A counseling philosophy

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A COUNSELING PHILOSOPHY

by

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Dean of Graduate College

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INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Study

It is proposed in this study first to review certain basic philosophical premises both of traditional and modern systems; second, to consider the objectives of counseling; third, to determine which of these philosophies is most compatible with the counseling art, and lastly, to discuss a method of counseling that could be developed from this analysis.

In considering this stated purpose there appears one glaring omission throughout the literature of counseling: the lack of an emphasis on the philosophy that is fundamental to the particular approach taken by any of the several adherents of the specific techniques of counseling. True, there have been certain exceptions to this generalization: but if one were to scrutinize the writings of the many authorities, one would be hard put to say that any writer had started from a point of generalization that had firm footings in philosophy or that could be clearly delineated as a philosophical approach. McGowan and Schmidt have commented on this very item. "Considerably less has been written on the issues of philosophy and values in counseling than on techniques...the development of a basic philosophy is one of the more advanced stages of a profession's evolution." (51) They further point out that most professions seem to be subjected to a series of evolutionary steps, that at the outset the primary emphasis seems to be on the clarification and perfecting of techniques. In succeeding phases,
emphasis turns to the training and development of new members, and finally there is a turning to the derivation of a systematic philosophy and the establishment of a code of ethics.

Counseling, as a formal movement, began a little over fifty years ago. From its first feeble steps in 1910 with Frank Parsons in Boston, it has pushed its scope out to encompass almost the entire spectrum of behavior and its manifestations as well as the modification of this behavior. During the course of this development it has been influenced by many movements and directions, this stress came from sources based in philosophy, in psychology or science, and each of these emphases have exerted some pressure in the direction that the course of counseling took. These pressures have brought about the formulation of a code of ethics, the establishment of an objective or objectives for the counseling situation and even established standards of qualifications for practitioners, but the development of a basic philosophy seems to have been neglected.

Unquestionably there is a trend toward an increased emphasis on the philosophies that underlie the counseling art; Carl Rogers' recent writings are an indication, as is Wrenn's comment "...it is of utmost importance that knowledge of man's behavior be seen in the framework of the meaning of his existence in the universe." (81) This is not to imply that, in their thinking, philosophy did not act as an underlying factor, but rather to propose that in so far as a stated philosophy is concerned one is very prone to notice that it is frequently non-evident.
We can note specific reference to the psychological technique or approach that was assumed to be basic, or to a quasi philosophic principle from which a system could be developed and on which frame a definitive or particular technique could be built. But is this adequate? Is it enough to say that a system which deals with essential notions, concepts, and ideals can be based on a thought process that is other than primary?

If we consider the counseling art as restricted to adjustment only or limited in some other dimension, this might be taken as enough! Yet we are constrained to ask the question. "Is this the scope, the intent, the objective of counseling?" There seems to be a sufficient body of evidence to say that such a view is restrictive.

To begin with, we should look to the object of counseling. It is not the composite of empirical data, nor is it the specific as deduced from some universal; it is rather the subjective "me", the individual. Not the "me" looked at in the cold light of science, but the subjective individual as a sum total of abilities, talents, social assets and liabilities, emotional strengths and weaknesses, values, wishes and aspirations. This should be immediately discernible when we read the statement of the Committee on Definition, Division of Counseling Psychology of American Psychological Association, (as regards the objective of counseling.) "...the development of an individual's inner life through concern with his motivation and emotions..."

We must likewise note the ethical and moral issues in each counseling encounter: how these can be divorced from their philosophic base is difficult
Some philosophies of the past have tended to be related to religion, but it does not follow that such a tie is essential, in fact the philosophical narrowness of some counselors might be closely related to their concept of religion as a set of dogmas telling man what to do. Arbuckle makes this point quite clear in his statement "...man moved into the study of the psychological and philosophical nature of man, with very little in the way of knowledge about the former and a general bias and suspicion toward the latter." (4)

If, however, we accept the idea that philosophy has a place in this art; if we further look on it as something which makes a man think about the basic foundations of his outlook, his knowledge, his beliefs and as that which inclines him to inquire into the reasons for what he accepts and does, and into the importance of his ideas and ideals in the hope that these ideas, when examined, will be validly held, then philosophy will have purpose and should be a prime concern when counseling is considered.

It will therefore be the intent of this paper to look at this art and to consider the implications that philosophy has when it is considered first, per se, and then in its application. Yet to say, "the implications of philosophy as related to counseling," is tantamount to saying that the total of recorded history will be related to single events in this field of study!
Such an objective is, at the stage of learning in this day and age, an undertaking that exceeds human ability and, if attempted, could only be the effort of a committee of some magnitude or a person not willing to face reality. This problem is in need of greater definition; the philosophy then that will be evaluated in this study is that of the existentialists, since it was previously noted that this would be an appropriate philosophy on which to develop a counseling psychology and methodology. (82)

Having proposed this particular philosophy as the area for exploration there exist certain propositions that must be considered; these are to be found in the problems of knowledge, of being and of self in the world as they exist in the traditional philosophies and as treated in the existential philosophy. These must be studied as a prerequisite to any detailed analysis.

The Status of Existentialism

Since, in recent years, existentialism has come to the fore as a controversial philosophy it is necessary to look to these points if we are to first be able to make a stand. Briesack has stated the current and popular notion of it when he says, "...it is regarded as some form of Parisian pornography or teutonic brooding." But such a statement, as he aptly pointed out, looks only at the superficialities and the outward manifestations, and these for the most part as noted in the observation of those individuals who have been the proponents of the major thoughts in the matter. To take such observations as the basis for accepting or rejecting a proposition would
be less than sensible, and although this might be a cause for questioning and investigation, it should not be taken as critical.

A position that must be looked into as one that created a slight difficulty is the statement made by Kneller, "Existentialism is not to be considered a systematic philosophy in the traditional sense; rather, it permeates philosophies, it is an act of philosophizing." (40) If we admit to the fact that no single author has completely systematized this doctrine in a formal structure of knowledge, if we also allow that it does not conform to the standards of traditional systems as exemplified by Aristotle, Kant and the other greats, then this comment has validity. Yet it appears that we must return to a basic definition of philosophy. The presentation of a formal definition offers some difficulty, but the comment of Will Durant seems to have merit, "every science begins as philosophy ends as art; it arises in hypothesis and flows into achievement. Philosophy is a hypothetical interpretation of the unknown (as in metaphysics), or the inexactily known (as in ethics or political history); it is the front trench in the siege of truth." (21) We might also consider the definition presented by Weigel and Madden: "Philosophy is the thought discipline which proceeds from the real considered in terms of meanings, achieved spontaneously by the mind in the search of the real, to the rational erection of a hierarchical system of principles derived from the meaning achieved, in order to give the ultimate understanding of reality in so far as it is assiminable by the natural human mind." (77) And of course in the context of this paper that comment made
by Bertrand Russell provides this answer in at least a negative manner; "Philosophy, if it cannot answer as many questions as we would wish, has at least the power of asking questions which increase the interest of the world, and show the strangeness and wonder lying just below the surface even in the commonest things of daily life." (65) We can also notice a difference of emphasis between philosophies and even between groups of philosophers; this is evident from the first beginnings to the most modern; from Plato to Aristotle, as individual philosophers; from certain of the British with their emphasis on the utilitarian aspects, to those of the German philosophers with their insistence on method.

But whatever the precise relationship that may exist between this and other forms of knowledge, between individual philosophies or between groups of philosophers, there is in most cases a general agreement on the types of problems with which philosophy is centrally concerned. They are most often related to those which raise the question of the meaning of human life and of the significance of the world in which man finds himself. It is, in most cases, concerned with the nature of the universe in which life has its setting and how this affects human destiny! What is this destiny? How can man affect this destiny by his actions? What actions and pursuits should be elected and what kind of life is most worthwhile?

If we study existentialism in the light of these considerations it would indeed be difficult to designate it as anything but a system of philosophy! The application of these ideas to the existential philosophy
would seem to set aside the contention that "...many philosophers regard
the existentialists as having abdicated the philosophers quest, as having
turned their back on a rational examination of man's world." (57) In fact
as R. Shinn remarks, "they are interested in the person who has met some
shock that makes him ask, 'What am I doing anyhow?'" (70)

It is well to note here an historical comment, "...la philosophie sem­
blait condamnée à une rôle secondaire. Elle a retrouvé aujourd'hui son
prestige. Dans un monde que ni la religion ne satisfont pleinement, elle
se croit de nouveneu, qualifier pour fournir une réponse aux interrogations
humaines. Elle ne s'exprime pas seulement dans les traités des spécialistes:
la literature, l'art subissent également son influence." (41)

This philosophy has not restricted itself to the method and notions
of the past. It has broken with the past to provide answers to human
questions. Mr. Lacour-Gayet continues his comment to indicate that the
philosophy that has so drastically reacted to the human condition and
which has permitted itself such diverse expression is none other than
existentialism. It is not considered in this excerpt as an aspect of a
system; there is no hesitation in giving it recognition, and no reservations
placed in according this philosophy status beyond that which might be
implied in Kneller's comment!

Yet this notion has been all too frequently used and must be looked
at in some greater length than as outlined here. The matter will be
looked at with some degree of thoroughness in this paper.
Need for the study

As might be deduced from the comment on the dearth of material that has been written on philosophical issues in counseling, there is need for greater, more extensive work in this area; Wrenn's superlative "...the utmost importance..." lends additional stress to this position. But once more there must be definition of the problem! Although it is not the contention of this paper that one specific philosophy is alone appropriate for counseling it will be an objective to demonstrate that the philosophy that stems from existential thinking could be basic for the development of the counseling art.

To this end it should also be noted that distinctions must be made in the terminology used, and perhaps the most important distinction may be found in the term 'counseling' itself. The art of counseling is frequently looked at as a generic whole and as encompassing all aspects of an interpersonal relationship. Such a broad connotation can lead to some problems in understanding and in this paper the term must have more critical definition. An indiscriminate application of the term could cause misunderstanding and lead one to place restrictions on the implications of the underlying philosophies. For this purpose then the term 'counseling' must be differentiated from 'guidance' as well as from 'psychotherapy.' The differences in these procedures can be noted, and thus if the word 'counseling' were applied without restriction, there would be an obvious and unwarranted invasion of objectives.

"Counseling," as Leona Tyler says, "is one of those words that
everybody understands but no two people seem to understand in precisely the same way." (76) This is true in the ranks of the professionals and among the nonprofessionals. The three operations, guidance, counseling, and psychotherapy must be distinguished at this point in order to lend clarity. The first is "guidance;" as a term, this is not meant to indicate the "guidance services" or the "guidance process" which are all inclusive as Smith noted; "The guidance process consists of a group of service to individuals to assist them in securing the knowledges and skills needed in making adequate choices, plans and interpretations essential to satisfactory adjustment in a variety of areas. These services are designed to result in efficiency in areas which require that the individual make adjustments in order that he may be an effective member of society." (51) Such a term is too all inclusive and would encompass not only guidance, but counseling and referral to psychotherapy as well. The term 'guidance,' as used in this paper, is intended to denote those activities that help an individual form a decision, make a choice, or find a direction at some important fork in the road, such as planning a life career, a program in college, or a campaign to obtain employment.

Counseling has deeper implications, it is a helping process the aim of which is not to change the person but to enable him to use the resources he now has to cope with life, the outcome of which would be that the client do something, take some constructive action in his own behalf. Whether the need that brings him to counseling grows out of his arrival at a point in life
where an important decision must be made, or out of an emotional conflict that is paralyzing his ability to act, the counselor will attempt to make forward movement possible. (76)

Arbuckle gives its broad objective as the helping of the individual to clean away the entangling and hampering tentacles so that he can be what he really is, and contribute more both to himself and to his fellows. This distinction is clearly defined by Loughary in this statement; "...the most important function and the greatest potential contribution of a school counselor is counseling per se ... while counseling guidance procedures make valuable contributions of their own, they should all facilitate counseling efforts." (47)

A final point to be clarified is the concept of 'therapy.' The aim of therapy is generally considered to be personality change of some sort. It was pointed out by several authors that perhaps the very difference that exists between 'counseling' and 'therapy' is the objective, and this has been noted as perhaps the "depth" of the encounter. Therapy has been regarded variously by several authors; Lecky for example said, "...the pursuit of unconscious complexes with no stated goal except to destroy them suggests a moral crusade against the Neurosis." Rogers, on the other hand, says that the outcome of therapy is "a more broadly based structure of self, ... and a more comfortable and realistic adjustment to life." (61) But regardless of what position we take it is possible to note that there is a
difference, and whether we note it as a difference in depth, objective or method, we must recognize it! Therefore this paper will take cognizance of this problem and in its approach will deal primarily with that aspect referred to as "counseling." This is not to imply that the approaches, techniques or applications of each are separate and distinct, but rather to note that this is a special field and one to which the main emphasis will be directed. Harry Bone in an introduction to Rollo May's book "The Art of Counseling" expressed this point with a very apt comparison; "if one is physically ill one needs a medical doctor; if one is ill with an illness in personality maladjustment that arises from both physical and mental causes one needs a psychiatrist; if one suffers from personality problems which are psychological a consulting psychologist is indicated; in so far as one is immature and uneducated one needs schooling; the field of counseling lies between these last two and the counselor shares part of the equipment of each." (50)

With this point established, it is possible to note two facts; one, the reason for counseling and two, the main emphases of the existential thinking in the radical stress on the concept of identity and the experience of identity that it posits as a sine qua non of human nature and of any philosophy of human nature.

In counseling we are forced to note the one underlying emphasis and that is the attempt to work with the client to a greater self realization, and the achievement of an effective relationship with his environment, or, as
summarized by the committee on definition, "to contribute to the realistic acceptance of one's own capacities, motivations and self attitudes." There is a distinct relationship then existing between this art and the identity emphasis that one finds in the existential thinking.

Yet we must look beyond this specific aspect for additional justification for this paper; first as has been pointed out because there is a very obvious paucity of material developed on the underlying philosophies of counseling, and second, because of the many recognized philosophical principles that relate to counseling. Cribbin (19) listed these in detail in his critique of the philosophy of modern guidance and are summarized in the following listings:

1. The recognition of the worth and dignity of the individual and his right to personal assistance in time of need.

2. The individual has a right to develop his whole person with the fullest realization of his potentialities for individual and social ends.

3. The right of every person to accept or reject help and services offered must be respected.

4. Counseling has a responsibility to society as well as to the individual.

5. A comprehensive study of the individual in his cultural setting by available means is demanded. Individual understanding must precede individual assistance.
6. Counseling is to be entrusted only to those who are naturally endowed for the task or have the proper training and experience.

But these principles return to the basic notion of man and the reason for his being, as well as to a comprehensive and all encompassing definition of 'counseling' in all of its facets. These principles are recognized and are accepted; yet, as was noted above the most obvious omission in the writing of the many specialists has been in the area dealing with these philosophic principles as they relate to counseling.

Developing from these considerations is a last point which will show the need for this specific aspect of the study, i.e., existentialism as a philosophy in counseling. The first consideration is that this philosophy is relatively new, when compared to the greater systems. It is also a widely misunderstood philosophy, but it has put into modern day thought ideas of certain human values which the classical philosophical and religious traditions tended to revoke. We will note in the work of the existentialists a study of the value systems whose source is in the acute awareness of the tragedy inherent in the human condition; their function is to liberate us from the fears and frustrations of every day life or the tedium of philosophical daydreaming, and their common characteristic is intensity. (53) Such considerations in the field of philosophy seems to ignore the first order questions that metaphysics used to ask, such as the nature of being,
causation, and free will, but they do ask these questions; their "man-centered approach," however, appears to make them indifferent to systematic thinking. Their emphasis on man the decision-making creature, blessed, or cursed, with the freedom to choose among a variety of possibilities in an absurd and mysterious existence is certainly one that should be explored in the light of the concept noted as fundamental to the philosophy of counseling. It is to this end that this paper will be oriented, to explore with considerable depth this relationship in order to determine if the philosophy of existentialism is compatible with a philosophy of counseling. If such a comparison is valid, and if this relationship can be noted, then such a study would be profitable since it would be a further addition to the total of knowledge in the area of philosophy and of counseling.

Method to be followed

In approaching this subject it is necessary to keep in mind this dual objective: first the implications of philosophy, and second the application of philosophy to counseling. Because of this two fold consideration, the commonness of the material to be covered, and distinctive aspects of the underlying philosophy must be noted. To meet this need the study will be made through an evaluation of the problems of knowledge, of being, and of self in the world. This organization was chosen because of its direct ties with philosophy and because of its implications in counseling. Thus in the method to be followed for each of these specific facets will be to:
(1) study them in their philosophic setting, (2) note the particular emphasis of the separate philosophies on the subject, and (3) evaluate this stress in relation to the counseling process. Finally, this effort will look at these problems in the light of existential thought and see if any consistency of principle or thinking can be noted or developed.

Epistemology or the theory of knowledge is an attempt to discover the means by which our knowledge is acquired, the extent of our knowledge and the standards or criteria by which we can reliably judge the truth or falsity of our knowledge. The popular usages of 'knowledge' are hardly what is in question here; knowledge must find out what we really "know," this is sharply distinguished from the notion of opinion which may or may not be true. It is the quest of true knowledge that gives rise to the problem of knowledge and which will, in this instance, be considered in the light of the existential philosophy, to determine if this latter system is valid.

However, it will not be an objective or attempt of this study to develop a theory of knowledge, since, as Bertrand Russell has pointed out, no one has succeeded in developing a theory that is both credible and consistent. Some of the more believable theories appear to contain grave inconsistencies and some of the most logical theories appear to be unbelievable. Rather, the aim will be to note those theories that have the greatest acceptance and to examine their applicability to counseling, to see if they are compatible to the existential philosophy, and how this philosophy complements or adds to
then in their approach to the human predicament.

The problem of being is so closely tied to the existential philosophy and is so much a part of many of the other systems that it must be studied and evaluated. In this aspect the problems of being must be noted in all their implications of existence, actuality, reality and historicity, as well as in their relation to knowledge. It is also necessary that these problems be related to the practice of counseling to develop or deny a relationship; if these principles change the notion of how man is to be helped the art of counseling will then be involved.

It will be a final point in this three fold analysis to look at the problem of self in the world. Since the all pervading object of counseling is to enable the individual to realize his fullest potential, this aspect of the study has a definite and positive application. Still it must be noted that if the philosophy of existentialism is to be evaluated in the light of the counseling art, these facets must be scrutinized. Therefore, while looking at the different thoughts of philosophers on this specific point, the application to existential thought will be an undercurrent and this in turn further related to the counseling practice.

With this analysis completed it should be possible to make certain inferences as to the acceptability of a philosophy based on existential thought to counseling, and once this has been determined, to develop a theoretical set of ideas that can be applied to counseling. From this philosophical theory certain hypothesis may be evolved that may enhance or add
to the further development of the art. It should also be the aim of this paper to look at the techniques presently accepted in counseling practice and to note whether the counseling methods based in existential philosophy could be tenable or would have to be rejected.

In summary it must be once again noted that if such a method can be shown to have merit and application to the art of counseling, then it will have added directly to the field of knowledge in this particular area. It will also provide new foundations for a greater theoretical expansion and in consequence provide more latitude in the development of hypothesis that can be proposed in the field of counseling. It will perhaps complement the notion of Rogers, "...attempt to discover the functional process relationships which lived for the inner world of personal meanings, and to formulate these with sufficient precision that they may be put to empirical test." (63)
THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

Man tends to be satisfied with what he thinks he knows of the universe and in his complaisance he does not stop to ask how this knowledge was attained or to question its reliability or validity. On occasion this certainty is shaken by a discovery that shows there is some doubt or falsity about what we assumed to be beyond doubt. When this happens with any consistency we may become suspicious of all claims to certainty. Such doubt would perhaps be the start of a philosophical questioning of the problem of knowledge so that it could possibly lead to a position of certainty.

