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Voluntary participation: implications for social change and conflict in a community decision organization

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Voluntary participation: Implications for social change and conflict in a community decision organization

by

Robert Doyle Bullard

A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of The Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

Sociologists and a host of other social scientists periodically rediscover poverty in the United States. Specifically, the nation in the early 1960's once again centered its attention on "poverty," the "poor," and the "disadvantaged." The existence of poverty was clearly demonstrated with substantial portions of the poor being aged, under-educated, and nonwhite (Harrington, 1963). Ameliorative actions through the "war on poverty" formed the major strategy of governmental intervention into poverty neighborhoods and communities (Miller, 1968). Governmental intervention into the area of poverty was translated into action systems by factoring major actions into operating activities. One of the efforts generated to combat poverty was the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act which created the Model Cities Program. The purpose of this program was set out in the CDA Letter Number 108 (1970):

The purpose of this title is to provide additional financial and technical assistance to enable cities of all sizes (with equal regard to the problems of small as well as large cities) to plan, develop, and carry out locally prepared and scheduled comprehensive city demonstration programs containing new and imaginative proposals to rebuild or revitalize large slum and blighted areas; to expand housing, job, and income opportunities; to reduce dependence on welfare payments; to improve educational facilities and programs; to combat disease and ill health; to reduce the incidence of crime and delinquency; to enhance recreational and cultural opportunities; to establish better access between home and jobs; and generally to improve living conditions for the people who live in such areas, and to accomplish these objectives through the most effective and
economical concentration and coordination of Federal, State and local public and private efforts to improve the quality of urban life.

Local city demonstration agencies were authorized to design service delivery systems for their respective communities. Cities that received model cities funding were allowed to develop tailor-made programs to meet their specific problem areas (i.e., housing, employment, social services, health care, etc.). Explicit stipulations in administrating the monies allocated through the model cities program required programs to be (1) coordinated, (2) comprehensive, (3) concentrated, and (4) offer citizen participation.

The administrative theory and policy in federal intervention strategies under model cities utilized a system approach. That is, the various agencies (i.e. public, private, voluntary, etc.) were linked in a systems relationship calculated to maximize the community resources toward a comprehensive attack upon poverty; agencies were linked by contract in the community action field, which, because of their special attributes, relied for coordination upon the network of contractual relationships, comprehensive information and public liaison systems, and a function of strategic control (Shipman, 1971). The framers of the poverty programs assumed that participation of the poor in the activities and programs affecting their lives would have instrumental and socio-psychological results over and above the benefits of an improved service delivery system (Zurcher, 1970a). Moynihan (1965) suggested that the impact of participation in poverty programs would be instrumental in the
sense that members of the poor united in social action would provide the political and strategic leverage necessary to open closed opportunity structures. However, the implications of coalition politics, interest group conflicts, and racial factionalism were not adequately resolved in the federal intervention approach to poverty (Peterson, 1970; Capps, 1970; Lowenstein, 1971).

Governmental intervention into poverty areas focused on the community, individual neighborhoods, and on the individual. The focus of analysis in community and other formal organizations may center on three distinct areas as outlined by Blau (1974:112-113):

The focus of analysis can be (1) the individual in his specific role as a member of the organization who occupies a certain position; (2) the structure of social relations among individuals in the various groups within the organization; or (3) the system of interrelated elements that characterizes the organization as a whole.

The focus of this dissertation is on the structure of social relations among individual citizen board representatives in a community development organization. Thus, the unit of analysis falls into the first and second categories that Blau (1974) delineates. By analyzing the social relations among individual citizen representatives of the local community development organization, we have attempted to explain and predict the domain upon which members disagree. Here, domain refers to the organizational field or area that citizen representatives stake out for themselves and constituents in terms of program resources and citizen participation. Arnstein (1969) noted that the question of citizen participation by the poor in poverty programs has been a major issue of political contention.
The domains in the community action and model cities agencies emerged out of tension and conflict in the mid-sixties. Individuals and groups through confrontation politics pressured their way into an already highly organized field. In many instances, the domain that one group of individuals had established for themselves conflicted and threatened the domain of a similar group of individuals (Warren, et al., 1974).

Modifications in the model cities program under Planned Variations Demonstration was a source of tensions and conflicts in a number of Planned Variation cities (Urban Management Consultants, 1972). The Planned Variations Demonstration was designed to "demonstrate -- the validity of the principles that when local governments are given the opportunity and resources, they can and will manage their affairs effectively and in a way that is responsive to all their citizens" (Urban Management Consultants, 1972).

The research study of Richards and Goudy (1971) focused on two segments of the Des Moines' Model Cities Program: citizen participation and interagency coordination. The goals of the research study were to "systematically analyze the interorganization relations established to bring about institutional change in the Model Cities Area" and to "provide systematic analysis of citizen participation in the Model Cities Program" (Richards and Goudy, 1971:2). The current research focuses on individual citizen representatives in the expanded Model Cities Program (Planned Variation's Community Development Program). Citizen representation on the poverty boards was expanded from 19 under Model Cities to over 120 members under the Community Development Program.
The bringing together of community representatives from diverse neighborhoods and socioeconomic backgrounds into a coalition form of participation presents an excellent opportunity to test city-wide, as opposed to neighborhood mechanism of involvement. As a result of the limited amount of federal funds allocated to each Planned Variations city, the functionally-oriented citizen advisory representatives sponsored by Model Cities and Planned Variations has become one major source of conflict (Urban Management Consultants, 1972). Specifically, conflicts were resultant of several interdependent factors: (1) the manner in which resources or funds were allocated across target areas, and (2) the perceived role of citizens in the planning and decision-making processes. The role of citizen participation was also found to be a key issue in community action, poverty boards, and model city agencies (Zurcher, 1970a; Van Til and Van Til, 1970; Capps, 1970; Richards and Goudy, 1971).

The different emphases placed upon the objectives of participation and resources allocation continue to be a source of friction and turmoil in community decision organizations (Warren, et al., 1974). The inclusion of diverse segments of the poor into a coalition with the non-poor presents a perplexing paradox: participation by low-income residents in federal poverty programs legitimates such programs while at the same time generates suspicions among residents of being "coopted" by the system. The dilemma was highlighted by a former chairman of the Central Advisory Board of the Des Moines' Community Development Program in an interview
conducted by Loretta Benz (1974). In his own words, the former citizen board chairman asserts:

The main problem with citizen participation comes when the power structure in the city isolates those who are viewed as "potential influentials" in the community, and manipulates them to think their way. . . . Citizen participation is a myth. It takes the people and make them part of the system. Black leadership in Des Moines is determined by the white power structure. Leadership should not be concentrated in any one person. It makes him too vulnerable to being absorbed by the System. . . . The last effective citizen participation was during the riots.

An evaluation of city-wide participation in Planned Variations revealed that citizen representatives protested proposed mergers of local citizen groups. Specifically, the Urban Management Consultants (1972:42) state:

The development of a city-wide citizen participation structure may subordinate and reduce the power of the existing structure in the original Model neighborhood. Fear of this development plus lack of input and participation in Planned Variations matters have caused protests by Model Neighborhood citizen groups in about 50 percent of the full variation cities.

The severity of the protests has varied with the circumstances. In a few cases, the original Model Neighborhood citizen groups were concerned with control over the distribution of jobs in their neighborhoods. In other cases, however, the original group was threatened by a proposal that it be merged into a city-wide group. Under these circumstances, the new city-wide group would exercise all the powers and functions of the existing group in the original Model Neighborhood as well as the other neighborhoods of the city.

Participants in community action programs bring to such programs the beliefs and values that have been inculcated in them through socialization and social interaction. The belief systems of individuals do not always coincide, and often run counter to one another. For instance,
social conflicts may arise when individual participants have different definitions as to the causes of poverty, its remediation, and strategy to be employed in combatting poverty (Banfield, 1968; Free and Cantril, 1967; Clark and Hopkins, 1969; Lowenstein, 1971; LeGates and Morgan, 1973). Silberman (1968:81) contends that organizations that have broadly based membership may find it difficult to arrive at a consensus on politically volatile issues. That is, racially and ethnically heterogeneous citizen boards or membership body may prevent innovation in that the maintenance of fragile coalitions consumes a considerable amount of the members energies. Peterson (1970) suggests that conflict is greatest in community organizations where racial factionalism is apparent and where black and white members oppose each other over the allocation of scarce resources.

As stated earlier, this dissertation focuses on the citizen representatives in a community development organization as the unit of analysis. In an earlier investigation of participation in the Des Moines' Model Cities Program of Richards and Goudy (1971), there appears to have been little interest in presenting the social conflicts among citizen board representatives from the Model Neighborhood. Community boards and citizen groups were initiated through the upheavals in the cities and were a type of "riot insurance" (Seligman, 1968). The interplay among citizen representatives in the poverty programs may be considered in terms of the dimensions of differences between competing or conflicting parties. Glenn et al. (1970) suggest that social conflicts may be of two types: a conflict of interest and a conflict of understanding. Stenberg (1972:193)
asserts that there is an inherent conflict between the poor's involvement and the middle-class values of bureaucrats, the objectives of the merit system, and the traditional principles of hierarchy and professionalism found in American administrative thought and policy.

Finally, the sociological problem under investigation in this dissertation may be succinctly stated in the following two questions:

1. What type of social relations do individuals structure in a heterogeneous (i.e., racial and socioeconomic status) community development citizen board?

2. What factors contribute to domain conflict among citizen representatives in a city-wide community development program?

Heterogeneity refers to the degree to which members of the citizen board are alike or different in terms of such characteristics as race and socioeconomic status. Blau (1974) asserts that the make-up of a membership group can affect the mode that the group selects for pursuit of its goal and interests. That is, individuals who are members of an organization where the membership is drawn from different racial and socioeconomic groups may find it difficult to find modes to accommodate diverse and sometimes competing segments.

The problem of domain conflict is especially relevant to this study in that individual members of the citizen board represent six constituent "target areas" or neighborhoods as opposed to one Model Neighborhood under the original Des Moines Cities Program observed by Richards and Goudy (1971). By focusing on the individual citizen representative and the
social relations that emerge from interaction, it should be possible for us to improve the understanding of domain conflict in a city-wide community decision board. A scrutiny of the conceptual and research literature found on existing models of community decision boards do not make an adequate presentation of social conflict.

In light of the above discussion of the sociological problem under investigation, a number of research objectives were formulated. They are:

1. To develop and test a model of domain conflict among citizen representatives in a community development board.

2. To test and delineate more clearly the relationships between key explanatory concepts or variables (i.e., institutionalized thought structure, interaction, voluntary association membership, social class, and ascribed status) and the key explained concept or variable of domain conflict.

3. To gain more insight into the issues surrounding lower class and minority group member (e.g., Black) participation in community and other voluntary associations.

4. To delineate some of the policy implications of city-wide citizen participation structures.

5. To develop an indicator of domain conflict which reflects both the material as well as ideological nature of the concept.
CHAPTER II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

It is commonly agreed that theory is not independent of research, but is a complementary element in social research (Merton, 1957). Theory has been defined by Sjoberg and Nett (1968) as a logically interrelated set of propositions or statements that are empirically meaningful. Wallace (1971:57) identified two consequences of theory: (1) Theories can explain known empirical generalizations, and (2) theories can predict empirical generalizations that are still unknown. The social phenomena that is being predicted or explained is referred to as the explained concept, while the factors which determine or contribute to the exploration and prediction of social phenomena are the explanatory concepts (Wallace, 1971; Dubin, 1969). In the process of theory building, Dubin (1969) suggests that the concepts of explanatory and explained variables provides a more precise presentation of the causal imagery in the social world than the use of the terms independent and dependent variables.

The conceptualization of variables in this study has followed the lead of Dubin (1969) in specifying explanatory and explained variables. The initial discussion covers the conceptualization and rationale for the explained variable, domain conflict. Attention turns next to a review of literature and past theory and research relevant to domain conflict. The discussion then takes up the causal relations among the explanatory variables and the explained variables. Finally, elements of the causal model are presented in a single theoretical framework.
The Explained Variable

Domain conflicts

The concepts of domain and domain conflict are important in understanding and predicting behavior of individuals in organizations (Levine and White, 1961; Warren, 1974a). Much attention has been focused on domain consensus. Levine and White (1961:1191) defined domain consensus as the degree to which there is agreement regarding the area that is to be covered by a group or organization. For this reason, domain consensus was posted as an important condition by which allocation of resources may take place. However, domain conflict also plays an important part in resource allocation. Kriesberg (1973) defined domain conflict in terms of the wide range of interest and beliefs in which individuals disagree. Glenn et al. (1970) defined domain conflict as the degree to which there is disagreement over scarce resources and epistemologies.

Domain conflict is useful for describing the relationships that develop between organizations as well as those that develop between individuals. In the case of this study, domain conflict becomes increasingly important in predicting and understanding the relationships that individuals as citizens' representatives establish in community development programs. Domain is a useful concept for defining the laws in which individuals compete for scarce resources. Participants in community development programs may share common goals but may disagree on how to attain the shared goals. Thus, disagreement over resource allocation is a key issue in poverty intervention programs (Kramer, 1969; Peterson, 1970; Lowenstein, 1971; Warren, et al., 1974).
In this study, domain conflict was defined in terms of the disagreement that citizen representative had toward organizational goals. That is, domain conflict is posited as being in the mind of the individual representative in regard to the goals that had been delineated by the local general purpose and federal government. The perceptions of the citizen representatives were used as an indication of the level of agreement or disagreement with the participation and programmatic goals of the local community development program. As citizen representatives have the ability to become aware of their interests and to organize themselves into a conflict group, the prediction and explanation of domain conflict have implications for both social theory and social policy in urban reform.

In outlining the elements of domain conflict, Glenn et al. (1970) assert that conflicts are of two types: conflict of interest and conflict of understanding. Conflict of interest involves disagreement over material resources, while conflict of understanding represents disagreement over ideologies.

The idea of individuals competing for scarce resources and holding contrasting epistemologies is consistent with Dahrendorf's discussion of the basis for "imperatively coordinated associations." Dahrendorf (1959) viewed imperatively coordinated associations as representing distinguishable clusters of relationships where individuals have the ability to become aware of their interests and to organize themselves into a conflict
group. Lenski (1966:30) also addressed this point of interest articulation:

When men are confronted with important decisions where they are obliged to choose between their own, or their group's interest, and the interests of others, they nearly always choose the former—though often seeking to hide this fact from themselves and others.

For Zechmeister and Druckman (1973), conflict of interest stems from differences between individuals in their preferred distribution of some scarce resources. Policies affecting resource allocation may have differential impact on citizen board members who are representatives of constituent groups. For instance, citizen members who represent a neighborhood where there is inadequate social services in human resource-type services may have this as their top priority. On the other hand, other citizen members may represent a neighborhood where social service and "welfare" are low priority services. For them, street sewers and other physical-construction type programs are rated as top priority. Thus, conflicts may develop between advocates of "social service" and advocates of "bricks and mortar" services. Such competing interests are often incompatible as poverty programs operate under limited budgets. Thus, individuals who get the least of the program resources inevitably feel contradictory incentives: the citizen representative may comply with the way resources are allocated, or resist the allocation process on the grounds that it yields inequitable results (Edelman, 1975).

In contrast to the conflict of interest, conflicts of understanding are couched in divergent epistemologies (Glenn, et al., 1970). In the
context of this study, conflict of understanding is conceptualized as divergence in norms and goals for citizen participation in governance. For instance, representation of contrasting or competing ideologies toward citizen participation by low-income residents in federally funded poverty programs has been predicted, and shown, to have implications for domain conflict (Warren, et al., 1974; Peterson, 1970; Kramer, 1969; Arnstein, 1969). Much controversy and misunderstanding have followed the implementation of citizen participation mechanisms (e.g., program components for involving low-income residents in poverty programs). A number of studies have shown that the interpretations of the degree and kind of participation by the poor engendered dramatic conflicts, particularly concerning representation, selection process, and decision-making power of citizen representatives on the policy formulating and advisory boards (Klein, 1964; Knoll and Whitcover, 1965; Cloward, 1965; Carter, 1966, Zurcher, 1970b; Peterson, 1970; Warren, 1974b).

Numerous studies have discussed the conflict of understanding component of domain conflict in community development programs (Arnstein, 1969; Van Til and Van Til, 1970; Capps, 1970; Warren, et al., 1974; Richards and Goudy, 1973). Client and grassroots participation forms of involvement emerge from the literature. Richards and Goudy (1973) suggest that client participation is empirically demonstratable, while grassroots participation is more ideological in nature.

