Reconsideration of underdevelopment and problems of development: an application of an alternative model of change to the Third World countries

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Reconsideration of underdevelopment and problems of development:
An application of an alternative model
of change to the Third World countries

by

Son-Ung Kim

A Dissertation Submitted to the
Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree of
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Iowa State University
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1975
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Statement of Problem

During the period following the first World War a massive scale struggle for national liberation began to spread widely among the colonial and semi-colonial areas. In a number of places, these nationalist struggles led to the emergence of independent political units during the interwar period. For the most part, however, the colonial areas have been decolonized since the second World War; becoming independent countries largely on the basis of their colonial heritage -- without regard to ethnicity, language, or other aspects of cultural homogeneity.

Since the second World War, the newly independent countries have consciously tried to construct some basis for national autonomy and eliminate the legacy of imperialist domination. While some of these new states took to the path of socialist reconstruction, others have been shaping their economies and social structures on the basis of "free market economies". These newly independent countries are described popularly as the "Third World" (Horowitz, 1966; Worsley, 1964), or simply as the "new states" (Shils, 1966). They are also characterized as "underdeveloped countries" and have been recently, in a more diplomatic sense, called "developing countries" or "less developed countries" (Myrdal, 1968: Appendix I). In this study, however, all these terms will be used synonymously.

Those underdeveloped countries based on market economies consist of Central and Latin America, Africa, and Asia (excluding the socialist countries, Japan, and Israel), and Oceania (excluding Australia and New
Zealand). These underdeveloped countries, constituting more than two-thirds of the world population, exhibit certain characteristics which distinguish them from developed countries. These characteristics, as described by a number of scholars, are: (1) technologically -- a predominance of human and animal power over inanimate power (such as steam power, electricity, or other sources) as a means of production; (Levy, 1972); (2) economically -- low levels of labor productivity and per capita income, a predominance of the primary sector over the manufacturing sector and relatively low development of organized large-scale machine-based industry; (3) ecologically -- a low level of urbanization; (4) socio-demographically -- low levels of living standard for the mass of people as is manifested in specific deficiencies (insufficient food-intake, bad housing conditions, inadequate public and private provisions for hygiene and medical care, and inefficient educational and cultural facilities, massive illiteracy, low level of health and nutrition, and rapid population growth due to high fertility rates) (Myrdal, 1968:1862); (5) socio-culturally and psychologically -- a prevalence of low levels of work discipline, a lack of punctuality and orderliness (Inkeles, 1966), superstitious beliefs and irrational attitudes, and fatalism. In the words of Hoselitz (1960), the indices of underdevelopment are "particularism, ascription, and functional diffuseness".

These underdeveloped countries are now trying to reshape such underdeveloped characteristics and to overcome their backward economies. It is on an unprecedented scale that these underdeveloped countries are consciously making a sustained effort to develop their economic, political,
social, and cultural contexts. The purposive change of national development planning (which is characterized by a conscious and deliberate effort to overcome poverty and backwardness by the massive mobilization of natural and human resources on the basis of plans and directions, and in terms of elaborated goals) is, indeed, a novel feature of our time.

Efforts to bring about accelerated economic growth through national planning have met with mixed results among the Third World countries. Some of these countries have been, in part, successful in bringing about the desired transformation, but there have also been many unsuccessful attempts at national planning. Many of these newly independent countries have been unable to achieve the overall objectives of their national plans. Not only have some countries failed to ensure sustained growth, but they also have been unable to develop and maintain the viable modern institutional structures which are necessary to absorb continuous change and deal with newly emergent problems. There seems to be a general agreement as to the failure of the development planning programs (Angelopoulos, 1972; Asher, 1970, Evans, et al., 1966). As a result, the optimism and enthusiasm which marked the beginning of the 1960's as the decade of Third World development has degenerated into pessimism and frustration (Said, 1971:1).

This study is concerned with the new dynamism of development planning and the major causes and related problems of underdevelopment in the newly independent Third World countries. As was pointed out above, the recent general failures to effectively promote development has cast serious doubts about the validity of the current theories of development upon which Third
World development plans were based. From a particular point of view, the possible reasons for the recent failure of instigated social changes in these countries may be broadly assessed in terms of: (1) unfavorable initial conditions at the starting point of development planning, (2) the theoretical inadequacy of the conventional theoretical approaches which were applied in development planning, and (3) the lack of verification of these theories as based on current predominant methods of inquiry.

1. Unfavorable initial conditions

As Myrdal (1968:673-706) emphatically pointed out, the initial conditions for development in the less developed new nations are quite different from those in which the now developed countries initially found themselves. With regard to general social conditions, factors such as inhibitive ruling classes and attitudinal obstacles among the masses, and other factors operate as much stronger barriers to developmental change than was the case in the developed countries. These attitudes are reinforced by existing social institutions, acting as both causes and effects of the attitudes. With regard to political institutions, the developed countries were politically independent, established as civil societies and had become fairly consolidated nation-states, able to pursue national policies, well before their industrial revolutions. By contrast, most of the underdeveloped countries in Asia and Africa, with the exception of the Latin American countries, have only recently become independent and have yet to become consolidated nation-states, capable of pursuing national policies effectively.
In addition to a generally poor endowment of natural resources, the less developed countries are characterized by a severe lack of supporting industrial infrastructures and a shortage of skilled labor and trained human resources. Moreover, some underdeveloped countries — as was the case, for instance, with South and East Asian countries — must initiate their development efforts with a considerably higher man/land ratio than did the Western countries. In addition, the recent population explosion in most underdeveloped countries is unprecedented and has become a most serious obstacle to development. International migration played a significant role in the reduction of the burden of any population increases in the European countries.

Finally, in regard to international relations, the trading position of most underdeveloped countries has been deteriorating. Since the colonial era, most of the underdeveloped countries have been exporting some specialized primary products but the demands for their exports have been shrinking relative to the marked expansion of world trade. These shrinkages have partially been due to substantial cutbacks in the amount of raw materials used in industrial use (because technological progress has developed industrial substitutes), and partially because the increase in the production of export products has generally been slow. Besides, discriminatory tariffs in the developed countries hamper the development of export industries in the underdeveloped countries. All these unfavorable initial conditions make economic development of underdeveloped countries more difficult today than it once was for the now developed countries.
2. Theoretical Inadequacy

Despite divergent forms and differing emphasis in their national development planning, the Third World countries have widely employed the principle of so-called "democratic planning"; largely based on the freedom of enterprises in market economies and the incentives of individuals rather than collectivization of the human and nonhuman factors in production and distribution. This type of development planning rests largely upon conventional Western theories of development rather than a pure socialist approach to development. These conventional development approaches, as have been applied in the Third World countries, are thought to be theoretically inadequate for the following reasons. First, the initial assumptions in these theories are either unrealistic or irrelevant to the realities of the underdeveloped countries. This is because most of the conventional theories were constructed on the basis of unique Western development experiences, or they were deductively derived in terms of ideal-types abstracted from time, space, and historical context.

As already noted, the current internal conditions, as well as the external settings, of the underdeveloped countries are different from those which the Western countries experienced. These conditions need to be taken into account in terms of their implications for development planning and induced social change. Models are needed that more adequately reflect the unique conditions of the Third World countries.

Secondly, some concepts of the development theories which were applied in the less developed countries are believed to be either misleading or inappropriate to the realities of these countries. The concepts of a
theory are as important as its initial assumptions because concepts are building blocks of theory. From a development viewpoint, for instance, the implication of the concept of "consumption" for the understanding of the people in the developed countries is different from that drawn concerning the undernourished people of underdeveloped countries. When applied in different social structures and cultural contexts, the concepts used may be redefined relevant to the contents of their referents. In many cases, however, the models were not relevantly revised. Nor were the concepts of the models redefined in a manner relevant to the realities of the underdeveloped countries.

Thirdly, there has been a tendency toward a Western bias in the social studies of underdevelopment. The sources of potential Western bias may be found in the following: (1) a natural ethnocentric impulse of the Western scholars, particularly during the colonial era; (2) the Western political and military interest in winning the underdeveloped new nations as allies against the communist expansion (especially during the cold war period) (Myrdal, 1968); (3) the intentions of securing the economic interests of the developed countries (vested in the form of foreign private investment or public loan, and the like); and (4) the fact that the developed countries, as providers of advisors (or consultants) and foreign aid, have exerted strong influences on the economic development planning of the recipient countries (Johnson, 1967:137-141). Thus, in the analysis of underdeveloped countries, such biases are likely to obscure the real causes of underdevelopment, and contribute ineffective development planning. Based on this biased viewpoint, these development approaches (with
irrelevant assumptions and with inappropriate concepts) have resulted in the failure of development efforts and often even hamper development.

3. Insufficient methods of research inquiry

Postwar analyses of the social changes of the new states were characterized by the increasing use of comparative analysis techniques, and of interdisciplinary approaches. More recently, functional and behavioral theories have been popular among social scientists. These functionalists and behaviorists have sought to integrate the ideas of system, culture, function, structure, and action in a conceptual scheme particularly designed for comparative analysis.

Resting on the assumption that a significant relationship exists between social, economic, and political development, many behavioral scientists advocate empirical analyses using a wide range of operationalized quantitative data. These studies generalize about the existence of an association of economic backwardness with social and political factors, using extensively sociodemographic indices such as per capita income, literacy rates, indices of levels of living, and various other demographic variables. Because of their more elaborated analytical framework, modern research methods have provided a strengthened conceptual unity in these social studies, and the operationalized concepts yield quantitative data which have provided a means for testing hypotheses.

Despite such improvement in analytical methods and techniques, the problems of modernization are often approached with unconsciously implied value-laden definitions. In particular, the conventional Western approaches are based on the assumptions: that democracy is a characteristic
of modernity, that it is the ideal form of political development, and that it is a prerequisite of development. Furthermore, other sources of bias enter into the study of modernization, in the selection of subject areas for research, and in the interpretation of findings (often being restricted by research funding agencies of the developed countries). Under such circumstances even empirical research cannot contribute to valid generalizations about the problems of development and current situations of underdeveloped countries.

Next, in the studies of modernization, the research methods of both the functionalists and behavioralists are largely reliant on cross-sectional analysis using quantitative data — without regard to cultural backgrounds, historical process, or the geographical peculiarities of underdeveloped countries. These contemporary approaches seek to explain underdevelopment and change solely in terms of theoretical characteristics of a society; characteristics generated within the theories and ignorant of the historical and external factors which have shaped life in the developing countries.

The main concern of this study is the correction of deficiencies operative in the current theories of development. In order to make development plans effective, in order that these plans can be used to induce desired social change, an alternative, inclusive model for the valid analysis of the underdeveloped societies and their changes is called for. It is desired that the alternative analytic framework should be theoretically adequate and empirically supported; on the basis of valid research on the underdevelopment.
B. The Objectives and Limitations of this Study

The main purpose of this study is to offer an inclusive, generalized model which identifies the major historical, international and societal forces, and processes which collectively define the sociocultural context in which development planning takes place in the new states of the Third World. This model will then be utilized as a heuristic device to guide a systematic analysis of the major causes and current conditions of underdevelopment, and to suggest areas of valid development strategies for the underdeveloped new nations. The determining causes of underdevelopment and related problems will be identified and analyzed in terms of the inclusive analytical model to be formulated. The model is a general one in that it is concerned with the general conditions of underdevelopment and problems common to development efforts in the new states. The model is inclusive in that it includes not only historical processes but also the international relationships within which the underdeveloped countries operate. The model is analytical because it offers a framework for a valid analysis of the underdeveloped societies and their changes. By providing a basis for a valid analysis of the underdeveloped nations, guided by the analytical framework, it is hoped that some viable ingredients for policy consideration might be isolated.

Since the real world problems of underdevelopment vary in their manifestations and complexity from one country to another, the analysis will be limited to some selective aspects of underdevelopment common to the Third World countries. At the same time, the discussion will remain at a broad and general level because its primary concern is the overall
conditions of underdevelopment and those problems of national development common to the underdeveloped nations of the Third World. As a result, the development strategies drawn from a guided analysis of current conditions of underdevelopment will be suggestive and remain to be specified in terms of their practical implementation.

C. The Approach of this Study

As indicated in the beginning of this chapter, the current change taking place in the Third World countries is not only unprecedented in terms of its quality but also because it is a comprehensive process of change which is more than the sum of many small changes, i.e., changes occurring in individual attitudes, in social behavior, in economics, and in politics. Thus, the analysis will, indeed, be based on an interdisciplinary approach. More specifically, the analysis of this study will include: (1) regional comparison, (2) historical considerations, and (3) an "insider's viewpoint" as suggested by Myrdal (1957, 1975). The regional comparative approach will be used to analyze the patterns of underdevelopment among the less developed countries, as well as the differences between the more developed countries and the less developed countries (especially in the analysis of demographic conditions and international relations).

Historical considerations will be emphasized in the analysis of the determining causes and social conditions of underdevelopment. Most of the underdeveloped new states are, in fact, the products of historical process, and these historical consequences become the initial conditions for current development planning in those countries. Analogously, what happened yesterday partially determines today's conditions.
Finally, consistent with Myrdal's discussion of the need for intensified research by indigenous young scholars of the underdeveloped societies (Myrdal, 1957; 1975), the "insider's view" will be emphasized in the interpretation of the internal social problems and issues of the underdeveloped countries. Merton (1971) is correct when he points out that the "insider's view" in social studies may also be biased in interpretation of their own problems. However, the author's firm conviction is that the "insiders" are in a better position than the "outsiders" to develop a coherent understanding of the nature and meaning of the internal social problems which plague less developed countries. What is called an "insider's view" should not be regarded as based solely on subjective judgments, but should rather be understood as a particular, yet valid, type of subjective interpretation of both the insider's social needs and their ideals for development.

This study analyzes the determining causes and current conditions of underdevelopment and discusses related problems of underdevelopment in terms of both quality of life and development planning. But the nature of this study is basically theoretical; beginning with formulation of an alternative analytical model of the social changes occurring in the Third World. The analysis includes some statistical data concerning the international relationships and existing sociodemographic conditions, but these statistics, which are obtained from secondary sources and existing publications, will be used for illustrative purposes rather than inferentially.
D. The Organization of this Study

The body of this study is composed of seven chapters, including chapters of introduction and summary. Chapter two will review current development theories and formulate an analytical model for the analysis of changes taking place in the Third World. In this chapter, with the introduction of general theories of social change, major theories of development will be reviewed in terms of their theoretical adequacy and applicability to the Third World countries. Following review of the major theories of development, an alternative generalized model which identifies major causes of underdevelopment and forces of development in the Third World countries will be presented.

Chapter three will be concerned with the products of the historical process of colonialism and the contemporary external constraints on development efforts in the less developed countries. This chapter will describe the "widen ing gap" between the income levels in developed rich countries and in underdeveloped poor countries. In chapter four, attention will be given to the internal dynamics of change, i.e., factors concerning national development planning in the new states. More specifically, the nature and role of the new nationalism will be discussed in relation to national development planning. On the basis of analysis of nationalism, social valuations underlying national development objectives will be elaborated in the second section of this chapter. In connection with national development planning, the role of the agents of change will be discussed. The agents of change refer to the "modernizing elites" and public administrations.
Chapter five will deal with the general conditions of underdevelopment in the areas of demography, of the quality of life, and of social institutions. Population problems mainly concern the impacts of rapid population growth in less developed countries. The quality of life will be discussed in terms of the educational, nutritional, and health aspects of the general population. Finally, social conditions will include the effect of political corruption, social inequalities within individual countries, and traditional land ownership systems. The model to be formulated will be utilized to envelop the above three chapters (chapter three, chapter four, and chapter five) in one package, as an analytical guide.

In chapter six, an effort will be made to discuss the general characteristics of modernization as achieved in the developed countries and formulation of comprehensive national development planning for the Third World countries. The third section of this chapter will present a discussion of the utility of "social indicators" for planning purpose, and the final section will be devoted to proposing a general strategy for the formulation of comprehensive development planning in an individual country. Finally, a brief summary will be made in chapter seven.
II. REVIEW OF THE THEORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE AND FORMULATION OF AN ALTERNATIVE INCLUSIVE MODEL OF CHANGE

The purpose of this chapter is: (1) to examine the major theories which have predominated in the application of development planning to less developed countries, and (2) to formulate an alternative, inclusive model which identifies the major factors and mechanisms associated with social changes occurring in parts of the Third World. Modernization is generally viewed as a specific form of development. The first section of this chapter will present an overview of the theories of social change in order to provide a context for the discussion of modernization which follows in the second section.

The second section attempts to examine six major development approaches (which are believed to have been predominant) in terms of their theoretical adequacy and empirical validity, and relate their application in less developed countries. Finally, the third section will be devoted to the formulation of an alternative model for systematic analysis of the major causes and current facets of underdevelopment. The model formulated will then be utilized as a heuristic scheme and guide for a discussion of contemporary social changes taking place in the less developed countries.

A. Overview of the Theories of Social Change

While the general theories of social change have been closely associated with somewhat philosophical interpretations of history, a sociological analysis of social change requires a model which makes possible the formulation of focal problems and the systematic analysis of the problems of change. Gerth and Mills (1953:377-378) have outlined such a
model with six major questions about social change: (1) what is it that changes? (2) how does it change? (3) what is the direction of change? (4) what is the rate of change? (5) why does change occur or why is it possible? And (6) what are the principal factors in social change?

The first question in the above requires a clear definition of social change and a delineation of the appropriate units of analysis. Distinguishing social change from cultural change, Ryan (1969) regards the former as a significant alteration in the social relations among the social members and patterns of their social activities, while regarding the latter as embracing broader ranges such as changes in values, ideas, technology, artifacts, and other various aspects of life. However, the distinction between social and cultural changes is only analytical, and they are closely linked and often fuzzy in their distinction. In the real world, changes can and do take place simultaneously both in social and cultural aspects.

The next three questions concerning the manner, direction, and tempo of change are usually answered in the historical description and interpretation of change. In sociological literature, comparative statics or analogies, particularly organic analogies, have often been employed in the analysis of the process of change. The unit of analysis varies in its scope and scale, ranging from characteristics of the individual, of the family unit, through organizational, and institutional aspects, up to the societal level. Contemporary sociological studies, oriented to middle range theories, pay more attention to "small-scale changes" than to large-scale changes or comprehensive wholes. According to Moore (1963:46-47)
"small-scale changes" can be roughly categorized into four areas: (1) repetitive cycles of social action, (2) cumulative structural changes of groups, (3) normative change in values and rules of conduct, and (4) inter-group dynamics.

Often, much attention is paid to such variables as individual personality, value orientations, attitudes, and role changes at the individual level. At the group level, sociologists usually deal with such variables as the group (or organizational) size, duration, mode of recruiting members, interpersonal relations, role relationships, communication patterns, leadership characteristics, and the like. Fundamentally, the studies on small-scale change rely on observation of short-term variations which are assumed to have long-term cumulative consequences.

Most existing sociological theories dealing with large-scale change relating the comprehensive whole of society can be seen as: (1) historical, insofar as some historical situations or the present situations are thought to be representative, particularly in terms of the unique characteristics of Western experiences after the Industrial Revolution; (2) theoretical, insofar as an inner consistency exists in the conceptual elements of theoretical models, whether based on analogies, comparative statics, or ideal type taxonomies; and (3) methodological, insofar as the construction of ideal types of overall societies is based on some selective traits of human society (Ponsioen, 1969). Such characteristics are seen in the well known works of Tonnies, Weber, and Durkheim by way of posing a dichotomy, and in those of Comte, Marx, Mannheim, and, recently, Riesman and Rostow by formulating certain stages in the historical process
of change. Apparently, referring to his own German society at the end
of the nineteenth century, Tonnies compared the traditional countryside
with the industrial urban centers, characterizing them as gemeinschaft
and gesellschaft, respectively. In terms of the underlying value orienta­
tion in the patterns of social organizations, Weber differentiated between
a communal type of society, whose members belonged by wesenwille
(natural will), and an associational type of society organized by kurwille
(rational will), based on individualism. In a similar vein, Durkheim
claims that society changes from a mechanic to an organic type of solidar­
ity when division of labor increases as a result of population expansion.
Although their criteria differed, these three theories (Tonnies, Durkheim,
and Weber) were developed on the basis of the unique transitional
phenomena in nineteenth century Western societies. And simple comparative
statics of dichotomy were used to look at the present compared with the
past.

All the stage theories imply that the series of stages in social
change are irreversible and inevitable in the sense that every society
must follow such stages. Methodologically, stage theorists explain or
describe social change by constructing typologies embodied in the concept
of "ideal types", which, by definition, are not found in reality. Often,
the validity of selecting some traits for constructing the ideal types
must be subject to empirical generalization and analysis. However, most
of these theoretical models either display only selected characteristics
of relevance to Western society, or remain as only philosophical or in­
tellectual speculation. Moreover, as Ponsioen (1969:26) has pointed out
"all authors are really thinking about the Western world even when speaking about mankind in general".

The earlier theories of social change can be divided into linear and cyclical theories. The linear theories, most of which are evolutionary, delineate in one form or another, a number of significant cumulative changes in human history, from lower to higher levels. Cyclical theories of social change depict other aspects of human history, expressed in terms of the conception of growth, maturity, and the decay of civilizations. In cyclical theories, an emphasis is placed on a rhythm of fluctuation similar to that of the life-cycle of an organism. Spengler, Sorokin, and Toynbee are the leading representatives of cyclical theorists.

The problem of why change occurs is closely related to the principal factors in social change as can be seen in the questions formulated by Gerth and Mills (1953). This subject is the central concern of inquiries into social change, and is also the most controversial. No consensus exists among the theorists. Gerth and Mills have briefly discussed the role of individuals in bringing about social change, particularly in relation to the influence of material (objective) factors and ideas (subjective).

In his recent article, "Conflicting theories of social change", James S. Coleman (1973) makes some distinction between theories of change and divides them into two broad categories, theories that start with changes in the social conditions versus those that start with changes in individuals. The first group of theories is again subdivided into those labeled "lawyer's theory" and "economist's theory", on the one hand, while the
latter group is labeled "psychologist's theory" and "revolutionary's theory". (See Chart A).

Max Weber, Everett Hagen, and David McClelland may represent the "psychologist's theory", while Lenin, Mao Tse-Tung, and Franz Fanon may represent the "revolutionary's theory". Despite the radical differences between these two schools of thought, one common similarity does exist and rests on the view that change is predicated upon changes in the personalities or beliefs and motivations of individuals. For Weber, the capitalist spirit, as both the value and practice of individualism, is rooted in the Protestant ethic. For Hagen and McClelland, the early socialization process in children forms the need for achievement which is essential for social and economic development. In other words, the "psychologist's theories" are based on the idea that, "the personality change that preceded the rise of capitalism lay in the ideals and values embodied in the new religious belief of Protestantism" (Coleman, 1973:68). But Weber avoided touching upon the reason for the formation of the new religious belief of Protestantism in terms of his "psychologist's theory". Both Hagen and McClelland emphasize the role of the entrepreneur, characterized by a strong profit motivation and risk-taking adventurism in the competitive capitalist system. In this case, rapid expansion in the economy in a laissez-faire capitalist system may be possible under the entrepreneur's aggressive activities. The qualitative, distributive aspects of human life are mostly shunned by these theorists.

Both Pareto and Mosca, who view social change as dependent on the leadership of elites, may be regarded as the "individualist's theorists"
Chart A. Theories of directed social change (Elaboration based on Coleman, 1973:61-74).
in Coleman's classification. In relation to the group of the "individualist's theories", an innovative minority, usually standing on the margin of the existing society, may be one of the crucial factors of social change. This theory was developed from the notion of Everett V. Stonequist's "The Marginal Man" (1937). The theoretical justification of the marginal man (or innovative minority) may be found in references made to the Jews in Europe and the Indian or Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia.

Although it shares the idea of psychological change in individuals, the thesis of "revolutionary's theories" has a different origin from that of the above "individualist's theories". The "individualist's theorists" conceive the changes in the individual's beliefs and motivations as being the main source in social change. The "revolutionary theorists" think that it is the revolutionary action itself which brings change (Coleman, 1973:69). Since the "revolutionary theorist" emphasizes the effect of action in changing beliefs, the mechanism of transformation is precisely the opposite of that of the individualists. The revolutionary approach is characterized by the total commitment of the individual to the collectivity through the revolutionary movement. To the "revolutionary theorists", the collectivity is viewed as the "single-minded instrument of change". And the "revolutionary theorists" believe that the social change comes about "by the collective force of the revolutionary group", not by an aggregate of changes in the individuals (Coleman, 1973:69).

In terms of the validation of these theories, it should be noted that these two groups of theories have often been applied to different situations of social change. The "individualist theories" have been
applied more often to social change in relatively open societies, on the one hand. On the other hand, the "revolutionary theories" have been more often applied to describe changes in more rigid social structures.

Although various factors may simultaneously operate in social change, the earlier theories of social change tended to emphasize a single factor in the causation of change. For the most part, however, they were not entirely monocausal theories, nor were they strictly deterministic. Among the principal factors singled out as the prime movers of social change, technological advancement is widely accepted among sociohistorians. This view is supported by the experience of Western societies after the Industrial Revolution. Ogburn focused his attention on the discrepancies between technological advancement and its subsequent changes in social institutions and various aspects of life. His hypothesis of "cultural lag" says that changes in social institutions, cultural spheres, and moral aspects of life always lag behind the rapid advancement of technology.

Marx posits class antagonism as the prime source of historical change. He conceives the "forces of production" as being the determining element of material and economic factors by which two antagonistic classes are formed. The class struggle inevitably results in a new synthesized stage. To Marxian theorists, material and economic factors are the determinants of social change and the dialectical process of class struggle provides the dynamic of social change. Thus, human history is viewed as continuous class struggles.
Diametrically opposed to the dialectical materialism, the proponents of social idealism (including Hegel, Weber, and Mannheim) view ideas as the ultimate core and prime mover in social change. In other words, the idealist's view emphasizes the role of ideas and the development of rationality in human history rather than material factors. They regard human history as a sequence of ideas.

Smelser (1959) presented a seven stage paradigm of sequential patterns operative in the maintenance of the stability of social systems and continuity in social processes. Change occurs through time by means of the equilibrating forces of four specific functions: adaptation, goal-attainment, integration, and tension-management. The essential portions of the seven stages proceed with: (1) an initial dissatisfaction or a sense of uneasiness with present conditions; (2) the dissatisfaction becomes a manifest unrest in regard to the persisting situations; (3) the unrest turns into the search for and assessment of solutions, and this stage is frequently a stage of trial and error in search of new patterns; (4) patterns are formalized which are capable of achieving public acceptance; and (5) finally, the new patterns become legitimate and institutionalized parts of the social order, thus completing one episode of social change. From a critical point of view, however, Smelser's model of sequential change fundamentally pays attention to the continuity of the persisting social order by means of minor modification rather than structural alteration. This theory cannot avoid the criticism of teleological fallacy, since Smelser regards the end result of change as always
good and legitimate, while the initial stage of change is bad and unsatisfactory.

From a different point of view, Ryan (1969) asserts that social and cultural change occurs when novel patterns of thought and action arise in the organization of a group or its culture. Thus, innovation is regarded as an origin of change and its diffusion of innovation as the main mechanism of change. By innovation Ryan meant the appearance of novelty, such as inventions (or "the arrangement of existing ideas into novel and meaningful patterns") referring to a source of immanent change or endogenous change (1969:11). These innovations do not remain long with their originations, but diffuse to others through communication. The recipient parties, whether individuals or societies, integrate the diffused innovations into their own way of social change and internalize them as parts of social conditions and structures. According to Ryan, the social system and its structures have the immanent conditions conducive to change for the following reasons: (1) an internal, imperfect integration of the social system, (2) an imperfect integration of the external social system, (3) an imperfect integration of the ecological system, (4) imperfections in processes of social replacement and succession in memberships, and (5) quantitative difference in membership, etc. (1969:73).

In sum, this section reviewed some general theories of social change in terms of: (1) the scope of change considered -- small-scale change versus change of comprehensive wholes, (2) direction of change -- evolutionary versus cyclical, (3) the prime movers in change -- objective versus subjective factors, and (4) process of change -- the process of
sequential equilibrium versus diffusion process of innovation. Based on these criteria, the process of modernization with which we are concerned can be regarded as a specific form of social change with the following characteristics: Although the principal factors in social change are controversial among the theories, (1) modernization has to do with the entire fabric of social life, of comprehensive wholes, in its scope; (2) it may be seen as evolutionary moving upward to higher levels of development; and (3) its process is characterized by higher structural differentiation and specialization. Most of the prevailing modernization theories are largely based upon the unique development exemplified as the Western experiences. Despite the fact that some major features of modernization processes more or less converge with Western experiences, the current change taking place in the non-Western countries is viewed as a unique form of development, utilizing state planning to accelerate social and economic transformation in desired directions (usually seen in the effort to bridge the gap between the level of a given society and a modern form achieved in other advanced societies). We now turn to specific theories of modernization in the next section.

B. Review of Modernization Theories

After reviewing some general theories of social change, modernization has been viewed as a specific form of development, particularly as seen in the reference made to the uniquely Western experiences. Modernization is a comprehensive total transformation of a traditional or premodern society into some types of "modern" industrial society through a series of interconnected social changes in the entire fabric of social life. Each
social science discipline has focused on different elements of the modernization process. Economists see modernization primarily in terms of increased productivity and efficiency by means of man's application of technologies to control of production.

Political scientists have focused primarily on the problems of nation-building and changes in the political systems. Thus, the political scientists concerned with development are interested, not only in who exercises power, but also in how governments increase their capacity to innovate, respond to demands for change, and to manage social conflict and economic backwardness. Sociologists have been primarily concerned with the process of structural differentiations and the functional specialization that characterizes modern societies. They have given attention to the differentiations occurring within social structures as new occupations emerge, new types of social organizations form, new legal and educational institutions develop, and new types of communities (urbanization) appear. Sociologists have also emphasized some of the disruptive features of the modernization process, such as rising tensions, mental illnesses, violence, divorce, delinquency, class conflict, and other forms of social conflict.

None of these views is sufficiently general to encompass all the features of a society in modernization. In defining modernization, some scholars emphasize, not in the character of the society, but in the character of individuals. On the basis of cross-national study, Alex Inkeles emphasizes rationality in individual attitudes and behaviors in modern societies, irrespective of cultural differences (Inkeles, 1966).
David McClelland (1961) underlies achievement orientations as essential qualities of modern man. Cyril Black (1966) characterized modern men by their increased capacity to apply new knowledge to daily life. Arnold Anderson (1966) stresses the development of skills and creativity shared by men in modern societies and as developed through expanded educational opportunities. In short, all the above authors emphasize that it is new ways of thinking, attitudes, and the behaviors of individuals which make it possible to make the transformation from the traditional types into "modern" societies.

In this study, the terms "modernization" and "development" are used interchangeably and are defined as a comprehensive progressive process of interconnected social changes leading to national autonomy and individual well-being. In recent years, most of the less developed new nations have adopted, in one form or another, national development plans in order to accelerate economic growth and to bring about social change in the desired directions. A number of development approaches have emerged, each providing a set of philosophical presuppositions within which the underdevelopment problems may be viewed and in terms of which the formulation of specific development policies may proceed. Many of these development theories have been, whether implicitly or explicitly, translated into guidelines for policy-making in national development planning.

Among the theoretical schools of thought on development, the following six theoretical approaches seem to be dominant: (1) the ideal-typical index approach, (2) the diffusionist approach, (3) the psychological approach, (4) the historical-critical approach, (5) the Marxist approach,
and (6) the general systems approach. The first three approaches have been popular in the advanced capitalist countries. These approaches have provided the major conceptual frameworks used to specify policies by the developed capitalist countries for the purpose of modernizing the underdeveloped societies. The fourth approach emerged in the late 1960's among a group of radical indigenous social scientists in Latin America and Asia as a challenge to the first three views. The Marxist approach to modernization in the underdeveloped countries, is diametrically opposed to the first four approaches in its major postulates and policy formulations. The general systems approach has been developed recently and it is regarded as a methodological tool rather than a substantial theory.

Manning Nash (1963:5) briefly summarized the central ideas of the first three approaches to modernization in the following manner. The ideal-typical index method is characterized by its tendency to view development as a transformation of one lower type into another higher type. The diffusionist approach, on the other hand, views development as the process of acculturation, particularly in terms of the adoption of elements of Western civilization -- including values, knowledge, organizations, technology, and capital -- into the indigenous societies of the underdeveloped non-Western areas. Finally, the psychological approach, which is mainly based on "smaller-scale hypotheses" tests, is essentially identical with what Coleman has labeled as the "individualist theories", mentioned in the previous section.

These development approaches, which have largely shaped contemporary Euro-American policies as well as attitudes toward less developed
countries, are interrelated to each other as Frank indicated:

The first mode is ideal typical in that it sets up supposedly typical characteristics of development. The second mode concerns itself with how these characteristics of the first mode are supposedly diffused from the developed countries to underdeveloped ones. Finally, the third mode, and herein lies its pioneering service, tells us how the typical characteristics that are identified in the first and diffused according to the second mode are to be acculturated by the underdeveloped countries if they wish to develop. (Frank, 1969b:76)

1. The ideal-typical index approach

This approach is based on the construction of polar ideal-types called developed and underdeveloped; resting on the basis of certain ideal-typical indices which elaborate the consequential attributes of development and underdevelopment. It usually has two major variants. First, the "pattern variable" approach, which was systemized by Parsons (1954), identifies similarities and differences between societies in terms of Max Weber's notion of "ideal types". This pattern variable approach is, in fact, nothing but a taxonomic generalization of the consequential characteristics of premodern (or traditional) and modern societies in terms of Western experience. Second, the historical stage approach is usually a simple expansion of the polar type approach into a specification of intermediate stages, as is exemplified in Rostow's (1962) "stages of economic growth".

