A cross sectional study of intra-organizational perceptions of power and authority by the chief institutional representatives to the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education

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A cross sectional study of intra-organizational perceptions of power and authority by the chief institutional representatives to the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education

by

Fred Douglas Gilbert, Jr.

A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of The Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION

Background and Rationale

Influence, or personal power, permeates our very being. Indeed, the ancient Greek philosophers defined power as being, reasoning that there was no being without power. Currently and particularly in Western cultures we all feel the influence of others. All the professions which are other person oriented are inexorably tied to the amounts and modes of influencing. Teachers, therapists and salesmen are all concerned with motivation and influence as being central to applying their body of skills. The culture and the economy, therefore, survive only because of an intricate network of influences.

In personal interaction and in institutional processes it is necessary to understand influence. A democratic way of life demands this understanding. In a democracy the variety of forms of power and its uses are considerable and broad. In this setting an enlightened citizen or involved person is important. Enlightenment is not just important to recognize different kinds of influences and perhaps resist them, but it is also important to understand that the use of power and the appropriate use of power in given situations may be entirely different things.
If understanding influence, both personal and institutional, is particularly important in a democratic society, it is doubly so in a college or university setting within that society. Freedom of speech, seeking knowledge, truthful inquiry and the dissemination of ideas are all activities espoused by higher education which require the people to understand power so that independent thinking and action can take place. In a "free and open society" it is important to open ourselves and our institutions to scrutiny.

The Need for the Study

A major problem faced by modern organizations in general and by professional organizations specifically is the design of a system of social control. This rationalization of administrative procedures implies autonomous working conditions and the exercise of discretion among workers. The methods through which contemporary professional organizations reconcile these two conditions in their control structures have important implications for other organizations which are undergoing changes toward bureaucratization and professionalization. Therefore, empirical inquiry into the control structures of universities is an appropriate step towards understanding those methods.
The Problem

A number of theories have been proposed to explain social power and influence. Persons in all kinds of settings feel the influences of others, and act accordingly. Many people, at one time or another, have wondered why humans behave as they do. They have observed actions and reactions and noted that different people react quite differently to the same situation. They have listened to people describe vastly different feelings about the same occurrence or the same person. They have noticed that some people seem to have a great influence over many others, while at the same time there are people who have no influence at all over others. Those being influenced have different feelings too—from awe and respect to fear and resentment. These observations have been the focus of interest and study by social scientists.

A university setting is one in which there are many diverse influences, and an obvious differential in power among its citizens. How are these differences reflected in the perceptions of those in the academic setting? Are some areas perceived to be more punitive or fearsome than others?

To study all aspects of power and its ramifications on a university campus would be impossible in one study. The research reported herein does, however, look at some aspects of power in the academic setting.
The problem undertaken in this study was to investigate the structures of power and the administrative behavioral correlates as perceived by the chief institutional representatives to the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education (CIRAACTE) at their various institutions. This main problem contained three subproblems: (1) to describe the control and power base structures in the institutions of the CIRAACTE, (2) to discern whether systematic control and power base differences existed among the institution's hierarchical levels, and to account for any structural differences which occurred, and (3) to determine (CIRAACTE) power satisfaction and scholarly activities correlates of the structures and to investigate the hierarchical level of differences in the relationships.

**Variables Active in the Problem**

The objectives of this research required conceptual and operational definitions of the major variables to be made theoretically sensitive, so as to generate hypotheses relating the variables, and which suggested measurements and techniques to test the hypotheses. These considerations were applied in the selection of the following: CIRAACTE power structure, CIRAACTE power satisfaction, scholarly activities, decision making structure, and institutional function.
Institutional Control Structure

Institutional control structure refers to the perceived amounts of influence the central administrator, the dean, and the department chairperson as a group have over the affairs of the institution and over one another. The "institution" in this instance refers to any structural unit of a university which houses the CIRAACTE.

Consistent with Tannenbaum's conception, the institutional control structure is taken as the amounts of power or influence exercised within the institution (central administrators), college (deans), and departments (department chairperson) hierarchy as perceived by the CIRAACTE. It was defined in terms of two related concepts:

**Distribution of Control** - the relative amounts of power or influence exercised in the institution by and over the central administrator, dean, and department chairperson; and

**Total Control** - the average of the amounts of power or influence exercised in the institution by and over the central administrator, dean, and department chairperson, all taken as a group.

It is possible to differentiate between two separate kinds of influence attempts. The central administrator, dean, and department chairperson exercise power or influence over institutional activities and functions; they also
exercise power or influence over one another. Therefore, a distinction was made between these two types of control (Tannenbaum and Georgopoulos, 1957).

In addition to the general exercise of control over the institution, the amounts of control over several institutional decision making areas were considered. These included references to control over departmental policy, college policy, institutional policy, teaching activities (in general), and research activities (in general); over authorization in personnel functions, curriculums, public relations, financial functions, and research functions; over departmental teaching activities, and departmental research activities; and over institution administrative activities.

**Theoretical Concepts**

Organizational power and authority become manifest in various ways. The physical presence and design of the building which houses the organization, for example, represents a form of power or influence. So do the mechanical and physical procedures required to perform the work; the conceptual systems and procedures which integrate organizational activities; the job descriptions and specifications which prescribe formal role behaviors; the forms, reports, and other information outputs; and the existence of a formally-structured hierarchy of authority
contribute towards converting individual behaviors into concerted effort. Although an organization might employ these physical, procedural, and normative mechanisms for behavior direction, in the final analysis the responsibility for evaluating deviations from organizational norms and for influencing behavior toward those norms lies with individuals in the organization. In other words, a significant amount of intra-organizational power and authority is mediated through people. Therefore, one method of studying power and authority structures and processes, and the one used in the present study, is by analyzing interpersonal influence.

The Control (Power of Influence) Graph

For the purpose of this study a means of conceptualizing and measuring influence relationships among people in organizations is presented by Tannenbaum and Kahn (1957). In their study of four trade-union locals they applied a technique called a "control graph." The control graph is a two-dimensional representation of the structure of power or influence, that exists among individuals in an organization. The abcissa of the graph is taken to represent the organizational hierarchy and the ordinate, the amount of control exercised by each position in the hierarchy. By plotting the intersections of the two axes--that is, the respective amounts of control exercised by each hierarchical level--a variety of different curves can be drawn, and two
different aspects of control can be illustrated. The distribution of control, represented by the slope of the curve, shows the relative amounts of control over organizational affairs and over one another exercised by each hierarchical group or individual; the total amount of power, represented by the average height of the curve, shows how much power is exercised within the organization from all hierarchical sources.

The control measures can be determined quantitatively by organizing numerical values to the points along the abcissa and ordinate of the graph and by assuming interval scaling along both axes. This technique provides two power indexes which can be used to compare different organizations or different divisions within a single organization, or to relate control structures to other organizational variables.

This scheme characterizes the control structure of an organization in terms of two axes. The horizontal axis is based on a universal characteristic of formal organizations: the system of hierarchically defined administrative positions. This axis is designed to represent the various hierarchical levels, from low to high, in the organization. In most institutions, for example, the department chairperson would be placed at the low end of this axis, and the central administrators would be placed at the high end, with another position group (e.g., the deans) at the intervening level.
The vertical axis of the graph represents the amount of control over the organization's policies and actions that is exercised by each of the hierarchical levels. For example, a given level, conceivably, could have very little control in determining the policies and actions of the organization. This might be true of the department chairperson in some institutions or of the central administrators in others. On the other hand, certain levels might be extremely influential in controlling the affairs of the organization. Again, this might be true of the central administrator, the department chairperson, or any combination of hierarchical levels. Varying shapes of curve might be generated from these axes, depending on how much control is exercised by each of the hierarchical groups.

The importance of two distinct aspects of control in organizations are the distribution of control, i.e., who or what hierarchically defined groups exercises control over the affairs of the organization, and the total amount of control, i.e., how much control is exercised within the organization, from all sources. The first is represented by the slope of the curve, the second by its average height. The one emphasizes the relative power of individuals and groups within the organization, while the other reflects its absolute amount. Discussions of control in organizations have more often recognized the former. However, an
understanding of control in institutions requires an accounting not only of where control resides but how much it all amounts to. Furthermore, institutional levels which have the same distribution of control may differ markedly in the total amount of control. Similarly, institutional levels with the same total amount of control, the control may be distributed in quite different ways.

The ideal model of power was represented by the unilateral, downward flow of authority from the top to the bottom of the pyramid of authority. This rigidly-structured, downward-flowing distribution of control was considered the *sine qua non* of organizational effectiveness. Organizations were assumed to function best where power was fixed in formal offices and allotted in decreasing amounts down through the hierarchy.

Implied in this view is the belief that the exercise of control is a zero-sum-game, that the organization affords a fixed amount of power with which individuals and groups can base their power exercised by other individuals and groups. Within the concept of "total amount of power," however, points on the power curve can rise or fall independently of the other points, or the entire curve can rise or fall. This shows that, theoretically there is a variable amount of power available in the organization and that individuals and groups can increase their influence without the usurpation of
influence from others.

This concept is apparent in a number of organizational models (Leavitt, 1965). Most participative management and power equalization models, for example, either explicitly describe or imply such an increase in the total amount of power available in the organization—an increase which is hypothesized to lead to a greater degree of organizational effectiveness.

Variations in power structures have been shown to have important implications for the job satisfaction of organization members and for organizational performance (Tannenbaum, 1968a). More specifically, it has been shown that a high degree of total power within the organization is the most important power condition for effecting these outcomes. This suggests that the importance that the classical viewpoint imputed to relative power variations in the authority hierarchy was overstated—the point being that individuals attach greater importance to having a sufficient amount of influence over their jobs and over those who formally direct their jobs than they do to their having more or less power than someone else above or below them in the hierarchy.

The power graph is of important theoretical and practical interest, therefore, since it can be used to conceptualize and operationalize major organizational
theories and prescriptions in terms of distributions and total amount of power. It can be used to generate and test hypotheses which come from bureaucratic theory, theories of professional organization, power equalization and participative management models, as well as the theory of total power developed by Tannenbaum. It can be used as a descriptive and analytical technique to operationalize the structure of power among the hierarchical levels of CIRAACTE.

Organizational Task Structures

It is well-documented that structural features of organizations are dependent upon other relevant technological and environmental variables, especially in business and industrial firms. Studies consistently discover that "firms differ according to the kind of work they do, and thus differ in their structure" (Perrow, 1970). Technological variations in production processes, such as differences in their degrees of routininess and rationality: environmental variables, such as the amount of certainty or predictability in the organization's subunit environment; along with work flow characteristics, organizational size, and goal orientations have been shown to differentiate effectively among organizations and their major subunits, and to have predictable effects upon their structures and processes—most typically, upon the degree of rationalization of their technical and social subsystems. In addition, research has
shown that the most effective leadership style is contingent upon leader personality, group characteristics, power, and task structure variables.

This same perspective has also been applied in colleges and universities. Size, frequency of decision making, goal orientation, degree of bureaucratization, and environmental pressure from sources outside the university have been used to differentiate institutions and their divisions along structural dimensions. Relative to power structures it appears that "different structures of authority, accountability and power obtain with respect to different type tasks and problems which the (academic) department confronts" (Hobbs and Anderson, 1971).

Findings from these kinds of studies lend support for the contention that the design of an organization's administrative system is dependent upon characteristics of the work performed, and point to the possibility of finding power and power variations occurring as a function of the task structure of universities. In the university the major tasks performed are typically included under the teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community. Therefore, these categories were used to anticipate task characteristics which could possibly account for variations in power structures.
**Institutional Environment**

If institutional task structures contain implications for power and authority variations, then it should be possible to differentiate among the institutions on the basis of their task, power and authority structures. That is, if there were systematic differentiation among the institutions with power and authority base similarities should emerge.

Research on college and university environments has provided methods for differentiating institutions according to the sets of perceived environmental stimuli which impinge upon the person and affect his behavior, and by extension, offer a means of categorizing and differentiating institutions. An appropriate and practical model for studying university environments is the Environmental Assessment Technique (EAT) proposed by Astin and Holland (1961). It is based upon the notion that a major part of environmental forces is transmitted through people, and that "the dominant features of an environment are dependent upon the typical characteristics of its members" (Astin and Holland, 1961).

People search for work environments that will permit them to exercise their attitudes and values, and to take on agreeable problems and roles. Members of an institution or major university or college have similar institutional
functions, and this study hypothesized four broad classes to account for these similarities in interests, traits, and behaviors. The four institutional functions are called Teaching, Research, Service to the College or University, and Service to the Community.

Objectives of the Study

The objective of this study is to provide current information, within a relevant conceptual framework, about the degrees of power perceived to be exercised at institutions holding membership in the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education. The perceptions of the chief institutional representatives to AACTE will be used to determine the perceived amount of power. The following list summarizes the objectives of the present study in terms of the major variables:

1. To describe, through the use of aggregate measures the perceived (a) distribution of control, (b) total control of power structure within teacher education institutions holding membership in the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education (AACTE).

2. To describe, through the use of aggregate measures the perceived degree of influence in teacher education institutions of the CIRAECTE according to their hierarchical levels (central administrators, deans, and department chairpersons).
3. To determine whether authority systems of institutions will be perceptually differentiated by their power structures according to their hierarchical levels.

4. To determine whether systematic control structure differences exist among the hierarchical levels.

5. To determine whether authority systems of institutions will be differentiated by their perceived decision making structures according to their hierarchical levels.

6. To determine whether authority systems of institutions will be differentiated by their perceived power satisfaction structures according to their hierarchical levels.

7. To determine whether authority systems of institutions will be differentiated by their expected scholarly activities according to their hierarchical levels.

8. To determine whether authority systems of institutions will be differentiated by their perceived institutional functions according to their hierarchical levels.

9. To determine the CIRAACTE perceived power structures correlates according to their hierarchical levels.

10. To determine the CIRAACTE perceived power satisfaction correlates according to their hierarchical levels.
11. To determine the CIRA ACTE perceived **scholarly activity** correlates according to their hierarchical levels.

12. To determine the CIRA ACTE perceived **institutional function** correlates according to their hierarchical levels.

**Organization of the Study**

This study has been divided into six sections. The six sections will address and/or include the following: a statement of the problem under investigation; define and list the variables active in the study; research and statistical hypotheses which were used for the purpose of guiding the study and describing the methodology used to carry it through; a review of the theory and research related to intra-organizational power in general and to university power specifically; present in aggregate and as they vary among hierarchy levels findings which describe the structure of power in the institutions; examine the relationships between power and other variables; summarize the research findings; attempt to evaluate the findings in the context of existing organizational power theories; and recommendations for future empirical research into institutional (university) power structures.
Definition of Terms

The following list enumerates, gives examples of, and/or conceptually defines the central variables important to the study:

1. **Control** - the ability to cause or prevent change, or direct or alter the direction of change.

2. **Influence** - for the purpose of this study no attempts were made to distinguish between control, influence and power.

3. **Power** - for the purpose of this study no attempts were made to distinguish between control, influence and power.

4. **Authorization** - synonymous with control, influence, and power.

5. **Authority** - the recognized capacity of an individual, committee or group to make formal decisions or statements that will be followed or adhered to by others.

6. **Institution** - an organization, such as a college, university, or similar establishment offering academic instruction suitable for students who have completed secondary schooling or its equivalent.
7. **Administrator** - an officer or employee of the university whose position requires a "professional" status, who oversees a portion of the university's programs and who spends not more than ten percent of his or her time in teaching duties, or who identifies with the administrative staff by so stating on the questionnaire.

8. **Central Administrator** - the person who performs as the chief administrative officer, usually the president, and those directly responsible to him in a college or university, which may be in a single institution with one or more campuses or a multi-institutional organization, and who identifies with the central administrator's staff by so stating on the questionnaire.

9. **Dean** - a major academic officer of a college or of a division, college or school of a university (in all cases this study is referring to education), who is responsible under the president or someone responsible to the president, for the administration and supervision of instructional activities and/or student relations, and who identifies with the position of the dean by so stating on the questionnaire.

10. **Department Chairperson** - a faculty member who, in addition to performing the usual duties of teaching in a department, has been designated to preside over staff meetings and to carry on certain administrative duties involved in managing the affairs of the department, and who
identifies with the position of the department chairperson by so stating on the questionnaire.

11. **Institutional Functions** - indicates the degree of importance and the level of achievement at the respondent's institution for each of the following: teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community.

12. **Personnel Functions** - the means of control and inducement that a person may have available to influence behavior in salaries, tenure, promotions, recruitment, etc.

13. **Curriculums** - the learning environment, a part of which constitutes the means of control and inducement that a person may have available to influence behavior in scheduling, course assignments, curriculum development, etc.

14. **Public Relations** - an institutional function, a part of which constitutes the means of control and inducement that a person may have available to influence behavior in securing good contacts within community, securing publicity for special projects, in developing interdepartment relations, etc.