This shift from neighborhood-based citizen participation mechanisms to city-wide mechanisms has significant implications for domain conflicts
among the various citizen representatives and neighborhood interest
allude to some of these implications involved in the dynamics of citizen
participation:

Citizen action, whose primary concern is the needs and
wishes of low-income citizens, constitutes a force moving in the
direction of an adversary role for citizen participation, primary
innovation, and to the extent that it is not attenuated, conflict
and eventual repelling. Citizen involvement, concerned pri­
marily with preserving agency rationale and validity. . . is
a force opposing the dynamics of citizen action.

The involvement of "target area residents" in policy and decision
making can only occur indirectly through actions of its representatives.
Conflicts over formal representation may develop as competing factors
within poverty programs seek arrangements facilitating the development of
their constituent's interests and ideas (Peterson, 1970; Lowenstein, 1971).

A conceptual illustration of domain conflict is presented in Figure
2.1. Two levels of abstraction are included in the diagram: (1) general
or theoretical level, and (2) sub-theoretical level. Domain conflict has
been analytically divided into two sub-theoretical level concepts: con­
flict of interest and conflict of understanding (Glenn, et al., 1970).
Past empirical research has focused on either conflict of interest or on
the conflict of understanding. At present, it seems no attempt has been
made to integrate the two components of domain conflict into a general
model which captures the diversity of meaning of domain conflict.

A conceptual composition of conflict of interest and understanding
may prove useful in understanding and predicting the dynamics involved in
Figure 2.1. A conceptual diagram of domain conflict and levels of abstractions. Dashed lines indicate inferred contribution of individual component of domain conflict into a composite sub-concept.
poverty intervention programs, and urban reform. Thus, a composite concept is needed for presenting a holistic approach to the understanding of domain conflict. Explication and measurement of the composite of the domain conflict concept is presented in Chapter III.

Although the number of federal community development programs have been reduced since their initiation during the mid-sixties, resource allocation and citizen participation continue to be salient issues in urban reform (Warren, et al., 1974). In addition, as resources become more scarce through federal "cut-backs" and "phase-out" of funding and citizen participation requirements, domain conflict among citizen representatives and other interest groups concerned with poverty intervention are expected to increase. A study of domain conflict among citizen representatives in a community development program seemed to be a topic worthy of research. Thus, development of a causal model of domain conflict will allow for greater understanding, explanation, and prediction of conflicts between community development organization members. The key explanatory variables in the causal model are presented in the next section of this chapter.

Explanatory Variables

The purpose of this section is to outline key concepts that explain the variable domain conflict. Each explanatory variable is defined and past theory and research literature is specified in developing its bivariate causal relationship to domain conflict. Five major causal factors are distilled from the literature as helpful to explain the amount of
domain conflict that may emerge. These five factors are: (1) institutionalized thought structure, (2) interaction, (3) voluntary association membership, (4) social class, and (5) ascribed status.

A major goal of this study is the development of a causal model of domain conflict. Following the discussion of the relationship between each explanatory variable and the explained variables, the relationships between the explanatory variables are described as they are introduced into a causal model. The sequential introduction of explanatory variables into the causal model is as follows: (1) institutionalized thought structure, (2) interaction, (3) voluntary association membership, (4) social class, and (5) ascribed status. The sociological logic of the sequence with which the variables are introduced into the model will be explicated in the course of describing the theoretical model.

Institutionalized thought structure

As a theoretical concept institutionalized thought structure has its roots in the sociology of knowledge. Mannheim (1936) specified several thought structures that individuals may develop in relation to their social environment. Mannheim (1936:198) suggested that the individual's thought structure falls on a continuum of conservative and liberal-humanitarian mentalities.

Individuals who have liberal-humanitarian institutionalized thought structures take on the role of "reformers" and change agents. In a sense, the visionary schema is "utopian" in that emphasis is placed on the normative, the critical evaluation of the existing order, and the impetus for
social change. On the other hand, individuals whose institutionalized structure is conservative are intent on maintaining the status quo (Mannheim, 1936:194).

The strata of individuals who represents the social and intellectual order experiences as reality that structure of relationships of which they are the bearer; while other individuals that are in opposition to that order will be oriented toward changing the status quo. Mannheim (1936:199) insisted that the relationships between utopian (e.g., liberal-humanitarian mentality) and the existing order are dialectical in nature.

The institutionalized thought structures which developed during the mobilization of concerns and actions about the poor have engendered domain conflicts (Clark and Hopkins, 1961; Kriesberg, 1973; Warren et al., 1974). Efforts that have been undertaken to ameliorate poverty at the individual and structural level have not come about without the presence of competing ideologies and interests (Marris and Rein, 1967). Community resident, citizen representatives, and community development staff persons were faced with the dilemma of placing priority on goals to rehabilitate the poor, or whether to focus attention on the process of decision-making through citizen participation as a goal to be accomplished (Kramer, 1969). The institutionalized thought structure within community development programs has been found to be an important factor in the structuring of social relationships and the operation of federal poverty programs. Warren, et al. (1974:20) defined institutionalized thought structure as the framework for addressing social problems and the mode through which behavior among individuals take place and is interpreted.
Institutionalized thought structure in this dissertation refers to the combination of ways of thinking about social and economic problems and the methods of instigating social change. Included in the institutionalized thought structure is the belief-value system for addressing the various problems that citizen representatives have established as priorities.

Clark and Hopkins (1969:19) addressed the issue of diverse thought structures in community development programs. For them, social change as a goal in the various community programs may take on the thought structure of the "Puritan" ideal, the "Good Samaritan," or the "New Deal." The dominant thought structure in the Puritan ideal conforms to the conservative imagery of poverty and social change. Poverty is assumed to be a resultant of a lack of personal or moral fiber within the individual. Thus, this orientation posits that it would be better to withhold assistance to the poor than weaken the fiber of those who have already succeeded. The Good Samaritan thought structure is also conservative in its strategy for reform and social change. Here, assumptions are posited which present the poor as tragically weak, incapable of helping themselves, and as victims of inescapable tragic circumstances.

A somewhat radical departure from both the Puritan and Good Samaritan thought structures is the New Deal thought structure. This thought structure, New Deal, is consistent with the liberal-humanitarian mentality as posited by Mannheim (1936). The New Deal thought structure is grounded on the assumption that poverty and unjust conditions exist in neighborhoods, communities, and even in society as a result of the rich
exploiting the poor. Individuals that take this position as their dominant thought structure set out to "upset" the status quo and to assert their "rights" (Clark and Hopkins, 1969:20-21).

Racial hostilities and tensions in the mid-sixties to a large measure played an important part in developing the strategy and dominant thought structures on poverty programs. Community development programs were established with a variety of latent and manifest goals in mind. Raab (1968) suggests that strategies which were employed in civil rights movements were transferred to the economics of resource allocation and re-distribution. Community development programs which were developed to combat poverty also served as a means for minority and low-income residents to gain access to political and decision-making processes (Miller, 1965; Moynihan, 1965; Harmon, 1970: Zurcher, 1970b; Warren, et al., 1974; Richards and Goudy, 1973).

Most studies on community citizen groups and organizations indicate that to a greater or lesser extent, they "shook up" local governments of power, at least temporarily, by fostering " politicization" of the poor and disenfranchised (Kramer, 1969). However, many, and perhaps most, of the federal poverty programs (i.e., urban renewal, community action programs, model cities, planned variations, and revenue sharing) all appear to solidly strengthen the prevailing or traditional arrangements of resource distribution and existing spheres of influence (Rossi and Dentler, 1961; Lowi, 1969; Graves, 1972; Chatman, 1972; Zimmerman, 1972; Walton, 1973).

Conservative institutionalized thought structure in poverty programs buttresses the established service delivery systems, while the liberal
institutionalized thought structure threatens the ideas of consensus and universality, challenges the motives and intentions of non-poor participants, and increases the likelihood of domain conflict (Capps, 1970). Arnstein (1969:216) has asserted that conservative thought structures in community action organizations emphasize service operations, while the more liberal structures emphasize the political aspects in terms of how resources are allocated and patronage and contracts are parcelled out. Domain conflicts are more numerous in those community programs where the liberal institutionalized thought structure is the prevailing norm. Stenberg (1972:193) has concluded that there was a built-in conflict between the poor’s involvement and the thought structures of bureaucrats, the objectives of the merit system, and the traditional principles of hierarchy which is found in American administrative thought and policy.

In sum, the institutionalized thought structure has been specified in terms of conservative-liberal, and puritan-new deal orientations (Mannheim, 1936; Clark and Hopkins, 1969). Community development program participants who have liberal institutionalized thought structures tend to see an urban development plan emerging not as just the product of neutral professional persons (e.g., planners), but as the result of the clash of values and interests of self-seeking individuals, groups, and organization (Lowenstein, 1971:290). Based on the above discussion, the relationship between institutionalized thought structure and domain conflict is posited in the following general hypothesis (G.H.):

G.H.1: The more liberal the institutionalized thought structure, the greater the domain conflict.
Interaction

Much of the social interaction of modern urban-industrial society is carried out through formally organized associations in which the prevailing pattern of social organization is bureaucracy. Although government, military, and industrial organizations come closest to being "pure" bureaucracies as described by Weber (1958), elements of bureaucratic organization can be found in community development programs. Community groups, committees, and appointed and elected citizen representatives are formed for the specific purpose of making decisions and formulating policies within larger organizational structures (e.g., community development organizations).

The importance of interaction in directing the ongoing activity of an organization was clearly demonstrated by Blau (1974). In any organization, each person brings to the field his own attitudes, prejudices, and other personality characteristics that lead him to play his assigned role in ways not prescribed by its designers. As a resultant of recurrent interaction, each individual develops feelings of like or dislike, of loyalty or distrust, for other members of the organization. In addition, the primary loyalties and personal interests may seem more important to a representative than the goals of a large impersonal organization, or the interests of competing members (Blau, 1974).

Interaction in this study is defined as the intra-group contact which may occur between citizen representatives in a community development program. Interaction among community development citizen
representatives usually takes place within the context of smaller groups, each with its own characteristic pattern of interpersonal relationships (Zurcher, 1970). For instance, interactions between citizen representatives may be informal and relatively intimate. In other cases, interaction may be more formal, ritualistic, and impersonal.

The goals of decision-making representatives are typically concerned with policy making, allocation of resources, distribution of rewards, approval of proposals, and other similar issues surrounding poverty intervention. A small group's decision can be of considerable importance to the members of the larger group it serves or to the other members with whom they are associated. In the case of community development programs, the arenas in which members interact often generate power struggles and competitive maneuvering. Interaction in such settings can be extremely subtle, as members attempt to influence each other and to promote decisions that will favor their special interests (Kramer, 1969; Lowenstein, 1971; Warren, 1974). The extent to which members interact to a large degree affects the program's locus including its manifest goals and the channel of access to maintenance resources (Warren, et al., 1974).

Warren, et al. (1974) suggest that citizen representatives in community development organizations interact with each other on the basis of their needs for scarce resources. Conflict over organization domain places representatives in the position of defending against competitors who would usurp their constituents' service field and degree of autonomy. Formal and informal interaction among representatives serve the dual purpose of making constituents aware of salient issues and serve as an arena
for mapping out strategies to counter competing groups or individuals. For instance, it is likely that citizen representatives who are consistently absent from community development meetings would have few opportunities of advancing their respective constituent group's interest in the formal structure of the community organization. In addition, interaction through "strategy sessions" sets the arena for interaction in the formal meeting setting. Here, strategy sessions refer to the impromptu meeting caucuses that members hold before the regular meeting. In other words, strategy sessions lay the groundwork on which representatives operate in the organization's domain.

From the above theoretical discussion of the two components of interaction, it was shown that both formal and informal interactions are important in structuring of strategies employed in community development programs. As an aid in understanding and predicting domain conflicts, both formal and informal interactions among citizen representatives must be considered. The formal interaction provides the "legitimate" arena for voicing grievances and interests, while the informal interaction provides opportunities for outlining strategies or "homework" for the more formal organization meeting setting. Formal and informal interactions are posited as having equally significant impacts upon domain conflict. Thus, a conceptual composite of these two components would allow for a better understanding of interaction as a whole as it relates to domain conflict.

Marris and Rein (1967) concluded that the patterns of interaction largely determines the level of conflicts (e.g., need for scarce resources,
and specialized interests). That is, greater levels of interaction is likely to lead to domain conflicts among participants in poverty programs. Based on the above discussion, the relationship between interaction and domain conflict was formulated in the following general hypothesis:

G.H.2: The greater the interaction, then the greater the domain conflict.

The relationship between interaction and institutionalized thought structure

Interactions among individuals in an organization are not likely to take place unless at least some members have objectives that cannot be met with available or internally accessible resources. Thus, the strategy of coalitions politics becomes an important element among an organization membership (Capps, 1970).

City-wide poverty programs have fostered interaction among individuals who represent divergent ideologies and interests. In this case, citizen representatives establish an interdependence with other representatives for the need of such resources as money, specialized skills, and access to policy and decision-making. The extent to which representatives concentrate their dependence on other members for acquiring scarce resources and for addressing their constituent interests and priorities are influenced by the coalitions that emerge among members (Kramer, 1969; Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1969; Harmon, 1970). Peterson (1970) has suggested that citizen representatives interact with each other in terms of furthering their respective interest and ideologies.
Interaction through board meetings, committees, and task forces are arenas where citizen representatives can present their views on program operations, resource allocation, budgeting priorities, and the overall philosophy of the poverty program efforts. Lowenstein (1971) has suggested that interaction among representatives on poverty boards "politicizes" the members in that planning is viewed as a political process. The "politicization" of the poor and disenfranchised was a major consequence of interaction in the federally funded poverty programs (Kramer, 1969; Lowi, 1969; Walton, 1973; Warren, 1974b).

Interaction by citizen representatives in community development programs also provides an arena for members to evaluate the impact of federal programs in the "target areas." Zurcher (1970a) has suggested that high level of interaction among citizen representatives allows members to achieve a greater self-expression in articulating the needs of their constituents. Peterson (1970) asserts that the most prolific producers of demands for "radical" change come from citizen group where there is high interaction among the members. Based on the above discussion, the relationship between interaction and institutionalized thought structures can be stated as:

\[ \text{G.H.3: The greater the interaction, then the more liberal} \]
\[ \text{the institutionalized thought structure.} \]

The relationship between voluntary association membership and domain conflict

The United States has been described as a "nation of joiners," and a country of high voluntary association membership (Babchuk and Booth, 1969).
In this study voluntary association membership was defined as participation in community organizations and/or activities which are external to the local community development program on which citizen representatives serve.

Numerous studies have been conducted on membership and participation in federal poverty programs, community organizations, and other voluntary associations (Moynihan, 1965; Miller, 1968; Zurcher, 1969; 1970a; Wright and Hyman, 1971). Participation in a wide range of voluntary associations has been found to decrease the likelihood of domain conflict in community organizations. Peterson (1970) has suggested that citizen representatives who are involved in multiple organizations have more "universalistic" perspectives of poverty action strategies, while non-participants are seen as presenting a more "particulistic" idea of community action. That is, individuals who are members of community action programs, but do not have ties to outside organizations, are more likely to engage in domain conflicts than individuals who have multiple membership in outside organizations.

Based on the above discussion of voluntary association membership, it is posited that membership in a wide range of outside voluntary associations decreases the likelihood of domain conflicts among citizen representatives. The general hypothesis formulated in the above discussion is as follows:

G.H.4: The greater the voluntary association membership, the less the domain conflict.
The relationship between voluntary association membership and interaction

Harp and Gagan (1971) have suggested that organizations or groups which have inclusive goals and broader membership base will result in greater interaction of its members. When different forms of social participation are generated by basically the same interests, an individual may be inclined to pursue more than one source of activity (Tomeh, 1974). On the other hand, when different types of voluntary association activity fulfill different needs, an individual may find that a choice has to be made in confining himself to some one activity.

Citizen representatives who are not members of a wide range of voluntary associations, or who do not have allegiances to outside groups, often confine their activity and effort to interaction within the community development program. Thus, interaction is more intense for members who are non-participants in voluntary association than members who are active in outside organizations.

Based on the above discussion, it is posited that membership in a wide range of voluntary associations is likely to decrease interaction among members in a community development program. The general hypothesis formulated from the above discussion is as follows:

G.H.5: The greater the voluntary association membership, then the less the interaction.

