political project (Álvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998).

I explore how the political parties ignored and failed to integrate the victims in their political projects, and the way the state fulfilled this gap without any political assessment from the society. Accordingly, I propose a set of recommendations, based on the organizations’ behavior and performance, to the state and political parties to protect and promote victims’ rights through comprehensive programs and policies.

In this chapter, I provide context and background of the problem. Then, I discuss the purpose and the importance of the study; I present the research question and the research design. Then, I outline the literature and the theoretical framework I will use to explain why the political opportunity perspective is the most compelling approach to understand the SMV’s growth in Colombia. I conclude with a brief methodological discussion.

**Context and Background**

According to the Geneva Declaration (2008) there were 12,894 violent deaths during conflict in the Americas between 2002 and 2007, of which 11,832 were in Colombia. Worldwide, Colombia ranks fourth in conflict deaths, following Iraq, Sudan and Afghanistan. The number of killings in these Middle Eastern countries has increased dramatically between 2005 and 2006 due to United States’ war on terrorism; and in Sudan mortality decreased after 2005, when the country signed a peace agreement after more than ten years of civil war with religious and ethnic layers. Colombia does not fit in any of these conflict explanations, but has maintained an average of 3,000 killings per year.

Although it is difficult to find up-to-date comprehensive estimates of deaths, disappearances, kidnappings, etc., there is information collected by international and national
organizations. For example, Amnesty International’s 2009 report of human rights in Colombia regarding killings and enforced disappearances, says,

In the 12-month period ending in June 2008, more than 1,515 civilians were killed in the conflict, compared to at least 1,348 in the previous 12-month period. More than 200 people were the victim of enforced disappearance during the 12-month period ending in June 2008, compared to 119 in the previous 12-month period.

But deaths or disappearances are not the only effects of the armed conflict; there are many forms of violence that injure Colombian society with equal intensity:

More than three million persons are internally displaced in Colombia, and many more become newly displaced every year due to ongoing violence. Human rights defenders, journalists, community leaders, trade unionists, indigenous and Afro-Colombian leaders, displaced persons’ leaders, and paramilitaries’ victims seeking land restitution or justice are frequently the targets of threats and violence by armed actors (Human Rights Watch, 2010).

In the last decades the Colombian internal conflict has changed significantly due to the influence of narcotrafficking. The vast profits of illegal drug businesses have provoked an alliance among armed groups and drug barons; the former benefits from liquid assets to operate and buy weaponry, and the latter gets security for their coca crops and cocaine routes. The new scenario allowed the government to engage in the rhetoric of the war on terrorism, which in turn allowed it to receive international aid and redirect resources to the conflict. Moreover, the country moves from having a problem rooted in social inequalities and political exclusion to be a victim of terrorism (Observatorio 2009). This is a generalization; nevertheless, it is a complex assertion since each illegal organization grew under different. I will return to this point in the following chapter.

The homogenization of all sources of criminality is not an unexpected consequence. As Tate (2007) states, political, domestic, common and organized crime commingle in Colombia,
making the debate about the political nature of violence outdated. The state’s force monopoly has been challenged by several organizations: guerrilla armies whose subversive actions; paramilitaries before their demobilization; and emerging trafficking gangs. The latter groups not only defy state authority, but also aspire to electoral influence, forceful guarantees of property rights, and local and regional economic power. As a result, regardless the perpetrator’s nature there is a growing population of victims who need attention from the state (Observatorio 2009; Tate 2007; Molano 2005).

Violent deaths in Colombia have increased to 16,000 between 2006 and 2009 representing an increase of more than 1,000 per year; but the escalating violence has also augmented other figures. For instance, the fueling nature of the drug trafficking have taken the conflict to the countryside adding the issue of illicit crops to the problems of distribution and property of the land. This situation has generated internal migration of peasants escaping from violence to urban areas.

The United Nations’ Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), accurately explain the problem,

(…) While some displacements may be short-lived, others can take years and even decades to resolve. We continue to face several longer-term internal displacement situations in places like Colombia, Iraq, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia. Each of these conflicts has also generated refugees who flee beyond their own borders. (…). Colombia has one of the world’s largest internally displaced populations, with estimates of 3 million (…) (UNHCR 2009).

At the end of 2009 there were up to 4.9 million internal displaced people in Colombia, bringing it alongside Sudan as one of the two largest internal displacement situations in the world. 2009 saw the opening of new fronts in Colombia’s internal armed conflict. (…) The continuing forced displacement of people from the countryside towards towns and cities continued in 2009. So-called “drop-by-drop” displacement, less conspicuous than mass displacement, accounted for most
displacement as it had in previous years. Nonetheless, around 80 large-scale events caused the displacement of a total of 19,000 people (IDMC, 2010).

This, along with the inherent negative effects in the social fabric, establishes the gravity of Colombian conflict. The numbers demonstrate that state military, economical or sociopolitical strategies have been ineffective at counteracting the violence. However contradictory and paradoxical, the political component of the Colombian conflict has allowed the government of the moment to use the mechanisms of the transitional justice such as peace dialogues and alternative legal frames to negotiate and build agreements with illegal armed groups.

In short, transitional justice is a set of legal and political instruments created to balance the values of justice at stake in political negotiations. The transitional model advises and legitimizes extraordinary institutional arrangements proposing normative frames less rigid than the ordinary justice’s regulations. It also recognizes that according to the situation of each society, sacrifices and tradeoffs to achieve peace and reconciliation might differ (Castresana 2005; Biggar 2002; De Greiff and Duthie 2009; Duggan 2005; Laban 2010; Uprimny 2006).

In Colombia, the attempts for achieving peace throughout negotiation began in the eighties and since then, governments have swung from dialogue to frontal war policies. Today, the army battles illegal groups when other criminal organizations are sitting and talking with the government. Consequently, Colombia has a history of peace dialogues while the conflict has been in force, situation that has questioned the legitimacy of any peace initiative (Avilés 2006; Bejarano 1997; García-Durán 2004; Thoumi 2002; Tokatlian 2000b).
**Problem statement**

In Colombia, victims’ organizations have grown since 2005 due to political and legal changes in the system introduced by the government. Research indicates that SM are very sensitive and receptive to those shifts (McAdam 1982; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 1997; Ondetti 2008; Tarrow 1994). Moreover, traditional parties were unable to address victims’ claims and as a consequence, the government has co-opted those movements and excluded the parties from the political debate about the victims. Therefore, a largely unchallenged government is deciding the fate of the victims’ reparation and putting on the line the peace possibilities derived from the negotiations.

**Purpose and justification of the study**

This study adds the study of Colombian SMV to the extended body of literature available about SM. I intend to increase the understanding of Colombia’s complex transitional process by applying the political opportunity structure theory to this case, there by contributing to the debate about the political opportunity perspective using field evidence. My empirical aim is to prove that the significant increase in the victims’ movements is due to the legal framework issued for the justice and peace processes. In closing, I will recommend a shift in the state’s role from director to facilitator of the victims’ processes to claim for reparation; and an inclusive strategy from the political parties to include the victims in their projects, not only for their significance to the fabric of society, but also for their electoral force.

**Research Question**

Which theoretical account is more suitable to analyze and explain the behavior and growth of SMV in Colombia since 2005?
Research Design

This thesis is presented in two sections. It begins with a brief presentation of the Colombian domestic conflict emphasizing on social, political, and economic problems that have historically triggered the violence. This section investigates the main explanations for the emergence of the SMV.

The second section consists of a literature review of the ongoing debate about the interactions among SM, the traditional political parties, and the state. I build a theoretical classification of those interactions, and evaluate the suitability of the political opportunity perspective to explain the increase of the SMV in Colombia, assessing those interactions for my case study.

The data used in this research demonstrate the increase of SMV since the 2005 passage of the LJP. I collected this information from available databases from different national and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that have worked with Colombian victims. Also, I gathered information from both the National Reparations and Reconciliation Comission (Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación, CNRR), and the Office of the National Attorney General of Colombia (Procuraduría General de la Nación, PGN), institutions appointed by the legislator to advice and counsel the victims’ movements (L-975/05 arts. 36, 50). Although the numbers are not comprehensive, they are significant for my experiment and consistent conclusions can be made.

As a conclusion, I evaluate in light of the Colombian history and the theoretical discussion, the connections between the growing number of SMV and the shifts in the political and legal structures.
Preliminary Literature Review

The literature review summarizes some relationships among SM, political parties, and the state. I begin with authors who have studied the mentioned interactions on a global scale. After that, I analyze the relevant readings that address the SM in Latin America and Colombia. The literature is presented this way because of contribution of South America’s SM to the field of study.

In a democracy, people communicate with the state and its institutions through intermediaries. In this context, political parties have maintained a relevant role (Burstein and Linton 2002; Escobar 1992a, 1992b; Lijphart 1999; Van Cott 2005). However, the place of the political parties has being challenged by social organizations that understand better people’s new demands and claims (Klandermans 2007; Shigetomi 2009). Then, SM phenomenon, according to the relation between political parties and SM, has been a subject of two different interpretations, as indicators of legitimacy and democratic wealth, or as reactions to the traditional parties’ crisis of representation (Joseph 1993; Franklin 1996; Lijphart 1969; Van Cott 2005).

Regardless of the nature of the relationship, there are strong connections between parties and social organizations. Now, imbalances among these actors generate a serious structural problem for a democratic regime. If the citizens stopped considering the political parties the best link to the government, and turned to secondary players like the SM; the state will only hear partial demands, and broader social needs will be left unattended.

Even though parties do not address every voter’s demands, their programs are meant to be comprehensive and inclusive of all social claims. Moreover, their inherently political nature generates built-in accountability; the parties can be monitored and then rewarded or punished in elections; SM lack of these this feature (Roberts, and Wibbels 1999; Van Cott 2003).
The connections among political parties, SM, and the state manifest in different ways. One arrangement is that grassroots organizations consolidate in a SM and then broaden their scope and become a political party. Another option is for SM to function as independent organizations, overlook the parties, and attempt to reach the state through alternative means. A third option is for SM to develop a symbiotic, not hierarchical, relationship of cooperation and autonomy with the political parties. This typology is subject to further analysis in the theoretical framework section.

In general, the relationship among movements, parties, and the state has long existed but remains unclear. A good example of these complicated interactions is Latin America. It is a region with fairly stable democracies and active civil societies that usually coalesce around two or three parties, but simultaneously participate in other social organizations. The extent to which political events affect people’s daily lives can reveal the complexity of Latin American societies. Theoretically, this situation could be interpreted as the fundamentals of the political opportunity theory, where the openness of the system prompts or inhibits the appearance of SM (Ondetti 2008; Van Cott 2005).