These approaches have been criticized on three criteria employed by Frank: (1) empirical validity, (2) theoretical adequacy, and (3) policy-wise effectiveness (1969b). It seems worthwhile to review Frank's critical examination of the three conventional development theories. As
was mentioned above, the application of "pattern variables" to the characteristics of development and underdevelopment is one type of the ideal-typical index approach. One of the "pattern variables" approaches is seen in Hoselitz's thesis (1960). Hoselitz characterizes the social relationships in developed countries as normatively universalistic, functionally specific, and achievement oriented. On the contrary, the dominant social values and social relationships in the underdeveloped countries are characterized as particularistic, diffuse, and ascriptive. These distinctive attributes of development and underdevelopment are developed on the basis of ideal-types whose validity is assumed a priori, and with the primary goal of providing abstract conceptual frameworks within which any society may be reviewed. They are not designed about the needs of developing countries. In terms of empirical validity, Hoselitz's pattern variables approach fails to correspond to the realities of both developed and underdeveloped countries.

Hoselitz views development as an increasing number of role-changes from one pattern to the other — from particularistic, ascriptive, and diffuse to universalistic, achievement oriented, and functionally specific regardless of the significance of the roles in change (Frank, 1969b:32-33). In reality, some roles (at the top or at the bottom) are more relevant to development than just roles in general. In this regard, Hoselitz's thesis is theoretically inadequate. The pattern variables approach usually neglects the structural aspects in the analysis of underdevelopment. In other words, this school of theorists tries to explain the existence of the underdeveloped characteristics of the parts, or "merely to demonstrate
the relations among them, but not to analyze or account for the existence of the social structure as a whole" (Frank, 1969b:36). Consequently,

These theorists, who pretend to analyze economic development and cultural change, fail to direct theoretical analysis to the past origins, the present transformations, or the future prospects of the existing social system as a system. (Frank, 1969b:36)

On the basis of the characteristics of developed capitalist countries, these theorists regard the rise of middle class as the indicator of development. Thus, they maintain that development policies should be in favor of upper and middle classes rather than larger masses at the bottom strata. Throughout the underdeveloped countries, it is common that the middle classes do not rise from the economic development. The upper and middle classes represent only a small proportion of population; leaving an increasing number of masses in extreme poverty. The tendency is toward a widening gap between the upper classes and the bottom strata in most of the less developed countries. This acute problem of inequalities is not only a characteristic of underdevelopment, but also a strong disincentive in social mobilization for development. Therefore, this conventional development approach is thought to be policy-wise ineffective in developing the underdeveloped countries.

Stage theory is another type of the ideal-typical index approach. Rostow's (1962) thesis of "the stages of economic growth" may be considered as representative of current stage theories. In terms of economic growth, Rostow identifies all societies by fitting into into one of the five stages: (1) the traditional, (2) the preconditions of take-off, (3) the take-off, (4) the drive to maturity, and (5) the age of mass consumption.
Rostow's model of developmental stages, like other conventional development theories, is also largely derived from the unique historical experiences of economic development in the West. When applied to the horizontal (contemporary) characteristics of the less developed countries in search of historical attributes of the West, the thesis of Rostow's stage theory is empirically invalid in terms of the realities of the less developed countries. Rostow regards the contemporary underdevelopment as the original conditions of traditional societies as the Western societies were. Many critical scholars (Brett, 1973; Desai, 1971; and Frank, 1969b) have reached an agreement that the presently developed Western countries were once undeveloped but not underdeveloped, as the newly independent countries are. The industrialized capitalist countries attempted to expand their capitalist systems on a global scale by incorporating the lands and peoples of their colonies. As a result of the product of both this historical (colonial) process and current market-forces in the global capitalist system, the undeveloped original conditions of traditional non-Western societies have now been transformed into the present state of underdevelopment. In this regard, Rostow's initial two stages, which regard current underdevelopment as the undeveloped original conditions of traditional societies, are incorrectly conceived. In fact, Rostow's theoretical formulation rests on the particularistic character of Western capitalist development and a faulty characterization of development by ignoring the realities of the underdeveloped countries.
2. The diffusionist approach

This school of thought views development as the process occurring through the diffusion of cultural elements from the developed to the underdeveloped countries. The underlying assumption of diffusionist theorists is that underdeveloped countries cannot overcome their backwardness without assistance from the developed countries. The diffusionist theorists emphasize that the inability of underdeveloped societies to utilize advanced technology and knowledge is essentially attributed to obstacles such as traditional beliefs and values, various institutions, and unfavorable demographic factors in the recipient countries. These theorists advocate that capitals, technologies, and institutional principles be diffused from developed industrial countries to underdeveloped countries. In reality, the proposition of the capital-flow from developed countries to less developed countries seems to be empirically refuted in terms of the amount of various forms of repatriation of foreign investment and the current trade deficit in the less developed countries.

The diffusion of innovations and advanced technologies is, indeed, an essential process for development. But the kinds of technologies and innovations have not always diffused for the benefit of the recipient countries. The thesis of this diffusionist approach is generally true in terms of the transfer of technologies and innovations, but it is empirically invalid in terms of the fact of recent "brain drains" from many developing countries.

In social and cultural aspects, it is true that cultural elements, including principles of institutions, methods of organization, and even
fads and fashions, have been extensively diffused and penetrated into
the underdeveloped countries through the networks of mass media and trans­
portation. In the process of social change, these new elements of dif­
fusion have operated to disorganize the traditional social institutions,
and, at the same time, they have largely contributed to the transformation
of old traditional institutions into modern forms of institutions in the
recipient countries. The factual reality, however, is that a great many
of the diffused Western ideas, in both political and social form, often
represent the expression of the particular interests of those who dif­
fused them. For example, some underdeveloped countries have been imposed
on by alien political ideologies, which have constraining effects on
economic development and political change. Some of these diffused ideas
often serve as the theoretical premises for, or practical justification
of, the status quo of the reactionary privileged classes, who stand in
the way of vital social reform and national development; in alliance with
external forces.

3. The psychological approach

The psychological approach, to which Nash (1963) and Frank (1969b)
refer, has been maintained by McClelland (1961), Hagen (1962), Kunkel
(1970), and others. The central hypothesis of this approach is that
"a society with a generally high level of achievement will produce more
energetic entrepreneurs who, in turn, produce more rapid economic develop­
ment . . . " and not the social structure "but only a high degree of
individual motivation or need for achievement is the alpha and omega of
economic development and cultural change" (Frank, 1969b:68). It is true
that entrepreneurs played an important role in bringing about economic
growth in the capitalist West. According to this approach, the generation
of motivation and n-achievement is the crucial problem of development.
Only such a psychological state can enable the underdeveloped societies
to overcome their present backwardness.

The psychological approach is believed to be insufficient to estab­
lish an inclusive causal model with the supposedly causative psychological
factors and with the supposedly resultant economic development. These
psychological theorists usually do not take account of the consequences
of historical process, nor of the external constraints operative in under­
developed countries. Despite the close relationship between the nature of
social structure (institutions) and the psychological traits of individ­
uals, these theorists not only ignore structural aspects, but they also
have confused concomitant correlation with the causal relationship between
the psychological states and economic development.

On the basis of Frank's critical examination of these three con­
ventional theories of development, the common shortcomings of these de­
velopment approaches can be summed up as: these three approaches are
empirically invalid when observed in the context of the realities of less
developed countries. They are theoretically inadequate:

Because they cannot identify the determinant social whole,
because it takes account neither of the history of the
underdeveloped part nor of its relations with the de­
veloped part, and least of all the world as a whole, and
because it does not conform to the structure of that
world's social system. (Frank, 1969b:78)

These theorists are policy-wise ineffective in pursuing the proclaimed
intentions of promoting the modernization and development of underdeveloped
countries. From a radical point of view, the policies proposed by these conventional approaches are conservative supporting the status quo and often operate as obstacles to needed social reforms.

4. The historical-critical approach

The theorists of this approach are severely critical of the major assumptions, approaches to analysis, and policy prescriptions of the above three approaches. In fact, this approach has emerged as a response to the abstract, formal, and ahistorical approach of the first three theories of development. This approach focuses on concrete historical inquiries into both developed and underdeveloped countries. It also assumes that the relations between developed countries and underdeveloped countries are not necessarily mutually beneficial. Rather, it asserts that the developed countries are in sharp conflict, economic and political, with underdeveloped countries. On the basis of the recognition of the conflicts between them, a realistic theory of development should be elaborated.

This school of thought is sometimes characterized as "radical sociology" or "conflict sociology" with its key focus shifted from equilibrium to change. Mills (1959), Frank (1969b), and Desai (1971) are the advocates of this school of thought. These scholars differ from the Marxist theorists. They do not consider that the production relation is the axis in social relations. While they recognize the significance of conflict, they do not consider class conflict as the central conflict in society. They presume that the ruling group in contemporary society is the "power elite", and not the capitalist class. These theorists emphasize the historical dimension and concrete evidences. Thus, they endeavor
to provide factual evidences and policy propositions on the basis of their concrete findings. Due to the emphasis on historical dimension and external relationship, however, this approach is likely to obscure many internal conditions associated with societal change, such as current population problems, which, irrespective of both historical dimension and external relations, has become one of the most serious social problems of many underdeveloped countries and an obstacle to economic development.

5. The Marxist development approach

This approach accepts Marx's philosophical and sociological postulates and its strategy for social change. It shares an emphasis on historical process and external relationship with the fourth approach. The Marxists consider that the cause of underdevelopment, and the problems arising out of this underdevelopment, can be properly understood only if it is fully understood in the context of the growth of the worldwide capitalist system from its mercantilist and industrial phases, to its latest imperialist phase of development. They claim that the present underdevelopment of the "Third World" is rooted in the fact that the newly independent countries were kept backward as colonial appendages of the present advanced capitalist, imperialist countries. This backwardness was simultaneously generated by the very process of development in the imperialist countries and the growth of the modern capitalist system on a global scale. The Marxists take the view that the underdeveloped new nations, having taken to the path of development along capitalist lines, are interlocked with the advanced capitalist countries. Thus, these
new states become economically and culturally subordinate to the developed countries.

According to this approach, the developed countries are not assisting the underdeveloped countries in overcoming their backwardness. On the contrary, they are elaborating a new and more subtle form of exploitation of the underdeveloped countries under the guise of "aid". They are transforming underdeveloped countries into their neo-colonial dependencies. The image of "aid", "assistance", and the transfer of skills, techniques, and capital is deceptive. In fact, the pattern of aid itself is a basic constraining factor which retards the economic development of the underdeveloped countries. In development policy, this approach prescribes the path for development in a socialistic way, based fundamentally on distinctive and qualitatively new forms of property relations and objectives of production. This school of thought is pursuing a fundamentally different goal and path of development from those of the above four major theories.

6. The general systems approach

This approach has a recent origin and has gradually appealed to the economic and social planning experts. This approach views a social system in terms of "open system" and shifts the notion of conventional causal relationships into the relationship of "input", "throughput", and "output". And this systems approach sees societal development in terms of growing systemsness. Chodack regards modernization as "a specific form of development which consists of bridging the gap between the level of
development of a given society, or some sphere of its life, and a more perfect and modern for achieved in other societies" (Chodack, 1973:12).

The characteristics of this approach may be summarized as follows: First, this approach is extensively employed among "experts" or "social engineers" for the purpose of management, program evaluation, and the like. This approach does not usually provide the desired goals of development nor identify the problems of underdevelopment. It is technically applied to development planning on the basis of the goals and problem areas identified. Secondly, this approach heavily depends upon quantitative diagnosis and prognosis. Most of the statements commonly made about the gap between developed and underdeveloped countries depend on how development is measured; even though the measurement employed is often inadequate for development purposes in terms of validity, reliability, and accuracy. Quantification has the merits of introducing both certainty and objectivity into development planning and it makes the planning more tangible and technical. However, the cost of quantification is the omission of the analysis of everything that is not quantifiable. Thus, this approach naturally neglects important noneconomic variables which are not taken into account.

Thirdly, although this approach has practical value in the application of development planning, it is thought to lack explanatory power to identify determining causes of underdevelopment and related problems of development. It also lacks fundamental philosophical presuppositions in terms of ontological and epistemological grounds. In this regard, the general systems approach is methodological rather than theoretical.
The six major approaches to the development of underdeveloped countries have been reviewed in the above. In terms of how modernization occurs, the first three approaches view change in certain values and attitudes as a precondition to development. The latter approaches associate present underdevelopment with historical and external relationship of social wholes. The first three approaches are generally ahistorical and abstract. Their strategy of understanding is based on a body of deductive theory, abstracted from the unique experience of Euro-American development. These approaches are often biased in their interpretation of the current underdevelopment of non-Western countries by forcing realities into abstract models which are derived deductively. Consequently, they tend to obscure determining causes of underdevelopment -- historical and external influences.

Though both the historical-critical approach and the Marxist approach emphasize the historical and external causations of underdevelopment, they have weaknesses in that they underestimate the problems of internal aspects, such as population problems, which are considered to be especially important in development planning. The general systems approach is also deficient in understanding the historical and external aspects of underdevelopment. Thus, each of the major approaches to modernization of underdeveloped societies is considered, one way or another, empirically invalid in terms of the realities of present underdevelopment and it is also inadequate in the understanding of the determinants of underdevelopment. In the next section, an alternative, inclusive model of change
will be attempted to be formulated in terms of historical, relational, and internal aspects.

C. Formulation of an Alternative Model of Change

This section attempts to formulate an alternative, generalized model which identifies the major causes and dynamics of the changes which are now taking place in the Third World countries. The formulation of a valid model of change is the main purpose of this study. It is hoped that the model will be viable enough to serve as a basic analytical framework for understanding recent societal changes in underdeveloped countries, and to guide future, instigated, change.

As reviewed, the six major approaches to development and current social changes all have some shortcomings, either on theoretical and empirical grounds, or in their application to development policy prescriptions for underdeveloped countries. These approaches have, in general, failed to adequately explain the unique phenomena characterizing the actual recent changes in the underdeveloped countries. Further, they fail as guides for achieving the objectives of development planning, i.e., in their application to the development of underdeveloped countries. Such shortcomings may be attributed to the universal application of the Western models to the unique phenomena of current social changes of the Third World countries. In order to formulate a valid model of change, the uniquenesses of current changes in the less developed countries must be properly taken into account in terms of determining factors, current conditions and related problems, and the internal dynamics of change.
As already noted, the nature and pattern of current changes taking place in the less developed countries are considered to be fundamentally different from those of the Western experiences in several aspects. First, the historical processes which served as the initial conditions for the current change in the underdeveloped countries are fundamentally different from those of the Western industrial countries. Secondly, while the change of modernization in Western societies largely began within those areas, causes of current changes in the less developed countries have generally originated from outside these societies. Thirdly, national development planning, as a way of promoting purposive change, has been emphasized by the less developed countries, while many of the developed, industrialized countries have largely relied upon *laissez-faire* policies relating to social change and development.

Each of the three fundamental differences in the explanation of current social changes has been stressed by one or more social change or development approaches. For instance, both the diffusionist and the historical-critical development schools of thought have emphasized the theme of exogenous change, while both the historical-critical and the Marxist development theorists put emphasis on the consequences of historical processes. Recently, many developmentalists, either in economic sciences or in international agencies such as the organizations of the United Nations and domestic policy-making bodies, have emphasized national development planning by state-intervention. However, each of these theories and development approaches seems to be insufficient in the emphasis of the three unique aspects of changes in the Third World countries.
The theories and approaches are narrow in scope; none able to relate in a unified fashion, to the three distinctive features of developing countries. What is required is a single integrated perspective on underdevelopment and programs for development.

The model to be developed is based upon observations of the characteristics of the current changes taking place in the less developed countries (rather than a priori theoretical grounds) as well as upon the results of the critique of existing theories and approaches. The generalized model is composed of four major components: (1) the incipient structural conditions of nation-building, (2) the external forces in international relationships, (3) the current internal dynamics of national development, and (4) the current internal conditions and related problems of underdevelopment. The major components of the model are outlined in Table 1.

1. The incipient structural conditions of nation-building

The first premise is that the historical consequences of initial conditions may profoundly influence the course and process of social change. For instance, it cannot be assumed that the formation of nation-states and national development of different regions occurred in the same ways, or can be accounted for in terms of a single generalization. Indeed, industrialization, as a particular process of change, is a different process in Africa (as tribal societies), in Asia and the Middle East (as the societies of ancient civilization), and in the North Atlantic region (as modern states). Thus, the indigenous traditional bases of a nation become important initial conditions for later changes.
Table 1. Major components of a generalized model of current changes in the less developed countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Premises</th>
<th>Major Aspects</th>
<th>Basic Elements</th>
<th>Selected Subjects</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initial conditions of historical consequences emphasized</td>
<td>Incipient conditions of national-building</td>
<td>Colonial effects&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Colonialism</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Traditional bases</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Exogenous changes emphasized</td>
<td>External factors in international relationships</td>
<td>Political&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (ideological, military)</td>
<td>Foreign aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Economic&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Trade</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Technological</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Purposive changes emphasized</td>
<td>Current internal dynamics</td>
<td>Nationalism&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rising expectations</td>
<td>Elites</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agents of change&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Public administration</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Current internal conditions and problems</td>
<td>Demographic&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Population growth, structure and distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Health, education, Political corruption, inequalities and land tenure systems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Indicates major emphasis in the discussion in the study.
Shils (1960:329) has used the term "new states" to refer to the fact that most of the less developed countries of Asia and Africa have been independent new states since World War II. These dependent new states are the historical products of a recent colonial era. Thus, their capacities for nation-building are largely based upon the former colonial administrative frontiers; frontiers established irrespective of the natural communities of indigenous people inhabiting the areas. In this regard, the initial conditions for development of these countries started with immanent structural weaknesses in their nation-building potentials.

Such immanent weaknesses are manifested broadly in two aspects -- (1) in the plural characteristics of the populations of the countries, as determined by ethnicity or tribal groups, linguistic criteria, cultural backgrounds, and the like, and (2) in terms of the built-in dependence on the economies of developed industrial countries as suppliers of raw materials and markets for the industrial goods from the industrialized countries. From a particular point of view, the present underdevelopment in the less developed countries can not be confused with the original state of underdevelopment. Rather it is the product of a historical process involving relations with the developed industrial countries. In this study, the effects of colonialism on the nation-building endeavors of the less developed new states are discussed with respect to the component of the initial conditions for development.

2. External factors in the current international relationships

The necessity of considering sources of exogenous change in developing countries is based upon the observation that transformations in one
part of the globe often influence profoundly the course of events elsewhere. This is especially true at the present time. Every country is involved in a general process of rapid change, which requires mutual adjustments in other countries that are linked by interdependent networks of political and economic interrelationships.

Some sociologists have been well aware of the importance of such external factors in the patterns of social change in current non-Western societies (Bottomore, 1972; deVries, 1961). DeVries viewed the external influences as the impetus of changes in less developed non-Western countries (though the intensity of the impacts of the exogenous influences and the patterns of responses vary from country to country). In the same way, Bottomore (1972) indicates that the recent social changes of the non-Western countries have largely originated from sources outside those countries; particularly from the developed countries of the North Atlantic regions. The external influences employed by both Bottomore and deVries refer to those cultural and technological influences (including technology, scientific knowledge, information, political ideologies, and religion) which have originated in the West. Though the intensity of and accessibility to these external influences has not been diffused equally from country to country, all these external factors have in some manner affected spheres of indigenous social life in the less developed countries.

As reviewed in the previous section, both Latin American scholars and the Marxist theorists have expressed theoretical concern about such external influences; particularly as manifested in the political and economic relations which obtain between the less developed countries and
the developed industrial countries. These groups of theorists view current international relationships as important determinants of the present underdevelopment in the less developed countries. For instance, mutual defense treaties and tied foreign aid are most likely to accompany economically dependent relations between the developed industrial countries and the less developed countries; often weakening the national autonomy of the less developed countries involved. During the Cold War era, especially, such military and political alignments with one ideological camp meant overall embargo from another ideological camp. Thus, the less developed countries find themselves in a position dependent upon the allied developed countries, with a narrow choice of freedom in economic, technological, and cultural exchanges.

Trade, as another example of external relations, is one of the most important sources of foreign exchange earning; desperately needed for national development planning. Many less developed countries export only a few limited items of raw materials. The international prices of such raw materials in general are unstable at international markets. Needless to say, countries whose major source of income is raw material exports are having difficulties in establishing realistic budgets for national development planning. Confounding this is the fact that some raw materials, such as rubber, have substantially reduced export value due to their substitution by synthetic products in developed countries.

The political and economic influences in international relationships can, then, become severe external constraints on the economic development of the less developed countries. Such dependent relations have historically
resulted in sharp conflicts of interests between the countries, rather than international cooperation between them. With respect to the external factors affecting current changes, the nature of current foreign aid and the current trends of trade terms will be discussed in this study.

3. Internal societal dynamics of development

As was discussed in previous sections, development is viewed as a particular type of change. Development planning means a conscious, deliberate attempt to change society in desired directions. Thus, development planning is characterized as a purposive change. In one sense, almost all social change may be considered purposive, i.e., to the degree that they result from the purposive acts of individual men. But such acts may have unintended consequences, because the individual actions are not perfectly coordinated and may impede each other as, for example, in situations of conflict. In such situations, change may be causally determined, but it is not purposive in the sense that it achieves the purposes of all the individuals who are involved. Change may more properly be termed purposive when a common purpose emerges and may be realized by degrees through a process of planned social change.

In the Marxist theory of social change, for example, the internal dynamics of social change have to do with the dialectical conflict of class struggle, as is determined by material and economic factors. In this study, the internal dynamics of planned change specifically refers to development policies and the agents of change. The development policies are thought to be largely grounded upon a growing nationalism and are
thought to be designed to meet the social needs and rising expectations of the masses of people.

The masses, liberated from colonialism and in contact with material and technological developments from the industrialized countries, have heightened expectations about individual well-being. Consistent with the rising expectations of the masses, the new nationalism, largely based on anti-colonialism, has grown among the elites and intellectuals in these areas. Thus, the new nationalism has become a powerful emotional impetus for national development and for national autonomy.

National autonomy includes: (1) economic self-sufficiency, (2) a national sovereignty in its own domestic decisions, (3) diplomatic recognition in international affairs, and (4) a national identity in terms of internal cohesion and differentiation from other nation's characteristics (Goulet, 1975:121). Development objectives are assumed to include the improvement of overall individual well-being and the promotion of national autonomy. Thus, the new nationalism which is expressed as a common purpose in social change is a basic element of the current internal dynamics of development.

In the implementation of development policies, development planning programs may be organized and carried out by agents of change. In this regard, agents of change are also important elements of the internal dynamics of current social change. The agents of change refer to those who articulate development ideals in nationalism, who initiate development policies through political processes, who organize development planning, and who formulate and carry out the development programs. Elites and
public administrators are thought to be among the most important agents of change in development planning.

Some traditional elites may become inhibitors for social change but other new elites, as bearers of new nationalism, serve as catalysts for induced social change (deVries, 1961). These catalyst elites are usually recruited from intellectuals or often military officials in the less developed countries (Pye, 1962). They have also been referred to as "modernizing elites" (Shils, 1960). The modernizing elites are usually involved in the political process and attempt to translate the ideals of the new nationalism into specific development policies.

Based on development policies, public administrations set specific development goals, formulate a comprehensive development planning, organize its specific programs, and carry them out. Thus, public administrations are thought to be largely responsible for the achievement of development planning. However, public administrations are, in the implementation of development policies, subject to various limitations including time and budget, or they are often under political pressures. In many cases, the public administrations of the less developed countries have internal shortcomings in terms of the quality of administrative personnel as well as the organizational structures. In this case, the nature of elites and the roles and characteristics of public administrations will be discussed.

4. Internal conditions and related problems of underdevelopment

It has been stated that both historical consequences and contemporary international relationships may profoundly influence the course and process of current social changes. Recent development planning movement has been
emphasized to be an important aspect of internal dynamics of social and economic development. In addition to these three major aspects, the internal societal conditions are thought to be an important factor of social change. Moreover, it is regarded as the substance of social change, i.e., what is changed. Some of these societal conditions in less developed countries are the manifestations of problems of underdevelopment, and at the same time, they function as constraining effects in social and economic development. These internal societal conditions include both demographic and social conditions.

Concerning social conditions in many less developed countries, the existing attitudes and institutional structures are thought to be rigid and inflexible in nature, and thus, are often barriers to development planning. In one sense, underdevelopment refers to undesirable social conditions that are largely detrimental and inconducive to overall development. Thus, attention has to be directed toward identifying unfavorable social conditions in development planning. Efforts should be made to transform these unfavorable conditions into favorable ones for further development, or to remove the causes of their related problems of underdevelopment. In this study, political corruption, social inequalities, and traditional land tenure systems are specifically selected as unfavorable social conditions for development.

In recent years, the subject of population problems have received considerable attention in the literature. Attention has been given to the causal relationships between economic development and population growth. Indeed, the population explosion, which is a new social phenomenon in many
less developed countries, has become one of the most pressing problems related to development planning. This is because the population explosion is immediately related to the problems of hunger and unemployment, and the levels of living standards. The additional population growth is the direct cause in the reduction of per capita income and domestic capital formation; increasing the demands for food, and for deteriorating the quality of human resources due to decreased social overhead capital. Thus, population growth control is thought to be one of the basic preconditions for development planning.

This study will focus on some selected population problems in less developed countries. The demographic conditions will be discussed both in terms of their quantitative and qualitative aspects. First, in terms of their quantitative aspects, population growth (and its impact), population composition by age and sex, and population distribution are selected to be discussed. Secondly, nutrition and health, and education are selected in the qualitative aspect of population.

A schematic outline of the major components and their process of current changes in less developed countries

Social change in less developed countries has been discussed in terms of the three basic premises, and four related major causes, and conditions. Planners may not be able to control or change a society simply by understanding the factors discussed, but the model may be useful for understanding the nature of social change in less developed countries. The model presented in Chart B, is the result of the attempt to incorporate the factors discussed within an analytic framework in order to understand
Chart B. A schematic diagram of a generalized model of current changes in a less developed country.
better the path of societal change in the presently less developed countries.

As discussed, the course and tempo of current social change may largely be decided by the internal societal dynamics. It was emphasized, however, that the nature and course of changes are also profoundly influenced by historically given initial conditions and current international relationships. The discussion also indicated that constraining internal factors affect, in large degree, the path of recent changes in less developed countries.

In Chart B, the horizontal axis represents the time dimension in change, specifying the past, the present, and the future. The initial conditions may be regarded as the antecedent factors which are irreversible (or given) in the process of change in a country. This implies that the course and process of current changes may largely be determined by the historical initial conditions of a country if there are no fundamental structural reforms.

The current international relationships are viewed as contemporary causes and, in principle, as reciprocal interactions between the outer world and any given less developed country. The external influences, especially in political, economic, and military relations, are thought to be beyond the control of a less developed country. Thus, a less developed country essentially needs valid international cooperation for its development.

The internal conditions, including demographic and social conditions, generally become constraining factors for development planning. In other
words, the current internal conditions in less developed countries are assumed to be generally unfavorable, or as barriers to the development planning. In addition to the direct efforts to accelerate economic growth, development efforts are usually made to remove undesirable social conditions and to control pressing demographic conditions.

From the above integrated point of view, valid development planning in less developed countries has to be made on the basis of an overall assessment of the four major components and their relationships as discussed. At the same time, valid development strategies have to be sought accordingly and in terms of development objectives. This study is designed to analyze the general characteristics of underdevelopment and problems of development in terms of the framework of the major components discussed in this section. Chapter three discusses colonial impacts on nation-building related to the historically given initial conditions and current international relationships; especially in the areas of trade and foreign aid. In chapter four, the nature of nationalism and the roles of elites and the public administrations will be discussed with respect to the internal societal dynamics of current change. Chapter five will analyze the demographic conditions and social conditions in terms of the internal conditions of the framework. On the basis of these discussions, finally, chapter six will attempt to propose some general directions of development strategies in less developed countries.
III. PRODUCTS OF HISTORICAL PROCESS AND CURRENT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

As already indicated, a main purpose of this study is to offer an inclusive alternative model to analyze current changes which are now taking place in the less developed countries. With the exception of the countries of Latin America, most of these less developed countries have only recently gained their independence. Less developed countries are newly independent countries, this change in political status occurring primarily during the period between the two World Wars in the Middle East, and after the second World War in most of Southeast Asia and Africa.

Most of the new governments in the less developed countries are now committed to the idea of overcoming the mass poverty of their peoples and of achieving national autonomy through development policies coordinated by national development planning. As discussed in the model formulated in chapter two, the development policies and their implementation in development plans are new social phenomena and are thought to be the sources of the internal dynamics of current social changes occurring in the less developed countries. It is therefore appropriate to begin inquiry into the present underdevelopment and the problems of development by considering the nature of the governmental institutions which have come to play so central a role in the economic and social development of the newly independent countries. How did these states come into being? What were their colonial situations? How were the initial conditions of nation building affected by the legacy of colonial rule? And what external forces are now working on the national development plans of these new states?
Using the model formulated in chapter two, this chapter will present an analysis of factors which have had consequences for the effectiveness of the nation building activities of the less developed countries. Corresponding to the two analytical components of the model (initial conditions and externalities) two factors will be examined: (1) the impact of previous colonial status, and (2) the impact of the international context within which less developed countries are likely to be found. The first section of this chapter will discuss the nature of colonialism, its legacy, and the resulting initial conditions for nation building. The second section will analyze the income disparities between the developed industrial countries and the less developed countries, and the trends of the income gaps between them. Finally, the third section will analyze the trends of current trade between the developed and the less developed countries, and the nature of foreign aid policies.

A. The Historical Consequences of Colonialism

1. Colonialism and underdevelopment

In relation to the analysis of the general process of social change, the term "development" in this study is used to denote a particular change process characterized by increased productivity, equalization in the distribution of social products, and increased national autonomy both in domestic decisions and in international affairs. Against this notion of "development" are contrasted "undevelopment" and "underdevelopment". "Undevelopment" and "underdevelopment" are extensively used in the literature dealing with modernization and economic development, etc., but in
general without adequate explanation of the distinction made between them.

In recent works of the radical theorists of development (Frank, 1969a; Johnson, 1972), the term "undevelopment" is used to relate to situations isolated from the system of international exchange — implying the original conditions of the non-European indigenous societies in pre-colonialization. "underdevelopment", on the other hand, relates to a condition of dependence in which the activities of a given society are subjected to the overriding control of an alien external power. In this sense, Frank claims specifically that present "underdevelopment" in most parts of the Third World is the product of its relationship with the West. In recent analysis of this historical relationship, colonialism has been accused of propagating "the development of underdevelopment" (Brett, 1973:18; Frank, 1969a; Johnson, 1972).

Consistent with Frank's claim, Myrdal previously expressed that "most of very poor countries now called 'underdeveloped' were until recently not countries at all, but colonial dependencies" (Myrdal, 1968:1839). Since obtaining formal independence after the second World War, the areas which were formerly referred to as "backward regions" are now called "underdeveloped countries". "Underdevelopment" implies, as again Myrdal pointed out, political connotations, and the underdeveloped countries are "not static but anxious to rise out of their poverty" (Myrdal, 1968:1839). The dynamics in the underdeveloped countries may be interpreted as the manifestations of recent national development planning. The root of this dynamics may be understood in the study of the nature of colonialism.
2. Patterns of colonialism and nature of colonialism

A colony may be defined as a political dependency. Depending upon colonial policy and practice, colonies differ in type. According to Ram, (1926), there are roughly two kinds of colonies -- settlement and exploitation colonies. The "settlement" colonies are situated in the temperate region or in the moderate zone in which the original population has been largely displaced by emigrants from the mother country as in North America and Oceania. The settlement colonies may be viewed as one type of massive migratory movement. The major factors in such settlement colonies are considered to be the population pressures in the mother countries, various other causes such as religious discord as in the case of the migration of the Puritans to New England, and dissatisfaction with social and economic conditions as in the case of the Irish.

"Exploitation" colonies are found in the tropics. It is with this type of colony that we are here concerned. Instead of the factor of population pressure in the mother country, the exploitative colonialization was animated by the missionary motive and the desire for exploration and adventure. Such colonialization was further intensified by the commercial motive and increased speed and efficiency of the means of communication and transportation (Ram, 1926:1-27). Ram explains that the missionary has tended to precede the merchant and the magistrates, often preparing the way for them and making their operations easy and possible. For example, it was primarily through the work of the missionary that the British Empire obtained its first foothold in countries such as Australia, Fiji, South and Central Africa (by David Livingstone), Burma, and Guinea (Ram, 1926:6). Among
others, however, the desire for the establishment of commercial relations is thought to have been the most important motive in colonialization by the European nations. This was particularly true during the latter half of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, wherein a primary object of colonialization was to search for markets, i.e., to find ways of disposing of the surplus products created by European industries. Such commercial expansion was supported by the rapid development of means of communication and transportation also witnessed during this period.

Depending upon the colonial motives and policies, the exploitative colonies can also be categorized into three types -- commercial, plantation, and industrial (Ram, 1926). The original activities of the Dutch, the Portugese, and the British provided examples of the commercial type of colonialization in Java, Indo-China, and Africa. In the "plantation" colonies, capital was usually supplied by the white men and labor by the natives; as in Ceylon, West Indies, and the colonies of tropical Africa. Finally, the "industrial" colonies are found in such countries as Egypt, India, China, etc. In these industrial colonies, with their rich cultural heritage, the natives were sufficiently civilized to supply both labor and capital.