15. **Financial Functions** - the means of control and inducement that a person may have available to influence behavior in securing travel funds, sabbaticals, etc.
16. **Research Functions** - the means of control and inducement that a person may have available to influence behavior on securing research time, securing research facilities, securing research assistants, securing research supplies, etc.

17. **Authorizational Satisfaction** - refers to the respondent's satisfaction with several aspects of his authorization (power and/or influence). It was defined in terms of the respondent's expressed satisfaction with (1) personnel functions, (2) curriculums, (3) public relations, (4) financial functions, and (5) research functions. An aggregate measure of overall satisfaction of authorization was defined as the average (arithmetic mean) degree of satisfaction expressed among the five satisfaction categories.

18. **Scholarly Activites** - the respondent's contribution to his academic field, research publication and professional service activities by his institution. It was represented by (1) publication of books, (2) publication of monographs, (3) publication of research and scholarly articles, (4) papers presented at professional meetings, (5) the holding of editorships or readerships on publication boards, (6) the holding of offices in national and regional professional associations, (7) professional meetings attended, and (8) consultantships undertaken. An aggregate measure of overall
scholarly activity expressed by all the respondents.

19. **Power Curves** -
   a. the democratic model is represented by a curve which rises (i.e., control increases) as one goes down the hierarchy;
   b. the autocratic or oligarchic model is represented by a curve which falls (i.e., control decreases) as one goes down the hierarchy;
   c. the laissez faire or anarchic model is represented by a curve which remains relatively low (i.e., control is low) for all hierarchical levels; and
   d. the polyarchic model is represented by a curve which remains relatively high (i.e., control is high) for all hierarchical levels (Tannenbaum, 1956).

20. **Power Curves Usage** - a graphical presentation of the means is given in Figures 3-8 where the slopes of the lines are a direct reflection of the scales adopted. However, since the main use of these graphs will be in the interpretation of the interaction, the only concern will be with the slopes of the lines relative to one another.

21. **Y or ETA in the Power Curves** - the amount of variation in the Y axis explained by the hierarchy factor. (This is to be considered only in a graphical sense, not in a mathematical sense.)
22. \texttt{Z\_used\_in\_chi\_square\_testing} - standardized \texttt{z} score.

23. \texttt{n\_used\_in\_chi\_square\_testing} - number of scores used in the evaluation.
CHAPTER II.

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Theoretical Background of Power

It was nearly twenty years ago that Cartwright (1959a) began the surge of research revolving around the concept of power. In 1953 Cartwright spoke to a gathering of colleagues, indicating that the sociologists and social psychologists had, in his view, neglected power in their research, and that to turn attention in this direction could provide major advances in their disciplines. The research that has followed could hardly be called exhaustive, nor has it solved all the problems nor even provided a great deal of thought. Of course the idea of power was not new to Cartwright, nor has the concept been limited to one or two disciplines. As early as the 1920's the political scientists had recognized it as a basic concept, according to Lane, (1963) and in 1938 Russell (1938) was writing about power as one of the fundamentals of all the social sciences. But it has not been until the last two decades that researchers in any numbers have scrutinized the concepts of power.

Many social scientists began exploration into the concept of power due to its rather obvious importance: explanation of the changes that occur during the course of a
sequence of interaction—for example, behavioral and attitudinal changes. Social power theories help explain learning, leadership, conformity, and many other phenomena. However, once having begun to look closely at the subject, researchers also found that a number of very persistent problems arise, too. One quite obvious problem is that there is a large array of meaning associated with the term power. Shopler (1965, p. 178) said "...this appears to be the fate of any construct which has been entrenched in everyday vocabulary, thereby acquiring a rich heritage of connotative and denotative meanings."

The study reported herein deals with social relationships between two or more people. The review of the power literature is, then, emphasizing but not limited to theories and research specifically dealing with power as a characteristic of a social relationship. Power and leadership, and community power are not included in the preview of this review. One might turn to Herson (1961) or Olson (1970) for some background in community power studies or political power studies. Coleman (1974) writes about power as it relates to the corporate enterprise.

Most of the reviews and analyses of the literature about the variable of power, tend to categorize the many theories into three "frameworks." The vast total array of literature in the subject area of this study can be put into the same
kind of frame of reference with little difficulty; there are however, some significant differences, those being mainly in the level of abstraction of the theory, the kinds of information focused upon to establish the manifestation of power, and the sequence they try to analyze. The three kinds of "framework" are called "interaction," "decision making," and "field theory."

Prior to examining the empirical studies, it is important to have some understanding of the three frameworks, since this study concentrates on one particular theory in the "field theory" framework. Although the relationships between the interacting persons are given different designations by the various theorists and researchers, a simple A and B label will suffice for our illustrative purposes here. Person A is the one who holds certain power over person B, the recipient.

Cartwright (1959b) has succeeded in comprehensively articulating the field theory approaches to power, and indeed the framework name is probably derived from the fact, as Cartwright points out, that the definition of power is rooted in Lewinian field theory. Psychological forces form the basis of these theories, and they essentially consist of specifying the types of relationships among the various types of forces. Power then comes to mean the resultant of the forces A brings to bear on B in conjunction with B's life space. In other words, A brings certain forces to bear on B,
and either one succeeds or fails in overcoming the resistent forces in B. Obviously the more power A has, as seen by B, the more likely B will comply with A's wishes and needs, and the wider the range on compliance.

Field theorists do differ somewhat in their views, however. In order for A to have power he must in some way be able to activate B's motivation base. Cohen (1959), Stotland (1959), and Berkowitz (1957) tend to talk more in terms of A having some valuable resource which B wants or A being able to control B's goal attainment or need satisfaction in some way. Horwitz (1958) on the other hand theorizes that the power of A will increase as A's own needs increase, since stronger needs enhance the legitimacy of the advocated position. Two persons with roughly equal power will find an imbalance in the direction of the one with stronger need, due to the urgency and legitimacy of his advocating a position.

Some writers have devised taxonomies in order to better systematize research and to differentiate the kinds of relationships implied by the meaning of A's acts on B. Rollo May (1972, p.99) specifies five types bases of power: exploitative, manipulative, competitive, nutrient and integrative. These all have to do with the way A exerts power. Exploitative is the most destructive, and is pure force, as in slavery. Unfortunately the word power has taken on a negative connotation due to this one kind of power.
Manipulative power is over another person as in the confidence game or in operant conditioning. Competitive is against another person. While the first two forms of power are both negative, competitive can be either negative or positive. In its negative form it consists of one person rising because his opponent lowers. In its positive sense, competition is a stimulus for both parties to perform better. Nutrient is power for another, as a parent caring for a child. Integrative is power with another, it aids and abets.

By far the most important taxonomy in the field theory area was developed by French and Raven (1968). They differ with Hullo May in that they are more closely aligned with other theorists since their taxonomy speaks in terms of power as seen by person B, the recipient. It is the French and Raven taxonomy with which this study was primarily concerned. Because of this, and because of its importance to the whole power question, it deserves somewhat more voluminous discussion.

French and Raven indicate that many different kinds of power might be defined. There are five which are especially common, and on which they concentrate:
1. **Reward power**, whose basis is the ability to reward. The strength of this power of A/B increases with B's perception of the magnitude of reward (positive valences) that A can deliver.

2. **Coercive power** is very similar, except that the valences are negative. That is, its basis is B's perception of A's ability to punish. Both bases are manipulative, and both gain or wane in strength according to the ability of A to in fact reward or punish once called upon to do so, or in B's perception of that ability. Obviously if A is unable to reward when the time has come (or is unable to follow through with threats of punishment) then the strength of the power of A/B will diminish, and that is caused by B's perception change.

3. **Legitimate power** is perhaps the most complex. Essentially it embodies the internalized feelings of "ought" or "should." While it may not necessarily be correct in stating that the superego or values are internalized parents of this idea, it can at least be said that they set up force fields. Legitimate power of A/B, then, stems from internalized values that A has a legitimate right to influence B, and that B should accept that influence. French and Raven (1968, pp. 259-270) "...note that legitimate power is very similar to the notion of legitimacy of authority which has long been explored by sociologists," particularly
Weber, but for them it may not always be a role relation.

4. Referent power is based in B's identification with A, or the feeling of oneness, or more precisely, the desire for such oneness.

5. Expert power varies with the extent of knowledge or special skill attributed to A by B. Probably A's knowledge is evaluated by B in terms of his knowledge as well as against some absolute standard. Acceptance of an attorney's advice or even the acceptance of road directions from a local resident, are examples of "expert" influence, even though the standards of knowledge are vastly different.

French and Raven sum up the five bases of power:

These five bases of power are (a) reward power, based on B's perception that A has the ability to mediate rewards for him; (b) coercive power, based on B's perception that A has the ability to mediate punishments for him; (c) legitimate power, based on the perception by B that A has a legitimate right to prescribe behavior for him; (d) referent power, based on B's identification with A; (e) expert power, based on the perception that A has some special knowledge or expertness.

Note that French and Raven speak in terms of B's perceptions, and how he is affected. Rollo May, as has been noted, is more concerned with the agent exerting power.

It should be noted that there are other points about which field theorists have somewhat different thoughts. For example, one can take either side of the question of whether or not the amount of A's power is linked or is independent of
B and B's power. Cartwright (1959b) characterizes the relationship as nonsymmetric, meaning A's power can vary independently of B's power. An asymmetrical relationship would exist where power is defined as the difference between A's power and B's power, thereby putting the theory in terms of relative power advantage. In the nonsymmetrical relationship, "A's power over B" has no bearing on "B's power over A." Both statements may be true. In the asymmetrical model, one person always has a power advantage over the other.

Another area of disagreement is that of intentions. Cartwright is joined by Hedier (1958) and others in believing that power is related to changes in B coordinated with the intentions of A. Indeed Russell (1938) states it very succinctly, "Power may be defined as the production of intended effects." Lippitt et al (1952) and others feel quite differently. Lippitt speaks in terms of "behavioral contagion" to point to occasions where there is no intention to influence, but rather person B imitates A in some context where A made no move nor had intention of controlling or influencing B.

One of the problems not dealt with in a very successful manner by the field theory models is the problem of assessing power of individuals who are not necessarily in the same interaction relationship. In the decision making theories,
relationships have been found that are defined in terms of exercising power so as to affect the policies of others. It has been found also that, power relationships must be asymmetrical. H. A. Simon (1953) first articulated many of these concepts in 1953 that later were to be accepted into the decision making models, but March (1957) and Dahl (1957) are more widely read and known today.

March specifically places the concept of power in a decision making context, and contends that human behavior can largely be treated in such a model. "Influence", he says "is to the study of decision making what force is to the study of motion—a generic explanation of the bases observable phenomena." Basically March believes that if we can observe an organism at one point, then any deviation from the predicted direction is due to influence. He talks in terms of probability connections between elements of decision making in order to arrive at predictions. Both March and Dahl have worked on formulations to try to assess relative power strengths of persons who are not interacting in the relationship, but both admit to complexities that make it presently impossible. Dahl (1957) has arrived at a formula approach that has limited success and has arrived at relative power rankings of U. S. Senators. This is done after analyzing the induced movements of others following each Senator's lead and after analyzing the overlapping
interactions. The relative strength of a U. S. Senator and a Member of Parliament of Great Britain could be assessed even though there would probably be no overlapping of those who are influenced by these legislators. The four areas needed in order to make such power comparisons include 1) the bases of their power, 2) the means by which their bases are invoked, 3) the scope of their power, meaning the types of responses they can influence and 4) the number of comparable respondents over whom they exercise power. The complexity of these models makes it extremely difficult, probably impossible, to arrive at a single index of power.

In short, then, there are those theorists who liken human behavior to a decision making process. The deviations from a predictable path are caused by influences, and all power must be studied in relation to A's ability to create changes in the direction of B toward A's intended goal or need. Harsanyi (1962) and Tannenbaum (1962) in the middle 1960's added a few interesting points to the decision making models by formulating theories that accounted for strength of power rather than breadth of power. It should be noted that the decision making theories may require different kinds of measurement, but they do not contradict the field theories.

The interaction framework theorists differ from either of the first two categories discussed in the manner in which they focus on power. The models discussed heretofore have
all attributed power to A by the change elicited in B. The interaction formulations lack such an orientation; they are only secondarily concerned with change and concentrate on the kinds of outcomes provided for each other by the participants.

Briefly stated, interaction models are more concerned with the quality of outcomes experienced by participants in a relationship. Both moves through a behavior sequence, or a series of behavior sequences, and these are valued on a good-to-poor scale. The better the sequences are and the larger the repertoire, the more power can be attributed to the partner in the interaction. According to Thibaut and Kelley (1959) the amount of power A has over B is determined by the range of outcomes through which he could potentially move B. The larger the range, the greater the power.

Attention was turned to empirical studies into the nature of power. Since the study reported herein is concerned with French and Raven, this section of the review of literature will primarily be limited to studies completed using the five bases of power in the French and Raven model, and to studies which contrast one of the five with another. There are a number of studies concerned with each basis of power and many of these studies contrast one basis with another. No studies were found that used the entire taxonomy in a global experiment, but there were researchers who
compared different bases of power with regard to variables such as permanence to change, attitudes of B toward A, surveillance, etc.

Before continuing, one brief word must be said about an interesting byproduct of power relationships: surveillance. French and Raven indicate that it is necessary for A to maintain some kind of surveillance over B, especially in the reward and coercive situations. Asch's (1956) famous experiments on conformity would tend to bear out a differential performance in accurately describing the length of lines, depending upon the presence or absence of others in a group. Schanck (1932) reports similar observations to liquor, card playing, and smoking. Behind closed doors, however, he personally had smoked, played cards, and drank hard cider with a number of them. Thibaut and Kelly (1959) observe the same phenomena, but conclude that the necessity for surveillance is reduced in the reward situation since it is incumbent upon B to demonstrate conformity to A before receiving reward. In any case, surveillance is one variable that concerned many persons studying the power phenomenon.

Reward and coercive power seem to go together, and indeed many people describe them as linked opposites. Probably because many researchers thought these categories obvious, comparatively few studies have been conducted in this area. The best documented work on reward and coercion
seem to be in the area of verbal conditioning. Greenspoon (1956) and Taffel (1955) are examples of researchers who have shown that reward (reinforcement) tends to elicit continued responses and punishment (coercion) suppresses responses. In most of these studies the experimenter "reinforced" certain kinds of responses with "good" or "um-hum" or a smile or some form of approval, or negatively reinforced certain kinds of responses with some similar forms of disapproval. Some experimentors go much further in these "personal" rewards as Raven (1965) calls them—approval, disapproval, love, hate, agreement, disagreement, liking, disliking, etc. The theory behind these experiments is that these personal rewards and punishments can be very potent. Maternal disapproval, for example, may mean much more to a child than taking away a toy. In a study related to this area, for example, Wolfe (1959) found that the husband's role in the family increases as a function of the wife's need for love and affection. These studies contrast with the more typical kinds of " impersonal" rewards and punishments such as electric shock, physical punishments, money payment, etc.

Imitative behavior has long been mired in controversy between experimentors, since they explain the behavior in different ways. But in the mid 1960's the reinforcement analyses of imitation were expanded by Bandura (1965) (and in other studies by Bandura and some associates) into a series
of studies on social influences of adults and peers on children.

One of the more important questions to the present study is that of distinguishing between reward and coercion. As previously noted, they are often lumped together as just linked opposites. Yet a perusal of the literature will indicate that it may be important to draw the distinction. In a number of studies, including those of French, Morrison and Levinger (1960) and Zipf (1960), attitudes of B towards A will be affected by whether A uses reward or punishment. Attitudes toward A were shown to be more negative with the use of coercion, particularly if B perceives it to be an inappropriate use of that power. Baxter, Lerner and Miller (1965) found an exception to the above rule, concluding from their studies that persons with authoritarian parents actually showed more identification with the experimenter under punishment conditions. Those with democratically oriented parents, however, identified with the experimentors more under the reward situations.

Referent power is defined as B's identification with A, or B's desire to be like A. There are many experiments which show this wish to conform. The classic autokinetic studies (Sherif, 1936) done in 1936 show that subjects' estimates of light movement changed with knowledge of other subjects' judgments. Pedestrians will be more likely to cross the
street against the light if they see others do so particularly, according to Lefkowitz et al. (1955), if they can respect the referent person. Freed et al. (1955) demonstrated that people are more likely to pass a "no trespassing" sign if they see others do so, students' contributions vary according to the magnitude of others' gifts, according to Blake and Mouton (1957) who also found that they were more likely to volunteer for an experiment if they saw others doing so.

On the other hand, many experimentors have found negative relevant influence. Instead of uniformity, as in the experiments just cited, researchers such as Osgood and Tannenbaum (1955), Heider (1958), and Peak (1958) have demonstrated that the pressures for nonconformity are just as great as previously cited for uniformity, when the situation is reversed and B is repelled by A, or when B sees himself as being quite different from A. Raven and Gallo (1965) in an interesting study, found, not surprisingly, that a Presidential candidate immediately upon nomination by the Democrats, becomes more negative in his opinions of Republicans.