Latin America’s diversity can be a challenge to scholars. They sometimes overcome – or, more accurately, obscure – this obstacle by homogenizing the case-studies or only studying the commonalities. Colombia is a case where such normalization has impeded a comprehensive characterization of the country’s problem. Relevant variables, such as the link between violence and drug trafficking, and the effect of the internal conflict on its victims, cannot be dismissed because they are unique to Colombia; they must be included and assessed (Van Cott 2000, 2003).
**Theoretical Framework**

This work analyzes how the peace and justice legislation impacts the victims’ organizations in Colombia. Broadly, this research touches on the debate about the capability of political power to shape portions of society; more narrowly, it provides an explanation for the rapid expansion of the SMV in the last five years in Colombia.

To conduct this study I employ the political opportunity structure (POS) as my preferred theoretical approach. This theory states that movements succeed or fail depending on the changes and openness of the larger political system where the activists or the SM themselves have little or no influence (McAdam 1982; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 1997; Ondetti 2008; Tarrow 1994).

Prior to the establishment of dialog between the government and the paramilitaries, the victims were absent and invisible on the political landscape. Until the 21st century, society as a whole – rather than individuals – suffered under internal conflict. With international courts and an increased emphasis on transitional justice, individuals’ claims began to receive attention.

In Colombia, in 2002 Álvaro Uribe won the presidential elections in a backlash against the failed guerrilla-government negotiations of his predecessor. This occurred for a few reasons: the public was tired of the guerrilla taking advantage of the government’s proactive attitude during peace negotiations, but also there was a desire to reward a candidate who promised dialog with other radical armed groups, the paramilitaries. This is another demonstration of the often-contradictory character of Colombian society.

In 2003, the paramilitaries began to demobilize, as a result of negotiations with the government. To succeed, the peace process needed a legal framework to legitimize the legally unstable situation of the ex-combatants, so the LJP created a special jurisdiction for those who
have put down the weapons from organized armed groups. It provides, for instance, lighter sentences in return for effective contributions to the reconciliation process.

The new political panorama places the victims at the center of the national debate. Truth, justice, and redress have appeared as essential factors to achieve peace. The LJP was tailored to satisfy these requirements, and to include mechanisms to promote and protect victims’ rights. Consequently, victims began to embrace their role as active participants in the political process, and to organize and speak out against their aggressors. These were facts that triggered the rise of the SMV in Colombia and lead me to choose the POS.

I have classified SM into three types according to their interactions with political parties and the State. The first type is the SM with political inclinations, which by time acquires ideological and electoral maturity, eventually transforming into a political party. In the second type, the SM acts as a direct channel between the state and society, shunning contact with traditional parties. For them, support grassroots social change is an effective way to understand and to rewrite the state-society relationships from below. The third model is a SM that maintains autonomy but functions as a platform for political parties. These movements are easily distinguishable from the parties themselves and are not held accountable for the parties’ actions.

Next, I explain briefly the fundamentals of each category and the key points I will develop in the third chapter:

**A social movement that aspires to become a political party**

Social movements that became parties in an atmosphere of political renovation and social change are often comprised of ethnic or minority nature. I examine the factors that allowed ethnic SM to become new political parties with stability and electoral ambitions. These
movements usually follow a cycle that begins with a social problem, which mutates into a collective action issue, and then these SM transform it into a political party. This is a good alternative to deliver effectively social demands to the state. In addition, these new parties have the advantage of legitimacy, when compared with the traditional parties’ corruption problems (Van Cott 2003, 2005a, 2005b; 2009).

The cultural approach: Building New Paths to Power

These movements intend to reshape the relationship between politics and culture within Latin America’s SM. These organizations argue that cultural patterns are effective mechanisms for changing power relations in a society. When politics transitions from the traditional-formal level to the informal relations of the popular bases, it can democratize the authoritarian practices of domination that characterize developing societies. This is an organizational response to both the state and political parties, and address issues of their relationship with the people they represent. This cultural approach reacts to the inability of political actors to interpret and answer social claims. Theoretically, these movements have no political interest, and develop far from the parties and the state institutions (Escobar 1992; Hale 1997; Spencer 1994).

A Symbiotic Relationship between Social Movements and Political Parties

This type comprises autonomous SM that connect and negotiate with political parties depending on the values and demands they represent but keeping their independence. A good example of this is the behavior of the Landless Rural Workers’ movements in Brazil (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, MST) and how they supported the successful presidential candidacy of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and the Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT)
in 2002. The party embraced the claims of the dispossessed augmenting the party electoral base.
And yet, the leaders were not co-opted by the government. This stance allowed them to fend off unpopular official policies without falling on programmatic or ideological contradictions (Hammond 1999; Khawaja 1993; Lichbach and Gurr 1981; Ondetti 2006, 2008).
CHAPTER II

Introduction

This chapter will explain the Colombian transitional process, and the relevance of victims as political actors. To understand these things, one must also examine the socioeconomic context of the conflict. To avoid further complicating to an inherently difficult matter, I build a historical narrative that addresses recurrent grievances of the Colombian society and describe how these unattended popular claims have contributed to perpetuating the conflict.

This chapter is divided into two sections. First, I present a review of the country’s republican history. Since the 1850s there have been several events, facts, and cultural tendencies that have shaped the conflict. I explain them in chronological order. This section also details the emergence of the conflict’s actors, as well as the commonalities and differences among them.

The second part focuses on the conflict’s recent history. I explain the changes that have occurred since 2002 during the Álvaro Uribe government who undertook formal negotiations with the paramilitaries and the Law of Justice and Peace was passed in the Congress. These events initiated the era known as the Peace and Justice period.

The two sections complement each other. The historical outline reveals the origin, expansion, and growth of the conflict; and explains the character and nature of its participants. It provides background information valuable for interpreting the latest developments detailed in the second part.

A Brief Account of Colombian History

The Republic consolidated during the first part of the nineteenth century. Since then, Colombian history has been written with blood and fire. The origins of the political turmoil are
intertwined with those of the democratic regime. In the following lines, I map the social, political and economic circumstances that have fueled the violence in Colombia.

My interest is not in reinterpreting Colombian history, but rather in demonstrating that the conflict, its actors, the failed negotiations, the repeated and useless political responses to different crises, and related phenomena, are not new challenges, but result from unresolved historical grievances.

To account for two hundred years, I place Colombian history in four chronological phases. The periods are as follows: prelims of the conflict (1850s -1902); the first wave of changes (1902-1950s); the politics of coalition rule (1950s-1991); and the new constitutional agreement (1991-2002). This approach allows me to highlight the similarities among the periods, including the recurrent actions of different actors in response to the same problems.

The prelims of the conflict

The period leading up to the conflict began shortly after the Spanish colony La Nueva Granada gained its freedom in 1810. Later, a new regime was being established but the new citizens kept most of the social and economic structures of the past. This adjustment process led to few regional confrontations about the role of the new actors. This period last until 1902 when The Thousand Days’ War (La Guerra de los Mil Días) shook the society and prompted another set of changes crucial to the state building process.

The first years of the republic are characterized by the formation and strengthening of two major political parties and the correlative weakening of the state. There was a marked overlap among the economic elites, interest groups, and political leaders. This fact facilitated cohesion
around a simple state idea: the political parties and civil authorities were apparently interchangeable.

Moreover, the army was not a significant factor. Some party leaders were army officials, and their rewards were frequently in the form of land grants and other recognitions. Thus, there was an implicit bond between the parties’ civilian authorities and the military. The same clientelist relation existed between the people who demanded public benefits from the parties, and the parties’ leaders who responded as state officials. Therefore, the establishment depended on the party structure to reach the rest of society (Bergquist 1978; López-Alves 2000).

Several factors worked against social cohesion. The diverse workforce – including laborers, mining slaves, cowboys, and farmers, among others – and the harsh geography contributed to an atmosphere of selfish and heavy regionalism. This situation led to easy co-optation of collective action processes, and hampered the creation of a national identity. (Bushnell 1993; López-Alves 2000; Todaro and Smith 2009).

War and coercion were also state makers. The unequal land distribution and corrupted land-tenure practices made the poor peasant distrustful of local landlords and central authorities. These motivated coalitions around blurred vindications provoking local rebellions or regional wars but overall, creating bonds among elites and their clientele and pushing away the already marginal population (Deas 1983; Fals-Borda 1969; LeGrand 1977).

As Hartlyn (1988) indicates, the only way to bond the massive rural population to an idea of nation was through the parties. The parties did not stand for any specific ideology; both were situated in the center. When circumstances demanded, liberals and conservatives moved apart on the political spectrum, demonstrating their opportunistic character. As a consequence, the character of the political regime changed according to the party in power.
For instance, the 1863 liberal-federal constitution, sponsored by the newborn liberal bourgeoisie, introduced modern ideas such as the separation of Church and State or freedom of speech and religion. In 1886, after several damaging wars, a transfer in power from liberals to conservatives led to a new conservative-centralist constitution supported by the elites that sought to reinstate the colonial and traditional status quo. This was the last shift of the century; afterward, alternating periods of hegemony of each party characterized party politics in Colombia (Posada-Carbó 1994).

Each regime dismantled the ideas introduced by the former government, provoking the anger of radical partisans who continually rebelled against the current political order. This sort of nationalism, plus continuing social inequalities, plunged the country into a conflict that killed more than 100,000 civilians between 1899 and 1902, known as The Thousand Days’ War (Caballero 1939).

Afterwards, revolutionary leaders reached an agreement that included promises of amnesty, free elections, and political and financial reforms. The war was over, but elites negotiated the political power to their own benefit, and the tensions in the society remained (LeGrand 1986; Roldán 2002; Sánchez 2007).

Since then, two issues have shaped and distinguished Colombian politics from other Latin American regimes: the capacity of the traditional parties to penetrate every sphere of society; and the prevalence of the civil authority over the military. Every political explanation of the conflict implies these realities. These realities help to explain how party affiliation replaced the idea of national identity, and why the state became an instrument to satisfy elite’s interests.
The first wave of changes

This period encompass the events that occurred during the second half of the twentieth century. Through the years, modern economic and political designs came to light and affected every sphere of the society. In the countryside, peasants began to expand agricultural frontiers looking for new places to grow crops and moving away from the large estate owners who sought to remove them from the land they had been occupying. The absence of a clear message from the central government in allocating absolute property rights benefited primarily the group with greater influence over the local authorities, worsening the situation of small tenants and wage workers.