The economic policies of the colonial systems were in general characterized by monopolistic capitalism which seeks to limit the foreign markets to trade with the mother country in colonial produce and with the colony in home produce. Such trade patterns, binding colonies to the economy of the mother country, was shaped and reinforced by heavy duties imposed on both products of foreign origin and exports to countries other than the mother
country. At the same time, the colonial policies restrained the colonies from establishing industries for the manufacture of raw material and basic industries (Papi, 1938:1-14). The economy of the colonies gradually took the form of appendices to the economy of the mother country, and ultimately resulted in economic dependence on the industrial countries; both during the colonial period and after political independence has been achieved.

Aside from these aspects of economic dependency, the real nature of colonialism may be understood by considering the kinds of structures imposed upon the colonial situation. The interactive activities in colonial administrations were generally determined by the dominance of the colonial agents. New administrative, economic, religious, and educational institutions were extended over the indigenous structures. But the pre-colonial formations were not entirely incorporated into the new colonial system. They were required to change only up to the point required for the purpose of the colonial political economy but no further than that. For example, the colonial authorities usually encouraged the perpetuation of traditional values and power structures, these being seen as fundamental to the maintenance of the "traditional" or "tribal" social order. In this sense, the administrative changes imposed by colonialism were only partial. At the same time, they may be considered fundamental because they undermined the old structures at their most critical and vulnerable points.

As initially stated by Boeke (1953), colonialism began by creating a dualistic situation based upon the juxtaposition of dominant colonial and dependent indigenous structures. As Boeke exemplified by his analysis of Indonesia, a dual economy means the presence within a subsistence economy
of the host society; of a highly capitalistic "enclave" economy which is solely export-oriented. Though Boeke's thesis is increasingly discredited by such writers as Frank (1969b), the idea of social dualism seems to have some elements of truth in describing the colonial system of exploitation.

The nature of colonialism is well summarized in Brookfield's definition of colonialism. He defines colonialism as

A thoroughgoing, comprehensive and deliberate penetration of a local or "residientary" system by the agents of an external system, who aim to restructure the patterns of organization, resource use, circulation and outlook so as to bring these into a linked relationship with their own system. (Brookfield, 1972:1-2)

As already indicated, however, the linked relationship of the colonies with the colonial power was characterized by dependence and great inequality.

The restructuring of the indigenous society through colonial rule included not only a cultural and social structural aspect but also involve the peculiarities of the colonial population itself. Balandier has called attention to the arbitrary nature of the colonial boundaries and administrative divisions between and within colonies. This has resulted in — or aimed at — "fragmenting important ethnic groups" (Balandier, 1951:44). These arbitrary colonial boundaries of the former colonies led to the current, nonintegrated plural societies with the attendant rivalries among major ethnic or tribal groups. This is particularly the case in the new states of Southeast Asia and Africa. The term "plural society" refers to a state of affairs in which factors such as language, ethnic differences, and disparate value systems mark the presence of significant sub-populations
within a single "society". Operating at the economic, political, and social levels, such factors are likely to be highly unfavorable to the achievement of the national unity and consolidation which will be required for development.

3. Decolonialization and independence

Liquidation of the colonial system meant the liberation of the colonial peoples from colonial rule and the coming of political independence. The causes of "decolonialization" can be found, not only in the nationalist's aspirations and their struggle for independence, but also in the domestic conditions of the colonial power and changing world conditions.

The colonial powers themselves had created a limited number of educated class of the indigenous people to provide administrative and professional services in the colonies -- particularly in the colonies under indirect rule as in British India, Ceylon, the Philippines, etc. (Myrdal, 1968). This indigenous elite was primarily the product of the legal, administrative, and educational structures created as instruments for ruling the colonies according to the interests of the colonial powers. This class posited themselves in the upper stratum, often possessing immediate social and economic interests convergent with those of the colonial governments, and divergent with the best interests of their peoples. As Fanon explained, it is not unusual that national bourgeoisie were completely incorporated into the international power structure (Fanon, 1967). As elites grew in number, however, they began to represent a new social force -- the nationalist liberation front or anticolonialism -- and they became the new leaders of the new states.
Outside the colonies, the world opinions concerning the colonialism and domestic situations of the colonial powers changed. First, the first World War became a turning point in colonial expansion and the colonial system, because the colonial powers could not reinsurance the idea of imperialism among the increasing radical intellectuals at home and abroad. Secondly, the Soviet Union vigorously denounced colonialism and supported the nationalist's demands for political independence. Later Russia's success in transforming a backward country into industrial power would inspire the nationalist elites with the possibilities of political and economic autonomy of the backward colonies. At the same time, the socialist thought was increasingly appealing to the European radicals, as well as to the nationalist elites, as a doctrine of social justice based on the equality of all.

Thirdly, the emergence of the United States as a world power was yet an additional factor to weaken the European colonial powers at world affairs. The principle of national self-determination, which was proposed as a basis of peace settlement by President Wilson during the first World War, was appealing to the nationalists and European intellectuals alike (Albertini, 1971). To European radicals and the socialists, the liberation of the colonial peoples were viewed as part of their own struggle against the upper class state (Myrdal, 1968:140).

Fourthly, the second World War was spread to the colonial territories. During the war, the European colonial systems were virtually brought to a total collapse in Southeast Asia and North and Central Africa. A new generation of nationalists was appearing in the colonial territories.
involved in the war. These young and radical elites led the emancipation movement in either collaboration with or resistant to the occupying power (Albertini, 1971:20-21). Fifth, after the second World War, the financial as well as the moral burden of colonial rule was to become an overwhelming one due to domestic rehabilitation of European countries from the war, and due to the mounting pressures from an anticolonial block including the Soviet Union and the United States. By all estimations, the second World War was of decisive importance in the dissolution of the European colonial systems and was similarly decisive in bringing about the end of the Japanese imperialism in the Far East.

Finally, with the emergence of Communist China and the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States was caught in conflict between its pronounced anticolonialism and its own strategic and economic interests to defend against communism. Thus, the colonial issue was shifted into the "East-West" conflict and brought about the advent of the "Cold War" era. For example, it has been stated that the United States granted the French massive military and financial aid by reinterpreting the "colonial war" in Indochina as a way of defense against communism (Albertini, 1971:25). Nonetheless, decolonialization was speeded up by the East-West conflict because both the communist and capitalist bloc declared their anticolonialism and at the same time competed for political and economic influence in the "Third World".

In conclusion, the political independence in the new states is not thought to have been achieved solely because of the nationalist's struggle for independence. Rather, most of the new states were born largely because
of the colonial power's domestic problems and the mounting pressures from the changing world situations. This also implies that the colonial powers did not decolonize voluntarily because of their generosity, but rather because "they felt they had no other reasonable choice" (Myrdal, 1968:146). As a result, many new states were made independent on the basis of former colonial boundaries or colonial administrative units, which were fortuitously determined by the historical interplay of imperial policies and rivalries in the colonial era. The general result in these new states was either the artificial maintenance of inherently plural societies or else a partitioning of formerly unitary nations. Consequently, most new states had to face the fact that independence did not automatically bring about a condition of national consolidation or national unity.

4. The initial conditions of nation building

In the above, the nature of colonialism and the process of decolonization have been discussed. The "exploitative" colonization was characterized by the transformation of the entire social fabric of peoples in the colonies -- economic dependence was created, traditional social structures modified, and existing political authorities subordinated (or deprived) to the foreign invader. After the second World War, political independence was given to the peoples in many parts of the colonies under the mounting pressure of world opinion and the domestic problems of the colonial powers.

Based on the legacy of the colonial situations and the arbitrary bases of independence, the new states are thought to have inherited two immanent structural weaknesses for national development -- built-in
economic dependence and deficient incipient conditions for nation building. First, while many of the former colonies obtained their political independence as a result of the decolonialization process, their economies remained heavily dependent on those of the industrialized developed countries. This was the legacy of their colonial economic policies. Colonial economic policies were largely designed to maintain the colonies as supplier of various raw materials and as markets for the manufactured goods of the mother countries by means of discriminatory tariff barriers. And, in many cases, the colonies were restrained from establishing heavy industries and manufacture of raw materials (Fapi, 1938:5). In general, the economic infrastructures of the present new states were originally built as economic appendices to the economies of the industrialized colonial powers. As a consequence, these built-in, structural economic dependencies on the industrial countries have contributed to the present economic backwardness of the newly independent countries (Brett, 1973).

Secondly, many of these newly independent countries are thought to inherit immanently deficient initial conditions for their nation building. These deficient conditions may be seen in the two aspects -- the lack of adequate preparation for the task of nation building and the arbitrary bases of independence. In the areas under direct colonial rule and most parts of Africa, political independence was generally granted without adequate preparation for self-governing (mainly because the colonial powers largely neglected higher education for the indigenous and allowed the natives very little say in political and administrative affairs) (Albertini, 1971). These can be seen in the presently severe lack of qualified administrators
and personnel, particularly in African nations. In addition, many new states adopted the legal and institutional arrangements of former colonial administrations without adequate restructuring or reorganization for the new needs of autonomous development. Examples can be found in the pressing needs for administrative reforms and other social reforms for national development efforts.

It is also true that most postwar new states have been faced with serious difficulties in creating national unity and national consolidation, mainly due to the released plural divisive forces within the new states. The divisive forces working against national consolidation and unity are largely the historical products of colonialism. As indicated earlier, major ethnic groups in some colonial areas were fragmented by the arbitrary nature of the colonial boundaries between and within colonies, which were fortuitously determined by the interplay of the imperial policies and rivalries. These colonial boundaries, in fact, became the present national borders of the new states. In many cases, colonial domination resulted in the creation of larger political entities than those which existed in pre-colonial times, as in British India, Indonesia, and elsewhere. In thirty-four independent African nations as of 1970, for example, two or more major languages are spoken in all thirty-three countries with the exception of Algeria. Table 2 demonstrates the consequences of the arbitrary establishment of territorial boundaries without adequate regard for ethnic composition in the newly independent countries. Twenty-two (73.3 percent) of the thirty developed countries are composed of only one major ethnic group. In
Table 2. Major ethnic composition of 79 LDC's and 30 MDC's.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Ethnic Groups</th>
<th>LDC's</th>
<th>MDC's</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five and over</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: See Appendix.

comparison, the populations of only twenty-four (30.4 percent) out of seventy-nine less developed countries are composed of one major ethnic (or racial) group. And the populations of the remaining less developed countries (more than two-thirds of the 79 LDC's), including the countries with five or more ethnic groups, are composed of two or more major ethnic groups.

This arbitrariness in the incipient conditions for nation building has resulted in two undesirable facts. First, it often brought border disputes between the new states as manifested in the border conflicts between India and China, China and Burma, Afghanistan and Pakistan, etc. (Myrdal, 1968).

Second, it is likely that it has contributed unfavorably to the national integration of the new states. Under such circumstances, many less developed new states have experienced a series of social disturbances and political upheavals. As an example, types of transfer of power have been cross-tabulated with colonial experience of countries in Table 3.
Table 3. Transition of power from independence until 1970 by colonial experience.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transition of Power</th>
<th>Colonial Experience</th>
<th>No Experience</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Colonized</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular</td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: See the secondary sources listed in Appendix.

Includes former colonial rulers and independent buffer states.

*Dates covered not given.

*Irregular transfers include military coups, palace revolutions, and the like from independence until 1970.

Irregular transfer of power means unconstitutional (or illegitimate) ways of transfer of power such as military coups, the countercoups, palace revolution, revolutionary provisional governments, etc. In other words, all these incidents represent political instability. Out of a total of 109 countries (in the data compiled), 80 countries were, in their recent history, colonized with varying duration and only 29 countries were not colonized. The 29 countries were either Western colonial rulers or noncolonized sovereign nations. Table 3 shows that about half of the 80 new states have, since their independence, experienced some form of political upheaval in transferring power. On the other hand, the old countries, with about 83 percent of regular transfer, show a higher tendency toward domestic political stability compared with 51 percent of that of the new states.

As discussed earlier, colonialization is thought to have affected the economic growth of the new states. As the crude measuring device in
Table 4. Distribution of 1971 GNP per capita by colonial experience in 109 countries.\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GNP Per Capita (Unit: $)</th>
<th>No Experience(^b)</th>
<th>Colonial Experience</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 150</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150 - 250</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250 - 1,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 - 2,000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 2,000</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Source: See the secondary sources listed in Appendix.

\(^b\)Dates covered not given.

Comparing rich and poor nations, gross national product per capita of the nations in 1971 has been cross-tabulated with the experience of colonization as shown in Table 4. According to Table 4, the highest bracket of income per capita in 1971 was skewedly concentrated in the 15 noncolonized countries (with 51.7 percent of 29 noncolonized countries and with 71 percent of 21 highest income countries). On the other hand, the new states having colonial experience were heavily distributed in the lower bracket of income per capita. More specifically, 85 percent of 80 new states had less than $1,000 GNP per capita in 1971 and about half (45 percent) of the new states were concentrated in the lowest income groups with less than $250 GNP per capita in the same year. In general, noncolonized old countries are characterized by higher economic growth compared with the new states. Though many factors such as colonial types, the nature of colonial economic policies, and colonial period should be considered in the explanation of the
colonial influence on the economic growth of the new states, it may be said
that the colonial experience has affected unfavorably the economic develop­
ment of the new states.

In conclusion, the consequences of colonialism were profound on the
initial conditions of the less developed new states. Colonialism was
designed to establish dependent economic relations of the colonies in favor
of the industrial countries. The results in the creation of (raw material)
export-oriented economies in the new states of the former colonies at the
expense of present economic backwardness.

The legacy of colonialism affected the initial conditions of the new
states. The initial conditions were deficient and unfavorable for the
activities of nation building and national development, largely because of
the lack of adequate preparation gotten for self-government in the areas of
qualified personnel, administrative organizations, and other social in­
stitutional arrangements. The deficient initial conditions are also
manifested in the arbitrary nature of the territorial boundaries of the
new states; boundaries established without respect for ethnicity, language,
cultural heritage, historical experience, and the like. All these deficient
initial conditions are thought to remain as unfavorable factors in national
consolidation and national development. It is, however, the legacy of the
colonial economic policies which seems to especially contribute to the
maintenance of economic backwardness in the new states. The next section
will examine the income gap between the developed industrial countries and
the less developed new states, and the economic dependence of the new states
in relation to the legacy of colonialism.
B. International Relationship

1. Widening gap

Currently, the major problems and issues confronting mankind are changing from ideological disputes and confrontations between the divided super power axis to the problem of the increasing economic discrepancy between the rich, industrialized countries and the poor, less developed countries. Both in relative and absolute terms, today's human conditions present an appalling contrast between the developed and the underdeveloped countries. There is affluence and development on the one side, and poverty and chronic underdevelopment on the other. Among the aspects of the present world crisis, the ever-widening gap between the rich industrial countries and the hungry underdeveloped countries is most disturbing and serious, both for the survival of the people of the proletariat hungry countries and, in a world spectrum, to the prospect of world peace.

The gross national product, as a single measure of economic growth, has conceptual deficiencies and methodological difficulties, especially when an attempt is made to arrive at a uniform estimate of the world gross national product. These are related to the differences between the Soviet concept of the gross national product, as adopted by all the centrally planned economies, and the Western concept applied in the market economies. The difference is that the Soviet concept of gross national product excludes all income of the tertiary production or the service sector. The role of the service sector in the formation of gross national product is of prime importance in the market economies (Angelopoulos, 1972:Appendix). Despite these conceptual deficiencies and methodological differences, the
figures in Table 5 show that the developing countries account for about 69 percent of the world's population and produce only about 15.4 percent of the world's gross national product. The developed countries, with only 31 percent of the world's population, account for 84.6 percent of the world's gross national product. The major social economic statistics computed by the geographical country groups of the non-Western world and the North Atlantic region (including Australia, New Zealand, and excluding Soviet Russia and the United States) show an alarming discrepancy between the developed and the less developed countries.

The disparities are even more striking in the distribution of the world's gross national product at an individual country level, particularly within the free enterprise economy group. The United States alone, with only 8.5 percent of the total population of the market economies, produces 44 percent of the total gross national product of the noncommunist world and 53 percent of the total gross national product of the industrially advanced countries of the West. The significance of the immense disparity in the distribution of the world's gross national product can be fully understood when it is noted that a gross national product per capita of $4,750 in the United States in 1970 was about 50 times greater than that of India.

Even more distressing than the size of the gap between the rich and poor nations is that the gap continues to increase, not only in total amount but in percentage. In underdeveloped countries from 1960 to 1970, the average per capita income increased by 27 percent, compared to 43 percent in developed countries (Simon and Simon, 1973:71-77). Narrowing the gap
Table 5. Distribution of world GNP and population, 1970.\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>GNP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Millions</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEVELOPED COUNTRIES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market economies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrally planned economies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (developed countries)</td>
<td>1,115</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEVELOPING COUNTRIES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market economies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia, Africa, and Latin America</td>
<td>1,664</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrally planned economies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (developing countries)</td>
<td>2,489</td>
<td>69.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WORLD TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>3,584</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Source: Angelopoulos (1972:22).

\(^b\)Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, and Israel.
In terms of total amounts is not mathematically possible for many years to come without virtually stopping growth in the rich countries. For instance, a one percent per capita growth in the United States means an annual increase of roughly $48 per person. The same growth rate in India in 1970 would only increase income by about $1 per person.

Suppose that from now on (1970) India with per capita income of $100 sustained a per capita annual growth rate (10 percent) twice that (annual growth rate of 5 percent) of the United States with per capita income of $4,750, it would take 83 years for the income gap to disappear between India and the United States. This kind of hypothetical assumption, however, is highly unlikely to be realized in the foreseeable future under the present circumstances. In reality, the income disparities between the rich and the poor countries are widening, and human conditions are worsening in many parts of the poor, less developed countries.

These income inequalities become even more meaningful when one examines the distribution of gross national product within each country of the non-communist world. This widening gap is taking place within the less

\[1\]

\[
\begin{align*}
100 \times (1 + .1)^n &= 4,750 \times (1 + .05)^n \\
\log (100 (1.1)^n) &= \log (4750 (1.05)^n) \\
n \log 1.1 + \log 100 &= n \log 1.05 + \log 4750 \\
n \log 1.047 &= \log 47.50 \\
n (.01010) &= 1.67669 \\
n &= 83.0
\end{align*}
\]

Where: 
- \(n\) = the years to come when the GNP per capita in India catches up to that of the United States
- $100 = GNP per capita of India in 1970
- $4,750 = GNP per capita of the United States
- .1 = annual per capita growth rate of India
- .05 = annual per capita growth rate of the United States.
developed countries as well. These internal inequalities within a country are one of the major characteristics of underdevelopment in the sense that underdeveloped structures manifest themselves in the discrepancies between urban areas and rural peripheries, between ethnic or racial groups, and between social strata.

In the less developed new states, poverty and hunger are not new, but these chronic problems are more aggravated than ever before in history. These aggravations are caused by such factors as: unfavorable trade with the developed countries and, internally, by the outstripping of economic growth by the current population explosion. Population explosions have resulted from the lag between rapid mortality reduction and the relatively slow reduction in fertility rates. Currently, nearly half a billion people are reportedly suffering from some form of hunger. It has been estimated that ten thousand persons died of starvation each week in 1974 somewhere in the world (Newsweek: November 11, 1974).

From a demographic point of view, the old Malthusian nightmare is now becoming a reality in the less developed regions of the world. Misery and poverty are becoming widespread all over the world due to the fact that too many share too little and too few possess too much in the world income distribution. The underdeveloped countries remain poor while the few rich industrial countries get richer.

2. The nature of dependent relation

In the historical perspective, the now underdeveloped new nations share a common past of colonial experiences and a linked history to struggle for independence. Looking at the current situation, they also share,
Internally, a common presence of poverty, unemployment, and other underdeveloped characteristics. Externally, they share dependent relations with the developed industrial countries. As already discussed, the course and process of the recent changes of the less developed new nations have been determined largely by external forces. Let us examine the degree to which underdevelopment in the newly independent countries are related to the external relationships with the developed industrial countries.

Peter Worsley views the present relationship of economic dependence of the Third World countries upon the industrialized capitalist countries as being the result of colonial origins, saying, "the most serious legacy of colonialism, thus, is in economic sphere, in the form of backwardness, monocultural economies, foreign ownership of major resources, poverty, ..." (Worsley, 1964:235). And a group of Latin American scholars (Frank, 1969a, 1972; Johnson, 1972; Cockcroft, 1968) see underdevelopment as causally related to the pattern of evaluation of developed industrialized societies. They interpret the underdevelopment in Latin American countries as highly conditioned or aggravated by the region's relation with international factors.

The term "dependence-relation", as used by Johnson (1972), refers to situations that result from the colonial history and that are maintained by the developed industrial countries. Johnson defines the concept of dependence as "a situation in which a certain group of countries have their economy by the development and expansion of another economy, to which the former is subject" (Johnson, 1972:71). Thus, dependence-relation may have a profound influence in shaping the internal conditions of both economic
and social structures in the less developed new nations. In its final form, considering the dependent relation, the newly independent countries are nothing but de facto colonies of the developed industrial countries (Johnson, 1972).

In addition to the constraining effect of the dependent relation on the internal mechanism of the less developed countries, it is necessary to examine the trade situation and the nature of foreign aid as major external causes of economic underdevelopment, or as external constraints to development in the less developed countries. In the less developed countries foreign trade policy is thought to be a major instrument in national economic development. For these countries, exports constitute a chief source of foreign exchange earnings with which, in turn, they must finance a steady growth in indispensable imports such as industrial equipment and machines, and other industrial materials needed for development planning. Since independence, however, the trading position of the less developed countries has been weakened and deteriorated. The next section will examine the trends of current trade.

3. Trade situation of less developed countries

Before independence, the colonial powers had an interest in protecting the dependent country as a market for the products of their own industry. Likewise, they had an interest in procuring primary goods, in investing to produce them in quantity, and at lowering the product cost. However, the industrialized countries in the post colonial period have often felt less responsible for the welfare of their former colonies, once they were on their own.
The present economic structure of the newly independent countries, which is largely inherited from the legacy of colonial economic policies, is characterized by the dependent economies oriented toward the export of a few specialized primary products usually under the control and ownership of foreign investors. The developed industrial countries relied upon the commercial advantage of the market forces and, at the same time, they substantially reduced demand for the primary products for industrial use by replacing them with synthetic substitutes (Myrdal, 1970). Aside from the substantial reduction in the demand of some raw materials, the industrialized countries set various forms of trade barriers discriminating against the primary products of the exporting countries. On the other hand, actual imports as well as import needs of the less developed countries have sharply been increased due to the various reasons such as: the industrialization purpose through economic development planning, rapid population growth, rising demand of higher living standards among the masses of population, the commercial penetration from the advanced economies by lowering product costs through mass production, etc.

Taken all together, there has been a steady decline in the share of primary products in the composition of international trade, with the exception of oil. Exports of raw materials accounted for about 15 percent of the world exports as of 1960. But even that figure has dropped to 12.9 percent by 1968 (Angelopoulous, 1972:79). Table 6 shows that the share of the advanced market economies in world exports rose from 60.8 percent in 1950, to 72.1 percent in 1969. The share of the less developed countries declined from 31.2 percent to 17.9 percent during the same period. The
Table 6. Distribution of world exports for selected years, 1950-1969.a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market Economies</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
<th>Value (Millions of U.S. $ at 1969 Prices)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>66.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrally planned</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aSource: Angelopoulos (1972:76).

Unfavorable trends of the last two decades are expected to continue unless the trade barriers are removed and the structural changes are made in the composition of exports from less developed countries.

Like most of the less developed countries, for example, Latin American economies have become conspicuously oriented toward the export of primary products, largely under the control of foreign capital, and are constituted as markets for imported manufactures of the industrialized countries. National governments or private national businessmen of the less developed countries have had no control over international markets for primary products, the prices of which are unstable and often subject to unfavorable terms of trade in relation to imports. Currently, the Latin American countries are losing control of their manufacturing sectors to so-called multinational corporations. These manufacturing sectors (as engaged in import-substitution) are usually protected by the national government and require huge amounts of foreign exchange earnings to purchase machinery, maintenance spare parts, and essential raw materials for processing; usually from industrialized countries (Johnson, 1972; Frank 1969a: 1972).
Whereas the commercial middlemen, as parasitic intermediaries, have been created by the foreign capitalists, national businessmen grew up with and benefited from the nation's dependence on foreign industrial capital. They are interlocked in a symbiotic relationship with foreign capital (Johnson, 1972). This dependent relation keeps the internal social structure of the new states in perpetual underdevelopment, impedes economic growth, and endangers the national economy by widening the trade gap between import needs or actual imports and actual exports in foreign trade.

Table 7 shows the balance of gains and losses in three selected years. According to the figures in Table 7, during the period 1965-1967 developing countries suffered an aggregate loss of annual average in foreign exchange earnings of $1.3 billion as a result of adverse movement in their terms of trade with developed countries. The widening gap between exports and imports of developing countries is generally due to the rapid rise in import

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gains Through Exports</th>
<th>Losses Through Imports</th>
<th>Total Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>1,038</td>
<td>- 882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>1,407</td>
<td>- 965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>2,243</td>
<td>-2,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual average</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>1,563</td>
<td>-1,305</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: United Nations (1969:Table 23).*
needs and actual imports to meet the essential demands from unprecedented population growth and development efforts. This significant trade deficit is also largely attributable to the faster rise in the prices of the imported commodities and the slower rate of increase in the prices of exports of less developed countries. Consequently, less developed countries complain that postwar unfavorable and ever-deteriorating trends work against the less developed countries in the world trade, and that these are primarily determined by the interests of the major industrial nations. The mounting losses in foreign exchange earnings thereby retard economic development of the less developed countries.

4. The nature of foreign aid policy

For developing countries, economic development is a chief objective in the national development effort to raise the extremely low living standards of the population, reduce unemployment rates, and the like. To this end, many of these countries implement long-term development plans designed to mobilize the unutilized material resources and the underutilized human resources to increase productivity and to assure full employment. During the initial stages of the development effort, the success of these development plans depends largely on a favorable climate of international cooperation and an adequate flow of financial aid. The efficacy of the aid, assuming genuine international cooperation, will still depend primarily on the nature of the efforts of the aid receiving countries themselves. Thus, national efforts and international cooperation become a precondition for the solution of the problem of underdevelopment and self-sustained growth.
In recent years, the developing countries have needed more funds than ever before in order to adopt the advanced technological innovations in industrial development, in modernizing and expanding the infrastructure of the economy, in the mechanization of agriculture for economic development, and increasing aggregate funds to feed the additional mouths due to the current population growth. International cooperation, both financial and technical, is indispensible for overcoming the major obstacles to socio-economic progress and for accelerating growth rates.

Throughout the last two decades, the developing countries have received large amounts of assistance from the industrialized world. Since 1950 the number of countries and international agencies providing assistance has increased. According to the Pearson Report, the aid resources so far have still been a small fraction, amounting to only about two percent of the total income of the developing countries. The report indicates, at the same time, that foreign aid has financed only about ten percent of investment in developing countries. On the average, only twenty percent of the imports from developed countries has been aid financed (Pearson, 1969:48-49).

The Pearson Report, in assessing the contribution of foreign aid, found a very weak correlation between the amount of aid received and the growth performance. According to the Pearson Report, the major factors responsible for the low correlation are: (1) politically considered allocation in the use of a sizeable portion of the aid, (2) aid donor's general lack of knowledge about the receiving countries or inexperience in promoting receiving country's economic growth, and (3) the irrelevant direction
of aid to development objectives in receiving countries (Pearson, 1969: 50).

According to the statistics in Table 8, the aggregate flow of financial resources from Development Assistance Committee member countries, and multilateral agencies, increased in absolute terms during the 1960's. The total development assistance rose from $8.1 billion in 1960 to $10.4 billion in 1965 and $14.7 billion in 1970. The amount of grants in official development assistance has declined from $3.7 billion in 1960 to $3.3 billion in 1970 in absolute terms. The private direct investment has almost tripled during the same period and export credits (commercial credits for short-term and at high interest rates) have almost quadrupled during a decade.

The Pearson Commission found that the flow of direct, private investment is heavily concentrated in (1) those developing countries which have already demonstrated their capacity for sustained and rapid growth, and (2) within countries, in extractive industry. One effect has been the neglect of the really needy and economically stagnant countries. In addition to the stagnation of official development assistance, the terms and conditions of aid have hardened. Since 1960 aid has been gradually tied to purchases from the donor country. In 1967 only sixteen percent of official aid flow remained untied (Pearson, 1969:77).

The decline in official aid, its increased costs, and the growing complexity of the regulations, tends to increase the external constraints, thus impeding development efforts. The system of aid tying inhibits the expansion of trade among developing nations and has serious effects on their price structure and, ultimately, on their capacity to export to world markets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net Disbursement</th>
<th>Millions of U.S. Dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total official and private</td>
<td>8,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official development assistance</td>
<td>4,703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral grants</td>
<td>3,716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral loans</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution to multilateral agencies</td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other official assistance</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private investment and credit</td>
<td>3,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct investment</td>
<td>1,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral portfolio investment</td>
<td>633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral portfolio investment</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export credits</td>
<td>546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total official and private</td>
<td>4,965</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Angelopoulos (1972:102).*

In Myrdal's terms, "tying aid to exports implies a curtailment of the aid receiving underdeveloped country's freedom to buy the most suitable commodities and at the most favorable prices" (Myrdal, 1970:349). In this context, aid does not cost the donor country. Rather, aid is good for business and is to serve in the best of the alleged national interest of the giving country.
In the case of the United States, for instance, an article in the Department of State Bulletin explicitly pointed out directions in the use of foreign aid. According to this bulletin, as much as "ninety-three percent of AID (Agency for International Development) funds are spent directly in the United States" (Gaud, 1968:603). In defense of their foreign aid policy, the British Government also clearly pointed out its long term interest as well as the trade advantages from her foreign aid (Myrdal, 1970:357-358).

It seems true that one of the primary objectives in the aid program is to help the donor countries themselves rather than to help the low income countries. The implication in the foreign aid program is to retard modernization of the developing countries and to keep them in perpetual underdevelopment by supporting the reactionary regimes of their ruling elites in order to suppress any opposition by the indigenous progressive elites in the aid-receiving countries, and by making them postpone the opportunities for needed social reforms. An earlier President of the World Bank, Eugene Black, indicated long ago the underlying fact of the reactionary nature of foreign aid, especially in bilateral lending. The criticism of bilateral aid programs is their susceptibility to political influences. Aid is often offered as a price in political bargaining that takes no account of the actual economic requirements of the recipients, or that may misdirect development aid in the sense that the objectives of aid are irrelevant to the real needs. Thus, the "ill-judged offers of aid" in bilateral relationships have made it possible for the receiving countries to postpone some essential reforms (Myrdal, 1970:8).
The recent trends in the composition of the flow of foreign capital shows that a large portion of official development assistance has been replaced by private direct investment and export credits. The private direct investment is not only expansive but also selective in the choice of host countries and sectors in the best interest of the foreign investors. From the beginning, the overseas direct investment to developing countries is made to link it to the investor's mother company in the developed countries and to establish dependent relationships. Myrdal explains the adverse effects of direct investment on the host countries by saying, "the investing concern often delivers to its foreign branch machinery, spare parts, and other production materials and makes available patent rights and other licenses" (Myrdal, 1970:328). It is also well recognized that the capital value of private investments is calculated in a somewhat arbitrary manner and at high cost because the transactions take place without much outside competition. When the transaction of private investment is once made, it is the industrial countries that receive the strongest benefits in the end. The private investors not only repatriate their profits and dividends, but also the other advantages in regard to licensing, taxation, and the like. Thus, the private direct investments result in a greater outflow of capital in both tangible and intangible forms. They ultimately contribute to paralyzed dependence-relations and a worsening underdeveloped structure.

According to the statistics in Table 8, export credit, as one form of private lending for development purposes, has sharply increased, both in volume and in the proportion of total flow of financial resources. Export
credit increased from $546 million in 1960 to $2,172 million in 1970. When a transaction is made between developed countries, the export credits, in strict commercial terms, are hardly called development assistance. The use of export credits, and their sharp rise in volume, creates serious problems to the developing countries. The Pearson Commission warned of the dangers involved in the excessive use of the export credits: the developing countries are experiencing serious balance-of-payment problems because they have relied upon such short-term borrowings as the export credits to finance long-term investments. This phenomenon was seen in a number of countries, notably Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ghana, Indonesia, and Turkey (Pearson, 1969:119).

Nonetheless, the notorious export credits are frequently used to finance investment in the social and economic infrastructure and in industrial projects in the public sector. In general, official aid, both bilateral and multilateral, is not used to finance public sectors. Given the present financial access, private direct investment is simply not available to them.

As already stated, the greater part of the contributions made by the donor countries comes from the private sectors. Such contributions are normal financing on strictly commercial terms, while the official aid flows do not exceed four tenths of one percent of the gross national product of the donor countries (Pearson, 1969:120). Even the declining official aid has been turned into tied aid — to purchase commodities from the aid-giving countries, inhibiting the expansion of trade among developing countries and
ultimately having adverse effects on their capacity to export to world markets.