Expert power is perhaps easier to study than referent power, since establishing that expertness is easier in many ways. Allen and Crutchfield (1963), DiVesta, Meyer and Mills (1965) and a host of other experimentors have shown that to
provide a task or series of tasks at which one person or group excels, that a person or group be accorded expert influence for the next series of tasks, particularly if the two sets of tasks are similar. Further, it was found by Coleman, Blake and Mouton (1958) that expert power operates much more readily if the task is complex or highly ambiguous. The expert influence is likely to be limited to the area in which particular knowledge is attributed, although Brim (1954) demonstrates some generalization into other areas. Expert influence is related to credibility and trustworthiness, and/or perception that A has little to gain from misleading those he wants to influence. Beal and Rogers (1959) for example, found that farmers placed a great deal of expert power in the hands of scientists, but those that worked for the government were accorded more expert power than those who were working for industry.

Legitimate influence is power accorded by B because of a feeling that A has some right to prescribe behavior. In some instances expert power can be used to establish legitimate power, as in a doctor-patient relationship where the patient feels he must obey doctor's orders even in nonmedical situations. Many studies use the simple method of having a group legitimize its own leader by vote but in other situations the experimenter was accorded legitimacy because he was "running" the study. Frank (1944) found that students
who were volunteers accorded particularly high legitimate
power to the experimenter and would go to great lengths to
please him—in fact, Frank reports outright astonishment at
the things volunteers would do to follow requests of
experimentors. The unexpected observation of Frank was
corroborated by Block and Block (1952), Orne (1962), and Orne
and Evans (1965) in experiments where subjects would spend
inordinant amounts of time complying with requests to fill
pages with random digits, stack spools or engage in
psychologically noxious or meaningless tasks—even to such
behavior as plunging their hands into acid or throwing acid
on another person. A television program called "60 Minutes"
filmed subjects who gave what they thought were lethal
electric shocks to other persons because they were directed
to by the experimentors. This was duplicating a 1963
experiment by Milgram (1963) in which he also found that
encouragement by two experimentors would increase conformity
by the subjects.

There are a number of experiments that should be
reported here because their conclusions were bases of power
in concert or contrast with one another. As stated earlier,
no experiments were found in which the French and Raven
taxonomy was used in quite the way it was used in gathering
data for the present study, but there are some researchers
who have made contributions to the field of power literature
by reporting findings where multiple power bases were in play.

One of the more common findings is that power is seldom used or experienced from one separate source at a given time. Most researchers consider that various combinations are in effect, but that they operate in a nonadditive, interactional manner. A doctor may choose to put up all his awards and degrees and line his office with books, appealing to the expert power, or he may be very friendly and appeal to the referent power. If one is emphasized, the other is reduced.

One particular experiment is of interest and relevance because it examines reward—coercion, expert and referent influence in one of the more comprehensive studies. In 1958 Kelman (1960) studied responses of freshmen in an all-Black college. He played a tape recording for them which outlined the thesis that even after all other colleges and universities were totally desegregated, a few all-Black institutions should be retained as a factor in maintenance of the Black culture. The students in the study were people who held views opposing this thesis, and a check of attitudinal change was the criteria for comparing the influence of the bases of power. One group heard the tape recording and was told that the speaker was a very powerful Foundation president who would support the colleges and students who agreed with him and who could and would punish those who
disagreed. In this reward-coercion situation, students' attitudes changed in favor of the thesis, but only after they were told that their responses would be seen by the Foundation president, thus compliance resulted. Another group from the same class heard the same tape recording, but this time were told that the speaker was a student like themselves but was the president of the student body at a leading Black college and who spoke the mind of most Black students. This referent influence produced significant attitudinal change regardless of whether or not the subjects thought the speaker would see their responses. In an expert power situation a third group of students from the same class were told that the speaker on the tape recorder was a history professor with considerable knowledge about Black culture, minority groups and the Black community. In this case, "internalization", as Kelman named it, took place. The students were greatly influenced whether or not they thought the speaker would see their responses, and the attitudes remained for weeks after.

It is evident that many researchers have made valid contributions to the power theories. Certain generalizations can be made: that people certainly experience different kinds of influences, they act on those influences and even change attitudes due to those influences. Some kinds of power elicit stronger responses or reactions, some elicit negative
responses or reactions and some not only elicit responses but change behavior or attitudes for longer periods of time. If nothing else, researchers seem to agree that the use of a single taxonomy is important to the study of power, and many point to French and Raven as the most predominant and usable. All researchers point to the need for further research, although some admit that the study of power is interesting but they don't expect it to be particularly productive in the years ahead.

**Empirical Approaches to the Definition and Measurement of Intra-Organizational Power**

As defined in this study, intra-organizational power is represented as the structure of influence relationships among people in the organizational hierarchy. Moreover, it is taken as the structure of influence as perceived by the CIRAACTE; thus, the pattern relationships may or may not parallel formally-drawn lines of authority. The theoretical and empirical precedents for the conceptualization of organizational control are presented later.

The control graph, which was one of the major research tools used in this study, was originally conceived and applied to four local industrial unions in a study by Tannenbaum and Kahn (1957). The purpose of that study was to investigate factors which influenced member participation in union affairs. Although the study and the control concepts
it employed were briefly discussed in the Introduction of this report, a more detailed account of the significance of the concepts relative to theories of organizational power is given here. Institutional power structures can then be described and evaluated in light of historical and conceptual perspectives.

As part of the union study, the operational definition of organizational control was called the "control graph," which characterized member influence in terms of the distribution and total amount of control among hierarchical ranks. Distribution of control emphasizes the relative power of individuals and groups in the organization; total amount of control emphasizes its absolute amount. The control graph thus illustrates and provides measurement of several traditional and contemporary conceptualizations of interpersonal influence in terms of four prototype control curves:

1. the democratic model is represented by a curve which rises (i.e., control increases) as one goes down the hierarchy;

2. the autocratic or oligarchic model is represented by a curve which falls (i.e., control decreases) as one goes down the hierarchy;

3. the laissez faire or anarchic model is represented by a curve which remains low (i.e., control is low) for all hierarchical levels; and

4. the polyarchic model is represented by a curve which remains high (i.e., control is high) for all hierarchical levels (Tannenbaum, 1956).
The University as a Bureaucracy

The autocratic model is a configuration of the classical perspective on organizational control, especially on control structures described by classical management theorists relative to business and industrial organizations (Massie, 1965). Generally implied in the autocratic model is the idea of a scalar chain of authority wherein directives are imposed upon subordinates by superiors. Justification for such practices is derived from a concept of authority which emphasizes the right and the power to give orders and to exact obedience that flows from formally established hierarchical offices. The cornerstone for this perspective is found in the writing of Weber (1968) on the elements of the bureaucratic form of administration.

Universities have been effectively analyzed by application of the bureaucratic paradigm. Stroup, for example, points out several organizing characteristics of colleges and universities that parallel Weber's bureaucratic ideal (Stroup, 1966). These characteristics are:
1. The criterion for appointment to offices is competence.

2. Faculty and administrative officers are appointed, not elected.

3. Salaries are fixed and paid by the organization rather than being collected on a fee basis.

4. The career is exclusive; no other work is done.

5. The faculty member's and administrative officer's life styles are centered around the organization.

6. Tenure policies provide work security.

7. There is separation of personal and organizational property.

Anderson concurs that the basic pattern of administration in higher education is bureaucratic (Anderson, 1963). Litchfield (1956, 1959) and Bibbero (1967) likewise believe that administrative processes in higher education occur in the same generalized form as they do in industrial and commercial organizations.

Implicit in bureaucratic organization is a rationalization of administrative procedures. In some cases this rationalization may lead to a reduction in power and influence of organization members. Bourke and Brooks (1966), for instance, studied the effects that the introduction of managerial techniques have had upon university governance and found a shift to a cabinet form of administration wherein the task of managing internal affairs has been delegated to the vice-presidential level. In the newer universities this
shift tends to increase administrative power via-a-vis the faculty, as is typical of the shift in power to upper hierarchical levels in organizations undergoing bureaucratization.

In contrast, Demerath, Stevens, and Taylor (1967) reported on a change in administration at the University of North Carolina between 1956 and 1960 and discovered an increased degree of bureaucracy. The routine and formal lines of responsibility and authority, however, were changes which "suited collegial plans and sentiments and, in turn, lent new support to the elemental collegial groups—the academic departments of the university."

The bureaucratic model has value in conceptualizing and describing legitimate, formalized power which, in the ideal sense, materializes in an autocratic distribution of influence. It is especially appropriate in application to the hierarchical structure of administrative offices. It is less effective, however, in dealing with the generally nonhierarchical relationships between faculty and administrators and in dealing with nonformal power and influence, the distribution and amounts of which may run counter to formal hierarchical designs.
The University as a Collegium

The democratic model, much like the autocratic model, stresses the importance power differential play in influence relationships in organizations. In the academic setting it is representative of the collegial model.

Weber characterizes a collegium as a body

...made up of individuals with specified functions. In such a case the preparation and presentation of a subject is assigned to the individual technical expert who is competent in that field or possibly to several experts, each in a different aspect of the field. Decisions, however, are taken by a vote of the body as a whole (Weber, 1968)

Under the concept of a community of scholars, full participation of the faculty in institutional decision making distinguishes this system of power from a bureaucracy. One of the most ardent supporters of this concept of academic organization is Millet, who argues that the hierarchical model is neither a realistic description nor a desirable prescription for university organizations---that the bureaucratic concept "is alien to the great social purpose of higher education and does not conform with the facts of academic life" (Millet, 1962). He is emphatic in his belief that organizational concepts relevant to business and public administration have limited applicability in colleges and universities. Corson (1960) tends to agree that the scalar organization found in other enterprises has no parallel in
academic institutions; however, he is less willing than is Millet to summarily dismiss the relevance of the bureaucratic model for understanding some aspects of university organization. He is equally reluctant to apply the full collegial model, focusing, instead, on the varieties of arrangements for academic governance.

Some fifteen years after his original study, Corson (1975) returned to the subject of governance in a revision of his earlier work. In his commentary about higher education in a turbulent decade, Corson abandoned the concept of organizational dualism that had constituted the innovative, unique contribution of his 1960 volume. Instead, Corson spoke of a "bifurcation" problem in college and university governance, and identified this separation as academic organization and operational organization. Corson appeared to endorse the idea of university councils, senates, or assemblies. He proposed that the functions of a college or university be narrowed and clarified, that the autonomy of individual institutions be reaffirmed, and that mechanisms for reestablishing a sense of academic community be developed. Corson then proposed a new concept of primary and communal authority for decision making. The primary authority of the faculty to make some decisions should be recognized, as should the primary authority of students to make other decisions. But there was a need, Corson
maintained, for a communal authority as well. Unfortunately, the nature and extent of this communal authority were not specified.

Some observers of higher education witness structural trends away from both bureaucratic and collegial organization. Parson characterizes the structure as "collegial associationism," wherein faculty responsibility is "not primarily to a group of persons, but rather to the integrity of his devotion to the learning process in its many ramifications" (Parsons, 1971). Clark (1963) and Moran (1968) describe the organization in terms of a "federated structure"; that is, as a loosely-knit federation of academic subcultures tied together by a form of bureaucratic coordination. Jeffrey (1968) prefers to identify the form of organization as "professionalized bureaucracy."

In their study of the role of forty-two college and university presidents for the Carnegie Commission, Cohen and March (1974) propounded the thesis that the American college and university belonged to a class of organization that they labeled "organized anarchy." The authors declared that the principal properties of an organized anarchy were problematic goals, unclear technology, and fluid participation. Cohen and March declared that institutions of higher education were uncertain about their purposes, practiced a technology that they did not understand and that might or might not produce
intended outputs, and brought together participants who devoted varying amounts of time to the enterprise. Because the organization was thus characterized as having a substantial degree of anarchy, Cohen and March found the leadership role of the president to be ambiguous.

The authors did not explore other models of governance in the literature about colleges and universities. They rejected all models except the one they considered applicable to a college or university. Apart from a considerable discussion about the special circumstances of the president in this organizational setting, Cohen and March said very little about the organizational concept itself. The authors were concerned about presidential leadership more than organizational theory.

Yet the concept of organized anarchy is an intriguing one as a model of governance of the American college or university. The properties set forth by Cohen and March had to do with purposes, performance, and participation. There was almost no discussion of structure and still less about processes of governance. The different interests of faculty members and of students were recognized, but leadership rather than governance was the expected procedure of reconciliation. The concept of organized anarchy was put forward as an idea rather than as a fully developed construct. The concept was essentially a basis for
discussion of leadership rather than of governance.

On the basis of Max Weber's discussion of the characteristics of bureaucracy, some American sociologists have held that the attributes of bureaucracy are evident in the organization and governance of the college or university. Andes (1970) utilized this point of view in his discussion of a systems approach to higher education. The bureaucratic position, however, is most clearly presented by Blau (1973) in his discussion of the organization of academic work. His point of view argues that the academic enterprise, no less than any other enterprise, has explicit procedures for organizing and coordinating its productive output.

Blau finds characteristics of bureaucracy within the university in the formal division of labor among departments, in the existence of an administrative hierarchy, and in the presence of a clerical apparatus. At the same time, Blau notes that bureaucratic "rigidity and discipline" are incompatible with academic scholarship. He acknowledges that colleges and universities tend to be different from other bureaucracies since the work performed by faculty members is not directly supervised and since "detailed operating rules" governing the performance of academic work are lacking.

In spite of these differences, Blau insisted that he found "striking parallels" in organization between government bureaus and academic institutions. He did draw a distinction
between the professional authority of faculty members and the bureaucratic authority of administration. Blau postulated that the distribution of decision making influence among faculty members and administrative officers determined the extent to which professional authority or bureaucratic authority dominated the college or university work. Blau went further and correlated largeness of size, recognized quality in faculty performance, and an emphasis upon research activity with professional authority (as distinguished from bureaucratic authority).

Blau drew several conclusions. He suggested that the allocation of economic resources was a major source of power for presidents and governing boards. Because larger universities tended to devote proportionately less of their resources to administrative apparatus than did smaller institutions, he argued that the larger academic institution was in most respects less bureaucratic. He concluded that bureaucracy did come into conflict with scholarship, observing that the bureaucratic features of an academic institution had no negative effect upon research performance but did have "deleterious consequences" for educational performance. Blau argued that the "threat of bureaucratization" in higher education should be resisted and that faculty members were the persons to resist it.
Blau's study is important here for two reasons. Without saying so specifically, Blau in effect emphasized the production role of a college or university. Much of the literature about governance presents colleges or universities as debating societies or legislative assemblies. Blau pointed to colleges and universities as organizations producing an output that was presumably important and socially useful. In addition, although he did not make the distinction explicit, he observed an important organizational characteristic, the difference between operations and housekeeping, between output programs and support programs. Moreover, the high degree of "anarchy" noted by Cohen and March was really applicable to the performance of the output programs of instruction, research, and public service. The bureaucratization observed by Blau was to be found in the administration of support programs.

Community Governance

The 1960's were a period of experimentation in the development of structures and processes designed to achieve community governance within colleges and universities. Dill (1971) presented case studies of changes at Florida Agriculture and Mechanical University, the University of Minnesota, Columbia University, and the University of New Hampshire. Dill concluded that much of the current
experimentation in university governance had been motivated by a desire to include students in the decision making process. From the early experiences of these four institutions, Dill noted several problems: the demand for new institutional activities without the necessary income; the tendency to politicize academic issues; the expense in time for faculty members and students active in campus governance; and confusion about the relationship of campus governance to the governing board.

Hodgkinson (1974) presented the results of his own study of campus senates, which he described as experiments in democracy. Upon the basis of replies from 1,863 institutions, Hodgkinson identified 688 as having a "broadly based campus senate." One-third of these respondents were two-year institutions, about one-fourth were general baccalaureate colleges, and some 44 percent were comprehensive and research universities. About one-third of the institutions had enrollments of 1,000 students or less, about 38 percent had enrollments from 1,000 to 5,000 students, and 28 percent had enrollments over 5,000. Three hundred sixty-four institutions responding in detail to a questionnaire. Hodgkinson found that the campus senate had been in existence less than seven years at 80 percent of these colleges and universities. Hodgkinson presented eleven conclusions from his survey, as well as details of experience
drawn from four case studies.

Millett (1974) called attention to various deficiencies in the experience to date in campus governance and suggested how the concept of community governance might be strengthened. Cleveland (1974) raised a pertinent question of criticism: "How do you get everybody in on the act and still get some action?" Against the openness and wide participation of a campus-wide senate, he presented a number of flaws: apathy, nonparticipation, procedures tending to polarize various representatives, an excess of voting and parliamentary procedures, a tendency to restrictive legalisms, the encouragement of mediocrity, and the discouragement of innovation.