LeGrand (1986) portrays the peasant’s role as central in the political history of Colombia. She explains how the peasant was diminished not only for being an ethnic minority (poor mestizo, indigenous, or African descendant), but also because the judicial and market regulations were hostile. The willingness of large entrepreneurs to push peasants aside also served to push society into foreseeable conflict. The political conflict’s foundations came from the legalization of this latifundio - minifundio system.

To mitigate the social unrest, in 1936 a liberal government undertook a constitutional reform and Land Act that included land titling and property regularization (Backus 1937). This approach was shortlived. The legislation misinterpreted the real necessities of the peasant population, and simply legalized existed settlements without redistributing land. In other words, the law validated the latifundio type of property, acquired by forcibly displacing peasants. As a result, today, most of the farming land in Colombia belongs to large landowners (LeGrand 1984, 1986)
Parallel to the agrarian turmoil, a conflict was growing in the urban areas. On one hand, the strong bipartisanship in cities blocked the masses’ access to the state; on the other hand, the global economic crisis of the 1930s increased unemployment and poverty rates (Farnsworth-Alvear 2000). Leaders were unable to provide suitable solutions for these problems and the nation was politically captured by the bipartisan system. So, as happened in other Latin American countries in the middle of critical situations, a charismatic and messianic leader arose (Dix 1978; LeGrand 1984).

Jorge Eliecer Gaitán was the figure who rose to prominence, inspiring the desperate masses. Gaitán was a young lawyer born in a middle class family with notable legal and political careers. He employed an anti-elite discourse expressed in passionate oratory, and became the most likely presidential candidate for the Liberal Party in the 1950 elections. Unfortunately, he was killed in still unclear circumstances in Bogotá the 9th of April of 1949. His death not only marked the end of his movement, it also incited a second wave of bipartisan violence because liberals blamed conservatives for the death of the caudillo. The following years were known as La Violencia: unstoppable engagements in both countryside and cities that bled the nation for almost five years (Bailey 1967; Braun 1985; Dix 1978; Dugas 2003; Roldán 2002; Sánchez and Meertens 1985).

After this period, Colombia experimented with six years of soft dictatorship under General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, who pacified and reunified the nation. His mandate lasted only six years. Later, in 1958, the elites tailored a bipartisan pact called the National Pact (El Frente Nacional). This consocialist agreement among traditional parties’ leaders consisted in intersperse all bureaucratic posts including the presidency among conservatives and liberals (Hartlyn 1988; Lijphart 1969; Scarpetta 1991).
Although political or ideological disagreements among liberals and conservatives were trigger reasons for the conflict; the agrarian issues and the political marginalization of the poor configure the remote but determinant causes of it. Nevertheless, ascribe politics to the conflict made easier to the government to address and confront the violence.

Moreover, the weak state made the citizens view political parties as providers of social benefits, a view that created confusion and allowed the parties to gained control of the masses. Even so, many Colombians who do not felt part of the pact looked to para-systemic solutions: for instance, the redemption promised by either charismatic caudillos or armed resistance.

**The politics of coalition rule**

The heritage of the consocialist pact (1958-1974) between the two traditional parties last until 1980s heritage, comprise the third period. The National Pact did not guarantee stability; it only mirrored the lack of national identity and perpetuated the incoherent polities of the bipartisan government. The aftermath of this alliance was a weaker and corrupted state with high levels of social fragmentation. The political parties shared power repelling any electoral alternative, and plundered the Treasury to feed their clientele (Palacios 2006).

The politics of coalition behind the National Pact consisted in the political elites’ endeavor for preserve their monopoly over the economic, financial, legal and popular forces of the state. Although, this type of power distribution is faithful to formal democratic values, it clearly restricts citizens’ political and electoral freedoms (Lijphart 1999; Lipset 1967).

In Colombia, while the elites were busy achieving the aims of their new political status as unique political power holders, the people excluded from the pact and the parties felt betrayed by the state, turned to the subversion. Guerrilla ideology offered attractive promises of equality and
inclusion to poor and unemployed citizens, leftist students and intellectuals, and landless peasants. Many guerrilla organizations were founded in the 1960s and 1970s, but in the field, there were already small groups of self-defense acting as subversive forces during the 1930s and 1940s. These organizations were assimilated and merged into broader and complex armed structures. By time, the subversion cells were grouped around three larger guerrillas: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC), the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN), and the 19th of April Movement (Movimiento 19 de Abril, M-19) (Appelbaum 2003; Palacios 2006; Ramsey 1973; Sánchez and Bakewell 1985).

Today, only the FARC and ELN engage in warfare against state’s forces, the M-19, after dialogue with the government, put down their weapons in 1990. A new Constitution was resulted from the negotiations, and new political forces foresaw an opportunity to participate in writing the document that represented a new order. Unfortunately, these fresh players of the political arena were objectives of persecution by the state security agencies. This dirty war was driven with the cooperation of illegal armies that later become another violent phenomena, known as the paramilitaries (Sánchez-Blake 2002; Semana 2010).

FARC with more than 30,000 enrolled militants as well as the ELN with more than 3,000 active members shared several characteristics, including membership and historical background. Their constituency was poor peasants, communist party supporters, students, intellectuals, and followers of the Catholic liberation theology doctrine. They worked to represent the rural nation in its ongoing struggle against wealthy classes, large landowners, United States’ influence, privatization of natural resources, and multinational corporations operating in the country. Furthermore, to finance their operations they have both used kidnapping, extortion of businesses
and entrepreneurs, and unofficial taxes on the population they protect and provide with security services (Broderick 1975; Tate 2007; Vélez 2001; Vieira 2004).

Despite this violent facts, in the 1980s the guerrilla was deeply rooted in the society, and for the government was difficult to bear out the idea of frontal war against the subversion. Conversely, peace dialogues were suitable options to untangle the situation thus governments since 1984 have attempted to negotiate with armed groups, and presidential candidates have campaigned on the peace issue that have become a decisive factor in presidential elections (García-Durán 2004; López 2007).

In 1984, the first large negotiations were held between the government and guerrilla militants (mostly from the FARC). From this agreement, a political party called the Patriotic Union (Unión Patriótica, UP) was created. The UP’s first poll participation was surprising; it won several public offices and achieved national relevancy. The UP was a growing party and an alternative to the bipartisanship that was suffocating the democracy (Afanador 1993; Medina, and Sánchez 2003; Ramírez, and Restrepo 1991).

Parallel to the peace initiatives, the government began an extermination campaign against members of the UP. This persecution was sponsored by the state’s security forces, and supported by proto-paramilitary groups and narcotrafficking bosses. It was responsible for the assassination of more than 2,000 members of the UP and the exile of most of its leaders. Several pieces of research and scholarship, as well as unfinished criminal investigations, have proved the state involvement in this genocide (Carrillo 2003; Cepeda 2006; Matta 2002).

As noted, a new war actor appeared. Vargas (2009) accurately describes the formation and emergence of paramilitary organizations:

The first militias were organized by the military during the late 1970s thanks to a law that permitted the formation of armed self-defense organizations of civilians encouraged to fight
against the insurgents. Subsequently rural elites formed private armies which emerged on a widespread scale during the eighties when drug lords started becoming landowners and facing extortion from the guerrillas. These militias were banned but kept operating in the shadow after which the Colombian conflict technically became three-sided.

So, the state provided support and sponsorship of right-wing organizations, using them as instruments to exert unofficial social control over the population. The objective was to neutralize political opposition at any cost, perpetrating many human rights abuses. As a result, the guerrilla was motivated to intensify their methods and began to attack civilians who refused to participate in the warfare against the army and paramilitaries. The government’s doublespeak of dialogues and war at the same time has compounded the conflict against the civil population (Dudley 2004; López 2007; Mazzei 2009; Richani 2007; Romero 2002; Tate 2007).

Additionally, during the 1980s, the FARC found the drug business attractive erasing ideological boundaries that once separated them from other criminal organizations. Then, the objectives of both leftist and rightist armed groups started to overlap: the monopolization of illegal drug markets and territorial control that facilitates broader purposes related to social, economic, political and electoral control. The hostilities were a means of imposing hegemonic power or inducing a particular behavior on the population. The violence was not random, but was rather a direct answer to patterns established by armed actors (Dudley 2004; Kalyvas 2000; Sánchez 2007).

Years after the UP’s failed experience, the M-19 movement began to negotiate with the liberal government of Virgilio Barco in 1990. This process was timed differently from the 1984 process because the society was aware of the state’s abuses and there was a general consensus about the need of political renovation (Gómez, Herrera, and Pinilla 2009; Semana 2011; El Espectador 2011). Thus, inspired in the human rights’ discourse, the guerrillas, the government,
the political parties, the Catholic Church, and the international community signed a peace agreement that implied significant changes in the political structure of the country and ended up forming the 1991 political Constitution (Gobierno de Colombia 1990; Van Cott 2005b)

**The new constitutional agreement**

The fourth period began in 1991 and ended in 2002, when Álvaro Uribe won the presidential elections. The 1991 Constitution was considered an optimistic, pluralist and human rights’ favorable document. It was a formal response to the new conflict scenario of multiple actors and lack of state authority in large portions of the geography (Cárdenas, Junguito, and Pachón 2006; Semana 2011; Van Cott 2005b).

The new political order fostered positive changes for Colombians. These improvements include the following: concrete actions to protect individual rights, elevation of such social rights as health and education to constitutional status, and the creation of new institutions like the Constitutional Court (Cepeda 1997; Nagle-Ortiz 1995; Ossa 2001). Nevertheless, the deep-rooted social grievances that nourished all these changes remained intact and even worsened in the rural areas where the state was weak and the para-states were the ruling authority.

The conflict escalated during the 1990s. After a couple of years of partial ceasefire, the guerrillas began to compete with the paramilitaries for the freed territory left by the M-19. By time, the paramilitaries changed their tactics and turned into complex criminal structures with regional and national influence. Furthermore, retired and active members of the army and the police were allied with them; they also had money from narcotraffickers that allowed them to expand their criminal project throughout the country (Romero 2002).
The original paramilitary model began as a legislative initiative introduced by the government of Ernesto Samper (1994-1998). He established security associations called *convivir* (roughly translated as *living together*), to build military-civilian networks to provide security in certain regions. These legal private armies were the genesis of the paramilitary militias that soon were out of the state’s control. These associations also helped the paramilitaries attain significant popular support from landowners, ranchers, businessmen, and the peasants who worked for them (Crandall 1991; Molano 2005; Tate 2007; Vargas 2009).