As a result of all the drawbacks, and of the direct and indirect costs involved for the aid-receiving countries, the effectiveness of development assistance is reduced and the foreign debt has been growing much faster than expansion in export earnings. Now, developing nations transfer large amounts of funds to aid-giving countries each year in payment of interest and amortization on their foreign debts. According to Table 9, during 1965-1967, Latin America transferred to foreign credits five percent more than it received from them. The seven oil-exporting countries paid back five times more than they received. In the near future, clearly, the outflow of financial funds from the less developed countries will exceed the level of foreign aggregate gross lending which is coming into them.

Table 9. Average annual percentage of debt service payments to gross lending, 1965-67. 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group of Countries</th>
<th>Percent of Gross Lending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Developing countries (48, exclusive of oil-exporting countries)</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America (20 countries)</td>
<td>104.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa (13 countries)</td>
<td>57.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia (12 countries)</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil-exporting countries (7 countries)</td>
<td>521.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{a}\)Source: Angelopoulous (1972:121).
It is one of today's paradoxical situations that the poor nations will be paying the rich countries more than they receive from them in development assistance. In a statement made to President Nixon at the White House on June 12, 1969, Gabriel Valdes, ex-Foreign Minister of Chile, clearly expressed this paradoxical situation of development assistance. His statement can be summarized as: (1) in terms of real financial flow, Latin America is contributing to finance the development of the United States and of other industrialized countries; (2) the multinational corporations in Latin America repatriate several times higher than what they invested, (3) foreign aids have only made a contribution to markets and greater development for the developed countries; (4) as a result, Latin America is left in payment of external debt; and (5) inter-American solidarity or any stable cooperation is not possible under the current situation (Frank, 1969a:1).

Valdes' outspoken statement is true of the current situation in Latin America and of most of the aid-receiving developing countries elsewhere. However, it does not always mean that all of the aid-receiving countries have been underdeveloped or all the aid programs have failed. Earlier, the Marshall Plan in Europe was, in general, successful in its outcome. But the nature of aid and the initial conditions were not the same as those of current aid to the developing countries. In the first place, the Marshall Plan was essentially a repair job, which involved the rehabilitation of modern and highly productive societies temporarily damaged by war. In the second place, the conditions and nature of aid were those of gifts
or grants in large volume, which differ from those of the foreign aid to the underdeveloped countries.

The rationale of the Marshall Plan demonstrates the interplay of American generosity and interests; generosity because most of the United States citizens trace their backgrounds to Europe. Millions of them still had close relatives there after the war. The Marshall Plan was in the interest of America because, economically, aid helped ease domestic economic stability by giving away surpluses. Strategically, aid helped to protect the international capitalist system from the threat of the Russian communist expansion in the postwar era by rehabilitating, through aid, Western economic strength. Around the 1950's, all other developed countries, along with the United States, made regular donations to the less developed countries for one reason or another. Foreign aid policy in the cold war period was mainly political and strategic under the motto of anti-communism, rather than development assistance.

It is also true that all other donor nations initiated aid programs, partly with some mixed feelings of guilt and moral obligation, to their former colonies. For the former colonial powers of Britain, France, and Holland, however, their principal preoccupation was the preservation of their long-established economic, political, and cultural ties by means of foreign assistance. When Germany and Japan reemerged as formidable economic and trading powers, both also entered the assistance field with purely commercial and financial considerations rather than as development assistance.
With the passage of time, the United States has gradually reduced its contribution of foreign aid. At the same time, the reasons behind foreign assistance manifest themselves as political, strategic, and economic, rather than as the so-called American generosity and humanitarianism, characteristics of the initial stage, under the semantic ambiguity of the term "foreign aid" (Mende, 1973). It may be at least partly true that both economic and military assistance programs were shaped so as to be in the best interests of the United States, not in the interests of humanitarianism or in the best interests of the recipients.

George Woods, former President of the World Bank, remarked that "some countries have made it clear that they see development finance as nothing more than a disguised subsidy for their exports" (Mende, 1973:68). For example, in terms of British official aid, about two-thirds of all aid was actually spent in Britain, thus providing orders and employment for British industry. For French official aid, practically all of it came back as remittances or in the form of export orders. In the case of Japan, about eighty percent of Japan's bilateral official loans are tied to the purchase of Japanese goods and services, and repayment terms and interest rates are particularly severe. The Japanese aid program "is little more than trade promotion" (Mende, 1973:68-70).

On the basis of the analysis of the facts and nature of the current foreign aid, it can be concluded that, seen from the perspective of underdevelopment, an aid program is apparently an alternative form of neo-imperialism. The industrialized, donor countries have found aid to be the most convenient instrument to maintain and strengthen their economic
benefits and political influence over the developing countries. That is, aid is an alternative to armed conflict in the pursuit of power and influence. It is an improvement over more destructive methods. Thus, foreign aid programs helped establish and maintain the dependent relations between less developed countries and developed metropolitan countries. In other words, aid programs helped to maintain the underdevelopment of the recipient countries.

C. Summary and Conclusion

Development policies through state planning were regarded as one of the significant and new social phenomena in the less developed countries. The role of states was recognized as central in the economic and social development of the less developed countries. In fact, most of these less developed countries are newly independent countries from colonialism. Thus, the study started with the analysis of the nature of colonialism and its legacy on the initial conditions of the new states with respect to the model formulated in chapter two. The initial conditions of the new states were discussed in terms of economic development aspect and national consolidation and its unity. As a result of the economic aspect of their colonial legacy, most of the newly independent nations inherited structural economic dependence on the industrial countries as determined by the colonial economic policies. The process of decolonialization, together with colonial policies, affected profoundly the initial conditions of nation building in the new states. In general, the new states started with structurally deficient incipient conditions of nation building due to the lack of adequate preparation for self-governing (in terms of qualified personnel.
and adequate structural reorganizations of administrations and other social institutional arrangements), and due to the arbitrary nature of their territorial boundaries irrespective of ethnicity, cultural heritages, etc. Thus, many newly independent countries have difficulties in nation building which is essential for social mobilization for development efforts.

The second section discussed the widening gap between the industrial countries and the less developed new states. And it also analyzed the trends of trade and the nature of foreign aid with respect to the externalities of the model formulated earlier. From the analysis of the economic and political influences from the developed world, it may be concluded that the trends of current trade have been unfavorable for the economic development of the less developed countries, and that the foreign aid from the rich countries has, in reality, become a new means of neo-imperialism to the less developed countries. Without true international cooperation, thus, the economic development of the presently less developed countries may not be optimistic.

In relation to the nationalist's struggle for independence under colonialism and the desire for overcoming the economic dependence, the next chapter will deal with the ideals and realities of the growing nationalism in the new states. This nationalism is regarded as an important internal dynamics of current social changes in the new states and it is virtually the driving force for national development efforts.
IV. INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF CURRENT CHANGES

This chapter deals with the internal dynamics of national development planning in the less developed states. These internal dynamics are provided by a new spirit of purposive change; a spirit rooted in nationalism and promoted by agents of change. These factors were initially elaborated in the model formulated in chapter two. With respect to the first of these factors, the first section of this chapter will discuss the ideals and realities of new nationalism in the Third World countries. Nationalism is essentially a political expression, and it is considered to be the driving force behind national development planning. In the second section, those development objectives which seem to be common to the new states will be delineated. The third and fourth sections deal with the factor of the agents of change in the model formulated. More specifically, the third section is mainly concerned with the nature of national elite and their role in development planning. The fourth section will, similarly, discuss the characteristics and role of the public administrations in the national development planning.

A. Ideals and Realities of New Nationalism

In formulating an effective development plan, it is essential to be able to realistically formulate the long-term objectives of the nation and, at the same time, to specify detailed and immediate targets. The goals of development planning must be set on the basis of the problems identified and in terms of these overall national objectives. Development planning, unlike an episodic action program, transcends being a solution to any immediate problem in question and aims at achieving the national
objectives for the betterment of human conditions. In other words, development planning may be said to be a deliberately calculated, collective human endeavor to change the present socioeconomic conditions in desired directions. The desired social objectives are derived from the modernization ideals of the society. These modernization ideals are expressed in the nationalism. Nationalism, in turn, is implanted in these ideals.

Ideals cannot be achieved, but remains to be realized. Objectives, on the other hand, can be achieved. In terms of the relationship between ideals and objectives, ideals can be regarded as the value premises which serve in the delineation and elaboration of socially desired objectives. Some value premises common to contemporary nationalism in developing countries will be briefly explored. These modernization ideals are not necessarily based on rational grounds. Rather, they are what the people of the developing countries would desire to realize.

The concept of nationalism originated in Europe and has taken its meanings from the national (or collective) consciousness which began to grow during the French Revolution and spread throughout Central and Eastern Europe during the following 150 years. Later the doctrine of self-determination added fuel to the burning nationalistic movements. From this European experience, nationalism may be defined as "an ideology and a movement striving to unite all people with the loyalty and emotional attachment to existing government and state" (Kautsky, 1962:32).

Nationalism has spread all over the globe until the whole of mankind accepted its dominant political attitudes. Naturally, nationalism has varied in form and function through time. Although all kinds of
nationalism have certain characteristics in common, they can be divided into several logically and empirically distinct categories. With a primary reference to the ideology of nationalism in its historical viewpoint, Snyder has provided the following taxonomy: (1) **integrative nationalism** (1815-1871) as the unifying force which helped to consolidate feudal divisions and other factions into the states of Central Europe; (2) **disruptive nationalism** (1871-1890), which stimulated subjected and minority nationalities to seek to break out of their oppression; (3) **aggressive nationalism** (1900-1945), which became almost identical with the imperialism which appeared in Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Japan; and (4) the **contemporary nationalism** (1945- ), which has been diffused worldwide, partly as a result of the anticolonial movement against the Western colonial powers (Snyder, 1968:48).

This is the age of nationalism and, since 1945, nationalism has been accepted universally throughout the newly independent countries. Nationalism has been an outstanding force in the shaping of human history and has decisively influenced the political, economic, and cultural life of all mankind. However, nationalism differs in each country according to its unique historical conditions and social structures. Broadly, nationalism in the developing countries is characteristically different from European nationalism along a variety of dimensions.

First, in Europe, linguistic and cultural homogeneity was a key element in the growth of nationalism as the loyalty to an already existing state. Here government was based upon a common historical or cultural background. The nationalism of underdeveloped areas seeks to create such
a state and build a government where there was none before. In general, the boundaries established by the colonial powers have been retained as the territorial base of the new states in most of Africa and Asia.

Second, in Europe nationalism was initiated and supported by the middle class, including the industrial and commercial bourgeois. In the developing countries the educated class, with the intellectual elites, has become the prime vehicle for the articulation of the nationalist strivings. These intellectual elites are usually composed of professionals and administrators who are ideologically oriented to rely on the state, planning, and state interference. Businessmen in industry and commerce, on the other hand, rely upon the foreign masters for protection and financial security; embedded as they are in the international economic setting (see chapter three). Nationalism in the less developed countries began among the intellectual elites and only later did it become a more popular movement downward.

Third, nationalism in developing countries essentially began as an independent movement against foreign domination and sought emancipation from economic exploitation. European development began to establish self-government as a means of outward expansion.

Finally, in terms of process, nationalism in Europe took place relatively gradually and remained secular with growing rational attitudes. Nationalism in less developed countries, on the other hand, tends to be radical and ultra-national, without any firm social grounding in economic progress, social equality, and political democratization with universal
adult suffrage. Often the nationalists have sought to construct and justified a program for revolutionary change.

Because of differences in historical experiences, socio-cultural contexts, perceptions of the present conditions and the problems of society, and aspirations for the future, the individual patterns of nationalism vary throughout Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. In terms of major regional differences in nationalism, Snyder (1968) categorizes the Third World nationalism into four types: Black nationalism in Africa, anticolonialism in Asia, politico-religious nationalism in the Middle East, and populist nationalism in Latin America. The outstanding characteristic of African nationalism was its ethnic or racial quality; but it was essentially a xenophobic angry protest against the White man. As a result, the spirit of African nationalism was oriented toward African fraternity and toward development of Pan-African socialism (despite the multitudes of tribal and ethnic fragmentations).

In Asia, as elsewhere, nationalism appeared in a variety of forms, but there was some common ground. First, Asian nationalism was distinguished by a highly emotional quality. Second, Asian nationalism was beset by endemic communal clashes and hostility because of a long history of deep-rooted differences of ethnic, class, and religious antagonism. Asian nationalism was tempered by religious feuds — Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and an implanted minority of Christians. Third, Asian nationalism took on the characteristics of linguistic rivalries. The boundaries of the Asian countries were dictated by geographical, strategic, and political interests of foreign countries rather than by national, religious, and
linguistic ones. Partly as a result of colonial policies, such as large-scale plantations in Southeast Asia, there are many alien enclaves in such countries as Ceylon, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the countries in Indochina. In Southeast Asia, these minority problems are grave. Although the details vary, however, the overwhelming characteristic of Asian nationalism is anti-colonialism.

In the Middle East, nationalism has also expressed itself in a number of political, economic, and cultural forms. Yet, there is a common denominator to be found in religion. Islam was the binding force in the Arab world during the centuries of political and cultural decline and, in modern times, in the struggle against European colonialism. The relationship between religion and nationalism in the area is exceedingly complex. On the surface, the rivalry between Arabs and Jews is politically and territorially complex, but at its root it is a religious impulse.

Snyder (1968) characterizes Latin American nationalism as derivative. Latin American countries borrowed their culture from Europe. There was a direct connection with the Iberian peninsula in terms of language, religion, traditions, customs, and ethnical ideals. Thus, Latin American attitudes toward their motherland are characterized as ambivalent — with a love-hate attitude. Since obtaining political independence (earlier than on other continents) internal class tensions and struggles between wealthy capitalists and urban proletariats, landowners and landless peasants, foreign investors and awakened intellectuals, have been grave. Above all, Latin American nationalism is strongly against foreign economic exploitation.
From the overall assessment of the varied forms of nationalism in the Third World, some general conclusions can be drawn. First, the new nationalism of the less developed countries is not clear in content and, in practice, it takes a variety of forms, although it is different from European nationalism. Second, the main thrust of nationalism in less developed countries has been flavored with a distrust and hatred of other nations (particularly colonial powers) rather than a loyalty to government and a concern for the integration of their diverse populations. Anti-colonialism is a common denominator in the nationalism of the newly independent countries in Asia and Africa. These less advanced nations are tending to adopt a nationalism of their own as a defense against exploitation by foreigners and seek to prepare themselves for economical self-reliance.

Third, nationalism in these countries is used to establish the political framework for the nation-state; through which the instruments of power could be exercised. The first requirement on the road to modernization is the achievement of political power. The fundamental need is to obtain control of the authoritative instruments of the state, whether this takes the form of an independence movement against a colonial power or the overthrow of an existing conservative, or reactionary, government.

Fourth, one of the major objectives in the new nationalism is oriented to integration of multitudes of ethnic, religious, and linguistic divisions as well as consolidation of the nation-state. Since decolonialization, these internal divisive forces have been more freely released in the new states. The development of a common feeling of identification with, and
loyalty to, a territorially defined state remains a major problem in many areas. Nationalist leaders attempt to replace the presently divided loyalties with a new sense of national community — nationhood. Yet, the traditional primary identification with ethnic, tribal, or other more limited groups has not disappeared among wide segments of many populations. Under these circumstances, and for reasons of national internal solidarity, enemies of the state are sometimes created or identified — frequently the former colonial powers or counterpart of ideological groups. To overcome these enemies, whether internal or external, nationalist leaders may attempt to rally their followers through emotionally charged campaigns to bring about national unity.

Fifth, nationalism is not mutually exclusive with socialism but they may go together. Laissez-faire capitalism is rejected by many nationalist leaders on both intellectual and moral grounds. They believe that the competitive aspects of capitalism are wasteful of human and natural resources, that development through capitalism is inefficient, and that capitalism promotes undesirable social and economic inequalities within a society.

Sixth, the nationalist leaders strongly believe in comprehensive central planning by the government. The central plan is viewed as a means of achieving the most efficient utilization of the limited resources available to development and for the mobilization of the human resources, essential for national consolidation as well as socioeconomic development. Socialistic nationalism is also regarded as conducive to national unity in that the economic policies to be pursued ignore ethnic and cultural differences within the state.
Seventh, by creating a sense of national community, with a common fate within the world community, nationalism seeks to provide an essential motive for the national cohesion of nationhood, and the emotional identification of the people with the state.

Eighth, nationalism contributes to the awakening of a collective consciousness among the masses and enlightens them to the modern ways of life and thinking through education and the mass communication media. In order to create (or restore) a national identity, and to teach rational attitudes, education stresses the unique features of the national society -- such as its history and origin, symbols, geography, religion, and modern sciences.

Finally, the political doctrine of nationalism in developing countries is inclined toward nonalignment in international affairs; out of the pressures or ties of the super powers. This doctrine, especially prominent in Asia and Africa, is based on the assumption that close alignment with one of the major power blocs is detrimental to political independence, economic independence, and self-determination. This nonalignment doctrine may be a result of the fear, arising out of past colonial experiences and present politico-economic dependent relations, that a close alignment with either bloc may put the developing countries under the pressure of the super powers in their foreign and domestic policies. However, nonalignment does not imply noninvolvement in international affairs. A large number of the developing countries play a prominent role in world politics. These developing countries, with a growing involvement in the international scene, seek to play their diplomatic roles outside the orbit of the great
power blocs, and, moreover, mobilize among themselves as a moral influence on world politics, as the so-called Third World groups.

Thus, nationalism in new and developing countries is complex in nature and indefinite in its possibility. Nationalism, as illustrated above, is a political ideology but, at the same time, it has an economic program. With regard to the economic aspects of nationalism, Johnson (1965, 1967) critically pointed out some prevalent characteristics of nationalistic economic policy: First, nationalist economic policy tends to foster activities selected for their symbolic value, in terms of the concepts of national identity and the economic content of nationhood. It favors manufacturing and, within manufacturing, emphasis is put on certain (heavy or strategic) industries symbolic of industrial competence. Second, nationalist economic policy fosters activities offering prestigious jobs for the middle class and/or the educated (favoring bureaucratic jobs). Third, economic nationalism will tend to favor both extensive state control and extensive public ownership of economic enterprises.

Fourth, the bias in economic policy in new states attributable to nationalism is the preference for economic planning. Concerning economic planning, Johnson indicates that the preference for economic planning involves some psychological motivations rather than any rational basis. Johnson says that one element of the motivation is imitation of what was believed to be the superiority of the Russians over their capitalist competitors. Another is in establishing moral superiority over the capitalist systems by adopting the policies recommended by their own social critics. Fifth, Johnson's criticism on the specific bias in economic policy is
focused on the indiscriminate hostility toward the large multinational corporations. He explains that these corporations tend to be regarded as agencies of colonialism and imperialism and are seen as a threat to national independence and identity (Johnson, 1965, 1967). However, behind this criticism, there seems to be a fear of the possibility of the nationalization of foreign investments, or other governmental measures.

Finally, the redistributive economic policy of the nationalist may be criticized from the neo-classical viewpoint of economic growth — maintaining the usual argument that income inequality encourages more savings for investment. Nationalism favors extensive state control and extensive public ownership, which can provide abundant employment opportunities for the educated. The low classes are not likely to be gainers due to illiteracy, ignorance, and other insufficient qualifications for the jobs offered under the public ownership. Along with the trends of welfare economics in developed countries, this calls for redistribution of income. Thus, the nationalist economic policy is concerned with redistribution of income and with the investment in national manufacturing. Although political nationalism is, in general, the outcome of foreign domination, there is an application of the economic aspect to the processes of democratic government.

The developing countries are in a rapid process of transition. In this transitional stage, nationalism is a powerful driving force for the economic development effort. It provides an integrative force in terms of which the masses of people, with heterogeneous characteristics, can be fit into common and unified political patterns. Nationalism works as a
cementing factor for political stability and economic development, which are based on modernization ideals.

Political stability is, no doubt, a necessary condition for economic development, and economic development becomes a sufficient condition for political stability and social development. Political stability and economic development constitute the *sine qua non* of the modernization of the developing countries. Nationalism in the developing countries is a powerful driving force for their modernization. Modernization ideals are manifested in the nationalist movement, expressed as nationalism. The specific nationalism of an individual country, although it is a main feature of political ideologies, has not been clearly formulated either in intellectual content or in practice. "It is, rather, a huge emotional reservoir which can be tapped for good or ill depending on the kind of leadership which capture it" (Holland, 1953:4-5). As Roy (1952:99) puts it: "Nationalism cannot be defined, but everything else must be defined in terms of this indefinable!"

Nationalism is similar in nature to the patterns throughout the developing countries, whether in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, or Latin America. "It differs in a way that can be explained best not by definition but by a set of characteristics" (Snyder, 1968:142-143). It is apparent that there exists a fundamental difference between prewar period European nationalism and the contemporary nationalism of new nations. By dividing the existing nations of the world into two classes, Bilgrami explains the difference between the old and new nationalism, such as: "The original
nations have come into being before the state, whereas the modern nations have just reversed the process" (Bilgrami, 1967:1).

Discriminant colonial policies have always been a successful stimulant to consolidate national feelings and assert the right of the peoples to be free from alien domination. The new type of nationalism growing in the new states is characterized by a shift from an imperialistic nationalism during the prewar period in the "original states" to a psychological and sociological nationalism of the "new states" since World War II "searching for identity, demanding acceptance and insisting upon equality" (Bilgrami, 1967:5).

In order to keep the spirit of nationalism aflame, nationalist movements have usually searched for a hostile object — internal or external. Thus, to a great extent, nationalism achieved national unity, broke down local barriers, widened social horizons, and inculcated into the society a political activism and sense of revolution. These nationalist energies are now called upon to be positive and creative in the setting of national goals, and the establishment of the new institutions necessary for modernization. In the words of Duchacek, "the national cohesion, which had been achieved by an emotional identification of the people with each other and with their state, failed to precede the rational and concrete agreement on goals and methods of achieving them" (Duchacek, 1966:40).

In the absence of specifically articulated ideologies (beyond emotional appeal) nationalism in developing countries is suffering from indecision. Socialism, democracy, authoritarianism, traditionalism, westernization, and many other alternatives and combinations, are put
forward by different lines of ruling elites within a society. In addition to this confusing indecision of national leaders, there is a substantial social distance between the mass of people, who are largely illiterate and poverty stricken, and the small group of government leaders, who are westernized in their thinking and lifestyle. The result is a lack of effective communication between the elite and the masses. The nationalist leaders have failed to bring about change and development in the borrowed political institutions; ignoring the necessity of fitting them more coherently to the real needs of the people and the uniqueness of the indigenous social systems.

As one adverse effect, the excessive self-identification of nationalism has seemed to amplify internal separatisms, along with ethnic, religious, or ideological differences. Some of these adverse effects are ethnic minority problems in Southeast Asia: mushrooming tribalism in Black Africa, widening economic disparities between upper and lower strata in Latin America, or ideological confrontation in divided countries, including Korea and Vietnam. These divisive tendencies are not conducive to administrative effectiveness or national economic development. Under Pan-Africanism, Arab nationalism, and Asian nationalism, they share as a common denominator the doctrine of full self-government with aspiration to survive as a political, economic, and social entity. On the practical side, unity is essential for survival and economic development in a world which still threatens to divide and exploit. Through unity, furthermore, it would be possible to overcome the arbitrariness of colonial frontiers.
and the partitioning of tribes or ethnic groups without risking political decay and social anomie.

Nationalism is a powerful driving force for economic development and a cradle embodying modernization ideals; despite the unintended problems of internal separatisms and political abuse of authoritarian dictatorships. Although varying in appearance and characterized by a lack of articulation in content, nationalism is believed to share some common valuations.

B. Social Valuations Underlying Development Objectives

Comprehensive development planning, like other specific development programming, must start with certain development objectives. Such development objectives may be decided in terms of, not only specific social needs and available budget, but also social valuations (used here synonymously as Myrdal's "modernization ideals"). The ideals of new nationalism are believed to be rooted in these social valuations. The new nationalism in the Third World states is an emotional drive for comprehensive national development planning. At the same time, it provides some fundamental development objectives.

In the preceding section, the nature of new nationalism was compared and contrasted with the old nationalism in the West, and the characteristics of new nationalism common among the new states of the Third World were discussed. This section attempts to delineate some social valuations common to the new states, and underlying their national development objectives, from the characteristics of the new nationalism discussed, and the social problems commonly identified. The basic social valuations
concerning national development objectives may be broadly divided into the areas of "national autonomy" and "individual well-being". However, the demarcation between these two aspects is analytical, and they are, in reality, overlapping as well as interrelated to each other.

The areas of "national autonomy" (including its political, diplomatic, economic, and cultural aspects) refers to these characteristics of the nation-state which provide individuals with national identity, internally keep social order, and externally protects them from foreign aggressions and alien domination. On the other hand, the social valuations concerning "individual well-being" may include the welfare aspects of individuals (such as material well-being, equal opportunities for education, employment, and political participation in terms of social justice), and the freedom in terms of spiritual, attitudinal, and behavioral aspects of human existence. The above social valuations are primarily derived from the ideals manifested in the new nationalism of the Third World states. They are also thought to implicitly underlie the national development objectives of those countries. These social valuations will be elaborated in more detail below.

1. Nation-building

The new states refer to those countries which have recently obtained political independence from colonial rule; both through the inter war period, and/or as the result of postwar decolonialization process. As discussed in chapter three, many of these new nations were primarily built on the basis of their former colonial administrative boundaries, and without regard to the area's historical heritages, cultural backgrounds,
ethnic compositions, social structures, or economic functions (see "Black Africa" by Morrison, et al., 1972). Some of these countries were initially, and remain, plural societies, composed of nonintegrated, heterogeneous groups, while others are divided nations where formerly there were unitary nations. As a consequence, it is true that many of these countries have yet to build the viable nation-state which must exist in order to effectively implement national policies. Nation-building is regarded as a prime valuation among these unfortunate countries, as a means to the restoration of national autonomy.

Nation-building may be discussed in terms of (1) national consolidation, (2) national unity, and (3) national identity. "National consolidation", according to Myrdal, refers to

A national system of government and administration that is effective, cohesive, and internally united in purpose and action, with unchallenged authority over all regions and groups within the boundaries of the state. (Myrdal, 1968: 63)

In other words, national consolidation means politically stable and administratively effective government. Thus, national consolidation is considered to be essential in nation-building and its subsequent national development planning.

"National unity" refers to the unification of structurally divided groups of population and the integration of the socially conflicting classes and strata within a nation. Thus, national unity is thought to bring about sufficient condition for the effective consolidation of nation and the "social mobilization" required for development planning. "National identity" may include two aspects of national autonomy -- diplomatic and
cultural. One type of national identity refers to, in the diplomatic context, the full recognition of a state as, legitimate sovereignty, independent of other nations and capable of manifesting a discernible voice in international affairs. In terms of the symbolic and cultural aspects of national autonomy, another type of national identity is provided by establishment of a distinct original social order, differentiated from other cultural and national units. Thus, nation-building possesses a broader meaning than simply the establishment of a nation-state by obtaining formal independence.

2. Economic growth and material well-being of individuals

In recent years, the term "modernization" has been often used synonymously with the term economic growth. In fact, most of the new states have long been economically backward. A majority of people in some of these countries are even now suffering from severe undernourishment and mass starvation. When compared with developed countries, the gap between levels of living in developed and less developed countries has been ever widening. Along with the revolutionary "rising aspiration" amidst the destitute peoples of these new states, this "widening gap" contributes to the creation of an impatience, in the population, with the present economic situation.

Besides the political, diplomatic, and cultural aspects, another important component of national autonomy is economic self-sufficiency. The new states are now trying to overcome their chronic economic backwardness and their aggravating present poverty, and to bridge the gap between developed countries and themselves through national economic development.
planning. These new states usually focus on industrialization and try to accelerate sustained economic growth by promoting the amount of exports. The idea about the economic growth through national development planning is rooted in the valuation of individual material well-being. Quantitative economic growth is viewed as an essential condition for the betterment of the levels of living for the mass of population. Indeed, poverty is one of the most pressing social problems in the underdeveloped countries, and it is critically related to the basic human needs. Thus, national economic development and the betterment of individual material well-being is considered to be one of the most compelling social valuations throughout the new states of the Third World.

3. Equalities

Most of the underdeveloped countries are generally characterized by rigid social stratification and an increasing economic polarization between the few upper and the mass at the bottom class. The masses of people at the lower strata in underdeveloped countries have long been unjustly deprived in both an absolute and relative sense. In the low income countries, the extremely unequal distribution of income and wealth between regions, different groups of the population, and the social strata, is one of the common social problems. This economic inequality has been maintained and fortified by such social institutions as the traditional land tenure system, or the modern exploitive land ownership patterns.

The opportunities for education and employment have not been equally and broadly provided to the masses of people in the bottom strata; especially including that portion of the population in the rural areas of the
underdeveloped countries. The same is true of political participation. With the liberation from colonial domination, the idea of social equity has had an increasing appeal to the minds of the masses of people. The issue of equality is at the essence of the socialism which has been widely accepted among the radical intellectuals of the new states. The idea of social equity is also partially manifested in various welfare policies (including education, employment, and social welfare) which the new states are gradually implementing in their national development planning. However, the fundamental solution to the problems of inequality may be found in the structural reformulation of the existing social institutions. Indeed, this social valuation of equalities is leading in the ultimate direction of development.

4. Radicalism and new order

The view of social change common among the indigenous people of the new states may be characterized by the dialectical dialogue between radicalism and a new stable order. The obstructing existing social institutions and attitudes of people, the staggering economic growth, the "widen ing gap" between the levels of living in the developed and less developed countries; all these factors have motivated the "modernizing elites" and educated classes of the less developed countries to attempt radical social change. An awareness of the possibilities for development has strengthened radicalism toward qualitative changes of the existing institutional structures which have often been found obstruct desired change. The impatience with the recent social and economic situation of underdeveloped societies
further contributes to accelerate social reforms and induced social change in a short period of time.

Radicalism referred to herein is not necessarily destructive or violent. Rather, it is a source of vitality arising out of stagnation, and a new dynamism in the sustained development effort. Radicalism, thus, is an antithesis against fatalism and conservatism which obstruct or inhibit establishing a new social order. Indeed, radicalism is considered to be an important valuation, especially as appreciated by the "modernizing elites" and the intellectuals in the new states of the Third World.

The desire for new stable order has been characteristic of the attitudes of many of the ruling classes and the disturbed masses during the transitional period. In fact, most of these new states have, in considerable degree, experienced social disorganization, social unrest, and political upheavals throughout the process of nation-building. These unfortunate transitional processes have, in large degree, resulted from the rising radicalism by the idealistic actionists (including the elites and the deprived people). In responding to the realities of the social disturbances and political instabilities, the social valuation of new stable order seems to be widely appreciated by the majority of people in the new states in transition. It must be understood that the essence of radicalism is not contradictory with the desire for stability. Rather, the idea of radicalism is the new dynamism for the desired new order.

5. Rationality: attitude and behavior

Most social scientists, following Weberian tradition, have reached a general agreement that one of the major attributes of modernity is
rationality, and that rational behavior is chiefly responsible for the success of modernization. Gunnar Myrdal (1968:44) also listed rationality as the first value premise in his study of Asia. Rationality certainly plays a critical role in modernization of societies. In underdeveloped countries, nonrational attitudes and behaviors of people are important obstacles to economic and social development. Thus, rationality is not an actual valuation held by the people of underdeveloped countries, but it is highly valued as a means to development rather than an end in itself.

The general term "rationality" has to be defined because, for instance, what is rational to one society may be irrational to another, and what is rational in a political sense is not in the economic. In this regard, Mannheim (1940) indicated two types of rationality — substantial and functional. "Substantial rationality" defines the goals of action in relation to practical possibilities and based on realism. Thus, the attitudes and decisions based upon substantial rationality are crucial to make the plan of development relevant in terms of practical limitations and real social needs. Another type of substantial rationality defines the goals of action, not in terms of practical possibilities, but in terms of priorities of values or hierarchical importance in decision making. This substantial rationality makes the development plan meaningful, rather than practical or realistic. On the other hand, "functional rationality" takes the goals for granted and rather concerns itself with the means-ends relations, effectiveness, and efficiency during the performance of action. From a developmental point of view, it is functional rationality that the
underdeveloped societies need to make their development planning more effective and conducive to rapid transformation.

Reasoning is the essence of both types of rationality. Reasoning may be viewed as problem-solving, critical thinking, guided by logic. Logic is not itself a priori. Rather, it is a social invention from the accumulation of knowledge, developed out of the techniques for refuting arguments. Thus, what makes man more rational is not acquaintance with logic, but obtaining a wide range of both scientific and normative knowledge as systematically verified beliefs. In this regard, wide-spread, valid education is considered to be a chief means for transforming nonrational attitudes and behaviors into rational ones.

In sum, the social valuations elaborated in the above are chosen on the basis of the ideals of the politically alert and active part of the population — the intellectual elites and the felt-needs of the masses of the population in the new states. The priorities and emphasis are certainly subject to the unique characteristics of the individual countries, but these social valuations, underlying development objectives, are believed to be more or less common to the Third World countries.

In the following two sections, we now turn to the agents of change, who are major carriers of the ideology of new nationalism and who are chiefly responsible for the deliberate instigated social change toward realization of the national objectives.

C. Elites

Dutch sociologist Ponsioen (1969:18) distinguished two types of social change: "change in society" and "change of society". According to him,
"change in society" would be a dynamic process of a society, as long as it identifies itself, either realistically or mythically, with the past. "Change of society" would be the process under the connotation that the present society does not identify itself collectively with the past. Development, as one type of change, is a dynamic process used to induce social change in desired directions. In this respect, development may be regarded as "change in society" rather than "change of society". Development planning is a blueprint for "change in society", on the basis of a deliberately calculated and rationally organized human endeavor for the betterment of human conditions for the general population.