In our daily life we often feel that something is a fact; we, however abandon or revise our opinion and adopt new positions and to these give the same credibility and hold with no less confidence than we did the previous. We notice that this happens not only in the case of individuals but also with groups, societies and even nations, yet at each step these have been put forth and supported as knowledge. In addition to this changing of opinions among many individuals, peoples and groups, we are forced also to notice a diversity of opinions and ideas that are contradictory! As a result it is mandatory that we look at these ideas and opinions, and many aspects of beliefs to determine which constitute knowledge.

But of greater importance to this work is the relationship that can be seen to exist between the ideas and art of counseling, this art in its dual aspect as seen by the counselor and the counselee. Knowledge
here is most critical, for we cannot expect the counselor to effectively
work with a client without an understanding of the intellectual systems
involved. Blaise Pascal wrote, "one must know oneself. If it does not
serve to discover truth, it at least serves as a rule of life, and there is
nothing better." (55) Ignoring the very dogmatic aspect of this dictum,
there is at least in this admonition an implication that this will have some
benefit, and if beneficial it should be considered as a guide post to the
parties involved in the encounter of the counseling situation. But his knowl-
edge of self is tied in so closely to the philosophical aspects of the
problem of knowledge that to ignore this latter would be to enter the work
in an unprepared fashion. It has deeper significance in this instance
since all features should be considered and the very critical aspects of
existential philosophy in its relationship to this problem should be noted.

Principles of knowledge

'Knowledge' as a term is most comprehensive in scope, it is in a way
a correlative of being and the only thing which cannot therefore fall in the
purview of this field would be something that cannot exist in any way except
negatively, in a word, nothing. Its consideration extends, therefore, to all
things knowable, to all kinds of knowers, to all modes of knowing and to all
methods of knowing. Nor must one confuse this idea of knowledge with ig-
norance. This is not a consideration of truth or falsity; it does not consist
of the truth of a conclusion but of the way the conclusion was reached.
or is held in the mind. By the same token knowledge is not a consideration of adequacy or inadequacy; it is not to be found in the distinctions that exist between certainty and opinion. Yet without regard to the approach we take to knowledge, we find no doubt that knowledge is good, that its possession contributes to the happiness of men and in the same way to the welfare of the state, and that its pursuit by the individual and its dissimulation in a society should be facilitated by every means and device that can assist man in communicating what they know to one another. This last point has particular interest in the counseling situation because of the recognition that has been given to the verbal and nonverbal aspects of communication and to the recognition that so many things contribute to the individual make-up, such as socio-economic and culture influences, personal values and the host of other aspects that distinguish one man from another.

One thing that appears to be certain in a review of the principles of knowledge is all the great thinkers who have considered the problem of human knowledge have seemed to set some limits on the capacity that man has for knowledge. All appear to have placed certain objects beyond man's power to apprehend, or have distinguished between those which he can apprehend in some limited fashion but which he cannot completely comprehend. They have also indicated others that fall completely within his grasp and about which his knowledge is adequate and certain. Most philosophers seem to have taken a stand which appears to avoid the extreme positions of saying
that nothing is unknowable or that everything is equally knowable! Yet they all appear to establish different criteria by which they set the limit of knowledge and distinguish between the areas of probability and certainty. Thus due notice should be given to the point that among these philosophers and thinkers there is a difference in how they determine the knowability of certain types of objects such as God or the infinite, substance or cause, the real or the idea, the self or the thing in itself.

We note that all seem to proceed from a desire to be critical. In their writings most philosophers seem to criticize what the others have proposed as knowledge and then to propose their own method by which they assume the pursuit of knowledge will be safeguarded from endless controversy. In this last aspect the moderns have appeared to have departed most radically from the ancient and medieval writers. In the earlier phases of philosophy the tradition of knowledge about knowledge did not seem to be all dominating, nor to take precedence over other inquiries, nor to be a prerequisite to this inquiry! The ancient and medieval philosophers seem to have presupposed the existence of knowledge. However, beginning with Descartes, who proposed a method of universal doubt in order to clear the ground before the foundation of science could be laid, the consideration of knowing is put before any attempt to know.

These two different approaches to the theory of knowledge result in different conclusions concerning the nature and the scope of human knowledge.
Rationalists, who begin with established science and look into their foundations and methods, will surely end with a complete confidence in man's ability to know. Empiricists, on the other hand, who make the inquiry of the foundations of science a necessary preparation for the development of science, will most surely set narrower boundaries in the area of acceptable knowledge. It follows then that there must be different ways in which the kinds of knowledge will be understood and compared.

Perhaps the most expeditious way to observe these differences would be to briefly review the positions held by certain philosophers in time, and to endeavor to point out their specific area of emphasis. When early man gave thought to the problem of knowledge he reached a conclusion that appeared valid for his culture; he believed ideas came to him from the world of spirits that surrounded him at all times. The gods were the source of good ideas and the demons put evil ideas in his mind. Thoughts came from outside himself, from the forces and processes that governed and directed every phase of his life. "The steps of man are guided by the Lord. But who is the man who can understand his own way." (Pvo. 22-24)

But philosophy, in explaining knowledge, has continually moved away from the supernatural and has tried to explain this phenomenon in naturalistic terms as the result of natural processes and as subject to the laws of nature. Heraclitus was one of the earliest philosophers to address himself to his problem. His interest was centered on nature, on the world
in which men lived, and his desire was to explain how it came to be and what it was. He felt that reason was a more certain source of knowledge than was sense perception. Reason was a spark of the divine in man, and this allowed him to see truth in ways not given to man devoid of reason.

To explain this in a manner that would be consistent with the notion that man is a rational animal, he held that most men lived not by reason but by passion. Democritus also held that sense experience was a source of obscure knowledge; he contended that we really know when we transcend sense perception, at this point we are in a realm that deals with things that can not be shown by the senses and are therefore in the realm of true knowledge.

The interest of these early philosophers seemed to point primarily to the problems of the nature of substance, they recognized that man's ability to have ideas and to know the world about him presented a problem. Their solutions all seemed to revolve around the concept that ideas and the material world must be similar, but ideas must be superior. Coming on the scene about this time we notice another movement, one that may be the most revolutionary and most far reaching in the history of philosophy. This is the Sophist movement which concluded that the knowing subject was the most important, and therefore it should be the matter of study. Knowledge, they held, depended wholly upon the individual, as a result there cannot be objective, absolute truth which would be the same for all men, or as Protagoras stated, "Man is the measure of all things," and this included
even truth and knowledge. By making all knowledge dependent on the individual, by denying the possibility of sure universal knowledge, their action forced philosophers to investigate thinking more clearly and in this manner opened the door for a theory of knowledge. As a result of this stand they gave cause to look at knowledge and to hasten the discovery of rules of thinking.

It could be said that Socrates snatched up this gauntlet (with immediacy) and proceeded to formulate the first procedural techniques that cleared the way for the development of a theory of knowledge. He held that the problem of knowledge was the key to all other problems, but his interest seemed to be in discovering a method for reaching true knowledge rather than mere opinion. In this methodology he sought to clear away all false notions, and then by observation and thought to reach universal judgments, or a position that would be common to all and which could not be disputed. Having defined this principle it would be possible to sequentially define other principles.

Following in this vein, Plato agreed with the notion that sense perception could not give genuine knowledge. It is necessary to go beyond the senses to ideas that are not derived from experience and not dependent on experience. In the soul are implanted ideas, these are in its existence before birth, and true knowledge is reached when these ideas are remembered and become conscious. These ideas show the essence of things rather than the mere accidental aspects of the object.
Carrying this line of reason further, Aristotle argued that since our world of experience is the real world, genuine knowledge consists of knowing the reasons or causes of things. To arrive at these basic causes, true processes of thought must be followed and to this end be developed his system of deductive logic, a system so complete that little has been added to it till comparatively recent times.

After Plato and Aristotle, the Epicureans and Stoics took positions at variance with those held by these men. The Epicureans turned to the senses as the basis for truth, in the view that all knowledge comes through the senses and error is the result of a mistake in the interpretation of our sensations. Thus if we do not get our ideas confounded we end up with truth about the real world. The Stoics pictured the mind as an empty tablet at birth. Sensory perception, after this result in memory-images which the mind organizes into general ideas, our real knowledge comes therefore from our impressions and our organization of these ideas.

This last position is quite obviously at variance with that held by Plato. He was a rationalist in holding that the mind had ideas independent of experience, while the Stoics were empirical in their approach holding that ideas were the result of experience. We can then trace to their Greek origins the two great traditions that are to be found in philosophy; the rationalists who hold that the ideas which man has are innate and the empiricists who claim that the mind has no ideas of its own. As we look at the development of philosophy from this point on we will be able to note
that it has been more or less a battle between various forms of these two major positions, as regards knowledge.

During the medieval period the discussion continues but the terms of reference change, we now find that we have a conflict between nominalists and realists. To the realists ideas are general concepts or universals that have an existence independently of things or experiences, ideas are real in the sense that they do not come about as a creation of the individuals experience. To the nominalist, on the other hand, ideas are the result of experience; without the support of experience ideas cannot exist. In addition to these two forms a supplementing form, that of revealed knowledge which comes thru faith was superimposed. This was necessary to permit the christian scholars to protect the doctrines of the church. It permitted man to extend the bounds of knowledge far beyond the limits of natural experience, for when man reached the restrictive limits of logical reasoning it was possible for him to proceed from this point and go on to accept the doctrines of the church.

This established the doctrine of two-fold truth, one aspect of which could be substantiated by logical reasoning and the other by faith and the authority of the church. Thomas Aquinas established his philosophy in this principle, one phase of his thinking dealt with ideas developed through the senses, this was the foundation of conceptual knowledge. On the other side was intuitive knowledge, greater than that gained through the senses, through reason or through mere faith, it had divine revelation as a source and was considered as superior to that coming from experience.
During these years it was possible for the church to suppress any conclusions that were not in the interest of what it held to be revealed truth, but in the 16th and 17th century the scientist began to realize what could be done through experience, observation, and thought. They were unwilling to continue to accept an authoritarian direction to their thought process and their discoveries led them to place greater reliance on the mind of man to build its own thought patterns, in effect they were demanding the right to think independently and to reject conclusions imposed through authority.

Bacon proposed an inductive process; to reach a justified conclusion man must examine all variations of an event and on the basis of this data it would be possible to reach a true solution. Beginning with Descartes, philosophers centered their attention on the structure of the mind, on the subject of knowledge rather than its object. There is a new stress on self-consciousness as the only immediately certain knowledge. The question as to how we know external reality became the point of emphasis. This subjective idealistic tendency in Descartes' thought appeared to be derived from his concern for the attainment of absolutely certain knowledge and was directed toward providing a solid unquestionable foundation for such knowledge. Starting with one universal method, he hoped to arrive at one universal science, a systematic knowledge of all things knowable to man. He established the fundamental principle of all thinking as being all true ideas must be clear and distinct.
What Plato and Aristotle did for the emerging philosophy of antiquity, Locke may be said to have done for modern philosophy. He laid the foundations of his thinking in empiricism and this frequently gets him into difficulty as it does for many other empiricists. His basic dilemma has been expressed by John Randal as follows: "We know the world only by experience, not by reasoning; yet what we know is not the world, but only experience. We must defer to facts, but there are no facts, only ideas."

Locke made the study of knowing his chief occupation. His conclusion was that all ideas come to the individual through sense experience. There are no innate ideas, for the mind is a blank tablet with only the power to assimilate or organize impressions. The ideas received through sense impressions are simple ideas, and as these are organized, complex ideas are built in the mind. Locke's treatment of the degree, extent, and reality of knowledge appears to give greater stress and attention to the faculty of understanding itself. "If we can find out how far the understanding can extend its views, how far it has faculties to attain certainty and in what cases it can only judge and guess, we may content ourselves with what is attainable by us in this state...When we know our own strength we shall then better know what to undertake with hopes of success; and when we have well surveyed the power of our own minds and made some estimate of what we may expect from them we shall be inclined either to sit still and not set our thoughts to work at all, in despair of knowing anything, not on the other side question everything and disclaim all knowledge because some
things are not to be understood." (44)

Berkeley desired to develop a theory of knowledge in accordance with common sense tenets. He felt that Locke, following the lead of Newton, had violated common sense with his theory of primary and secondary qualities. To Berkeley, it seemed that this view of sense experience jeopardized the reality of knowledge. Reality, in the Newtonian and Lockeian picture consists of "solid, massy, hard, imperturbable, movable, particles." Our perceptions, however, tell us of things that are blue, hot, etc. Consequently our knowledge is not real, by Locke's own test of the reality of knowledge. Berkeley's efforts are directed to recasting the picture of the world and the account of knowledge is such a fashion that knowledge will assuredly be real.

The problem of the reality of knowledge for Locke was in knowing whether there is conformity between our ideas and the things of which they are the ideas. Berkeley's solution is to deny the distinction between ideas and things of which they are ideas. What we know, he says, are our ideas, and there is nothing outside the mind to which these ideas refer, or if there is it is totally unknowable anyhow and in no way affects our knowledge. There is not need to go any further; in fact, it is foolish to try to have knowledge beyond the realm of our idea. As he says "...As to what is said about existence of unthinking things without any relation to their perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their "esse" is "percepi," nor is it possible they should have existence out of the minds of
thinking things which perceive them." (9) To exist means to be perceived, therefore bodies have no existence without mind. The mind creates the material world and this world has existence only in the mind.

David Hume went one step further and showed that on the basis of Locke's dualism, we cannot prove even the existence of mind. All that we can prove is that ideas, impressions, come one after another. Where they come from cannot be proven. There is, for Hume, no material world and no mind; just a succession of ideas. "If you insist that the inference is made by a chain or reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning." (33) All the contents of the mind are ideas in certain relations. Beyond this we cannot go. We have ideas and think in terms of them and their relations. Here we must stop; we cannot demonstrate anything beyond this.

Leibniz' proposals are contrary to those of Locke and Hume. His philosophy has all ideas contained within the Monads. Experience merely brings them to the front. The senses, he held, can arouse, justify and verify these facts but cannot demonstrate their eternal and inevitable certitude. Ideas and truths are innate in the mind as tendencies. We do not receive ideas, but have them at all times. He agreed with Locke in holding that there was nothing in the intellect that did not exist before in sensation, but criticized him for not having gone farther and not adding "except the intellect itself."

It is Kant who sought to overcome the difficulties of both extremes
here presented. He held that we do receive impressions from the environment, from the thing-in itself, but the mind is of such a nature that it shapes these impressions into ideas. But knowledge is universal, this is due to the fact that all minds are fundamentally alike and therefore we all think very much alike. We make impressions into ideas and since these are of the mind they can be applied to a world outside the mind. It follows then that we cannot know the world outside of the mind. We can, of course, bring ideas into large generalizations, and we can act as though these were true, but we are dealing with generalizations and not provable ideas.

Fichte was led from the arguments of Kant to the conclusion that one can understand only that which one can create freely in thought. Our ideas are a result of an act of creation. The ego, by which Fichte means reason or intelligence, creates everything that man knows. The whole array of ideas that we know exist before the individual, they are not the result of the material world which we experience, but come from the universal ego. Beginning with a particular finite ego which posits a world for action, he ends by assimilating both to an absolute ego which posits both. (2)

For Hegel the processes of the mind and those of nature are the same, within each we find a dialectical process. In the mind we find contradictions, disagreements and opposites, but there is a process by which these opposites are reconciled in a synthesis which includes both, but at a higher level. This process is everywhere. The human mind is not satisfied with contra-
diction but seeks to get rid of them by effecting a synthesis in which
the values of both aspects are concerned and together they move to new
values. The highest function then of knowledge is to see opposites
unified. Thought is not static, a mere receiving of impressions, it is a
living logical process in which there is an unfolding and a progression.

Hegel conceives his dialectic as a law of thought and a law of
being. The individual when considered in itself becomes an abstraction.
The only real or concrete entity is the Absolute itself. Everything else
is but a moment of the Absolute. "Thus by a paradox to end all paradoxes,
the only reality, in Hegel's view, remains for us an ideal of reason which
is always realized by particular processes that never really are." (52)

Philosophy seems to move away from this note in recent times; the
interest does not seem to lie in the genesis of ideas as much as in their
working in actual life situations. Ideas become the tools for solving
problems. Thinking is one way to meet difficult situations. Its effective-
ness seems to be the measure of success the individual experiences from
its use. But the question of knowledge remains critical; the question seems
always to be "what can man know?" To this existentialists answer by
saying we can know the human condition; as to how man can know they
answer: by intuitive insight from affective experiences. In reply to the
question of the value of human knowledge, they answer that proper under-
standing of human condition is essential to the experience of values,
the only values genuinely available to man. (53) Berdyaev crystalizes these ideas in the following statement, "For knowledge, existence begins to reveal itself from below, not from above. With Marx as hunger, as economics, with Freud as desire, sex. With Heidegger as worry and fear. From above existence reveals itself as spirit. The supreme mystery of knowledge is that knowledge of material things is possible, when knowledge by its nature is not material. Thomas Aquinas faced this problem as a problem of the intellect. But the problem is solvable only if we recognize that knowledge is existential, that in it the darkness of being is enlightened, that it is capable of taking the objectivized world within the spirit... Knowledge and other states of mind." (7)

Knowledge in relation to other states of mind

The theory of knowledge is a field of many disputes, but it appears that one fact seems to go unquestioned by all philosophers, this is that there is an unquestioned relationship existing between a knower and a known. William James expressed this insight, perhaps somewhat strongly and more dogmatically than many would allow, as follows, "Knowledge is a thorough-going dualism. It supposes two elements, mind knowing and thing know... Neither gets out of itself or into the other, neither in any way is the other, neither makes the other. They just stand face to face in a common world, and one simply knows or is known to its counterpart." (34) This remains true even when turned to the special case of knowledge about knowledge or
the knower knowing himself. The mind's examination of itself makes the mind an object to be known as well as a knower. This point will be referred to later in this discussion, but at this point it must be noted that for any theory of the nature of knowledge we must necessarily distinguish between knowledge and ignorance, between having or not having something in mind. This should also point to the fact that ignorance is not error. The mind in error claims to know something about which it is, in fact, ignorant. In Meno, Socrates points out that a person aware of his ignorance is easier to teach than one who is in error and as he further points out that getting a person to acknowledge this is often the indispensable first step in teaching.

However, although the distinction between ignorance and knowledge and between ignorance and error seems to be understood and readily admitted, not everyone admits to or agrees on the difference between knowledge and error. The point of agreement appears, at first glance, to be this; to know is to possess the truth about something, whereas to err is to be deceived by falsity mistaken for truth. But the disagreement begins when the meaning of 'truth' and 'falsity' is examined.

Truth is one thing for those who insist upon some similarity between the thing known and that by which it is known or represented in the mind. It is another for those who think that knowledge can be gained without the mediation of images or representations. In the first instance it must consist of some kind of correspondence between what the mind thinks or understands and the reality it tries to know. In the second instance it would be a
consistency between the mind's own ideas.