Johnson (1971) and Helsabeck (1973) have called for greater organizational effectiveness on campuses. Still others, such as Jellema (1972) and Balderston (1974) have stressed the management performance of colleges and universities as even more vital than governance.

A highly respected university dean provides an appropriate conclusion. Brown (1973, p.1) wrote: "Science and technology have provided new knowledge and devices for human organizations to use... Science and technology have not altered the persistent and controlling attribute of human organization—namely, whatever the organization's size or form, it continues to be subject to the complex and
unpredictable initiatives and responses of the individual human beings who make it up."

**Power Structures in Universities and Colleges**

In their study of colleges and universities as complex organizations, Baldridge and Riley (1977) propounded the thesis that one could imagine a situation of power equalization in which all concerned participants would influence goals equally, through a town meeting arrangement or through some set of organized message transmission in the manner of sealed bids on a municipal contract. Even the least hierarchical of organizations seems to be far from such a model, though some, of course, wish to move in that direction. Nevertheless, they thought they would begin by identifying those who would likely play at least a smaller role in goal definition and attainment. Then, they asked respondents whether some were more important than others, and to what extent. As might have been expected, they found a definite power structure in existence, with some persons and groups perceived as having far more influence than others. The most important source of variation appeared to be type of control and even that was not a simple distinction, for there remained variations among universities, probably attributable to local conditions. Their analysis lead them to conclude that the power structure of American universities was remarkably uniform, at least among the sixty-eight studied.
Some writers were observed to avoid the general argument as to whether institutions of higher education tend toward bureaucratic or collegial organization, and many instead tend to focus upon varying organizational structures that may include both bureaucratic and collegial elements depending upon the functions for which they exist. Hobbs and Anderson (1971), for example, identify possible departmental decision making structures that include, besides the autocratic and democratic structures, oligarchies of senior faculty members. They conclude:

The most widely applicable model of academic department organization is a composite of (1) a division of labor among peers for administrative activities, (2) an oligarchy of the senior professional concerns, and (3) a collegium, i.e., a democracy, for decision making with respect to curricular affairs (Hobbs and Anderson, 1971).

These observations are supportive of Kerr's suggestion that the university is a democracy, a bureaucracy, and a community, and that no one form of governance is best as related to the functions of the university---that "governance problems are best handled function by function" (Kerr, 1970). Ikenberry (1972) notes that fundamental professional-organizational conflict renders present organizational structures of colleges and universities, ineffective in coping with the dilemma, and suggests, as does
Kerr, that different organizational forms are compatible with different structures of tasks.

University organizational analyses which uncover multiple decision making structures are not uncommon under the assumptions of a governance model that recognizes multiple and/or conflicting goals (teaching, research, service to society, and creating an ideal democratic community, for example) and the possibility of varied administrative structures coexisting side by side to carry out these goals. Institutional arrangements to carry out the traditional promotion-of-instruction objectives might not have kept pace with these newer functions (Perkins, 1972), and likewise, analytical frameworks based upon traditional organizational structures might not be appropriately applied to contemporary universities. Trends which include increased faculty specialization, increased faculty power over educational objectives, increased department autonomy, a reward system geared primarily to research productivity, the changing role of the president from academician to administrator, and decreased faculty interest in administrative activities become contrasted against institutional arrangements geared to instructional activities (Gross, 1963). Governance structures may change as the institution moves toward full university status (Walker, 1970), thus, there may exist different structural forms to
cope with changing organizational purposes and tasks.

A shift of emphasis from consideration of the impact of formal academic structures to concern with the interplay and impact of power forces within the institution is apparent in Baldridge's (1971a) study. He dismisses the utility that both the autocratic and democratic (bureaucratic and collegial) models have for understanding academic operations, and instead proposes a political paradigm that recognizes multiple forms of power, multiple loci of influence, and the effects of their interactions. He finds analytical relevance not in the traditional structural models, but in the conflict theory, community power theory, and interest group theory frameworks.

The Concept of Variable Power

Tannenbaum's anarchic and polyarchic power models provide a perspective for organizational control structures that go beyond the traditional autocratic-democratic continuum. The bureaucratic and collegial influence models emphasize power differentials; and an implied assumption underlying both viewpoints is that the organization affords a fixed amount of influence, and members increase their power in proportion to the amount of power given up by other members. In Kerr's words, "(t)here are more claimants for power than ever before, and there is no more power to be divided. Someone must lose if others gain---a zero-sum game"
Dykes (1968) notes that the source of much tension between faculty and administration is the belief held by many faculty members that any increase in administrative power must necessarily result in a decrease in their own.

The power curve contrast to this fixed-amount-of-control concept is the variable-amount-of-control hypothesis, which assumes that power within the organization is expansive—that members can increase their influence without necessarily effecting a decrease in power among other members. In principle, this expansion of the total amount of control in the system can occur under

...a number of internal conditions that subsume (1) structural conditions expediting interaction and influence among members, and (2) motivational conditions implying increased interest by members in exercising control and a greater amenability to being controlled (Tannenbaum, 1968a).

This theoretical emphasis appears in the writings of a number of organizational, managerial, and leadership theorists (Argyris, 1964; Blake and Mouton, 1964; Burns and Stalker, 1961; and Likert, 1967). Even though the models are typically put in the context of business and industrial organizations, the power curve models have relevance for all organizations that can be described in terms of interpersonal influence relationships among formally-defined offices.

The concept of "shared authority" as stressed in the American Association for Higher Education report on faculty participation in academic governance is a decision making
system in which both faculty and administration have "effective influence" (AAHE, 1967). Governance problems are approached not as power struggles among competing factions, but as the usurpation of influence by those parties most capable of and most affected by the decisions. An extension of this concept is reported by Keeton (1971), who proposes that the sharing of power is a zero-sum game only to the extent to which it is perceived as such by the constituents in the struggle for power. There are other strategies of power sharing, however. In the "positive sum" game each party gains because he acknowledges the interests of the other, and together they increase their benefits by virtue of their understanding of mutual self-interest. In the "nongame" there is an empathetic sharing of interests and a working together strategy to solve the common problems.

This approach is apparent also in the AAUP 1966 statement of government of colleges and universities. Relative to "joint effort" in decision making among the governing board, administration, faculty, and students, it concludes:
...(1) important areas of action involve at one time or another the initiating capacity and decision making participation of all the institutional components, and (2) differences in the weight of each voice, from one point to the next, should be determined by reference to the responsibility of each component for the particular matter at hand... (AAUP, 1967).

In both the AAHE report and the AAUP statement, emphasis is placed upon what might be termed the "total amount of power" in the influence system, in addition to the relative amounts of power possessed by institutional constituents. This approach allows for the recognition of influence patterns which add a second dimension to the simple autocratic-democratic continuum. It is a viable alternative for analyses of university power structures, and its empirical use has and will uncover instructive patterns of influence.

Research Studies on University Power Structures

Description of University Power Structures

Several empirical studies describe the power structures of universities in terms of organizational models that are consistent with Tannenbaum's conceptualization. The study of fifteen universities reported in Dressel, Johnson, and Marcus (1970) is representative of this approach. They characterized department organization as a "democratic bureaucracy," but found distinctions by department. Relative
to rank order of influence, they discovered that the department chairman was perceived to have the greatest amount of influence over department affairs, followed with decreasing degrees by the department faculty as a group and the college dean. The faculty members perceived themselves as having lesser influence personally than did these three groups.

In Baldridge's study on the distribution of power and influence, he concluded that "the university is not 'democratic,' for there are clear pyramids of influence, with dominant elite groups that are highly involved and highly influential in almost every area" (Baldridge, 1971b). Faculty were perceived as having the greatest amount of influence over curricular affairs; the deans were seen as having the most power over faculty appointments, selection of department chairmen, and faculty promotion; central administrators retained the most influence over university plans, budgets, and public relations (Baldridge, 1971b). The analysis showed that there tended to be a "fragmented system of influence"; that different groups had power in different areas of activity, and that no one group dominated everything.

Other empirical support for the observation of multiple control structures is provided by Ryan (1972), who found that academic departments could be differentiated by a decision
making typology. Departments were classified as having either headships or collegial organizations. The headships could be further subdivided into those departments in which decisions were influenced by a cohesive and select power group of faculty members ("oligarchies"). Smaller departments tended to have headships and oligarchic organizations; larger departments were organized for collegial decision making, with no perceived oligarchic power groups.

Patterson (1966) queried faculty in ten universities and discovered a variety of preferred decision making structures—individual, hierarchical, oligarchical, and group. These arrangements differed by subject matter of the department.

Hill and French (1967) studied the power structures in 65 departments in five colleges. They found a "flat" authority structure in which professors exercised about as much control as that to which they were subjected. The state board, higher administration, and middle administration exercised more influence than did department chairmen and faculty; and the department chairmen exercised less influence and were subjected to more influence than were any of the other hierarchical levels. The entire control curve was low, indicating that an outside agency—such as the state legislature—exerts considerable control over the colleges'
internal affairs.

The Gross and Grambsch (1968) study of university goals and academic power is also relevant to the idea of dimensions of influence in addition to the traditional autocratic-democratic configuration. A major purpose of this study was to describe the power structure of the university and to relate it to goal emphasis among the powerholders. Data were collected from administrators and faculty at sixty-eight institutions.

A secondary analysis of the data revealed that across all institutions the college deans, department chairmen, and faculty all have a comparable amount of influence in affecting the major goals of the university (Baldridge, 1971c). A polyarchic distribution of influence was discerned. Clearly, neither the autocratic nor democratic model of control was representative of the perceived power structures in these universities. The study concluded that although administrators have greater power than do the faculty, the power "should not be regarded as necessarily inimical to the faculty or as inconsistent with the fundamental role and purposes of the university" (Baldridge, 1971c). In other words, faculty and administrative power differentials might be regarded as secondarily critical to goal setting decisions which favor the faculty's role. In terms of the control graph model, the sufficiency of the
faculty's power rather than the relative amount of its power as compared with that of administrators could be considered fundamental to its academic welfare.

Variations in University Power Structures

Variations in university control structures have been shown to relate to differences in other organizational characteristics. Most typically, institutional size has been considered a major independent variable. Boland, for example, found that

...increasing institutional size was strongly associated with the development of (1) a "center" at the highest organizational level which mediates those external relations which are crucial to the maintenance and development of institutional legitimacy and material support, and (2) a considerable power on the part of the faculty to influence the institution's educational policy...(Boland, 1971).

Similar to Boland's approach to explaining structural variations, Baldridge examined the institution's external environment--financial dependency, clientele base, and political pressure--for organizational structure devices to cope with pressures in insuring faculty autonomy (Baldridge, 1971d).

Effects of size upon university organizational structures are also reported by Ryan (1972), Peterson (1968), and Patterson (1966). However, Hass and Collen concluded that size was not a major determinant of formalization of decision making; instead, they propose that it is the
"repetitiveness" of decision making which produces formalization (Hass and Colleen, 1963).

Several investigators have found influence structure differences across departments and relative to the functional emphasis given within the departments. Dresse, et al. discovered, for example, that the internal structures of departments which emphasized either basic research or undergraduate instruction encouraged a great deal of influence to be vested in the department chairman; departments which primarily emphasized basic research delegated more decision making influence to the faculty; when departments perceived the dean as being relatively influential, the department was viewed as being engaged in service and undergraduate instruction activities rather than as having a national prestige orientation (Dressel, Johnson, and Marcus, 1970). Richard (1970) found that a greater degree of faculty autonomy was associated with departmental emphasis upon graduate instruction and research.

Perceptions of structure also differ depending upon department orientation; noted in the manner that:
...there are three major types of departments, and we shall identify them in terms of whether the department is oriented to the university, to its own operations and problems, or to the discipline which it represents. Departmental priorities and even internal organization are, to a considerable extent, determined by this orientation (Dressel, Johnson, and Marcus, 1970).

Other researchers have looked to the structure of tasks in the department for implications about structural differences in interpersonal relations. On the basis of multiple-dimension scaling, Biglan (1971) was able to sort academic areas into categories and analyze the task characteristics of the various areas. Three dimensions were found to differentiate among the departments: (1) concern with objectivity, (2) concern with research application, and (3) concern with life systems. Subsequently, it was found that departments differed in the degree of social-connectedness among faculty depending upon the task characteristics of the areas (Biglan, 1971).

That administrative structures may vary relative to characteristics of the tasks for which they exist is well documented for business and industrial organizations (Hunt, 1970). In the university setting, however, little research effort has been devoted to uncovering task structure variations which contain logical, predictable implications for control structure variations. Models exist which conceptualize educational "technology," differentiating it
from other technological forms, and relating task structures to control structure processes (Perrow, 1970). The variety of university environmental scales (Astin, 1962; Pace and Stern, 1958; and Pervin, 1967) provides effective criteria for differentiating among institutions, typically on the bases of perceptions of members in the environment. Yet, explanations remain vague concerning inter-department and inter-disciplinary variations in structures of control.

A notable exception to the general techniques of measuring college environments is the Environmental Assessment Technique (Astin and Holland, 1961). This method provides for the measurement of academic subcultures in addition to characterizing the entire campus culture. Since environments are classified in terms of the characteristics of members of vocational fields, it has implications for academic disciplines and, of course, academic departments. Little empirical evidence is available to suggest that administrative structural variations in colleges and universities are associated with different environmental types. However, Dressel, et al. found structural variations by academic department:
Departments in professional schools tended more toward the autocratic and paternalistic pattern, those in chemistry, history, and psychology preferring the democratic bureaucracy, and mathematics and English departments representing a mixture between an oligarchy and democracy (Dressel, Johnson, and Marcus, 1970).

Richards, Seligman, and Jones (1970) analyzed undergraduate and graduate environments which classified faculty and curriculum into the six types in Holland's theory of personality and vocational choice. In addition to finding differences in the orientations across subject matter areas, they concluded that "meaningful investigations could be conducted of differences among various parts of universities" (Richards, Seligman, and Jones, 1970), using this six-fold personality-environment typology.

**Behavioral Correlates of University Power Structures**

The control graph has been applied in many different kinds of organizations. It has been used to determine the control structures and their correlates in unions (Tannenbaum, 1968b), voluntary associations (Tannenbaum, 1961), insurance companies (Bowers, 1964) and other business and industrial organizations (Smith and Tannenbaum, 1963), liberal arts colleges (Bachman, 1968), and four-year state colleges (Hill and French, 1967). Member performance and job satisfaction criteria are typically related to the structure of total control and distribution of control in these
organizations.

Studies tend to indicate that high degrees of performance and satisfaction are associated with high degrees of total control (Tannenbaum, 1968c). That is, members tend to be more productive and they express a higher degree of job satisfaction where they have a high degree of control over their jobs. In addition, it is generally shown that the sufficiency of influence of organization members tends to have stronger implications for performance and satisfaction than does the relative amount of influence the member has in comparison with other members above or below him in the hierarchical chain.

These findings are generally paralleled in studies conducted in colleges and universities. Hill and French (1967), in their analysis of the perceptions that professors had of their department chairman's power, tested hypotheses on the relationship between the power of the department heads and faculty satisfaction, faculty professional output, and department productivity. Questionnaires were sent to faculty in five state-supported, four-year colleges in two western states.
The main findings of the study were:

1. The department chairman's power was significantly positively correlated with the professor's satisfaction (opposite from hypothesized direction);

2. The department chairman's power was significantly negatively correlated with the professor's professional output (opposite from hypothesized direction); and

3. The department chairman's power was significantly positively correlated with the department's institutional productivity (hypothesis sustained).

The analysis showed, however, that the faculty tended to have a great deal of power themselves. Thus, the positive correlation between chairman's power and faculty satisfaction is consistent with the total control concept, even though the researchers did not offer this interpretation.

In attempting to explain the finding that the department chairman's power was negatively correlated with the professor's professional output, the researchers proposed that perhaps some of the professors had strong personal contacts in their discipline and tended to impute lower power to their department heads than did professors who were not as productive professionally. A viable alternative explanation might have been that output tends not to relate to perceptions of control, but does tend to relate positively with the structure of control apart from individual
perceptions (with the actual structure of control) (Tannenbaum and Smith, 1964). This possibility was not explicitly tested in the study.

Although the Tannenbaum control scale was used to solicit perceptions of power, the researchers' hypotheses did not recognize the varieties of control structures which were possible (and apparent in the reported findings), nor were they entirely consistent with the findings of available prior research. The design of the study left unanswered questions concerning the effects of both total control and distribution of control upon faculty output and satisfaction, and the effects the "actual" structure of control had upon performance criteria.

Oncken (1971) studied the control structure of 37 departments at the University of Illinois and found a negative relationship between perceptions of total control and research output, and no general relationship between department control structure and faculty satisfaction with various aspects of the job situation. Although the findings did not parallel those expected, neither did the control measures parallel those generally used to construct control graphs. Total control and distribution of control measures were based upon the degree of participation of faculty in departmental decision making. Tenured and nontenured faculty were used to represent the hierarchical levels on the control
graphs. Thus, the results of this study cannot be directly compared with others which use a somewhat different question and response scale to measure influence relationships.