Development planning must not be fictitious in its formulation, but must be realistic and appropriate to meet the real needs of society. In fact, not every development planning program in the developing countries has been satisfactorily successful. Not infrequently those countries have failed to induce the desired social change through development planning. There are varying specific reasons for the failure of social planning from country to country.

Aside from specific and unique reasons, several factors may account for the frequent failure of the development efforts in developing countries. These factors may be found in: (1) unrealistic or over-ambitious development goals in terms of feasibility of achievement, (2) inadequate theoretical models employed in the planning endeavor (in terms of empirical validity and theoretical relevance), and (3) inefficiencies or deficient qualities in the change agents.
Development planning is initiated and designed by a small number of social planners and policy makers. Thus, development programs require change agents for the effective implementation of the policies and programs of development planning. These change agents may be categorized as: (1) catalytic elites, (2) implementing organizations or agencies, and (3) the staff and personnel of the organizations or agencies. An adequate development planning model and realistic development goals are very important for the effectiveness of development implementation. The success or failure of the development program may depend upon the change agents' performance and support from the grass-roots level.

The course and character of modernization tend to vary in many respects, depending on the degree of economic backwardness and sociopolitical conditions of the given country. The variety of structural forms accompanying the process of modernization in different countries is influenced by the available resources, the orientations of the various social groups and strata, and by the policies of the more active elites of the society — called the modernization elites. The type of governmental structure in the political system is especially influenced by these broad structural conditions of the society. To a very large degree, it is also influenced by the composition and orientation of the leading elites. The role of elites in the developing countries has been crucial in nation-building and in the process of overall modernization. However, different elites tended to develop different strategies with respect to some major problems of social and economic policy.
The term "elite" semantically means "chosen" people, but, according to Bottomore (1964:14), "elite" generally refers to those "functional, and mainly occupational, groups which have high status in society". These elites can be categorized into two groups: power elites and cultural elites. Power elites are usually composed of the military elite of the army, the political elite of the political parties, and the organizational elite in the economic sphere. People in these positions are able to impose their views on given sectors of society. Cultural elites, as the bearers of the "substantial rationality" and unattached to interests, comprise those who contribute directly to innovation, transmission, and criticism of ideas. They include writers, artists, scientists, social theorists, religious leaders, and the like (Mannheim, 1940). The cultural elites are the intellectual class in the underdeveloped countries. By intellectuals Shils (1960:331) meant "all persons with an advanced modern education and the intellectual concerns and skills ordinarily associated with it".

The professions of the intellectuals include: civil service, journalism, law, teaching, and medicine. Since the occupational structure is a function of the level of economic development, the occupational distribution of intellectuals in the underdeveloped countries is notably different from that of advanced countries. Students in the colleges or universities have been treated as part of the intellectual class, and they have regarded themselves as such. Even this small number of educated elites was unable to find satisfying employment within the colonial regime and remained unemployed or underemployed. Shils (1960) analyzed the role of intellectuals in the politics of new nations. Many of the elites, unemployed
and dissatisfied with colonial theory and practice, were intensely politicized and deeply committed to political involvement for three reasons: (1) a deep preoccupation with authority, (2) the scarcity of opportunities to acquire even a temporary sense of vocational achievement, and (3) a deficient tradition of civility in the underdeveloped countries.

As a result, these elites led the revolutionary struggle against the colonial governments and became heirs to governmental authority after attaining independence. Retrospectively, the tactics and strategies employed in the independence movements were not only underground or sporadic guerrilla warfares, but also involved methods of noncooperation and the discrediting of the rule of law introduced by colonial powers. On the other hand, the rule of traditional order had already been shattered during the colonial period.

Charismatic leadership seems to flourish today to bridge the discredited past and the uncertain future (Willner and Willner, 1965). By nature, charismatic authority rests on "devotion to the specific sanctity, heroism, or the exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative pattern or order revealed by him" (Weber, 1947:328). Meanwhile, the public at large has been divided into those who are predominantly tradition oriented and those oriented toward a new order. In many of the underdeveloped regions, further division may exist along with ethnic, tribal, religious, and linguistic lines.

Under such circumstances, a charismatic leader mobilizes the population in opposition to the traditional and prevailing order and provides a vision of new order. Charismatic leadership may contribute in many ways
to the consolidation of the state in the earlier stages of nation-building. It may also be detrimental for the independent institution-building required for the concrete tasks of development. In the situation of an increasing demand for rational authority -- administrative bureaucracy in modern times -- there exists a strong tendency for the charismatic authority to turn into an authoritarian dictatorship without providing orderly transfer of power. Ultimately, this absence of orderly succession under charismatic leadership becomes a breeding ground for political crisis and instability, which impede the development of a new civil order.

For the most part the influence of the intellectual elites is assimilated into the life style of the newly growing urban middle class. Their way of thinking and style of life brings about small and gradual changes in taste and manners. In such a way, the initial spirits and influence of the revolutionary intellectuals are gradually weakened and remain unattached. Despite a growing number of intellectuals, due to the expansion of higher educational systems, they have largely failed to produce a self-confident intellectual class. There are several reasons (internal and external) for this: (1) the intellectuals are now recruited from diverse social origins in a wider social strata, (2) their occupational distribution tends to be widely dispersed, and (3) the intellectuals are in a marginal position in a cultural context and, thus, are isolated from the mass of population by their Western education. However, the role of intellectual elites in the developing countries is decisively important for social development. They modernize themselves in part, and serve as catalysts in the modernization process. "Modernizing elites" are (1)
innovators of new ideas and ideals, (2) transmitters of these new ideas by
diffusion through their professional and daily activities, (3) organizers
to meet the needs of a mass society, and (4) the spokesmen in formulating
the unarticulated aspirations of the masses.

Recently, in some developing countries, the military officers have
been the key ruling elites, often more influential than either the in-
tellectuals or the political leaders. It is evident that, in those newly
independent countries which are politically insecure, the military officers
control the ultimate power of direct physical coercion and have the oppor-
tunity to play an important part in political decision making. Because
of modern military technology, the structure of the organization, and its
sensitivity to advancement in military technology abroad, Pye (1962)
asserts that the political role of the army in developing countries should
be viewed as a contribution to socio-political development.

Although room may exist for the positive role of the military in
political development, the military services contributing through the
training process to the instilling of national attitudes and discipline,
all those countries are now suffering from serious social disturbances,
political instability, and economic stagnation through coup d'etat and
counter-coup d'etat. In conclusion, among the variety of elites, there
is a widely shared commitment to development.

D. The Public Administrations

The role of elites in the development planning is to initiate and
stimulate interaction between those experts and social theorists whose
job is to create social policy and carry out policy implementation. In
this regard, development programs (or social planning) flow from the top down to the masses, rather than from the bottom to the top. In doing so, the development policy may be implemented through intermediate machinery, such as existing administrative bureaucracy or other special independent institutions, and agencies as agents of social change. Although the administrative bureaucracy is, in essence, an instrumental organization for the administration of public services, the allocation of the various resources, and for the maintenance of law and order, it generally develops its own orientations and structural patterns of activities. In other words, bureaucracy develops a formalistic systems framework.

Bureaucracy, thus, is a structure of clearly defined hierarchical positions and a functional interrelationships among the positions. Efficiency and rigorousness are the prime merits of bureaucratic performance through rational decision making according to a set of rules, specific procedures, and impartiality. Rationality in bureaucratic performance may be regarded as "functional rationality" as opposed to "substantial rationality". In Mannheim's (1940) terms, "functional rationality" is located in the means-to-ends relationship. If the means are adequate to the purpose, action is rational, but, if not, it is irrational. With this intrinsic limitation of bureaucracy, a public administrative bureaucracy is normally instrumental to politics, not political although there exists bureaucratic (rational) authority.

The position and role of the governmental bureaucracy are schematically delineated in Chart C, from a developmental point of view, although they may be more complex in reality. The simplified scheme suggests that
Chart C. The position and role of governmental bureaucracy in development policy implementation.

development policy is regarded as political inputs to the governmental bureaucracy on the political side. The results of policy implementation through the public bureaucracy are treated as administrative outputs on the other side. In opposition to the mass (as the object of change), both elites and bureaucracy are regarded as change agents because development planning implies incrementally induced change on the basis of calculated rationality rather than spontaneous fundamental change at the grass-roots level.

Modern elites, including power elites and cultural elites, formulate development goals on the basis of identified problems and social needs, in terms of their foundations in the modernization ideals. These modernization ideals are directed as political inputs to the governmental bureaucracy. The bureaucracy translates the political inputs into specific development programs and implements them. In development planning, the "modernizing elites", directly and/or indirectly, guide the mass. The
various sections and agencies of bureaucracy directly implement the policy and enforce the program by means of legislative measures and, at the same time, may act indirectly through their staff and personnel in the field.

Yet, it has long been recognized that the neat dichotomy of politics and administration does not correspond to reality. The nonpolitical role of bureaucrats is not clear in enforcing laws and exercising power. At the one extreme, officials may be fully controlled by the politicians. On the other, the government officials and administrators may be a monopoly at the expense of all other social groups. This is frequently seen in the developing countries. Bureaucratism, then, as a direct manifestation of heavy bureaucratic power, is dysfunctional for administrative efficiency (Riggs, 1964:272-276).

In all developing countries, bureaucracies tend to grow very rapidly, constantly extending their scope. Most of the post colonial new states took over the systems of public administration remaining from the former period. At the same time, the scope of their activities greatly expanded and new organs were created. Since, in most of these countries, the government plays a great role in economic and social development, the bureaucracies also engage significantly in development activities. Thus, the role of the governmental bureaucracy is decisively influential on the direction and tempo of the country's modernization. In a further step, the success or failure of the development program at a final stage depends upon the performance of the staff and personnel as well as the effectiveness of the bureaucratic machinery.
In his analysis of the "problems of emerging bureaucracies in developing areas and new states" Eisenstadt (1963) looked into the pattern of bureaucracies in two groups of developing nations: the post colonial new states (i.e., those formerly under colonial rule) and those which had not been under colonial rule. According to him, in most of the post colonial new states there exist multiple bureaucracies, or different layers of bureaucratic organization and structure: (1) a "predevelopment layer" which succeeded from the preindependence bureaucracy, and (2) a second stratum of bureaucracies which have been expanded or recruited since independence (Eisenstadt, 1963:165).

The first layer of "predevelopment" bureaucracies in these countries is characterized by the remaining personnel, organizational structure, and tradition from the old colonial civil service. In fact, the structure and organization of the old civil service actually provided the basic framework for the extension and development of the bureaucratic administration during post independence. These preindependence bureaucracies are apolitical and limited in their activities; confining them to the basic administrative services under a high degree of centralization.

The second main layer of the bureaucracies in these countries is regarded as a new civil service -- "new in personnel, goals, departments and activities". These new bureaucratic organs are frequently staffed with new recruits, who are much more attuned to political goals and interests. The new organs or bureaucratic departments have a new type of specific goal under the general orientation of national development, including socioeconomic development, and the like.
In a similar way, the bureaucracies in those developing countries which were not under colonial rule, exhibit two different elements and structural organizations: "A traditional bureaucracy — whether 'royal' as in the Middle Eastern countries or 'oligarchical-republican' as in most of Latin American countries" (Eisenstadt, 1963:166). The traditional bureaucracies were designed to preserve and protect the political power and maintain the status quo. "These administrations were usually concerned with supporting the interests of the ruling oligarchies, and with implementing rather limited social and economic objectives" (Eisenstadt, 1963:167). Since the second World War, within the traditional bureaucratic structure, the traditional elements have been mixed with more modern ones; frequently copies from the Western models of bureaucracies.

As described, each part of the bureaucracy developed under somewhat different conditions and in response to different types of needs and pressures. Thus, it is not surprising that the overall structure of the administrative systems, which should play a vital role in the development effort as the prime change agents, has not been well coordinated. Eisenstadt (1963) pointed out some specific structural problems of administrative bureaucracies in developing countries. Among the most important ones are: (1) they tend to be understaffed at the lower level, (2) they lack qualified personnel, or are deficient in the quality of their personnel, (3) they have overlapping interorganizational functions, and (4) there exists over-centralization with lack of operational autonomy as well as regional autonomy, etc. (Eisenstadt, 1963:166).
Although there may be some minute variations, it is generally true that chronically intrinsic structural problems exist in the public bureaucracies of most developing countries. In terms of national development planning, it may be recognized that the state is the most important single agent of modernization and change. There has been an increasing concern on the part of the governments of the developing countries with the task of nation-building, particularly in the social and economic sphere. It is imperative that the traditional law-and-order administration be re-oriented to the needs of new functions and tasks of development. Structural reforms in administration may also occur as a stimulus for development and to provide an effective change agent for achieving development goals.

Aside from the developmental perspective, the need for administrative reform arises from malfunctions in the structural procedures and inefficient performances of the bureaucratic personnel. Reform movements may begin with removing recognized obstacles and resistance to improve the resulting performance. Reform is often more than a series of incremental changes or marginal adjustments and is frequently a rather radical process, departing sharply from existing arrangements and policies. Thus, "administrative reform" means "any change of principles, organizations, their structures, methods or procedures which are aimed at the administrative process" (Caiden, 1969:66-67).

Because of built-in rigidity, resistance, and opposition, administrative reform by an administrative bureaucracy is unlikely to be successful. It is a political process and the reformers are likely to be politicians.
with a mission. Reviewing the administrative reforms attempted in developing countries, Calden illustrated the patterns and contents of the reform as follows: (1) organizational change concerned with formal arrangements, (2) attitudinal and behavioral change of the staff and personnel of the administrative bureaucracies, (3) technical or instrumental change handling the administrative processes, (4) facilitating new technical aids, and (5) reinforcing training programs of personnel and for recruitment of staff and personnel of the administrative bureaucracy (Calden, 1969:101). All these attempts may be too expensive, in view of the current economic conditions of the developing countries. The failure of the administrative reform, like others, will only make things worse for national development.

Administrative reform, however, is not in itself an end. It may be viewed as a means to national development; as one of the important development strategies. Since development administration is concerned with the introduction of goal-directed change in a way which is desirable and acceptable to society, administration for development essentially has to be goal-oriented and action-oriented. Its structures, procedures, techniques of policy-making, planning, staffing patterns, personnel, and relations with citizens have to be fully conditioned to the processes and goals of development programs.

As one Indian developmentalist administrator pointed out; one of the basic characteristics of the new development administration is its operational autonomy. Such autonomy, which is achieved by insulating the administrators from political pressures, should provide a framework for
the formulation of relevant policies and programs; as well as their implementa-
tion (Narula, 1970:329). However, interference by either the govern-
ment or traditional institutions is noticeable in varying degree. For
instance, it is commonly known that, although bureaucratic recruitment
is formally based on examinations and the "merit system", the
characteristic mode of selection in most of the underdeveloped countries
is nepotism; i.e., selection through connections with high officials and
with the politicians (Riggs, 1964:260-285). Those recruited in such a way
are generally characterized as unqualified, politically oriented, and
opportunist rather than qualified and dedicated to the job assigned.
This obstructs the merit system by giving no opportunity for proper and
needed personnel.

Since development requires a new type of administrator, combining
both effective program and efficient administrative skills, the new cadres
would have to be recruited from a number of disciplines, possess the in-
tegrating skills of general management, and able to continuously identify
the links and interrelations involved in the development process. In the
context of the contemporary social and political conditions existing in
many of the developing countries, development administrators need to
possess a sense of professional commitment, be achievement-minded, and
show a genuine dedication to the citizen's problems and felt-needs. In
the developmental context, the old Weberian concepts of totally imper-
sonalized decision making and formalistic procedures does not seem to
apply. Although national planning tends to centralize the decision making
process, a rigid hierarchical structure is not considered to be conducive
to implementation of development programs. Valid administrative reform must proceed so as to implement development policies effectively. At the same time, comprehensive national development planning calls for coordination among the agencies including various administrative levels and organizations.

In concluding the discussion of the internal dynamics of current change, the new nationalism is considered to provide a powerful emotional impetus for national development planning and, at the same time, provide sets of development objectives. This nationalism is, in a sense, political expressions of the intellectual elites on the basis of their own ideals, and either reflecting or articulating the felt-needs of the mass of the population. The social valuations, which underlie the objectives of national development, are more or less manifested in the characteristics of the new nationalism.

The essential characteristic of national development planning is instigated change guided by the agents of change. Thus, the role of the change agent is very important in the implementation of national development planning, and the success or failure of the national development planning is largely dependent upon the change agent's performance. In this study, the agents of change refer to intellectual elites and the public administrations. Elites provide the mass with certain visions for the development, and they articulate development objectives reflecting the social valuations and the interests of the mass of population. On the other hand, the public administrations (including policy-makers, social planners, and administrative personnel) organize development planning,
execute the programs, mobilize both human and natural resources, and thereby, take ultimate responsibility for national development planning. In order to organize effective development planning, the internal social conditions and related problems of underdevelopment need to be correctly analyzed and assessed. The next chapter will analyze these conditions and related problems of underdevelopment.
V. INTERNAL CONDITIONS AND RELATED PROBLEMS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

Under the analytical guidelines of the model formulated in chapter two, chapter three was used to discuss the major determinants of current underdevelopment in the new nations -- the consequences of the historical process of colonialism and the external influences of economic and political international relationships. Chapter four was devoted to a discussion of the nature of the new nationalism and the role of change agents with respect to the current internal dynamics of the Third World countries.

This chapter will present an analysis of internal conditions, and of the related problems of underdevelopment; particularly demographic and social conditions as was identified in the model in chapter two. More specifically, this chapter analyzes three different aspects of the current internal conditions. In the first section, the general problems of population growth in the less developed regions will be analyzed, in comparison with those of the developed regions. The second section will be devoted to an analysis of the qualitative aspects of population, i.e., nutrition, health, and education. Finally, the third section will be used to discuss the social conditions which are thought to be generally undesirable or unfavorable for development.

A. Population Problems

From his observations on the rapid increase in population of Western Europe in the early nineteenth century, Malthus wrote "An Essay on the Principle of Population" in 1826. In this essay, Malthus warned that uncontrolled population growth would eventually become a cause of poverty
and other forms of human misery (e.g., massive starvation, disease, and war) because of the potential societal imbalance produced by a geometric growth of population and an arithmetic increase of food production. The Malthusian nightmare is now a reality in many of the less developed countries. An unprecedented acceleration of the population growth has become manifest in those areas, and this trend is unlikely to be reduced in the near future.

1. Factors affecting population growth

The current population growth in the less developed countries has been sudden and more massive than that experienced previously in the West European countries. The population explosion in the less developed regions results mainly from the substantial lag of fertility rates behind the rapid reduction in mortality rates since the second World War.

The factors directly affecting the recent reduction in mortality are: the increasing accessibility of modern medicine to the masses of people in the less developed regions, improvements in sanitary conditions with regard to water and food, and fairly wide-spread education in personal hygiene (United Nations, 1974a:1). In the less developed areas, the effects of economic development on the recent reduction in mortality seems insignificant. The reduction is largely due, then, to improvements in public health and access to modern medicines. It may be reasonably conceived that every possible effort will be made to continue to reduce mortality rates since long life and good health are universal values, regardless of economic differences and cultural variations.
The pattern of fertility behavior is more related to the change of people's values and attitudes than to sanitary improvements and medical advancement. Fertility rates have remained almost unchanged or have declined only slightly; the reduction in fertility rates generally lagging behind the reduction in mortality rates. On the basis of the world, regional, and national population in 1950, a demographic typology by birth, death, and population was proposed to suggest a hypothetical demographic transition model as shown in Table 10 (United Nations, 1954). This classification of the areas of the world suggests a close relationship between the pattern of demographic transition and the pattern of economic development. Low income areas are in general characterized by both high birth rates and high death rates, areas of transitional economic development by low death rates but still high or steadily declining birth rates, and high income areas by both low birth and low death rates.

As indicated earlier, levels of mortality are generally related to food and nutrition, environmental sanitation and public health services, medical advancement, and levels of living standards. On the other hand, birth rates are more related to traditions, family institutions, and values that are culturally salient. Thus, the phenomena of almost unchanging or at best steadily declining birth rates should be assessed in relation to the values, aspirations concerning the desired number of children, and social structures, rather than the factors of modern medicine and economic growth.

The rate of natural increase in population has gone up rapidly in most of the less developed countries, especially in those of South Asia and
Table 10. Demographic typology, by birth, death rates, population, and percent of world population, 1950.\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birth Rate</th>
<th>Death Rate</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population (Millions)</th>
<th>Percent of World Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Middle Africa</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. High</td>
<td>Declining but still high</td>
<td>Asia (except Japan)</td>
<td>1,280</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. High</td>
<td>Declining but fairly low</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Middle America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tropical South America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Declining</td>
<td>Fairly low</td>
<td>Temperate South America</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Balkan Peninsula</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Low or fluctuating</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>North America</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Undefined</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pacific Islands</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and East Asia. During the last decade from 1960 to 1970, the population has increased 14.8 percent in South Asia, and 28.1 percent in Africa as shown in Table 11. As a whole, the natural increase of the world population has gone up to 19.2 percent in the 1960's, and the world population is expected to increase 1.9 percent annually from 1970 to 1975. During the decade of the 1960's, the annual rate of natural increase in the less developed regions was 2.26 percent, compared with 1.02 percent in more developed regions.

Table 11. Birth rates, death rates, and rates of natural increase, 1960-1970 and 1970-1975 in the world and major area (rates per 1,000 population).^a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World total</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More developed regions</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less developed regions</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern America</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12 shows the population density in the world major areas in 1960 and estimates for 1975. The world's population is unevenly distributed in relation to land resources and in this respect the less developed regions are at a growing disadvantage due to higher rates of natural increase, initial high density, and being primarily agricultural regions. Although population density per square kilometer is a very crude measure, in 1975 the less developed regions will have an average density of forty persons per square kilometer, more than twice that of the more developed regions combined.

Table 12. Land area, population density in 1960 and 1975, and 1960-1975 gain in population density, in the world and major areas.\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Land Area (Thousands km(^2))</th>
<th>Inhabitants per km(^2)</th>
<th>Gain in Density, 1960-1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World total</td>
<td>135,779(^b)</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More developed regions</td>
<td>60,097</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less developed regions</td>
<td>74,872</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>4,936</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>96.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>22,402</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern America</td>
<td>21,515</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>8,509</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>15,775</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>80.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>11,756</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>85.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>30,320</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>20,568</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{b}\)Not including the Antarctic continent.
In terms of major regions, the 1960-1975 gains in population density are greatest in South Asia and East Asia. In Africa and Latin America, the density gains are comparatively moderate since these areas are initially more sparsely populated than Asia. Despite the crude measure of population density, it is evident that the pressure of population growth is unequal among different parts of the world. In some countries in South and East Asia, the current population growth is one of the most pressing problems. The population growth has outstripped gains made in gross national product and presents an awesome problem.

It has been fashionable to describe excess fertility as one of the fundamental causes of poverty, whether among individuals or societies. In a sense, though, fertility is autonomous and imprecisely connected with any preceding, or concomitant, economic characteristics, as mortality has been. For obvious humanitarian reasons, however, any attempt to depress population pressure is restricted to work on the fertility factor, either by national policy measures or population education.

With respect to the serious effects of population growth on other sectors of life, population problems should be viewed and understood as one of the key problems. Socioeconomic development is hampered in the densely populated underdeveloped countries.

2. Population growth and its impact on productivity

The agricultural output per worker has risen by improving farming technology, cultivating high-yielding crops, and expanding irrigation systems, etc. In fact, according to a United Nations report, a given unit of land (unit square kilometers) of the world agricultural land could feed
five persons in 1970 as compared with four persons in 1950 (United Nations, 1974a:9). However, unequal conditions between developed and less developed countries still exist, and as a result of population growth agricultural lands in less developed countries are becoming more crowded. As an inevitable result of the current population situation, the average size of land holdings per agricultural worker continues to diminish. Between 1950 and 1970 the agricultural population of the developed regions apparently diminished from 299 million to 206 million according to Table 13. In the less developed regions it increased from 1,282 million to 1,656 million. The consequence was a decline in the agricultural density of the more developed regions from 46 to 31 while in the less developed regions there was a rise from 221 to 226.

The statistics in Table 13 show that in 1970 an agricultural density of 453 in East Asia, 235 in South Asia, 18 in Oceania, and only 5 in North America. The density in the less developed areas was 226 per square kilometer of agricultural land. This is almost seven times greater than the agricultural density of 31 obtained of the more developed countries. This tremendous discrepancy, in the ratio of agricultural labor to land, between the developed and the less developed regions is, in part, conditioned by the limited employment opportunities outside the agricultural sector. There are few secondary industries and tertiary industries in the economic structure to provide such opportunities.

Table 14 shows projections for the agricultural and nonagricultural population according to the Food and Agriculture Organization. The data include the economically active population, whether in agriculture or in
industry and services, and their dependents. The agricultural population in the more developed regions is expected to decline, not only in relative terms, but also in absolute numbers from about 207 million to 181 million from 1970 to 1975. In South Asia and Africa about two-thirds of the population in 1970 were still dependent on agriculture. There was about the same degree of dependence on agriculture in East Asia and Latin America. In all these less developed areas, the relative ratio of the agricultural to the nonagricultural population are still steadily rising. Overall the rapid relative decline in the agricultural sector is expected to continue in all regions. In the developed regions the percent of agricultural
Table 14. Population of agricultural population, nonagricultural population, and percent of agricultural in total population, in the world and major areas, 1970 and 1975, according to F.A.O.\(^a,b\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Agricultural Population (Millions)</th>
<th>Nonagricultural Population (Millions)</th>
<th>Percent of Total Population Dependent on Agriculture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World total</td>
<td>1,860</td>
<td>1,943</td>
<td>1,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More developed regions</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less developed regions</td>
<td>1,653</td>
<td>1,762</td>
<td>891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern America</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^b\)Note: These projections are still in conformity with earlier population projections of the United Nations.

Population to total population is expected to dwindle to less than sixteen percent by 1975. The dominant role of agriculture in the economic structure of less developed countries today, is so great that agriculture is expected to continue to be the main source of livelihood of the growing population. In the majority of the less developed countries, where shortages in land and capital impede the absorption of additional agricultural population, an even greater pressure will be exerted on the limited employment opportunities in nonagricultural sectors. Developing high-yielding
crops and using labor-intensive methods in agriculture are considered to be more appropriate for absorbing underemployed surplus labor force in the densely populated developing countries rather than using large-scale capital-intensive methods or sheer mechanization in agriculture for exporting agricultural goods.

It should be noted that many of the densely populated low-income countries, especially in Southeast Asia, are now faced with a severe food shortage. In order to feed the growing additional population it is necessary to import foodstuffs, and this requires enormous precious foreign expenditures which are badly needed for development planning. A large proportion of the people, for instance in India, Bangladesh, and other regions, have inadequate diets and suffer from chronic starvation. Another social implication of the population pressures is prevalent and increasing underemployment in rural areas due to the additional surplus population. In general, the growing underemployed may be characterized as economically landless, living in poverty and misery, lacking education, undernourished, socially and politically deprived, lacking in psychological achievement motivation, and fatalistic.

3. Population composition

In the previous section the general effects of population growth were examined in terms of the socioeconomic aspects of life. As generally stated, the population growth that now jeopardizes economic development, and aggravates the problems of hunger and poverty, is the product of the unchanging birth rate and declining death rate of the last half century.
This section will deal with the characteristics of population composition, that is, the age structure and its implications for the cumulative process. Changes in fertility and mortality ultimately produce changes in the age structure of a population. A number of measures are available for the analysis of mortality conditions. These measures include crude death rate, infant mortality rate, late infant mortality rate (ages 1-5), life expectancy, and other various composite indices. Historically, the earliest and greatest gains in improved mortality conditions were manifest in the relatively great reductions in death rate in the less developed areas of the world. This is similar to the past experience of the developed areas. However, as shown in Table 15, the less developed regions are experiencing relatively higher infant mortality rates compared with those of the developed areas of Europe and North America. Many of these less developed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black Africa (29)^b</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>163.6</td>
<td>204.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East^c (13)</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>112.1</td>
<td>152.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia^d (16)</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>182.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America (22)</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>150.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe, North America, Oceania (28)</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Total (108)</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>89.1</td>
<td>204.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^aSource: See the secondary sources listed in Appendix.

^bNumbers in parentheses is number of countries in the region.

^cIncludes Israel.

^dIncludes Japan.
regions have substantially reduced their crude death rates by reducing their infant mortality rates. The impact of this reduction upon the age structure should be apparent, as well as its consequences for the qualitative aspects of population. Further, the less developed countries have a relatively high or unchanging birth rate while the more developed areas have already reduced both birth and death rates.

Table 16 shows the age composition of major areas in 1965, as assessed by the United Nations. The more developed areas have 9.5 percent of the age group 0-4 and 63 percent for the economically active age group of 15-64. The less developed areas, on the other hand, have almost 16 percent in the 0-4 age group and 55.1 percent for the 15-64 age group.

Table 16. Percent of age composition of major areas, 1965.a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Area</th>
<th>0-4</th>
<th>5-14</th>
<th>15-64</th>
<th>65+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More developed countries</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less developed countries</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The measure of "dependency" in a population is afforded by the proportion of that population that is under 15, or 65 and over. It is
generally accepted, in an historical context, that the younger population proportion is inversely related, while the proportion of the old age group is directly related, to the level of living standards and economic development. The United Nations has classified the nations of the world into three categories: the "aged", the "mature", and the "young" (United Nations, 1956:7). The "aged" nations, those with over 7 percent of their population 65 and over, are the more economically developed areas. As shown in Table 16, the more developed countries had an average of 8.9 percent of the age group 65 and older in 1965; including 10.5 percent of Europe, 9.2 percent of North America, 7.4 percent of the Soviet Union, and 7.3 percent of Oceania. The "mature" countries, with 4-7 percent of their population 65 or older, are primarily countries undergoing industrial transition. In the findings of Table 16, East Asia is the only region classified as a "mature" area among the less developed regions with 4.1 percent. However, this may be accounted for because the region includes Japan and other small city-countries, such as Hong Kong and Singapore. Latin America, with 3.7 percent of the age group 65 and over, is regarded as being in almost the same or in a better position than East Asia, excluding Japan. The rest of the regions, Africa with 1.8 percent, South Asia with 3.0 percent, and Latin America are all categorized as demographically "young" nations. In light of the comments made previously, East Asia properly falls into this category as well. They are characterized, without exception, as economically less developed countries.

Another index based on age structure is afforded by the "dependency ratio". The dependency ratio is a measure, based upon age structure alone,
of the number of persons of dependent age under 15, and over 65, per 100 persons of "productive" age group 15-65. The age structure of Table 16 was used to compute dependency ratios projected, by five year periods, to 1985. These are presented in Table 17. Overall, the figures of dependency show that less developed areas have had higher (81 percent) ratios than those of more developed regions throughout the period 1965-1975. Regionally, South Asia, Africa, and Latin America had above 85 percent in 1965 and 1970 and are expected to retain that ratio through 1985 without any substantial reductions in any of these regions.

Table 17. Dependency ratio (per 100) by major areas, 1965-1985 (median variant).a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More developed regions</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less developed regions</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It should be noted that age data in most developing countries are quite inaccurate. Not only is there serious misreporting of age in census enumeration, but the undercount of children, particularly infants, requires
careful adjustment in estimation. The technical refinement of estimates of population statistics, and their assessment in terms of the reliability of the data, are beyond the scope of this study. The statistics of the dependency ratio are taken for granted. However, in mathematical reasoning, the numerator of the number of persons in the age groups under 15 and over 65 neutralizes some of the differences between developed and less developed countries because, in the case of developing countries, a higher portion of young persons are somewhat compensated for by lower proportions of older persons. According to recent information, compared with a dependency ratio of around 100 in the developing countries, the median is 58, with a range from 45 for Japan to 67 for New Zealand, among the 16 specified developed countries (Population Council, 1974:88).

High fertility (along with lowering infant mortality rate) is considered to be a major component in population growth in the less developed countries and in the production of their characteristically "young" populations. The adverse impacts of high child dependency in population composition are far-reaching in the various aspects of the socioeconomic development efforts in less developed countries. In the first place, the immediate adverse impact of high child dependency, as a main source of population growth, is to retard overall rapid socioeconomic development. Because the recent high fertility rate does not affect the size of the labor force, for fixed size of labor force and a fixed national income, the population with a heavy burden of increasing child dependency will be under constant pressure to direct scarce investment funds and resources to a less productive use, i.e., simply to feed additional mouths. For instance, the
average family size will be larger with a large number of living children. It will require more housing construction than can be produced. Housing conditions will be seriously deteriorated or in short supply. At the same time, the general human conditions of health, nutrition, children's educational attainment, and the like, are not likely to be improved unless there is epoch-making success in socioeconomic progress.

In the second place, the impact of today's heavy child dependency and high fertility will eventually result in large numbers in the later labor forces. This may result in persistent socioeconomic retardation or stagnation, which will manifest itself as serious unemployment and underemployment; eventually becoming one of the main sources of social unrest and economic deprivation unless there is rapid structural change in the existing industrial and occupational structures. Projections of regional labor forces for the base year of 1970, according to the International Labor Organization, are shown in Table 18. The labor force includes those gainfully employed and those seeking jobs. The reliability and comparability of the statistics are considered doubtful. Another way of looking at population composition, besides age groupings, is the composition by sex. Table 18 is narrowed to that of labor force by sex. The impact of population composition on economic activity will be further discussed shortly.