The definition of truth as the agreement of the mind with reality leaves some problems to be solved. As James indicates in his Principles of Psychology, the theory of truth begins rather than ends with its definition. How do we know when our ideas correspond with reality? By what signs or norms do we know their truth or falsity? This definition implies that truth is the property of ideas rather than of things. Aristotle holds that falsity and truth are not in things but in thought. Aquinas distinguished between the sense in which truth and falsity are primarily in the intellect and secondarily in things, in so far as they are related to the intellect as their source. This at once, in the position of Aquinas, points to profound difference between truth in the Divine and in the human intellect.

In the human sphere, the interpretation may be different as it is made a property of words or ideas. Locke says that to have a distinct notion of truth one must consider the truth of words and of thought distinctly from one another. (44) The words are signification of what ideas the mind has, but the ideas are the expressions of the reality they represent. The truth in each instance is dependent on the exactness of the representation; but as he continues, verbal truth may be chimerical because it can exist whether our ideas really have or are capable of having reference to existence in nature. Hobbes, however, would maintain that truth was the result of the ordering of names in our affirmations. His conclusion is that the holding
of false and senseless tenets arises from a want of definitions or from false definitions. Some, like Kant, distinguish between the truth which a proposition has when it conforms to the rules of thought and the truth it has when it represents nature. Valid reasoning alone cannot guarantee that a conclusion is true in fact, this depends on the truth of the premises upon their being true to the nature of things.

Some thinkers ideas have their own intrinsic marks by which they reveal their truth or falsity. Augustine posits God as the warranty of the inner voice which plainly signifies the truth; for Spinoza, the truth of an idea depends on its relation to God. Descartes and Locke give as the criterion of truth the clarity and distinctness of ideas, but they do not seem to mean, as does Spinoza, the single idea in and of itself, but rather the proposition which involves at least two ideas, or as Kant says, "Truth and error...are only found in a judgement."

The criterion of truth gives rise to the question of the cause of error. Socrates explained that false opinions arise when the senses and mind do not co-operate properly, others suggest that it is the imagination that misleads the mind. Some, for whom the senses are infallible, attribute error to the fault of reason which misinterprets the accurate impressions of the senses. Descartes would intimate that the intellect is more reliable than the senses and so the senses are the source error. Montaigne finds that both the senses and the reason are fallible, and Pascal says "Man is
full of error, natural and ineffaceable, without grace. Nothing shows him the truth. Everything deceives him. These two sources of truth, reason and the senses, beside being wanting in sincerity, deceive each other in term." (55)

If we consider only the relationship between these aspects of knowledge we would be neglecting a very important distinction between knowledge and opinion. Here the difference is not the same as exists between knowledge and error, it is not a matter of truth or falsity. There is such a thing as right opinion and this can have as much use and validity as knowledge. It has been held that an individual holding the right opinion will be just as good a guide if he thinks the truth, as he who knows the truth. The contrast between right opinion and knowledge is expressed in this context as was emphasis on the words "think" and "know." It does not relate to the truth of the conclusion, but rather in the manner in which that conclusion was reached or is held in the mind.

There does appear to be at least one deficiency of right opinion as compared with knowledge: it lacks stability and permanence. Yet such notions, when fixed in the mind by the reasons on which they are grounded, would have the nature of knowledge and thus permanence. From this we might deduce that a proposition which is neither self-evident nor demonstrated expresses an opinion rather than knowledge. Even when true it is qualified by some degree of doubt and some estimate of probability, and
this is to be contrasted with the situation in which the mind has adequate grounds for its judgement; when it knows what it knows and why, it has knowledge.

The relationships that have been discussed between knowledge and different states of the mind have been noted in context of several philosophies which cover much of the thinking of man, but as noted above in a reference to knowledge of the self, little has been seen of the existential position relative to this aspect of the discussion. We note that the existential thinker is concerned with the knowledge about the human condition; not the human history, natural or social environment or the laws of human behavior, but the certain general traits that remain the same through all ages: of man's contingency, particularity, and freedom, of his fundamental aspirations and of the basic ways in which man can relate to the world and to other human beings.

The existentialist denies any sharp difference between intellect and passion or at least with regard to the latter as a condition for the operation of the former. He also maintains that the insights delivered in the experience of anguish are but the rendering explicit of the state of affairs in which the individual is deeply involved and that he in some sense already knows what anguish reveals to him.

If existentialism is the call for acceptance of these ideas it should be evident that the relationship of the various states of mind also must apply to the system they propose. Yet as Brown points out, "any matter of rational inquiry must be allowed a certain elbow-room or breathing-space, as it were,
in which to develop its own corners of intelligibility, to define its own kind of objectivity, to which it pretends in the name of truth." (13) Existentialism is opposed to idealism, positivism, materialism, to a dogmatic faith or rationalism, to individualism or collectivism. These are not rejected because they are one-sided or extreme but because they cover or hide the nature of the problem. Existentialists hold these proposals not merely as wrong solutions, but as the wrong kind of solutions. These thinkers hold essentially that although the proposals dispose of the problem, the problem cannot be disposed of because it makes the human condition. Human reality is "awareness of" and "intention to" and thus constitutes itself and constitutes the world for itself in its thoughts and projects. (10)

The extent of human knowledge

In the preceding sections it has been noted that the scope of knowledge extends to all things knowable, to all kinds of knowers, to all methods of knowing, and to all modes of knowledge. But it might be held that certain questions are prior to all of these: first, is knowledge possible, and second, can we know anything? The skeptic will challenge the man who thinks that knowledge is attainable or even claims to possess knowledge of any sort. In its most extreme form skeptics will hold that there is nothing true or false. From their point of view skeptics will look at their position as irrefutable as long as they do not allow themselves to accept any standards by which refutation can be accepted. But such a position is generally self refuting
for the moment the skeptic expresses himself definitely on any subject he has demonstrated a preference and a decision. This leaves only two courses of action, first to make statements in defiance of self contradiction or second to remain silent. Now this is not intended to refer to the philosophic aspect of skepticism which is useful and has been employed to arrive at truth. This, as Hume remarks, makes one "sensible of the strange infirmities of human understanding," and enables the thinker to delve deeper into the matter and more clearly apprehend the truth or falsity of a position.

Everyone expresses doubt as to various matters of life; in the broadest philosophic sense a skeptic is one who for specific reasons questions the validity of what others regard as truth. Descartes raised the question as to what guarantee one would have that all one had been taught, all we had accepted from tradition, all our sensory apperceptions, were true. He reasoned that if he were ever to have a guarantee that he had valid knowledge he must, so to speak, start with a clean slate. He must probe everyone of his beliefs, doubt all of them even the fact of his own existence. This part of skepticism was not something with which he ended, but rather that with which he must begin. His skepticism then is only a method or device that he used to arrive at a refutation of skepticism. The refutation takes the form of the view that there are intuitive or self evident first principles of knowledge. It does merit the name skepticism, since it is the method by which each individual, through a resort to universal doubt, can assure himself that there is absolute and certain knowledge.
Kant developed in this respect an attitude of skepticism as opposed to a method advanced in the Cartesian philosophy. He endeavored to investigate the foundations of knowledge. He held that whatever could be called knowledge must justify itself as such. By this he meant, that whatever we hold must be explained in the sense in which it is knowledge; what kind of knowledge it is; what is its scope; and what degree of certainty it holds. His origin in this critical spirit shows an unwillingness to accept conclusions unless there are good grounds for these contentions. Yet this method was not new; we must note it in the Dialogues of Plato, and of course it is evident in the empirical and scientific method in which evidence is scrutinized and each conclusion is open to re-examination.

Considering this problem further we should note two other approaches to the scope of knowledge: the first is the approach made through a method of authority, intuition or faith, and the second the method of empiricism. The first has been referred to by Kant as dogmatism in that it lays claim to knowledge without a critical examination of the methods and principles on which that claim is based. The intellectual system erected on religious authority and faith exemplify this approach. It has been held by philosophers that the dogmatists are those who accept "self evident" truths uncritically, or who create elaborate chains of reasoning in which conclusions are drawn without analysis of the justification of basic principles. The extremes to which empiricism has been carried has developed another approach to this
problem of what can be known. With Kant we note that his skepticism led him to the denial of the possibility of metaphysical knowledge, the ideas in this area have no theoretical or cognitive value but are of immense moral value as being ideas on which all our practical conduct must ultimately be based. For extreme empiricists this value is not attributed to metaphysics, which they hold as a useless branch of inquiry and serves only for the labeling of theories which cannot be directly tested by sense observation. These adherents place total emphasis on the scientific method, and they do not admit any theory that cannot be directly tested in experience.

If we look now at the scope and extent of knowledge, what we can know, we see that it must be influenced by this variety of approaches. And if we start with God as the object of knowledge in this discussion, we note an immediate variety of interpretation. The crux of the problem seems to arise from the otherness of the concept. Thus the narrower the metaphysical approach that the philosopher holds, the more restricted will his response be to the problem of the knowledge of God.

Any philosophy that reduces that otherness to a specious otherness, simply must reject the knowledge of God even though there is verbal acceptance. Materialism, naturalism and idealism insist that being is homogenous and consequently there can be no otherness within being. Naturalism makes God some aspect of nature, and this obviously makes him cease to be God. Idealism makes God the ultimate subject of thought, either as a sum
total of all thought whereby it can be a cohesive substance, as in the case of Hegel, or as the subsisting thought at the center with dependent thoughts projected by it to a periphery. Reality then being thought is one in substance, but many in modes, which are still one with the basic substance, and in this case there is no otherness. The intuitive approach accepts the notion of the noumenon without critical evaluation, since man is constantly thrown up against the limits of his own being and thus is thrust upon God who bounds him in. As Tillich holds "God is beyond categories, and to force him into categories is idolotry..." (75) The rationalist approach holds that it is possible to arrive at a knowledge of the noumenon through reasoned reflection in reality. The rationalists analyze reality as it is met and through this analysis see the relation that connects the finite to the infinite. There is no experience of God but there is proof of his existence. We do not meet him directly but there is evidence that he is attached to everything we meet. (78)

The existentialist approaches to the knowledge of God runs the gamut from atheism to acceptance with philosophical faith and discreet refusal to make a philosophical commitment, serving as an intermediate step. In the one instance we are brought face to face with the atheistic thinkers who point in their manner to the seriousness of the "God-forsakenness" of modern man. On the other hand most other existentialists, in their attempts to point out the ways to overcome the estrangement of man, have discovered a characteristic openness of the human conduct toward God. The unanimity of the existentialist on the importance of the question of God disintegrates however,
with their separate representations. Kierkegaard stands at one end of the existential continuum: for him God is infinite and absolute, he does not ask if such a God exists; how to live a life in relation to this infinite and absolute God is the crux of human existence. At the other end of this continuum is the Sartrean approach, which denies God completely and outrightly. The absence of God leaves a universe without pre-set meaning; man, the new master, sets it. In between these two extremes we find Jaspers who would have God to be found in the constant and purely individual search for the path to transcendence. Although he acknowledges the experience of religious prophets as valid and genuine, he insists that everyone has his own experience of God. Briesack says of the existential position on this knowledge of God..."Without having to choose between the Scylla of pseudo-scientific atheistic humanism and the Charybdis of a 'proved' God or one pictured in dogmas or creeds. The existentialists have again opened to everyone the door to the religious realm in the spirit of a personal exploration. Those who prefer sophisticated theoretical discussions of God or who are looking only for a consoling certitude will have no use for the existential position on God and his relation to man. Others, however, will find its possibilities intriguing." (14)

When we look to the extent of human knowledge in respect to the knowability of matter we note that the existentialists stand in a position that is between the idealists and the materialists. The idealists attempts
to resolve the struggle that is to be found between the individual mind and the world by explaining the world as a projection of the mind. To the materialists the individual mind is submerged in a vast sea of matter. This alone is reality. Before considering the existentialists position, it would be proper to look at the specifics of these two points of view first, to note their impact on this problem and second, to form a base on which a comparison can rest.

If it were possible to put the various concepts of philosophers on a continuum in respect to the manner in which they hold that matter is known, it would perhaps be correct to say that the idealists would be at one end and the materialist at the other, with a vast number of interpretations to be noted in between. If we consider idealism first we see that it holds that our sense-data cannot be supposed to have any existence independent of us, but must be, in part at least, in the mind. Berkeley made the first attempt to establish such a theory and held additionally that unless this mind was present, the existence of the object could not continue. From this he reasoned that sense-data were the only things of whose existence our perceptions could assure us, and that to be known is to be mental or in the mind. Materialism, on the other hand, would hold that all realities can be reduced to material properties undergoing change of motion in space. This means that all the sciences treat of phenomena which, if fully analyzed, would be causally reduced to material phenomena;
it also implies that the mind is but the complex working of the brain, the nervous system and the other bodily organs; and lastly it implies that "values," "ideals," "purposes" and such words are but names or subjective human tags for different physical situations in which physical organisms find themselves.

Now if we consider the existential stand, we see it never denies the reality of either the mind or the world but, rather, is careful to preserve the tension between the two. "The world is mine but still remains strange. That it is here, I experience as a brutal fact." (68) But no trick can give man the knowledge of what it is and thus make it a comfortable place to live. Briesack states this position and shows this middle of the road stand in this excerpt: "Neither a denial of the reality of the world nor a denial of the uniqueness of man, nor a set of benevolent laws of nature nor divine providence can eliminate the fundamental fact of the human condition, that no miraculous harmony exists in the world and that to resolve the enormous tension between man and his world is beyond human power... Both the personal character of man's world and his being a stranger in it everyone can discover for himself in his own life." (14)

Such a position is not conciliatory nor is it an arbitrary denial of the positions established by the philosophers who hold to an idealistic or a materialistic emphasis, it is rather a position in which the existentialist fuses the world with his personality and which he embraces fully in his encounter with reality. This is characterized by Heidegger's "being-
thrown-in-the-world" by virtue of which everything is no longer "just-there" but "there-for-me."

Another aspect to be considered when looking at the extent of human knowledge is that of the self. Within this area existential thought is at greatest odds with the Hegelian approach and it is Kierkegaard who is the main proponent. But we might look at the rationalist and the empirical positions once more before discussing this point in any detail. To the questions "What can man expect to know?" "What are the methods by which men acquire knowledge?" and "Why should men know?" we find two distinct and contrary positions. For the rationalist the answer to what man can know is; "Whatever is eternal, necessary and universal. That which is temporal, contingent, and particular cannot be known. The empirists hold that we can know particular beings and the relationships that obtain among them. The "how" is answered by the rationalist as through the mind or intellect and for the empiricist as through the physical senses. The why of knowledge for the rationalist is because of its own right; through it he experiences the greatest pleasures, and through it man learns to conduct himself in a world of becoming. The why for the empiricist is for the sake of power, the power to transform the natural and social environment. Against these stand the existential answers that we can know the human condition by intuitive insight resulting from affective experiences, and that this knowledge will provide a proper understanding of the human condition and existentialist values.
To look more explicitly at the notion of a knowable self we should consider the position of Kierkegaard. The self, as he sees it, cannot be understood as an object, that is "I am present to myself not as an object but as a subject." (56) This awareness is practical not theoretical. It is not an abstract point of view, detached from any active desires and tendencies, but rather is intimately united with them. Thus this mind introspects the tendencies of self as they are proceeding; it further reveals a world that is essentially an alien existence; a world that at times will be an aid, at times a burden and at times a source of frustration. This is the awareness and knowledge of self that the existentialists would propose.

This is not the idealized notion of Hegel, who in his Philosophy of Right defines the self as "The transition from undifferentiated undetermining to the differentiation, determination, and positing of a determinancy as a content and object." Or as he describes the nature of the self in his Logic; "By the term 'I' I mean myself, a single and altogether determinate person. And yet I really utter nothing peculiar to myself, for everyone else is an 'I' or 'Ego,' and when I call myself 'I,' though I indubitably mean the single person myself, I express a thorough universal. 'I,' therefore, is mere being-for-self, in which everything peculiar or marked is renounced or buried out of sight; it is as it were the ultimate and unanalyzable point of consciousness. We may say 'I' and thought are the same, or, more definitely 'I' is thought as a thinker." (28) From this statement and from the basic under-
standing of the underlying principles or tenets of Hegel's philosophy we can see that the existing person is identified with thought. This, as Kierkegaard points out, is the identity of subject and object, the unity of thought and being, a tautology, because this being which is ascribed to the thinker does not signify that he is, but only that he is thinking. (35) Kierkegaard rejects the definition of man as essentially mind, he gives emphasis to the existing individual.

We can see the position of Kierkegaard in reference to knowledge of self as being contrary to the positions held by the rationalists, the empiricists and most especially to the idealist position exemplified in Hegel. And of course at this point it is well to ask why this divergent stand? Heinemann (30) maintains that he acts as a provocation to thought, calling on his reader to question his established opinions and to rethink his whole position. His philosophical solution of this problem may be summarized as follows:

1. Only knowledge that has essential relationship to existence is essential knowledge.

2. Objective reflection leads away from the subject to abstract objective truth, and while the subject and his subjectivity becomes indifferent, the truth also becomes indifferent.

3. In subjective reflection truth becomes appropriation, inwardness, subjectivity, therefore it is mandatory that the subject plunge itself into its own subjectivity.
4. Only ethical and religious knowledge are essential knowledge, and are alone related to the fact that the knowing subject exists. In this knowledge alone can truth and existence coincide.

What are the implications of these conclusions? They represent a reaction, not only against Hegel, but against all modern methods of thought as it becomes more abstract. They emphasize what it means to live as a human being, rather than to stress a senseless accumulation of knowledge. They discard the old distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact since these ignore or neglect what is essential, true existence, i.e. existence in the face of God.

The existentialist holds that the individual comes into the world as a thinker after he became aware of the "other," of the body, of the world. The object of knowledge is thus given before the ability to react, to decide. By this is meant that human reality is "awareness of" and "intention to" and thus constitutes itself and constitutes the world for itself in its thoughts and projects. For Marcel, self is a creative engagement of the self in relation to something other. The real self is pure possibility unless and until it realizes and establishes itself in decisions; it comes into existence only in coming to decisions.

Although this concept of self adds a further dimension of decision, we may note a similarity between the notion of the existentialists and that offered by Bergson, "There is one reality, at least which we all seize from
within, by intuition and not by simple analysis. It is our own personality in its flowing through time - our self which underlies." (8)

As a means of summarizing the position of the existentialist on the knowable and relating this stand to the art of counseling it would be well to quote at this point from Gordon Allport. "Each person is an idiom into himself, an apparent violation of the syntax of the species. An idiom develops in its own particular context, and this context must be understood to understand the idiom. Yet at the same time idioms are not entirely lawless and arbitrary; indeed they can be known for what they are only by comparing them with the syntax of the species." (3) The existentialist is not one who questions the possibility of human knowledge, nor does he place any philosophic limitations on this knowledge, but he does place it in direct confrontation with the human existence, or as Marcel states, "...Knowledge is contingent on a participation in being for which no epistemology can account because it presupposes it." (48)

The ends and use of knowledge

To this point we have looked at knowledge in a general sense and have seen that the problems related to the nature of knowledge and to the relations that obtain between it and its objects are fundamental in philosophy, since everything is given to us in and through knowledge. But it is now important that this consideration be brought a level of practicality and that these ideas be related to first, the ends of knowledge and then to the use
and value of knowledge.

Without question one would be hard pressed to find in the human tradition a cult of ignorance! It must follow then that, by and large, the effort to dispel this state could be looked at as a prime end of knowledge, in fact not even those, who like Rousseau, have gloried in the pristine innocence of man, or those who have scoffed at the pedantic efforts of certain students to attain to wisdom, would question the notion that men by nature desires to know. Nor could one find much argument to the statement that knowledge is good, and that its possession contributes to the happiness of man. But more germane to the question is not the what but why!