At the turn of the century, the major illegal actors of the conflict were virtually undefeatable by the state. Both guerrillas and paramilitaries possessed considerable political, social, and numerical strength. The guerrilla movement got involved in the drug business and became a scary criminal organization, leaving behind the idea of being a response of the rural poor to the social injustice abandoned to the inertia of the conflict. Although, the government looking for legitimacy extended the offer of peace talks, and in order to regain support and recognition, the guerrillas agreed to talk.

In 1999, Andres Pastrana (1998-2002) won the presidential election by promising to continue dialog with the FARC. He ceded control of 42,000 kilometers to the FARC and declared it a “clearing zone” (*zona de depeje*), fulfilling conditions set by the FARC to begin negotiations. However, after three years of fruitless talks and various guerrillas’ terrorist acts, the president ended the dialogues in February 2002 and ordered Colombian forces to retake the cleared territory. Months later, when Uribe took office in August 2002 he launched an aggressive security campaign against the FARC and ELN and proposed dialogues with the paramilitaries (Leguízamo 2002; Posada 2002).
Despite this failure, in order to achieve national reconciliation governments kept using political and legal mechanisms to tailored agreements, dialogues or negotiations with the armed actors. Thus, peace remained intrinsic to the political agenda but in the 2000s and following the constitutional objectives of inclusion, the victims that once were observed as part of the civil society began to be recognize as a separate group. (Constitutional Court C-228/02)

But the victims’ history began at the end of the Cold War. During the 1980s, the international community created legal mechanisms to face the genocides and extreme violence against minorities in El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Ruanda, Liberia and Sierra Leona. Thence, United Nations issued the Declaration of basic principles of justice for victims of crime and abused of power, which was the first document that addresses the victims of internal conflicts as important participants of reconciliation processes.

Even though, this Declaration was developed in multiple documents; it took years to the Colombian legal system recognize the victims’ status in the conflict (Constitutional Court C-228/02, C-578/02, C-004/03, T-249/03; United Nations 1985, 1989, 2000, 2005; Patiño et al. 2008; Pozo 2002).

**The Justice and Peace Period**

After the failed negotiations between Pastrana’s government and the FARC, the guerrilla movement lost its political status and went on to become a narco-terrorist organization. This situation propelled Álvaro Uribe’s presidential campaign, which main purpose was frontal war against guerrillas and negotiation with the paramilitaries assembled under a single organization known as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (*Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC*) (López 2007; Romero 2002).
Since 2002 Colombia lives a period of transitional justice. The negotiations with the AUC have brought positive and negative upshots. On one side, the express victims’ recognition in the political and legal frameworks of the process is a positive outcome. On the other side, the politicians and paramilitaries had secret alliances and parallel agendas, and subsequent rearmed processes, shed questions over the peace process.

Uribe won the elections with the support of large coalitions of elites from traditional parties. His legitimacy allowed him to raise the AUC’s status from criminal to political arguing that the country need them in the struggle against the guerrillas (BBC Mundo 2001; Urrutia 2002). The president’s background made him a genuine negotiator, not only for his familiar background of large landowners, cattle breeders, business’ and political leaders, but also for have supported self-defense’ groups (Caballero 2009; Dugas 2003; López 2007; Murillo 2004; Uribe 2004; Vélez 2010).

It was easy to achieve ceasefire accords, demobilization and reinsertion commitments, and implement justice cooperation mechanisms. Massive demobilizations of paramilitaries began in 2003 with 1,000 combatants and before December 2005 more than 35,000 men had put down their weapons. Despite the precedents, the country was optimistic watching the media covering each week positive developments of the peace process (Gobierno de Colombia 2011.)

However, alternative media and human rights’ advocates were doubtful about the process and argue that AUC’s leaders were taking advantage of the transitional process gaining political status and benefiting from a special legal framework, the LJP, that granted them less time in jail, clean their criminal record, and legalize their wealth obtained from the drug business (Bocchi 2007; Fundación Ideas para la Paz 2011; Romero 2002). Nevertheless, the LJP was challenge and the Constitutional Court that ruled on declaring that the law abides the constitutional
requirements. Furthermore, the Organization of American States (OAS) in order to legitimate the process designated a mission to observe and support the process (Constitutional Court 2010; MAPP-OEA 2010).

Two political parties, the traditional Liberal party and the Polo Democrático, questioned the original LJP’s draft presented by the government, and struggled to introduce few changes in the final version. Basically, they argued the law was not rigorous enough preventing standard narcotraffickers of manipulating the law, according to the Liberals and Polistas, the AUC’s leaders had strong bonds with drug barons; even exchangeable roles in some regions, and the LJP could serve as an instrument to pay off justice’s accounts and the negotiations could ended up benefiting the wrong criminals.

Besides, the political opposition complained about the punishment saying that it was not sufficiently harsher, even recognizing there should be a trade-off between justice and peace; the paramilitaries were paying a very low price for crimes against humanity. Alas, the core guidelines of the LJP’s did not changed, the debate gave the nation a perception of a healthy democratic discussion around a relevant issue that counted towards the overall legitimacy of the process.

As mentioned, the Congress approved the bill in 2005 and then, the constitutional court reviewed it. The tribunal declared it enforceable, however, the scope of certain concepts and procedures to avoid further misinterpretations, was fixed. The tribunal gave to victim’s relatives equal participation in the process; also, the reparation should account for any crime committed by the criminal organization, not only those against humanity, but also, for instance, land tenure-related felonies; in addition, the decision mandated that both perpetrator or accomplice patrimony regardless its legal or illegal origin, must be used to repair the victims; and finally, it
ordered that demobilizes’ statements had to be based on verifiable facts information (Patiño et al. 2008).

The court decision substantially bettered victims’ situation. Moreover, a growing public awareness of the victims’ role in the reconciliation process was growing along with the interest in new and old organizations, associations, or NGOs that originally were created to advocate for human rights in general but turned to advised and defend the victims’ of the LJP’s cases.

Independent and few mainstream media played a relevant role. They were thoughtful covering the developments of the LJP and following up denounces of abuses and misconducts of the participants, as well as investigating the links of politicians, regional elites, large/landowners, with narcotraffickers and paramilitaries. These reports were taken to the General Prosecutor office and are known as the Parapolítica’s processes, which indicted hundreds of high and middle profile politicians and businessman that are suspected of having close contact with the paramilitary criminal activities (Corporación Nuevo Arcoíris 2011; López 2008; El Espectador 2006; Semana 2005, 2010; Roy 2002; Romero 2004).

I have described the previous environment, the genesis, the first developments, and some of both positive and negative consequences of the Justice and Peace´ process, and the criticisms made from different sectors of the society. Next, I present how the victims appeared, got visible, and began to participate in the reparation processes.

**The Justice and Peace´s victims**

In general, the LJP set standards and procedures to members of illegal organizations who want to return to a civilian life. To receive the benefits of the law, the government nominates the former combatant depending on unequivocal attitudes towards national reconciliation and
effective contributions to victims´ rights satisfaction performed by the accused. Once the president recommends an individual as subject of the LJP’s process, the jurisdiction takes effect.

The law states that the victims and their rights are fundamental variables of the peace equation. Yet, reality was different, in the specific section of the victim’s intervention the admission requirements for the victims were major obstacles. The law establishes that victims could be observers and participants throughout all the process but could only act as subjects in a separate motion before the judge takes a final decision; moreover, the victims have to act individually, nor as a group, organization or legal entity. These prerequisites themselves do not configure an obstacle, however, if the victims were not prepared, advised and educated about the law’s details they could become an invincible barrier (Patiño et al. 2008).

To avoid such risk and assure victims’ participation in the LJP’s processes, the law created the CNRR, and mandated the PGN to advise the victims (LJP art. 28, 35, 36, 38-7). In addition, since the social movements of victims cannot act directly as interested party, they have managed to gain social legitimacy, and to be recognized and supported by the international community intervene as public advocacies and defenders of victims’ rights. The role of SMV has prevented the victims of being co-opted by the state. If the future of victims’ rights were a government's single responsibility, clientelism and corruption would be a certain outcome because the state in order to adjust the reparation to its accounts may manipulate and re-victimize the victims (Álvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998).

As proven, the victims’ socioeconomic disadvantages are not new; through history they have been displaced and abused by the powerful and wealthy. The International Committee of the Red Cross (2009) fairly describes who are those victims and shows that despite their invisibility, they are many:
Rural inhabitants unable to move freely in and out of their villages because of the fighting; families mourning the death of a relative or enduring years of agony due to the disappearance of a loved one; victims of weapon contamination, whether they have suffered death, mutilation or psychological trauma; members of medical teams threatened, attacked or prosecuted, simply for doing their job; men, women and children suffering abuse – often sexual – in silence; civilians fleeing their homes to escape fighting or threats, leaving almost everything behind; indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities who, among the thousands of civilians exposed to the armed clashes, find themselves especially affected; hostages and members of the police and armed forces deprived of their freedom, and their relatives back home, clinging to the hope that one day they will be reunited with their loved ones; people detained in connection with the armed conflict, in overcrowded prisons.

Although there is an agreement among the government and the society in general regarding the concept victim, the exact number of affected individuals is unknown. The size varies depending on the dates, the perpetrator, the crime, and other demographic variables. For instance, figures change if calculations began in the sixties or the nineties, also if all guerrilla, paramilitaries and state’s victims are included; likewise numbers would dramatically differ if account only for crimes against humanity or felonies as internal forced displacement as well. The truth is that thousands of individuals are victims of the conflict and have to be included in the reparation accounts (Richards 2006; Sanchez 2007).

In conclusion, I place the reader in the right spot to critically understand who are the victims, where they come from and why is their role so vital to achieve the reconciliation ends of the Colombian transitional justice process. I chose the victims because among all the actors of the conflict (armed organizations, the state, civil society, the media, interest groups, and so forth) are the less favorable group and the one who have paid the real war’s costs. Moreover, the law basically was customized to the convenience of the AUC’s leaders, and the victims’ participation
was a later achievement obtained thanks to the intervention of the international community, opposition parties and the constitutional court.

Thus, the victims finally appeared in the national scenario after decades of persecution and invisibility. The state was always deaf to victims’ protests and claims. But the victims were always there and their organizations, associations and movements that grew as collective voices shouting for reparation. Today, political and legal frameworks have proven to be more friendly to the human rights, social vindication, and therefore to the victims. As a consequence, they have triggered and activated social movements that otherwise would remained asleep and unknown. These political shifts have placed the victims in the center of the national context. The victims’ issue is becoming popular.