Thirdly, this portion of the populations of the less developed regions will soon reach child-bearing age and, therefore, provide a base for increased population growth during the next generation, unless, that is, a dramatic change occurs in the fertility rate. If this change fails to occur, the heavy burden of child dependency in the less developed areas
Table 18. Projection of labor force, percentage of labor force in the total population, and percent of women within the labor force, in the world and major areas, 1970 and 1975, according to the I.L.U. \(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Labor Force (Millions)</th>
<th>Percent of Labor Force in the Total Population</th>
<th>Percent of Women in the Labor Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World total</td>
<td>1,507</td>
<td>1,637</td>
<td>41.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More developed regions</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less developed regions</td>
<td>1,021</td>
<td>1,122</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


will become increasingly detrimental to the possibility of the betterment of human conditions.

Finally, the population growth due to high fertility and increased life expectancy will continue to aggravate population density in the already overcrowded low income countries in the next couple of decades. This means that the unfavorable man/land ratio, especially in the already densely populated agricultural areas, will probably result in an unprecedented crisis. Taken together, all these sequential effects of population growth with high fertility will devastate the economic well-being of the future generations. It will also produce destructive mental strains and
stresses in human relationships and activities because of the manifest relative deprivation of the "havenots" relative to the "haves"; and an absolute deprivation in terms of depleted resources.

Economic activities vary by sex, age, and by regions and countries. The overall activity rates are significantly affected by the participation of women in economic activities. In the Soviet Union, 50 percent of the labor force is made up of women in 1970 as contrasted with only 20 percent in Latin America. The role of women in society is apt to be enhanced when they are engaged in productive functions outside the home. Such activities have, of course, played a significant part in emancipating them from their traditional role of mother and homemaker, especially in the more developed countries. The rise in the participation of women in the labor force does not seem to be a general expectation in the less developed regions. The low rate of participation of women in the labor force may be determined by various factors, including: educational attainment, training, experience, potential absenteeism as produced by pregnancies and child rearing, and, structurally, the opportunity structure in the labor market and customs affecting the gainful employment of women. The hidden fact behind formal statistics, however, is that seasonal participation of women in the labor force is very high, especially in the rice growing monsoon climate areas. Irregular or marginal work participation, for example, as peddlers and hired house maids, is particularly conspicuous in the less developed areas. The women are either paid intermittently, or have a very low remuneration.
4. Population distribution

Population distribution within the territory of a country is also another direct aspect of population study. Within a country, population distribution is generally heavily concentrated in some particular regions while sparsely populated elsewhere. Besides this differential population distribution, and the natural population increases which contribute to it, migration is an essential mechanism of the current population distribution. Throughout human existence, migratory movements have been made; ranging from short distances to a cross-continental scale. The basic motivations for human movement have changed little from time to time, although they have become much more complex in modern times: the search for more and better opportunities, the desire to better oneself or one's group materially, the need for security, and refuge from the oppression of others. In general, the major determinants of human migration can be regarded as the various forms of existing population pressures, the availability of resources, and social disorganization.

Historically, under the colonial era, there were massive international migrations to fill the labor shortages created in the operation of colonial plantations or mines. Cheap Chinese laborers were brought by the colonial powers to the areas of Indochina and Malaysia. Destitute low-caste Indian laborers were brought to Burma for rice production, to Ceylon for plantation work, and to other areas in Southeast Asia and Western Africa for railroad construction. Some evidences of slavery trade, as one type of migratory movement, remain in North America and Central and Latin America. Except in Central and Latin America, these particular ethnic
migrants now remain an isolated "ethnic enclave" in the countries of South­
est Asia and Western Africa.

After World War II international migration almost stopped; the
majority of the world's population coming to be concentrated in urban
settlements. The present urban concentration in the advanced nations is
almost wholly a product of the last 150 years and has accompanied the
growth of industrialization. The North Atlantic regions and Japan are now
over 70 percent urbanized (Gallagher, 1973). The sudden population con­
glomeration in urban centers of developing countries is quite a recent
phenomenon, the highest percentage of increase in urbanization being
manifested in the last two decades (Davis, 1969).

Table 19 gives the relative scale and urbanization trends for the
period 1920-1960, in relation to the world total. The percentage increases
in urbanization in South Asia are 52 percent for 1940-1950 and 51 percent
for 1950-1960, compared with the 25 percent and 42 percent of the world's
total during those respective periods. This means that most ongoing urban
growth in the developing countries, most of them heavily dependent on
agriculture, is accelerated by the increasing tempo of rural-to-urban
migration on a massive scale. Given the poverty of the Asian countries,
the problem of urbanization becomes acute due to urban population size and
the inability of the economies to provide the economic and social over­
head necessary to support such populations. There is no standard defini­
tion of "urban area". In fact, the census definition of "urban" varies
from country to country and, sometimes, from one census to another in the
same country. According to the 1961 Indian census, they qualified "urban
Table 19. Scale and pace of urbanization in South Asia in relation to world total, 1960.¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indices</th>
<th>South Asia</th>
<th>World Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Urban population (localities of 20,000 or more inhabitants) in millions (1960)</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Population in rural areas and small towns (smaller than 20,000) in millions (1960)</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>2,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Urban population (20,000+) as a percentage of total population (1960)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Decennial increase (percent) in urban population (20,000+): 1920-1930</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1930-1940</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1940-1950</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1950-1960</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Big-city population (500,000+) in millions (1960)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Big-city population as a percentage of urban population (20,000+)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Big-city population as a percentage of total population</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Source: Adapted from Bose (1971:82).

areas" as follows: (1) a density of more than 1,000 persons per square mile, (2) a population of more than 5,000, and (3) more than 75 percent of the working population engaged in nonagricultural activities. Following the above three categories of urban qualification, the 1961 Indian census analyzed 59.6 percent of the total number of towns with 83.5 percent of the total urban population as urban areas (Bose, 1971:87-89).

On the assumption that rates of natural increase in urban and rural areas are nearly the same (although according to United Nations estimates
the developing countries have higher fertility rates in rural areas than in urban areas) it was projected that between 1970 and 1975 about 106 million individuals moved from rural to urban places, 33 million were in the more developed countries and 73 million in the less developed regions. At a regional base, the net incoming urban migration of 1970-1975 amounts to 33 million in East Asia, 23 million in South Asia, 12 million in Europe, 11 million each in Latin America and Africa, and the rest in the Soviet Union and North America (United Nations, 1974a:32-33).

Table 20 shows that in the more developed regions, the proportion of urban population to total population, in 1975 was projected to reach 67%

Table 20. Projection of urban and rural population and percent of urban in total population, in the world and major areas, 1970 and 1975.a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World total</td>
<td>1,330</td>
<td>2,291</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,548</td>
<td>2,439</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More developed regions</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>763</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>67.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less developed regions</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>1,906</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>785</td>
<td>2,070</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>64.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>318</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>67.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>154</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>60.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern America</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>74.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>181</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>76.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>69.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>71.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>288</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>299</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>96</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>56.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>196</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>60.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

percent, while in the less developed regions a projectional 28 percent was obtained. Among the less developed regions, Latin America is as highly urbanized as the Soviet Union. South Asia and Africa are still, comparatively, at a lower level of urbanization than other regions. In the more developed regions, continued urban growth occurs partly at the expense of a decline in rural population. Most less developed areas still have steady growth in the absolute number of population in the rural areas, though a massive outmigration to urban areas is ongoing.

According to the United Nations assessment of the nature of urban migration and its composition by sex, age, and marital status, most of the urban migrants are late adolescents and young adults ranging from 15 to 30 years of age. Among such migrants women predominate in the developed regions and in Latin America. Men predominate in the cities of South Asia and Africa. In the developed regions and Latin America many migrants generally settle down permanently in the cities and never return to the rural area. In South Asia and Africa, by contrast, there is much more turnover in the urban population. Many of them are married men whose families remain in the country, and sooner or later these migrant men return to their villages. This may be explained by the fact that a large number of rural-to-urban migrants, unable to secure any job in the city, return to their native place or some other place. A widely accepted view about rural-urban migrants in developing countries is that they are "pushed" rather than "pulled" into urban areas because of over population in the rural areas and rural deprivation. Considered in terms of the phenomenon of the "turn-over" in migration in South Asia and Africa (under the
conditions of high rates of natural population increase in both the rural and urban areas) the push factor operates in the urban areas also. Thus, the push and pull factors should be interpreted in the overall demographic and social context. At the same time, it is generally true that more people come to the cities in search of employment, rather than just better employment. On the basis of Indian data, Bose estimated that for every 100 persons migrating to urban areas for better employment, 254 migrated just in search of employment (Bose, 1971:100).

In a traditional social context, like India, the individual migration of labor, especially long-distance migration, from rural to urban areas largely depends on the presence of friends or relatives in the city of migration. According to Patel's findings, surveyed in Bombay, India, most rural-urban migrants with gainful employment have close relatives or friends already settled as urban residents. This implies that floating, rural-urban migrants, with no ties in the migrated cities, may be employed and living in the slum areas, wandering the streets, or they return to their native places (Patel, 1963:29).

The process of urbanization has commonly been closely associated with economic development, especially industrialization. In the more developed Western countries, the urban areas have historically become industrial centers by absorbing labor forces from the rural areas as their economies were rapidly expanding. In the context of developed industrial countries, urbanization has gone hand-in-hand with economic development. Thus, levels of urbanization have been regarded as comparable degrees of "urbanism" in terms of the prevalence of typically urban economic, social, cultural, or
physical features; that is, the essential characteristics of modernization. In the more developed countries rural areas are already permeated by all the characteristics of "urbanism", exceeding the levels of urbanization.

In many of the less developed countries, recently burgeoning large cities have been over-urbanized, far in advance of lagging "urbanism". Excessive urbanization in the less developed regions does not appear to be positively correlated with social or economic development. Rather, "over-urbanization" seems to have an adverse effect on economic development. This recent phenomenon of urbanization in less developed regions may be viewed as a function of the national economic structure. For instance, according to one study, the densely settled and economically impoverished countryside in Egypt was pushing people into the cities because they had no other alternative (Davis and Golden, 1954).

In Korea after the Japanese occupation in 1910, economic development lagged far behind urbanization. Korean city growth was more the result of the "push" from a hard pressed rural economy than of the "pull" from expanding opportunities in urban areas (Wilkinson, 1954). After the departure of the Japanese, this tendency was increased. Furthermore, most of the refugees from the northern region flocked to the large cities during the Korean War of 1950-1953. In this respect, cities function as refuges for migrants from the poverty of rural areas, and become a pool of consumption units, rather than a base for industrialization and productivity. Thus, such over-urbanization is harmful to a balanced economic growth.

Recent over-urbanization in developing countries is one aspect of a demographic phenomena in population distribution, a phenomena largely
produced by the mechanism of rural-to-urban migration. However, the impact of the problem of urbanization in developing countries is enormous in terms of the economic, social, and political impacts for the nation.

In the economic sphere, the urban growth has its own self-generating dynamics; even though, in its initial stage, urbanization was made up of pushed outmigrants from impoverished rural areas. Private and public capital funds are invested primarily in large new administrative office buildings, hotels, stores, and storage houses—not in productive industries. At the same time the transportation, communication, and educational institutions are concentrated in the large cities.

Everything being considered, rapid urban growth in the developing regions requires more consumptive goods and services, outpacing national industrialization. This situation of urbanization and modernization is inevitably subjected to the dependence relation upon the developed industrial countries as was discussed in chapter three. The demand for foreign consumption goods is reinforced and aggravated by the effects of conspicuous consumption by a small number of people in the upper strata. Ultimately, urban areas, without much contribution to the national product, are maintained and grow at the expense of the rural economy. For instance, to secure urban interests, or under the pressure of the urbanite public opinion, the "urban government" controls the price ceilings of the major agricultural products, even under the unit-production costs.

The social implication of urbanization in developing countries is much deeper and wider in its adverse impacts. In the cities, increasingly high demands for services, in the light of limited resources, creates
frustration and unrest. This often makes the very viability of the countries themselves questionable.

Almost all cities suffer from severe housing shortages and, thus, the floating urban migrants feel residential insecurity. All the cities in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa seem to be plagued with squatters and slum dwellers. Some 25 percent of the populations of Djakarta, Kuala Lumpur, and about one-third in Manilla live in slums or squatter shanties (Laquian, 1971:184). According to UNICEF, in Mexico City 30 percent of the population lives in self-built housing, 11 percent in antiquated substandard housing, 14 percent in "proletarian" housing, 26 percent in "antiquated housing", and only 19 percent live "in housing that may be classified as good" (Frank, 1969c:281).

As a group, these slum dwellers are usually at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder. They are commonly found in jobs that require little or no skill, especially in the service fields. Since the primary and secondary sectors are not expanding fast enough, much of the population in this unstable sector is forced into the tertiary sector -- such as street vending, odd jobs, and domestic service. Thus, unstable employment, as an immediate concern of the marginal slum dweller, is directly related to economic insecurity. In Brazil, 40 percent of the family heads "work with irregularity" and another 55 percent are entirely unemployed. In Santiago, 41 percent of its employable people have been unemployed between four and twelve months out of the year (Frank, 1969c:279). Besides the attributes of the people, the slum areas are characterized as: (2) spatially peripheral areas on the hillside or riverside; (2) with physical deterioration
of surroundings; (3) overcrowding and congestion; and (4) with inadequate urban services such as water, fuel, light, medical, welfare services, etc.

In many large cities either the municipal or central government is attempting to clear out or improve the slum areas by means of urban renewal plans or community development programs. Without a fundamental change in the overall social and economic structure of the nations, the misery and poverty of the slums and squatter dwellers will remain hidden; under the cosmetics of the tentative and superficial administrative measures usually taken. The central government must take comprehensive measures to control the rural immigrants and increasingly sprawling urban slums which tend to surround the urban area. This might be accomplished by: (1) population redistribution policies, with a nation-wide reallocation of essential functions and resources; (2) integrative linkages with regional plans; (3) providing the unemployed and underemployed with employment opportunities for themselves; and (4) community development under an effective urban renewal plan.

Industrialization, the slow rate of economic development, urban unemployment, poor housing, and inadequate services: all these factors have significantly affected the growth of crime in urban areas. This is another adverse effect of urbanization in the developing countries. Delinquency and crime rates are always lower in rural than in urban areas in developed countries, and a similar situation exists in the developing countries (Clinard, 1968). After studying the urbanization process in Denmark, Christiansen (1960) concluded it could be predicted that countries in which the process of industrialization and urbanization continues, will experience
a further increase in crime and delinquency. Throughout the Third World pronounced differences have been found between the urban and rural areas in the incidence of crime and delinquency (Clinard, 1968:81-99).

In Iraq in 1969, nine out of ten convicted juvenile offenders came from urban areas (Chambers and Barker, 1971).

Delinquency and crime are not only concentrated in the urban areas of any country, but also tend to occur in the largest of these cities, for crime rates tend to vary directly with the city size. Crime rates appear to be increasing at a more rapid rate in cities (Clinard, 1968:83). These social pathological phenomena seem to be closely related to the increasing economic distress in the urban slum areas. These deteriorating and overcrowded urban areas are becoming a hotbed for the breakdown of family life of the poor, the rise of prostitution for their daughters and wives, delinquency and crime, problems of psychic maladjustment, and dehumanization. In addition to external vulnerability of their children, the family heads with economic insecurity are losing parental authority. Other traditional social controls of all persons are weakened or broken down in the midst of social chaos in the urban slum areas.

All things considered, in the urban congestion of the developing countries, the apathy, dehumanization, and fatalism, are additional social phenomena which obstruct the constructive human mobilization necessary for development. The modern political systems of many noncommunist developing countries are, in principle, based upon the idea of Western style democracy. However, in the process of rapid urbanization during the past independence period, the political system of democracy in the developing countries has
been rooted in the urban middle and upper classes, rather than in the majority of the population in the rural areas or in the lower class urban areas. What counts as public opinion, in other words, is synonymous with the voice of the upper and middle classes. Public opinion is manipulated by the urban mass media, which is owned and operated by these same classes. As a result, the socially and economically alienated majority are apathetic toward politics and are moving away from real participation in political activities.

All-in-all, the far-reaching impacts of these current demographic mechanisms in developing countries seem to remain stable or worsen without any structural change in the population composition, population distribution, or in the total socioeconomic structure.

B. Qualitative Aspects of Population

Poverty, misery, and unemployment are the end results of underdevelopment. They are not underdevelopment itself. In fact, most poor countries today are underdeveloped. Poverty and its related low living standards are concurrent with the problems of underdevelopment, or are indicators of underdevelopment. The previous section dealt with the demographic mechanisms of underdevelopment which could be quantitatively expressed. This section is devoted to the qualitative aspects of population, especially two aspects of the quality of life: health status and the educational attainment of the population of less developed countries.
1. Health and nutrition

To an ordinary individual, health, long life, and material well-being are generally conceived as necessary conditions for human happiness. Health itself is an end and means in life, because everyone values health and a healthy person leads a normal everyday life; participating in various productive activities.

With the advancements in medical science, most of the previously fatal epidemic and infectious diseases have been brought under control in both the developed and less developed countries. In addition, extensive public sanitation, personal hygiene, and generally improved living standards have substantially reduced mortality and, in turn, increased the average human longevity.

Table 21 shows the major regional differentials of crude death rate and life expectancy at birth in 1972. Though there has been a general decrease in mortality rate and increase in life expectancy at birth, there are still substantial discrepancies in mortality and life expectancy between developed regions and poor regions. Among 109 countries, the regional average crude death rate ranged from 10.1 in developed North Atlantic region to 22.0 in Black Africa. In 1972 life expectancy at birth varied from 43.4 years in Black Africa to 71.3 years in the developed regions, with a world average of 58 years.

It may be worthwhile to look at the availability of medical systems of hospital beds and physicians in world distribution as a factor in the differentials in average human longevity and mortality rate between the developed and less developed countries. Table 22 gives the aggregate
Table 21. Differentials of mortality rates (per 1,000) and life expectancy by major region, 1972.a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Crude Birth Rate</th>
<th>Life Expectancy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Min.</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World total (109)b</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Africa (29)</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa and Middle Eastc (13)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia (17)</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and Latin America (22)</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Atlantic Regiond (28)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[^a\]Source: See the secondary sources listed in Appendix.

\[^b\]Numbers in parentheses is number of countries in the region.

\[^c\]Includes Israel and Asia with Japan.

\[^d\]Includes Australia and New Zealand.

Averages of accessibility of hospital beds and physicians among the major regions of the world.

In terms of population per hospital bed, the Asian countries have a severe shortage of hospital establishments with an average of 1,280 persons per hospital bed. This is more than ten times greater than developed countries, with 114 persons per bed. Sub-Saharan African countries show a serious shortage of medical practitioners with 26,520 persons per physician as compared with an average of 715 persons per physician in the Western countries. Moreover, in less developed countries, medical facilities and personnel are usually concentrated in the large cities. Therefore, most of the rural areas of countries with low urbanization are almost entirely excluded from the benefits of modern medicine, partly because of its
Table 22. Outlook of population per hospital bed and population per physician by major region, 1970.\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Population Per Bed</th>
<th>Population per Physician</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Min.</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World average (108)(^b)</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Africa (29)</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa and Middle East(^c) (13)</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia (16)</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>1,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and Latin America (22)</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Atlantic Region(^d) (28)</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Source: See the secondary sources listed in Appendix.

\(^b\)Numbers in parentheses is number of countries in the region.

\(^c\)Includes Israel and Asia with Japan.

\(^d\)Includes Australia and New Zealand.

Substantial distance from the rural villages and partly because of medical costs. The poor rural population is more susceptible to various diseases because of inadequate diets, poor sanitation, and substandard living conditions. In general trends, nonetheless, it is true that the average life expectancy has increased. However, the sheer extension of life with increased life-expectancy does not imply a healthy life. Unfortunately morbidity statistics are not as available in most of the low income countries as they are in high income countries and existent statistics are merely rough estimates of doubtful reliability.

Man is mortal with a limited life-span, whether he is rich or poor, though modern medicine has helped to extend life-expectancy to a limited degree. Under ordinary circumstances, a man dies of certain illnesses.
On the basis of both causes of deaths and morbidity patterns, a hypothetical relationship between morbidity patterns and the level of national economic affluence was drawn in Figure 1. This assumes that there is a certain degree of association between the levels of living standards with the relative incidences of diseases. In other words, chronic illnesses, other age-related illnesses, and mental illnesses, which are not necessarily a direct cause of death, have a statistically higher proportion of incidence in the high income countries than in the lower income countries. Infectious diseases and other endemic or parasitic sufferings have a comparatively higher proportion in the countries with lower living standards than those of chronic illnesses.

Figure 1. A hypothetical relationship between morbidity patterns and levels of economic affluence.
Health status is affected by various factors such as: the degree of sanitation and hygiene, preventive medicine, appropriate exercise, etc. The basis for health maintenance is adequate nutrition. Malnutrition and undernourishment are fatal to the status of health.

Regional differentials in average daily caloric intake per person range from the regional average of 2,145 calories in Black Africa, to 3,109 in developed regions. The difference between the national aggregate average caloric intake at the bottom and at the top is more than double, as shown in Table 23. According to experts in the nutrition field, the normal requirement of a full grown person of 154 pounds is 3,000 calories per day (Borgstrom, 1970:30). Brown (1954) gives us a more detailed example about calorie-intake. Man requires energy to survive and obtains energy by ingesting organic matters (food) and burning them with oxygen. Although the basic quantity of energy needed to maintain life depends upon sex, age, body weight, and certain other biological characteristics, a man lying in bed and performing no external work requires about 1,700 calories per day. If he works for approximately 16 hours at light physical activity, the total daily requirement of energy becomes about 2,800 calories. In terms of body weight, a man of 125 pounds engaging in moderate activity requires about 2,600 calories per day, while a man weighing 200 pounds requires 3,700 calories per day. A man weighing 165 pounds requires about 2,800 calories per day for light work, about 3,300 calories for moderate work, and as much as 4,500 calories for heavy physical labor (Brown, 1954: 107-109).
Table 23. Differentials in caloric intake per day and protein intake per day by major region, 1970.\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Calorie Intake</th>
<th>Protein Intake (Gram)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Min.</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World average (109)(^b)</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>2,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Africa (29)</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>2,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa and Middle East(^c) (13)</td>
<td>1,890</td>
<td>2,313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia (17)</td>
<td>1,920</td>
<td>2,306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and Latin America (22)</td>
<td>1,760</td>
<td>2,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Atlantic Region(^d)</td>
<td>2,770</td>
<td>3,109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Source: See the secondary sources listed in Appendix.

\(^b\)Numbers in parentheses is number of countries in the region.

\(^c\)Includes Israel and Asia with Japan.

\(^d\)Includes Australia and New Zealand.

Figure 2 shows a presumed relationship between caloric intake per day and productivity, replacing Brown's different types of work. This assumes that a certain minimum energy intake is required simply for physical maintenance and, up to a certain amount, the productivity of physical and mental activity is roughly proportional to the additional calorie-intake per day. Human endeavor and productivity depends, to a considerable extent, upon adequate food. Conversely, lack of food resources continues to drastically limit and retard labor productivity.

According to the Food and Agriculture Organization's studies of food consumption patterns, at a very conservative estimate, some twenty percent of the people in developing countries are undernourished and sixty percent
are malnourished. Undernutrition refers to inadequacy in quantity of food available to an individual, on the one hand, and malnutrition refers to the quality of diets, on the other hand. The direct effects of undernourishment over a long period are: loss of weight, susceptibility to disease, and low physical activity. A malnourished person may or may not be undernourished. The person who is undernourished, however, will very likely be malnourished. Both are hungry (Simon and Simon, 1973:xvi).

In his food man does need adequate calories plus a number of vitamins and other nutrients. Proteins, however, are the key compounds. Proteins with amino acids are needed for the growth, repair, and building up of human bodies; while calories are needed to maintain the physiological metabolism internally and for human activities in daily life. Protein deficiency is a direct cause of various fatal diseases. During recent
decades, protein deficiency diseases have come to prevail in most of the low income countries and to be regarded as the chief nutritional deficiency of the world. A calorie shortage causes a man to look tired and lazy, lacking a sense of responsibility, devoid of all ambition, and, finally, low in productivity. Lack of protein in the first weeks and months of a child's life induces brain damage, which can never be repaired. This protein deficiency results in sustained detrimental effects on mental capability, learning, etc. (Simon and Simon, 1973:58-59).

From the above examination of the health and nutritional status of low income countries and the importance of it in human life, promoting the health status by improving health delivery systems, eradicating undernutrition, and preventing malnutrition are of immediate and urgent concern. These concerns are the means to develop productivity and creativity of human potentials, as well as an ends in themselves in the quality of life.

2. Education

Education may be considered a social institution specifically designed for the socialization of new generations. Broadly speaking, its objective is to awaken and develop those physical, intellectual, and moral states in the child, which are required of him by his society. The socialization of new generations necessarily takes place in all societies. It takes varying forms in respect to the social groups and institutions, and in respect to its own dynamics and complexity. The function of education is to transmit knowledge and cultural heritage to the new generation for the continuity of the culture. It also contributes to new discovery and innovation, on the basis of the accumulation of knowledge, by analyzing
situations in terms of the needs and instruments which might lead to changing society.

Historically, much of the educational effort has been concentrated upon the children of the upper stratum of the social ladder. Wherever there is a system of social stratification, there is a corresponding differentiation within the educational system. In other words, educational differences in kind and quality are closely related to social stratification. The children of high status families are, in general, better qualified for higher education.

Every educational system historically has been, and still is, selective in one way or another. The coming of mass society revolutionized the whole educational system, even in the less developed countries. "The revolution of rising expectations" of the people in a wide social spectrum, along with governmental policy introducing compulsory education, makes education accessible to all. Therefore, education, like health, becomes an ends and a means for development; where development is considered primarily as economic, political, and social development.

In the developmental perspective, the educational institution contributes to the transformation of potential human resources into actual resources; the most essential element in societal development. In the long-range view, the educational effort is a human investment, although structured and determined by the given socioeconomic conditions. The impacts are far-reaching for socioeconomic productivity, national manpower composition and quality, and socioeconomic stratification (especially the industrial and occupational structure). All these impacts of education
are regarded as valid social indicators of development and quality of life.

Most of the less developed countries have been faced with a paradoxical situation of a severe shortage of necessary and qualified manpower in the midst of the overflowing unemployed and underemployed. Educational policy as a means for development may not be the only way. Surely it is one of the most urgent and possible ways open to socioeconomic development in the less developed countries. Without effective and appropriate human development through the educational system, economic growth will result in the failure of societal development. In other words, the sheer number of growing untrained labor forces is not necessarily conceived to be human capital formation. Rather, the problems of unemployment and underemployment is one of the most pressing social problems, especially in the less developed countries with limited labor market and lack of capital. When these massive labor forces are well trained they will eventually turn into the valuable formation of human capital which is essential in the development program.

Because of the fact that formal education in the new states was primarily introduced by colonizers or borrowed from the outside, the underlying objectives of the formal educational system was generally not for the indigenous people. Rather, it was deliberately used for the purposes of colonial governing; by training clerks and a limited number of administrative functionaries. Often, separate school systems were established for the children of the colonial rulers. The direction of higher education established under colonial rule largely agreed with the cultural
inheritance from precolonial times; that is, an education producing a traditionally highly valued literary type, as well as an attitude contemptuous of manual work. The colonial formal educational system produced a handful of identity-lost, educated elites, while neglecting the formal education of the masses of people who were left an illiterate society. The colonial heritage in the educational system and its end result still remain intact in many of the less developed countries.

The reliability of the statistics of illiteracy rates, especially in the developing regions, is highly doubtful. Table 24 gives partial features of the literacy and vocational enrollment rates in secondary and third level education around 1970. The national aggregate average literacy rate in Black African countries is less than 15 percent of those 15 years old and above, while mostly former colonial rulers average almost 95 percent literacy. In the vocational enrollment rates in secondary education, the lowest rate is only 1 percent of total enrollment in secondary education, with one country each both in Asia and Black Africa. The national aggregate average rates of vocational enrollment are generally very low: 13.1 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa, 8.9 percent in the Middle East, 11.9 percent in Asia, and 19.7 percent in the Latin American countries, compared to 45.6 percent in the Western developed countries.

For the national development of the less developed countries, technical and vocational educated personnel are needed. There is a serious shortage of skilled laborers, technicians, and agriculturalists. The responsibility of the unbalanced and maladjusted education system with respect to socioeconomic needs is, of course, not entirely caused by
Table 24. Differential percent of literacy, vocational enrollment rate in secondary education, science and engineering students in the third level by major region, 1970.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Literacy (No. of Countries)</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>Vocational Enrollment (No. of Countries)</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>Vocational Engineering (No. of Countries)</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Max.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>(109)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>(103)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>(101)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Africa</td>
<td>(29)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East^b</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>50.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia^c</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>55.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>(22)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>(22)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>(22)</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Regions</td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>61.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^Source: See the secondary sources listed in Appendix.

^Includes Israel.

^Includes Japan.

^Includes Australia and New Zealand and excludes the United States and Soviet Russia.
colonial policy. It is partly caused by the mentality of the ruling elites of the less developed countries

Without substantiating the absolute numbers in distribution, the relative proportion of percentage is likely to distort the real facts. The percent of science and engineer majors in the third level of education suggests some ideas about the distribution of students at college level by major regions. One country in Africa shows 100 percent of the university students majoring in science and engineering because there is only one university, which is based on science and technology. In addition to this kind of pitfall in the statistics, the real number of universities and students are generally very small in terms of the proportion of the corresponding age group in the less developed countries. Some countries in Asia and many of Latin America have placed comparatively more emphasis on higher education.

Table 25 was tabulated by the Population Council and is based on the UNESCO criterion of literacy, i.e., the ability both to read and write. Female literacy is much lower than male literacy, especially in developing traditional countries. According to the Population Council reports, most of the developing countries with a high proportion of literacy are in Latin America. Several Asian countries have over 75 percent literacy, including the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. In the developed countries, even female literacy is practically universal.

In a sense, universal literacy is one step toward national consolidation by means of the development of a common, or national, language. Universal literacy is almost a precondition for social development, especially for those newly independent countries with multi-ethnic and multi-language
Table 25. Percent of adult females literacy among 74 selected developing countries, 1974.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent of Adult Female Literacy</th>
<th>Number Among 74 Selected Developing Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 25.1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.1 to 50</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50.1 to 75</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75.1 and over</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unavailable</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although educational policies vary from country to country, and often within a country, school enrollment in both age groups of 6-11 years and 12-17 years increased greatly during 1960-1970, as shown in Table 26. In the less developed regions, boys enrolled in age group 6-11 increased from 54.4 percent to 68.6 percent during 1960-1970, in addition to continuing
Table 26. Percent of all boys and all girls enrolled in schools at ages 6-11, 12-17, and 18-29, as estimated for 1960 and 1970 according to UNESCO.a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Percent of Boys in School</th>
<th>Percent of Girls in School</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AGED 6-11 YEARS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World totalb</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>75.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More developed regions</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>92.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less developed regions</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>68.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>71.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>71.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AGED 12-17 YEARS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World totalb</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More developed regions</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>87.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less developed regions</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AGED 18-29 YEARS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World totalb</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More developed regions</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less developed regions</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


bNot including China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Mongolia.

growth in the absolute number of school age children. Enrollment for those aged 12-17 years increased from 27.6 percent to 39.4 percent during the same period. In the more developed regions and in Latin America, the
enrollment ratio of girls slightly exceeds that of boys at age 6-11 and does not fall far short of boys at age 12-17. Advanced education is somewhat less accessible to young women than to young men, although the difference in that respect may tend to diminish with time. By contrast, in South Asia and Africa, enrollment ratios of girls fall far short of boys at age 6-11 and at age 12-17. Women, aged 18-29 in advanced education, are still exceptionally few. There are enormous gaps in the enrollment ratios between more developed and less developed regions, especially in the higher levels of education. The gap in ages 12-17 is more than double in 1970 and the gap in age 18-29 is more than three times for young men in the same year.

The educational establishment, since obtaining independence in most of the underdeveloped areas, is still an expansion of the earlier colonial system with a few marginal changes in nature and technique. The earlier graduates from secondary and tertiary education, which is a general education oriented toward literature, law, and the other humanities, could fill vacancies in governmental administrative positions when colonial personnel withdrew. The recent graduates from the expanded general educational system are overflowing the limited job market. They await opportunities, remaining idly in the cities as "educated unemployed", becoming the targets of the social complaints of inhibitors and opportunists.

In the above case, education is not only wasteful in time and money but also is dysfunctional for development. Education, with due structural reform in terms of socioeconomic needs and long-term perspectives, can only be effective for development if, at the same time, all the social,
economic, political, and cultural systems work together to provide sufficient job opportunities for the educated people and financial support to enhance quality of education.

Aside from the problems of educational systems, the quality of education in the less developed countries is quite low due to obsolete methods of teaching, shortage of qualified personnel, lack of teaching materials, overcrowded school buildings, etc. According to Table 27, the national average percent of public educational expenditure of the governmental budget is around 15-20 percent throughout the world. In most of the less developed countries, public education is predominant and their total government budget is smaller when compared with the rich countries. In developed countries private schools occupy a much larger proportion of the educational system, in addition to an appreciably larger total government budget. This implies that the percent of the government budget expended on public education is probably financially insufficient for the quality education necessary in developing countries, in comparison to the rich countries.