Knowledge for the sake of knowing is a very limiting and surely a restrictive consideration in looking at the entire problem of knowledge. It must be looked at in its purpose and, in the context of this paper, in its precise relationship to the way in which this relates to the art of counseling.

We cannot assume that an individual can act in a manner that would be consistent with reality unless such an individual had some degree of knowledge. To make such an assumption would be to state that the conduct of the idiot or imbecile would have the same relevance to truth and reality as would those knowledgeable acts of the genius. If we made this statement we would deny the many decisions of our courts who hold that knowledge is a basic ingredient of intent. Thus we first note that for the direction of
conduct the first requisite is knowledge and that without it any criterion of behavior cannot be developed. As a corollary of this we must recognize also that it is an essential characteristic of voluntariness since unless we know of our relationship to the act it would be impossible to give or withhold consent.

From this consideration it follows that this problem of knowledge is closely tied to the art of counseling. This is evident from the already quoted objective of counseling "to develop the individual's inner life through concern with his motivation..." This in no way denies any particular theory of knowledge whether it be based in the philosophy of realism, empiricism, idealism or positivism. But, by the same token, it does not rule out the more irrational and humanistic approach of the existentialist who deny neither the reality of the mind or matter, but maintain between mind and matter a brutal tension, and stress and uniqueness of the individual.

If we take as a point of reference a comment by Olson, "the commanding value in life is intensity as manifested in acts of choice, individual self assertion, personal love or creative work..." (53) The value of intellectual knowledge becomes necessarily subjective and relative in so far as it is specified by the organic needs of the active subjects. From such subjective characteristics the reconstruction of a realistic metaphysics would appear to be unnecessary, and further the human concepts, being only useful symbols, would also lessen the demand for a system of knowledge based on a firmly rooted
rationalistic philosophy. These considerations would appear to provide some merit to the notion that the position of the existentialists relative to the problem of knowledge are compatible in the approach to the art of counseling.
THE PROBLEM OF BEING

The study of "being" is a rather technical inquiry and one that philosophy seems to have pursued at length. According to Berkeley nothing seems of more importance toward erecting a firm system of real and sound knowledge than to lay a firm foundation in a distinct explanation of what is meant by the terms 'reality' and 'existence.' Philosophy appears to have taken on its very particular characteristics by just this attempt to answer this problem. Over the centuries it has raised and attempted to answer questions on the nature of existence, on the modes and properties of being, on the difference between being and becoming, between the actual and the possible and on being and nonbeing.

These same questions and their answers have a very definite bearing on the individual in the counseling situation. He is concerned with those basic characteristics that define him as unique; he is involved in a process in which the outcome may be a change or may lead to a developing process that can lead to his realization of the actuality and potentiality of his individuality. It can be an activity that may define for him the particular characteristic of his personality, those specific aspects of his way of life, of his "being" that mark him as something other than a member of the common herd, that make him an individual with a right to be and to become.

It can be seen then that there does exist a close relationship in these aspects of very different areas of study; in philosophy the need of making
a determination of this question is fundamental per se; in counseling, to ignore it is to ignore an elemental, basic consideration. Therefore to treat either area lightly would be akin to making a prime error of omission. In looking at this problem we will attempt to review the problem historically, then to consider the particular situation as seen by the counselor, and finally to see the problem as seen by the existentialist thinker and to consider this particular aspect of the study as related to counseling.

**Historical aspects of the problem**

The problem of being was one that plagued the ancient philosophers and can even be seen in its carryover to the discussion of the religious question of the early fathers of Christianity in their discussion of "ousia" and "substantia." The ancients and most traditional non-Christian philosophers regarded "being" as eternal and necessary; eternal because it had no beginning or end, and necessary since this could be demonstrated by logical reasoning.

But to see this idea in its full context it should be studied in the light of the history of the notion; such an approach will enable us to note the changing emphasis and will provide a support upon which a basic understanding of the problem can be established. Once this aspect has been satisfied it should be possible to develop comparisons and to even note the particular areas of conflict or emphasis.

Historically it can be said that Parmenides is the father of the
ontological tradition. To him, being is one and unchanging. Plato carried on in this tradition and rooted being in the realm of the idea. In this instance it is behind the moving and multiple world of the senses and is described again as unchanging and one. It is the unity of perfection, it is the highest idea, and the idea of "being" is the Being itself. As a result only immutable essences, eternal ideas are Beings, and though they are many in number they all belong to one realm and possess the same type of being.

In the philosophy proposed by Aristotle there is a greater detail added, not only is the imperishable substance considered, but also the perishable. In addition to the immaterial and eternal being we must also consider the sensible and mutable substance. Thus we note that essential being is not the same as accidental and also that existence in reality is not the same as existence in the mind. From these considerations Aristotle claimed that there are many senses in which a thing is said to exist, some things are said to exist because they are substances others because they are appearances of substance or because they are in the process toward substance, or are relative to or negations of those things that are substance.

In this last instance it is because of this that we say of nonbeing that it is nonbeing; or that in addition to substance there is that which 'is" potentially or actually. Both Plato and Aristotle began their inquiry about being with the realization that after all questions have been answered about being, there still remained the question, "What does it mean to say of anything that it is or is not?" Thus after we recognize that a thing "is" we must still
consider what it means for that thing to be in anyway at all, to be in one sense and not in another.

From this line of thought we are forced to the dichotomous system of questioning that says, first, if we classify being according to those characteristics which it shows with more and more things, we come to "being" itself. This signifies the very least that can be thought of anything; hence if we study the thing we learn the least possible about the thing by coming to a realization of its being since it is that which is common to all things; abstracted from all else "being" has only the positive meaning of excluding "nonbeing." In the opposite approach "being" has a maximum significance, since whatever else a thing is, it is a being. Its being lies at the very heart of its nature and underlies all its other properties. Aquinas, for example, follows this latter line of reasoning, being taken simply as including all perfections of being, being without qualifications, as the most proper name for God. In this sense "being" is the richest of terms, the one which has the greatest amplification of meaning.

This method of thinking causes us to arrive at the problem of the one and the many in this context of "being." In this we note the basis for Spinoza's contention that everything which is, is either in itself or in another; this permits him to hold that whatever multiplicity or diversity we find in the world are but aspects of one being. Thus he says, "The thing extended and the thinking things are either attributes of God or affections of the attributes of God." (71)
But if we hold that there is no unitary whole of being, that there is a plurality of being alike in being but diverse in being from one another, then our system involves one of meanings. Descartes in this instance distinguishes between the infinite being, whose essence involves existence, and finite beings which do not exist of themselves but must be caused to exist. The infinite, in Descartes view, causes but does not contain within itself other finite substances and among finite substance really distinct substances can exist apart from each other. These finite substances, Descartes holds, are first those in which thought, or the mind, immediately resides, and second those which are the immediate subject of extension in space and accidents that presuppose extension. In this instance substance has more reality than accident or mode and infinite substance has more than finite substance. The problem, then, of the one and the many is an issue between the philosophy of Spinosa and Descartes and is one of the ways in which the problem of being presents itself for clarification.

Later philosophers, whose main concern was with the origin and validity of human knowledge, were not so much interested in an analysis of this problem but rather with the origin of the "ideas" of being or substance. Once the problems of being are viewed in terms of mind, the question becomes one of determining the conditions of our knowledge of existence and the identification of the real and ideas with matters of fact and intelligible relations between ideas.
In this context Kant saw it as a relation between the sensible and the supersensible, or the phenomenal or noumenal realm of being. Differently stated, he saw it as the being of the thing in itself as considered apart from human experience and the things of experience. The first concepts of the thing in itself are unconditioned but the latter are acted on by the knowing mind which is formative or constitutive of experience. In contrast to this approach we must see in Hegel, not an approach through a critique of knowledge, but rather the acceptance of the notion that nothing is actual except the idea, and to apprehend in the appearance of the temporal and the transient the substance which is immanent and the eternal which is present, or the reduction of everything to a manifestation of the underlying reality of the Absolute idea.

The idea of change must be also observed in the concept of being. We will frequently note this basic issue concerning being and becoming as a recurring theme in western philosophy. This idea is implicit in Spinoza's concept of God's knowledge of things under the aspect of eternity and the man's temporal view of the world in process. They are relevant to Hegel's Absolute idea which while remaining fixed, progressively reveals itself in the changing aspects of nature and history.

And one further consideration in this problem may be seen in the judgment of reality of the thing, this consideration refers us back to the problem of knowledge and the meaning of reality which is derived from the notion of "thing-hood" or having being outside the mind, not merely in it. James
approaches this problem in a typically modern fashion by asking how do we know a thing to be real and in the same manner replies that, "any object which remains uncontradicted is ipso facto believed and posited as absolute reality." (34) As an ultimate criterion for this reality he has established the self or ego, "the world of living reality as contracted with unreality seems to be anchored in the ego...whatever things have intimate and continuous connection with my life are things whose reality I cannot doubt." (34)

We might conclude from this brief overview of the problem of being, as looked at historically, that throughout the full spectrum of philosophical thought the attempt has been to affirm or deny the separate doctrines with respect to their emphasis of the notion of being and the modes of being. But to forget to look at this problem now in the light of existential thought would be to treat this subject too lightly! As Copleston said, "I think these problems can be called 'perennial' problems in the sense that they arise through concentration of attention, not on some temporary circumstance of man's life on some situation in which man is temporarily involved...but in man's abiding situation and on the condition of human existence as such." (18)

Before proceeding with this discussion a modern position must also be looked into and this is that as taken by the "analytic philosophers." With this group the neglect of existence in its various modes appears to have reached a climax. This group attempts to dispense with "existence" as an empty epithet. John Wild, quoting Quine states, "to speak of 'existent' and
'nonexistent,' 'real' and 'unreal' is but a bandying of empty honorifics and pejoratives... such ontological distinctions are dismissed as an accumulation of factually meaningless verbalisms." (79) All entities are reduced in this philosophy to the single level of phenomenal being with no essential difference between a person and a thing, between human and natural science. The reduction of all to this physical state is simply a clear cut implication of science, no criticism of other views is attempted, they are merely brushed aside in the process.

The existential view of the problem of being

Quentin Lauer (43) in his work on Phenomenology stated that the problem of reconciling reality and thought about reality is as old as thought itself. This appears quite true in noting the difference in opinions previously outlined. The problem is complicated by the fact that we cannot know consciousness independent of reality; we meet consciousness only as consciousness of something and reality only as reality of which we are conscious. The average individual will for the most part not be concerned with these problems, however some philosophers are greatly concerned with this mystery of being. Although we note the many approaches to this problem and although the explanations may be limited in number there is no indication that the matter has been solved. Thinkers will continue to propose new ideas in their attempt to arrive at acceptable solutions and of course the existential solution must be reckoned as one that has attempted to resolve the disparity.
Several writers on the existential philosophy have considered Heidegger the developer of the new ontology, and that Marcel proposed a mystery of being, yet we should perhaps go even back farther for a foundation of this concept. (7)

In his work, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, Kierkegaard, forcefully taking Hegel's concept to task stated, "The systematic idea is the identification of subject and object, the unity of thought and being. Existence, on the other hand, is their separation. It does not by any means follow that existence is thoughtless; but it has brought about, and brings about, a separation between subject and object, thought and being." Here it is possible to note a concern with the thinking process as well as existence that he has for the individual, the existing subjectivity which tends to evaporate in the Hegelian idea of pure thought or thought in itself.

In this same work there is a brief outline of the Kierkegaardian doctrine of the three spheres of existence - the esthetic, the ethical, and the religious. This could be noted rather as a theory of personality growth than as a metaphysical scaffolding, as Collins notes in his study of the existentialists. (17) Man is the one being endowed with conscious freedom and hence with the possibilities of or existing at various levels of adequacy.

Heinemann (30) finds in the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* a synthesis of these ideas, and he lists several points of importance and of interest in considering knowledge and existence when considering the Kierkegaardian influence on the question of being. These notions are briefly as
follows:

1. All essential knowledge concerns existence, or only such knowledge which has essential relationship to existence is essential knowledge.

2. All knowledge which does not relate itself to existence in the reflection of inwardness, is essentially viewed contingent and inessential knowledge; its degree and scope is indifferent.

3. The essential truth is subjective or internal, or truth is subjectivity.

This summary implies a complete re-evaluation of human knowledge. Kierkegaard wants to discard the superfluity of knowledge, in order that we may again learn what it means to live as a human being. He discards the old distinction between truths of fact, both of them are of little avail to him because they neglect what is essential to him, true existence.

Heidegger does follow in this system of reasoning; in his *Metaphysics* he states that "thinking sets itself off against being in such a way that being is placed before it and consequently it stands opposed to it as an object...

So it comes about that thinking is not merely the contrary member of some new distinction but the foundation and fulcrum on the basis of which the opposite is determined, so much so that being takes its entire interpretation from thinking."

(29) From this statement there does appear to be considerable similarity with the basic ideas of Kierkegaard, and that, in this relationship, the statement of Hook (32) that Heidegger is the "font of almost all existential thinking today" would have limited validity.
With this brief statement as to the foundations of the existential thread that may be noted in the philosophy of Heidegger, it would be appropriate to consider his position on the philosophy of being and note some of its salient characteristics.

The first thing to note in the work of this author is his insistence that he was perpetuating the method of phenomenology as one which permits the investigator to get to the things themselves. We would expect such a concept when we look to his training. As a disciple of Husserl it would be expected that Heidegger would be influenced by the philosophy of phenomenology. But whereas phenomenology is concerned with the essential being, that is "the universal, the general qualities which are capable of being inherent or ingredient in particular things or events." (43) Heidegger enlarged this scope and raised the question of reality and nonreality so as to look at Being itself and did not limit himself to the appearing and nonappearing of evidence.

One must next note in his writings a vocabulary that is specific in its own interpretation, but somewhat complex to render exactly in another language. This problem was clearly delineated by Ralph Manheim in his translation of Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics! The terms sein, Seiende and Dasein, although translated by the words being, existent and existence respectively, are only approximations of the full meanings implied. For the purpose of this paper, however, and in discussing this man's position the accepted English equivalents will be used.
When we look at man in the world among other things, we see that this "standing-in" or existence is not what characterizes the human relationship to things and other people. It is rather authentic or inauthentic method by which he relates himself to the whole structure of what he really is. "The authentic act of standing-in is an act of existence involving a self extension toward what is unknown and is not yet, so that meaning may be brought to be and new explanation offered for the things that are. The Dasein (existence) as understanding projects from out its possibilities." (42) Although the authentic mode of existence is basic, the inauthentic has a fundamental relation to the description of Dasein; these are as much positive and concrete realities as are the authentic, and they both constitute the finitude of Dasein. It is this finitude that man is thrown against in his everyday world and this is dominated by concern for the requirements of survival. It belongs to the nature of a person to exist in the execution of intentional acts. Molina suggests that there might be a similarity to the philosophic contributions of John Dewey that man is not a creature apart but that he is, on the contrary, inextricably and essentially a participant in the world." (52) The concept of existence as a standing out from oneself, the choice of being-in-the-world as the main structure of the person, the emphasis on the inauthenticity of our everyday absorption in familiar things, and even the choice of the word "concern" as designating a definition of the person, all are factors that are
indicative of the strong existential flavor in the concept of "being" proposed by Heidegger. Like Kierkegaard, his treatment is not so much in terms of created being as in terms of the basic free orientation of human life. It might be more correct to say that he presents an ontological ethic. This is perhaps seen in his practical restriction of existence to man. Dasein is man's self-presence or essence in the sense that he is most truly man when he relates his essential thought to the openness of being, recognizing his own contingency and that of the world in respect to participating in being. His essence is the realization of the truth of the proximity of being, and his care is a solicitude to realize this essence and in this way to become truly human. Existence leaps into being by engaging in a pure finding of being, a finding which is always possible and always necessary.

Unlike Heidegger, the French existentialist Marcel does not look at the task of metaphysics as that of making a primary affirmation of being. The recognition of being is rather the act of the individual man precisely as a human being. This is a premetaphysical apprehension since it does in a sense come within the ability of every man and is not contingent upon learning some special technique.

Man, alone among all beings, is not simply identical with his own life and factual reality, he is both a thing and more than a thing, for he can undertake an evaluation of his own life. "He is himself an affirmation of being. He is made by the affirmation of being within him and as himself. Being affirms
itself in him, so that he may be able to reaffirm it or give it intellectual expres-
sion." (17) In his discussion Marcel distinguishes between what he calls
"mystery" and "problem." In the latter, the mind passes from one problem
to another without attempting to plumb the ontological depth of a situation
which may reveal more than meets the eye. "Mystery" by contrast is depth,
involve and relationship between the subject of the inquiry and his field.
The quest is endless and resistant to neat conclusions; such states as grief,
love, fate, and fidelity are illustrative of those situational experiences which
properly belong in the broader area of being. Because being is always infinitely
more than we can say about it within any arbitrary frame of reference, it is
the interminable quest of mystery. In "problem" we have the first reflection,
the "me" "it" confrontation, by the reflective posture of communion and
participation the problem of being becomes the mystery of being.

Marcel places one other notable emphasis in his philosophy and it is
the role of the body. This does not to classify him as a sensualist, but
rather emphasises his notion of the affinity of the senses for other existents,
and in this manner man is able to participate in the world by receiving,
sharing and giving. The human existent is thus prepared for the encounter
with being of others. If we compare this last point with the view of Sartre
which holds that man is a "stark and lonely splinter of humanity," standing
alone in his uniqueness, we will note the third and the most recent position
on the problem of being in the existential thought.
In *Being and Nothingness* Sartre presents his theory of the nature of reality or doctrine of being. Here he presents a subject matter that is supposedly the fundamental and universal human experience, the comprehension of these experiences presupposes an insight which comes only from the frank and honest analysis of one's motives and behaviors. Reality, as Sartre pictures it, is composed of objects and subjects, being-in-itself and being-for-itself. The category of objects includes the surrounding material as well as any other object of consciousness, including the individual self as seen in introspection and individual behavior as seen by others. The subject is consciousness which is awareness, that which exists is but various instances of subjectivity and in each instance of subjectivity we find a process by which being becomes aware of itself.

In his ontology he seems to be looking for a middle road between materialism and idealism. He does not decry the fact of the reality of the material world, he accepts that objects do exist apart from human experience. He also admits, with the idealist, that the nature of the world in which men live is determined by the nature of man. But he considers the dualism which makes it impossible for the subject, as one kind of being, to know the outside world, which is another. His identification of nothingness is perhaps the central role of his existentialism, and may be found in his statement from *Nausea* which summarizes this entire doctrine, "Every existing thing is known without reason, prolongs itself out of weakness and dies by chance." There is no meaning in
existence except the little that human reality gives it, and the human being is a futile mode in the end. Existence and life and death are all meaningless and "absurd" in that they cannot be explained or in any way justified.

This human reality for Sartre, however, means that man is his project, this is the key to all his behavior; he is free and can change his life, he is a product of his own actions and situation, and he is as others see him. For Sartre, freedom and reality are one and the same, his "for-itself" is pure freedom coming from no cause, and its reason for existing is its constant activity, its constant search for an impossible goal.

Although there appears to be an excessive emphasis on freedom this in no way should be construed as license. We are free, totally and irrevocably, but not free to do anything we desire with no concern for consequences. Such freedom carries with it responsibility, since we make our world in concert with other realities, and the total result of our freedom is a concrete manifestation of our wisdom or folly. Looking into this freedom we see that every being is alone with no excuse behind him and no justification before him. Sartre sees in this a constant anguish, an anguish which is an awareness of the constant need for choice and action and a realization that nothing and no one can assure us that this is the right choice or the right action. Man makes himself by his choices and upon this choice rests his happiness and the progress of the other.