In the Javier (1971) study of five mid-western colleges and universities, it was found that the closer the institution approximated the Likert System IV organizational model, the greater the satisfaction of faculty and administrators. The Likert model is characterized by a strong system of influence and interaction which implies a high degree of total control in the organization.

Johnson (1970) approached the control-satisfaction, control effectiveness relationships more directly by use of the control graph and found faculty satisfaction to be associated with agreement among members as to the actual power structure, but not with perceptions of the relative amount of influence they possessed. Divisions in which faculty members perceived democratic structures of control were perceived as being instructionally effective by the students.

In the Dressel et al. study, university performance was assessed using the Cartter report (Cartter, 1966). It was discovered that departments that have a more democratic operation tend to be ranked high by the report:
...compared to members of the departments which were not mentioned in the Cartter report, faculty in the highly rated departments stated that the faculty, department committees, and graduate students all exerted relatively high influence over departmental affairs. On the other hand, university administration, the dean, and the chairman of the department exerted relatively low influence over departmental affairs (Dressel, Johnson, and Marcus, 1970).

Relative to faculty satisfaction, internal conflicts or problems were reported less frequently by faculty members who felt they had a high degree of personal influence than by faculty of medium or low influence (Dressel, Johnson, and Marcus, 1970).

It was also reported that a faculty member's disciplinary orientation had some bearing on the manner in which he reacted to the extent and effect of departmental autonomy (Dressel, Johnson, and Marcus, 1970). It might be recalled that according to the Holland vocational classification system, various academic disciplines are represented by the personality types of members who populate them, and can be differentiated across six personality-type categories. Additionally, Vroom (1973) has shown that control-satisfaction relationships are affected by dimensions of personality. Thus, it can be expected (and tended to be confirmed by the Dressel et al. study) that the relationships between structures of control and faculty job satisfaction be somewhat different across disciplines. Such a viewpoint is
in line with Pervin's conclusion that performance and satisfaction are functions of the interaction between the characteristics of the individual and those of the interpersonal and noninterpersonal environments (Pervin, 1968).
CHAPTER III.

METHOD OF PROCEDURE,
HYPOTHESES AND PROCEDURE

Method of Procedure

Purpose of Study

This study was designed to examine four dimensions of administration-administrative perceived power as it relates to: (1) performance, (2) satisfaction, (3) expected scholarly activities, and (4) institutional functions.

This study used the CIRAECTE perceptions of the relative influence of various groups in the authority systems of their institutions, relative influence of the CIRAECTE in various areas, and the regularity of the CIRAECTE participation in college activities in order to determine the perceived power position of the CIRAECTE relative both to other administrators and to the CIRAECTE themselves.

The instrument for assessing these dimensions of perceived power of the CIRAECTE as viewed by themselves was a questionnaire. This instrument was also to determine whether variations in such perceptions of perceived power are associated with variations in the administrations hierarchy levels of the CIRAECTE as it relates to: (1) performance, (2) satisfaction, (3) expected scholarly activities, and (4) institutional functions.
Methodology

The data needed to assess perceived power were couched in the items of a questionnaire. The questionnaire included items organized in sections. One section was concerned with general information about the respondent, the others were concerned with the CIRAACTE perceived power at their institutions, their perceived expected scholarly activities, their perceived institutional functions, the perceived relative influence of various clusters of power in colleges, their regularity of participation in institutional activities, and their perceived relative influence in various decision making areas.

Population

The population used in this study was the CIRAACTE as listed in the 1977 directory of member institutions and representatives of the AACTE, consisting of approximately 791 American higher education institutions. The association has its headquarters at One Dupont Circle, Suite 610, Washington, D.C. 20036.
Limitations of Study

1. Only those institutions listed in the 1977 AACTE directory were used in the study.

2. This study only investigates the listed hypotheses as they relate to: (1) hierarchy levels (administratively only), and (2) performance satisfaction, expected scholarly activities, and institutional functions.

The Hypotheses

Hypotheses formulated for the study relate to (1) institutional control structure and power differences among their central administrators, deans, and department chairpersons, and (2) the relationships between institution control structure and perceived power satisfaction, and scholarly activities and institutional functions.

The research hypotheses which guided the study are:

1. Authority systems of institutions will be differentiated by their power structures according to their hierarchy levels (central administrators, deans, and department chairpersons).

2. Authority systems of institutions will be differentiated by their decision making structures according to their hierarchy levels.
3. Authority systems of institutions will be differentiated by their power satisfaction structures according to their hierarchy levels.

4. Authority systems of institutions will be differentiated by their scholarly activities according to their hierarchy levels.

5. Authority systems of institutions will be differentiated by their institutional functions according to their hierarchy levels.

6. There will be a relationship between perceived power structures of the CIBAACTE and perceived power satisfaction of the CIBAACTE.

7. There will be a relationship between perceived power structures of the CIBAACTE and perceived power satisfaction of the CIBAACTE that will differ according to their hierarchy levels.

8. There will be a relationship between perceived power structures of the CIBAACTE and perceived scholarly activities of the CIBAACTE.

9. There will be a relationship between perceived power structures of the CIBAACTE and perceived scholarly activities of the CIBAACTE that will differ according to their hierarchy levels.

10. There will be a relationship between perceived power structures of the CIBAACTE and perceived institutional
functions of the CIRAECTE.

11. There will be a relationship between perceived power structures of the CIRAECTE and perceived institutional functions of the CIRAECTE that will differ according to their hierarchy levels.

**The Procedure**

**The Observation Unit**

Questionnaires were sent by the United States mail service to all CIRAECTE located at member institutions. The original questionnaire was mailed to each CIRAECTE. A follow-up questionnaire was sent three weeks later to each CIRAECTE who did not respond to the original mailing.\(^1\)

**Preparation of the Data**

The facilities at Iowa State University were used to transfer data from the returned questionnaires to IBM cards. For all questionnaires returned, the IBM cards contained responses to all questionnaires plus demographic data.

The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), programs for the investigative research, hypotheses testing, and rapid retrieval of a small number of specific statistics

\(^1\)The original and follow-up questionnaire appear in the Appendix.
were used. The SPSS was developed through the close cooperation of three types of specialists: practicing social science researchers, computer scientists, and statisticians. At each stage they attempted to satisfy the following criteria:

1. That the statistical procedures be mathematically and statistically correct.

2. That the program design and code be computationally efficient.

3. That the logic and syntax of the system parallel the way in which social scientists approach data analysis.

4. That the system provide statistical procedures and data management facilities tailored to the particular needs of empirical social researchers.

They effectively satisfied these goals with the contribution of experts in each of the fields listed above.

**Statistical Analyses**

Four main kinds of statistical methodology were used in the analysis: (1) analysis of variance techniques to test for group differences on the variables, (2) Multiple Classification Analysis, (3) correlational techniques to determine the degree of relationship between variables, and (4) chi square test of significance of the difference between correlations. Specific statistical techniques as they were applied to each of the research hypotheses will be discussed
in the analysis of data, as Findings.

Findings and Results

Table 1 indicates the hierarchy levels included in the study and the number of usable questionnaires returned by the CIRAACTE. A total of 791 original and 498 follow-up questionnaires were distributed. Of the 791 CIRAACTE contacted, 551 returned the questionnaires, of which 527, or 67 percent were usable in the study. Returned questionnaires with fewer than 15 responses indicating a particular administrative status (e.g., associate deans, professors, etc.) were excluded from the study.

Table 2 indicates the general background of the CIRAACTE.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chief Institutional Representatives to the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education</th>
<th>Number of Usable Returns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Admini-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy Levels</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>82</td>
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<tr>
<td>Variables</td>
<td>Central Administrator (N=82)</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ed. D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Masters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rank</strong></td>
<td>Professor</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assoc. Prof.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assist. Prof.</td>
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</table>
CHAPTER IV.

FINDINGS: THE STRUCTURE OF POWER AMONG HIERARCHICAL LEVELS

The findings that are descriptive of control and power structures among hierarchical levels are presented in this chapter. The deviation of the mean of the perceptual levels for each hierarchical level expressed as a deviation from the grand mean are shown in Tables 3 through 8. The distributions and total amounts of perceived control and power of hierarchical levels (central administrators, deans, and department chairpersons) are presented, first in aggregate, as representative of the perceived power structure variations across hierarchical levels, second, the amount of variation in \( Y \) (as defined in Definition of Terms in Chapter I) explained by the hierarchy factor, and third, as perceived power structure exists by all CIRAECTE. Finally, control and power structures are related to decision making, power satisfaction, scholarly activities, institutional functions, and the manner in which these variables differ across hierarchical levels are described and discussed.
The distribution and total amounts of power within the hierarchical levels, based upon the mean ratios of perceived measures of power, and the amount of variation in Y explained by the hierarchy factor expressed as ETA (as defined in Definition of Terms in Chapter I), are presented in Table 3. The general distribution of personnel functions ratings as perceived by the CIRAACTE showed a moderately-decreasing distribution of power (set forth in Table 3, the hierarchy factor explains about 5.3 percent (.23^2) of the variation in Y). As shown in Figure 1, the greatest amount of power is exercised by central administrators. The deans exercise only slightly more power than do the department chairpersons. In terms of the prototype "power curves," (used only as defined in Definition of Terms in Chapter I), an autocratic or oligarchic distribution of power is perceived. The "power curve" decreases as one goes down the hierarchical levels.

The general distribution of curriculums ratings as perceived by the CIRAACTE showed a moderately-increasing distribution of power (set forth in Table 3, the hierarchy factor explains about 8.4 percent (.29^2) of the variation in Y). As shown in Figure 1, the greatest amount of power is exercised by department chairpersons. The deans exercise only slightly more power than do the central administrators.
Table 3

AVERAGE AMOUNTS OF POWER
BY THE HIERARCHICAL LEVELS
(n=518)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power Variables</th>
<th>Distribution of Power</th>
<th>Total Power (Means)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deviation ETA&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(From the Grand Mean)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

POWER EXERCISED OVER:

Personnel Functions
- CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS: 0.71 6.25
- DEANS: 0.28 5.82
- DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS: -0.69 4.85
- CIARACTE, AS A GROUP: 0.23 5.54*

Curriculums
- CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS: -0.83 5.34
- DEANS: -0.39 5.78
- DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS: 0.85 7.02
- CIARACTE, AS A GROUP: 0.29 6.17*

Public Relations
- CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS: -0.66 5.72
- DEANS: 0.08 6.46
- DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS: 0.12 6.50
- CIARACTE, AS A GROUP: 0.14 6.38**

Financial Functions
- CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS: 0.81 6.20
- DEANS: 0.22 5.61
- DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS: -0.66 4.73
- CIARACTE, AS A GROUP: 0.21 5.39*

Research Functions
- CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS: -0.08 4.28
- DEANS: 0.42 4.78
- DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS: -0.53 3.83
- CIARACTE, AS A GROUP: 0.20 4.36*

<sup>1</sup> Amount of variation in Y explained by the hierarchy factor
* Means significantly different at the .001 level
** Means significantly different at the .01 level
*** Means significantly different at the .05 level
Figure 1: Relative Distribution of Power Classified by Hierarchical Levels
In terms of the prototype "power curves," a democratic distribution of power is perceived. The "power curve" increases as one goes down the hierarchical levels.

The general distribution of public relations ratings as perceived by CIRAACTE showed a moderately-increasing distribution of power (set forth in Table 3, the hierarchy factor explains about 2 percent (.14^2) of the variation in Y). As shown in Figure 1, the greatest amount of power is exercised by department chairpersons. The deans exercise only slightly more power than do the central administrators. In terms of the prototype "power curves," a democratic distribution of power is perceived. The "power curve" increases as one goes down the hierarchical levels.

The general distribution of financial functions ratings as perceived by the CIRAACTE showed a moderately-decreasing distribution of power (set forth in Table 3, the hierarchy factor explains about 4.5 percent (.21^2) of the variation in Y). As shown in Figure 1, the greatest amount of power is exercised by central administrators. The deans exercise only slightly more power than do the department chairpersons. In terms of the prototype "power curves, an autocratic or oligarchic distribution of power is perceived. The power decreases as one goes down the hierarchical levels.

The general distribution of research functions ratings as perceived by the CIRAACTE showed a generally high
distribution of power (set forth in Table 3, the hierarchy factor explains about 4 percent (.20^2) of the variation in Y). As shown in Figure 1, the greatest amount of power is exercised by deans. The central administrators exercise only slightly more power than do the department chairpersons. In terms of the prototype "power curves," a polyarchic distribution of power is perceived. The power remains generally high across all hierarchical levels.

The Perceived Decision Making Power Structures by Hierarchical Levels and all CIRAACTE

The distribution and total amounts of decision making power within the hierarchical levels, based upon the mean perceived measures of decision making power and the amount of variation in Y explained by the hierarchy factor expressed as ETA, are presented in Table 4. The general distribution of departmental policy ratings as perceived by the CIRAACTE showed an increasing distribution of decision making power (set forth in Table 4, the hierarchy factor explains about 24 percent (.49^2) of the variation in Y). As shown in Figure 2, the greatest amount of decision making power is exercised by departmental chairpersons. The deans exercise only slightly more power than do the central administrators. In terms of the prototype decision making "power curves," a democratic distribution of decision making power is perceived. The decision making power increases as one goes down the
Table 4  
AVERAGE AMOUNTS OF POWER  
BY THE HIERARCHICAL LEVELS  
(N=518)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power Variables</th>
<th>Distribution of Power (From the Grand Mean)</th>
<th>Total Power (Means)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deviation ETA(^1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**POWER EXERCISED OVER:**

**Departmental Policy**
- CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS: -1.63, 4.73
- DEANS: -0.60, 5.76
- DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS: 1.46, 7.82
- CIRAACTE, AS A GROUP: .49, 6.36*

**College Policy**
- CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS: .48, 6.97
- DEANS: .51, 7.00
- DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS: -0.86, 5.63
- CIRAACTE, AS A GROUP: .32, 6.49*

**Institutional Policy**
- CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS: 1.61, 7.32
- DEANS: -0.03, 5.68
- DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS: -0.61, 5.10
- CIRAACTE, AS A GROUP: .32, 5.71*

**Teaching Activity (In General)**
- CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS: -.63, 4.84
- DEANS: -.11, 5.36
- DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS: .40, 5.87
- CIRAACTE, AS A GROUP: .15, 5.47**

**Research Activity (In General)**
- CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS: .18, 4.14
- DEANS: .62, 4.58
- DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS: -.86, 3.10
- CIRAACTE, AS A GROUP: .29, 3.96*

\(^1\) Amount of variation in Y explained by the hierarchy factor  
* Means significantly different at the .001 level  
** Means significantly different at the .01 level  
*** Means significantly different at the .05 level
Figure 2: Relative distributions of influence on decision making classified by hierarchical levels.
hierarchical levels.

The general distribution of college policy ratings as perceived by the CIRAECTE showed a generally high distribution of decision making power (set forth in Table 4, the hierarchy factor explains about 10.3 percent (.32\(^2\)) of the variation in Y). As shown in Figure 2, the greatest amount of decision making power is exercised by deans. The central administrators exercise more decision making power than do the department chairpersons. In terms of the prototype decision making "power curve," a polyarchic distribution of decision making power is perceived. The decision making power remains generally high across all hierarchical levels.

The general distribution of institutional policy ratings as perceived by the CIRAECTE showed a moderately decreasing distribution of decision making power (set forth in Table 4, the hierarchy factor explains about 10.3 percent (.32\(^2\)) of the variation in Y). As shown in Figure 2, the greatest amount of decision making power is exercised by central administrators. The deans exercise more decision making power than do the department chairpersons. In terms of the prototype decision making "power curve," an autocratic or oligarchic distribution of decision making power is perceived. The decision making power decreases as one goes down the hierarchical levels.
The general distribution of the decision making power of teaching activities ratings (in general) as perceived by CIRAACTE showed a moderately-increasing distribution of decision making power (set forth in Table 4, the hierarchy factor explains about 2.3 percent \( (.15^2) \) of the variation in \( Y \)). As shown in Figure 2, the greatest amount of decision making power is exercised by department chairpersons. The deans exercise more decision making power than do the central administrators. In terms of the prototype decision making "power curve," a democratic distribution of decision making power is perceived. The decision making power increases as one goes down the hierarchical levels.