The victims have taken advantage of both political and legal situations produced by government’s decisions taken within a reconciliation atmosphere. This situation provided the right momentum to promote, on one hand, demobilization and lax justice processes, and on the other hand, reparation and truth guarantees. Now then, despite the room to perform in the LJP processes and official institutions’ support, the procedure was complex and difficult to those inexperienced in legal maneuvers. Inside the processes the victims had to rely on the PGN and CNRR; but outside, in the victims’ daily life, SMV were the preferred actors for their closeness to the victims’ situation, and their nongovernmental nature.
CHAPTER III

Introduction

In democracy SM and political parties play a determining role in closing the gap between the state and civil society. The scholarship has identified different connections between them according to the political regime’s specific characteristics (Álvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998; Ondetti 2008; Van Cott 2005). The State’s organic structure and institutional design influence SM’s and political parties’ failure or success. However, the political parties have an historical advantage over contemporary SM; for instance, in Colombia they performed as state makers while the SM, of more recent formation, are considered an expression of a modern and illustrated civil society that functions outside the realm of traditional party politics. So, despite the fact that SM exert some influence on the state, the parties have deep rooted bonds with the people, larger membership and effective influence on government’s decisions.

Furthermore, SM and political parties share a sociopolitical spot, and compete for public support and legitimacy. The number of SM in Colombia has grown significantly along with the academic interest and scholarship on them. A prominent group of researchers argue that SM’s visibility and effectiveness intervening in the national politics are outcomes of shifts on the regime’s structure, without which they would remain in the shadows. This theoretical perspective is known as the political opportunity structure (POS). It states that broad political changes that do not involved directly the movements are responsible for the emergence and performance of SM. (Gamson and Meyer 1996; McAdam 1982; 1996; Tarrow 1994; Koopmans 1999).

In this chapter I formulate a conceptual framework for the SM category; a definition of political parties; and analyze possible relationships with the grounds of the POS. Also, I study the range of possible interactions between movements and parties and assess those links to
render a better idea of how the Colombian victims’ situation is influenced by current structures of governance in Colombia.

**Social Movements and the Political Opportunity Structure**

The study of SM an interdisciplinary endeavor that political scientists, sociologists and anthropologists, among others, have tackled from their own perspectives creating an array of theories, classifications, forms, etc., of movements, popular mobilizations, social protest and collective actions. Despite the efforts for unification, this subfield is still fragmented and there is not a comprehensive concept of SM (Klandermans and Roggeband 2007; Smelser 2002).

This diversity anticipates the variable character of the SM. Indeed, a phenomenon that emerge from people everyday relations could not be anything but a cross disciplinary subject. However, I argue that a simple, updated and pragmatic definition could frame and facilitate my discussion of SM in Colombia. To attain it I begin introducing different disciplinary approaches to the movements’ idea; and then, using this knowledge I build my own definition.

Sociologists characterize SM as extra-institutional, multi-centered network organizations with fuzzy boundaries made by citizens willing to disrupt and change the state institutional designs (Gerlach and Hine 1970; Klandermans and Roggeband 2007). Two recent perspectives have informed the sociology debate over the SM’s nature. One is the structural approach that remarks the importance of changing unequal mental models of reality trough the re-distribution of material resources (Smith and Fetner 2007; Tilly 1978). The other is the cultural view that focuses on how the individual perceives and interprets these material conditions (Jasper 2007).

Sociologist also recognized that even though inequalities are experienced all over the globe, only a minority of social groups engages in protest and mobilizations. What follows is that movements appear and grow according to the state’s distribution of political and economic
power, and the expected possibilities to change them. Plus, the position of the state in the international arena and the chances to take advantage of that in a globalize world.

Thus, the flexibility of the political structure is beyond the strength of the movement itself. This is better illustrated by Smith and Fetner (2007, 16) note that: “People such as Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. may indeed have been highly exceptional politicians and strategies, but if they had live in a different historical moments, we would not be recalling them today.” Likewise, McAdam (1982) argues that large-scale structural forces (economic transformations, change in migration patterns); and domestic opportunities (divisions among elites, the state’s role exerting social control and sudden conjunctural changes), have motivated social organizations in searching new political horizons (Gamson and Meyer 1996; Tarrow 1994; Tilly 1978).

But consider political opportunities the only reason for SM’s emergence could mislead and ignore cultural or collective’s features of the society (Goodwin and Jasper 1999). So, rather than observing the level of openness of a specific regime, other stream of thought have purposed to identify aspects of the structure that specifically affect a given movement, this second level of analysis is known as the political context theory (Kriesi 1996).

In the same sense, della Porta, Peterson, and Reiter (2007) argue that although the way SM exploit the opportunities is important; learning how the state is organized to manage and resist challenges from social advocates, is a more reliable predictor of movements’ emergence and reproduction. What is clear, is that the state itself cannot force or inhibit SM. Otherwise, how could one explain those regimes where the structure allows for mobilization but it does not occurred, or vice versa? Thus movements indeed contribute to their own existence. There are other driving reasons behind movements arise like the movement’s maturity, complains’
attractiveness to the international community, the militants’ proactive attitude and activists’ strategies.

The SMV’s case suits this description. In Colombia, the political context that facilitated the emergence of victims’ organizations was made of informal and formal variables. Acting as informal variables, I identify the presidential decision to declare war against the guerrillas and negotiate with the paramilitaries; and the poor status of the human rights’ protection program as observed by the international community. And as formal variables, all the laws and regulations the Congress approved with the purpose of providing legal framework to the negotiations. Nevertheless, this does not entail the inactive role of the movements but instead it demonstrates their preparation and readiness to act when conditions were favorable.

As stated, SM have been assessed by other disciplines. In anthropology SM indicate specific societal groups’ identities made by symbols, cultural narratives, popular protest and so forth, assuming social unrest (at different degrees) intrinsic to any society. According to this view, SM movements arise as vehicles to express social grievances to the state in contexts where historically marginalized groups do not have access to traditional channels to the state or where these channels have broken down.

Groups’ demographic nature is important as well. Landless peasants, indigenous people, forced displaced communities, afro descendants, victims of conflicts, and so forth might choose different paths to power. They can either use integrated channels such as political parties or create new routes to attain the state. So, despite of expressing submerged realities or being labeled as socio cultural phenomena, SM relate explicitly to political issues (Castells 1997; Escobar 1992a; Giddens 1991).
This theory upholds for the SMV in Colombia. History has shown how the country’s turmoil is multi-causal, it is rooted in political ideology disagreements and land distribution problems; in geographical constrains and lack of state’s presence; in public servers’ corrupt practices and narcotraffick’s influence. Thus, SMV have been in the quotidian “going on” of the nation; but while cultural and social frameworks have forced victims’ organizations appearance, the political context has inhibited it until recently as shown in previous chapters (Foweraker 1995; Giddens 1991).

Within these strictures, Rose’s (1997) class-cultural theory offers a multidisciplinary approach that incorporates principles of sociology, anthropology and political science. He claims that SM reflect the connections among class struggles and social mobilization even though they stand for objectives that are not strictly class-based. Specifically, Rose redefines social class as a cultural notion of systemic practices of conformity and resistance explained according to the individual’s place in the production process. In other words, to belong to a SM not only responds to class’ interests but also to the searching for individual identity through social and collective action.

This theory also enlightens SMV’s analysis. The government deliberatively considers the victims’ claims and poor population’s needs exchangeable categories in the same way as the poor and the victim. The fact that most of the victims belong to the low-income sector of the population has been used by the government to issue misleading policies that deliver in social investments as if they were forms of reparation. For instance, building a hospital in a poor town is a state’ responsibility regardless the backlashes of the conflict in that area; reparation cannot be taken as a fulfillment of states’ duties it should go beyond that. Hence, it is important to consider the intersection of class and culture in these movements.
As Lipset (1963) states, political science is a discipline that focus on the connections among organized actors and their interests, state structures and public policies. The state has been defined as an actor that performs according to the nation’s best interest and bears internal and external constrains. Besides, in democratic regimes the state is an arena where political action occurred and individual and collective, private and public actors operate pursuing different outcomes (Almond et al. 2004; Meyer and Lupo 2007; Morgenthau 1993).

As players of the political game, SM have been studied with different emphases and timing depending on the political situation of the country or the international environment. Moreover, since movements have appeared when larger political phenomena such as world wars, nuclear threats, and revolutionary waves have taken place; they have been considered subordinate and temporary not independent actors (Huntington 1968; Lipsky 1968).

Dahl’s (1963) pluralistic view considered SM as groups of people with similar interests who build coalitions to gain meaningful access to the government. Since ideally democracy incorporates the separation of power among multiple levels of government, all sorts of interests are potential veto players.

In this view, SM transcend merely social areas and move towards a political nature engaging in strategies and activities tending to switch power distribution. SM operate in different ways, they succeed when popular bases are mobilized bringing new actors to the social turmoil, and authorities recognize their demands and gripes as broader national interests beyond particular vindications (Schattschneider 1960). But, when they lack of political impact and claim for unpopular changes, street protest appears as effective and cheap mechanism to provoke sympathetic attitudes from more powerful allies (Lipskky 1968; McCarthy, and Zald 1973; Piven and Cloward 1971).
Despite these realities, at some point, every movement would be recognized and institutionalized, and will negotiate their grievances with the state, yet they would create a shift in the political order, and would generate changes where official institutions failed (Lowi 1971).

Research on SM of less develop countries have centered on structural and environmental factors like failed democratization processes and unequal market conditions, whereas in develop countries these factors are homogenized and taken for granted and movements claim for issues apart from political processes like environmental problems (Eckstein 2001; Schuurman 1989; Sckopol 2003).

To conclude, it is important to observe that SMV comprise in their nature features of both broad western and specific development theories about SM. They expose a communication break between the state and society; but also, the questions they raise are rooted in social inequalities that existed since the state’s foundation linked directly to economic and political structures. Moreover, SMV success and permanence depend on specific conditions making them sensitive to regional and local circumstances. So, SMV are associations, organizations or groups of victims, victims’ relatives or victims’ sympathizers demand from the state and society effective actions tending to repair their damage.

**Political parties and the Political Opportunity Structure**

Political parties have occupied a central role in the study of modern politics. Parties are the most common linkage between state and society. They are the result of permanent struggles among popular bases and political elites. Therefore, they serve as good indicators of the society’s political character, and their performance is a good predictor of a regime’s functioning (Arian, and Barnes 1974; Van Cott 2005).
Ideally parties channel demands from the electorate to the state (and vice versa), shape and mold the public opinion, organize the masses, and shape the priorities of the society and the government as well. Political parties not only look for the general interest (once in power), or for the interest of their constituency, but also concentrate on pursuing political power. Sometimes, these objectives are in conflict and corruption and clientelism arise. In addition, political parties could be found exerting strong opposition and vetoing to the dominant party decisions.