In this choice the past has meaning and significance and distinguishes the individual, but only if a choice is made to give it significance by
accepting the present, by which one's past is made possible. The present is the context of freedom and if the choice is not accepted the past is divested by changing the present mode or status of existences, thus we control the past through control of the present. Through an indirect effect, location or surroundings can effect this freedom of choice by putting the individual in a position that might dictate a decision, but as in the case of the past it is within the power of the individual to control this in the present. An example may serve to illustrate this point; if a specialist can find work in San Francisco, his living or being in New York would be an indirect obstacle to his realization of finding work. He has, however, within his area of free choice the ability to decide to move to San Francisco and thus remove the obstacle or to remain in New York and continue in his unrealized state of employment in this new area.

One shortcoming that has been noted by several critics of the philosophy of Sartre is its refusal to give ultimate answers to ultimate questions that is questions of origin and destiny. To a man such as Sartre such problems are absurd since he feels they cannot be explained or justified. Things are as they come to be without reason and cease to be purely by chance. Although it can be granted that not every aspect of reality is equally susceptible of analysis and explanation, it is the function of philosophy not to stop its investigation with obvious and important phenomena still to be explained. A suggestion other than absurdity as an explanation to these questions of origin and destiny might be expected, and this failure is considered to be a drawback in the philosophy,
that Sartre has proposed. This should not be confused with the position of the logical analysts who ruled the realm of metaphysics out of philosophy by restricting the scope of philosophy to logic. Sartre is no way restricted his coverage, but simply declared the matter "de trop."

Between Sartre and Heidegger we can see some similarity particularly their acceptance of certain points of emphasis from the philosophy of Husserl. Sartre seems to have been impressed by the latter's concept of intentionality according to which there is the consciousness of something. In this notion there is a close link between man and his world that had been the early notion of a subject with pure consciousness. This pure consciousness gave the individual an air of detachedness. Heidegger sought to freeze being and consciousness and in the attempt consciousness lost some of its central position; Sartre, however, realizes that the individual must be before there is consciousness. Man actually lives, objects of the world are not mental projections, they are "brutally true." It is through this close correlation of man to his world that he is aware of both the object outside of himself and of himself. It is this particular point that is the prime difference in the notion of being in these two positions, in Heidegger being is arrived at by exploring life, to Sartre being is life! And although in his work Marcel seems to have greatly stressed the ontological mystery, it is possible to see that he too stands squarely in the existential camp with his claim that the "I" and
"the world" cannot be separated. Central to everything in the human realm is the concrete, the existing individual in the here and now. For Marcel only the existing individual, as a unique entity, will be able to meet the 'ontological mystery' instead of 'problems.'

John Wild (79) challenges the position of the existentialists by holding that although they are correct in stating that theories that cannot be checked by direct evidence provide no data, no discipline, they have applied this method only to human existence and have paid little attention to other levels and manifestations of being. They offer no philosophy of nature and in the case of Sartre, Wild holds, that his philosophy, based on a very narrow base lacks discipline and coherence. He admits that brute facts must be given, but holds that causes and reasons are also required, the data should be explained in this light. Additionally he holds that to misread the data or experience is to fall into metaphysical error. This error he notes in their dealing with man and especially with human freedom. Yet when Wild compares this mode with the classical we note that he says, "...the existentialists are more rational than their realist ancestors. We cannot live without a decisive insight into the order of the world in which we exist, and an awareness of our own role in establishing this order, and a sharp sense of the radical difference between persons who possess this cognitive power, and things which have no world of their own but inertly exist without thought of self direction." (79) Copleston, in quoting Maritain, gives support of this
idea by saying that the only way to escape the dilemma of submerging the common good to the egotistical interests of individual or collective, is to recognize man as a person and society as a society of persons. (18)

This appears to be the intent of the existential concept of being, to look at the human condition, to see man as the concrete human persons, not an abstract epistemological subject, and at the same time as a self-creating and self-transcending subject.

Thus we can see that although this philosophy may have generated certain errors in techniques in the traditional sense of philosophic systems, and is at variance with the findings and research approaches of these systems, it does relate closely to that object which is the prime concern of the counseling art.

The relationship of the problem of being to counseling

Here it might be well to propose certain basic functions of this counseling encounter. Rollo May (50) has shown three that are immediately relevant and which are consistent with the generally accepted idea of counseling. First among these is to lead the counselee to an acceptance of responsibility for the conduct and outcome of his life. This principle is in complete accord with the existential-tenet that man is the product of his choices; he is, according to Sartre, nothing else but what he makes of himself. He must choose, this burden of choice is heavy, and again Sartre points out, man is condemned to be free. He cannot choose to be free at one time and not another, he does not
have freedom from which he can hide at times without consequence. Kierkegaard in his work "Either/Or" makes this clear, it is only through choice that authentic selfhood is attained since life is a matter of either-or.

A second function of counseling is to assist the counselee to find his real self and to help him have the courage to be this self. This point is most clearly shown by Tillich in his *Courage To Be*. Courage in man is a sign of his caring for something enough to decide and to act despite opposition considered in terms of its effect on his being, courage is the self affirmation of one's being. "Courage as the universal and essential self affirmation of one's being is an ontological concept...it is the affirmation of ones essential nature." (74) The concept is also proposed by Kierkegaard, in his reference to Abraham. (37) Abraham did not reason in syllogisms, but monumentous decision gave his whole life a new dimension. Not that man has now arrived, once and for all, at an ultimate goal and so to speak possesses it, on the contrary he is immersed in himself in a most exhausting struggle, the struggle to be worthy. He has accepted not a doctrine but a new way of life. Fulfillment is possible in it, not as experience evoked suddenly and forever, but as a dynamic one.

Existentialism is primarily oriented to man and interested in man. For the existentialist man is the obvious point of departure and accordingly its entire thought system must begin with him. Man's existence is the central fact which must be continually analyzed and observed. In the fact that man
exists really and uniquely originates all his interest in the world. It drives him to all his endeavors of thought because he realized that in the end his life is at stake. It is in the light of these remarks that the second function of counseling can be met, and that the very evident compatibility of this philosophical system to the art of counseling can be seen.

Rollo May proposes as his third function that of assisting the counselee to a cheerful acceptance of his social responsibility, to give him courage which will release him from the compulsion of his inferiority feeling, and to lead him to direct his striving toward socially constructive ends. Such an objective, if looked at in the ordinary terms that are attributed to the existential thought, i.e. "besorgne" "sorge" "angst" and "de trop," might appear to be a ridiculous endeavor, but this has been one of the problems that has plagued this philosophy for too long. The terms are improperly taken out of context and are given the day to day interpretation of these words without referring them to their specific intent. There can be no doubt, from the previous discussion, that these terms were used in a philosophical sense, that they were intended to apply to a metaphysical condition, it was not the intent of these writers to impute these to conduct but rather to the human condition in its ontological concept. But conduct is not the same as thought. If the notion of authenticity that the existentialist holds were followed, it would be the true man in action; the real self which Marcel notes in incarnation, communion and transcendence, and which Kierkegaard calls to our attention in his three
stages of aesthetic, ethical and religious life.

Again it must be noted that the existential emphasis that Sartre placed on "the other" is an equally prominent and necessary part of this philosophy. Although he stresses this aspect more than the other writers none of these philosophers deny that they make their world along with other human realities. The individual human being acts, not in some kind of socio-personal vacuum, but rather within the context of a concrete situation in which he finds himself involved or engaged.

It must be allowed that there are many other functions to counseling but these three appear to offer an area for initial evaluation and are specifically related to this problem of being, these were proposed to allow a very brief analysis to see if the philosophy and the art can accept one another. This looking at the one area is admittedly inadequate and is not considered conclusive; it does, however, indicate that this very fundamental concept is mutually acceptable and will be considered with the other points in a final summation.

This brief evaluation in no way is intended to stipulate or indicate that other concepts of being, envisaged in different philosophic systems, are wrong or would be unacceptable to the counseling situation, nor is there any intention to evaluate the concept of being proposed by the existentialists with that proposed by the idealists, realists or others for the purpose of determining which is valid, in which truth may be found! Its purpose has been solely to
look at the antecedents of this thinking, to note the thinking itself, as shown by its several proponents, and to see how it meets the counseling need. Considering the very individual nature of the counseling situation and the emphasis on individuality in existentialism as well its emphasis on authenticity and involvement, this does seem to indicate that the two notions propose mutually acceptable positions. These positions might be summarized in Paul Tillich's words, "Man becomes truly human only at the moment of decision."

The objective of counseling being to assist in the development of the human and of existentialism to foster decision, existentialism gives man a way of discovering what makes him unique and offers him a means of understanding his situation. It shows that even at bay the individual still has the means to seek his personal identity and to find happiness even in failure.
THE PROBLEM OF SELF IN THE WORLD

The self has been a matter of concern to the field of psychology and has very recognizable ties with the area of counseling. Among the persons of whom one forms an impression in a lifetime there is one that is always of peculiar interest, it is the self. This is not, however, the same as the human organism, it is the cognitive construction of the organism. This is that self that Rogers refers to when he says, "Within myself— from with my own internal frame of reference I may 'know' that I love, hate, sense, perceive, comprehend. I may believe or disbelieve, enjoy or dislike, be interested in or loved by."

(63) It is this same self that Maslow posits in his work Toward a Psychology of Being, of this self he makes certain assumptions:

1. We have, each of us, an essential biological based inner nature, which is to some degree natural, intrinsic, given, and, in a certain limited sense, unchangeable, or at least, unchanging.

2. Each person's inner nature is in part unique to himself and in part species wide.

3. The inner nature, as much as we know it, seems to be either neutral or intrinsically good.

The other assumption made by this author in this summary will not be considered here because they are not immediately of importance in this particular discussion; Maslow directs his further consideration to the conflict...
that takes place within the individual and it would not be of immediate or
direct value, but it should be recognized to preclude any claim of bias in this
discussion of self, from the particular emphasis of his work as cited.

The object of this paper is not to look at the psychological aspect of
any one notion, although it cannot be denied that there would be some relevance,
but to endeavor to note the underlying philosophical ideas in each problem.
Although it is true that these two subjects, philosophy and psychology, can
only be separated with difficulty, it would be more correct in this work to
remain as close to the original intention as possible by looking only at the
philosophical implications.

The ultimate questions that man asks about "self" are partly answered
by the very fact that they are asked. The answer to the questions asked may
be that man is the measure of all things; it may be that he is sufficient unto
himself; it may also be that he is not a god overlooking the rest of nature or
even his own particular environment in time and space, but that he is rather
a finite and dependent creature aware of his own insufficiency and looking
for something greater than himself. Whatever question he asks, and whatever
answer is forthcoming seems always to show up the dichotomies of mans
greatness or his smallness, his strength or his weakness, his knowledge or
his ignorance.

Traditional philosophic considerations

The problem of the self can be considered as starting from the philosophical
consideration of man and his place in the universe. The attitudes toward man's place have varied through the centuries and this variance has had a direct relation to the concept of the self. The first notion we encounter is the exalted one, that man is just a little lower than God. Such a notion flows through the Judaic-Christian theology but in the same flow of thought we encounter the very pessimistic notion that man like all the rest of creation is nothing but dust and will return like all else to dust. "Pulverum est et in pulverum reduxisti." This is the reasoned approach from the biblical implication that man will earn his bread in the sweat of his brow!

This twofold notion has been recorded for us in the bible, but the other peoples of the world also looked to this problem, and we note among the Greeks an evaluation of man. To the atomists he was the same as all the other forces of nature with a superabundance of the "soul atoms;" to the sophists man was, however, the measure of all things. He was no longer tied to the universe, subject to its inevitable laws, but rather free of the forces that govern the universe, able to determine his own fate and able to mold the universe in those aspects that were of importance to him, in such a way that his desires would be satisfied. He was in this philosophy torn loose from the forces of nature and made master of his own fate. Plato merely reoriented the emphasis in this instance, and although he admitted that man was the master of his own fate, he held that this evolved from his mastery of thought, his ability to apprehend the universe, the idea. This idea was the pure changeless eternal universal
that man can know. But man alone is the only creation that can know this idea and the process by which things of nature come into being. In this manner Plato stressed man's unique place in the universe. By the entry of the divine reason into man's body he is capable of knowing the "real" things of the universe. Aristotle distinguished in man, matter and form, but distinguished him further from all other forms of life by his ability to reason. Like all other forms he performs the vital functions, and has the power to imagine, remember, experience, pain, pleasure, desire and the like, but further, unlike plants or animals, he has the power to think. His reason is creative, he has the spark of the divine!

Now although most Greek philosophers saw man as something living in his environment we note that the earlier thinkers saw it as social encounter. With the later group the idea that man is above nature begins to develop, he is also able to approach the divine because he is of the divine; he has within him that which rises above matter and approaches that which is the most ideal in the universe.

Little change occurred in this notion through the ages except for the greater emphasis on God as the creator, and man as the combination of matter and spirit, dragged down by the body (matter) and seeking redemption for the inherited sin. In the process of change through the renaissance, with its humanism, to the period of enlightenment with its empiricism, there was a gradual withdrawal from the notion of the total power of God in the universe,
and with it came a new notion of man's position in the universe.

Man assumes the central emphasis in Bacon's philosophy where we note the greater stress on the value of understanding the universe but we must also note that he could not accept it completely as a source of knowledge. In this movement we see the first steps away from religion and a greater emphasis on the scientific approach to the self in the world.

It is right to note here the influence of Descartes because it is the initial major breech with the scholastic concept and it is also the start of modern philosophy. Descartes held that everything in nature must be explained mechanically and reason or intellect is the very essence of the soul itself. There is one absolute substance but there are two relative substances, mind and matter. Although these latter two are united in man, they do not influence each other, the body, or matter, operates mechanically but the mind is spiritual. Thus man partakes of the two relative substances of which the universe is made, therefore man is the universe. His body functions according to those laws which operate in nature, but his mind is distinct from his body and, as a result, is eliminated from the natural procedures.

For Locke man is a part of the world and is sensitive to the world about him. His ideas of the world about him come through the sense organs and through experience, yet there is an interaction between the mind and the body of which man is composed. In this philosophy, man's reason is established as the ultimate test of everything in the world and thus all must be reasonable,
and must satisfy man's mind. Reason becomes the test of revelation, and
with this philosophy and the individuals who adhered to it, Christianity
became a rational religion and lost its mystery. The court of last appeal is
the human reason and an understanding of something is necessary before
man can accept it.

As a transition we see Berkeley bringing this idea to a further point
by eliminating the material universe and making man the central part of
everything in the universe. Existence is that which is perceived through ideas
and nothing has existence outside of the mind. Hume carried this idea to
its logical conclusion by making man the center and whole of the universe.
Since all we can know are our ideas the only thing we can prove is the
succession of our ideas. Regardless of what we believe, whether it be
the world outside of us, or the existence of God we cannot in any way prove
it by any rational method.

In this group of philosophers we see the insistence that man must first
stop and examine the power of the human mind. This examination was carried
further by Berkeley and Hume: the latter left man standing alone without the
traditional ability to prove that there was a universe, a cause for his ideas
or even that he be existed.

It fell to the lot of Kant to endeavor to limit the scepticism of Hume;
on one hand, the dogmatism of the scholastics on the other; he tried also to
refute materialism, atheism, and fatalism as well. Man is a part of the
universe of objects and things, but although he can be certain of the existence of the world apart from himself he cannot know it. And this smacks of Locke, Berkeley and Hume, with whom knowledge is confined to ideas. But man is also able to reason. He can form ideas of God, freedom and immortality. Therefore, while Kant says that man is limited to his own ideas, these represent only part of the picture. He can, using the talents within, justify his assuming the existence all of nature and the transcendent, and can understand the universe and control it to his destiny. Kant also suggested that there was a higher kind of truth than that offered by human intelligence, the moral law within us, by which the value of the world was guaranteed. In this philosophy Kant and his followers gave man assurance of his power and dignity in the universe.

In his work, Fichte states that man is a free agent, not a mere link in a predetermined chain of material events. His self determining activity is his supreme characteristic. His argument to prove this contention was somewhat similar to the method used by Kant; he stated that although reason cannot prove the primacy of freedom, we must accept it because only by doing so is it possible to realize the demands of our moral nature, and to give our lives value and meaning. From this position it was a logical step to proceed to the fundamental principle of the universe which he called the absolute ego. This is universal active reason which is above all things and is similarly in every individual. Man is seen as a part of the universal ego, partaking of the
nature of the universe but dominated by this universal process. This representation of the idealist position, from the standpoint of looking at the universe from the point of view of man, was the method used by Hegel. In man, Hegel found certain logical processes in operation. The human mind moves from the statement of fact to its opposite. From this proposal of thesis and antithesis results the final proposition or synthesis. As with the human mind, so too with the universal mind, except in the scale of operations. Since man is the pattern of which the universe is the complete realization, the man is the little universe which is the miniature of the whole universe. Thus it makes no difference at which place we start to study the individual, since the similarity exists in either direction.

In the idealist tradition, these last two, Fichte and Hegel, could be regarded as different. The older traditionalists were not interested in the universe except as it affected man and his relations with his fellows. They began with the study of man and ultimately arrived at a theory of the universe. In the case of these two it was essentially this notion, but there was to be noted also the limitation that Fichte established, that is freedom, and the reversal possibility in the case of Hegel. Yet despite this difference it is necessary to see the approach through man and his nature; as man, so the universe!

James and Dewey place man as the center of the universe, but this egocentric approach is rooted in man's experience. Reality is pure experience
and the universe is constructed on our experience.

For James, whatever satisfies man is true and, conversely, what does not satisfy is false. The term satisfy may cause some confusion at this point and a word in explanation is necessary. James in his original lectures on pragmatism noted the excitement caused by his offering of ideas "working successfully" as a sign of truth. This he claimed as not a new definition of the nature of truth, but only a new interpretation of what it means to say that the truth of our ideas consists in their agreement, as falsity means their disagreement, with reality. "To agree in the widest sense with reality," James explains in the preface to *The Meaning of Truth*, "can only mean to be guided either straight up to it or into its surroundings, or to be put into such working touch with it as to handle either it or something connected with it better than if we disagreed...any idea that helps us to deal with either the reality or the fact...and adopts our life to the reality's whole setting, will agree sufficiently to meet the requirement. It will be true of that reality."

Dewey holds that man is the measure of universe; it is that which he experiences. To try to go beyond this to absolute origins is folly since man cannot get beyond his experience. Reality, then, is the growing, changing, and developing according to the conditions of human experience. Man is in the universe, he is a part of the process, a creation of this evolutionary development that is seen everywhere.

Throughout history philosophers have tried to understand the position
of man. There have been both religious and scientific approaches at each extreme and a myriad of interpretations in between. Religious orientations have attempted to show man in a universe that was friendly to him and his values. The scientists take the universe as they find it in the laboratory or under strict scientific investigation. They find only laws and phenomena that can be depended on to act in certain ways, but with no concern for human values. Yet the question remains, despite these many interpretations, what is man; what is his position in the world; what is this relationship that exists between man and the universe; in a word the problem of self in the world!