The general distribution of the decision making power of research activities ratings (in general) as perceived by CIRAACTE showed a generally low distribution of decision making power (set forth in Table 4, the hierarchy factor explains about 8.4 percent \( (.29^2) \) of the variation is \( Y \)). As shown in Figure 2, the greatest amount of decision making power is exercised by deans. The central administrators exercise more decision making power than do the department chairpersons. In terms of the prototype decision making "power curve," a laissez faire or anarchic distribution of decision making power is perceived. The decision making power generally remains low across all hierarchical levels.
The Perceived Power Satisfaction Structures by Hierarchical Levels and all CIRAACTE

The distribution and total amounts of power satisfaction with the hierarchical levels, based upon the mean perceived measures of power satisfaction and the amount of variation in $Y$ explained by the hierarchy factor expressed as ETA, are presented in Table 5. The general distribution of personnel functions ratings as perceived by the CIRAACTE showed a generally high distribution of power satisfaction (set forth in Table 5, the hierarchy factor explains about .8 percent ($0.09^2$) of the variation in $Y$). As shown in Figure 3, the greatest amount of power satisfaction in personnel functions is indicated by deans. The central administrators indicate only slightly more power satisfaction than do the department chairpersons. In terms of the prototype power satisfaction curve, a polyarchic distribution of power satisfaction is perceived. The power satisfaction generally remains high across all hierarchical levels.

The general distribution of curriculums ratings as perceived by the CIRAACTE showed a moderately-increasing distribution of power satisfaction in curriculums 10.2 percent ($0.32^2$) of the variation in $Y$). As shown in Figure 3, the greatest amount of power satisfaction is indicated by department chairpersons. The deans indicate more power
Table 5

AVERAGE AMOUNTS OF POWER BY THE HIERARCHICAL LEVELS
(N=518)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power Variables</th>
<th>Distribution of Power (From the Grand Mean)</th>
<th>Total Power (Means)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deviation ETA&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**POWER SHOULD BE EXERCISED OVER:**

**Personnel Functions**
- CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS: -.01, 6.51
- DEANS: .16, 6.68
- DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS: -.24, 6.28
- CIRAACTE, AS A GROUP: .09, 6.52

**Curriculums**
- CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS: -1.06, 5.48
- DEANS: -.34, 6.20
- DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS: .88, 7.42
- CIRAACTE, AS A GROUP: .32, 6.54*

**Public Relations**
- CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS: -.75, 6.15
- DEANS: .12, 7.02
- DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS: .11, 7.01
- CIRAACTE, AS A GROUP: .16, 6.90*

**Financial Functions**
- CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS: -.10, 6.62
- DEANS: .10, 6.82
- DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS: -.15, 6.57
- CIRAACTE, AS A GROUP: .07, 6.72

**Research Functions**
- CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS: -.94, 5.05
- DEANS: .25, 6.24
- DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS: .01, 6.00
- CIRAACTE, AS A GROUP: .19, 5.99*

<sup>1</sup> Amount of variation in Y explained by the hierarchy factor
* Means significantly different at the .001 level
** Means significantly different at the .01 level
*** Means significantly different at the .05 level
A Great Amount 9.0
Quite A Bit 7.0
A Moderate Amount 5.0
Some 3.0
Little or No Amount 1.0

CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS  DEANS  DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS  CIRAACTE AS A GROUP

PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS  PUBLIC RELATIONS  CURRICULUM  FINANCIAL FUNCTIONS  RESEARCH FUNCTIONS

FIGURE 3  RELATIVE DISTRIBUTIONS OF POWER SATISFACTION CLASSIFIED BY HIERARCHICAL LEVELS
satisfaction than do the central administrators. In terms of the prototype power satisfaction curve, a democratic distribution of power satisfaction is perceived. The power satisfaction increases as one goes down the hierarchical levels.

The general distribution of public_relations ratings as perceived by the CIRAECTE showed a generally high distribution of power satisfaction in public relations (set forth in Table 5, the hierarchy factor explains about 2.6 percent (.162) of the variation in Y). As shown in Figure 3, the greatest amount of power satisfaction is indicated by deans. The department chairpersons indicate more power satisfaction than do the central administrators. In terms of the prototype power satisfaction curve, a polyarchic distribution of power satisfaction is perceived. The power satisfaction generally remains high across all hierarchical levels.

The general distribution of financial_functions ratings as perceived by the CIRAECTE showed a generally high distribution of power satisfaction in financial functions (set forth in Table 5, the hierarchy factor explains about .5 percent (.072) of the variation in Y). As shown in Figure 3, the greatest amount of power satisfaction is indicated by deans. The central administrators indicate more power satisfaction than do the department chairpersons. In terms
of the prototype power satisfaction curve, a polyarchic distribution of power satisfaction is perceived. The power satisfaction generally remains high across all hierarchical levels.

The general distribution of research functions ratings as perceived by the CIRAECTE showed a generally high distribution of power satisfaction in research functions (set forth in Table 5, the hierarchy factor explains about 3.6 percent (0.192) of the variation in Y). As shown in Figure 3, the greatest amount of power satisfaction is indicated by deans. The department chairpersons indicate more power satisfaction than do the central administrators. In terms of the prototype power satisfaction curve, a polyarchic distribution of power satisfaction is perceived. The power satisfaction generally remains high across all hierarchical levels.

The Perceived Expectations of Scholarly Activities
by Hierarchical Levels and All CIRAECTE

The distribution and total amounts of expected scholarly activities within the hierarchical levels, based upon the mean perceived measures of expected scholarly activities and the amount of variation in Y explained by the hierarchy factor expressed as ETA, are presented in Table 6. The general distribution of central administrators ratings as
Table 6

AVERAGE AMOUNTS OF POWER
BY THE HIERARCHICAL LEVELS
(N=518)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power Variables Distribution of Power</th>
<th>Total Deviation</th>
<th>ETA* Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCHOLARLY ACTIVITIES EXPECTED BY:</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS</td>
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<td>3.11</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEANS</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>3.13</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS</td>
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<td>2.75</td>
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<td>CIRAECTE, AS A GROUP</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>3.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS</td>
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<td>3.82</td>
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<td>DEANS</td>
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<td>3.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>CIRAECTE, AS A GROUP</td>
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<td>3.53**</td>
</tr>
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<td>Department Chairpersons</td>
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<td>DEANS</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS</td>
<td>-.42</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIRAECTE, AS A GROUP</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>4.21**</td>
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<td>Professors</td>
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<td>CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS</td>
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<td>CIRAECTE, AS A GROUP</td>
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<td>5.22*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Associate Professors</td>
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<td>CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS</td>
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<td>5.02</td>
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<td>DEANS</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>5.52</td>
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<td>DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS</td>
<td>-.77</td>
<td>4.18</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIRAECTE, AS A GROUP</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>4.95*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Professors</td>
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<td>CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEANS</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS</td>
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<td>3.92</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIRAECTE, AS A GROUP</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>4.59*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Amount of variation in Y explained by the hierarchy factor
** Means significantly different at the .001 level
*** Means significantly different at the .01 level
**** Means significantly different at the .05 level
FIGURE 4  RELATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF EXPECTED SCHOLARLY ACTIVITIES CLASSIFIED BY HIERARCHICAL LEVELS
perceived by the CIRAECTE showed a generally low distribution of expected scholarly activities (set forth in Table 6, the hierarchy factor explains about 0.8 percent ($0.09^2$) of the variation in $Y$). As shown in Figure 4, expected scholarly activities is indicated by deans. The central administrators indicate only slightly more expected scholarly activities than do the department chairpersons. In terms of the prototype expected scholarly activities curve, a laissez faire or anarchic distribution of expected scholarly activities is perceived. The expected scholarly activities generally remains low across all hierarchical levels.

The general distribution of deans ratings as perceived by the CIRAECTE showed a moderately-decreasing distribution of expected scholarly activities (set forth in Table 6, the hierarchy factor explains about 2 percent ($0.14^2$) of the variation in $Y$). As shown in Figure 4, the greatest amount of expected scholarly activities is indicated by central administrators. The deans indicate more expected scholarly activities than do the department chairpersons. In terms of the prototype expected scholarly activities curve, an autocratic or oligarchic distribution of expected scholarly activities is perceived. The expected scholarly activities decreases as one goes down the hierarchical levels.

The general distribution of department chairpersons ratings as perceived by the CIRAECTE showed a generally low
distribution of expected scholarly activities (set forth in Table 6, the hierarchy factor explains about 2.6 percent ($0.16^2$) of the variation in $Y$). As shown in Figure 4, the greatest amount of expected scholarly activities is indicated by deans. The central administrators indicate more expected scholarly activities than do the department chairpersons. In terms of the prototype expected scholarly activities curve, a laissez faire or anarchic distribution of expected scholarly activities is perceived. The expected scholarly activities generally remains low across all hierarchical levels.

The general distribution of professors ratings as perceived by the CIRAECTE showed a generally high distribution of expected scholarly activities (set forth in Table 6, the hierarchy factor explains about 7.3 percent ($0.27^2$) of the variation in $Y$). As shown in Figure 4, the greatest amount of expected scholarly activities is indicated by deans. The central administrators indicate more expected scholarly activities than do the department chairpersons. In terms of the prototype expected scholarly activities curve, a polyarchic distribution of expected scholarly activities is perceived. The expected scholarly activities generally remains high across all hierarchical levels.

The general distribution of associate professors ratings as perceived by the CIRAECTE showed a generally high distribution of expected scholarly activities (set forth in
Table 6, the hierarchy factor explains about 6.8 percent ($0.26^2$) of the variation in $Y$). As shown in Figure 4, the greatest amount of expected scholarly activities is indicated by deans. The central administrators indicate more expected scholarly activities than do the department chairpersons. In terms of the prototype expected scholarly activities curve, a laissez faire or anarchic distribution of expected scholarly activities is perceived. The expected scholarly activities generally remain low across all hierarchical levels.

**The Perceived Importance of Institutional Functions by Hierarchical Levels and All CIRAECTE**

The distribution and total amounts of exercised importance of institutional functions among the hierarchical levels, based upon the mean perceived measures of exercised importance of institutional functions and the amount of variation in $Y$ explained by the hierarchy factor expressed as ETA, are presented in Table 7. The general distribution of teaching ratings as perceived by the CIRAECTE showed a generally high distribution of exercised importance of teaching as an institutional function (set forth in Table 7, the hierarchy factor explains about $0.2$ percent ($0.04^2$) of the variation in $Y$). As shown in Figure 5, the greatest amount of exercised importance of institutional functions in this area is indicated by central administrators. The department
Table 7
AVERAGE AMOUNTS OF POWER
BY THE HIERARCHICAL LEVELS
(N=518)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power Variables</th>
<th>Distribution of Power</th>
<th>Total Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deviation ETA¹ (Means)</td>
<td>(From the Grand Mean)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>8.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEANS</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>7.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>8.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRAECTE, AS A GROUP</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>8.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS</td>
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<td>4.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEANS</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>5.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS</td>
<td>-.82</td>
<td>4.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIRAECTE, AS A GROUP</td>
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<td>4.88*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Service to the College or University</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>6.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEANS</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>6.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>6.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRAECTE, AS A GROUP</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>6.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service to the Community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>6.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEANS</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>5.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>6.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRAECTE, AS A GROUP</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>6.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Amount of variation in Y explained by the hierarchy factor
* Means significantly different at the .001 level
** Means significantly different at the .01 level
*** Means significantly different at the .05 level
FIGURE 5  RELATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF IMPORTANCE EXERCISED ON INSTITUTION FUNCTIONS CLASSIFIED BY HIERARCHICAL LEVELS
chairpersons indicate only slightly more exercised importance of institutional functions than do the deans. In terms of the prototype exercised importance of institutional functions curve, a polyarchic distribution of exercised importance of institutional functions is perceived. The exercised importance of institutional functions remains high across all hierarchical levels.

The general distribution of research ratings as perceived by the CIRAACTE showed a generally low distribution of exercised importance of research as an institutional function (set forth in Table 7, the hierarchy factor explains about 9 percent (.30²) of the variation in Y). As shown in Figure 5, the greatest amount of exercised importance of institutional functions in this area is indicated by deans. The central administrators indicate more exercised importance of institutional functions than do the departmental chairpersons. In terms of the prototype exercised importance of institutional functions curve, a laissez faire or anarchic distribution of exercised importance of institutional functions is perceived. The exercised importance of institutional functions generally remains low across all hierarchical levels.

The general distribution of services to the college or university ratings as perceived by the CIRAACTE showed a generally high distribution of exercised importance of
service to the college or university as an institutional function (set forth in Table 7, the hierarchy factor explains about .1 percent (.03²) of the variation in Y). As shown in Figure 5, the greatest amount of exercised importance of institutional functions in this area is indicated by deans. The department chairpersons indicate more exercised importance of institutional functions than do the central administrators. In terms of the prototype exercised importance of institutional functions curve, a polyarchic distribution of exercised importance of institutional functions is perceived. The exercised importance of institutional functions generally remains high across all hierarchical levels.

The general distribution of *services to the community* ratings as perceived by the CIRAECT showed a generally high distribution of exercised importance of service to the community as an institutional function (set forth in Table 7, the hierarchy factor explains about .2 percent (.04²) of the variation in Y). As shown in Figure 5, the greatest amount of exercised importance of institutional functions in this area is indicated by central administrators. The department chairpersons indicate more exercised importance of institutional functions than do the deans. In terms of the prototype exercised importance of institutional functions curve, a polyarchic distribution of exercised importance of
institutional functions is perceived. The exercised importance of institutional functions generally remains high across all hierarchical levels.

The Perceived Achievement of Institutional Functions by Hierarchical Levels and All CIRAACTE

The distribution and total amounts of indicated achievement by institutional functions among the hierarchical levels, based upon the mean perceived measures of indicated achievement of institutional functions, and the amount of variation in Y explained by the hierarchy factor expressed as ETA, are presented in Table 8. The general distribution of teaching ratings as perceived by the CIRAACTE showed a high distribution of achievement of institutional functions (set forth in Table 8, the hierarchy factor explains about 1 percent (.102) of the variation in Y). As shown in Figure 6, the greatest amount of achievement of institutional functions is perceived by the department chairpersons. The central administrators indicate more exercised importance of institutional functions than do the deans. In terms of the prototype exercised achievement of institutional functions curve, a polyarchic exercised achievement of institutional functions is perceived. The exercised achievement of institutional functions remains high across all hierarchical levels.
Table 8
AVERAGE AMOUNTS OF POWER
BY THE HIERARCHICAL LEVELS
(N=518)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power Variables</th>
<th>Distribution of Power</th>
<th>Total Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deviation ETA(^1)</td>
<td>(Means)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(From the Grand Mean)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ACHIEVEMENT ACCOMPLISHED FOR:

Teaching
- CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS: 0.07, 7.04
- DEANS: -0.20, 6.76
- DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS: 0.20, 7.16
- CIRAECTE, AS A GROUP: 0.10, 6.96

Research
- CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS: -0.17, 3.85
- DEANS: 0.27, 4.29
- DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS: -0.32, 3.70
- CIRAECTE, AS A GROUP: 0.14, 4.02**

Service to the College or University
- CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS: -0.17, 6.08
- DEANS: -0.06, 6.19
- DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS: 0.09, 6.34
- CIRAECTE, AS A GROUP: 0.05, 6.25

Service to the Community
- CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS: -0.24, 5.40
- DEANS: -0.09, 5.55
- DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS: 0.10, 5.74
- CIRAECTE, AS A GROUP: 0.06, 5.64

\(^1\) Amount of variation in Y explained by the hierarchy factor
* Means significantly different at the .001 level
** Means significantly different at the .01 level
*** Means significantly different at the .05 level
Figure 6 shows the relative distribution of achievement indicated on institutional functions classified by hierarchical levels. The chart compares different functions: teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community, across hierarchical levels such as central administrators, deans, department chairpersons, and CIRAACTE as a group.
The general distribution of research ratings as perceived by the CIRAACTE showed a generally low distribution of achievement of research as an institutional function (set forth in Table 8, the hierarchy factor explains about 2 percent $(-14\%$) of the variation in $Y$). As shown in Figure 6, the greatest amount of achievement of institutional functions in this area is perceived by deans. The central administrators indicate only slightly more achievement of institutional functions than do the department chairpersons. In terms of the prototype exercised achievement of institutional functions curve, a laissez faire or anarchic distribution of exercised achievement of institutional functions is perceived. The exercised achievement of institutional functions remains generally low across all hierarchical levels.

The general distribution of service to the college or university ratings as perceived by the CIRAACTE showed a slightly increasing distribution of achievement of service to the college or university as an institutional function (set forth in Table 8, the hierarchy factor explains about $0.3$ percent $(-0.05\%)$ of the variation in $Y$). As shown in Figure 6, the greatest amount of achievement of institutional functions in this area is perceived by department chairpersons. The deans indicate more achievement of institutional functions than do the central administrators. In terms of the
prototype exercised achievement of institutional functions curve, a democratic distribution of exercised achievement of institutional functions is perceived. The exercised achievement of institutional functions increases as one goes down the hierarchical levels.

The general distribution of service to the community ratings as perceived by the CIRAACTE showed a slightly increasing distribution of achievement of service to the community as an institutional function (set forth in Table 8, the hierarchy factor explains about .4 percent (.06^2) of the variation in Y). As shown in Figure 6, the greatest amount of achievement of institutional functions in this area is perceived by department chairpersons. The deans indicate only slightly more achievement of institutional functions than do the central administrators. In terms of the prototype achievement of institutional functions curve, a democratic distribution of achievement of institutional functions is perceived. The achievement of institutional functions increases as one goes down the hierarchical levels.