But parties are not an exclusive legacy of democracy; many non-democratic regimes have had similar groups or associations that perform similar functions. Distinguish between those is important because they legitimate regimes, their presence represents civil guaranties that embodied political freedoms of association, election and participation. Thus, the study of political parties yet is not interdisciplinary cannot be limited to their connections with the democracy.

For instance, Arian and Barnes’s (1974) dominant-party analysis explains how, in some cases, parties are identified with an epoch, a national need at certain point of history or as essential part of a given political community. Moreover, they are recognized as state makers or builders the political order that they came to dominate. So, the line between the state, regime, and political parties, is unclear.

For Duverger (1951), on the other hand, states that there are elite-base and mass-base parties. The former attracts people of greater influence, such as landowners, entrepreneurs and political leaders; the latter is made of single individuals attached by ideologies rather than elites’ interest. The cultural, economic and political structures of the society influence which type of party will arise (Freidenberg and Levitsky 2007; Riker 1982).
Parties of any lineage have different origins and timing. On one hand, traditional political parties were born, grew and even exchanged roles with the state. On the other hand, contemporary parties emerged after convulsive conjunctures, sometimes using the same hierarchical and clientelist structure, other times proposing original ways to do politics. Where there is a constituency to assemble there surge a party (López-Alves 2000). Good examples are ethnic and green parties and how, apparently, non public issues became of public interest (van der Heijden 2002; Montecinos 2000).

In particular, Latin American parties have different roots. Countries in this region share a history of caudillismo and bipartisanship originated in the dissolution of the colonial state. Even though, Colombia had a history of charismatic and populist leadership, the country did not experience an authoritarian rule of a one leader with strong influence over the masses. On the contrary, Colombia embraced a two-party system commanded by elites and few regional influential leaders loyal to the party. As a result, parties were the ruling authorities in large portions of the territory providing public benefits to the people, coordinating and leading army’s operations, and appointing their clientele to official posts.

By the time, this model of omnipresence and powerful parties worn out, and in order to preserve power and influence they undertook processes of renovation. Traditional parties spread in micro political organizations, adopted political platforms of new but weak parties, absorbed them or redesigned their propaganda to appear as renovate forces (Corrales 2001, Kingstone and Young 2009; Riker 1982).

Since state and political parties were exchangeable ideas, their members were also exchangeable. In other words, political leaders were high-rank military officials; and economic entrepreneurs acted as parties’ elites. The private sector fueled the state investing but also bribing
public officials, and, in turn, the government responds with favorable economic reforms (Lijphart 1999; Palacios 2006; Van Cott 2005b).

But these parties failed to update their platforms and began to lose constituency. As a result, people needed alternative ways of expression, in particular those members that have put down the weapons and were looking for legal ways access to the state. The 1991 constitution was the formal outcome of this political chaos. The new constitution stands over pluralistic and participatory principles that technically prevent hegemonic practices as those performed by traditional parties, and allow for third forces to intervene in the political arena. Since then, the country has experienced a weaken two-party system with several coalition governments and with parties exerting strong opposition (Van Cott 2005b).

During the Justice and Peace period (2002 – currently), president Alvaro Uribe won the elections with a coalition party called Colombia First (Colombia Primero). Uribe was a renegade liberal leader who ruled together with conservative’s elites. This new model of governance implies free market oriented economic reforms, preservation of the *status quo*, and expansion of party’s clientele through direct contact with the bases where the president acted as a populist leader and give state resources as personal gifts. This style of politics shielded Uribe’s authority and allowed him to undertake structural reforms while run for reelection (Caballero 2009; López 2007).

These alliances raised several questions to the government. The president in order to honor different commitments including those made with paramilitary’s leaders allowed in his constituency legitimate and illegal partisanship. Thus many government officials or para-officials with the government’s consent, executed illicit actions with the purpose of preserve Uribe in power (López 2007; Richani 2007).
Nevertheless, there were positive outcomes. The international community had an eye on Colombia after the failed peace process of 1998, and was observing the new paramilitary demobilizations, the denouncement of illegal drug money for financing elections, and the recurrent human rights’ abuses by both private actors and public forces.

In addition, political opposition gained public recognition and found in, former invisible, social organizations channels to communicate with the bases. Movements also served they own purpose and used the parties to gain leverage and reach more audience (Kingstone and Young 2009). An example of this collaboration is the relationship between the NGO Corporación Nuevo Arcoíris and the Polo Democratico Alternativo--the organization investigates specific social concern and the party advances political debates in the Congress.

As a consequence of these alliances, the government began to yield spaces for SM’ participation in the political arena; partly to convince the international community of their willingness to protect human rights’ advocates, and partly to co-opt opposition’s supporters unlike SM that need external forces for entry to the political arena

To conclude, political parties in Colombia have had the capacity to shape the political structure and use external forces for their benefit, thus they can intervene in deciding the aftermath of political changes. Both traditional and new parties are able to transform the panorama; the traditional parties by using their electoral machine, and the secondary or weak parties by unbalancing the bipartisan equilibrium. Such instability is created using their institutionalized nature to introduce new grievances to the public debate (McAdam et al 1997; Ondetti 2008; Tarrow 1994; Van Cott 2005b).

In addition, parties by nature live for winning electoral debates, typically in democratic regimes. Other objectives are secondary and must align with these ones; otherwise the party will
lose its character and become a civic organization. But more than often SM mutate into parties, but rarely the opposite way. Therefore, the process of parties’ consolidation is not up to external circumstances, these actors decide the fate of their political life.

There are an array of connections between SM and political parties. To ease this analysis I designed a threefold classification that compiles the ways of how the SMV have related with the PP. I redirect the presentation of each category to the Colombian case and assess their validity in light of the POS.

A Threefold Categorization

A social movement that aspires to become a political party

As Van Cott (2005) asserts, indigenous social movements in Colombia “took advantage of a more permissive institutional environment and the extraordinary opportunity presented by constitutional reform to mobilize dense networks of affiliates behind new political projects.” This type is found mainly in indigenous organizations formed by poor and marginalized ethnic communities who associated in order to gain support from domestic and international organizations.

Ethnic parties are an example in the Latin American politics of SM that transition into parties. There organizations begin advocating crosscutting issues and end up finding in politics the best way to address these claims. However, indigenous communities have a particular feature; they look for preservation of their territory and recognition of their individuality. These premises have propelled few indigenous organizations to advance towards participatory politics. Ethnic movements have genuine specific demands; but as political entities they pursue political power drawing followers and voters. Then, they address new issues that enhance their
constituency and not necessarily contradict their primary interests. They use the available
mechanisms of the political system to gain visibility.

According to Van Cott (2005) the permissiveness of the institutional environment is a
determinant variable to predict the transformation of ethnic movements in reliable electoral
vehicles. Such permissiveness is reflected in quota systems and decentralization of executive and
legislative posts, through which movements maximized their representation at a national scale.
As a result, ethnic movements do not lose their genuine character of third force but still represent
an alternative path to power bettering the political debate.

SMV in Colombia did not follow the same path of ethnic movements despite their
commonalities. Both victims and indigenous organizations have lived for years in the society’s
heart, and got visible after changes in the state’s structure, however victims’ demands were
attractive for opposition parties; both center-left and leftist parties welcomed victims’ leaders and
invited them to their electoral platform. For the victims, this was an effective way to deliver their
demands to the state.

Perhaps in the future, some SMV turn into political parties, but until today the legislative
mechanisms, the international accompaniment, the government partial will of redressing the
victims of the conflict, and the growing support of political parties, are strong reason to prevent
the victims’ organizations of transforming into political parties. Thus without implying SMV’s
stability or consolidation mutate into a party is not in the political horizon. Because of this, co-
option is a higher risk since they have to make alliances with other political actors to persist in
their struggle (Van Cott 2003, 2005a, 2009).
The Cultural Approach. Building New Paths to Power

These movements intend to reshape the relationship between politics and culture within Latin America’s SM. These organizations argue that cultural patterns are effective mechanisms for changing power relations in a society. When politics transitions from the traditional-formal level to the informal relations of the popular bases, it can democratize the authoritarian practices of domination that characterize developing societies. This is an organizational response to both the state and political parties, and address issues of their relationship with the people they represent. This cultural approach reacts to the inability of political actors to interpret and answer social claims. Theoretically, these movements have no political interest, and develop far from the parties and the state institutions (Escobar 1992; Hale 1997; Spencer 1994).

This type of connection is unlikely to appear between SMV and other political organizations. As stated victims population represents the less privilege layers of the society, poor peasants, landless tenures, indigenous communities, afro descendants are unable to design suitable routes to reach the state. By no means, a grassroots organization can communicate in equal conditions with state’s official without being subject of co-optation. They do not enjoy the political or economic leverage of traditional parties, or financial groups, which can avoid intermediaries and influence state’s decisions.

Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge the ideal scenario presented by this theoretical take. If low profile social organizations are strong enough to attain the state, the parties would have to redefine their role in the political debate and incorporate those, once invisible, claims to their political programs. I foresee this as a long run scenario of the SMV’s future. The parties will realize the relevancy of the movements and will intent to take from the organizations the leverage gained after years of experience.
A Symbiotic Relationship between Social Movements and Political Parties

This type comprises autonomous SM that connect and negotiate with political parties depending on the values and demands they represent but keeping their independence. A good example of this is the behavior of the Landless Rural Workers’ movements in Brazil (*Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, MST*) and how they supported the successful presidential candidacy of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and the Workers Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT*) in 2002. The party embraced the dispossessed’s claims augmenting the party electoral base. And yet, the leaders were not co-opted by the government. This stance allowed them to fend off unpopular official policies without falling on programmatic or ideological contradictions (Hammond 1999; Khawaja 1993; Lichbach and Gurr 1981; Ondetti 2006).

This represents the most likely fit for the SMV. Although, victims’ organizations are weak and disperse, their political scope due to their large constituency, has called the attention of political parties. This scenario led to two possibilities, on one hand, traditional parties while reconsidering their position towards the conflict acknowledging responsibility in the remote causes of the violence, will embrace victims’ demands with great chances to reach agreements and gain mutual support. Traditional political parties know historically, the necessities of the people in particular, those that have suffered abuses from armed organizations. Thus, the victims is not a new topic in these parties agenda, but a recognition of dated claims but today with enough leverage to attract national and international attention.