Social class

The Marxian definition of social class involves a contest for influence, the exercise of power, and the redefinition of authority. For Marx, social classes are clearly discrete population categories.
They are collectivities which may have a common culture or be homogeneous demographically, but their essence is that they are identifiable people (Marx and Engels, 1906). Dahrendorf (1959) asserts that the identifiability of members of social classes lie in their understanding of social organization, hence in their views of the locus of authority. A class system based principally on power inequalities has been posited by a number of authors (Lynd and Lynd, 1929; Hollingshead, 1949; Mills, 1956). The two-class system described by the Lynds has its line of demarcation based on the ways in which people "get a living." Mills (1956) described three institutional hierarchies in American society: the economy, the political order, and the military establishment. Mills (1956:11) states:

The people of the higher circles may be conceived as the members of a top social stratum. . . . The elite. . . feel themselves to be, and are felt by others to be, the inner circle of the 'upper social classes.' They form a more or less compact social and psychological entity; they have become self-conscious members of a social class.

Mill's (1956) conception of elite centers around status groups forming a social entity or social class. Following the lead of Mills (1956), social class is viewed as social stratification based on status. An individual's status is seen in terms of his relations to the means of production (e.g., occupation, education, income, etc.). A person's status imposes upon the individual certain attitudes, values, and interests relating to the political and economic sphere. Differentiation between the various classes is often made on a social basis: (1) the subjects differentiated are members of a social aggregate, and (2) the ideas of the statuses and criteria applied to the members of the aggregate are usually
socially derived. Therefore, social class is primarily concerned with the acquisition of goods and property and the achievement of a level of living usually referred to as one's socioeconomic status.

Social class is especially relevant in any discussion of theory and policy involved in federal poverty intervention. That is, the major policy and decisions regarding federal and local allocation of poverty funds were based on "poverty thresholds" and specific concentrations of lower class individuals and families (Urban Management Consultants, 1972). In the initial development of the "war on poverty" and "Great Society" programs, the representatives of the poor and lower class citizens did not articulate the views and issues which were relevant for residents of the federally designated "target areas." The interests of lower class citizen representatives were not the same as that of middle-class or non-poor citizen representatives on certain controversial issues, such as welfare, education, employment and income maintenance. Kramer (1969) has asserted that the initial controversy over "maximum feasible participation" of the poor was actually a political struggle between public officials and middle-class "self-proclaimed representatives" of the poor.

The inclusion of lower-class and minority persons on local poverty boards and committees was a way of preventing segregation and broadening the base of the federal community action programs (Levitan, 1968:273). In many instances, citizen boards were composed of public officials, private agencies and residents from low-income "target areas." However, representatives of the poor were not necessarily poor themselves. In addition,
there was no design or plan to incorporate the poor as a controlling component of the decision-making body (Wofford, 1971:80). Representatives on community decision boards were either elected by target area residents or appointed by local government officials. Silberman (1968) argues that local governmental officials fear the policy-formulation of the poor, minority group individuals, and agencies that represent the poor.

Peterson (1970) contends that as citizen representatives of the poor gain more control over the allocation of resources in poverty programs, there is more at stake to divide them. That is, lower class representatives are greatly affected by policy decisions of the advisory boards, task forces and city councils. In addition, policy decisions will have direct impact on the lower class representative's constituents and "target" neighborhood. As lower-class representatives have the most to lose or gain from advocacy planning in community development programs, domain conflicts are greatest among this class (Marx and Engels, 1906).

Lower-class representatives in an effort to assert their interests and rights have often used tactics which disrupt the citizen board meeting and/or slow down the decision and policy making machinery of the poverty programs (Alinsky, 1965; Lowi, 1969; Kramer, 1969; Walton, 1973).

As lower-class citizen representatives have a greater stake or interest in the resource allocation processes and the citizen participation efforts in community development programs, domain conflicts emerge more often among these lower class representatives than among the middle-class or non-poor representatives (Alinsky, 1965; Kramer, 1969; Peterson, 1970; Wofford, 1971).
Based on the above discussion of social class, the following general hypothesis is posited:

G.H.6: The higher the social class, then the less the domain conflict.

**Social class and institutionalized thought structure**

Harmon (1970) has described the federal poverty programs as "reformist" in design in that few provisions were made for radical program departures (e.g., resource and power redistribution). Lowi (1969) has suggested that lower class participants in poverty programs are the most dissatisfied with the community action efforts as compared with middle-class participants. Evaluations of community development programs are shown to have reinforced the position of elites and marginally improved the "power-position" of the lower class or poor (Lowi, 1969; Graves, 1972; Walton, 1973).

Edelman (1975) asserts that the members of citizen groups who feel that they have received the least of the available resources are more likely to resist the community program's decisions on the grounds that such decisions contribute to their "unequal" status. Lower class individuals who may feel "deprived" or have established a sense of "class consciousness" often propose more radical proposals for social and economic change (Marx and Engels, 1906; 1961).

Free and Cantril (1967) in their study of attitudes toward poverty and socioeconomic status, found that the higher the socioeconomic status, the more likely an individual would view poverty as a result of lack of individual effort. Thus, individuals who view poverty as an individual
problem are more likely to propose solutions or action strategies that affect only the individual. On the other hand, when the problem of poverty is viewed structurally, action strategies take on a more radical departure in that proposals are made for structural change (Clark and Hopkins, 1969; Capps, 1970).

The lower class citizen representatives in community development programs often adhere to a "New Deal' orientation (Clark and Hopkins, 1969). Here, they are operating on the assumption that poverty and other unjust conditions exist in their neighborhoods as a result of the rich exploiting the poor. Where this orientation is present, efforts are directed toward "upsetting" the status quo (Clark and Hopkins, 1969:20).

Based on the above discussion, it is reasonable to assume that lower class citizen representatives will have more liberal institutionalized thought structures as compared with middle-class citizen representatives. The causal relationship is stated in the following general hypothesis:

G.H.7: The higher the social class, then the less liberal the institutionalized thought structure.

Social class and interaction One major assumption of the interest group approaches is that individuals mix primarily with others of the same socioeconomic status. Such patterns of interaction are applied to lower class and well as upper-class individuals. Marx and Engels (1961:23) suggest that it is the sharing of a common experience with others of the same class that leads a "class in itself" to become a "class for itself."
Warren et al. (1974) has asserted that members of community organizations interact with each other in terms of their need for scarce resources (i.e., staff support, funds, access to decision making). Interaction patterns of an organization's membership body often become structured either because all of the members have some common interests or because a sub-group has furnished inducements to another sector to work in behalf of its interests (Blau, 1974).

Lower class citizen representative interaction in community development programs was a means of gaining access to channels of policy and decision making that had been closed to them (Moynihan, 1965; Miller, 1968). Activism on the part of lower-class individuals was in part shaped by the lower class representatives' exclusion, voluntary or otherwise, from other voluntary associations. Interaction in poverty board meeting and task force sessions was shown to be greatest among lower class citizen representatives (Zurcher, 1969; 1970a). Thus, as lower class representatives are both "clients" and "planners" in community development programs, their interests are articulated through board meetings, task forces, and planning conferences.

Based on the above discussion, it is reasonable to assume that lower class citizen representatives will have higher interaction in community development programs than middle class citizen representatives. The relationship is formulated in the following general hypothesis:

G.H.8: The higher the social class, then the less the interaction.
Social class and voluntary association membership

Much has been written about the correlates of social class and voluntary association membership. There is a general consensus in most of the studies that the various indices of social class are related to organization affiliation (Wright and Hyman, 1958; 1971; Campbell, et al., 1960; Tomeh, 1969; Phillips, 1969; Crenson, 1974). Persons of high social class are more likely to be affiliated in voluntary associations than are persons of low social class. Therefore, it is posited that middle class citizen representatives will have higher social participation activity than citizen representatives who are lower class.

Based on the above discussion of social class and voluntary association membership, the following general hypothesis is posited:

G.H.9: The higher the social class, the greater the voluntary association membership.

Ascribed status

Ascribed status has been described in terms of definitions "assigned to individuals with reference to their innate differences or abilities" (Linton, 1937:115). Ascription is stratification placement based on birth (Smelser and Lipset, 1966). The ultimate in ascribed status is the formation of castes. A caste has been defined as "a hierarchy of endogamous divisions in which membership is hereditary and permanent" (Berreman, 1960:20). However, the evidence of racial castes in the United States has not been well documented (Cox, 1948).

Ascribed status in this study is defined in terms of the superordinate-subordinate (e.g., white-black) position that is socially assigned to
individuals based on race. Individual as well as institutional racism have largely determined the subordinate status of blacks in the United States (Cox, 1948). The United States Commission on Civil Disorder (1968) concluded that the nation was moving toward two societies, black and white, separate and unequal. The marginal status, for the most part, was attributed to white racism. That is, the black-white status differentials in the U.S. are based on the assumption that whites as a race are inherently superior, while blacks are inferior as a race. The ascribed status, status assigned at birth based on racial attributes, for whites is higher than for blacks under the "white racist society" agreed by the U.S. Commission on Civil Disorder (1968). As white racism has been suggested as the major factor for the unequal status of blacks vis-a-vis whites, it is reasonable to assume that institutionalized racism has assigned higher ascribed statuses upon whites as compared to blacks.

The initiation of "Great Society" programs was one measure taken to ameliorate some of the consequences of white racism. Such community programs brought blacks and whites together, sometimes for the first time, into the politics of redevelopment. Individuals entering the community development programs brought to these organizations the beliefs, values, and attitudes that they had internalized through previous social interaction. This is true for members of one racial or ethnic group compared with another (Kriesberg, 1973). Community programs where service areas covered diverse ethnic neighborhoods had citizen members who represented diverse special interests. The representation of special interests has important implication for domain conflict. Specifically, resolution of
domain conflict, to a large extent, depends on the extent to which one racial group can satisfy its constituents in terms of achieving favorable results (Zechmeister and Druckman, 1973). Where black and white neighborhood interests are incompatible, domain conflicts among the citizen representatives of the respective neighborhoods will result (Lowenstein, 1971; Peterson, 1970).

Peterson (1970) suggests that domain conflicts emerge in community development programs where black and white representatives compete for some sort of scarce resources. Conflict was greatest in the poverty programs where racial factionalism was apparent, as black and white members oppose each other over the allocation of resources. Silberman (1968) has suggested that organizations that have memberships of diverse ethnic and racial groups may be unable to arrive at a consensus on politically volatile issues as citizen participation and resource allocation.

Kramer (1969) asserted that the skills that blacks acquired in organizing and structuring the Civil Rights movement were transferred into poverty programs. However, the racial tensions and hostilities did not disappear once blacks were included in the citizen boards and policy councils. Black citizen representatives while serving on the citizen boards and councils could "fight poverty" and at the same time gain access to policy and decisions channels (Miller, 1965; Moynihan, 1965; Zurcher, 1970a). As many of the boards and councils which representatives served on were advisory in nature, the proposals for "community control" by black members were not implemented (Arnstein, 1969; Capps, 1970).
The inclusion of blacks into a coalition with whites on the various citizen boards and councils has engendered dramatic conflicts regarding representation, selection process and decision making powers of citizen representatives (Carter, 1966; Arnstein, 1969; Zurcher, 1969). The emphasis on citizen participation and "community control" movement flourished best among blacks that came to regard the local institutions (e.g., police, health, welfare, education) controlled by whites or "outsiders" (Capps, 1970).

Competition for power within the community organization forces the competing leadership to justify their appeal for resident support. The black citizen representatives while legitimating the overall community action efforts of local programs at the same time must contend with the suspicions among constituents of their being "coopted" by the system (Benz, 1974; Edelman, 1975). Also, where there is hostility toward black involvement in planning and programming, attempts may be made to subvert the goals of the organization by using manipulative tactics or by trying to bulldoze programs through, regardless of sentiment or opposition. Such tactics with the community development program often trigger opposition and conflict from black representatives (Lowenstein, 1971).

Based on the above discussion of race and domain conflict with community development programs, the following general hypothesis is posited:

G.H.10: The more superordinate the ascribed status, then the less the domain conflict.
Ascribed status and institutionalized thought structure

In the mid-sixties, there developed an increased awareness or "consciousness" among blacks in terms of their position in the American society. To a large extent, the hostility and riots in the urban centers played a dominant role in shaping the "War on Poverty" programs and strategies (Raab, 1968; Seligman, 1968; Kramer, 1969). Involvement in resource planning and decision making in model cities programs was to serve a dual purpose for Blacks: (1) A means of improving the "quality of life" in the black community, and (2) a means for blacks to gain "political clout" (Miller, 1965; Moynihan, 1965; Zurcher, 1970b). However, these two goals or purposes were accepted to varying degrees among the different participating individuals and groups.

The "Black Power" movement in the mid-sixties was a catalyst in politicizing the black population in social and political action (Hamilton, 1974). White leaderships were purged from several civil rights organizations (i.e., Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee, Congress of Racial Equality) in the move toward black assertiveness. Efforts were directed toward reorganizing the civil rights organization with their "white heads and black bodies" (Hamilton, 1974).

Most studies of community action programs in the United States show that the "politicization" of blacks was one major outcome of their federal poverty effort (Kramer, 1969; Lowi, 1969). In addition, the strategies that were borrowed from the civil rights movement were of some utilization in the poverty programs. Blacks who had been "activists" in civil rights organizations often become participants in poverty programming.
Kramer (1969) has suggested that the impact of blacks on inner-city poverty programs had the effect of politicizing new interest group constituencies and providing them with the training ground in ways of local politics.

Black citizen representatives in community development programs often focused on segregation and inequality in the local community, and on the American society as a whole. Conflicts and tensions emerge as black representatives propose structural solutions to deal with the problem of poverty, while white representatives advocate changes at the individual level (Clark and Hopkins, 1969). Thus, black representatives are prolific in their demands for ending discriminatory practices in employment, education, and other areas. The idea of incremental social change has not been accepted by black members to the degree as it has by other citizen representatives in poverty programs (Edelman, 1975). For many black representatives, "community control" and "citizen participation" are sub-goals that have not been reached (Benz, 1974).

Based on the above discussion, it seems reasonable to assume that white citizen representatives will have less liberal thought structures than white representatives in community development programs. This relationship is stated in the following general hypothesis:

G.H.11: The more superordinate the ascribed status, then the less liberal the institutionalized thought structure.

Ascribed status and interaction The Black-white cleavage in the United States represents the most salient ethnic cleavage in contemporary America (Jackman and Jackman, 1973). In community action efforts,
black and white participants were involved in areas of poverty intervention which often took the two groups on a collision course (Peterson, 1970). Interaction in community development programs takes place through formal board meetings, task force meetings, planning conferences and informal group sessions. For the most part, the informal interactions are patterned along racial lines. In addition, coalitions between citizen representatives are structured along racial and ideological lines (Lowenstein, 1971).

As poverty funds are allocated to communities in part based on the level of poverty in the area, often the "target areas" also have high concentrations of blacks. Federal poverty funds have "non-discrimination" provisions and allow blacks to participate at varying levels within the community development program structure. The interests of the black community are articulated through its citizen representatives. Interaction in strategy sessions, and formal policy board meetings are the major channels through which proposals are articulated. In articulating community and neighborhood interests, black representatives interact more often than white representatives on community development programs (Zurcher, 1970b).

One explanation of high interaction among black representatives is the idea of "class consciousness" or the "ethnic community" thesis (Lane, 1969; Olsen, 1970). This thesis suggest that blacks may become more active in community programs because of pressures exerted upon them within their ethnic community to conform to the norms of the black community. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that white citizen representatives will
have less interaction than Black citizen representatives in community development programs. This relationship is presented in the following general hypothesis:

G.H.12: The more superordinate the ascribed status, then the less the interaction.

Ascribed status and voluntary association membership Studies on the voluntary association membership rates among the various racial groups are far from conclusive as the findings are contradictory. One of the most prevalent interpretation of black-white differences in social participation is based on socioeconomic status. As blacks are found predominately in the lower socioeconomic groups, they are less likely to be affiliated with formal organizations (Campbell et al., 1960; Wright and Hyman, 1958; 1971). However, once the limiting effect of socioeconomic status has been removed, blacks actually tend to participate more actively than whites and in a wider range of social and political activities (Babchuk and Booth, 1969; Orum, 1966; Renzi, 1968; Olsen, 1970; Ross and Wheeler, 1971).

In an investigation focused on the voluntary association membership of Anglo, Black and Mexican-American, Williams and Babchuk (1973) found that ethnicity proved to be an important variable in predicting social participation, with blacks having the highest social participation rate of the three ethnic groups studied.

Based on the above discussion, it seems reasonable to assume that black representatives will have higher levels of voluntary association membership than white representatives. The general hypothesis can be stated as:

G.H.13: The more superordinate the ascribed status, then the less the voluntary association membership.
The Theoretical Model

The general purpose of this study has been to develop and test a causal model for understanding and predicting domain conflict within a community development program. Citizen representatives who are members of the local poverty boards were the empirical referent for this study. Domain conflict was the variable to be explained, while five explanatory variables were distilled from the literature: institutionalized thought structure, interaction, voluntary association membership, social class, and ascribed status. A causal model was developed utilizing the above six variables. Mulford et al. (1972) have defined a causal model as the articulation and evaluation of relationships between all explanatory and explained variables.