**Summary - Structure of Power Among Hierarchical Levels**

In terms of the hypotheses tested, the major findings are:
1. There are significant differences among the hierarchical levels in their perceptions of distributions of power. There are significant differences among the hierarchical levels in all of the power variables listed (personnel functions, curriculums, public relations, financial functions, and research functions).

2. There are significant differences among the hierarchical levels in their perceptions of distribution of decision making power. There are significant differences among the hierarchical levels in all of the decision making power variables listed (departmental policy, college policy, institutional policy, teaching activities (in general), and research activities (in general)).

3. There are significant differences among the hierarchical levels in their distribution of power satisfaction and/or should be power for the curriculums, public relations, and research functions variables. There are no significant differences among the hierarchical levels in their distributions of power satisfaction and/or should be power for the personnel functions and financial functions variables.

4. There are significant differences among the hierarchical levels in their distribution of expected scholarly activities for the deans, department chairpersons, professors, associate professors, and assistant professors.
There are no significant differences among the hierarchical levels in their expected scholarly activities for the central administrators variable.

5. There are significant differences among the hierarchical levels in their perceptions of importance of institutional functions for the research variable. There are no significant differences among the hierarchical levels in their perceptions of importance of institutional functions for the teaching, service to the college or university, and service to the community variables.

6. There are significant differences among the hierarchical levels in their perceptions of achievements of institutional functions for the teaching, service to the college or university, and service to the community variables.
CHAPTER V.

FINDINGS:
THE RELATIONSHIP OF PERCEIVED POWER AMONG HIERARCHICAL LEVELS

The relationships between perceived power and perceived power satisfaction, perceived expected scholarly activities, perceived importance of institutional functions, and perceived achievement of institutional functions are discussed in this chapter. The correlations are expressed for each hierarchical level and for the CIRAACTE as a group. Finally, the chi square test of significance of the difference between correlations of perceived power with perceived power satisfaction, perceived expected scholarly activities, perceived importance of institutional functions, and perceived achievement of institutional functions among hierarchical levels are presented. The formula used to ascertain the chi square test of significance is as follows:

\[ x^2 = \sum (n-3)z^2 - \frac{\left( \sum (n-3)z \right)^2}{\sum (n-3)} \]

The Relationship Between Perceived Power and Perceived Power Satisfaction by Hierarchical Levels and All CIRAACTE

The correlations between perceived power with perceived power satisfaction by hierarchical levels and the CIRAACTE as a group are presented in Table 9. The chi square test of significance of the difference between correlations of
Table 9
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERCEIVED POWER AND
PERCEIVED POWER SATISFACTION BY HIERARCHICAL
LEVELS AND ALL CIRAACTE

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<td>.25*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRAACTE, AS A GROUP</td>
<td>.34*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹1=Personnel Functions; 2=Curriculum; 3=Public Relations; 4=Financial Functions; 5=Research Functions

* significant at the .001 level
** significant at the .01 level
*** significant at the .05 level
not significant
perceived power with perceived power satisfaction among hierarchical levels are presented in Table 13. The correlations between perceived power of personnel with perceived power satisfaction of personnel functions, curriculums, public relations, financial functions, and research functions as perceived by the CIRAACTE, in general, all showed a high correlation. The largest correlation was expressed between perceived power of personnel functions and perceived power satisfaction of personnel functions (.67) and the least amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of personnel functions and perceived power satisfaction of curriculums (.28). The chi square test of significance of the difference between correlations by hierarchical levels of perceived power of personnel functions with perceived power satisfactions of personnel functions, curriculums, public relations, financial functions, and research functions indicated significant differences of hierarchical levels for personnel functions and no significant differences of correlations by hierarchical levels for curriculums, public relations, financial functions, and research functions.

The correlations between perceived power of curriculums with perceived power satisfaction of personnel functions, curriculums, public relations, financial functions, and research functions as perceived by the CIRAACTE, in general,
all showed a high correlation. The largest correlation was expressed between perceived power of curriculums and perceived power satisfaction of curriculums (.83) and the least amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of curriculums and perceived power satisfaction of research functions (.32). The chi square test of significance of the difference between correlations by hierarchical levels of perceived power of curriculums with perceived power satisfaction of personnel functions, curriculums, public relations, financial functions, and research functions indicated significant differences of hierarchical levels for personnel functions, and financial functions and no significant differences of correlations by hierarchical levels for curriculums, public relations, and research functions.

The correlations between perceived power of public relations with perceived power satisfaction of personnel functions, curriculums, public relations, financial functions, and research functions as perceived by the CIRAECTE, in general, all showed a high correlation. The largest amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of public relations and perceived power satisfaction of public relations (.79) and the least amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of public relations and perceived power satisfaction of curriculums (.35). The chi
square test of significance of the difference between correlations by hierarchical levels of perceived power of public relations with perceived power satisfaction of personnel functions, curriculums, public relations, financial functions, and research functions indicated significant differences of correlations by hierarchical levels for financial functions and no significant differences of correlations by hierarchical levels for personnel functions, curriculums, public relations, and research functions.

The correlations between perceived power of financial functions with perceived power satisfaction of personnel functions, curriculums, public relations, financial functions, and research functions as perceived by the CIRAACTE, in general, all showed a moderately high correlation. The largest amount of correlation expressed between perceived power of financial functions and perceived power satisfaction of financial functions (.59) and the least amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of financial functions and perceived power satisfaction of curriculums (.15). The chi square test of significance of the difference between correlations by hierarchical levels of perceived power of financial functions with perceived power satisfaction of personnel functions, curriculums, public relations, financial functions, and research functions indicated significant differences of correlations by
hierarchical levels for personnel functions, financial functions, and research functions and no significant differences of correlations by hierarchical levels for curriculums and public relations.

The correlations between perceived power of research functions with perceived power satisfaction of personnel functions, curriculums, public relations, financial functions, and research functions as perceived by the CIRAECTE, in general, all showed a moderately high correlation. The largest amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of research functions and perceived power satisfaction of research functions (.54) and the least amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of research functions and perceived power satisfaction of curriculums (.15). The chi square test of significance of the difference between correlations by hierarchical levels of perceived power of research functions with perceived power satisfaction of personnel functions, curriculums, public relations, financial functions, and research functions indicated significant differences of correlations by hierarchical levels for financial functions and research functions and no significant differences of correlations by hierarchical levels for personnel functions, curriculums, and public relations.
The Relationship Between Perceived Power and Perceived Expected Scholarly Activities by Hierarchical Levels and All CIRAECTE

The correlations between perceived power with perceived expected scholarly activities by hierarchical levels and the CIRAECTE as a group are presented in Table 10. The chi square test of significance of the difference between correlations of perceived power with perceived expected scholarly activities among hierarchical levels are presented in Table 13. The correlations between perceived power of personnel functions with perceived expected scholarly activities of central administrators, deans, department chairpersons, professors, associate professors, assistant professors, and instructors as perceived by the CIRAECTE, in general, all showed a moderate correlation. The largest amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of personnel functions and perceived expected scholarly activities of professors (.35) and the least amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of personnel functions and perceived expected scholarly activities of instructors (.16). The chi square test of significance of the difference between correlations by hierarchical levels of perceived power of personnel functions with perceived expected scholarly activities of central administrators, deans, department chairpersons, professors, associate professors, assistant professors, and instructors
Table 10
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERCEIVED POWER AND PERCEIVED EXPECTED SCHOLARLY ACTIVITIES BY HIERARCHICAL LEVELS AND ALL CIRAACTE

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<td>.41*</td>
<td>.39*</td>
<td>.23*</td>
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</table>

1=Central Administrators; 2=Deans; 3=Department Chairpersons; 4=Professors; 5=Associate Professors; 6=Assistant Professors; 7=Instructors
* significant at the .001 level
** significant at the .01 level
*** significant at the .05 level
Not significant
indicated no significant differences of correlations by hierarchical levels for central administrators, deans, department chairpersons, professors, associate professors, assistant professors, and instructors.

The correlations between perceived power of curriculums with perceived expected scholarly activities of central administrators, deans, department chairpersons, professors, associate professors, assistant professors, and instructors as perceived by the CIBAACTE, in general, all showed a low correlation. The largest amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of curriculums and perceived expected scholarly activities of deans (.16) and the least amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of curriculums and perceived expected scholarly activities of assistant professors (.02). The chi square test of significance of the difference between correlations by hierarchical levels of perceived power of curriculums with perceived expected scholarly activities of central administrators, deans, department chairpersons, professors, associate professors, assistant professors, and instructors indicated no significant differences of correlations by hierarchical levels for central administrators, deans, department chairpersons, professors, associate professors, assistant professors, and instructors.
The correlations between perceived power of public relations with perceived expected scholarly activities of central administrators, deans, department chairpersons, professors, associate professors, assistant professors, and instructors as perceived by the CIRACTE, in general, all showed a moderate correlation. The largest amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of public relations and perceived expected scholarly activities of professors (.27) and the least amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of public relations and perceived expected scholarly activities of instructors (.15). The chi square test of significance of the difference between correlations by hierarchical levels of perceived power of public relations with perceived expected scholarly activities of central administrators, deans, department chairpersons, professors, associate professors, assistant professors, and instructors indicated no significant differences of correlations by hierarchical levels for central administrators, deans, department chairpersons, professors, associate professors, assistant professors, and instructors.

The correlations between perceived power of financial functions with perceived expected scholarly activities of central administrators, deans, department chairpersons, professors, associate professors, assistant professors, and
instructors as perceived by the CIRAECTE, in general, all showed a moderately high correlation. The largest amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of financial functions and perceived expected scholarly activities of professors and associate professors (both were .33) and the least amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of financial functions and perceived expected scholarly activities of instructors (.20). The chi square test of significance of the difference between correlations by hierarchical levels of perceived power of financial functions with perceived expected scholarly activities of central administrators, department chairpersons, professors, associate professors, assistant professors, and instructors indicated significant differences of correlations by hierarchical levels for central administrators, associate professors, and assistant professors and indicated no significant differences of correlations by hierarchical levels for deans, department chairpersons, professors, and instructors.

The correlations between perceived power of research functions with perceived expected scholarly activities of central administrators, deans, department chairpersons, professors, associate professors, assistant professors, and instructors as perceived by the CIBAACTE, in general, all showed a moderately high correlation. The largest amount of
correlation was expressed between perceived power of research functions and perceived expected scholarly activities of professors (.42) and the least amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of research functions and perceived expected scholarly activities of instructors (.23). The chi square test of significance of the difference between correlations by hierarchical levels of perceived power of research functions with perceived expected scholarly activities of central administrators, department chairpersons, deans, professors, associate professors, assistant professors, and instructors indicated no significant differences of correlations by hierarchical levels for central administrators, deans, department chairpersons, professors, associate professors, assistant professors, and instructors.

The Relationship Between Perceived Power and Perceived Importance of Institutional Functions by Hierarchical Levels and All CIRAACTE

The correlations between perceived power with perceived importance of institutional functions by hierarchical levels and the CIRAACTE as a group are presented in Table 11. The chi square test of significance of the difference between correlations of perceived power with perceived importance of institutional functions among hierarchical levels are presented in Table 13. The correlations between perceived
Table 11
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERCEIVED POWER AND PERCEIVED IMPORTANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS BY HIERARCHICAL LEVELS AND ALL CIRAECTE

<table>
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<td>.21*</td>
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</table>

1 = Teaching; 2 = Research; 3 = Service to the College or University; 4 = Service to the Community
* significant at the .001 level
** significant at the .01 level
*** significant at the .05 level
not significant
power of personnel functions with perceived importance of institutional functions of teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community as perceived by the CIRAECTE, in general, all showed a moderately high correlation. The largest amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of personnel functions and perceived importance of institutional functions of teaching (.37) and the least amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of personnel functions and perceived importance of institutional functions of research (.27). The chi square test of significance of the difference between correlations by hierarchical levels of perceived power of personnel functions with perceived importance of institutional functions of teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community indicated significant differences of correlations by hierarchical levels for teaching and indicated no significant differences of correlation by hierarchical levels for research, service to the college or university, and service to the community.

The correlations between perceived power of curriculums with perceived importance of institutional functions of teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community as perceived by the CIRAECTE, in general, all showed a moderately high correlation. The
largest amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of curriculums and perceived importance of institutional functions of teaching (.44) and the least amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of curriculums and perceived importance of institutional functions of research (.05). The chi square test of significance of the difference between correlations by hierarchical levels of perceived power of curriculums with perceived importance of institutional functions of teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community indicated no significant differences of correlations by hierarchical levels for teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community.

The correlations between perceived power of public relations with perceived importance of institutional functions of teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community as perceived by the CIRAACTE, in general, all showed a high correlation. The largest amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of public relations and perceived importance of institutional functions of teaching (.45) and the least amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of public relations and perceived importance of institutional functions of research (.28). The chi square test of
significance of the difference between correlations by hierarchical levels of perceived power of public relations with perceived importance of institutional functions of teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community indicated no significant differences of correlations by hierarchical levels for teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community.

The correlations between perceived power of financial functions with perceived importance of institutional functions of teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community as perceived by the CIRAECTE, in general, all showed a moderately high correlation. The largest amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of financial functions and perceived importance of institutional functions of teaching and research (both were .35) and the least amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of financial functions and perceived importance of institutional functions of service to the college or university (7.24). The chi square test of significance of the difference between correlations by hierarchical levels of perceived power of public relations with perceived importance of institutional functions of teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community indicated no significant differences
of correlations by hierarchical levels for teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community.

The correlations between perceived power of research functions with perceived importance of institutional functions of teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community as perceived by the CAACTE, in general, all showed a moderately high correlation. The largest amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of research and perceived importance of institutional functions of research (.41) and the least amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of research functions and perceived importance of institutional functions of service to the college or university (.21). The chi square test of significance of the difference between correlations by hierarchical levels of perceived power of research functions with perceived importance of institutional functions of teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community indicated no significant differences of correlations by hierarchical levels for teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community.
The correlations between perceived power and perceived achievement of institutional functions by hierarchical levels and the CIRAACTE as a group are presented in Table 12. The chi square test of significance of the difference between correlations of perceived power with perceived achievement of institutional functions among hierarchical levels are presented in Table 13. The correlations between perceived power of personnel functions with perceived achievement of institutional functions of teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community as perceived by the CIRAACTE, in general, all showed a moderately high correlation. The largest amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of personnel functions and perceived achievement of institutional functions of teaching (.34) and the least amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of personnel functions and perceived achievement of institutional functions of research (.26). The chi square test of significance of the difference between correlations by hierarchical levels of perceived power of personnel functions with perceived achievement of institutional functions of teaching, research, service to the college or...
Table 12

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERCEIVED POWER AND PERCEIVED ACHIEVEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS BY HIERARCHICAL LEVELS AND ALL CIRAACTE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived Achievement of Institutional Functions</th>
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<td>.30**</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.28*</td>
<td>.29*</td>
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</tr>
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<td>.23***</td>
<td>.24***</td>
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<td>.34*</td>
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<td>.21**</td>
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<td>.35*</td>
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<td>.41*</td>
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<td>.45*</td>
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<td>.14</td>
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<td>.19*</td>
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<td>.19*</td>
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</table>

1 = Teaching; 2 = Research; 3 = Service to the College or University; 4 = Service to the Community
* significant at the .001 level
** significant at the .01 level
*** significant at the .05 level
not significant
university, and service to the community indicated no significant differences of correlations by hierarchical levels for teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community.

The correlations between perceived power of curriculums with perceived achievement of institutional functions of teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community as perceived by the CIRAACTE, in general, all showed a moderately high correlation. The largest amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of curriculums and perceived achievement of institutional functions of teaching (.39) and the least amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of curriculums and perceived achievement of institutional functions of research (.12). The chi square test of significance of the difference between correlations by hierarchical levels of perceived power of curriculums with perceived achievement of institutional functions of teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community indicated no significant differences of correlations by hierarchical levels for teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community.

The correlations between perceived power of public relations with perceived achievement of institutional
functions of teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community as perceived by the CIRAACTE, in general, all showed a moderately high correlation. The largest amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of public relations and perceived achievement of institutional functions of service to the college or university (.40) and the least amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of public relations and perceived achievement of institutional functions of research (.29). The chi square test of significance of the difference between correlations by hierarchical levels of perceived power of public relations with perceived achievement of institutional functions of teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community indicated no significant differences of correlations by hierarchical levels for teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community.

The correlations between perceived power of research functions with perceived achievement of institutional functions of teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community, as perceived by the CIRAACTE, in general, all showed a moderate correlation. The largest amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of financial functions and perceived achievement of
institutional functions of research (.28) and the least amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of financial function and perceived achievement of institutional functions of service to the community (.22). The chi square test of significance of the difference between correlations by hierarchical levels of perceived power of financial functions with perceived achievement of institutional functions of teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community indicated no significant differences of correlations by hierarchical levels for teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community.