Besides a large proportion of unqualified teaching personnel, the aggregate average pupil-teacher ratios are higher in the less developed countries than in the developed Western countries, as shown in Table 27. The teacher shortage and lack of classrooms is particularly acute. This lack has resulted in the introduction of shift systems in various Asian states. For instance, two or three shifts have operated in some schools, especially in the large cities of South Korea.
Table 27. Differential percent of pupil-teacher ratio for primary education, and public expenditure on education to government budget by major region, 1970.\textsuperscript{a}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Percent of Educational Expenditure to Budget</th>
<th>Pupil-Teacher Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Africa</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East\textsuperscript{b}</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Regions\textsuperscript{c}</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a}Source: See the secondary sources listed in Appendix.

\textsuperscript{b}Includes Israel and Asia with Japan.

\textsuperscript{c}Includes Australia and New Zealand.

The shortage of qualified personnel is not just limited to the teaching personnel. Recently, a significant number of badly needed technicians and professionals, vital to development, have emigrated to Europe and North America. Many of the less developed countries have also lost manpower as many of their students studying abroad do not return home. Between 1957 and 1963, Taiwan had a net loss of 6,900 students (Stein, 1972:89). In 1967, 44 percent of the junior medical staff in the United Kingdom came from overseas; mainly from India and Pakistan (Godfrey, 1970). Higher salaries abroad, especially in the United States, undoubtedly are the major determinants of "brain drain" from the less developed countries.

In terms of manpower planning, a basis for calculating various educational costs and social needs must be provided which is consistent with the preconditions for national development in a broad context. It must
also be able to pinpoint, in real terms, the types and quantities of educational resources required and where potential bottlenecks might arise. Modern development has been achieved due to advancements in knowledge and in technology -- which has been accomplished through development of human potential resources. In comparing changes in total inputs and total outputs over time, output changes could not entirely be attributed to the growth of inputs. Thus the residual can be regarded as the effective human capital formation through educational processes of training, learning, etc.

C. Social Conditions

In the previous section, we have analyzed the levels of living and qualitative aspects of population in the underdeveloped countries. This section is concerned with such social conditions as: attitudes, behaviors, and the social institutional aspects of underdevelopment. Besides economic criterion such as low levels of living standards in the general population, an "underdeveloped" country is usually characterized by overall social conditions of the country which are evaluated as unfavorable, or undesirable, from a developmental perspective. These unfavorable social conditions are perceived to be obstacles to development; since all of these social forces contribute to the preservation of stability in social systems.

All these social factors are considered to be closely interrelated in a social system, especially in the underdeveloped countries where economic and social behaviors are not well differentiated. Economic development cannot be viewed simply as the function of economic inputs alone in the
underdeveloped country. Rather it may well be influenced by the other social conditions. Thus, the interdependence of the various social conditions which is general characteristics of a social system must be taken into account in development planning. In a way, development implies either the elimination of the unfavorable social obstacles, or the improvement of the existing conditions in a favorable direction.

Among the various underdeveloped social conditions, this section will be confined to the three aspects: (1) socio-political atmosphere, (2) socio-economic inequalities, and (3) the land-tenure systems. Many developing countries have been chronically suffering from political turmoil, and accompanying social disturbances, which are believed to contribute profoundly to the shrinkage of productive economic activities. One of the important sources of such political instability is believed to be the prevalence of political corruptions of political leaders.

The second problem of socioeconomic inequalities is perceived, not only as unfavorable to development programs in terms of the social mobilization of the masses of people, but also as the most serious social problem in terms of social justice and rising egalitarian ideals. However, in the subsistence economies of underdeveloped countries, the problem of economic inequalities are not just the sociological problem of relative deprivation, but the problem of the absolute deprivation of masses of people who are illiterate, undernourished, often of ill-health, and who live in destitution.

Most of the underdeveloped countries are nonindustrialized, agrarian societies. The largest proportion of population find their livelihood in
agriculture. Land is, of course, one of the basic factors of production for food and other agricultural products. Thus, land-tenure system becomes to a large degree one of the most important sources of economic inequalities in the underdeveloped agrarian societies.

1. Political corruption

In most of the underdeveloped countries, corruption of politicians and civil servants is rampant and a common phenomenon. These corrupt practices are usually in the form of bribery, graft, and embezzlement on the part of both politicians and administrators; and fraud, nepotism, and favoritism in the social relationships among the ordinary citizens.

People generally recognize the prevalence of political corruption in the less developed countries and the frequent revelation of these alleged corrupt practices through the mass media or some sort of ad hoc investigative committee. However, intensive and scientific inquiries on this subject are comparatively sterile. One reason is that corruption, by nature, is not manifest but veiled. It remains concealed and kept secret, because the techniques employed in corruption are applied secretly. The consequences of the corrupt practices are also camouflaged as far as possible; not only the event itself but the causes and effects must be veiled. The corruption of ruling classes is one of the most serious social and political issues in the developing countries. Distrust and cynicism permeats the majority of the citizens and intellectuals working against the ruling elite and government.

In terms of a dictionary definition, "political corruption" means the misuse or improper use of public power for private benefit. Corruption,
as Roy indicated, denotes "the corrosion of traditional values -- thus moral decay and the disintegration of standards of proper behavior" (Roy, 1970:86). However, functionalist theorists view corrupt practices as functional to integration of the political system and as a complemental role for the imperfect market: "such activities as usury, blackmarketing, and smuggling, though patently illegal and immoral, have been identified as adaptations to market forces working to equilibrium" (Roy, 1970:89).

Though he plainly criticizes such behavioral patterns as characteristics of underdevelopment, Myrdal views these corrupt practices and the spoils systems they generate as functional to the societies in which "there is no market for services and goods" (Myrdal, 1968:948). In this regard, Myrdal even attempted to obscure the distinction between gifts and bribes. To outsiders, it may seem that there is no clear distinction between gifts and bribery. In fact, the indigenous people well perceive which is gift and which is not. Just as the symbiotic relationship is different from the parasitic relationship, so a gift is different from bribery in corrupt practice.

What is a mutually beneficial contribution to each party in the bribery case is not necessarily beneficial to the total society. The functionalist's interpretation of corruption in developing countries, in terms of misconceived and confused cultural behavior, fails to explain the underlying phenomenon and leads to erroneous conclusions. Corruption implies misconduct, which has two sides of reality; one is a private benefit or, at best, is beneficial to a few, while the other obstructs the majority or is harmful to the totality. In this regard, corruption is not
universally defined in terms of any legal or scientific concept, but corrup­tion is what is called corruption by the indigenous people. It is also true that corruption is prevalent in developing countries and that it is growing among higher officials and politicians.

The causes of the growing phenomenon of corruption in the underde­veloped countries can be listed as follows: In the first place, there is undoubtedly the legacy from the traditional patriarchal-patrimonial system. Secondly, the salaries of governmental officials in developing countries are generally too low to match the corresponding social status. Moreover, the social status of the officials is relatively higher than manual workers or other services. These two factors together are likely to increase the possibilities of bribery and graft. Thirdly, some of these government officials are in the position of administrating dis­cretionary controls over private sectors which were originally designed to stimulate enterprise and investments for economic development. These officials are likely to be attracted by the temptation of corruption. Fourthly, on many occasions, large-scale foreign aid has been misused through the corrupt process. Finally, the businessmen and entrepreneurs in developing countries have been active clients to the higher officials and politicians. Under these circumstances, corruption is a natural social consequence and unavoidable in less developed countries.

The effects of corruption are never favorable for development as well as social order. Corruption itself is wasteful. The earnings through corrupt practice are seldom used for productive purposes, such as invest­ment, but often are used for conspicuous consumption or capital-flight
for later security. It is not only unproductive economically, but it is inefficient from the administrative viewpoint, by either obstructing or delaying the processes of government.

Corrupt practices disintegrate popular mobilization and demoralize the spirits of the people. As a result, the effectiveness of a corrupt government is seriously weakened in national development efforts. Most of the corrupted regimes themselves often pave the way to an irregular transfer of power with growing social disturbances. In resistance to the threatening political challenge, most of the corrupted regimes follow the only alternative way, ultimately resorting to a rigid, authoritarian dictatorship. The more often they are challenged by military coup attempts, student's anti-government demonstrations, and other oppositions, the more rigidly repressive measures the authoritarian regime takes.

Table 28 shows the distribution of power transition types among 72 developing countries, excluding socialist countries, as of 1970. Only 28 countries out of 72 could manage to transfer power in regular ways, such as a general election or legitimately establishing new cabinets. The other 39 countries experiences irregular transfers of power by means other than constitutionally legitimate ways.

In Table 29, almost 60 percent of 72 developing countries have experienced successful coup incidences once or more than twice. Table 30 indicates the types of socio-political disturbances among 72 countries of the Third World. Chaotic civil war or organized social movement, such as violent anti-government demonstrations, marked 58.3 percent of the 72
Table 28. Transition of power in 72 developing countries, as of 1970.\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number of Countries</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regular transfer</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular transfer</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dictorial or monarchial</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Source: See the secondary sources listed in Appendix.

Table 29. Distribution of coup incidences of 72 developing countries, as of 1970.\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Incidences</th>
<th>Number of Countries</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One time</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two times</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three times</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than four times</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Source: See the secondary sources listed in Appendix.

developing countries. Only 10 countries out of 72 have not suffered from such serious social and political instabilities.

The revelation of increasing political corruption at a colossal scale in developing countries is nothing but one of the manifest aspects of underdeveloped structures. As Myrdal pointed out, "people's beliefs about corruption and the emotions attached to those beliefs are themselves
Table 30. Distribution of communal instabilities of 72 developing countries, as of 1970.a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number of Countries</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Riots or guerrillas</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil war or organized anti-government</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic violence</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolution</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aSource: See the secondary sources listed in Appendix.

It is not easy to eradicate the social problems of corruption and to make clear the people's beliefs about corruption under the present circumstances.

Political systems, no matter how effective, will not likely function properly without a restoration of confidence in the political leadership. Under corrupt government, the integrity of the politicians and the officials is seriously damaged, and confidence in the government (including the legislative, executive, and judicial branches) is weakened. As a result, the majority of people become indifferent to governmental programs and plans. People no longer trust in their government. Taken all together, as Myrdal indicated, social indiscipline as characteristic of the so-called "soft states" is one of the conspicuous social phenomena in the underdeveloped countries (Myrdal, 1970).
2. Inequalities

It is true that in any society, whether underdeveloped or not, an individual's place in the social order is defined in terms of his relative rank. This rank is a compound of the economic, social, and political factors of class, status, and power. According to Parsons (1954), prestige is the most important dimension of stratification. Social prestige is differentially allocated by the joint product of two factors: the division of labor and sets of social values (Parsons, 1954:386-439). A social stratum means a subpopulation of individuals with more or less equal status in the arranged hierarchy. Every member of a society may be placed in these hierarchies, and, hence, a total society can be viewed as consisting of a stratified population.

The functionalist alleges that stratification with inequalities serves as integrative function for society in several ways (Davis and Moore, 1945:242-249). It may be pointed out that judgmental interpretation is quite different from objective analysis. As Mayhew said, "stratification is not a specialized integrative subsystem, but a system that permeates the total society and all of its differentiated subsectors" (Mayhew, 1971:205).

Inequality among social members is the sine qua non of institutionalized stratification systems. Inequality relates to all social, economic, and political relationships. Functionalist sociologists regard stratified inequalities as functional to the integration of a society. To many economists, it is a generally accepted contention of economic development that, at least in the initial stages of development, an unequally skewed
income distribution may be favorable to the attainment of a rapid rate of economic growth. This argument is based upon the naive assumptions that the marginal savings rate is greater in the higher income than in the lower income groups, and that the larger savings realized from an unequal income distribution will lead to a high rate of investment (Lefeber, 1972: 133-151). On the contrary, inequality in the less developed countries stands as a complex of inhibitions and obstacles to development. In fact, the economic inequality in both relative and absolute terms is greater in the underdeveloped countries than in the developed countries. The inequality between the few top rich and the poor majority is, in itself, the characteristics of underdevelopment in developing countries. The issue of inequality is not only the problem in development, but it is the very matter of social justice. Modernization or development is generally regarded as an increase in structural differentiation from a sociological point of view (Friedland, 1969:34-84). The increasing structural differentiation, however, does not necessarily imply widening inequality. Rather, it indicates the feature of growing complexity in social roles. Hence, the structural differentiation is a precondition for increasing social mobility.

However, social inequality in underdeveloped countries is characterized by an extreme lack of social mobility; it becomes rigid and tends to widen disparities in social privileges. In most underdeveloped new states there has been a built-in mechanism that the existing upper strata almost automatically remained in power after decolonization, without any fundamental change in the colonial social structure. The colonial powers allied with the precolonial privileged groups to share their vested
interests in maintaining the economic and social status quo by strengthen­
ing the inegalitarian social and economic structure in their colonies.
Thus, in the newly independent countries, conservative regimes could
tightly rule their people by preserving the social, economic, and political
power structure inherited from the colonial times. It is a general rule
that at the upper strata the systems of stratification more closely link
all other privileged institutional spheres than at the lower strata. The
upper strata is tied to high economic status and higher political power.
Social inequality stands as a main cause of economic inequality and, at
the same time, economic inequality reinforces social inequality.

Economic inequality in the underdeveloped countries is serious because
of absolute deprivation. Extremely concentrated income in these countries
stands as a main cause of the misery and poverty of a nation. Table 31
shows the 1961 income distribution figures for selected developing coun­
tries, ranging from the lowest gross national product per capita of $53.6
in Tanzania to $1,334.9 in Israel. In some important respects, the lowest
gross national product group -- below $75 -- is characterized by compar­
atively more equal distribution. The greatest inequality exists for the
countries that fall in the $200 to $500 range of per capita gross national
product. In these countries, the bottom 20 percent of population receive
an income shared by about 2 percent to less than 5 percent, the lower 60
percent share an income of about 15 percent to less than 25 percent, the
upper 20 percent share from 57 percent to 71 percent, and the top 5 percent
of the population alone receive an income share from 28 percent to 60 per­
cent of the gross national product.
Table 31. Income share received by various ordinal groups and per capita gross national product, 1961, selected countries.¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Bottom 20%</th>
<th>Bottom 60%</th>
<th>Top 20%</th>
<th>Top 5%</th>
<th>1961/per Capita GNP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>9.75</td>
<td>29.25</td>
<td>61.00</td>
<td>42.90</td>
<td>53.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>36.00</td>
<td>48.50</td>
<td>28.21</td>
<td>66.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>35.00</td>
<td>42.00</td>
<td>23.00</td>
<td>74.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>21.00</td>
<td>64.00</td>
<td>22.20</td>
<td>75.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>23.00</td>
<td>60.90</td>
<td>38.38</td>
<td>75.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>33.00</td>
<td>45.00</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>81.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>29.30</td>
<td>48.10</td>
<td>17.10</td>
<td>97.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>26.60</td>
<td>59.10</td>
<td>35.70</td>
<td>117.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>29.00</td>
<td>52.00</td>
<td>24.10</td>
<td>159.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>42.60</td>
<td>41.80</td>
<td>21.50</td>
<td>195.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhodesia</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>65.00</td>
<td>60.00</td>
<td>203.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>22.70</td>
<td>61.50</td>
<td>38.40</td>
<td>214.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>17.10</td>
<td>67.60</td>
<td>48.30</td>
<td>225.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>15.88</td>
<td>68.06</td>
<td>40.36</td>
<td>282.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>71.00</td>
<td>47.00</td>
<td>339.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>21.75</td>
<td>58.04</td>
<td>28.52</td>
<td>351.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>19.00</td>
<td>61.50</td>
<td>31.20</td>
<td>412.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>16.27</td>
<td>57.36</td>
<td>39.38</td>
<td>454.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>5.40</td>
<td>27.00</td>
<td>52.30</td>
<td>22.60</td>
<td>558.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>30.40</td>
<td>52.00</td>
<td>29.40</td>
<td>710.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>30.00</td>
<td>47.10</td>
<td>23.20</td>
<td>968.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>38.80</td>
<td>39.40</td>
<td>11.20</td>
<td>1,334.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Source: Adapted from Kravis (1973:80).
The income distribution becomes more equal in the higher "gross national product per capita" countries. In developing countries, the overall income inequality gets worse, especially in the low income bracket.

In Mexico during 1950-1963, for instance, the income share of the lowest two deciles of population substantially decreased from 6.1 percent in 1950, to 4.4 percent in 1957, and 3.6 percent in 1963 of the gross national product. This implies that the living standards of the lowest 20 percent got worse rather than improving or, at best, they retain almost the same standard of living (if we account for the increase in gross national product during the period). There was some redistribution of income in the top 5 percent and the tiny 1 percent group during the same period. There was not much change in the higher 20 percent -- 59.8 percent in 1950, 60.4 percent in 1957, and 58.5 percent in 1963 (see Table 32). The other developing countries are assumed to be about the same as the example of Mexico.

Table 32. Estimates of changes in personal income distribution in Mexico, 1950-1963.a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Unit Rank</th>
<th>Percent of Total Income Received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower than 20 percent</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher than 20 percent</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest 5 percent</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest 1 percent</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aSource: Adapted from Committee for Economic Development (1966:220).
The system of stratification bearing on inequalities, as differentiated institutional spheres, is inseparably connected with the population in size, composition, and pattern of mobility. Likewise, inequality is not confined to the overall population but it is patterned by region -- especially urban and rural differences -- on race or ethnic groups, and industrial and occupational differences. In Mexico in 1963, the average income per family was 1,278 pesos per month. The average for rural and urban families were, respectively, 738 pesos and 1,706 pesos.

Thus, rural families had an average income equal to only 43 percent of that of urban families (Ducoff, 1970:110). From Table 33, almost two-thirds of Mexican families had a monthly income of less than 1,000 pesos.

Table 33. Percent distribution of families and income by level of family income, for the total, urban, and rural areas in Mexico, 1963.\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Monthly Income per Family (Pesos)</th>
<th>Total Fam. Income</th>
<th>Rural Fam. Income</th>
<th>Urban Fam. Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 300</td>
<td>18.4 3.1</td>
<td>29.0 8.5</td>
<td>10.0 1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301-600</td>
<td>25.1 8.6</td>
<td>32.5 18.8</td>
<td>19.4 5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>601 - 1,000</td>
<td>21.6 13.1</td>
<td>22.4 23.2</td>
<td>21.0 9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,001 - 1,500</td>
<td>10.9 10.6</td>
<td>5.7 9.4</td>
<td>15.0 11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,501 - 3,000</td>
<td>15.0 24.6</td>
<td>7.8 22.3</td>
<td>20.7 25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,001 - 10,000</td>
<td>8.1 30.7</td>
<td>2.6 15.7</td>
<td>12.4 35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000 and over</td>
<td>.9 9.3</td>
<td>.1 2.1</td>
<td>1.5 11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All families</td>
<td>100.0 100.0</td>
<td>100.0 100.0</td>
<td>100.0 100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Source: Adapted from Ducoff (1970:110).
(United States $80) and they share about one-fifth of the gross national income. For the rural families the same monthly income is shared by nearly 85 percent. The degree of inequality in income distribution was not very different between the urban and the rural sectors in terms of their respective shares of income, but the share of the total income going to the half of the Mexican families living in rural areas was only 25.6 percent (Ducoff, 1970:111).

It is apparent that the purchasing power of lower income families is extremely low and, thus, their participation in the market is virtually nonexistent in developing countries. In most cases of national economic growth in developing countries, the average income gain for the urban families is generally much greater than that for rural families. Thus, for this reason, the gap between rural and urban family incomes has not only widened relatively but absolutely.

The validity of the usual argument that income inequality is a condition for saving is doubtful in the present situation of underdeveloped countries. The national income, usually concentrated in the nonproductive upper class of high government officials, military officers, landlords, and a handful of capitalists as well, is not likely to be reinvested in ways beneficial for development. As a direct result, many developing countries are suffering from difficulties in capital formation for economic development in addition to an innate capital deficiency.

It also cannot be overlooked, from a particular point of view, that the prevailing laissez-faire attitude towards distributional aspects of development policies lends only convenient support to maintenance of the
political and social status quo in many underdeveloped new states. The enrichment of few or upper stratum members in underdeveloped countries is only possible by leaving the masses of peasantry and urban poors in poverty.

In conclusion, the currently growing income disparities within a country seems more likely to impede healthy economic expansion by operating as powerful disincentives to public participation in development programs. The impoverishment of the masses is characterized by lack of elementary health care, educational opportunities, and suffering from undernourishment and malnutrition. Thus, all these poverty-stricken people are likely to be unable to raise their productivity; from a developmental perspective.

3. Land ownership and land reform

Underdeveloped countries are often referred to as nonindustrialized societies. Most underdeveloped countries are, in fact, agrarian societies. As of 1970, about two-thirds of the population in developing regions were still dependent on agriculture (see Table 14). However, agriculture in most parts of the underdeveloped countries is generally characterized by extensive land-use combined with a high man/land ratio. As a result, the productivity per acre and productivity per laborer are exceedingly low in most underdeveloped countries compared with some developed countries such as Japan and countries in Europe.

Low productivity in agriculture naturally results in extremely low real incomes for agricultural people. The real incomes of the farmers in most parts of underdeveloped countries are so low that the farmers are
not only unable to invest in improved farming methods and technological improvement, but many of them are unable to feed themselves. Thus, the vicious circle of chronic poverty will continue to operate in the low income rural areas of the underdeveloped countries; unless there is a fundamental change in the agricultural structure.

It is generally true that the low productivity per acre in most parts of the underdeveloped countries is due to the low levels of agricultural technology, and the low productivity per labor force is due to underutilization of the labor force. However, it may be that the underlying factors of the low productivities, underutilization of land and labor force, and the low levels of agricultural technology, must be found in the social and institutional structure of the underdeveloped countries.

Man's relationship to the land, the patterns of land-holding and land use, are shaped by the interaction of a complex of forces -- climatic, economic, cultural, and other social. Thus, the patterns of land control and land use in the temperate areas are different from those in the tropical and arid areas. Similarly, laws and customs governing inheritance have an effect on the distribution of land.

The established pattern of land ownership is basic to both the social organization and to the institutional structure of rural areas. The status hierarchy in most agrarian societies reflects the kind of access that different groups have to land, while individual status within these groups is dependent upon the amount and quality of land commanded. The institutional structure, which formalizes and legitimizes the various means of control (and the relationship between categories of land users),
also determines the accessibility of external institutions and services to various groups.

According to the World Bank's study of land reform (1974), the systems of land ownership and tenure were classified into six major types though in many countries examples can be found of more than one type. Three of the six types are found in a traditional context: (1) the feudalistic Asian type of landlord and tenant system, (2) the feudal Latin American system of large farms, and (3) the communal land ownership pattern of many tribal groups (especially in Africa). The other three major types have a modern context: (4) the private ownership of land common in market economies, (5) the state or collective ownership of socialist countries, and (6) the plantation or ranch-type.

Although few data are available, the distribution of land ownership is known to be skewed, with the degree of concentration varying with the tenure situation types. The Asian, Latin American feudal, and the plantation-ranch types generally have high degrees of property concentration, while the socialist and traditional communal types have low concentrations. The market economy type is somewhere in between.

The distribution of holdings by size is frequently used as a first approximation in estimating the distribution of wealth and income in the agricultural sector. The skewedness of the distribution of holdings, though, does not reflect, precisely, the patterns of the distribution of wealth or income. First, all land is not homogeneous in value and quality. Second, the distribution of holdings by size is not the same as the distribution of ownership of land; in general there is a greater
concentration of land ownership than of holdings. In some parts of Asia, the distribution of income of rural people may depend largely on the contractual arrangements between owners and tenants, or sharecroppers. But, in most cases, the distribution of income will be more skewed than the pattern of holdings. Frequently the income of sharecroppers and renters differ very little from that of the landless laborers.

Conditions governing agriculture vary from country to country. One characteristic, common to all, however, is a rapid growth in the rural population. Thus, while pressure on the land is increasing, the average man/land ratio is worsening. At the same time, nonagricultural employment opportunities are not expanding rapidly enough to provide adequate incomes for all entrants to the labor market. In many countries, as a consequence, massive rural underemployment is accompanied by high rates of open unemployment in the cities and growing inequalities in the overall distribution of income.

The consequential extreme poverty of the many who live on the land, and the chronic underemployment and underutilization of labor under the increasing population pressure require some viable policy measures to raise productivity and income in agriculture and, at the same time, to absorb more people into employment in the sector. Some countries have prospects for expanding the frontier of cultivation to absorb more labor. In other countries, since the conditions that govern access to land are questions of major importance, a policy of land reform through the redistribution of land is required and has been adopted to provide more
equitable employment opportunities and to raise productivity per acre and per laborer.

Land reform, by its nature, is interconnected with political, economic, and social aspects of development. In general, land reform is concerned with changing the institutional structure governing man's relationship with the land. Thus, land reform involves intervention in the prevailing patterns of land ownership, and usage, in order to change the structure of holdings, improve land productivity, and broaden the distribution of benefits. In practice, however, land reform is pursued in response to political pressures for socioeconomic change arising from factors such as increased population, pressure on a limited land base, and/or rising egalitarianism.

Land reform necessarily implies many different kinds of adjustments in an array of situations and with great variations in distribution and agricultural productivity. In most instances, the considerations of social and economic equity are the main concerns. Thus, when there are exploitive landlord-tenant systems of the Asian or Latin American feudal type, land reform incorporates changes in the rights of tenants, redistribution of ownership to existing tenants, or the replacement of the landlord by community ownership.

A primary conclusion drawn from past experiences with land reform, concerns the overriding importance of political factors in securing meaningful change. The concentration of control over land provides a power base for many groups in the less developed countries. Land is a source of political power as well as economic security, especially where the
land owner controls the access of peasants to their only source of security -- the land. A meaningful land reform program will inevitably destroy or limit the power base of many persons. Thus, the resistance from the various vested interests in land ownership is mainly responsible for the failure of agrarian reform in many countries. On the other hand, the masses of poorer strata in the villages are powerless in the existing social situation, remaining inarticulate and too unorganized to defend their interests in the movement of land reform. As a result, many countries have legislated land reform but only a few can be said to have achieved real land reform. These reforms, furthermore, were only implemented when there was a new revolutionary government or a change in government that favored drastic change (such as was the case in Mexico, Japan, and Taiwan).

In terms of land reform policy, one is confronted with a range of cultural and political situations -- based on different patterns of social organization and customs -- associated with different levels of development. As cited, the differences among these six types of land tenure systems point to the varying reforms necessary to achieve more equitable land access and improved productivity in country specific situations. Accordingly, while it is possible to identify the need for land reform, it is difficult to make general prescriptions with regard to the form of land holding reorganization or patterns of land distribution necessary to achieve the multipurpose objectives of development. Nonetheless, one thing is certain, land must be redistributed to the tillers, from the standpoint of both egalitarian ideals and a developmental perspective;
especially in the context of the exploitive traditional sharecropping system and the skewed patterns of current ownership.

In the main, land reform is seen as a means of bringing about structural change in the agricultural sector, thereby altering the distribution of holdings or the distribution of income. It is also viewed as a goal in itself in terms of social equality, but in a development context, is usually seen as a concomitant of agrarian reform or rural development programs. From the experiences of land reform in much of Asia and Latin America, some form of rural organization may be a critical condition for successful land redistribution, but mere redistribution of land may not suffice to raise agricultural output substantially without accompanying other complementary institutional reforms and new services.

D. Conclusion

In this chapter, the internal conditions and related problems of underdevelopment in the Third World have been discussed with reference to the two factors of the formulated model -- demographic and social conditions. The analysis of current demographic conditions indicates the problem which most of the Third World countries face with rapid population increase. The population explosion produces acute adverse effects on economic development of those countries. These adverse effects are: (1) to retard directly the increase in per capita national gross production and to reduce social overhead for general population, (2) to necessitate spending additional national income to feed the additional mouths (thereby reducing the rate of capital formation), (3) to increase the ratio of child-dependency resulting in heavier burdens for the labor force, and
(4) to increase underemployment or unemployment without substantially expansion of labor markets. Thus, effective population control becomes a precondition for a viable economic development.

The rapid growth of urban population, due to recent urban migration (as well as natural increase in original urban population), also produces serious social problems such as increases in unemployment, crime and delinquency, deterioration of urban environment with insufficient public sanitation, shortages of housing, water supply, educational facilities, and other social services. In this regard, a comprehensive program of population redistribution is necessary, not only through urban renewal, but also through coordinated regional development programs.

In the second section, the qualitative aspects of population were discussed in the areas of nutrition, health, and education. Many people in most parts of the Third World are undernourished or of malnutritional status, and they are also in poor health. Food-shortage, mainly due to the current rapid increase in population, in addition to low agricultural productivity, is the main cause of the undernourishment problem. The causes of poor health are: inadequate public health sanitation, inadequate medical personnel and facilities, and the concentration of medical delivery systems usually in urban centers.

In the third section, the problems of political corruption, inequality, and the traditional land tenure systems were discussed. Political corruption is prevalent in most countries of the Third World, and its impacts are profound in terms of the effectiveness of governments, in political leadership, in the maintenance of the national solidarity of
the populations, and in social mobilization for national development planning. Thus, the general climate in the circle of power elites and in the administrative machinery should be cleared.

Social stratification in the parts of the Third World are generally more rigid and the inequalities more acute than in the developed countries. These inequalities are not only inappropriate with regard to the concepts of social equity and social justice, but are also unfavorable to economic development. Finally, the land tenure system is one of the sources of social and economic inequalities in agrarian societies; these traditional land tenure systems being mainly based on rigidly unequal social stratification. Further, it is generally inefficient for the increase in agricultural productivity and rural development. Thus, an appropriate land reform need to be effectively implemented in such areas.
VI. DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
AND A GENERAL STRATEGY

This chapter will deal with the nature of development planning and presents a general strategy for comprehensive development planning. The first section of this chapter will present a discussion of the major characteristics of converging processes of modernization as manifested in the First World (developed capitalist) countries and the Second World (socialist) countries. It also contrasts the development strategies and development goals of the capitalist and the socialist lines of development.

The second and third sections will deal with the general characteristics of development planning and the possible utility of "social indicators" for a comprehensive development plan, respectively. The fourth section will propose a general strategy for comprehensive development planning derived from the analytical model formulated and its subsequent analysis of the conditions and related problems of underdevelopment of the Third World.

A. Modernization and Development

Almost all the development plans of developing countries may be said to have been directed toward ultimately modernizing their societies. In a sense, modernization is viewed as a specific form of development exemplified as in the industrialized capitalist countries and the now developed socialist societies. In the Third World countries, a variety of development efforts are being made to bridge the gap between the levels
of modernity in their societies and the levels achieved in developed societies.

Modernization may be regarded as both a process and product. The rubric of modernization essentially envelops all the basic aspects of social life, because change in one part of a system brings about change in other sectors of the system. Modernization theorists are diverse in their perspectives concerning the basic processes of modernization. First, modernization in the intellectual sphere is thought to exhibit itself in the advancement of science and its application in technology. Since increasing knowledge and advancing science play a vital role in the process of change in modern times, the development of rational attitudes is regarded as the core process of modernization (Black, 1966).

Secondly, modernization, as a complex process of "system transformation", manifests itself both in "sociodemographic aspects" and in the structural aspects of social organization. The "sociodemographic aspect of modernization", as referred to by Eisenstadt (1966), is termed "social mobilization" by Deutsch (1961). "Social mobilization refers to the process in which people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior" (Deutsch, 1961:494-495). Modernization in social structural aspect is characterized by "high differentiation and specialization with respect to individual activities and institutional structure; recruitment for these (roles) is not determined by ascription but by achievement" (Eisenstadt, 1966:2-3).

Thirdly, political changes in modernization often referred to are: (1) the legitimacy of the sovereign authority of the state is derived from
the people not from supernatural sanctions; (2) the growing mass participation by means of universal adult suffrage; and (3) the growing extension of the territorial scope and intensification of power of the central, legal, administrative, and political agencies of the society (Eisenstadt, 1966).

Fourthly, modernization in economic aspect is characterized by industrialization (increasing substitution of inanimate power for human and animal power as the means of production). It is also indicated by the replacement of primitive tools by machines and technology. In such a way, mass production has been possible and economic growth has been accelerated. In terms of consumption, general levels of living standard have been substantially raised among the mass of the people. Fifthly, in the ecological aspect, modernization is characterized by ever-increasing urbanization, and the environmental pollution resulting from industrialization and mass consumption. Finally, modernization manifests itself in the cultural sphere by the spread of literacy and secular education provided by the formal educational institutions; by the emergence of a new personality orientation to the broadening societal horizons, and by the growing faith in science and technology (Eisenstadt, 1966).

These processes of modernization range from changes in individual personality and attitudes to the structural transformation of the social and economic infrastructures by means of application of technology to social and political institutions. The point to be made is that the complexity and extensiveness of modernization made it hard to distinguish
between causal factors and concomitants of the modernization process. This means that the development of theories will be difficult.

According to Horowitz (1966), one should distinguish between the First World, developed capitalist societies, and the Second World, socialist societies. Both similarities and differences result when one compares these two kinds of societies. Although they have taken different paths of development, and different agencies of development, both have certain processes in common and converge into certain observable characteristics. Both are attempting to transform the social structure from one based on ascriptive to achieving roles; and both are evolving structural differentiation on a principle based on role specialization. Both are attempting to harness inanimate power as a base of mass production; and both are establishing programs of industrialization as the central sector of the economy. Both have been urbanized, and both are also elaborating large-scale bureaucratic organizations, which provide a framework for industrialization, urbanization, and mobilization of the population in social and political activities. Recognizing the role of knowledge and of science, both emphasize the significance of formal education and mass media communication in development efforts.