Mulford et al. (1971) have specified a number of advantages of using a path model over regression analysis. Mulford et al. (1971:13) write:

First, variables may exist in complex relationships or networks with each other. Path analysis attempts to measure and describe these networks. Second, path analysis examines the direct and indirect causal relationships among variables on each other. Thus, path analysis can serve as a guide in evaluation research by providing more information about the nature of the relationship among the variables.

In the development of the causal model, the explained variable, domain conflict, was explicated along with a presentation of theoretical and empirical literature on the concept. The discussion then takes up each explanatory variable while at the same time presenting the presumed causal relationship between the explanatory variable and the
explained variable, and the presumed causal relationship between the
explanatory variable as they are introduced into the model. The causal
model is developed starting with the explained variable, domain conflict
\(X_6\) and working backward toward presenting and explicating each of the
explanatory variables. The explanatory variables are introduced into the
causal model in the following order: First, institutionalized thought
structure \(X_3\); Second, interaction \(X_4\); Third, voluntary association
membership \(X_3\); Fourth, social class \(X_2\); and Fifth, ascribed status
\(X_1\). A summary of the causal model is shown in Figure 2.2. Concepts in
the model are presented at the theoretical level. A causal chain is shown
by the arrows \(\rightarrow\) in Figure 2.3 which indicate that a variable is pre­
sumed to be the antecedent (cause) and the other variable the consequences
(effect). The double arrowed dashes line \(\leftrightarrow\) between voluntary as­
sociation membership \(X_3\) and institutionalized thought structure indi­
cates that no relationship is predicted between the two variables.

A major assumption of this causal model was that the explanatory
variables follow a time-sequence in the "real world." That is, ascribed
status is presumed to occur first in the real world. As ascribed status,
race, is conferred at birth, it was the most logical choice. Ascribed
status was presumed to have causal relations to domain conflict, insti­
tutionalized thought structure, interaction, and voluntary association
membership (see G.H.7, G.H.13, G.H.11, and G.H.9). A causal relation was
not posited between ascribed status and social class.

The second explanatory variable that is presumed to occur in the real
world was social class. Social class is presumed to be causally related
Figure 2.2. A conceptual causal model of explaining domain conflict among certain representatives. The two variable general hypotheses and paths are shown by G.H. numbers and directional arrows, respectively.
to domain conflict, institutionalized thought structure, interaction, and voluntary association membership (see G.H.6, G.H.12, G.H.10, and G.H.8). The third explanatory variable that is presumed to occur in the real world was voluntary association membership. Voluntary association membership is presumed to be causally related to domain conflict and interaction (see G.H.4 and G.H.5).

Interaction was presumed to be the fourth explanatory variable to occur in the real world. Interaction was presumed to be related to domain conflict and institutionalized thought structure (see G.H.2 and G.H.1). Finally, institutionalized thought structure was presumed to be the fifth explanatory variable to occur in the real world. The causal relationship was posited between institutionalized thought structure and domain conflict (see G.H.1).

The causal priorities among the variables were specified in the above section. The specification of priorities indicates how the equations of the model are to be set up, and the operations, along with the data, provide the basis for deriving path coefficients. Path analysis requires a theory of causal priorities. This study assumes that since ascribed status is assigned at birth, it is the first explanatory variable to enter the model. Social class follows ascribed status as social class may be achieved later in life or "inherited." Voluntary association membership and interaction are the next two variables to enter the model as it is assumed that both variables are affected by ascribed status and social class. The final explanatory variable to enter the model is
institutionalized thought structure. An individual's thought structure is assumed to be a consequence a combination of ascribed status, social class, voluntary association membership and interaction.

To summarize briefly, the theoretical model in this study presents a framework on which to study domain conflict. Specifically, the purpose of the model was to pull together the factors involved in domain conflict in that better understanding and prediction can be made. The model has special implications for the community development program setting as well as other formal organizations setting. That is, if the elements or factors that have been defined as explanatory variables are present in a community organization, domain conflict can be predicted with some degree of accuracy. With the prediction and understanding of domain conflict, planners and other policy makers may employ the model to resolve conflicts. The theoretical as well as the policy implication of the domain conflict model will be specified later on in this dissertation.

In the chapter which follows, variables theorized in the causal model will be operationalized so that empirical hypotheses can be formulated to test the general hypotheses and the overall theoretical model.
CHAPTER III. METHODS

Introduction

The hypotheses and the causal model developed in Chapter II were formulated at a general level. In this chapter, the concepts included in the general hypotheses and model are operationalized at the empirical level. The methods and procedure of this study are presented in four sections. The chapter opens with a discussion of the sample. Attention then turns to the collection of data. The discussion then takes up the operationalization and measurement of concepts to be formulated in the empirical hypotheses. The chapter concludes with the methods of analysis used in the study.

The Sample

The data in this study are based on a sample of citizen board representatives from the Des Moines Neighborhood Development Program. The citizen board members are representatives on six Neighborhood Priority Boards and a Central Advisory Board. Respondents on the Neighborhood Priority Boards are elected representatives from the 6 federally designated "Prime Service Areas." Whereas, respondents on the Central Advisory Board are either elected or appointed to their position in the Neighborhood Development Program. The individual citizen board representatives was used as the unit of analysis. Thus, the sample is composed of 115 of the 125 citizen board representatives in the Neighborhood Development Program.
Collection of Data

Interview schedule and questionnaire

Data were collected by means of both a mailed questionnaire and a structured interview schedule. This plan was initiated primarily to reduce structured interview time. The respondents were citizen board representatives of the local community development program. The questionnaires consisted of the scales assessing domain conflict, and institutionalized thought structure. The structured interview schedule included items assessing citizen representatives' interaction, voluntary association membership, social class and ascribed status. The first draft of the measurement instruments were pretested using the "alternate" citizen representatives from the local community development program who were not included for the research sample. Following the pretest, several changes were made in the original instruments.

Data collection procedures

The initial design of this research study was presented to the citizen board members and Neighborhood Development Staff personnel in August, 1974. During this time, the author was employed as a program planner with the program. Following revisions, the final design of the research study was presented before the citizen board representatives in June, 1975. This time, the author had a contractual agreement with the Neighborhood Development Program to conduct the research study.

The questionnaires were mailed to the citizen board representatives in June, 1975, with accompanying cover letters from the Chairman of the
Central Advisory Board of the Neighborhood Development Program eliciting respondent cooperation. Respondents were instructed to return completed questionnaires to the Neighborhood Development's Central office. The personal interviews were conducted during the months of August and September, 1975. The allocation of resources and prioritization of services had been completed six months prior to the interviewing. At the time of this study, there appeared to be little open conflict or hostilities among the citizen representatives in regard to the administrative and programmatic functions of the program. In an effort to involve the neighborhood staff persons in the study, the Neighborhood Service Area Coordinators were given the responsibility of scheduling the date and time of the personal interviews. Through the techniques of field interview and mailed questionnaire, a total of 115 citizen representatives were contacted. Seven citizen board members flatly refused to participate in the study, and three representatives could not be reached or contacted. Telephone calls were made to respondents by the Neighborhood Service Area Coordinators to remind representatives to complete and mail the questionnaires, and at the same time the personal interview was scheduled.

Operationalization and Measurement

In this section each of the explanatory and explained concepts specified in Chapter II are operationalized and measured. General and empirical hypotheses are also stated. The first concept to be operationalized is the explained variable, domain conflict. Following the discussion of domain conflict, each of the explanatory variables is operationally defined and measured.
Domain conflict

Domain conflict was defined in terms of responses that individuals gave to items addressing scarce resources (e.g., conflict of interest) and divergent espistemologies (e.g., conflict of understanding). Domain conflict is operationalized through the citizen representatives' perception of resource allocation and citizen participation in the community organization.

A modified version of Richards and Goudy's (1971) Citizen Participation Score was used to measure the respondents citizen participation conflict level. The respondent's resource allocation conflict was measured by a three-item Resource Allocation Conflict Score. Thus, the Citizen Participation Conflict Score assesses conflict of understanding, while the Resource Allocation Conflict Score assesses conflict of interest. A brief discussion of each component and the development of a composite measure of domain conflict is presented below.

Component score 1: citizen participation conflict score

The questions used in the Citizen Participation Conflict Score are Likert-type items with four response choices for each question: namely, strongly agree (SA), agree (A), disagree (DA), and strongly disagree (SD). The ten items and respective scoring scheme are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Citizen participation makes for a more effective Neighborhood Development Program.
2. Citizen participation has improved the relations between people in the Neighborhood Development neighborhoods.
3. Citizen participation is just another way of "using" the residents in the neighborhood.

4. Citizen participation helps people feel a part of the neighborhood.

5. Citizen participation provides an opportunity for residents to speak, but without being heard.

6. Citizens are often frustrated from the lack of input into the decision-making processes of the program.

7. Citizen participation in the Neighborhood Development Program is really causing less exploitation of the residents.

8. Citizen participation has generated special interest groups that are competing for limited resources in the neighborhoods.

9. Citizen participation is nothing more than a gimmick since the residents have not been given any real power.

10. Citizen participation has contributed to an increased class consciousness among neighborhood residents.

The theoretical range of the Citizen Participation Conflict Score was 0 to 30, with an observed range of 4 to 25 and a mean of 12. Scores which are greater than the mean score may be considered as "high" citizen participation conflict, while "low" scores (e.g., scores equal to or less than the mean score) are indications of low citizen participation conflict. Agreement with the items where citizen participation is described as a "gimmick," as "using the residents," "frustrating residents," "generating
"special interest," and "increasing class consciousness" are indicators of citizen participation conflict and are assigned high scores. The distribution of Citizen Participation Conflict Scores is presented in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1. Distribution of citizen participation conflict scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 10</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 20</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 30</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Component score 2: resource allocation conflict score

The Resource Allocation Conflict Score was empirically measured by using a Guttman-type measure. The respondents were asked the following three questions:

1. In thinking about funds coming into Des Moines for community development programs, would you say that such funds are equally or unequally distributed across the six Neighborhood Development neighborhoods?

2. Do you feel that this neighborhood (neighborhood which respondent represents) has received its fair share of funds from the Neighborhood Development Program?

3. What is your feeling on the impact of programs provided through Neighborhood Development, in general, would you say that the
programs have caused greater or less competition among residents of the neighborhood?

Responses to item 1 was simply equally or unequally distributed. An unequal was assigned a score of 1, and equal a score of 0. In item 2, the responses were yes and no. A yes was assigned a score of 0 and a no a score of 1. Finally, the responses in item 3 were less and greater. A less was assigned a score of 0, and a greater was scored as 1. The Resource Allocation Conflict Score was obtained by a summation of the three items. The theoretical range of the scale was 0 to 3 with the observed range of 0 to 3. In this Guttman-type scale, scores less than 2 are considered as "low" resource allocation conflict, while scores equal to or greater than 2 are considered indications of "high" resource allocation conflict. The actual distribution of Resource Allocation Conflict Scores is presented in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2. Distribution of resource allocation conflict scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 1</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - 3</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The coefficient of reproducibility for the Citizen Participation Conflict Scores and Resource Allocation Conflict Scores were .79 and .92, respectively. These two measures were combined into a composite measure to obtain an overall evaluation of domain conflict among citizen
representatives. The intercorrelation between the two measures showed a statistically significant positive correlation ($r = .27, < .05$). A major assumption of this study posits that the two elements of domain conflict are of equal import. Therefore, each respondent's Resource Allocation Conflict Score was multiplied by a factor of 10 (making the theoretical range of each scale 0 to 30). The theoretical range of composite measure, Domain Conflict Score, was 0 to 60 with an observed range of 4 to 53 and a mean of 32. The actual distribution of Domain Conflict Scores is presented in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3. Distribution of domain conflict score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 30</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 - 40</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 - 50</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 - 60</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again, scores which are equal to or less than the mean of 32 are considered "low" Domain Conflict, while scores which are greater than the mean score are indicators of "high" Domain Conflict. In testing the empirical hypotheses, the Domain Conflict Scores was used as the measure of citizen representatives domain conflict.
In constructing a measurement instrument to assess citizen participation and resource allocation conflict, the community development organization's goals were used as a frame of reference on which board members could agree or disagree. Citizen participation as mandated in CDA Letter 10B (1970) outlines specific goals of community programs. The items included in the Citizen Participation Conflict Scale and the Resource Allocation Conflict Scale were derived from these program goals. For instance, citizen participation was described as an essential element in community programming: It was designed as a means of (1) improving relations between neighborhood residents, (2) providing opportunities for residents to articulate grievances, (3) developing community awareness, and (4) gaining access to policy and decision making.

The Resource Allocation Conflict Score also reflects the respondent's agreement or disagreement with the organization's distribution of federal funds across the poverty neighborhoods. In many instances, funds are allocated based on "need." While in other cases, funds may be allocated equally across the target areas. The idea of "deprivation" is a useful concept in describing the perceptions that may be expressed through the Resource Allocation Conflict items.

Thus, domain conflict is conceptualized as in the mind of the individual citizen representative in terms of perceptions of organizational goals.
As the explained variable, domain conflict, has been operationalized and empirically measured, the explication of the explanatory variables is presented in the following order: institutionalized thought structure, interaction, voluntary association membership, social class, and ascribed status.

**Institutionalized thought structure**

It was hypothesized that the more liberal a citizen representatives' institutionalized thought structure, the greater the domain conflict. Institutionalized thought structure was defined as the combination of ways of thinking about social and economic problems and the methods of instigating social change. Institutionalized thought structure was operationalized as the degree of liberalism of citizen representatives toward federal poverty programs. That is, the extent to which citizen representatives believe the federal government should be involved in poverty intervention programs. Again, a modified version of Richards and Goudy's (1971) Attitudes Toward Government Programs Scale was used as a form of reference to measure the institutionalized thought structure variable. Thus, the empirical measures of institutionalized thought structure was called the Liberalism Score.

The questions used in the Liberalism Score form a Likert-type scale where each question has four response choices, namely, strongly agree (SA), agree (A), disagree (D), and strongly disagree (SD). The six items and respective scoring scheme are as follows:

<p>| | | | | |</p>
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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SA A D SD 1. Government programs have not gone far enough to eliminate poverty in this country.
2. Government programs create dependent classes of people.

3. Government programs kill the spirit of individualism which made this country great.

4. Government programs have strengthened the economic and social institutions in this country.

5. Most people deserve the benefits they receive from Government programs.

6. Government programs have grown in size to the point of being unmanageable.

The theoretical range of the Liberalism Score was 0 to 18, with an observed range of 2 to 18 and a mean of 11. The distribution of the Liberalism Score is presented in Table 3.4.

Table 3.4. Distribution of liberalism scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 - 12</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 - 18</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Liberalism Score was obtained by summing the six-items in the measure. Respondents whose Liberalism Score was greater than the mean score considered "high" liberal (e.g., liberal-humanitarian), while
respondents whose scores are equal to or less than the mean score are considered "low" liberal (e.g. conservative) representatives. As the Liberalism Score assesses the respondent's attitude toward government programs, "high" scores are indicative of support for federal government intervention into poverty areas, while "low" scores are indications of criticism of federal poverty intervention programs. The empirical hypotheses for the Liberalism Score to the Domain Conflict Score is as follows:

E.H.1: If Liberalism Score is high, then the Domain Conflict Score will be high.

Interaction

It was hypothesized that: (1) the greater the interaction, the greater the domain conflict; (2) the greater the interaction, the more liberal the institutionalized thought structure.

Interaction as a concept is defined as the interpersonal conflicts which occur between individuals or groups of individuals. It is operationalized as the level of formal and informal contacts between citizen representatives.

Again, a composite measure was used to measure the citizen representatives' interaction. This composite measure is called the Interaction Score. The Interaction Score consisted of two components: (1) Meeting Attendance Score assessing the amount of formal interaction, and (2) Friendship Interaction Score assessing the amount of informal interaction. A brief discussion of each component is presented below.
**Component 1: Meeting Attendance Score**

First, the question used to assess the respondent's formal interaction through board meeting attendance was:

About how many Community Development Board meetings a month would you say you have attended on the average over the past six months?

The actual number of meetings that the respondents indicated was recorded as their Meeting Attendance Score. The theoretical range of the meeting score was 0 to 9, with an observed range of 2 to 7 and a mean of 3.5. The actual distribution of the meeting attendance score is presented in Table 3.5.