The existential emphasis

A system that has attempted to respond to this specific problem is that of the existentialist. These philosophers have laid aside the self consciousness of the philosophers from Descartes to Hegel. They refuse to consider this as
the main aspect of personality, for them it seems to call for an emphasis on freedom, this is as they see it, the chief characteristic of the human person. Molina in defining existentialism points to this, "...a type of philosophizing which endeavors to analyze the basic structures of human existence and to call individuals to an awareness of their existence in its essential freedom." (52)

To look at this problem alone from a single emphasis would be limiting the full impact of this idea. Existentialism, in looking at man, considers many facets of this problem, these aspects can be looked at as general considerations and then as specifics. They can then be related to the counseling problems that are relevant to the self in the world and as developing from the notions of personality and of values.

Looking at the general area first, of the self in the world, we see that the most generally accepted proposition of the existentialists is that existence means having one's being as a human individual in the world. Camus sees this juxtaposition of a blind, relentless, environment and man given to planning, hoping and seeking response from nature, as this relationship, this obvious bond. "Sisyphus, proletarian of the Gods, powerless and rebellious, knows the whole extent of the wretched condition: it is what he thinks of during his descent. The lucidity that was to constitute his torture at the same time crowns his victory." (16) He makes capital out of viewing the environment as benevolently disposed to man and of endeavoring to read
human purposes into nature. His position is one that maintains that the only virtue gives dignity to our tasks, with no illusions about ever attaining significant ends. His doctrine of absurdity is in open revolt against "the loose and sentimental interpretations" that material things are ordained to minister to the needs of man in the world. "All Sisyphus silent joy is contained therein. His fate belongs to him. His rock is his thing. Likewise the absurd man, when he contemplates his torment, silences all the idols. In the universe suddenly restored to its silence, the myriad wondering little voices of the world rise up...they are the necessary reverse and price of victory. There is no sun without shadow...the absurd man says yes and henceforth his effort will be unceasing." (16)

Briesach discusses this position in a more direct fashion and in a more critical than literary vein; "Neither a denial of the reality of the world (idealist position) nor the denial of the uniqueness of man (materialist position) nor a set of benevolent laws of nature nor Divine Providence can eliminate the fundamental fact of the human condition, that no miraculous harmony exists in the world and that to resolve the enormous tension between man and his world is beyond human power. What becomes audible in this tension is the echo of man's questions reflected from "somewhere," and human life at its best is this sounding of the depths. The tension also is the challenge to proceed with this sounding all life long. The existentialist considers it his merit to have rediscovered this tension in all its serenity. He did not,
however, create it in his philosophy, as some critics would have us believe. Both the personal character of man's world and his being a stranger in it everyone can discover for himself in his own life." (14)

Once again it will be well to return to the acknowledged starting point in the existential system of thinking, and in Kierkegaard's writings to notice the emphasis that he brings to this notion. He points out in his *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* that if one goes to history for one's life without having first life of one's own, one has nothing to go by, no means of discriminating between the authentic and the unauthentic. This would be to abdicate the responsibility of living and to resort to helpless imitation. "Every human being must be assumed in essential possession of what essentially belongs to being a man. The task of the subjective thinker is to transform himself into an instrument that clearly and definitely expresses in existence whatever is essentially human." (35)

Although it can be seen that Kierkegaard lacked an historical interest, and had little care for an analysis of the social situation, he was saved from reducing his works to a diatribe or a polemic on the human condition by a firm anchorage in the religious and philosophic conception of the human situation. This, in conjunction with a declaration that it was the permanent function of the individual to save and to realize the distinctly human, was the starting point for the later existentialists in a mass society. The self, in Kierkegaard's situation, once having achieved authentic selfhood, in absolute
choice, has given itself away absolutely. "His absolute subjectivity becomes absolute objectivity in his total displacement before God, which is the effect of his persistence in a reiterated absolute choice of the infinite." (10)

It is possible, to note that between Camus and Sartre there is a similar undercurrent of theological ressentiment, Sartre's position of "Man-in-the-world" is on a surer footing in that he employs the notion of intentionality. The intentional character of thought means that our ideas are about something other than our ideas themselves. This is a phenomenological method of explaining the common sense conviction that we work out our lives in the world, and it provides the background for the existential description of the worldly context of the human condition, the human existence. Sartre holds that man's consciousness is the projective source whence proceeds the meanings which are related as a world order. This world as an organized whole or rational purposes and relations in a human product.

A description of Sartre's theory of human reality in terms of the operations of the prereflective consciousness as a self transcending movement toward freely chosen goals indicates the nature of man as subjectivity. But human reality is in society as it is in the world, it is neither nature nor state, but makes itself. As well as examining man as subjectivity, therefore, we must look at man in society in order to really see man as Sartre sees him.

Man is a society because he finds himself among other subjects and he is in the world because he is surrounded by other objects. In this last
connotation we must recall that human consciousness is without content other than that derived from its awareness of objects that surround it, and that the goal of this consciousness is a relationship with and in this world. Human reality, therefore, can only be "being-in-the-world" and to define it other than as a "situation" would be incomplete. Yet as Sartre sees the "situation" the strict limitation restricted to objective forces is not the total picture. The situation must be seen as a synthesis of himself as well as the non-subjective conditions in which he finds himself. It is very easy in this context to see the archetype implication of Jung and the environmental considerations of the Adlerian psychology. To Sartre no view is complete that refers to the self as all contained nor that places the goal of human striving as an inner state of grace.

Man is in society and part of his environment is made up by other people. Although these "others" may appear to us as simple object-natures upon whom we pass judgments which derive from our projects, they do in their turn constitute us as objects, since they are free subjects and are in this manner responsible for our "being-for-others." Thus the individual is social, he must fit into the collectivity, but in the sense that his reality, as an individual, is mediated through the other members of the collectivity. Marcel refers to this in his Mystery of Being when he held that the thinking of the involved self is threatened by the interest in abstractions and by beauraucratic society which reduces individuals to the average. To know others existentially is to
encounter them, not as things, but in acknowledgment of them as persons. Thus in summary of the Sartrean stand, it can be noted that of his theory of human reality, man is his project, this is the key to his behavior; he is free and can change his life; he is the product of his own actions and situations, and he is as others see him.

Although it was noted that there could be seen certain similarities in the ideas of Sartre and certain psychologists in so far as determinism is concerned, it must be clearly distinguished that the goals of the individual vary and are privately adopted. This is equally true in so far as obligatory social goals are concerned. Although certain sociologists hold that goals are of social origin and are the basis for social unity, the existentialists, of the Sartrean school, would agree that these goals are formulated in terms of particular social environment, and while they involve the modification of the environment they also presuppose it. Heidegger's formula that man is a product of his past moving to the future through the present gives support to this position.

Jaspers notes, in advancing his personalist foundation of human society, that the individual, in treating "the other" as an existent or a self, not only contributes to social reality but also perfects himself as an individual. (10) The other is the mirror of one's self, learning how to act properly toward "the other" is a lesson in self knowledge. The individual does not attain this mature growth of dealing with others and of self possession until he has
developed his capacities for social intercourse. As long as the subject-object relationship is in existence in man's social state, it is impossible for the individual to exercise that freedom which will permit the realization of the full potentialities of the authentic existing self. Martin Buber argued in this direction when he held that the "Thou" stands as a judge over the "It," but as a judge with the form and creative power for the transformation of the "It." Each encountered "Thou" reveals the nature of reality. (15)

Personal existence is coexistent not with things but with fellow men. All beings make some sort of response to the individual existent concerned about them. Thus the "we" form of being can be developed only between individuals who respect each other as free objects. This aspect is readily accepted by the existentialists and for them mutual relation among selves is necessary for the perfection of human existence. Other existents cannot be approached as utensils but only as free agents. Although there may exist some difference in concept as the specific method in which this relationship occurs and is developed, it is recognized that the stewardship of self is not the exclusive province of concern of any one existent individual, but is rather shared by him along with others.

In summary of this existential position one might take cognizance of these words of Berdiaev: "Man finds himself in the world, or is cast out into it, and he stands before the world as before a riddle to be solved. Man's existence depends on the world and he perishes in the world from the effect of
the world upon him. The world nourishes man and destroys him. The milieu into which he has been mysteriously thrust from somewhere else, constantly threatens man and arouses him to struggle. And man sets for himself the extraordinarily daring task of knowing the world and all that may be glimpsed beyond it." (6)

Existential philosophy represents a European trend away from positivism, functionalism, instrumentalism, pragmatism and operationalism, all of which tend to be close to the value system of scientist. As such then it stresses the importance of the individuals goals and his personal world.

It is concerned with the meaning structures of each individual's world of values, and by stripping out any preconceived notions it would be possible to understand the essential nature, the basic kind of being, the basic human value, the "being-together-in-the-world" that makes each individual unique and important. To arrive at this understanding, however, the values that underlie the philosophy must be noted, because it is to be admitted that these objectives are not beyond the abilities of the scientific philosophies, if not immediately, at least at a future date when the advances of science attain their ultimate fulfillment.

The existential values should be considered first in this consideration, for we cannot look at the individual notion of values without first having some idea of the grounds upon which these values can be developed. Perhaps a paramount consideration in an evaluation of the existential values system is a
realization, first that it recognized frustration, insecurity and striving as the inescapable lot of man, and it is only in a life faced with such conditions that true values are realized and worthy of human endeavor. Second we must see the contempt in which they hold the striving for "happiness" or "well-being." Properly understood this is not an untruth nor is it a contradiction, since in the first place they may be considered to imply a state of being that is most desirable for mankind or may at another time be constructed to mean a state of harmony or calm or detachment from worldly concern. Under either of these conditions we have an ambiguity and if nothing else the existential commitment to authenticity must deny this possible duality. But lest it be assumed that in this interpretation the existentialists denies the possibility of happiness, it should be clarified that his is rather a denial of the seeking of happiness as a universal. They are not in any way denying that although happiness may be attained, it is perhaps generated in a life of frustration, insecurity and painful striving.

The existentialists do not always agree among themselves as to the precise nature or the relative ranking of the values that they say should accompany the espousal of this life of striving. Sartre stresses freedom of choice; Berdysev stresses personal love and creative endeavor, Kierkegaard subjectivity and authenticity, but in general we can find freedom of choice, individual dignity, personal love and creative love as basic values in their thinking.
With respect to these values, however, it is necessary to see an acceptance of anguish and suffering as a fundamental condition for these values to be experienced at all. We can see free choice, then, without anguish as being something that is petty or trivial, something without meaning, surely something that has little value in determining man's real being. The same is true of love without suffering; the essence of love is an attitude of care or concern for a being whose death or desertion is always possible and which would be an immeasurable loss. Love without this definition is nothing more than infatuation or habit.

When one considers the traditional position of philosophers or the experience of man in his everyday confrontation with life, the idea of anguish seems to be identified with fear, tedium, anxiety or apathy. But this is not the concept in the existentialist system of thought; it is rather to relieve man from these forms and to allow him to confront himself with the true anguish which is a concern for authenticity, the full realization of being. It is through this concern for the authentic self that the individual commits himself to a course of action which will involve and engage his total energies.

The sum of the existential values therefore, has a common source, a common function and a single identifying characteristic. The source is the acute awareness of the tragedy inherent in the human condition or as Sartre says "in justification before us." (67) Their common function is to liberate us from the fears of everyday life and the tedium of philosophic daydreaming
and the single identifying characteristic is intensity, an intensity that can be noted in the demand placed by Kierkegaard and the others for authentic self determination.

We must also note that this position has merit only if we accept the existential position that the human condition is fundamentally the same for all, and also if the validity of intuition as a method of knowledge is accepted. If we accept these requirements there is no reason to deny the value orientation of the existentialists. But if these requisites are denied then we must stipulate others, and this would be a nonacceptance and a rejection of this philosophy of existentialism. Yet such a denial would be, in the light of the very humanness of this method of thinking, and the fact that it is a synoptic view of man's existence rather than an analysis of the why and wherefores of this existence, a flight from the reality that man can recognize in his day to day commitment.
CRITICAL COMMENTARY AND SUMMARY

These problems of knowledge of being, and of the self into the world show solutions that appear to be at considerable variance. This is not a matter that can be denied, but one that must be noted with a degree of concern. To propose a synthesis of the ideas is not possible within the structure of these many philosophies. Such an approach may have been possible in the traditional philosophies, but in this juxtaposition of ideas, an effort to integrate or to consolidate the thoughts would be to deny one form of thought or support the other.

Jean Wahl in his work on existentialism provides a concise statement of comparison when he states, "Let us construct a few rules of thumb for distinguishing between existentialists and nonexistentialists; if we say: man is in this world, a world limited by death and experienced in anguish, is aware of himself as essentially anxious, is burdened by his solitude within the horizon of his temporality; then we recognize the accents of Heideggarian philosophy. If we say; Man, by opposition to the in-itself is the for-itself is never at rest and strives in vain toward a union of the in-itself and for-itself, then we are speaking in the manner of Sartrean existentialism. If we say, I am a thinking thing (Descartes), the real things are ideas (Plato) or the ego accompanies all our representatives (Kant), then we are moving in a sphere that is no longer that of the philosophy of existence." Although this quotation does not cover the entire realm of philosophic thought it does in a limited way
touch on the several fringes and does point to the fact that the differences seen in the basic concepts would prove difficult to integrate.

In preceding chapters the effort was to look at the many philosophies in their specific stress on these problems of knowledge of being and of the self in the world. But this overview needs to be pulled together in generalized fashion so that the full implications of these views may be noted and from this position a relationship to counseling developed.

A logical connection does exist in the three areas that have been discussed and although they are treated as separate studies in the field of philosophy they cannot be limited to a vertical analysis. In the broadest of terms, the traditional approach to philosophy may be organized in two major groupings: the rationalist group that would cover in its span a listing from Plato to Hegel, and the empirical movement of the seventeenth century English philosophers to the present day Anglo-American positivists and realists. Opposing this traditional group is the existential philosophy with its deep strains of irrationalism.

For the rationalist, reason is paramount, it is the source of all truth, and as a result there is firm belief in the autonomy of thought. As a generally accepted idea for these philosophers there is the view that thought can, without support from supernatural revelation and without an appeal to sense perception, discover what is ultimate. They hold to the theory that there are certain innate ideas which form the basis of all certainty and from which all proof is derivable by logical inference. Opposing this view or this position is that of the
empiricists who are opposed to all forms of intuitionalism and who hold
that the mind is originally an absolute blank on which, as it were, sense
given impressions are recorded without any action on the part of the mind.
In this theory there can be no causation, one thing is observed to
succeed another, but observations cannot assert that it was caused by
that thing, it is post hoc but not propter hoc. We might summarize these
two positions in one single sentence: rationalism signifies man's power
of thought, and empiricism his power of perception and observation.

Such a generalization is of course almost peremptory but it does
serve to point out the greatest difference between these two systems as
well as showing its point of similarity and that is the stress that is placed
on knowledge. In these traditional approaches to philosophy we note first
a discussion of the ultimate reality arrived at through natural reasoning
or a denial of this reality because it is not knowable through empirical
facts or abstract reasoning. Where then does this place the individual?
How can these philosophies contribute to his well being? How can they
provide him with certainty in his daily confrontation with life? More
specifically how can these be interpreted to serve as a basis for a counseling
philosophy? If our attempt is to reason from a prior essence of being, or
to inductively and scientifically arrive at a knowledge of man, then these
processes would have considerable value. We state, however, that the
objectives of counseling are to contribute to the client's realistic acceptance
of his own motivations, capabilities and self attitudes, and an achievement of a reasonable harmony with his environment. It does not immediately appear that these objectives can be met in the pursuit of a traditional philosophy!

As an alternative to this rationalist philosophy the existentialists propose an irrational solution. They do not claim that we can know this or that, nor that man can know nothing but the common condition; they claim rather that nothing but the human condition is worth knowing! They may deny that a specific object of knowledge exists, or they may even deny that the object could be known even if it did exist, but their position is not the existence or knowledge of this object but rather, what is its human significance. It is therefore first and foremost a system of value!

It would be well to note the difference in the way the existentialist considers the role of the passions and the intellect. To the rationalist the operation of the intellect is obscured by the passion, but to the existentialist the passions are an essential condition to the successful operation of the intellect. The existentialists will also hold that his insights are an explicit rendering of a state of affairs in which the individual is deeply involved and that in a sense he knows what anguish reveals to him. Some historical trace of this notion may be seen in Plato's doctrine of knowledge by reminiscence, in Augustine's claim that man can know the truth only if God first grants him the privilege of believing.
without understanding, and also in Pascal's contention that the heart has reasons that the mind does not know.

If we compare their position to that of the empiricist we see that the existentialists are more concerned with the "world fact" of the subjective personal experience than with the special or abstract fact of science. (53) The existentialist is attuned to the real (in his terms) world of human life, of personal relationships, and grappling with the problem of finding purpose in life. The world of fact and explanation of empiricism is but a highly select portion of the world and is completely conditioned by the objective standpoint from which it derives. The human world cannot be understood from the objective standpoint but requires participation and the willingness to acknowledge the reality of the subjectivity of human feelings, purposes, and aspirations.

Such an approach would tend to negate the scientific approach to the solution of personality problems. These problems arise in the full range of human experience, to equate this human experience to a situation that can be met head on in the realm of science or empiricism would be to reduce the human condition to a mathematical formula that can be solved by predetermined rules and deductions. But such an approach denies the individuality of the person, it fails to reckon with the person in his particular aspect of life, in his very uniqueness.

The criticisms raised against an existential approach to counseling
have some merit but they seem to be based on an argument that is not singular, that is, they move from philosophy to theology and back again to philosophy. If theology is to be the guiding point in counseling then it must be admitted that the approach through existentialism is less than valid, since it cannot determine a theological approach that is singular for itself. In this discussion we are concerned with the relationship of the individual to his way of life. Without doubt, ethics, logic, and theology are involved but indirectly since we are first concerned with what man is, what he can know and what he can become. The rationalists look at the workings of the mind, the empiricists refer man to an objective reality, but only the existentialists refer man to himself. Copleston states this quite clearly when he says, "The existentialist, it seems to me, changes or tries to change the perspective in which we see certain facts of which we are already aware. He directs my attention to limits which are normally marginal to my consciousness and focuses my gaze on my finitude, on my limitations, on my death as the extinction of my possibilities. Instead of my seeing my existence in the world from the point of view of a member of "the one" absorbed in my social functions, he tries to make me see my existence in the world from the point of view of the individual subject who finds himself a pilgrim in the world, who strives after the realization of ideas and values and who is from the start menaced by death which extinguishes himself and his ideals. The existentialist
tries to make me stand back, as it were, from my absorption in "the one," from my absorption in my social cares and preoccupations, and to make me take stock of my position as an individual."