On the other hand, contemporary political parties born in the last two decades have already begun to support the victims’ vindications in high political spheres. Due to their nature of young and fresh political organizations they are well represented in congress and in the executive power; their electorate pertains to urban and educated voters though with little reach to the
lowest and less privilege social layers. Once, new parties identify the victims as potential but autonomous supporters the SMV’s leaders become equal agents of agreements in equal conditions. SMV will be grant as independent organizations that support specific policies and back up a party as long as it respect previous contracts.
CHAPTER IV

Introduction

This chapter aims to prove, using relevant data, the significant effect of the justice and peace processes’ legislative framework on the SMV’s growth. I present the information and state the limitations and difficulties of the collecting process. I then assess sources’ dependability and evaluate their validity for the purpose of this research. I conclude by presenting my findings and a set of recommendations to guide future investigations and new policies regarding the victims’ issue in Colombia.

The data gathered is consistent with the argument that previous to the legal gap opened by the LJP, the victims were unknown and lack of formal mechanisms to demand for their rights. Once the space was created, several civil organizations realized that it was possible to advocate for victims’ rights and accomplish something in that endeavor. Thus, taking advantage of the law’s invitation to participate in the processes and the sudden surplus of victims without assistance, the SMV began to increase and strengthen (Art. 30 L-975/05).

The LJP ordered the procuraduría and the comisión to advise the victims. However, these institutions were unable to provide them with adequate assistance due to the lack of resources to advise the large number of victims attracted to the processes. Furthermore, the law was tailored to guarantee perpetrators’ not victims’ rights; and in consequence, several institutions were created to assist the ex-combatants but not the victims. In fact, the LJP was the outcome of broader agreements made between the government and paramilitary groups. Furthermore, the benefits received by the victims were spillovers of the government's will to make the LJP appealing to the constitutional court, the international community and the domestic political opposition (Corporación Nuevo Arcoíris 2009).
Even though, the victims obtained significant benefits from these tradeoffs. According to the LJP, if the perpetrator is on trial the victims can produce evidence and participate actively in the processes. Unfortunately, victims’ ignorance about their rights as participants and bear knowledge in legal matters undermined their chances of assuring reparation, troubles the peace possibilities, and LJP’s legitimacy.

In this situation, the PGN and CNRR saw in the organizations appropriate instruments to reach the victims. In turn, SMV used these institutions to gain visibility and broaden their political scope. This teamwork of social organizations and governmental institutions advising the victims was essential to accomplish law’s objectives of coverage and full redress for the victims (Art. 2 L-975/05).

As observed, SMV’s leadership was useful but only after legal and political opportunities, were laid out. Same happened with other factors; for instance, the activists’ initiative to ally with parties, and the existence of pro-victims organizations and human rights movements in Colombia before the law was passed.

**Data Collection**

The complex relationship between the state and SMV made the data collection process challenging. Official Colombian institutions are more interested in counting the victims as individuals not as organizations. The movement matter only as a bridge to reach more victims, it is not consider a valid collective actor capable of intervene on behalf of the victims. This secondary condition of the SMV has not inhibited their growth, but it has hampered building real statistics of their performance.

Despite these limitations, the data collected provides a suitable foundation for the overall research. Despite of its incompleteness, the figures demonstrate a tendency of SMV’s grown
sufficient to prove my hypothesis. This is true for academic purposes. However, greater accuracy is warranted for designing policies or regulations.

I assess the data in two ways. First, I explain how it upholds my theoretical arguments and, second, I explain the way it captures the specificities of the Colombian crisis. However, the official government numbers do not fully capture the functioning of SMV. The LJP only allowed for individual’s participation in reparation processes, thus the figures I deploy some figures do not fully address still social movements invisibles from these accounts.

The individual victims’ and SMV’s data are also substantially different. From that unbalance, I conclude that the growing trend in the SMV’s behavior does not satisfy the demand of victims’ organizations. The victims who have attended and intervened in the processes without any informed support, and find out about the law through the media, the international community, or parties’ campaigns; have been being mislead and fooled.

Although any help is welcome, these are not the desired means to reach the government. The media focus on high-impact cases and usually interpret victims’ demands according to their marketing conveniences; the international community is unaware of the specific socio cultural conditions of the community and it takes time to build relations based in mutual trust and reliance; and parties, unless they assumed clear commitments with the victims’ they could take advantage used them as electoral fuel. So, social organizations already in the field with appropriated support and advice are desire channels between power structures and the victims (Van Cott 2005; Escobar 1992).
Findings

This information came from public and private sources. Although the initial idea was to obtain data from the two institutions appointed by the LJP, the lack of dependable information on those offices led me to look for data in different places. The law only allowed individuals to participate in LJP’s trials excluding the SMV, thus the PGN and CNRR targeted individuals, and data about victims’ organizations was fractioned and scattered in isolated documents. Moreover, several international institutions that advocate for the victims use government’s agencies intervene signing agreements or adjusting old cooperation treaties adding complexity to the data collection process.

The lack of cooperation from official institutions was also a challenging issue. According to the Colombian constitution public offices have the duty to provide their material to any citizen who requests it. Hence, I issue several letters of request but the standard answer was that due to the lack of personnel it was impossible to provide information, even if it was in the archives. By the time, I realized the non-existence of SMV’s databases, and that I have to build my own statistics with such limited data.

To track the establishment date of the SMV was a difficult task as well. Several organizations started as grassroots initiatives without formal ambitions until the LJP encouraged them to formalize their status and access to its benefits. As a consequence, SMV’s timeline could not be assessed in this research.

Considering these limitations, data collection was a handcrafted job made revising both targeted official and nongovernmental institutions. I began with the CNRR and the PGN. The process began looking into electronic archives and carefully counted every time a victims’ organization was mentioned. I evaluated all the documents published after any courses,
workshops, seminars, etc. given to the victims to prepare them for the justice and peace procedures.

Regarding individual data although the law privileges their intervention, the information is limited as well. The Public Prosecutor office (Fiscalía General de la Nación, FGN) represents the state in the LJP’s trials and had a record of each proceeding advanced by the victims. Thus it stands as a source of reliable information yet I expected higher numbers. Next, I present and assess the information found in the FGN.

**Individual victims’ data**

Table 4.1 shows in detail the participation in the first procedural stage. These are the victims that have attended directly the laws call, which means that they heard about the legal opportunity offered and reach the process to claim for reparation. Nevertheless, becoming part of the process is not sufficient, and if they want to satisfy their rights to reparation, active participation is needed. However, less than half of the participating victims have made questions to the prosecutor or the perpetrator. This indicates lack of assistance, especially in legal issues, a gap that could be filled by SMV’s advocacy.

**Table 4.1. Individual victims’ participation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of participation</th>
<th>Number of victims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victims that have participate in the preliminary testimony stage (perpetrators’ first interview)</td>
<td>59,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims that have made questions in the preliminary testimony stage</td>
<td>24,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of questions made by the victims to the perpetrators during the preliminary testimony stage</td>
<td>30,889</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Social organizations, international community, mainstream media, parties and the state itself—all of them have contributed to promoting and spreading the word about the LJP’s promises. However, despite of the good intentions of helping the victims, they are alone in the process where only the perpetrator, the prosecuting attorney, and the victim, are facing the judge. So, the hard work to help the victims has to be done outside, in the margins of the process. It is the only opportunity to overcome the legal disadvantage of the victims in the law and justice processes.

Nevertheless, the legitimacy of the process and national reconciliation depend on the guarantee of victims’ rights. Taking this into account, the FGN also assumed the mission to inform and include the victims in the law’s procedures. As stated, this office represents the state in every criminal cause and has more accurate individual-wise data. Furthermore, even if SMV are not the target of this actions, I assumed that individual victims’ increase is directly related SMV’s growth. The following table reflects the interest of the state in attracting the victims, and their positive response.

Table 4.2. General meetings of attention to victims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of meetings</th>
<th>Number of victims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>15,704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>24,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>42,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>28,961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>113,788</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These are official figures of victims that have had some involvement in justice and peace workshops and seminars organized by the FGN. But, these statistics do not account for all the victims, thousands them have not come to light because they are afraid of ex combatants revenges, or because the message have not reach them, either way these numbers only reflect a portion of reality.

Even worst, the lack of resources for investigate denounces confined the victims to decide among crimes, and tell only about those relevant to the authorities. Regrettably, this is a repeated situation. For example, a rural widow who is victim of killings and disappearances of family members, sexual offenses, forced displacement and electoral freedoms’ violations, because of such limitations, is forced to choose and tell only those crimes that she can prove by her own means leaving a range of crimes in impunity. In turn, the perpetrators take advantage of the situation and confessed only crimes that are easily prosecuted by the authorities.

The following table illustrates this problem. War crimes such as massacres, forced disappearances and killings have the highest rate of denouncing, but a historically overlook crime as the sexual offenses that reflect a gender aspect of impunity, have a low number. This prove that sexual offenses are one of the less investigate by the authorities, and less denounced by the victims.

*Table 4.3. Confessed crimes*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of crime</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Massacres</td>
<td>1,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murders</td>
<td>46,902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced recruitment</td>
<td>2,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced Disappearances</td>
<td>4,420</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.3. (continued)

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forced Displacement</td>
<td>9,622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extortion</td>
<td>1,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping</td>
<td>1,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual violence</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic, manufacturing and bearing of narcotics</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3. (continued)

In summary, numeric differences between victims and perpetrators are the reflection of inequalities of higher scope with larger consequences to the process. On one hand, victims have historically lacked of state’s protection that is why they looked in political parties, or armed actors state’s substitutes. But these para-states have not delivered adequately the benefits of the democracy to the victims, contrarily, the paramilitary’s leaders negotiated with the state without intermediaries. These differences manifest in the mentioned imbalances. On the other hand, to attain equality in the number of denounces and confessions is not guarantee of reconciliation, what actually matters are the agreements between the victims and the perpetrators with the state approval.

But the results in this matter are disappointing. For instance, one of the most important components of full redress is the assurances and guarantees of non-repetition. These measures translate into express declarations of forgiveness, regret, public guilt recognition and promises of non-repetition made by the defendants. And, although they are determinant for create bonds of trust and reliance among the participants of the processes; data on this issue is not significant.
Table 4.4. Guarantees of non-repetition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of action</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public re-establishment of victims’ dignity</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offer of forgiveness to the victims</td>
<td>795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public demonstration of regret</td>
<td>637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public promises of non-repetition of crimes</td>
<td>696</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, if the information collected on purpose by the fiscalía has these shortfalls and cannot be taken as absolute; the SMV’s data incidentally gathered cannot be taken as definitive. The following section presents the assembled data of the SMV.