The correlations between perceived power of research functions with perceived achievement of institutional functions of teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community, as perceived by the CIRACETE, in general, all showed a moderate correlation. The largest amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of research functions and perceived achievement of institutional functions of research (.38) and the least amount of correlation was expressed between perceived power of research functions and perceived achievement of institutional functions of teaching and service to the community (both were .19). The chi square test of significance of the difference between correlations by
Table 13  
CHI SQUARE TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCES  
BETWEEN CORRELATIONS OF PERCEIVED POWER WITH  
PERCEIVED POWER OF OTHER VARIABLES

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<td>1.41</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.37</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1=Personnel Functions; 2=Curriculums; 3=Public Relations; 4=Financial Functions; 5=Research Functions
* Correlations significantly different at the .005 level
** Correlations significantly different at the .01 level
*** Correlations significantly different at the .05 level
Correlations not significantly different
hierarchical levels of perceived power of research functions with perceived achievement of institutional functions of teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community indicated no significant differences of correlations by hierarchical levels for teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community.

**The Relationship of Perceived Power Among Hierarchical Levels**

In terms of the hypotheses tested, the major findings are:

1. There is a relationship between perceived power structures of CIRAACTE and perceived power satisfaction of CIRAACTE.

2. There are significant differences among the hierarchical levels in their perceptions of the relationships between perceived power of personnel functions, curriculums, and financial functions with perceived power satisfaction of personnel functions; between perceived power of curriculums, public relations, financial functions, and research functions with perceived power satisfaction of financial functions; and between perceived power of financial functions and research functions with perceived power satisfaction of research functions. There are no significant differences among the hierarchical levels in their perceptions of the relationships...
between perceived power of public relations and research functions with perceived power satisfaction of personnel functions; between all the perceived power variables with perceived power satisfaction of curriculums and public relations; between perceived power of personnel functions with perceived power satisfaction of financial functions; and between perceived power of personnel functions, curriculums, and public relations with perceived power satisfaction of research functions.

(3) There is a relationship between perceived power structures of the CIRACATE and perceived expected scholarly activities of the CIRACATE.

(4) There are significant differences among the hierarchical levels in their perceptions of the relationships between perceived power of financial functions with perceived expected scholarly activities of central administrators, associate professors, and assistant professors. There are no significant differences among the hierarchical levels in their perceptions of the relationships between perceived power of personnel functions, curriculums, public relations, and research functions with perceived expected scholarly activities of central administrators, deans, department chairpersons, professors, associate professors, assistant professors, and instructors respectively.
(5) There is a relationship between perceived power structures of the CIRAACTE and perceived importance of institutional functions of the CIRAACTE.

(6) There are significant differences among the hierarchical levels in their perceptions of the relationships between perceived power of personnel functions with perceived importance of institutional functions of teaching. There are no significant differences among the hierarchical levels in their perceptions of the relationship between perceived power of personnel functions, curriculums, public relations, financial functions, and research functions with perceived importance of institutional functions of teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community respectively.

(7) There is a relationship between perceived power structures of the CIRAACTE and perceived achievement of institutional functions of the CIRAACTE.

(8) There are no significant differences among the hierarchical levels in their perceptions of the relationship between perceived power of personnel functions, curriculums, public relations, financial functions, and research functions with perceived achievement of institutional functions of teaching, research, service to the college or university, and service to the community respectively.
CHAPTER VI.

CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions and/or Implications

The power structures indicated by the CIRAECTE respondents tend neither to resemble primarily a bureaucratic nor a collegial form of organization. That is, high degrees of influence over the departmental, college and institutional policies and activities exercised by the upper hierarchical levels and decreasing degrees of influence exercised from offices down the hierarchy are not apparent. The deans seem to have the primary influence over college decision areas as indicated by observers sympathetic to a collegial organizational viewpoint. The central administrators, the college deans, and the department chairpersons all appear to have effective influence over the institution and over one another. Although central administrators are perceived to have the greatest amount of general influence, its exercise tends not to be at the expense of the influence exercised by the deans or by the department chairpersons. Although different hierarchical levels exercise differing degrees of control over one another, each level exercises an effective amount of influence without a substantial degree of usurpation of influence from the other levels. There is the desire on the part of the department chairpersons to have a
somewhat greater influence than they presently have.

These characterizations, however, do not tell the complete story on institutional organization. Consistent with contemporary frames of reference, structural variations do occur due to differences in the kinds of decisions that are made. For example, relative to decisions made in regard to institutional policy, it is discovered that the central administrators have a large degree of influence, in an absolute sense and relative to that retained by the deans and department chairpersons. In the area of establishing teaching (in general) the department chairpersons and their deans both have quite a bit of influence. Thus, for these decision areas, in which deans and department chairpersons have traditionally been assumed to have primary responsibility and commensurate influence, it is true that there is collegial, or democratic, organization. In contrast, the collegial model simply does not apply in other decision areas. Relative to decisions on carrying out university and community service activities, control tends to be shared among all hierarchical levels. For decisions concerning the hiring, evaluation, and promotion, authority is likewise polyarchically structured (generally high across all hierarchical levels). It is, therefore, the most accurate observation that no one theoretical perspective is best for describing university control structures; the most typical
arrangement is the one which appears to permit effective decisions to be made by those who have primary interest vested in them.

**Recommendations**

Not without design, this study raised as many questions about university organization and its effects as it attempted to answer, and it revealed research areas which need to be strengthened in future studies. The following list is certainly not exhaustive, but it does raise representative questions for concern and investigation.

1. Will different power structures occur with respect to different institutional size, institutional type, institutional control, and type of campus setting?

2. Will these power structures change over time? Will these power structures move towards different types of power structures (i.e., polyarchic, democratic, autocratic, or anarchic) and move back to their original types over a period of time? What reasons for these changes? In which decision areas will these structures appear?

3. In what ways do administrators and faculty differ in their perceptions of power structures?

A major impetus was given to this study by the observed lack of representative numbers of systematic inquiries into college and university administrative structures and their
effects. This lack of research effort was especially revealed by the relatively large number of published articles dealing with organizational analyses in other institutional forms, undertaken by researchers housed primarily in organizations which have, until very recently, escaped analytical scrutiny—the university. As is obvious by the research orientation of this study, its approach and methodology was adopted primarily from studies conducted in commercial, industrial, and other private institutions. The approach was flexible enough, however, to have been shown of value when applied in the academic setting. Future studies into university organization and performance will benefit from similar techniques in anticipation of closing the surprisingly large gap between what is known about collegiate organizations and what is generally assumed by their inhabitants.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to positively reinforce the members of my graduate committee for their candor and hard-nosed adherence to the standards they believed in, particularly during the proposal stage of this dissertation. Dr. Larry H. Ebbers, Dr. William A. Hunter, Dr. George Kizer, and Dr. Glenn L. Smith are due my thanks for their support and honesty. Dr. Larry H. Ebbers and Dr. William A. Hunter spent many hours working with me, reading initial drafts and challenging my ideas. Theirs was a service beyond the call of duty. Dr. Richard D. Warren also spent many hours working with me, reading initial drafts and challenging my statistical survey techniques and statistical analyses. He also is due my thanks for his support and honesty.

My wife Cynthia D. Gilbert and son Fred D. Gilbert, III stuck with me through the tensions, the long hours, and the long absences from home and for that I am forever grateful. Their encouragement and patience have meant more than they will ever really know, therefore, I dedicate this study to them.
APPENDIX
May 12, 1978

Dr. Edward Pomeroy
Executive Director
American Association Of Colleges
For Teacher Education
One Dupont Circle, Suite 610
Washington, D.C. 20036

RE: A Study Of Perceptual Power And Authority

Dear Dr. Pomeroy:

As a follow-up of your conversation with Dr. Hunter regarding my research, I am forwarding copies of the rationale, proposal, and final questionnaire used for my study.

Your time and cooperation in this matter has been eminently appreciated. Please advise if there is any additional information needed.

Sincerely,

Fred D. Gilbert, Jr.

P.S. I will send you a copy of the results of this study.
Mr. Fred D. Gilbert, Jr.
8 Santa Barbara Drive, Apt. 5
Marshalltown, Iowa 50158

Dear Mr. Gilbert:

Please forgive the lengthy delay in responding to your letter of May 12, and the accompanying copy of your study proposal. These past weeks have been exceptionally busy for this office, as I am sure it has been for everyone.

I am pleased to have a copy of your questionnaire, and the rationale behind your study. I am assuming that you are moving ahead with the study in line with the general discussions I had with Dr. Hunter, and that before long you will begin to have some data to work with. I will be interested to know what sort of response you are receiving from our chief institutional representatives. This time of year may be a difficult one for them to be very responsive.

When your study is completed, I will appreciate receiving a copy. Please accept best wishes for much success in your work. I am sure you are finding it a pleasure to work with Dr. Hunter. He is a fine person, and one who AACTE holds in very high esteem.

With best wishes, I remain,

Sincerely yours,

Edward C. Polineroy
Executive Director

ECP/sn
Dear AACTE Institutional Representative:

Developments in education indicate that governance is a very important issue facing educational institutions today. James Thompson has developed a theory regarding intra-organizational governance within institutions. We are interested in testing this theory in application to teacher education and ascertain how it is perceived within educational settings. Therefore, we are conducting this cross-sectional study of intra-organizational perceptions of governance by institutional representatives of the American Association of College for Teacher Education (AACTE).

This questionnaire is designed to ascertain perceptions of governance working within teacher education at your institution. The data from the survey will be used to suggest national trends of the perceptions of governance by institutional representative of (AACTE). This project has been launched with the knowledge of (AACTE) headquarters in Washington, D.C.

This questionnaire has been constructed to require a minimum of your time. However, we hope you will deal thoughtfully and frankly with each item so that the results will accurately reflect your perceptions.

The responses will be processed automatically by computers to summarize the answers in statistical form so that individuals and/or institutions will not be identified. Complete confidentiality will be maintained on all responses returned for this study. We will send you a summary of the questionnaire results if you so desire.

It will be appreciated if you will complete the questionnaire by May 19, 1978 and return it in the stamped, envelope enclosed. We appreciate your time and cooperation and look forward to receiving your completed questionnaire.

Sincerely,

William A. Hunter
Director, Research Institute for Studies in Education

Fred D. Gilbert, Jr.
Graduate Research Assistant
May 23, 1978

Dear AACTE Institutional Representative:

We are concluding the data collection phase of our study on governance. As of the above date, we had not received a completed questionnaire from you. We are eagerly awaiting its return.

We believe this to be an extremely valuable study. If, however, you believe that some parts of the questionnaire are irrelevant to your unit, please feel free to leave those sections blank. Another questionnaire and stamped envelope are enclosed for your convenience in responding. We urge you to return the completed information by June 9, 1978.

Your time and cooperation in this endeavor are deeply appreciated. We look forward to receiving your completed questionnaire.

Sincerely,

Fred D. Gilbert, Jr.
Graduate Research Assistant

Enclosures
A Study of Perceptual Power and Authority

This questionnaire is completely confidential. However, to facilitate follow-up and to prevent you from receiving bothersome reminder letters the name of your institution is needed. At no time will respondent data be identified by institution!

NAME OF INSTITUTION

SECTION I: BACKGROUND INFORMATION ABOUT INSTITUTIONAL REPRESENTATIVE AND INSTITUTION

1. Sex
2. Age ______ years
3. Highest degree earned
4. Your present employment status (Check one). _____ Part-time  _____ Tenured  _____ Non-tenured
5. Your present academic rank (Please be specific).
6. Your present administrative status (Please be specific).
7. How long have you been employed at this institution? ______ years
8. Type of institution (Check one).  _____ 4-year  _____ Comprehensive  _____ Professional  _____ University
9. Type of institutional control (Check one).  _____ Public  _____ Private  _____ Private/Religious
10. Type of campus setting (Check one).  _____ Urban  _____ Suburban  _____ Rural

SECTION II: SCHOLARLY ACTIVITIES

Indicate the degree of scholarly activities (contribution to their field i.e., books published, papers presented at professional associations, articles published, etc.) expected by your institution for persons in each position below.

For the following positions please use this rating scale and circle the appropriate number:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>expectation</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Moderate Expectation</td>
<td>A Great Amount Of Expectation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = Don't Know or Can't Say

Central Administrators 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N
Deans 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N
Department Head 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N
Professors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N
Associate Professors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N
Assistant Professors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N
Instructors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N
SECTION III: AUTHORIZATION/POWER

Below are commonly claimed powers in terms of authorizations. Authorizations are the power instruments, the resources, the means of control and inducements that a person may have available to influence the behavior of others. Please react to these authorizations from the standpoint of the position you presently hold giving the following two different points of view for each authorization:

1. What is your perceived power over each of the authorizations listed?
2. What should be your power over each of the authorizations listed?

For the following authorizations please use this rating scale and circle the appropriate number:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Moderate Power</td>
<td>A Great Amount Of Power</td>
<td>N = Don’t Know or Can’t Say</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS (e.g., Salaries, Tenure, Promotions, Recruitment, etc.) SHOULD BE

CURRICULUM (e.g., Scheduling, Course Assignment, Curriculum Development, etc.) SHOULD BE

PUBLIC RELATIONS (e.g., Good contacts within community, Secure publicity for special projects, Interdepartment relations, etc.) SHOULD BE

FINANCIAL FUNCTIONS (e.g., Travel funds, Sabbaticals, etc.) SHOULD BE

RESEARCH FUNCTIONS (e.g., Secure research time, Secure facilities, Secure research assistants, Supplies, etc.) SHOULD BE

SECTION IV: INSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS

Please indicate the degree of importance and the degree of achievement at your institution for each function listed below:

For the following functions please use this rating scale and circle the appropriate number:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMPORTANCE</td>
<td>ACHIEVEMENT</td>
<td>N = Don’t Know or Can’t Say</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TEACHING

RESEARCH

SERVICE TO THE COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY

COMMUNITY
Please indicate the degree of influence each of the following clusters has on the determination of your institution's goals. Please circle one answer for each cluster.

For the following clusters please use this rating scale and circle the appropriate number:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influence</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>A Great Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Alumni, as a group
Sources of large private grants or endowments
The president
The Citizens of the State, as a group
Legislators
The vice-presidents (or provosts)
Parents of Students, as a group
Federal government agencies or offices
The Deans of Colleges as a group
The Students, as a group
State government agencies or offices
The trustees (or regents)
The Faculty, as a group
Chairmen of departments, considered as a group

SECTION VI: PARTICIPATION IN INSTITUTIONAL ACTIVITIES

Please indicate the degree of your regular participation in the following departmental and college activities. Please circle one answer for each activity:

For the following activities please use this rating scale and circle the appropriate number:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>A Great Amount</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. What is the degree of your participation in each of the following departmental activities which might influence departmental policies and decisions?
   a. Departmental Meetings
   b. Departmental Committees
   c. Departmental executive committee or advisory group, or executive officers
   d. Discussion or conferences which might influence policy and decisions

2. What is the degree of your participation in each of the following college activities which might influence college policies and decisions?
   a. College general meetings
   b. College Committees
   c. College executive or advisory committee
   d. Discussions or conferences which might influence policies and decisions
SECTION VII: DECISION MAKING AREAS

Please indicate the degree of influence that the following individuals or groups have on your institution's decisions. Please circle one answer for each decision making area.

For the following decision making areas please use this rating scale and circle the appropriate number:

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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>A Great Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>Of Influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>A Great Amount</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N = Don't Know or Can't Say</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. How much influence do you have on:
   a. Departmental Policy
   b. College Policy
   c. Institutional Policy
   d. Teaching Activities (in general) within department
   e. Research Activities (in general) within department
   f. Teaching Activities (in general) within college
   g. Research Activities (in general) within college

2. How much influence does the faculty have on:
   a. Departmental Policy
   b. Departmental Teaching Activities
   c. Departmental Research Activities
   d. College Policy
   e. Institutional Policy

3. How much influence does the departmental chairperson and/or administrative equivalent have on:
   a. Departmental Policy
   b. Departmental Teaching Activities
   c. Departmental Research Activities
   d. College Policy
   e. Institutional Policy

4. How much influence does the dean of your unit have on:
   a. Departmental Policy
   b. Departmental Teaching Activities
   c. Departmental Research Activities
   d. College Policy
   e. Institutional Policy

5. How much influence do central administrators (e.g., President, Provost, Vice- Presidents, etc.) have on:
   a. Departmental Policy
   b. Departmental Teaching Activities
   c. Departmental Research Activities
   d. College Policy
   e. Institutional Policy

6. How much influence does the board of trustees or board of regent have on:
   a. Departmental Policy
   b. Departmental Teaching Activities
   c. Departmental Research Activities
   d. College Policy
   e. Institutional Policy

We appreciate your time and cooperation and look forward to receiving your completed questionnaire! Please print your name and mailing address below if you would like to be sent an abstract of the results of this study.

Mailing Address:

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________