Despite these similarities in the process and convergences characterized in some outcomes of modernization, the two kinds of societies fundamentally differ in their development, goals, and in the strategies employed in the development efforts. Development along capitalist lines takes place on the axis of private property as the means of production, and the properties class and entrepreneurs are the main driving force of
development. On the other hand, development on the socialist lines occurs on the axis of public ownership as the chief means of production. A large number of nonpropertiees, laboring workers are the driving force of development. These two approaches to development are qualitatively different in terms of their principles of social organization. The socialist lines assume the meeting of the assessed needs of society as the central objective of production, while the capitalists assume that profits are the central motivation to produce and pursue their programs accordingly.

In the capitalist theories of modernization, private ownership (of the means of production) works as a key factor in the system of social stratification (shaping the distributions of income and wealth, living standard, consumption patterns, and life style, etc.). On the other hand, the socialist theories elaborate a new principle of stratification by eliminating the properties class possessing the means of production and transforming social groups into categories of people in terms of skills acquired for production. On the capitalist lines, the fundamental strategy for sustained economic growth relies on providing primary incentives to the property owners and entrepreneurs, while the Marxist lines rely on mobilization of landless peasants and propertyless workers. In the capitalist system, the private ownership of the property is a major institutional means for keeping social order. In contrast, in the non-capitalist societies, the political authority of the state become legitimate apparatus for keeping social order by eliminating the properties class, thereby becoming the major agent for development.
The greatest portion of Third World countries have been shaping their social and economic structures on the basis of "market economies", but many of them are now undertaking the principle methods of so-called "mixed economic system" in order to reconstruct their national autonomy and to overcome poverty. Thus, these countries have undertaken some form of national economic development planning. As already noted in the introduction, these countries in general have failed to achieve their development goals, and some are unable to improve general human conditions, leaving many people in extreme poverty and undernourished. Nonetheless, not only has the idea of national development planning been widely accepted among the scholars and policy-makers of these countries, but state planning is vigorously practiced to accelerate sustained economic growth and to improve individual well-being. In the next section, the general characteristics of the development planning will be presented.

B. Development Planning Process

One of the novel features in our time is the prevalence of national development planning among the Third World countries. The major objectives of development planning are to accelerate sustained economic growth and to improve the levels of living standard. Because of excessive emphasis on economic growth, national development has often been "confused with economic development and economic development with economic growth" (Seers, 1969:2).

According to Ponsioen (1969), individual countries have different development orientation such as:
Some have their main emphasis on political development — nation-building, others put their emphasis on social development, and again some others on economic development, making the other values subservient to the preferred one. (Ponsioen, 1969:148-149)

These three factors (political, economic, and social) are, in effect, closely interrelated in the process of development, and they are, ultimately, the essential aspects of national development.

Development, whether economic, political, or social development planning is involved, refers to a rational, deliberate attempt to transform the society in the desired directions under the direction of governmental agencies. Planning incorporates a range of political decisions, but the essential attribute of planning is that it involves rationally calculated and anticipated action (or decision-making). Planning is

The provisional set of policy decisions fixing the lines along with which the development administration have to make their day-to-day decisions in the face of restricted possibilities as well as in face of the interdependent opportunities for development. (Ponsioen, 1969:164)

Development planning is a process of policy determination for orderly development to achieve given objectives. As a series of generalized guides to future decisions and actions, the implementation of planning process calls for steps such as:

(1) to clarify goals, priorities, interests
(2) to ascertain the facts, the social realities, the trends
(3) to inventory the knowledge, skills, and resources available or obtainable
(4) to analyze the alternatives and the predictable outcomes of choices among them
(5) to formalize the expressions of preference and the process of choice
(6) to translate policies into implications program on different levels
(7) to measure the outcome of the programs (Kahn, 1969:16).
In effect, in focusing on the nature of the planning process per se, the planning endeavor itself is "a developmental process in which the several levels of intellectual undertaking are in constant interaction" (Kahn, 1969:60). Though somewhat arbitrary, Chart D depicts, on a reasonable ground, a sequence of specified formal steps in planning endeavor. First, the planning process begins with major social problems. These social problems are often selected from social concern areas which are particularly tied to the general national objectives. As already indicated in the discussion of the social valuations underlying national objectives, development planning in general has been motivated by various factors, such as: (1) the idea of self-determination in nation-building and to overcome economic backwardness; (2) the so-called "revolution of rising expectations" in the postwar period; (3) the impatience with the present situations of underdevelopment; (4) the existence of possibilities of development as seen in the successful economic development of Russia; and (5) the "widening gap" between the levels of living in developed and in less developed countries. In the real world, however, development planning tends to begin with the substantive issues in the political process.

Second, once the problems are either politically assigned or identified, the planners try to build planning models or to formulate the planning task through a constant playback between an assessment of the relevant aspects of social reality and the social valuations of the target population. At this stage of the planning process, major effort is given to social inquiry (including fact-finding, projection, and inventory taking)
Planning Instigators:
Problems (or Needs, Concern) Ideals

Assessment of Factual Situations
and
Analysis of Value Preferences

Formulation of Planning Model
and
Definition of the Planning Tasks

Policy Formulation:
Legitimation of the
Levels of Interventions
(Development Strategies)

Programming:
Time-Phased
Budgeting and
Administrative
Structuring

Reporting, Evaluation and Follow-up

Chart D. A general process of planning (modification based on Kahn, 1969:62).
into social conditions, manpower, and resources. Because planning is a normative activity, relevant social values need to be analyzed; sometimes through political mechanisms. At the third stage of the planning process, specific planning tasks may be formulated on the basis of an assessment of the factual situations in terms of both resource availability and the existence of obstacles; as well as the analysis of value preferences. The conceptual framework of planning at this stage formulates a systematized development model specifying a planning target, its alternatives, anticipated impacts and possible side-effects. The model-building of development planning is generally based upon some form of development theory as generated from a particular perspective, as was discussed in chapter two. On the other hand, the development planning model develops out of an assessment of the relevant components of social reality, such as the operative values and preferences. Planning without an adequate investigation of relevant realities (the actual social facts) is utopian thinking. At the same time, planning that assembles volumes of data without conceptual clarity, or priorities in their appraisal, is useless ritual.

Through both conceptual formulation and empirical analysis, planning model (1) defines the problems in detail; (2) diagnoses the causes of the problems, the obstacles to development, and the interrelationships of the component parts; (3) inventories resources, skills, and manpower available or obtainable; (4) estimates the scope and substance of relevant variables; (5) projects these variables into the future; (6) locates just where the needs are concentrated; and (7) allocates all this as is appropriate into
geographical units, or subdivides it by other critical variables. All the listed functions and activities are not a definitive procedure, rather they may be regarded as relevant subject matter headings. In sum, not only can the planning model be used to define the problem areas and set the planning goals, but it can also be used to suggest relevant development strategies which are essential to achieve the development goals.

The term "development strategies" is here used to refer to the general methods and tactics of state-intervention. These development strategies must be (1) relevant to the problems, (2) appropriate in terms of normative sense, (3) feasible in terms of natural and human resources, skills, and technologies available, and most of all, (4) effective to achieve the development goals.

However, a planning process does not always lead to a program. The outcome of the process may also be a policy calling only for laws embodying new provisions or regulations. Thus, at the fourth step of the planning process, policies should be formulated which are relevant to programming specifics (and planning activities are thereby legitimated), concerning the levels of the proposed intervention, i.e., development strategies.

At the fifth step, the development policies need to be translated from the general planning model into specific programs and practices. Programming refers to the process of the particular organizational, financial, and other procedural means required. "Programs are time-phased plans for allocating resources and for specifying the successive steps required to achieve stated objectives", and "they are means to clearly

The emphasis here is on the development of means to translate the general principles of the planning model into specific operations.

Finally, planning activities may include reporting and evaluation of the time-phased processes through feedback processes and follow-up research. Though planning is a rational activity derived from calculation of empirical data, and guided by a conceptual model, neither a conceptual model nor collection of empirical data can be perfect at the initial stage. Planning enterprise is a developmental and continuous flow of activities, and thus, should be flexible enough to pose options and to permit alterations to meet unforeseen contingencies. The basic planning processes of both fact-finding and evaluation must recur throughout the programming phases and operational phases. The whole point of reporting, evaluation, monitoring, and feedback is the self-correcting aspect of planning activities. In this regard, development of a comprehensive reporting system of time-series social statistics is required to make a development plan effective and efficient. The next section will discuss the utility of comprehensive "social indicators" with respect to the reporting system for the purposes of evaluation as well as fact-finding.

C. Social Indicators and Planning

The development of a so-called "social indicators system" may serve to meet the requirements of formulating a substantive development planning model. In recent years, in relation to the idea of national development planning, the social indicator movement has been very active in policy-making agencies, international assistance agencies, and even within academia.
Although there is little agreement on the definition of "social indicators" among agencies and scholars, perhaps the most publicized definition was given in "Toward a Social Report": "A social indicator, as the term is used here, may be defined to be a statistic of direct normative interest which facilitates concise, comprehensive and balanced judgments about the condition of major aspects of a society" (United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1969:97).

Criticizing this definition as being too restrictive in terms of the specification of "normative interest" and of the confining notion of "measures of welfare", Sheldon and Freeman (1970:97) pointed out the attributes of social indicators shared among other scholars: (1) social indicators are a time series that allow comparison over an extended period and (2) social indicators are statistics that can be disaggregated by other relevant characteristics. Later reviewing the previous definitions of social indicators, Land proposed that

The term social indicators refer to social statistics that (1) are components in a social system model (including socio-psychological, economic, demographic, and ecological) or of some particular segment or process thereof, (2) can be collected and analyzed at various times and accumulated into a time series, and (3) can be aggregated or disaggregated to levels appropriate to the specifications of the model. Social system model means conceptions of social processes.

(Land, 1971:323)

What Land meant by social statistic as a social indicator is "its informative value which derives from its empirically verified nexus in a conceptualization of a social process" rather than "social statistics" that are collected for administrative purposes (Land, 1971:323).
From the current trend of the social indicator movement it seems clear, out of the controversy on the definition of social indicators, that there is a common effort to develop social indicators in the form of quantified statistics and for such statistics to be derived from the social system model (nor necessarily a Parsonian social system). In this regard, social indicators at this initial stage have some problems in terms of both theoretical paucity and difficulty of measurement. In the social development field most main goals and other social policy objects are not directly measurable in their totalities, and indicators commonly serve as a proxy or partial measure of these entities.

In terms of "development indicators", McGranahan suggests two kinds. The first type is a direct and full measure of a particular factor or aspect of development, which is a recognized goal of development. Certain development goals like the reduction of unemployment, an increase of per capita income, or a reduction in infant mortality, can be stated quite adequately in specific quantitative terms. Another type of indicator is the indication of a "true goal" or some element of development which may not itself be directly and fully measurable. For instance, "the true goal is not reduction of infant mortality but better health" (McGranahan, 1972: 92). In this case, the infant mortality index is a substitute or proxy indicator for health, which may be used as an item for diagnosis and evaluation; among other items.

What McGranahan emphasized above is mainly concerned with the statistical measures of what Land called "output indicators" or goal indicators. Since development implies an interdependent process, social indicators of
development have to be identified as indicators of goals — intended consequences — and of concomitants and its implications, but also indicators of input factors and conditions. To the extent that a social indicator system is stated in mathematical form, they may be identified in three groups: (1) parameters or "sociological constants" governing the development of the process, (2) input indicators, and (3) output indicators.

In the same manner, Land suggested:

Given models of specific social institutions of processes, we need an analysis of how sensitive the output variables are to variations in the input variables and the parameters of the system. This knowledge may facilitate decisions as to which variables or components of the structure of the institution a particular government agency can or should manipulate. That is, we need to know which input variables and structural parameters government agencies can manipulate, how difficult (costly) such manipulations are, and how such manipulations will be transformed into variables in the output variable. (Land, 1971:324-325)

Indicators, however, will neither replace the policy-maker's decisions or priorities nor become development planning itself. Their function is to make decisions more efficient by providing a more comprehensive description of society, its changes and problems, constraints, and needs, in a more systematic way. Although there are controversies on the promise and potential of the social indicators, Carlisle (1972:26-32) has described them according to their use as follows: First, "informative indicators", referring to operationalized system components and system goals which roughly correspond to Land's "input" and "output" indicators. They are intended primarily to describe the social system and changes within it. To be categorized as informative indicators, social statistics must be
subject to regular collection as a time-series (in the form of levels and rates) and the possibility of disaggregation.

Secondly, "predictive indicators" which refer to these operationalized system components and goals that fit into the theoretical models by identifying causal relationships among the system components and between input variables and output variables. Thirdly, "problem-oriented indicators" which indicate operationalized social problem areas which provide the basis for policy solutions and suggest social needs; and, fourthly, "program evaluation indicators" which represent operationalized policy goals, which are used in the evaluation of the effectiveness of the development program.

As Carlisle pointed out, the above categorization is purposive and any statistics in each category are not mutually exclusive. Considered from a social indicator perspective, it seems highly advisable that actual development planning should incorporate the "predictive indicators system" and substantiate the planning model with "information indicators". However, it must also be noted that the present state of the art for developing a comprehensive system of social indicators is still at its initial stage, and it will be sometime before it will be able to meet the requirements for comprehensive development planning. In relation to the comprehensiveness, we now turn to a general strategy for the formulation of a development plan.
D. The Strategy Proposed with Reference to the Framework of Planning Models

A general framework of planning model has been presented in the second section of this chapter, and the final section will be devoted to proposing a general strategy in formulating development planning models with regard to the identification of social problems and development tasks. In this section, the importance of the proposed strategy will be discussed with reference to the framework of planning models.

In the real world, planning is not always appropriate in such cases as: persisting tradition or preference, crisis, lack of capability, and the like. Nor is planning always possible even when it is appropriate: the lack of power to implement, the absence of sufficient consensus, etc., may inhibit the enactment. Feasibility is also limited at times by the realities of resources, technique, and ability to project. Yet increased planning remains desirable and inevitable, especially in the underdeveloped countries.

Though the steps or stages of planning should not be conceived of as a linear or deductive process, some aspects of a planning framework in action can be outlined (as shown in Chart D): (1) preliminary explorations, including efforts to identify problems, goals, and to define priorities; (2) the formulation of planning tasks and models, both following upon and leading to reality assessments and inventories, value analysis, and choosing; (3) policy formulations on the basis of empirical exploration, as generalized guide to action in the areas of decisions about the levels of intervention to be proposed, and about the fiscal and "social price"; (4) programming, including a wide range of activities from
administrative structuring and manpower assignment to budgeting and time-phasing, i.e., everything that is relevant to administration; and (5) a system of reporting and evaluation of the output and effects of the planning implementation. In short, rational planning is concerned with an efficient relation of means to ends, as identified. In effect, the entire framework of planning is based on a constant feedback process.

With respect to the above "context of planning" framework, the strategy to be proposed in the following section will be particularly concerned about the first step of preliminary exploration, and the second step of the formulation of planning task. These two steps are considered to be an intellectual undertaking in the activities of planning process. From a theorist's point of view, these first two steps are most critical in formulating development plans because through them the direction of development, the goals of development, and the basic means to the goals are determined. Thus, these two steps in formulating planning are thought to require a valid understanding of the dynamics of development process.

Development, as pointed out earlier, has been often confused with economic growth, but development must be viewed in a much broader perspective, i.e., (development = economic growth + social change, as defined by Committee for Economic Development, 1966). In other words, development must be understood in terms of both quantitative factors and qualitative factors. For development, quantities are in incremental growth but the qualities must be structurally changed. These quantities and qualities are not isolated but closely interrelated in development process. In effect, qualitative factors represent noneconomic factors, i.e., social,
political, cultural, and psychological. For this reason, development planning should be comprehensive, taking into account all the variables of both the economic and noneconomic factors relevant to the problems and goals of development. In this regard, the necessity of a comprehensive social information system was proposed as one component of strategy in formulating development plans.

Unlike the undeveloped original conditions of traditional societies, present underdevelopment is the product of the historical process of colonialism, and it is maintained or intensified by the market forces in the global capitalist system. Thus, both historical origins and the international context must be taken into account, especially in underdeveloped countries. At the same time, the goals and directions of development must be decided by the specific social valuations of the people, rather than by those of others.

E. General Strategy in Formulating Development Planning Model

In the introduction of this study, it was noted that national development planning was prevalent among the Third World countries. In chapter two, the model formulated treated national development planning as a major internal dynamic having direct consequences for current changes taking place in the Third World countries. The general characteristics of development planning have been presented in the second section of this chapter. This section will illustrate how the model formulated relates to and can be used in the formulation of a development plan.
The strategy proposed here is neither definitive nor specific to the development planning of any country. Rather, it is meant to be suggestive of the type analysis that any country may profitably undertake in the formulation of comprehensive development plans.

As indicated in the statement of problem, this study was concerned with identifying some of the causes of the failures (or ineffectiveness) prevalent in the implementation of national development plans of the Third World countries. Broadly speaking, the factors affecting the failures of development plans were identified as: (1) the unfavorable conditions of the new states, and (2) the theoretical deficiencies of the models used for such development planning.

This study proceeded with the formulation of an analytical model, that was used to discuss these two factors in relation to the unique current changes occurring in the Third World. The model formulated is characterized as "analytical" because it seeks to offer a framework for a valid analysis of both the major causes of underdevelopment and the problems inhibiting development. The major analytical components of the model include: (1) factors concerning historical consequences; (2) the factors of externalities in the international context; (3) the internal dynamics of current change, i.e., national development planning; and (4) the social and demographic conditions of underdevelopment. This model was utilized as a heuristic device for the analysis of general conditions of underdevelopment of the Third World.

From the analysis of the general conditions of underdevelopment with respect to each of the four components of the model, it was noted that
many of the Third World countries are having generally similar experiences (though the national specifics of individual countries may differ greatly). In suggesting a set of general strategies in formulating development plans for a specific individual country, brief consideration of the generalities, which many of the Third World countries are facing, may sensitize both policy-makers and social planners to the uniquenesses of a specific individual country, and assist them to take into account such uniquenesses in formulating development plans. The consideration of the similarities of underdevelopment may further serve to broaden our perspective on defining the objectives and tasks of comprehensive development planning for a specific individual country.

In the first place, most of the Third World countries are newly independent countries, with the exception of those of Latin America. These new states are, in fact, however, the products of the historical process of colonialism. With traditional social structures and indigenous cultural backgrounds, these historical consequences of colonialism serve as initial conditions, as antecedent factors, that affect profoundly the patterns, processes, and outcomes of current changes occurring in the new states. These initial conditions, in most cases, are unfavorable for development change, i.e., for the implementation of national development plans in the new states.

The nation-building efforts of these new states are generally embedded in deficient incipient conditions: (1) many new states were established largely on the arbitrary territorial boundaries without regard to such criteria as ethnicity, language, cultural heritage, and economic function
of the territory. As a result, the various subpopulations have been poorly integrated among these nations and divisive forces are working against national unity. (2) Many of these new states are politically deficient in terms of the national consolidation necessary to pursue national policies effectively, partly because the colonial administrations neglected the higher education of the indigenous people and, at the same time, the colonial rulers restricted the opportunities for self-governing by the colonial peoples. (3) Under the colonial economic policies, the economies of these new states (which had been generally self-sufficient in pre-colonial period) were transformed into economic dependence upon the developed industrial countries. For effective development planning, it is recommended that planners and decision-makers take into account these historically derived deficiencies and social barriers to development that act as constraints.

Secondly, in relation to the dependent relations of the new states with regard to the developed industrial countries, external factors operating in the realm of international relations influence profoundly the current efforts to bring about instigated social change in these countries. It is widely recognized that there has been a growing interdependence between nations. In terms of technological aspects, less developed countries are in the position to benefit from the technological advancement made by the more advanced countries. However, this is not true of political and economic relations. The nature of political and economic relations with developed countries is considered to be most critical to the national autonomy of the less developed countries. In the real world, the present
political and economic relations may act as major external constraints to national development.

More specifically, the relative trading position of the less developed countries has deteriorated because of such factors as shrinking exports of primary products (due to gradual substitution for industrial raw materials in the industrial countries), subsequent unfavorable trade terms, and discretionary tariffs in the raw material importing countries, and the like. With the exception of a limited number of oil-producing countries, it has been observed by contemporary analysts that the poor countries in the Third World have sometimes been deprived because the international market mechanism in general works in favor of the rich industrial countries.

After the second World War, considerable amounts of foreign aid were given to the poor countries in the form of "economic assistance", "peace for food" (primarily for relief purpose in food-shortages), and "military aid". This was understood to be international cooperation for the purpose of developing underdeveloped countries. But the practices such as "tying aid" and increasing the amount of private foreign investment (as many critics of present foreign-aid programs point out), to the extent these practices exist, help the developed donor-countries more than the recipient countries. In effect, some foreign aid has been detrimental to the national development of the recipient countries. These inappropriate foreign aid programs, especially bilateral aid in the form of "tying aid" and private foreign investments with high interest rates, function to cause the failure of economic development efforts in the recipient
countries. Thus, the valid assessment of the nature of existing political and economic relations in specific individual countries needs to be taken into account in formulating national development plans.

Thirdly, development planning itself is regarded as a new dynamic of purposive change in the Third World. Development planning is deliberate, conscious attempt to change society in desired directions. Thus, development planning is a normative activity intended to achieve specific development objectives that are embodied in the social valuations of the people and the ideals of "modernizing elites". Based upon the perceived common characteristics of the ideologies of nationalism among the new states, the two broad areas of "national autonomy" and "individual well-being" are believed to be important development objectives. In effect, the national objectives of individual countries differ and have to be articulated in terms of the unique situations of each country and specific valuations of the people.

National development planning is instigated change guided by the agents of change. Thus, the role of the change agent is important in the implementation of national development planning. The success or failure of the national development planning is, in large degree, dependent upon the change agent's performance. In this study, the change agents refer to intellectual elites and public administrators. In reality, some ruling elites may inhibit development rather than promote it. In some countries, public administration is also characterized by lack of sufficiently trained personnel, inefficient administrative procedures, and rigid organizational hierarchy, and with a lack of internal coordination and cooperation between
the personnel and the mass of people. Thus, it is imperative for effective implementation of planning that traditional or overly bureaucratic and/or ineffective administrations be reformed in order to perform the new functions and tasks of development.

Finally, many less developed countries appear to share common problems in political, economic, social, and demographic aspects. Politically, it has been stated that some of these countries are characterized by political corruption, political instabilities, and ineffective administration. Economically, they are low income, agrarian countries, with low productivity, with high rates of unemployment or underemployment, with internal income inequalities, and even food-shortages. Socially, a rigid social stratification system and growing social inequalities are seen as common social problems in the less developed countries. Traditional social institutions and the conservative attitudes of the masses of people are seen by some as social obstacles to development efforts. Demographically, most of these countries are experiencing rapid population growth, which operates to wipe out national economic growth and becomes one of the most important social problems, especially in the densely populated, less developed countries. All these problems are, in effect, interrelated, which means that circularity exists between causes and effects. For these reasons, development planning needs to be comprehensive and based upon a broad perspective.

In the real world, as a major point of departure, most development planning starts with some selective social problems relevant to the unique realities of a specific individual country. However, these social
problems may be tied to political issues. For valid development, the social needs and social problems need to be analyzed with concrete and objective empirical facts, transcending politics. Because the essential attribute of planning involves rationally, calculated, and anticipated action (or decision-making), the reliability of information systems is critical for effective development planning.

With respect to the four components of the model formulated, hopefully, the above consideration of the common characteristics shared that exist among many of the less developed countries serves primarily to broaden the social planner's perspective on comprehensive development planning, at least partially sheds light on major causes of current underdevelopment and major constraints in development efforts in specific individual countries. In terms of a general process of development planning outlined in Chart D (on page 217), the analyses in this study are mainly concerned with defining development goals and formulating development tasks, rather than the actual programming of tasks to be carried out. Thus, the model formulated may further serve to provide the social planners with the analytical framework necessary to generate the kinds of information required to set the development goals realistic and to make the development planning effective.

For effective development planning for a specific individual country, first of all, the social planners need to clarify their development goals and priorities by considering the two kinds of information: (1) information about specific modernization ideals of the country which are embodied in the social valuations of the people, and (2) information of important
social problems and major social concerns in the country. In effect, development goals may be seen as desired long-run achievements, more than just the solution of immediate social problems. Thus, the objectives of the development planning need to be decided by a rational assessment of the ideals and the social problems or needs at hand. The same can be said for selecting the appropriate means to achieve the goals.

Secondly, for the formulation of comprehensive development planning in a specific individual country, the social planners also need to identify the major causes of underdevelopment, and the constraints on development efforts, by consideration of the four kinds of information that are suggested by the model: (1) information of the forces working in the international mechanism and of the nature of the country’s own international relationships; (2) information from the country’s own historical heritages and recent past experiences; (3) information about internal social obstacles and inhibiting factors; and (4) information about the characteristics of the change agents, i.e., the capabilities of existing public administration to implement the development planning. All these kinds of information are considered critical for identifying the major constraints for the development and implementation of development plans.

Information about international relations may be useful for defining external constraints which may be beyond the control of an individual, less developed country. Both information about historical heritages and information about existing social obstacles may be used to identify corrective measures necessary in order to make the development planning effective. Finally, information concerning the characteristics of the change agents
and their skills, level of training, and orientations may help to make planning and the implementation of plans efficient.

As was emphasized earlier, the entire framework of planning, including the defining of development goals and the formulation of development planning tasks, should be based upon a constant feedback process. Thus, development planning needs to be kept flexible, subject to reassessment, and subject to modification as the action is carried out.
VII. SUMMARY

The current societal changes which are now taking place in the Third World countries were the central concern of this study. The patterns and processes of the recent changes in those countries were perceived as unique and different from those in the Western experience. One of the distinct social phenomena occurring in those countries seems to be the collectively organized efforts at national development planning. The purpose of such national development planning is in general to accelerate growth of national economy and thereby to bring about induced social change in desired directions. However, many countries have, in fact, not been so successful in achieving their national objectives. Several reasons are apparent. One of the reasons for the failure was conceived to be either deficient or inadequate theories in the earlier stages of development planning.

Development may be viewed as a particular type of change — overall movement in a desired direction. There are several competing theoretical schools of thought concerning underdevelopment and societal development. Most long-term development planning, unlike annual fiscal planning, requires some theoretical presuppositions. Because of the uniqueness of the current changes in the Third World countries, however, the existing major theoretical approaches to modernization are believed, neither to correspond validly to the realities of the present underdevelopment, nor to explain adequately the uniqueness of the current changes which take place in the non-Western underdeveloped countries.
In this regard, the main objective of the study was to formulate a generalized, inclusive model which identifies the major causes and related problems of underdevelopment in order to explain adequately the causes and mechanism of the unique changes in the Third World countries. The model was utilized as valid analytical framework in the study of the conditions of underdevelopment; and of the problems of development. Though it is primarily a conceptual scheme, an attempt was made not to formulate the model on the basis of any a priori theory; rather it was based largely on the observation of the empirical phenomena common to the underdeveloped countries.

From the observation of the current changes in the Third World, emphasis has been put on (1) exogenous change — emphasizing the external factors affecting changes taking place in the Third World, (2) purposive change in the light of emphasis on the role of national development planning, and (3) differences in the initial conditions of the new states as compared with those of the industrial Western countries when they began to industrialize.

Based upon these viewpoints, an effort has been made to formulate an analytical model which is designed to identify major causes of underdevelopment and the dynamics of the current change taking place in the Third World countries. This model includes four analytical components: (1) factors of the historical process of colonialism, (2) factors of externalities, (3) the internal dynamics of current change in the Third World national development planning, and (4) the internal social and demographic
conditions. Then, the general characteristics of underdevelopment were discussed with respect to each of the four components of the model.

In chapter three, both the historical consequences of colonialism and the external constraints of the underdevelopment have been analyzed. In effect, most of the Third World countries are the products of the historical process of colonialism. These historical consequences became the initial conditions of national development planning for the new states. These initial conditions are considered to be unfavorable for national development. The external constraints were specifically selected in the areas of trade and foreign aid. Through the workings of the "free international market mechanism" in favor of developed industrial countries, the trading position of raw-material exporting countries has been increasingly deteriorated. In the case of foreign aid, public grants have been gradually replaced by private investment or commercial loan. The overseas private investments and commercial loans in bilateral aid have now become one of the major causes of the economic dependence of the recipient countries.

In chapter four, the internal dynamics of current change was discussed. The internal dynamics of change refers here to factors of nationalism and the agents of change. Nationalism in the new states is different from old nationalism. The new nationalism is the emotional reservoir for national development planning. The national objectives are thought to be embodied in the ideology of new nationalism. The role of the agent of change is critical in the implementation of national development planning. In this study, the agent of change refers to the
"modernizing elites" and the public administrations. The role of elites is to stimulate national development planning while the public administrations formulate development programs and execute them. Thus, these agents of change are chiefly responsible for the performance of national development planning efforts.

The internal conditions of underdevelopment has been analyzed in chapter five. The internal conditions are composed of: (1) demographic conditions, (2) quality of life, and (3) social conditions, including attitudes and institutions. Most of the underdeveloped countries are characterized by rapid population growth, which has become one of the most critical social problems in many countries. Due to rapid population growth and relative slow economic growth, poor health and low levels of education are common in many poor countries. Political corruption, social inequalities, and land tenure systems were also selected as important social conditions characteristic of underdevelopment. In fact, political corruption has been prevalent among many underdeveloped countries, contributing to government ineffectiveness and leading to social indiscipline and political instabilities. The exploitive land tenure system is another major source of social inequality in the underdeveloped countries. These social inequalities have become a major social problem in these countries. At the same time, all these social conditions are not only unfavorable but have also become major obstacles to development.

Chapter six dealt with the general characteristics of development, development planning, and offered a general strategy for formulating valid national development plans. The components of general strategy proposed
include: (1) an emphasis on the historical dimension, (2) on the international context, (3) on the normative aspect of development, and (4) on the development of a system of social information.

This study attempted to view underdevelopment from broad perspectives including the historical and international setting. Current underdevelopment is largely the product of a particular historical process, it is determined externally, and it is internally conditioned with various obstacles. Developing underdeveloped societies requires conscious and deliberate development planning. However, internal planning alone is not enough to develop a society under the circumstances of current international relationships. Valid international cooperation between the developed and the less developed is a precondition for successful development.

The major purpose of this study was to offer an analytical model as a means to developing a relevant, substantive, development approach to specific individual countries in which existing development approaches are not likely to work. Though the model was utilized to analyze general problems of underdevelopment in the Third World, the model must be sharpened more and be applied to specific individual countries for further verification.
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I thank Miss Mary Davis who typed this dissertation efficiently through hundreds of handwritten pages and several revisions.
This study is mainly a theoretical work rather than an empirical investigation which tests specific hypotheses of development studies through the use of statistical analysis. Recently, there have been quite a few quantitative analyses of cross-national comparative studies on the subject of development problems using statistics from secondary sources or from some primary observations (Russett, et al., 1963; Taylor, et al., 1972; Adelman and Morris, 1967; Harbison, et al., 1970).

However, these aggregate statistics at a national level are only recently available, especially in the underdeveloped low-income countries. Their reliability is highly doubtful, considering the present state of the art in data collection of the regions, even if data are available. For comparative studies, many of the desirable variables are nonexistent not only in a time series in one country, but also cross-nationally in the less developed countries.

The data, even when available, are aggregate statistics which are assembled from the secondary sources, such as the United Nations Statistical Yearbook, UNESCO Yearbook, USAID Fact Books, other encyclopedias, etc., published during 1970 and 1973. (See the sources in the following). These aggregate statistics are mostly by-products of administrative work or estimates other than enumerations of data. Thus, the reliability of the data as a whole is nothing more than rough guesses because of the estimates, the cases of under enumeration or over enumeration, differing years of availability in the tabulations, and differing criteria used in enumeration from country to country.
The time axis of the social economic variables compiled is centered around the years, 1970. The number of variables used are very few because they are used for the purpose of highlighting national disparities in the comparison of the current international situations (though the original number of variables in the data matrix exceeds 200 variables). The number of cases are 109 countries, including both developed and the Third World countries. The criteria for the selection of the statistical unit are: (1) availability and (2) politically independent sovereign nation-state, except Hong Kong in Asia and two extremely large countries of Soviet Russia and the United States (see the following list of countries). In addition to the limited use of the compiled data, some readily available statistics from various publications are to be used, with permission from the publishers, merely for an illustrative purpose, rather than for verification of personal contentions.
B. Country List

Black Africa (29)
Botswana
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Chad
Congo (Brazzaville)
Dahomey
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Ivory Coast
Kenya
Liberia
Malagasy Republic
Mali
Mauritania
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Upper Volta
Zaire
Zambia

Asia (17)
Afghanistan
Burma
China, Rep.
Cyprus
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Japan
Korea, Rep.
Malaysia
Pakistan
Philippines
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Turkey

North & Central America (22)
Argentina
Barbados
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama

(Continued on next page)
### North & Central America (Contd.)
- Paraguay
- Peru
- Uruguay
- Venezuela

### Europe & Oceania (28)
- Austria
- Belgium
- Bulgaria
- Canada
- Czechoslovakia
- Denmark
- Finland
- France
- Germany, Rep.
- Germany, Dem.
- Greece
- Hungary
- Iceland
- Ireland
- Italy
- Luxemburg
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Poland
- Portugal
- Romania
- Spain
- Sweden
- Switzerland
- United Kingdom
- Yugoslavia
- Australia
- New Zealand
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Food and Agriculture Organization

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

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United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America

United Nations Education, Science, and Cultural Organization
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