**Table 3.5. Distribution of meeting attendance scores**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 3</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - 6</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 - 9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Component 2: Friendship Interaction Score**

Three questions were asked each respondent about informal interactions with other citizen representatives. The items consisted of the Friendship Interaction Scale developed by Blau (1961). The questions were:

1. How many really close friends do you have on this board that you occasionally talk over confidential matters with?
2. How often do you get to visit the friend(s) that you know best on this board?

3. Would you say that you go around with a group of close friends on this board who visit back and forth in each other's houses?

Responses to item 1 was simply none or one or two or more. The none or one was assigned a score of 0, and two or more a 1. In item 2, responses were either once a month or less or more than once a month. The once a month or less response was assigned a score of 0, and more than once a month a score of 1. The response to the third item was no or yes. A no was assigned a score of 0, and yes a score of 1. The Friendship Interaction Score was obtained by summing up the three items. The theoretical range was 0 to 3 with an actual range of 0 to 3 and a mean of 1.7. The actual distribution of Friendship Interaction Scores is presented in Table 3.6.

Table 3.6. Distribution of friendship interaction scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 1</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - 3</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Composite: Interaction Score

The coefficient of reproducibility for the Friendship Interaction Score was .90. As mentioned earlier, the meeting attendance sums and
friendship scores were built into a composite measure called the Interaction Score. Since an assumption of this study is that formal and informal interaction are of equal importance in domain conflict (see Chapter II), each respondent's Friendship Interaction Score was multiplied by a factor weight of 3 to make it have a theoretical range equal to that of the Meeting Attendance Score (e.g., 0 to 9). The intercorrelation between the Friendship Interaction Score and Meeting Attendance Score was .28. Thus, the theoretical range of the composite measures of interaction, Interaction Score, was 0 to 18 with an actual range of 2 to 16 and a mean of 8.6. The actual distribution of the Interaction Scores is described in Table 3.7.

Table 3.7. Distribution of interaction scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - 8</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 - 13</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 - 18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^A composite measure of interaction.

Thus, a "high" score on the Interaction Score was indicative of "high" interaction of the citizen representative with other members and a "low"
score represented "low" interaction. The empirical hypothesis relating Interaction Scores to Domain Conflict is:

E.H.2: If Interaction Score is high, then the Domain Conflict Score will be high.

The empirical and statistical hypothesis relating Interaction Scores to Liberalism Scores is stated as follows:

E.H.3: If Interaction Score is high, then Liberalism Score will be high.

**Voluntary association membership**

In an earlier section, it was hypothesized that: (1) the greater the voluntary association membership, the lower the domain conflict, and (2) the greater the voluntary association membership, the greater the interaction.

Voluntary association membership is defined as activity in community and other formal organizations. In this study, voluntary association membership is operationalized as social participation in community and other formal organizations outside of the Neighborhood Development Program. Chapin's (1952) Social Participation Score was used to measure the respondents voluntary association membership. The scale consists of four components: membership, attendance, financial contribution, and offices held.

The coefficient of reproducibility for the Social Participation Score was .90. The breakdown of the scoring scheme includes: 0 score for non-members; 1 for membership; 2 for attendance; 3 for contribution; 4 for committee; and 5 for officer. Scored responses for the four components
were summed to form the Social Participation Score. The theoretical range of the scale was 0 to infinity. However, the actual range was 0 to 97 with a mean of 18.8. The actual distribution of the Social Participation Score is presented in Table 3.8.

Table 3.8. Distribution of social participation scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 20</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 40</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 - 60</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 - 80</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81 - 100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relationships between voluntary association membership and domain conflict may be stated in the following hypotheses:

E.H.4: If Social Participation Score is high, then Domain Conflict Score will be low.

E.H.5: If Social Participation Score is high, then Interaction Score will be low.

Social class

It was hypothesized that: (1) the higher the social class, then the less the domain conflict; (2) the higher social class, the less liberal the institutionalized thought structure; (3) the higher the social class, the less the interaction; (4) the higher the social class, the greater the voluntary association membership.
Social class is defined as social stratification based on status. Social class in this study is operationalized as the socioeconomic status of the citizen representative. Among social scientists, the interest group as well as pluralist approaches assume that the various components of an individual's socioeconomic status (e.g., education, occupation, and income) are highly correlated (Mitchell, 1970:571).

The measure of social class in this study was Hollingshead's (1957) two-factor Index of Social Position. The index utilizes occupation and education to determine social class. Respondent's occupation was scored according to the following scheme: (1) Laborer, farm, unskilled, (2) service worker, semi-skilled, (3) skilled manual, craftsman, (4) clerical, sales, (5) administrative personnel, (6) business manager, proprietors, (7) professionals. The scoring scheme for education was as follows: (1) 0-8 years, (2) 9-11 years, (3) high school graduate, (4) some college, (5) college graduate, (6) work after BA/BS, (7) advanced degree. Each respondent's scale score on occupation was multiplied by a factor of 7; and the scale score for education was multiplied by a factor weight of 4. Thus, occupation is seen as having a greater weight in measuring social class (Hollingshead, 1957). These factors are then summed into a composite score which is called the Index of Social Position. The coefficient of reproducibility for the Index of Social Position was .95. Its theoretical range was 11 to 77 with an actual range of 11 to 70 and a mean of 43.7. The actual distribution of the Index of Social Position is presented in Table 3.9.
Table 3.9. Distribution of index of social position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 - 17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 - 27</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 - 43</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44 - 60</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 - 77</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although income is an alternate measure of social class, the inclusion or exclusion of income is believed to be inconsequential as a variable in this study. There was a relatively strong intercorrelation between income and the Index of Social Position ($r = .77$). Thus, the Index of Social Position was selected as the measure of social class because this two factor index represents a broader view of the social class variable (Hollingshead, 1957). Again, "high" scores on the Index of Social Position represented "high" social class, while "low" scores indicated "low" social class.

The empirical hypotheses are formulated as follows:

E.H.6: If Index of Social Position is high, then Domain Conflict Score will be low.

E.H.7: If Index of Social Position is high, then Liberalism Score will be low.

E.H.8: If Index of Social Position is high, then Interaction Score will be low.
E.H.9: If Index of Social Position is high, then Social Participation Score will be high.

Ascribed status

It was hypothesized that: (1) the higher the ascribed status, the less the domain conflict; (2) the higher the ascribed status, then the less liberal the institutionalized thought structure; (3) the higher the ascribed status, then less the interaction; and (4) the higher the ascribed status, then the greater the voluntary association membership.

Ascribed social status is defined as biological or group attributes (e.g., sex, race) of the individual which determine stratification placement. Ascribed social status in this study is operationally defined as the race of the citizen representative. The concept of race was assigned scores as follows: black was assigned a score of 0 and white a score of 1. Thus, the dichotomous concept of race was scored as a "dummy" variable. Dummy variables are especially useful when a nominal-scale variable (e.g., race) is inserted into a regression equation (Nie, et al., 1975:373). That is, the metric values of 0 and 1 may be treated as interval variables. The theoretical range was 0 to 1 with an observed range of 0 to 1. The actual distribution of black and white respondents is presented in Table 3.10.

Table 3.10. Distribution of race "scores"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 (Black)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (White)</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The empirical hypotheses are presented as follows:

E.H.10: If Race Score is high, then Domain Conflict Score will be low.

E.H.11: If Race Score is high, then Liberalism Score will be low.

E.H.12: If Race Score is high, then Interaction Score will be low.

E.H.13: If Race Score is high, then Social Participation Score will be low.

Test of Paths in the Theoretical Model

The six variables in the path model presented in Figure 2.2 have been operationally defined and empirically measured in the previous section. Based on this path model, a set of recursive equations for the path model which represent cause and effect relationships among variables can be written as follows:

\[ X_3 = b_{31.2}X_1 + b_{32.1}X_2 + e_3 \]
\[ X_4 = b_{41.23}X_1 + b_{42.13}X_2 + b_{43.12}X_3 + e_4 \]
\[ X_5 = b_{51.234}X_1 + b_{52.134}X_2 + b_{54.123}X_4 + e_5 \]
\[ X_6 = b_{61.2345}X_1 + b_{62.1345}X_2 + b_{63.1245}X_3 + b_{64.1235}X_4 + b_{65.1234}X_5 + e_6 \]

The above equation represents theoretical paths in the causal model. Each path coefficient represents the direct influence of a particular path in the model.
Methods of Analysis

Two major statistical techniques were employed in the analysis of data in this study. First, bivariable correlation analysis was used to test the two-variable hypotheses. The .05 level of probability was used as an acceptable indication of a statistical significant relationship. However, the tabular values at the .001, .01, and .05 level for relevant degrees of freedom are specified as an aid in interpreting the findings. A one-tailed F test was used because the direction of the expected relationships was specified in the hypotheses. Second, a path analysis technique was used to assess the causal model and to test the paths in the theoretical model. As a major portion of this dissertation research is exploratory in nature, the .10 level of significance with a one-tailed F test was used to assess the causal model.

A discussion of the findings based on the testing of the bivariate empirical hypothesis and the path model is presented in the following chapter.
CHAPTER IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Introduction

In Chapter II general hypotheses were derived from theory and previous research and stated at the abstract level from the concepts delineated. These concepts were operationalized and measured in the empirical setting in Chapter III. The purpose of this chapter is to present and discuss the findings of the research study.

The findings of this dissertation will be presented in two main sections of this chapter. The first section presents the finding based on the tests of the two variable hypotheses. Here, the tests of the bivariate hypotheses are discussed in the order as presented in Chapter III. The general and empirical hypotheses are restated as an aid in understanding the link between theoretical and measurement level concepts. In the second section, the statistical tests and evaluation of each path in the causal model is discussed. In that section, attention is focused on the research variables operating jointly in the path model.

Statement and Test of General and Empirical Hypotheses

The results of the regression analysis on the two variable hypotheses are presented as a correlation matrix in Table 4.1. The correlation matrix displays the magnitude of the relationships between the six research variables in this study. Below, the results of the test of hypothesis one (G.H.1) through hypothesis thirteen (E.H.13) are presented. Then, the
Table 4.1. Matrix of intercorrelations\textsuperscript{a} between the six variables in the model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>$X_1$</th>
<th>$X_2$</th>
<th>$X_3$</th>
<th>$X_4$</th>
<th>$X_5$</th>
<th>$X_6$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$X_1$ - Race</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_2$ - Index of Social Position</td>
<td></td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_3$ - Social Participation</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.60**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_4$ - Interaction</td>
<td>-.37**</td>
<td>-.25**</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_5$ - Liberalism</td>
<td>-.58**</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_6$ - Domain Conflict</td>
<td>-.58**</td>
<td>-.28*</td>
<td>-.22*</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a}Coefficients of .17 and above are significant at the .05 level of significance with 1 and 113 degrees of freedom.

*Significant at P < .05.

**Significant at P < .01.
relationship between institutionalized thought structure and domain conflict is the first hypothesis to be discussed.

**Institutionalized thought structure and domain conflict**

G.H.I: The more liberal the institutionalized thought structure the greater the domain conflict.

E.H.I: If Liberalism Score is high, the Domain Conflict Score will be high.

The hypothesized relationship between institutionalized thought structure and domain conflict was statistically supported. The $R^2$ value was .11. This value means that Liberalism accounts for 11 percent of the variance in domain conflict among citizen board representatives. As there was a statistically significant correlation ($r = .33$, $P < .01$) between the two variables, the hypothesized relationship between institutionalized thought structure and domain conflict is consistent with Warren et al. (1974) appraisal of thought structures in community decision organizations.

Thought structures may range from "liberal-humanitarian" to "conservative" with the more liberal institutionalized thought structures placing greater emphasis on challenging the *status quo* and the traditional distribution and allocation of power and resources (Mannheim, 1936; Clark and Hopkins, 1969; Edelman, 1975). In the case of the community development organizations, domain conflicts may result from the citizen representatives emphases and strategies they deem relevant for producing social change or "upsetting" the *status quo* in the target neighborhood (Arnstein, 1969; Warren, 1974a).
The liberal-conservative institutionalized thought structure is described in terms of a continuum. Here, the more liberal the thought structure, the more likely citizen board representatives are to challenge the ideas of consensus, universality, and the motives of individuals who are "outsiders" (e.g., non-poor, mayoral appointees). On the other hand, the more conservative thought structures are seen as buttressing the "establishment" or existing order, reinforce the status quo of the privileged, and advocate only marginal strategies for the re-distribution of wealth, power, and status (Lowi, 1969; Clark and Hopkins, 1969; Graves, 1972; Chatman, 1972; Edelman, 1975).

Therefore, the above finding in this study confirms the proposition that the more liberal the institutionalized thought structure, then the greater the level of domain conflict expressed by the citizen board representatives.

**Interaction and domain conflict**

G.H.2: The greater the interaction, then the greater the domain conflict.

E.H.2: If Interaction Score is high, then Domain Conflict Score will be high.

The obtained correlation coefficient \( r = .35, P < .01 \) confirmed the hypothesized relationship between interaction and domain conflict. The \( R^2 \) value was .12. In other words, interaction explained 12 percent of the variance in the domain conflict variable. Therefore, E.H.2 was weakly supported by the data in this study.
Warren *et al.* (1974) assert that members interact with each other in community decision organizations in terms of their need for scarce resources. In addition, member interaction can be seen as an indicator of member interest. Interaction in a community development program provides a number of outlets for the members: (1) it allows members a chance to exercise their voice and vote in the prioritization of neighborhood "needs," (2) offers an opportunity for members to input their ideas into program designs and resource allocation, (3) allows members an opportunity to articulate and represent interests of their respective constituent neighborhoods, and (4) builds internal morale as an advocacy group.

Citizen representatives who interacted most frequently in formal board meetings and in friendship groups expressed greater levels of domain conflict than citizen representatives who interacted infrequently with other board members. These findings seem to suggest that the setting for interaction is a major arena where strategies for social change and reform in "target neighborhoods" are mapped out. The "strategy sessions" and "caucuses" which are held by citizen representatives can be viewed as a means for delineation and articulation of constituent interests. Therefore, the greater the interaction among citizen board representatives, then the greater the level of domain conflict. As the data support the hypothesized relationship between interaction and domain conflict, E.H.2 was supported.

**Interaction and institutionalized thought structure**

G.H.3: The greater the interaction, the more liberal the institutionalized thought structure.
E.H.3: If Interaction Score is high, then Liberalism Score will be high.

The relationship between interaction and institutionalized thought structure was not supported by the data. The correlation coefficient \( r = .16 \) was not statistically significant at the .05 level. The \( R^2 \) value of .02 indicates that interaction accounted for only 2 percent of the variance in the institutionalized thought structure variable. Therefore, E.H.3 was not confirmed.

Voluntary association membership and domain conflict

G.H.4: The greater the voluntary association membership, then the less the domain conflict.

E.H.4: If Social Participation Score is high, then Domain Conflict Score will be low.

The obtained correlation coefficient weakly supported the hypothesized relationship between voluntary association membership and domain conflict \( (r = .22, P < .05) \). The \( R^2 \) value of .05 indicates that only 5 percent of variance in domain conflict is explained by the voluntary association membership variable. Participation in a wide range of voluntary association and activities outside the community development program seems to reduce the likelihood of domain conflict occurring among the membership body (Mitchell, 1970; Peterson, 1970). When individual representatives' attention and energies are spread over a wide range of social and political activities, the likelihood of these individuals expressing domain conflict in the community development program is diminished or reduced. Thus, social participation in a wide range of formal organizations reduces the domain conflicts that many develop among community development membership representatives.
As the data indicate that citizen representatives who participate in a wide range of voluntary associations express lower levels of domain conflict than citizen representatives who are non-participants or "inactive," E.H.4 was supported.

**Voluntary association membership and interaction**

G.H.5: The greater the voluntary association membership, then the less the interaction.

E.H.5: If Social Participation Score is high, then Interaction Score will be low.

The data did not support the hypothesized relationship between voluntary association membership and interaction. The correlation \( r = .11 \) was not statistically significant at the .05 level. Only 1 percent \( (R^2 = .01) \) of the variance in interaction was due to the variable voluntary association membership. This finding suggests that participation in organizations and associations external to the community development program does not have a significant effect on the interaction patterns among citizen representatives in the community development program. Thus, E.H.5 was not confirmed by the data and was rejected.

**Social class and domain conflict**

G.H.6: The higher the social class, then the less the domain conflict.

E.H.6: If Index of Social Position is high, then Domain Conflict Score will be low.

The obtained correlation coefficient weakly supported the hypothesized relationship between social class and domain conflict \( (r = -.29, P < .05) \).
The $R^2$ value was .08. In other words, social class accounted for 8 percent of the variance in domain conflict. These findings weakly support the interest-group and Marxian approaches to social conflict (Dahrendorf, 1959; Marx and Engels, 1906; 1961; Peterson, 1970; Marx, 1971; Jackman and Jackman, 1973; Kriesberg, 1973). Lower class individuals are more likely to express greater levels of domain conflict than individuals who are members of middle or upper classes. The argument has been clearly demonstrated in communities, neighborhoods and community organizations (Coleman, 1957; Lowenstein, 1971; Warren, 1974b; Crenson, 1974b; Edelman, 1975).