When one looks at the existential philosophy there are many discrepancies that may be evident. It does not follow the strict and traditionally accepted reasoned approach to wisdom, and it does not establish itself as a total system but places great stress on its ontology and emphasizes intuition as a base for its epistemology. These are positive approaches, its negative side is most evident in its omissions, first is its failure to provide a basis for a theology. Yet such men as Tillich, Buber, and Barth have developed their theology from the existential approach, and Copleston in his concluding statement on existentialism says, "In spite of its defects existentialism seems to have been of value in drawing attention in a modern context to the human person as a free and responsible subject. Atheistic existentialism by its attempt to draw the logical consequences from the postulate of atheism, underlines the importance of the problem of God...The atheistic existentialism of Jaspers and the reflections of Marcel open up in a fresh way the approach to the transcendent." (18)

A second area that may be considered to have been slighted is that of ethics, when it is considered as the investigation of the right end of human action, the nature and foundation of moral distinctions,
the grounds of moral obligation, and the sanctions of morality. But if we note the plea to live authentically, the stress laid on freedom of choice, the stages of life, and the intensity of life, we can see the possibility of developing from this an ethic that can serve the engaged individual. Wild comments in part on this idea, "the existentialists have performed an important service in calling our attention to the direct, empirical evidence that human beings are in some sense free, and thus reviving the interest in ethics, as a central discipline, which has long been on the wane." (79)

Despite its shortcomings, the unsystematic manner in which this philosophy developed and many misunderstandings about the stated principles, we are forced to note its central theme, the individual, the person. It is not the person of Aquinas with the rational soul and body, nor is it the self-consciousness of Descartes with the spiritual substance thinking and enclosing the human person, nor is it again the ultimate progress of mind or spirit proposed by Hegel, rather it is an emphasis on freedom. This becomes recognized as the chief characteristic of the person, it is the efficient cause of personality or at least a necessary condition for it. Personality is something that must be won, it is created and maintained with difficulty. If we look at the counseling art, we must see that it too is concerned with the person, not the static individual but the developing person, the person who is to become the
product of his choices. This person is not someone to be manipulated, he is not some unformed clay that is to be molded to fit some preconceived pattern, he is not an idea or an intellect, he is, as Heidegger claims, a person who through resolution, decision or commitment moves in time from the past through the present, appraises himself, chooses the whole of his being, and thereby achieves authentic existence. Arbuckle summarizes these notions in this excerpt, "Thus the counselor does not plan or decide for the client, since he honestly does not know what is best for him. His function is to help the client decide what is best for him, not the counselor, or society, or anyone else, although there will very often be a close relationship among all of these." (4)

In following chapters it will be the purpose to examine the counseling process, but to restrict the philosophic approach only to that of the existentialists. This effort is considered valid since there does not appear to be any contradiction between this philosophy and the objectives of counseling as previously outlined.
COUNSELING AND PHILOSOPHY

The objective of this paper has been to show the need to look at a philosophy that might be considered in its application to the art of counseling. While no attempt has been made to deny the validity of any one philosophy to this art, it has been an objective to show that the philosophy that stems from existential thought is at least compatible and could be considered as a basic approach from which a counseling art could develop and upon which a firm base could be established for a total counseling procedure.

In the years of development, counseling has glossed over this facet of its system, not only ignoring the existential philosophy but all the philosophies as well. Williamson suggested that perhaps its origins may have been the cause for this lack of concern for a philosophy. We can see its point of origin in problems! It was first the problem of vocational aptitude; it developed from here to an emphasis on the determination of the individual's abilities through the use of a test and measurements, and finally it came to a counseling confrontation with multi-faceted approaches, directive, non-directive, trait and factor, psychoanalytic, eclectic and others. This emphasis may have precluded the development of a philosophy, but the speed with which these methods came on the scene, as well as the world conditions stemming from the many socio-economic and political upheavals, may also have turned
the development of a philosophy. This frequent and rapid change could have slowed down or even prevented the development of a philosophy of counseling. But no matter how we rationalize this problem, there seems to be a need for a philosophy, because it alone can provide a focus through which we can see our roles and activities, and determine if they have significance. Through such an examination and evaluation we are better able to assess our ideals and aspirations as well as to understand better why we accept them, and possibly even whether we ought to accept them!

To argue and discuss the why's and wherefores of a philosophy of counseling without looking in detail at the counseling process would be a one sided approach that might lead to decisions that are inconclusive or that proceed from assumptions that might or might not have merit. It is proper then to determine what we understand as the purpose of counseling. We must again refer to the concept of counseling that is to be considered. It is not "vocational guidance," "psychotherapy" or "psychoanalysis," but it is an attempt to help the individual realize his full potential, in a healthy setting and as a result of his own determination. Note here that the objective alone is the area of consideration; techniques, approaches, and methodologies are not a part of this problem, although it is admitted that the approach to the objective may be influenced in some degree by the method that is to be used. One other point that must be considered here is that the philosophy followed may, in like manner, be
the determinant of the approach and methodology that would be used in the counseling art. A recognition of these two points will perforce place certain restrictions on this study. This means that it will be necessary to look at the general objectives of counseling first, and from these it may be possible to further limit the scope of the study by referring it to a particular technique or methodology.

From these comments it seems proper to outline an approach to this question and to consider this in its context and relationship to the problem of a philosophy for counseling. The general objective then will be to review the major requirements of counseling, second to look at the counselee, and next to see the impact of these considerations on the counselor. Having established these primary ideas it will be possible to look at the counseling situation, the confrontation of the counselee and the counselor and to evaluate this specific activity from the standpoint of a philosophic approach. If the situation and the approach can be critically defined, it should be possible to theorize from these generalities and to propose certain conditions that would have universal applicability to the very concrete problem of counseling.

Counseling objectives

A clear delineation of counseling objectives that could be fully acceptable may be difficult to establish, but if it is possible to show certain characteristics that are generally recognized, this primary step
may be possible! It should again be repeated that counseling is not advising; in the latter case we endeavor to inform an individual of an obligation or a requirement, so as to help in the solution of an immediate problem. This procedure is more correctly recognized as direction or possibly teaching. Advising makes two basic assumptions that are not at all compatible in a counseling situation; one, the individual is incapable of self direction, either because of lack of experience, or of an unwillingness to commit himself; and second that the advisor is a person whose consummate experience ability and skill permits him to know what is best for the client, and that he can impose this decision on the individual. We will at a later point refer to this comment, but for now it is proposed as a definition or delineation of an advising process. And if counseling should not be mistaken for advising, it should also not be taken for therapy! In the notion of therapy there are basic overtones of illness, the intention is to establish intense and lengthy interactions for the purpose of making major changes or alterations in the clients behavior or personality. A therapeutic relationship generally implies that there are fundamental irregularities in the psychic make-up of the client that must be recognized and compensated for if the normal and healthy balance of mental life is to be maintained.

Counseling, however, falls between these two extremes and is characterized by a very different set of conditions. The first is that it
is a social learning interaction between two people. This interaction may vary from a very simple information seeking relationship to an intense long term psychological treatment, but it should be consistently regarded as healthy. Related closely to this is the second consideration and this is that concern is typically with the normal or usual people rather than those who might exhibit abnormal or extreme modes of conduct or adjustment. For the client who shows indications that their adjustment to the situation is abnormal, the counselor must use his referral service or if qualified, enter an intense therapeutic relationship with the client. Such action should not be construed as counseling even though it stems from the initial, or from the developing situation. A third characteristic of the counseling relationship is that it functions to help the client understand and accept what they are and, in the light of this awareness, to realize their potential. This realization may come about through an alteration or a modification of their attitudes, outlooks, or behavior but not through a substitution or sublimation of values or attitudes. Fourthly, we should note that although talking and listening are the primary methods used in a counseling situation, this does not preclude the use of tests and measurement devices, psychological or sociological instruments or other materials to help the client understand and recognize his potential. Lastly in the counseling situation a greater emphasis is given to the positive and the obvious than is given to the negative and the unconscious.
In these considerations we note the general aspects of counseling activity and it should be possible to derive from these the goal or objective of counseling. Since counseling is an interpersonal confrontation we must question whose goal is to be met, is it that of the counselor or that of the client? There is some merit to this questioning because if we consider time, experience, society, and needs, the emphasis may vary from situation to situation. Under the exigencies noted here there might be a basis for relating the goals to the counselor; in this case the counselor would have in mind specific objectives that would apply to the counselor, and which when adopted by the client would meet the personal and societal needs of the individual, as seen by the counselor. E. G. Williamson refutes this particular approach when he says, "I have suggested that we accept the "teaching" of values as a function of the counselor, but that we remain aware of the risk of imposing a set of values on a student and thus depriving him of his right to and responsibility for self determination. Rather should we aid him in using rational and emotional clarity in facing his problems, so that he may choose from among a variety of guides to action those which seem promising to him in leading to forward development in him and in his relationships with others." (51)

Yet there are counselors who consider only the limiting aspects of time, experience, and needs and determine that these only are deciding
factors; these people invariably relate the goal of counseling to themselves. By this they dismiss any contradictory position, establish themselves as fountain heads of human behavior and ethical standards, and effect little more than to bolster their own ego. If the self satisfaction of the counselor is the aim of the counseling situation, there can be no question that this orientation has merit!

It would seem, however, that the aim of counseling would not necessarily be counselor satisfaction. This may result from the situation, but it does not seem to fulfill the total demand of this art. From these brief comments it may be assumed that the goals of the client should be given first emphasis, in other words the needs of the client come before those of the counselor. Counseling can only be justified on the basis of its effect on the client, and the only measure of success, or the "goodness" of the session must first be found in the effect on the client. It is possible that the goals or objectives of the counselor may be met in the encounter, the desired character development may come about, the standards that the counselor feels are correct may be accepted, yet the prime consideration must be that of the needs of the client. If counseling were to be oriented in any other way it could only be a directive and disciplinary process, one that would ignore the individual and would cause all clients to be fashioned according to the mold that the counselor would deem appropriate. The fallacy in such a technique appears obvious if we
accept the individual as the prime concern of the counseling situation, yet the counselor may negate this individuality by failing to accept the value orientation of the client and it would be appropriate to consider this aspect as well as that of the personality of the client at this point.

Consider first the question of human values. One definition of basic and general import is that they arise from the relations of men and their institutions in society and nature, and also that they emerge from the attempt of man in society to express his experience and to respond to the sensuous aspects of his environment in a particular fashion. The question as to whether these are learned or intuitional is of no great importance, at this particular phase of the study, but that they do exist and are present in an individual is a point of considerable importance in the counseling situation. On this point Maslow has said in his work Toward A Psychology of Being, "values are uncovered as well as created or constructed, that they are intrinsic in the structure of human nature itself, that they are biologically and genetically based, as well as culturally developed..." Values are not mere subjective incidents, more or less gratuitously superadded to fact, they are inherent in the structure of reality; they must therefore be recognized by the counselor and must be respected by him.

The question as to whose values are important again relates us back to the question of the objective of counseling, and we must ask whose
Values are to be considered? If the values that the counselor holds are normative, the choice that the client should have loses its relationship to reality, the counseling situation becomes the subjective determination of someone other than the one for whom the encounter is aimed. Should the values that are established by the community be the criterion that is to be the guide, then we are again faced with a problem of rejecting the individuality of the client and demanding conformity that may be a hindrance to his or her development. A recent comment in this respect is worth noting; it is held that before a client can become, he must have the right to be. Man moves toward a more adequate functioning only when his current behavior is examined and found to be restrictive or inadequate. He rejects a certain mode of behavior only after it has been allowed to exist and only after it has been perceived as not fulfilling to the self. A client is motivated to change because of the emergence of an internal stimuli that enables the client to reject an inadequate self in favor of an existence that enhances the self. Such a contention in no way denies the education process but it would support the claim that the values held by the client are the ones that will direct his choice and will bring him to reject or accept a behavioral pattern that will permit him to realize the self that is the outcome of the values which he holds as important and as essential to his self realization. But lest it be assumed that these values are a permanent part of one's human condition, it would be appro-
appropriate to note with Klausmeier that, "With the individuals increasing age and experience some positive and negative attitudes tend to become more stable and are incorporated into a more generalized value system or philosophy of life. But marked changes still occur during high school years and even in college." (39) It should also be recognized that in the counseling process these values, either established or changing, will be the basis for the individual's motivation. This concept of motivation as a matter of client response to stimulus, external to himself, has been the basis for much counseling practice. Motivation in this sense is seen as a process of structuring external events to assist the client to arrive at "prior" and "proper" ends. In such a relationship the client is viewed as an organism to be made into something. This view does not recognize the possibility that the client is or might be internally motivated, and in a zeal to develop this situation there is the danger that the counselor might convince the client that he is not "acceptable" as he is. But before a client can become he must be, thus it must be the goal of counseling to unlock the inner force, the value system that they recognize, accept, and need. For the client to move toward a more adequate and personally satisfying behavior their attitudinal structure must be internally challenged rather than externally imposed. From this it may be deduced that it is to the needs, the values, the demands of the client that the counseling situation should be oriented. This is evident in the
positions held by the many adherents or proponents of different techniques of counseling, each counselor or specialists supports this notion without equivocation or reservation; the client is always the focus of the counseling situation. Bordin, reviewing the many theories in counseling, at no time stressed or pointed to any other consideration, it was always the need of the client that was fundamental or basic in the counseling situation. (12)

What then is the impact of these observations if we consider the counselor? Does it imply that the counselor be someone who is simply a sounding board, a recording machine that can parrot back to the client trite cliches or thoughtless mouthings that have no meanings and no foundation in his own individuality? It does not! It means only that the counselor must be acceptant of the values that the client has and that he will refrain from imposing on the client those values that he holds and that constitute or determine his personal orientation. It means also, as Williamson points out, that the counselor must aid the client to clearly understand his own personal value system, or as Rogers asserts, to develop an I - Thou relationship, a timeless relationship, a living in the experience between the client and the counselor. (46) We cannot assume that the primary goal of the counselor is to contribute to the resolution of the immediate situation presented by the client. There can be no doubt that this may be the desired outcome, but one must note that it is incumbent on the client to understand the obstacles to personality
growth and development that are inherent in the specific situation. This should be the action of the client, not the "directed" diagnosis of the counselor. Should the client become accustomed to the directive support of the counselor the personality and individuality of the client would gradually disappear and a "photo copy" of the counselor would begin to emerge defeating the objective of self determination. From this it can be concluded that the value system of the counselor must not be dominant, but it does not imply that it must be obliterated in the presence of that of the client. It does mean that it must be used in conjunction with that of the client to permit the client to arrive at a point of self realization. The terms "self realization" and "self determination" have been used here interchangeably, but should not be mistaken in this concept for "self actualization." The self of the client is actual, it is there to be refined, modified and to be made into something by the client that will conform to his needs. It must become something that it is not at the moment, it must transcend its "actualized" structure to meet the needs that the counselee conceives as fulfilling his demands. This may be a negative or a positive move, but it will be one that is acceptable to the client. This is the part that the counselor must recognize; he must first be willing to accept the fact that the client has the right to accept or reject any behavior pattern, he must be willing also in the encounter to respect the individual in his final choice. It is this that is implied in
the statement that the counselor must be acceptant of the client's value orientation, and also what is implied in saying that the counselor must recognize the client for what he is and, that to fully meet the goal of counseling, the counselor must be willing to accept the internally stimulated attitudinal structure which brings about the behavioral change in the client.

Relationship to philosophy

These aims of counseling can be summarized at this point, before considering the objective from a position in relation to a philosophy, as follows:

1. The interpersonal relationship is with normal and "healthy" individuals.

2. Each person's inner nature is in part unique to himself and is in part common to all others.

3. Each person should be helped to the realization of his self.

4. The values of the individual are developed in the social and individual context of his own existence.

5. The value system of the counselor is similarly developed but must not be imposed on the counselee.

6. A willingness to accept the client for what he is, as well as to permit him the right to self determination, is fundamental to a counseling relation.
It can be noted that these aims are very similar to the objectives outlined by the Committee of Definition of the American Personnel Guidance Association. There is then some basis or substance in these derived aims, and they do conform to established ideas in the field of counseling. These aims should be considered in the light of a philosophy to see if they can be supported from a fundamental and basic position.

As a point of departure a comment by Winborn will serve as a synthesis of previous ideas as well as basis for this evaluation. He states, "Counselors will continue to be called on to assist individuals as they search for individual truths, examine the value options that are available, and consider the responsibilities that are inherent in the alternatives that are deliberated. This calls for a commitment to the individual and his search for a meaningful existence rather than a commitment to any one system of values that transcends the characteristics of individuals, notions and peoples." (80) Of the philosophies examined in the course of this discussion, those that are of the traditional nature seem to put little or no stress on the individual, or they establish absolutes which limit this search for individual purpose and meaning. The modern philosophies stemming from naturalism, positivism or pragmatism similarly seem to ignore the project man, except to stress his functionalism. They may recognize individual difference, but do not carry this premise far enough. In the existential philosophy we do see,
however, a prime concern for the individual, the fully committed individual capable of self determination and faced with the awesome need to commit himself to his own development. It sees the person as the product of his choices, not the result of the elimination or sublimation of drives, nor the finished product of manipulation by the "superior" counselor. The existentialist insists that one of the deepest elements underlying a behavior changes is the freedom of the individual to choose his way of life, to make himself what he is, in a word, to live each moment as a decisive and committed self. This philosophy notes that in choosing a situation that creates anguish, it must be faced decisively and requires total self commitment. It also recognizes the relationship of "the other," the world about him; the person is known from his phenomenal universe, not from his interior and isolated world. He moves in the present as a human existence and is involved consciously in "becoming." Van Kamm's statement, in his article on counseling, is an excellent summary of the application of existential philosophy to the art of counseling in that it reviews the philosophy as well as the counseling situation. "The client should not be encouraged to escape his present by flight into the past where existence is explained by inescapable needs. Nor does it force him to revise the fixed history of his past. It invites him to face the situation of today, not excuse his self, but to return to his world in a new mode of living and to accept its challenges. He reconditions his
behavior in the phenomenal universe. When we know the world in which a person lives, we know him. Every feeling, desire, hope, and idea of the client is embedded in a world of meaning, therefore every experience has for him a place somewhere in this system of meaning. When the client can grasp this idea of his existential world, he will be able to understand the meaning of his problem within this system."

Considering the several specifics of this evaluation we can see that the objective of the counseling art is to work toward a warm human relationship in which the counselor fully and completely accepts the client as a worthy person. In this relationship of complete acceptance the client can grow and develop and come to use the strengths and capacities that are his, and to make decisions and choices that will be satisfactory to him, and thus to his fellows. Such decisions will be rational and logical in that they will bear some relationship to the assets and liabilities that are possessed by the individual. (4) Clifford Froelich states this objective as follows: "Counseling provides a situation in which the individual is stimulated (1) to evaluate himself and his opportunities; (2) to choose a feasible course of action; (3) to accept responsibility for his choice; and (4) to initiate a course of action in line with his choice." (22)

It can be noted that the philosophy of the existentialists with its emphasis on the existent individual, its emphasis on freedom of choice
and its demand for commitment are in accord with the ideas of counseling. Although other philosophies may support the objective in part, they do not supply a universal base on which art of counseling can be developed. It is not illogical, therefore, to conclude that the existential philosophy is compatible with counseling, and it would appropriate as a foundation for this art.

**Conceptual frame of reference**

The existential philosophy is weighed with terminology that is, to say the least, frequently interpreted with varying meanings. It is as a result of this misunderstanding that some difficulty has been experienced and may have raised opposition to the system. Although it is true that some specificity is lost in translation and some further problems arise in the substitution or elimination of these terms, still it does appear possible to show the application of this philosophy to a counseling situation using that terminology that we find in the common usage of counseling today.

To illustrate this position it is intended to develop a construct that will show this relationship, and that can serve as a guide to a discussion of counseling supported by an existential philosophy and couched in the terms of today's counseling techniques.