Social Movements of Victims’ data

The path taken to find data about the victims’ organizations began in the archives of two official institutions that, according to the LJP, were in charge of supporting the victims: the General Prosecutor Office and the Commission of Reparation. These institutions have poor movements’ data, the PGN did not provide any specific information, and the CNRR has scarce and poor numbers. So, I turn to investigate the agreement signed among the government and the Organization of American States (OAS) to aid the state of Colombia in the peace process finding complementary but still insufficient information. I explain in detail the mission of the OAS when I assess that complementary data.

This situation anticipates one of my conclusions, due to the lack of relevant data of SMV, the victims appeared underrepresented and alone and the role of grassroots or small collectives is
underestimated by the state. So, SMV instead of being central for the government’s peace projects played a secondary role.

Next, I present data from each institution explaining the path taken to find it, and arguing over their significance to my research aims.

**Office of the National Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la Nación, PGN)**

For the PGN victims’ organizations were relevant to the extent of serve as extra-help to convene and organize individual victims. I found no record of direct assistance to SMV, but several informative journals, chronicles, articles, or publication of meetings between PGN’s representatives and victims as individuals or organizations, indistinctly. The outcomes of those meetings were a variety of informs, booklets and manuals explaining the basic LJP’s concepts and steps to access to the peace and justice jurisdiction. These publications were distributed to the victims through governmental regional and local offices.

However, the role of the PGN is more diverse and has a larger scope. This institution has focused on building alliances and collective projects with other institutions and the publications are one outcome of its extensive ground work. The PGN’s mission has been developed on two fronts, one focus on the interior that concentrates in educating their own official in the law’s regulations, and other projecting this knowledge outside the institution to the victims and community.

At the end of this section I introduce an example of this inter-institutional cooperation showing the mission to support the peace process in Colombia of the Organization of American States (Misión de apoyo al proceso de paz colombiano, MAPP/OEA). Next, I summarize the information that to some extent concerns the SMV, and was available in the PGN archives.
According to the LJP (art. 36) the PGN has to provide suitable mechanisms of participation of both the victims and their organizations and achieve the goals of truth and reparation of the law. One of those instruments was an audiovisual TV show called “Truth, justice and reparation. The victims ‘rights.” In this show, the institution recalled the concept of victims, and their rights and how they can be demanded in LJP’s range. It also explains how several forms and requirements are filled out and the institutions authorized to process those. Also, in the PGN website I found different audio files re-stating the concept explained in the show and convoking the victims to approach to the LJP’s first interviews.

The PGN repeatedly mentioned the importance of including the SMV to better accomplish their mission of informing the victims. The PGN designed plans to verify the policies of ex-combatants reinsertion in society integrating the SMV in this task. Also, this institution has involved the SMV in the design of reparation policies according the victims’ own experience; evaluating the law application methods; and advising public officials on conducting LJP’ issues.

To conclude, the PGN has done a lot for the victims but its work has been underrated because its national impact is lower than the government’s policies guarantee the demobilized rights. However, the SMV did have had a secondary place in its counts, thus a serious strategy to include them in their statistics would serve better the purpose of protecting and guarantee the victims’ rights.

National Reparations and Reconciliation Comission (Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación, CNRR)

The L-975/2005 created the commission to act as the link between the victims and the law’s benefits. The CNRR has the mission to assist all the victims, particularly the victims of
paramilitaries’ who are looking for reparation in the LJP’s framework. The commission was established in 2006, and among their eight members, two must represent victims’ organizations with legal status, extensive background and accreditation. So, I thought the selection process of those commissioners would provide pertinent data; but the minutes of those meetings were not available.

Nevertheless I found valuable information in the archives of the institution. The commission is permanently issuing bulletins and magazines of their activities, also specialized and independent media have worked with the commission helping in circulating information to the public. Then, looking in the archives year by year, it was possible to build a fairly acceptable data about the SMV.

After 5 years of mandate, the CNRR have established 13 regional offices and have provided personal assistance to more than 171,000 victims (Table 4.5). Also, 243,214 individuals were advised about the law’ regulations in different meetings and workshops all over the territory in more than 326 districts. In July of 2010, 2,702 leaders of 598 official institutions have received special training in LJP’s procedures; and 52,621 victims of 220 SMV, have accessed to different training modules. The CNRR throughout different covenants have formed around 300 volunteer liaisons and 350 communitarian leaders.

*Table 4.5. Number of regional offices of the CNRR*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>No Offices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Bogotá, Centro</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Bogotá, Centro, Antioquia, Sucre</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Bogotá, Centro, Antioquia, Sucre, Santander</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Bogotá, Centro, Antioquia, Sucre, Santander, Atlántico, Putumayo, Nariño, Valle del Cauca, Cesar</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
By the same token, I found estimated data of the precedent years dispersed in different publications of the commission and different supportive international agencies. This numbers by no means are official or unequivocal, the traced data of the SMV is accessorial and circumstantial to the main purposes of training and informing the victims in the LJP’s matters. The main purpose of the meetings organized by the CNRR was the victims’ interest regardless their connection with advocacy groups; the presence of SMV was welcome but was not indispensable. As a result, the assembled numbers prove a significant increment in the SMV, which is the purpose of this research, nevertheless, for further conclusions the data has to be fixed and complemented including all the institutions that have intervene in the victims’ advocacy. Next, I present the data of the SMV obtained exploring the commission’s archives.

Table 4.6. Number of social movements of victims (SMV) assisted by the CNRR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>SMV</th>
<th>Approx. No of individuals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>4,602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>14,123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>28,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>52,621</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusions and recommendations

The political opportunity structure theory upholds, and these numbers endorse my take regarding the nature of the SMV’s growth. In this case, the POS was the outcome of multiple national and international forces and slow social transformations that led to changes in the perception towards the victim, first as a visible part of the conflict, then as a central actor in any reconciliation process (McAdam et al 1997; Ondetti 2008; Tarrow 1994).

Behind the number of SMV is the story of thousands of victims that overcame major obstacles and decided to voice themselves through these organizations. This data represents those victims that suffered from political violence actions, but also poor and illiterate peasants who became victims for being in the way of armed groups’ expansionist projects. Other small group of victims, not represented in these numbers belongs to solid human rights’ advocacy groups and the government learns from their experience and asked them for advice.

Following this reasoning, I conclude that the state’s advisory institutions are not the preferred sources of information according to victims’ behavior. They go first to any form of organization placed in their area, and when these mechanisms fail, they turn to the authorities. The decision of looking for grassroots, community groups, and political organizations before going to the government reflected the perennial problem of state lack of presence, and its replacement by alternative corporate bodies, in the some cases, the political parties, in others armed groups. However, in this particular case, victims’ reparation was beyond the parties’ ability to respond thus non formalized organizations as social movements were preferred.

Nevertheless, alternative opposition parties did embrace the victims’ cause and advocate for them in the Congress and through their representatives in regional or local public offices.
Yet, their lack of grasp in base communities captured by traditional parties relegates them to perform as supporters of official or non-governmental institutions who advocate for the victims.

In summary, there are two kinds of relations between the SMV and political parties. On one hand, when traditional parties viewed the situation stepped aside and let the government assume the problem, thus the victims began to realize that the justice and peace process was the only channel to tell their story because the parties’ response was disappointed. On the other hand, alternative parties could not address victims’ grievances properly. Victims like any other Colombian citizen expected from the parties to perform as providers of state’s benefits and the new parties could not overcome this difficulty. Instead, they ended up upgrading the victims’ struggle at a legislative level and became political supporters of the SMV.

The commission played an important role trying to assemble the victims to a single project; but the large number of victims overwhelms its capacity. Thus, mechanisms to decentralize the victims’ service have to be designed and implemented. The numbers show how SMV began to expand after 2008, as well as the commission regional offices. This indicates the need of provide the victims with larger structures of service, which can be provided by strengthening the relation between the governmental agencies and grassroots social organizations.

Also, interesting results can be drawn comparing individual victims’ and victims’ movements’ data. Between 2006 and 2007 the commission advised less than 150 organizations that gathered around 5,000 victims; during the same period the FGN’s data tell us that the number of victims participating in the LJP’s trials was close to 17,000. This means that half of the victims did not belong to any organization. A deficit of SMV was evident. Assuming that only those SMV were available for the victims, each organization had to advise more than two
hundred individuals, a reasonable number for experienced SMV but a lot for not skilled communitarian associations (Van Cott 2009).

This situation has not changed despite the CNRR’s and social organizations’ efforts to promote SMV. The number of SMV doubled in the last two years, but thousands of victims out there needed advice and assistance. The FGN in 2010 registered 113,788 individuals looking for reparation in the LJP’s processes, but only 53,000 individuals belong to any of the 220 SMV advised by the CNRR. Again, more than half of the victims struggling for reparation in the LJP’s trials are orphaned of a social movement (CNRR 2010; Corporación Nuevo Arcoíris 2009; Semana 2005)

This led me to conclude, that despite valuable and important efforts made by the SMV, the international community, advocacy groups, alternative political parties, etc., the victims are still in great disadvantage to face the challenges of the future. For the perpetrators, the LJP is an opportunity to legalize their status paying a low price to the Colombian justice, and the victims’ inaction only contributes to maintain this situation. So, the victims instead of being relevant actors are serving to the perpetrators’ purposes. The response should be the empowerment of the victims strengthening their organizations, which in turn need to be advised by the governmental institutions. Therefore, the SMV will have the deserved place in the process, as central actor, and the PGN and CNRR will serve to their purposes as bare instruments of the community.

The political opportunity tailored by the government and used by the victims opened the door to the victims’ arrival to the national debate. However, despite the efforts and valuable outcomes, the government must undertake deliberate task in favor of the victims. It has been proven that the victims by themselves, the political parties, or institutions such as the CNRR, do not have the political, social, or economic power to face the challenges of the LJP. Political
parties should turn to the communities, look for the SMV, and invite them to their political project, while the state must extend the scope and budget of the institutions established to advise the victims.

As observed, if the benefit received by the victims due to an indirect government’s intervention was so significant, I urge the state to promote, implementing straightforward policies, any form of victims’ associations and recognize them as main actors of future peace initiatives. By the same token, I exhort the parties to include the victims’ claims in their programs and admit the SMV as inherent part of their political platforms. Only then, the victims will feel they belong to the social contract and new bonds of reconciliation and solidarity will born.
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