A fundamental issue which is evident in the poverty intervention strategy involves the question of whether lower class individuals can be both planners and recipients of social service programs, and whether the traditional system representatives (e.g., middle-class individuals) can act as advocates and articulate the interests of the poor even against their own interests (Capps, 1970; Warren, 1974a). The greatest domain conflict occurs among lower class members who may feel "powerless" or "deprived" of the scarce poverty funds that are allocated to improve the living condition in the low-income neighborhoods. Conflict resolution, to a large extent, depends on the extent to which citizen representatives satisfy their constituents (Zechmeister and Druckman, 1973). Lower class individuals have a greater stake in the outcome of federal poverty program than middle class persons. That is, policies and practices that are instituted under federal and local poverty efforts have numerous implications on the lower class individual, family and neighborhood. For instance, social and
human resource services (e.g., child care, family planning, skills training, counseling, etc.) cut across the boundary of families and neighborhoods.

As the data support the proposition of a statistically significant inverse relationship between social class and domain conflict, E.H.6 is accepted.

**Social class and institutionalized thought structure**

G.H.7: The higher the social class, then the less liberal the institutionalized thought structure.

E.H.7: If Index of Social Position is high, then the Liberalism Score will be low.

The hypothesized relationship between social class and institutionalized thought structure was supported by the data. The correlation coefficient was statistically significant in the predicted direction ($r = -.18$, $P < .05$). The $R^2$ value was .03 which indicated that only 3 percent of the variance in institutionalized thought structure was explained by social class. These findings weakly support the argument that a person's socioeconomic status with respect to the economic processes of a community imposes upon him certain attitudes, values, and interest regarding the strategy of federal poverty programs. Specifically, lower class individuals are more apt to propose "radical" changes in the existing order (e.g., power and resource re-distribution), while middle and upper class individuals are more likely to offer incremental proposals for social reform (Centers, 1949; Kornhauser, 1950; Kramer, 1969; Lowi, 1969; Peterson, 1970; Warren, 1974a).
The data in this study also suggest that lower class individuals welcome federal government intervention into the poverty areas. However, they propose structural solutions to the problems of poverty. While middle class individuals propose to address the problems of the poor on an individual basis. As social class had a statistically significant negative correlation with institutionalized thought structure, E.H.7 was accepted.

**Social class and interaction**

G.H.8: The higher the social class, then the less the interaction.

E.H.8: If Index of Social Position is high, then Interaction Score will be low.

The data weakly support the hypothesized relationship between social class and interaction. The relationship was statistically significant in the direction as hypothesized ($r = -0.25, P < .01$). The $R^2$ value was .08. In other words, social class accounted for only 8 percent of the variance in interaction. These findings suggest that members of high socioeconomic status interact less than members of low socioeconomic status in the poverty program. Warren (1974a) has suggested that lower class participant have more to gain in their interaction in community development programs (e.g., improved housing, employment, social services, health services, etc.) than the middle class participant who do not meet the "eligibility" requirements for the demonstration programs. Thus, middle class members are more likely to be "marginal" participants in the poverty programs, while lower class representatives are more likely to be "active" members in the poverty program.
The issues that lower class citizen representatives focus on may be at the center of their daily survival needs. Therefore, lower class citizen representatives will tend to direct their energies in interactions in the poverty organization, while excluding or limiting themselves in other voluntary associations (Harp and Gagan, 1971; Tomeh, 1973). As the data confirmed the proposition of a significant inverse relationship between a social class and interaction, E.H.8 is accepted.

**Social class and voluntary association membership**

G.H.9: The higher the social class, then the greater the voluntary association membership.

E.H.9: If Index of Social Position is high, then Social Participation Score will be high.

The hypothesized relationship between social class and voluntary association membership was supported by the data. The correlation coefficient significantly confirmed the hypothesized relation ($r = .60$, $P < .001$). The $R^2$ value of .37 indicates that 37 percent of the variance in voluntary association membership was explained by social class. This finding is in agreement with the literature reviewed regarding social class and organizational affiliation (Campbell et al., 1960; Tomeh, 1969; Phillips, 1969; Wright and Hyman, 1971; Crenson, 1974). Individuals of higher social class are more likely to be affiliated or members of voluntary associations than lower class individuals. Thus, E.H.9 is confirmed by the data.
Ascribed status and domain conflict

G.H.10: The more superordinate the ascribed status, then the less the domain conflict.

E.H.10: If Race Score is high, then Domain Conflict Score will be low.

The hypothesized relationship between ascribed status (race) and domain conflict was supported. A statistically significant correlation was found between the two variables \( r = -0.58, P < 0.001 \). The \( R^2 \) value was 0.34. In other words, 34 percent of the variance in domain conflict was explained by the ascribed status variable (e.g., race). The ascribed status of blacks has been described in terms of "subordinate" in American society (Myrdal et al., 1944; Cox, 1948; U.S. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968; Jackman and Jackman, 1973).

The findings suggest that white citizen representatives express lower levels of domain conflict than black citizen representatives. Kramer (1969) has suggested that the tension and hostilities of the mid-sixties to a large extent structured the movement for the "war on poverty" programs. In many instances, individuals who were "activists" in the Civil Rights Movements were employed as community organizers and planners in the poverty programs (Raab, 1968). Seligman (1968) has asserted that these federal programs were a type of "riot insurance." Black involvement in community development programs has been described as a means of combatting poverty and as a way for blacks to gain "political clout" in their community affairs (Miller, 1965; Moynihan, 1965; Harmon, 1970; Zurcher, 1970b).
Thus, white citizen representatives expressed less domain conflict as compared with black representatives in the community development program. As this argument was supported by the data, E.H.10 is accepted.

**Ascribed status and institutionalized thought structure**

G.H.11: The more superordinate the ascribed status, then the less liberal the institutionalized thought structure.

E.H.11: If Race Score is high, the Liberalism Score will be low.

The hypothesized relationship between ascribed status (race) and institutionalized thought structure was supported by the data. There was a significant correlation between the two variables ($r = -.58$, $P < .001$). The $R^2$ value of .34 indicates that 34 percent of the variance of institutionalized thought structure was explained by the ascribed status variable. These findings are consistent with the earlier studies of "superordinates" investment in status quo (Myrdal et al., 1944; Cox, 1948; Clark and Hopkins, 1969; Lowi, 1969; Marx, 1971; Kriesberg, 1973). Whites have been shown to have more "conservative" views on poverty intervention than blacks. As blacks have been victimized by individual and institutional racism in the United States, they are more likely to propose more "radical" strategies under federal poverty intervention programs than whites.

Citizen representatives entering the community development organization bring to that organization the beliefs and values that they have internalized through socialization. In the case of middle class citizen representatives, their institutionalized thought structure tend to be less liberal than the thought structure of lower class citizen board
representatives in the community development program. As the data support the above argument, E.H.11 is accepted.

**Ascribed status and interaction**

G.H.12: The more superordinate the ascribed status, then the less the interaction.

E.H.12: If Race Score is high, then Interaction Score will be low.

The data support the hypothesized relationship between ascribed status (race) and interaction. The correlation coefficient was statistically significant and in the direction as hypothesized ($r = -.37$, $P < .01$). The $R^2$ value of .15 indicates that 15 percent of variance in interaction is accounted for by ascribed status. These findings suggest that white citizen representatives interact less in community development programs than the black citizen representatives. Conversely, black citizen representatives are more apt to be "active" in poverty programs as compared with whites. Again, these findings are consistent with a number of studies which have investigated interaction of minority and lower class individuals in community action programs (Kramer, 1969; Capps, 1970; Zurcher, 1970b; Warren, et al., 1974).

Many of the federal poverty programs were instituted after the riots in the inner cities. The involvement of blacks in the structure of the poverty programs was by design (Seligman, 1968). The federal government mandated that minority group members be represented on the citizen boards and councils that set the policy or advised the general purpose governments on work plans (Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1969). Through
the participation in the civil right movement and the later involvement in the "Great Society" programs, black citizen representatives had a greater "identity investment" in such programs than the white citizen representatives. As the above argument was supported by the data, E.H.12 was supported.

**Ascribed status and voluntary association membership**

G.H.13: The more superordinate the ascribed status, then the less the voluntary association membership.

E.H.13: If Race Score is high, then Social Participation Score will be low.

The data did not support the hypothesized relationship between ascribed status (race) and voluntary association membership. The correlation coefficient (r = .09) was not statistically significant at the .05 level. In addition, ascribed status (race) explained only 1 percent of the variance in voluntary association membership. These findings indicate that race was not significantly related to social participation. That is, social participation rates for black and white citizen representatives did not differ statistically in this study.

These findings do not conform to the "isolation thesis" which suggests low social participation among blacks vis-a-vis whites (Campbell et al., 1960; Wright and Hyman, 1958; 1971). On the other hand, the findings do not fit the "compensation thesis" which suggests that blacks participate more actively than whites in a wider range of social and political organizations (Babchuck and Booth, 1969; Orum, 1966; Renzi, 1968; Olsen, 1970; Ross and Wheeler, 1971). In addition the findings in this study do not
conform to the "ethnic community thesis" which suggests that members of an ethnic minority may become more "active" in social and political organizations because of pressures exerted upon them within their ethnic community to conform to the norms of that community (Myrdal et al., 1944; Lane, 1969; Olsen, 1970).

The findings on ascribed status (race) and voluntary association membership indicate that there is no significant difference between black and white social participation rates. As the data do not support the hypothesized relationship, E.H.13 is rejected.

**Summary of two variable hypotheses**

The results of the regression analysis for the two variable hypotheses are summarized in Table 4.2. The table illustrates that three empirical hypotheses were not supported by the data (see E.H.3, E.H.5, and E.H.13). However, ten of the thirteen empirical hypotheses tested were statistically significant at the .05 probability level or better. The statistically significant relationships range from a weak correlation of .11 to a moderately strong correlation of .60. These ten significant relationships represent a multi-variate approach in describing the relations in a community development program. Each of the ten relationships contributes to the building of a theoretical model of domain conflict.

Below attention is focused on evaluating the six research variables in a path model. The purpose of this analysis was to assess the causal linkages between all the research variables in the theoretical model. It is the fundamental premise that the incorporation of a multi-variate model
### Table 4.2. Summary of regression analysis for the two-variable hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Empirical Hypotheses (E.H.)</th>
<th>Hypothesized relationship</th>
<th>Standardized Regression Coefficient</th>
<th>&quot;F&quot; Value</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>Result of Hypotheses Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E.H. 1</td>
<td>Liberalism - Domain Conflict</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>13.08**</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.H. 2</td>
<td>Interaction - Domain Conflict</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>16.17**</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.H. 3</td>
<td>Interaction - Liberalism</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>Not Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.H. 4</td>
<td>Social Participation - Domain Conflict</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>5.93*</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.H. 5</td>
<td>Social Participation - Interaction</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>Not Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.H. 6</td>
<td>Social Position - Domain Conflict</td>
<td>-.29</td>
<td>10.22**</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.H. 7</td>
<td>Social Position - Liberalism</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>4.31*</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.H. 8</td>
<td>Social Position - Interaction</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>7.66**</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.H. 9</td>
<td>Social Position - Social Participation</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>65.00**</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.H. 10</td>
<td>Race - Domain Conflict</td>
<td>-.58</td>
<td>57.73**</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.H. 11</td>
<td>Race - Liberalism</td>
<td>-.58</td>
<td>57.90**</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.H. 12</td>
<td>Race - Interaction</td>
<td>-.37</td>
<td>19.89**</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.H. 13</td>
<td>Race - Social Participation</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>Not Supported</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*F values significant at the .05 level, i.e., 3.93.

**F values significant at the .01 level, i.e., 6.90.
of domain conflict solves the sociological problem of interpreting the meaning of the joint effect of many variables.

Path Analysis and Evaluation of Paths in the Causal Model

The conceptual causal model developed in Chapter II has been diagrammed in Figure 2.2. The technique of path analysis was used to assess the overall theoretical model of domain conflict. Path analysis displays a network of unidirectional relationships through arrows from explanatory variables to all variables from which a causal relationship is hypothesized (Wright, 1934; Duncan, 1966; Mulford et al., 1972).

In this section, the computation of partial regression and standardized regression coefficients (path coefficients) for each path in the theoretical model were performed. The path model was tested for the "goodness of fit" within the data.

The standardized regression coefficients or "path coefficients" are used to indicate the relative size of the relationship between the explained variables, when all other explanatory variables are taken into account. The null hypothesis for partial standardized regression coefficient ($B = 0$) was tested for each path coefficient using the .10 level. This procedure was used to evaluate whether or not the variables found in the recursive equations should remain in the equations. The findings of the relationships between the explanatory and explained variables in the path model are presented for all paths in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3. F values, path coefficients and percent variance explained ($R^2$) in the path model of domain conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent and Independent Variables</th>
<th>&quot;F&quot; Value</th>
<th>Standardized Regression Coefficient (Path Coefficient)</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$X_3$ - Social Participation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_1$ - Race</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_2$ - Social Position</td>
<td>63.01***</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_4$ - Interaction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_1$ - Race</td>
<td>16.59***</td>
<td>-.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_2$ - Social position</td>
<td>4.31**</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_3$ - Social Participation</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_5$ - Liberalism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_1$ - Race</td>
<td>55.10***</td>
<td>-.61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_2$ - Social position</td>
<td>3.61**</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_4$ - Interaction</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_6$ - Domain Conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_1$ - Race</td>
<td>25.18***</td>
<td>-.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_2$ - Social Position</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_3$ - Social Participation</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_4$ - Interaction</td>
<td>2.03**</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_5$ - Liberalism</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***F value significant at .01 level, i.e., 4.82.  
**F value significant at .05 level, i.e., 3.09.
Not all of the hypothesized causal relations predicted in the path model were statistically supported. However, seven of the thirteen causal relationships predicted in the model were statistically significant at the .10 level or better. Specifically, the Index of Social Position had a significant effect on social participation. However, race had only a negligible effect on the social participation variable. These findings suggest that social class is a better predictor of voluntary association membership than ascribed status. Ascribed status and social class acting jointly explained 36 percent of the variance in the voluntary association membership variable.

Two of the three paths that lead to the interaction variable were statistically significant. That is, Race (ascribed status) and social Position (class) had significant effects on interaction. The social participation variable had a negligible effect on interaction. Although race and social position were both causally related to interaction, Race had the greater direct effect on the interaction variable. The three variables of Race, social position and social participation explained 18 percent of the variance in the interaction variable. Thus, ascribed status and social class were causally related to interaction.

Two of the three predicted paths that lead to the Liberalism variable were statistically significant. That is, Race and Social Position had a significant inverse causal relationship with Liberalism. However, the standardized regression coefficient for Race (-.35) had a greater relative effect than social position (-.22) on the liberalism variable.
Social participation had only minimal direct effect on liberalism. The above findings indicate that both ascribed status and social class have direct causal effects on institutionalized thought structure with ascribed status having the greater relative effect.

Finally, five explanatory variables were specified in the model to have a causal linkage to domain conflict: Race, social position, social participation, interaction, and liberalism. The test of the model indicates that only two variables had significant path coefficients leading to domain conflict. That is, Race (ascribed status) and interaction had significant standardized regression coefficients of -.50 and .12, respectively. By far, Race had the greater relative effect on domain conflict. The standardized regression coefficient for social position, social participation, and liberalism were not statistically significant at the .10 probability level. The path coefficient for Social Position (.11) was just under the cut-off point for statistically significant results. However, Social Position did have a significant indirect effect on domain conflict through the interaction variable. A path diagram of all the standardized regression coefficients is presented in Figure 4.1.

The numbers in Figure 4.1 are the standardized regression coefficients or "path coefficients." By using the standardized path coefficients, one is able to see the relative amount of variance explained by the various explanatory variables. The diagram shows all paths (significant and non-significant) in the causal model. The doubled-arrowed dashed line (←→)
between social participation and liberalism indicates that no hypothesized relationship was specified between these two variables in this study.