The following construct is proposed to aid this effort:
Before discussing this construct it is well to note a comment by Carl Rogers, he says, "The counseling relationship is one in which warmth of acceptance and absence of coercion or personal pressure on the part of the counselor permits the maximum expression of feelings, attitudes, and problems by the counselee. The relationship is a well structured one, with limits of time, of dependence, and of aggressive action which apply particularly to the client, and limits of responsibility and of affection which the counselor imposes on himself..." (61) In this comment he defines a relationship that can be expected to meet the needs of the client in the counseling situation as well as noting the attitude of the counselor. Before the encounter however the source of the problem should be noted and understood. An individual is in a continuing process of developing and he will carry within himself deep traces of the past, as well as looking to the future with some concern. This situation gives rise to problems that may be generalized under three distinct categories; conflict, anxiety, and dependency. Without doubt there may be other areas proposed, but these three seem to cover the difficulties that beset the person "becoming" a mature individual. In
considering these as separate situations we find that they will for the most part synthesize into one, and that is anxiety. This is not a term that is to be construed as just another term of fear. Fear may refer to a feeling of being threatened by something particular and may be quite unfounded in the eyes of an outside observer. But when we speak of "anxiety" we refer to a basic human experience, as Briesach says, "In it the total person suddenly feels the contingency in which he lives. In anxiety man confronts nothingness. Anxiety then is not in any way similar to fear caused by superstition or a misunderstood context. It has its roots in the confrontation with nothingness and offers the way to an authentic life, to a finding of one's ground in... authentic existence." (14) In this comment we can note two very relevant conditions in the counseling situation, one the fact that the problem of anxiety may be seen and accepted by another and two that its resolution will bring the client into a contingent situation with his own authenticity.

Referring to the construct, we can look to the problem and note that it is a situation arising from an indecision on the part of the client. This indecision will cause him to question his mode of existence and will lead him to a counseling situation which as Tolbert claims, in his Introduction to Counseling, will, "...help him to know himself and his present and possible future situations so that he can make use of his characteristics and potentialities in a way that is both satisfying to
himself and beneficial to society, and further, can learn how to solve future problems and meet future needs." The solution of the problem then would appear to be the reason for entering the counseling situation, and this relates back to the objective of counseling, not the solution as designed by the counselor, but that one that meets the need of the client as he sees the need, and is willing to accept; Wrenn refers to this "as the self-determined resolution of his problem."

The relationship that exists between the individual and the counselor is one that must next be considered. This is not an alter ego status, that is, the counselor does not try to become a part of the client. In this relationship he does not take on the values, or attitudes of the client, he does not subordinate himself to the client; he must maintain his own personality structure; he must continue to exist as an entity whose own existence is his own determination. He must, however, accept this client for exactly what he is, not something that he will determine him to be in the brief moment of confrontation, but rather the person who will, as a result of this counseling situation, determine what he will be at each and every moment of the encounter. He will endeavor to help the client to marshal his own resources, as well as those of the community, so that the client may achieve the maximum adjustment of which he is capable. Thus in this phase of the encounter there is a two fold relationship to be noted. On the part of the client there will be a form of
dependency which will recognize in the counselor an "other" who is a resource to him in his self-determination. On the part of the counselor, a recognition of this process as well as a fully acceptant attitude will give the client the right to use this resource as he desires. But it goes past this for the counselor, who in addition to recognizing the right of the client to use him, must also recognize his right to accept or reject him in his free choice. Such an attitude is in complete conformity with the first principle of existentialism, as seen by Sartre, in which man is nothing else but that which he makes himself. But both the client and the counselor are faced with this responsibility, to use specious reasons to deny this responsibility would be to create a dependency that would negate freedom of choice and commitment, or become a condition in which the interpersonal relationship, essential to the counseling situation, would degenerate into a mechanical and prosaic meeting.

This relationship is explained by Tillich in his work The Courage to Be, of it he says; "A self which has become a matter of calculation and management has ceased to be a self. It has become a thing. You must participate in a self in order to know what it is. But by participating you change it. In an existential knowledge both subject and object are changed by the very act of knowing... But it restricts detachment to one element within the embracing act of cognitive participation. You may have a precise detached knowledge of another person... but in knowing
this you do not know the person, his centered self, his knowledge of himself. Only in participating in his self, in performing an existential breakthrough into the center of his being will you know him in the center of your breakthrough to him." This is what is meant by the participation with the client, it is what the interpersonal relationship implies, the participation "with one's own existence in some existence." (75) This relationship may be further defined as empathy. Rollo May defines this as "the feeling, or thinking of one personality into another until some state of identification is achieved. In this identification real understanding between people can take place; without it, in fact, no understanding is possible." (50)

Rogers in speaking of this condition lays additional stress to it by defining its mechanics in a series of questions; "The primary point of importance," he says, "is the attitude held by the counselor toward the worth and the significance of the individual. How do we look on others? Do we see each person as having worth and dignity in his own right? If we do hold this point of view at the verbal level, to what extent is it operationally evident at the behavioral level? Do we tend to treat individuals as persons of worth, or do we subtly de-evaluate them by our attitudes and behavior? Is our philosophy one in which respect for the individual is uppermost? Do we respect his capacity and his right to self direction, or do we basically believe that his life would be best
guided by us? To what extent do we have a need and a desire to dominate others? Are we willing for the individual to select and choose his own values, or our actions guided by the conviction that he would be happiest if he permitted us to select for him his values, standards and goals?" (61)

At the first phase of this construct we can see the very basic and fundamental elements of the counseling relationship. The client has been brought to it by reason of some problem that has created, for him, a block to further self-determination, to continued growth. This problem may be real or imagined, but it does constitute a reason for anxiety and will hopefully lead the individual to a positive affirmation of the person and to positive interpretations of personality. The counselor in his relationship with this person has certain obligations or tasks which can best be met if his philosophy will permit him to recognize the worth of the client. The American Personnel Guidance Association considers the following tasks as elemental in the counseling process:

1. Increasing the accuracy of the individual's self-percepts.
2. Increasing the accuracy of the individual's environmental perceptions.
3. Integrating the individual's self-percepts with environmental realities and perceptions.
4. Presenting relevant information.
5. Improving the individual's ability to make and execute plans.
When these are considered in the relationship discussed above, it can be seen that they will be met fully by that counselor who realizes that his function is to aid the client to realize that the problems he faces are a part of life, that they constitute the basis of his choice, and that in the choosing, the person actually creates his life; by this commitment and in this decisive choice the individual realizes selfhood. The relationship does not envisage any subordination of values or attitudes on the part of either the client or the counselor, but rather an acceptant and empathetic involvement in which both members affirm their own being by participation.

It could be expected that in a discrete reference, the situation that develops would be the next point for consideration. But it should be noted that this separation can only exist in a rhetorical sense, for there can be no time frame, no arbitrary separation by phases in a counseling situation. The situation, or that combination of events that is generated by the confrontation of the client, the problem and the counselor is then a sequential matter to be viewed now, to determine those particular aspects that have an impact on this study. From the problem that the client brings to the situation must stem anxiety, an anxiety that is generated in concern with the right course of action. The choice is for the client; his authenticity is challenged by his decision, he must search himself, his values, the influence of his past, and then when all facts
are known, make his choice. To refuse to make this choice can only prolong the problem, can only make him, at this moment of indecision, an individual who refuses to accept the responsibility of commitment, and can continue the period of unauthenticity.

Yet it is here, in this construct that the role of the counselor must be noted. This role is not play acting, it is not an assumed character that the counselor will put on to give help to an individual who is faced with a conflict. It becomes rather, a demand that the counselor enter the situation with the client, that he recognize the particularness of the person and that he permit himself to be "used" to develop the difficulty in all its implications. Nor is it an advice giving episode! Advice is always superficial; it is a handing down of directions, a one way traffic. Counseling operates in a much deeper sphere, and its conclusions are always the product of two personalities working together on the same level.

Advice-giving is not an adequate counseling function because it violates the autonomy of personality. It must be seen that personality must be free and autonomous in all counseling situations, but especially in one fashioned after the existential theme, it follows that one person cannot justifiably pass ready-made decisions down to another. In the situation-role construct however the aspects that must be recognized are first, the indecision that may exist with the client and second, the
fact that the counselor is a resource on which he may draw. Thus at this phase we may note a dependency on the part of the client, an aspect that cannot be fostered but which should be recognized. We must also see that the counselor will both recognize this need, will meet it and provide the client with that help that he will see as necessary to aid in authentic self-determination. This self-determination is one that can be seen to exist in a two way confrontation, one that the client must observe in his effort to come to a decision, and in which the counselor must continually recognize in the free choice that the client must be afforded in his search for authentic or non-authentic commitment.

Finally in this construct we must note the difference between the need of the client and the expectation of the counselor. The need is that which the client sees as stemming from his problem, from his values, from his socio economic situation, from his past, in a word from his "self;" the expectations of the counselor have no firm roots, they are product of the counselors relation with the client and may be based in experience, in hopes, in expectations stemming from communication, or from desires. But at this point in our construct any parallelism must be forgotten. The subjectiveness of the encounter must be the deciding influence. There can be no doubt that the counselor will have developed several hypothesis to be tested in his mind during the course of the encounter, but he must still remain at this phase just what he was at the start, a resource that
the client can use, and with whom he can enter an interpersonal relationship which respects and recognizes the "other" as well as the "self". This particular aspect of an existential encounter is very appropriately commented on by Schrag. "Existentialism," he says, "is neither intellectualistic nor voluntaristic, neither rationalistic nor irrationalistic. It transcends the distinction. The validity of thought is in no wise denied. What is denied is that thought can be reduced to a rational objectifying, theoretical activity...It is precisely the task of the existential thinker to think his existence. He must penetrate his concrete particularity and existential involvement with thought that has universal validity. The existential thinker is a thinker and an existing individual at one and the same time." (69) Thus the counselor must recognize and realize that the free choice of the client permits him to choose or not choose his own form of authenticity.

The final point in this construct is behavior, this has been variously defined, but one that seems to meet with almost full acceptance, is that which states that it is the way an organism responds to a stimulus. It includes both the overt and the covert, that is, the apparent as well as that inner change or response that cannot be readily assessed. Its merit is too often judged on its usefulness to the individual or on its acceptability to society, and such judgment is made even before its cause is understood. But in the counseling situation such a determination cannot be made. If
we accept the individual for what he is, worthy of consideration, with
dignity and integrity in his own right, his choice, freely made must be
respected, as meeting his demands for authenticity. What then are the
implications of this particular phase? From the position of the client,
the choice he makes is the response to the stimulus of the encounter,
his choice is his own, his decision develops his own life, creates his
self at the moment. Ignoring the problem does not develop that authen­
ticity he seeks, but only prolongs the period of indecision. For the
counselor this may be the moment of truth! There may be no question in
his mind as to the proper course to follow, yet he does not have the right
to impose this opinion on his client. Not only is such an action out of
the question, but the further requirement exists that he accept the decision
of the client first as a right and secondly as that which is essential to
his own relationship with "the other."

Problem considerations

Two immediate considerations are raised at this point. First,
what if any distinction exists between this and the non-directive approach
to counseling, and, secondly, what ethical questions are implied in this
apparent permissiveness? The answer to the first question is to be found
only in the underlying philosophy. The entire counseling process,
regardless of the approach claims that its concern is first with the individual,
but in this encounter there is a deeper significance. The existentialist is concerned with man, not in so far as he can be treated as an object, like any other object, and studied with the aid of the scientific method; man can turn himself into an object and consider himself as one kind of thing among other types of things which together form what we call the world and each of which can be studied from different points of view in the impersonal and objective spirit of the scientist; man may also study himself from the standpoint of the biochemist or the anatomist. But though he may objectify himself, he is still the subject, a fact which is shown by his very capacity to objectify himself. It is man as the subject, however, that the existentialist is concerned with in his approach to the individual. At no place do we find a positive statement of such a philosophy in any of the other techniques of counseling. Therefore, though we note similarities in methodology we must look to the reasons for the methodology to note the difference. In the other methods or techniques of counseling there is, as was noted, a lack of an underlying philosophy. The technique proposed here does not burden itself with technical jargon proposed by the exponents of this philosophy, but is apparently supported in its basic tenets. "This theory undertakes to explore man as an irreducible totality rather than a collection of unrelated behaviors. An understanding of the whole man and his relation to society has been and remains the necessary foundation of every view as to what is good for
man as an individual and as a member of society." (25)

The answer to the second question follows from this consideration
because as Sartre points out; "If a man once becomes aware that in his
forlorness he imposed values, he can no longer want but one thing, and
that is freedom, as the basis for all values. That does not mean that he
wants it in the abstract, it simply means that the ultimate meaning of the
acts of honest man is the quest for freedom as such." (67) Commitment
has two aspects, one subjective and one objective; the subjective aspect
is the requirement that one act authentically. It requires that one accept
responsibility for his past within a given context of a given project. It
means that once a man has become self conscious he is morally obliged to
act in no way that will deaden his preoccupation with his integrity. He is
obliged to impregnate all his actions with some sense of their relevance
to him, as a man and as a person. (27)

Objectively, this aspect of commitment is derived from the fact
that an act is essentially a relation between the actor and the world.
These problems of actions then include problems of the nature of society
and history, the relation of means to the ends and the consequences of
actions. A man cannot become the person he wants to be by merely
thinking of himself, but only by doing something with himself. This
requires involving himself in the affairs of others, in adopting himself to
social pressures, in transforming his environment. (27)
Thus the problems seem to pale to insignificance when we understand the existential concept of freedom and feel the responsibility for rational decision and commitment.
This paper has attempted to point out the need to look to a philosophy that would be compatible with the counseling art. This need was derived from two pertinent considerations, first, the almost apparent neglect of this subject and its sparse coverage in the literature, and second, the time period over which this neglect has extended. Without question individuals have concerned themselves with a counseling philosophy but they have not expressed themselves with any degree of definiteness on this subject. The many other facets of the art have been discussed and clearly stated, such as the psychological fundamentals, the scientific and the anthropological approaches, and the various factors of an educational or sociological nature that have had an impact on this art, but unfortunately that area, which this paper assumes to be basic to a counseling process, that is the philosophy of counseling, has received only a cursory treatment.

In considering a philosophy of counseling it was seen that many systems were evident and an evaluation of these was essential, if any one was to be proposed. To make the determination of the compatibility of the philosophy to the counseling art, a comparison of the traditional and modern systems of philosophy was made, using as an evaluation base the three fold problems of knowledge, of being, and of self in the world. This selection was deemed appropriate because of the very evident application these have to the counseling situation and because of their
inherent relation to philosophy. From this evaluation certain conclusions could be drawn that would permit the philosophies to be related to the counseling situation and a statement made as to which philosophy would be compatible with counseling. Having made this selection it would be possible to construct, around this philosophy, a system of counseling that would be firmly entrenched in a philosophy for this art. The comparison and application was between two distinct approaches, first the traditional, which includes certain modern philosophies that would be extensions of the empirical approach, and second, the philosophy that stems from the existential thought. By considering these philosophies in the light of the problems of knowledge, of being, and of self in the world, it becomes possible to note their specific emphasis and to see how these would support the counseling effort.

The various philosophies were looked at in their historicity to note the changing stress that they placed on the problem of knowledge; by relating this aspect to the problem of counseling it was noted that its subjective and relative value negated to a degree some of the stress that was found in the more traditional systems. The rationalists concern for knowledge was to be found in the eternal, necessary and universal. The empiricist were primarily concerned with that which could be perceived through the physical senses. The why of knowledge became for the first group a goal, and for the empiricists a means of transforming natural and
social environment. To the existentialist, however, the what and the why of knowledge are to know the human condition and to provide a proper understanding of this condition and existential values. The existential approach does not question the possibility of human knowledge nor does it place any philosophic limitations on this knowledge; it does, however, place it in direct confrontation with human existence. Because of this emphasis and its direct relation to the individual in counseling, it was felt that the existential philosophy in its treatment of the problem of knowledge, was an acceptable approach in counseling.

The problem of being as a second point for consideration was again reviewed from the aspect of history, that is, the concepts held by the many philosophers over the ages. These were noted to be grounded in "ideas," the idea of "being" was being itself at the onset of this problem, but with the progress of thought the notion of substance and the appearance of substance gave rise to the question of being and non-being. Later concepts were noted to have their origin in the concern that the philosophers had for the source and validity of human knowledge. The problem then became one of determining the conditions of our knowledge of existence and of the identification of the real and ideas with matters of fact and the intelligible relations between ideas. An extreme position in the approach to this problem was that taken by latter day empiricists who reduced all entities to a single level of phenomenal being and all other
views are brushed aside in the process. In opposition to all these philosophies, that of the existentialists looked again to the human condition. They endeavored to see man as a concrete human person, not as an abstract epistemological subject, but rather as a self-creating and self-transcending subject. Although the existential philosophy frequently loses itself in difficult terminology, and although it does appear to generate certain errors in thinking when looked at in the traditional sense of philosophic systems, it does relate closely to that object which is the first consideration in the counseling situation, the person, real, present and existing, not the idea nor the determination of an object of knowledge. Existentialism offers the individual the means of discovering what makes him unique and also a means of understanding his situation.

Following from these problems we see next the problem of the self in the world. This has been an area of consideration that has plagued the philosophers throughout history. They have looked at this condition from a religious or from a scientific viewpoint with a myriad of other interpretations between these concepts. The one approach is permissive, the other coldly scrutinizing, the one treats values and personality lightly, the other ignores them completely. Neither of these or the in between approaches are definitive of the position of man and his universe, in a word they misinterpret the problem of the self in the world. On the other hand we see that the existentialists do not deny any of these positions.
They do not deny the idealist nor the materialist stand, they do claim, however, that there is a tension in the world and that it is man's right and need to discover this tension. They see man in society as a part of his environment, but still as an individual with values and characteristics that make him unique and important in his own right. Such an idea is completely in accord with the objectives of counseling which calls for acceptance of the individual as a person, worthy in his own right, and whose dignity as an individual must be respected.

In considering these problems in the light of the philosophies and in relation to the objectives of counseling it was concluded that the philosophy of the existentialists was very adaptable to a counseling situation. This philosophy met the needs both of the counselee and the counselor in the encounter, and continued to support the situation when the encounter was finished. The objections that are often raised about the similarity of this method to other techniques showed that this method stemmed from a single and completely compatible philosophy. When viewed in its full impact it is fully supportive of a moral and ethical system that would meet the demands established by an individual's value system, and would call for rational and decisive commitment.
CONCLUSIONS

By way of conclusion it can be stated, with some degree of certitude, that it is right and proper to base the counseling process in an appropriate philosophy. To continue to ignore this aspect of the art will only lead it away from its prime objective, the person, the individual for whom it is intended; this will preclude the possibility of a warm interpersonal relationship, and set it firmly in empiricism or scientism.

Yet if we claim that this step is necessary it also follows that the philosophy must be one that is compatible with the art. Those philosophies that follow the traditional systems appear to fall short of meeting this specific objective in that they do not reach the crux of the problem. They stress, so to speak, the "things on the other side of the moon" and pay too little attention to the thing which is themselves. The existentialist, on the other hand, is concerned with the "existential experience," with "existence as a subject of inquiry," with the concept of "becoming" and with "subjectivity." These matters are of very direct concern to the counselor and the counselee in their relationship. They bear directly on the decisions that will be made, on the manner in which it is made, and on the method in which it is carried out in the continuing act of becoming. This philosophy of existentialism then can be seen to support the counseling art to a greater degree than do the others with their foundations in the more traditional systems.
To claim that one method is better than the other, and to demand that this selected method be imposed as a criterion, would of course be contrary to the existential belief, in that it is an imposition of values and is a denial of free choice. "The peculiarity of existentialism," as Blackham points out, "is that it deals with the separation of man from himself... The main business of this philosophy is not to answer the questions that are raised but to drive home the questions themselves until they engage the whole man and are made personal..." (11) Yet to ignore this philosophy in making a choice of a philosophy to support the counseling art would not be realistic, and if a choice is available, it is only logical to choose that method which is most compatible. If the propositions of this paper are acceptable, this must be seen to be existentialism.
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