Duncan (1965:7) has suggested the deletion of those standardized regression coefficients (path coefficients) which are not statistically significant. This procedure results in a modification of the path model and accompanying recursive equations representing the modified path model. The modified recursive equations are:

\[
\begin{align*}
X_3 &= b_{32}X_2 + e_3 \\
X_4 &= b_{41.2}X_1 + b_{42.1}X_2 + e_4 \\
X_5 &= b_{51.2}X_1 + b_{52.1}X_2 + e_5 \\
X_6 &= b_{61.34}X_1 + b_{63.4}X_3 + b_{64.3}X_4 + e_6
\end{align*}
\]

New standardized regression coefficients were computed based on the above modified recursive equations. The findings of the relationships between the explanatory and explained variables are presented in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.2. Again, the numbers placed on the arrows in the modified model represent the direct effects. Partial regression analysis was computed, and all F-ratios for each regression coefficient were statistically significant. Thus, the arrows in Figure 4.2 represent only statistically significant paths in the model. A brief discussion of the findings based on the path analysis of the modified model is presented below.

First, race and interaction have direct effects on domain conflict. The relative effects can be evaluated by comparing their respective path coefficients presented in Table 4.4 and values placed on the arrows in the path diagram in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.1. Path model of domain conflict with all path coefficients presented.
Table 4.4. F values, path coefficients and percent variance explained ($R^2$) in the modified path model of domain conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explained and Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>&quot;F&quot; Value</th>
<th>Standardized Regression Coefficient (Path Coefficients)</th>
<th>$R^2$ (Explained Variance)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$X_3$ - Social Participation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_2$ - Social Position</td>
<td>65.00***</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_4$ - Interaction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_1$ - Race</td>
<td>16.77***</td>
<td>-.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_2$ - Social Position</td>
<td>4.92***</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_5$ - Liberalism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_1$ - Race</td>
<td>56.92***</td>
<td>-.57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_2$ - Social Position</td>
<td>2.98*</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_6$ - Domain Conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_1$ - Race</td>
<td>40.53***</td>
<td>-.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_2$ - Interaction</td>
<td>3.40**</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***F values significant at .01 level.
**F values significant at .05 level.
*F values significant at .10 level.
Figure 4.2. Path model of domain conflict with all significant path coefficients presented.
Race (ascribed status) had a greater relative effect than interaction on domain conflict. The two explanatory variables have combined effects in the prediction of domain conflict. The multiple partial $R^2$ value was .36. This value means that race and interaction jointly explained 36 percent of the variance in domain conflict. Thus, ascribed status (Race) and interaction can be seen as contributing to the prediction of domain conflict among citizen representatives in the community development program.

Second, the modified path model suggests that social class (social position) and ascribed status (Race) had direct effects on the institutionalized thought structure (Liberalism) among citizen representatives. The relative importance is evaluated through comparison of their respective path coefficients shown in Table 4.4 and values placed on the path diagram in Figure 4.2. The path coefficient for Race (-.57) had a greater relative effect than social position (-.16) on Liberalism. The impact of these two variables explained 37 percent of the variance in domain conflict. These findings suggest that while social class and ascribed status are important in predicting domain conflict, they are also important in predicting institutionalized thought structure. The factors impacting domain conflict indicates that race, social position and interaction each had relative magnitudes greater than liberalism. That is, institutionalized thought structure (liberalism) was not as important in determining domain conflict as were ascribed status, social class, and interaction.

Third, race and social position have direct effects on interaction. The path coefficients found in Table 4.4 and in Figure 4.2 can be compared
directly for their relative importance. The multiple $R^2$ was .18, meaning that 18 percent of the variance of interaction was explained by the two variables. Although the $R^2$ value was not large, the two variables appear to affect the level of interaction among citizen representatives. That is, black and lower class citizens are more likely to have greater levels of interaction in the community development program as compared with white and middle class citizen representatives. These findings suggest that the design of the poverty programs has elicited the participation of the "under-class" and "disenfranchised" individuals. Interaction in the poverty program is seen as one way of building a power base for these persons (Miller, 1965; Kramer, 1969).

Fourth, Social Position had a significant direct effect on social participation in voluntary associations. The $R^2$ value of .36 indicates that 36 percent of the variance of social participation was explained by the social position variable. Social class was the single most important factor in predicting voluntary association membership among citizen representatives. The Race of the individual was not significant in determining organizational affiliation. Once the limiting effect of socio-economic status was controlled, the social participation rates among black and white citizen representatives was statistically the same. Thus, social class can be seen as contributing to the explanation and prediction of voluntary association membership.

Finally, the overall evaluations of the causal model of predicting domain conflict indicate that three explanatory variables are significant
in this operation: ascribed status (race), social class (social position), and interaction. Specifically, Race and interaction had significant direct effects on domain conflict. Of the two variables, Race had a greater relative effect on domain conflict as compared with interaction. In addition, Race and social position had significant indirect effects on domain conflict through the interaction variable. Again, Race had a greater relative indirect effect than social position.

Although institutionalized thought structure was significantly related to domain conflict in the test of the two variable hypothesis, it was of less importance in determining domain conflict when the variables of ascribed status, social class and interaction were considered in a causal model. This finding points out the utility of a multi-variate model of describing domain conflict. While the use of bivariate hypotheses are useful in describing relationships, the causal model (path model) allows one to go a step further in delineating the networks and linkage of variables in the empirical arena.

In summary, this chapter has presented the study of the chapter findings. The two variable hypotheses have been delineated and the tests and evaluations of the causal model have been made. In the chapter to follow, a discussion of the implications of the study findings is presented.
CHAPTER V. IMPLICATIONS

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to indicate implications of the study findings for the following areas: (1) social theory, and (2) social policy. A major goal of social theory is to offer explanations and prediction of social phenomena. In looking at citizen board representatives as the empirical referent, an attempt was made to offer a theoretical framework in which to explain and predict domain conflict in a community development program. In addition, the study focused on the interrelationships among the variables under investigation. The findings of this study also have implications for social policy and practices in urban reform. Community development planners and decision makers may discover that the study findings are useful in developing and/or evaluating participation of citizens in urban community organizations.

Implications for Social Theory

The research problem of explaining and predicting domain conflict among citizen board representatives in a community development program has been explored through a multivariate concept of domain conflict developed from the literature. Five major factors were distilled from the literature as causally linked to domain conflict: namely, institutionalized thought structure, interaction, voluntary association membership, social
class, and ascribed status (race). It was also posited that the five explanatory variables are causally related.

The conceptual framework of this study was grounded on past theory and research literature focused on voluntary associations, community action, and interest-group studies. This study was exploratory in terms of testing a "new" theoretical or causal model of domain conflict in a community development program. The theoretical implications of the study are presented below.

1. The theoretical framework for understanding and predicting domain conflict can be accomplished by focusing on three major theoretical concepts: namely, ascribed status (race), social class, and interaction (formal and informal interaction). Ascribed status (race) and interaction have direct causal effects on domain conflict. Social class, on the other hand, has an indirect effect on domain conflict through the intervening variable of interaction.

Specifically, white citizen board representatives expressed lower levels of domain conflict than black citizen board representatives in the community development program. Individuals who were the most "active" in the formal and informal structure of the community development program expressed greater levels of domain conflict as compared with members who interacted infrequently in the program. Two factors were important in determining the degree of interaction among citizen representatives: namely, race and social position. Interaction was greatest among the black and lower class citizen representatives.
2. In presenting the interrelationships between the explanatory variables, this study lends support to the "interest-group" theories that hold that social class and ethnicity are prime determinants of "consciousness" (Marx and Engels, 1906; 1961; Mannheim, 1936; Centers, 1949; Lane, 1969; Jackman and Jackman, 1973). That is, social position and race had direct causal effects on the degree of liberalism concerning government intervention in the area of poverty. The relative magnitude of the variables showed that race had a greater effect on the citizen representative's thought structure than the representative's social position. Jackman and Jackman (1973) insist that the black-white ethnic cleavage in the United States represents the most salient ethnic cleavage in contemporary America. Blacks and whites do not act as one group in their personal development of institutionalized thought structures. The civil rights movement of the fifties and sixties, along with the "Black Power" movement were essential ingredients in raising the "ego-involvement" and consciousness among blacks in the United States (Kramer, 1969; Hamilton, 1974; Lowi, 1969). Participation in the "War on Poverty" and "Great Society" programs had the effect of politicizing traditionally disenfranchised individuals as demonstrated by their proposals for "radical" solutions (e.g., structural change, re-distribution of power and wealth) to the problem of poverty (Kramer, 1969; Lowi, 1969; Peterson, 1970; Warren, 1974a; Edelman, 1975). Thus, membership in an "underdog" class (e.g., ethnic minority, lower class) causes citizen representatives to have liberal-humanitarian thought structures.
The interest-group approach enables a direct evaluation of the variables that impact domain conflict within an organization where members compete for scarce resources and have divergent epistemologies (Glenn et al., 1970; Zechmeister and Druckman, 1973). Considering the argument that federal poverty programs were designed with a variety of latent and manifest goals in mind, it is no small wonder domain conflicts existed among the various program participants. However, the causal factors involved in domain conflict have not been systematically examined in a causal model framework in previous empirical research studies. In this study, the interest-group approach proved useful in illuminating the interrelationship of variables operating in a community development program.

3. Since community development programs represent only one type of organizations where individuals interact, it would appear fruitful to use the concepts, hypotheses, and causal model in the study of other organizational settings that have advisory boards or councils (i.e., school systems, social welfare agencies, health organizations). Again, it should be noted that one of the objectives of this study was to explore the interrelationships of variables in a causal model framework. This objective was accomplished through the use of the technique of path analysis. Here, significant relationships were built into a causal model. Path analysis provided the relative path magnitude so that comparisons of the direct effect of variables could be made and the path coefficients which were not statistically significant could be deleted from the causal model. Thus, in presenting key variables in a path model, one is better able to
understand the interrelatedness of concepts operating together, and to specify the relative effect of explanatory variables on the explained variable.

4. The findings on social participation in voluntary associations suggest that social class was causally related to organizational affiliation. That is, the higher the social class, the greater the voluntary association membership. These findings are consistent with the theoretical literature reviewed on socioeconomic background and organizational affiliation (Campbell et al., 1960; Tomeh, 1969; Phillips, 1969; Wright and Hyman, 1971; Crenson, 1974). However, ethnicity (race) was not a significant factor in determining organization affiliation in this study. This finding is contrary to the "isolation thesis" (Wright and Hyman, 1971), the "compensation thesis" (Myrdal et al., 1944; Babchuk and Booth, 1969; Orum, 1966; Renzi, 1968; Ross and Wheeler, 1971), and the "ethnic community thesis" (Lane, 1969; Olsen, 1970; Williams and Babchuk, 1973). Thus, the findings of this study suggest that once the limiting effect of social class has been controlled, black and white participation in voluntary associations is essentially the same.

5. A limitation of the theory used in this study concerns the additional explanatory variables that might have been predictive of the explained variable but were not used. However, as this study was explanatory in nature, a few explanatory variables were developed from the literature as key factors that might affect domain conflict. There are several other areas that could be developed for future research in an organizational setting: (1) need for more general theoretical inputs in terms of
development of concepts, models and theory in this area, (2) application of multi-variate approaches in analyzing community programs, (3) use of other organizations in addition to replicating with community development organizations, and (4) longitudinal study of community development organizations.

In summary, it is suggested that the empirical findings of this study contribute to the advancement of a theoretical model of predicting and understanding domain conflict in a community development program, and the interrelationships of variables that operate in the organization setting of a community program. This model may also be applicable to other formal organizations as well as the study of domain conflicts that may emerge at the neighborhood or community level.

Implications for Social Policy

Stenberg (1972) has posited that much of the public administrative policy and practices of governmental agencies run counter to the principles of citizen participation. This problem is compounded when citizen representatives are clients, lower class, minority, uneducated, or demand a decision making position in the organizational hierarchy. Thus, Stenberg (1972) concludes that there is an inherent conflict between lower class member's involvement and the middle class values that are prevalent in both the bureaucratic structure and traditional principles of "professionalism" found in American administrative policy.

Lower class and minority group members are more apt to suggest more "radical" departures for community programming than middle class or
superordinate group members (whites). Policy makers should be willing to accept the idea that plans and programs developed with citizens will reflect the values, interests, and needs of neighborhood residents and may sometimes conflict with administrative policy and professional doctrine (Lowenstein, 1971).

The findings in this study tend to confirm the argument posited by Peterson (1970) who asserted that opportunities for domain conflicts are increased in community development organizations where racial factionalism is apparent, and where black and white citizen representatives oppose each other over the allocation of resources. Silberman (1968) has argued that racial coalitions (e.g., black-white) may find it difficult to arrive at a consensus on politically volatile issues. In the case of the community development program, resource allocation and citizen participation are two focal issues where conflicts are prevalent (Peterson, 1970; Capps, 1970; Warren et al., 1974; Edelman, 1975).

Several key causal factors were delineated as significant in the prediction and explanation of domain conflict among citizen representatives: namely, race, social position, and interaction. These three concepts were shown to be the most efficient variables in this study for explaining domain conflict. Specifically, the direction of the relationships were as follows: (1) blacks expressed a greater level of domain conflict than whites, (2) blacks interacted more often in the community development program than whites, (3) lower class members interacted more often than middle class members, and (4) "high" interaction members
expressed a greater level of domain conflict than "low" interaction members. These findings indicate that race and interaction have direct effects on the level of domain conflict expressed by citizen representatives. On the other hand, social position (social class) has an indirect effect on domain conflict through the intervening variable of interaction.

Institutionalized thought structure (the degree of liberalism toward government intervention in the area of poverty) and domain conflict were not causally related in the path model. However, the test of the bivariate hypothesis showed a statistically significant relationship. When the liberalism variable was inserted into the causal model along with the other explanatory variables, the relative effect of the liberalism variable was not statistically significant. This finding suggests that race, social position, and interaction are the key factors in determining domain conflict among citizen representatives, while liberalism has only a negligible effect on domain conflict in community programming.

Finally, the results obtained from this study may prove useful to policy makers in their re-thinking of community programs. That is, most of the federally sponsored community development programs were designed based on a "consensus model" where emphasis was placed on integrating minority and lower class citizen into the middle class way of life. In addition, participation by the poor in federal poverty programs was viewed as an opportunity for the poor to learn skills and acquire motivation comparable to that of the middle class (Moynihan, 1965; Miller, 1965; Arneson, 1969; Harmon, 1970; Capps, 1970).
The findings of this study have shown that the "consensus model" may not be the appropriate framework to use in understanding and explaining the relationships that develop among citizen representatives in a community development program. This may be particularly the case where federally mandated "citizen participation" requirements are in effect. Under such circumstances, lower class and minority group members (e.g., blacks and other ethnic minorities) are included in the advisory board and councils. Through the delineation of key variables such as race, social position and interaction patterns, one is better able to understand the end product of the joint effect of these variables in a community development program: namely, domain conflict.
The procedure in this chapter is to review and assess research findings related on each of the objectives of the study. This dissertation is an attempt to examine domain conflict in a community development program by using the citizen board representatives as the empirical referant. As stated at the outset, the five objectives of this study are: (1) to develop and test a model of domain conflict among citizen representatives in a community development board; (2) to test and delineate more clearly the relationships between key explanatory concepts (i.e., institutionalized thought structure, interaction, voluntary association membership, social class, and ascribed status) and the key explained concept of domain conflict; (3) to gain more insight into the issues surrounding lower class minority group member (e.g., black) participation in community and other voluntary associations; (4) to delineate some of the policy implications of city-wide citizen participation structures; and (5) to develop an indicator of domain conflict which reflects both the material as well as the ideological nature of the concept.

In Chapter II, the conceptual causal model explaining domain conflict was presented. Five major explanatory variables were distilled from the literature as causal factors of domain conflict: institutionalized thought structure, interaction, voluntary association membership, social class, and ascribed status. The theoretical framework was developed from voluntary association, community action, and social conflict literature and studies. Based on these perspectives, a causal framework was
formulated for the analysis of domain conflict in a community development program. Following the lead of Glenn et al. (1970), domain conflict was conceptualized as being comprised of two components: conflict of interest and conflict of understanding. In an attempt to capture both of these aspects in a holistic approach in the community development program, a composite conceptualization of domain conflict was employed.

Another major focal concern in the theoretical chapter is the formulation of the explanatory concepts. Here, explanatory concepts were those variables which were posited as causal or determinants of domain conflict. First, bivariate hypotheses were formulated based on a review of previous studies. Thirteen general hypotheses (G.H.) were delineated. These hypotheses are restated below:

G.H. 1: The more liberal the institutionalized thought structure, then the greater the domain conflict.

G.H. 2: The greater the interaction, then the greater the domain conflict.

G.H. 3: The greater the interaction, then the more liberal the institutionalized thought structure.

G.H. 4: The greater the voluntary association membership, then the less the domain conflict.

G.H. 5: The greater the voluntary association membership, then the less the interaction.

G.H. 6: The higher the social class, then the less the domain conflict.
G.H. 7: The higher the social class, then the less liberal the institutionalized thought structure.

G.H. 8: The higher the social class, then the less the interaction.

G.H. 9: The higher the social class, then the greater the voluntary association membership.

G.H. 10: The more superordinate the ascribed status, then the less the domain conflict.

G.H. 11: The more superordinate the ascribed status, then the less liberal the institutionalized thought structure.

G.H. 12: The more superordinate the ascribed status, then the less the interaction.

G.H. 13: The more superordinate the ascribed status, then the less the voluntary association membership.

Following the two variable hypotheses, the path model of domain conflict was developed. The same six concepts used in the two variable analysis were also specified in the path model presented in Figure 2.2.

In the chapter on methodology, Chapter III, the sample of citizen board representatives in a local community development program was described. This sample provided the data for testing the hypotheses and evaluating the conceptual causal model. The data were collected by means of mailed questionnaires and structured interviews conducted during August and September, 1975.

Each of the six concepts delineated in the theoretical discussion was operationalized and empirically measured. For each of the thirteen general
hypotheses, an empirical hypothesis was delineated. The statistical technique used to test the bivariate relationships of the empirical hypotheses was regression analysis. The .05 level of probability was used to assess statistically significant relationships.

For the path model, the same six concepts previously delineated were linked in a causal framework, with domain conflict being the last variable to enter the model. The statistical technique used to evaluate paths in the model was partial regression analysis.

In Chapter IV, the results of the bivariate relationships and the path model were presented. With regard to the two variable hypotheses, ten of the thirteen empirical relationships were significantly supported by the data. A brief summary of each of the bivariate relationships is presented in Table 5.1.

For the test of significance for path coefficients, the F values and standardized regression coefficients for the hypothesized paths in the path model were computed and presented in Figure 4.1 and Table 4.3. Seven of the thirteen hypothesized paths were statistically significant. The non-significant paths were deleted from the causal model. The remaining paths were recomputed which resulted in a modified path model. These findings are presented in Table 4.4 and the path diagram is shown in Figure 4.2. A brief summary of the findings of the modified path model is presented as follows:

1. Both ascribed status (race) and interaction contribute significantly to the prediction of domain conflict. However, race seems to be a
Table 6.1. Summary of regression analysis for the two-variable hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Empirical Hypotheses (E.H.)</th>
<th>Hypothesized Relationship</th>
<th>Standardized Regression Coefficient</th>
<th>&quot;F&quot; Value</th>
<th>R²</th>
<th>Result of Hypotheses Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E.H. 1</td>
<td>Liberalism - Domain Conflict</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>13.08**</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.H. 2</td>
<td>Interaction - Domain Conflict</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>16.17**</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.H. 3</td>
<td>Interaction - Liberalism</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>Not Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.H. 4</td>
<td>Social Participation - Domain Conflict</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>5.93*</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.H. 5</td>
<td>Social Participation - Interaction</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>Not Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.H. 6</td>
<td>Social Position - Domain Conflict</td>
<td>-.29</td>
<td>10.22**</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.H. 7</td>
<td>Social Position - Liberalism</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>4.31*</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.H. 8</td>
<td>Social Position - Interaction</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>7.66**</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.H. 9</td>
<td>Social Position - Social Participation</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>65.00**</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.H. 10</td>
<td>Race - Domain Conflict</td>
<td>-.58</td>
<td>57.73**</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.H. 11</td>
<td>Race - Liberalism</td>
<td>-.58</td>
<td>57.90**</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.H. 12</td>
<td>Race - Interaction</td>
<td>-.37</td>
<td>19.89**</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.H. 13</td>
<td>Race - Social Participation</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>Not Supported</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*F value significant at the .05 level, i.e., 3.93.

**F value significant at the .01 level, i.e., 6.90.
2. Social class has a significant indirect effect on domain conflict through interaction. In addition, ascribed status (race) was causally related to interaction. Social class and ascribed status explained 18 percent of the variance in interaction, with ascribed status having a greater relative effect on interaction than social class.

3. Both paths from ascribed status and social class to institutionalized thought structure are significant. These two variables explained 37 percent of the variance in the institutionalized thought structure variable. Thus, these findings suggest that ethnicity and socioeconomic status are significant factors in shaping the attitudes that citizen representatives have toward federal poverty intervention programming.

4. Social class has a direct causal effect on voluntary association membership. That is, social class appears to contribute significantly to the explanation and prediction of organizational affiliation among the citizen representatives. Here, middle class citizen representatives were more likely to be affiliated with outside organizations (organizations external to the community development program) than lower class citizen representatives. The single variable of social class explained 36 percent of the variance in voluntary association membership. Thus, social class seems to be the single most important variable in explaining organizational affiliation in this study.
In Chapter IV, the implications of the research study were delineated in terms of theoretical and policy implications. The theoretical model of domain conflict appears useful in explanation and prediction of domain conflict in an organizational setting. Three key variables were important in explaining domain conflict: namely, ascribed status (race), interaction, and social class.

The findings of this study support the "interest-group" theories where social class and ethnicity are seen as determinants of "consciousness" (Marx and Engels, 1906; 1961; Mannheim, 1936; Centers, 1949; Lane, 1969; Jackman and Jackman, 1973). Class and ethnic cleavages are seen as major causal factors of an individual's institutionalized thought structure. Participation in the "War on Poverty" and "Great Society" programs seems to have politicized traditionally disenfranchised individuals (e.g., the poor, ethnic minorities) as demonstrated through their liberal-humanitarian thought structures on poverty intervention (Kramer, 1969; Lowi, 1969).

The findings on voluntary association membership and social class were consistent with the literature reviewed. That is, middle class members were more likely to be affiliated with voluntary associations than were lower class members. However, race was not a significant factor in determining organizational affiliation. Once the limiting factor of social class was eliminated or controlled, it seems that black and white participation in voluntary associations was essentially the same. This finding was contrary to Wright and Hyman's (1971) "isolation thesis," the "compensation thesis" (Myrdal et al., 1944; Babchuk and Booth, 1969; Orum,
1966; Renzi, 1968; Ross and Wheeler, 1971), and the "ethnic community thesis" (Lane, 1969; Olsen, 1970; Williams and Babchuk, 1973). Thus, social class seems to be a crucial factor in explaining voluntary association membership.

In terms of the implications for social policy, it was pointed out that the findings in this study confirm the argument that domain conflicts are likely in community organizations where black and white citizen representatives oppose each other over the allocation of resources (Peterson, 1970). In addition, the study findings indicate that lower class and minority group members (e.g., blacks) are more apt to propose more "radical" solutions to the problem of poverty than middle class or superordinate group members (e.g., whites). In turn, policy makers should be aware that plans and programs developed by lower class and racial minorities will reflect the values, interests, and "needs" of these groups and may sometime conflict with administrative policy and professional doctrine. Stenberg (1972) asserts that much of the public administrative policy and practices of governmental agencies run counter to the principles of citizen participation. This problem is compunded when members happen to be clients, lower class, minority, or demand a decision making role in the organizational hierarchy.

It was demonstrated that blacks, lower class members, and members who interact frequently with other citizen board members expressed greater levels of domain conflict as compared to whites, middles members, and members who interacted infrequently with other citizen board representatives.
Institutionalized thought structure was not a major causal factor of domain conflict among citizen representatives. That is, a significant positive relationship was found between liberalism and domain conflict in the test of the bivariate hypothesis. However, when the relationship was analyzed in a causal model framework, liberalism was not as significant as race, interaction, and social position in determining domain conflict. Thus, race, social position, and interaction are key factors in explaining domain conflict in a community development program.

Finally, it seems that a multi-variate approach in explaining domain conflict is useful in presenting the key variables that operate jointly in an urban community organization. This approach allows one to show the mutual effects of the causal factors along with the relative magnitude of each variable on domain conflict. Thus, the multi-variate approach seems to be a useful framework for describing and explaining the interrelationship of key elements that exist in a community organization.
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I would like to thank the Neighborhood Development Service Area Coordinators who were invaluable in making the initial contacts, scheduling interviews, and follow-up with citizen representatives. The Chairman of the Central Advisory Board, Mr. Robert King, and the Chairpersons of the Neighborhood Priority Boards were also useful in disseminating information among the citizen representatives who were the respondents in this study.

I wish to express my sincere appreciation to several persons who have contributed to this dissertation. I am most grateful to Dr. Gerald E. Klonglan and Dr. Robert O. Richards, Co-Chairmen of my graduate committee, for their patience, understanding and thoughtful advice in the conceptual presentation of this dissertation. My gratitude is expressed to Dr. Charles Mulford, Dr. Joe Hraba, and Dr. Don Hadwiger, who have served on my program of study committee.
Personal thanks go to Riley P. and Bettye B. Evans with whom I resided while completing the final stages of the research and writing of this dissertation.

To my wife Linda McKeever who has always provided her moral support and that "extra" bit of encouragement, this work is dedicated.
APPENDIX A. DISTRIBUTION OF OCCUPATION, EDUCATION, SEX AND INCOME
### Table A.1. Distribution of occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Frequency</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laborer, Farm</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Work, Semi-skill</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Manual, Craftsman</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Manual</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical, Sales</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin. Personnel</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>115</td>
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### Table A.2. Distribution of education

<table>
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<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>0-8 years</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-11 years</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Graduate</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Graduate</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work After BA/BS</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Degree</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>115</td>
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</table>
Table A.3. Distribution of sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A.4. Distribution of income

<table>
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<th>Range</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Frequency</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$ 1,000 - 4,999</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000 - 8,999</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9,000 - 12,999</td>
<td>27</td>
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<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13,000 - 16,999</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17,000 - 20,999</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21,000 - 24,999</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25,000 and over</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>115</td>
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</table>
APPENDIX B. QUESTIONNAIRE
APPENDIX B. QUESTIONNAIRE

The questions that follow the instructions below are those selected for analysis in this dissertation.

The following questionnaire contains a number of statements on citizen participation for which there is no general agreement. The purpose of these statements is to give the Board members a chance to evaluate citizen participation in the Neighborhood Development Program. There are no right or wrong answers. NO ONE WILL BE SINGLED OUT BY NAME OR OTHER IDENTIFYING FACTOR in compiling the total evaluation which Board members will be making. We would like your honest opinions on each of these statements.

1. The following statements are things sometimes heard about participation by people in community development programs, particularly in planning such programs. In each of the below items, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the statements as they may apply to citizen participation in the Neighborhood Development Program.

SA A D SD a. Citizen participation makes for a more effective Neighborhood Development Program.

SA A D SD b. Citizen participation has improved the relations between people in the Neighborhood Development neighborhoods.

SA A D SD c. Citizen participation is just another way of "using" the residents in the neighborhood.

SA A D SD d. Citizen participation helps people feel a part of the neighborhood.

SA A D SD e. Citizen participation provides an opportunity for residents to speak, but without being heard.

SA A D SD f. Citizens are often frustrated from the lack of input into the decision-making processes of the program.

SA A D SD g. Citizen participation in the Neighborhood Development Program is really causing less exploitation of the residents.

SA A D SD h. Citizen participation has generated special interest groups that are competing for limited resources in the neighborhoods.
i. Citizen participation is nothing more than a gimmick since the residents have not been given any real power.

j. Citizen participation has contributed to an increased class consciousness among neighborhood residents.

2. In thinking about the funds coming into Des Moines for community development programs, would you say that such funds are equally or unequally distributed across the six Neighborhood Development neighborhoods?

   ____ Equally distributed
   ____ Unequally distributed

3. Do you feel that this neighborhood (NEIGHBORHOOD MEMBER REPRESENTS) has received its fair share of funds from the Neighborhood Development Program?

   ____ Yes
   ____ No

4. What is your feeling on the impact of programs provided through Neighborhood Development, in general, would you say that the programs have caused greater or less competition among residents of the neighborhoods?

   ____ Less competition
   ____ Greater competition

5. How many really close friends do you have on this Board (NEIGHBORHOOD BOARD MEMBER REPRESENTS) that you occasionally talk over confidential matters with?

   ____ None or one
   ____ Two or more

6. How often do you get to visit the friend(s) that you know best on this Board?

   ____ Once a month or less
   ____ More than once a month
7. Would you say that you go around with a certain group of close friends on this Board who visit back and forth in each other's houses?
   _____ No
   _____ Yes

8. About how many Neighborhood Development Board meetings a month would you say you have attended on the average or over the past six months? __________
APPENDIX C. INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT
APPENDIX C. INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT

The questions that follow the instructions below are those selected for analysis in this dissertation.

CONFIDENTIAL

Schedule Number __________ Name of Respondent _______________________

Date __________ Time __________

Hello! My name is ______________________. I am conducting a study of citizen participation in the Neighborhood Development Program. The purpose of the interviews is to give each Neighborhood Priority and Central Advisory Board member a chance to evaluate citizen participation in the present program. The goal is to put all the Citizen Board member's opinions together to form a total evaluation of citizen participation. YOUR NAME WILL NOT BE USED IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR ANSWERS. Thus, all board members will be asked about citizen participation as it relates to residents, other Board members, and to service delivery.

As a board member in Neighborhood Development, your cooperation in contributing to the evaluation is important in the development of future models of community programs.
1. As you know, the Neighborhood Development Program is funded through a grant from the federal government (Department of Housing and Urban Development). Because of this tie with the federal government, please give us your opinion of government programs in general by indicating whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements. (HAND CARD 1).

SA A D SD a. Government programs have not gone far enough to eliminate poverty in this country.

SA A D SD b. Government programs create dependent classes of people.

SA A D SD c. Government programs kill the spirit of individualism which made this country great.

SA A D SD d. Government programs have strengthened the economic and social institutions in this country.

SA A D SD e. Most people deserve the benefits they receive from Government programs.

SA A D SD f. Government programs have grown in size to the point of being unmanageable.

2. Are you a member of other voluntary and/or community organizations other than the Neighborhood Development Board(s)?

_____ No

_____ Yes 2a. (IF RESPONDENT ANSWERED YES) Please list the organizations you belong to, and how active you are in them whether they are in Des Moines or elsewhere (HAND R FORM INSERT)

2b. (RECORD THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF MEMBERSHIP ORGANIZATIONS; IF ANSWERED NO, ENTER 0)

_____________ Number
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Organization</th>
<th>Do you attend meetings regularly?</th>
<th>Do you pay dues or give contributions?</th>
<th>Are you a member of any committees?</th>
<th>Are you an officer?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. How many years of education have you completed? ____ What is the highest degree completed? ________________

4. What is your occupation (specific job title and description of job)? ________________

5. One item generally thought to be a good measure of social status is income. Thus, in which category does the total income in your household for the past year fall? (HAND R CARD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Code</th>
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<td>Less than $1,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>$1,000 to $1,999</td>
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<tr>
<td>$2,000 to $2,999</td>
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<tr>
<td>$3,000 to $3,999</td>
<td>04</td>
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<tr>
<td>$4,000 to $4,999</td>
<td>05</td>
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<tr>
<td>$5,000 to $5,999</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$6,000 to $8,999</td>
<td>07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$9,000 to $11,999</td>
<td>08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$12,000 to $14,999</td>
<td>09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,000 to $24,999</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$25,000 or more</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Respondent's Sex

1 ___ Male  2 ___ Female

7. Respondent's Race

1 ___ Black  2 ___ White  3 ___ Other
APPENDIX D. RESEARCH SETTING
APPENDIX D. RESEARCH SETTING

The citizen representatives who were the empirical referrants for this study were either elected or appointed to one year terms on the respective community boards. Representatives came from six "Prime Service Areas" from the research city.

At the time that this research study was being conducted, there were no raging controversies or conflicts within the program. The ranking of service projects and allocation of resources based on priorities had been completed six months prior to the interviewing. Board meetings were fairly routine and predictable in terms of citizen demands.

Although the citizen participation component of the Neighborhood Development Program had been reduced from the early "key days" of 1971-1972, the city still has a sizable budget for citizen participation. The top administrators in the program often point to this fact that the program has decentralized offices in six neighborhoods. These decentralized offices have staffs and an operating budget. Neighborhood meetings and other program functions are held in the site offices.

The site area coordinators of each "target area" are responsible for disseminating information on citizen participation and community involvement. As the Service Area Coordinators were familiar with the citizen representatives of these respective neighborhoods, they were useful in making telephone follow-ups to respondents and in scheduling interviews.
The citizen representatives have the responsibility of ranking and prioritizing the service areas or goals of the program. This ranking process starts from the community residents and continues through the Neighborhood Priority Boards, Central Advisory Board, and then to the City Council. These processes had been completed long before this study began.

Thus, although there appeared to be some differences in terms of neighborhood "needs" and priorities advocated by citizen representatives, these differences did not manifest themselves into open confrontations and hostilities.