Affect and moral judgment in older children

Sonia Soneson Werner

Iowa State University

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Affect and moral judgment in older children

by

Sonia Soneson Werner

A Dissertation Submitted to the
Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the
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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Major: Child Development

Approved:

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For the Graduate College

Iowa State University
Ames, Iowa

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INTRODUCTION

Significance of the Problem

Children's moral judgments are not based entirely on their cognitive abilities. Other dimensions of their development seem to be involved in determining their moral judgments. However, so much emphasis in research has been placed on the cognitive contribution to moral development that we are in danger of overlooking the affective contribution (Aronfreed, 1976; Rybash & Roodin, 1978). Intelligence is necessary but not sufficient for the development of moral maturity (Lickona, 1976). As suggested by Hoffman (1975), more research is needed which will help to clarify the relationship between the affective domain and moral decision-making. Several theoretical approaches emphasize the importance of this relationship.

Simpson's (1976) holistic approach to moral development gives equal deference to thoughts, emotions and motivation. She describes her approach as a cognitive-affective-conative developmental theory. In general, she assumes that children must satisfy their emotional needs before they will be motivated to use their cognitive abilities in making mature moral judgments.

Selman and Jaquette (1977) have formulated a theory of social cognition which integrates clinical and developmental approaches to explaining moral development. They focus on the relationship between social situational variables and individual social-cognitive capabilities as they jointly influence social and moral development. Selman (1971) emphasizes
both the stability of the child's capacity and the oscillation in the child's performance due to external and internal forces. This approach is based on the assumption that children can be expected to fluctuate in their moral development, and this fluctuation is partially explainable. Selman's research indicates that affect does influence children's performance in social-moral situations.

Kohlberg's (1969) theory of moral development emphasizes the cognitive domain. However, he states that affective and cognitive development are parallel, not distinct realms, and they represent different aspects of the personality. Although Kohlberg theoretically acknowledges the influence of affect on moral judgment, he has not empirically investigated this influence.

There are many unresolved issues in moral development research. Turiel (1966), doing research following Kohlberg's theory, stated that individuals frequently make judgments based on reasonings at more than one stage of moral development at a time. He describes this as stage mixture. Kohlberg (1976) asserts that even though people are rarely in only one stage at a time, the stages are hierarchically ordered, and development progresses in only one direction. Selman and Jaquette (1977) believe that although progress is basically in one direction, individuals still may use lower level reasoning under particular conditions.

Bandura and McDonald (1963) focused their research efforts on the identification of particular environmental conditions which influence performance on moral development tasks. They found that certain social variables, such as the presence of models, can elicit either prosocial or
antisocial behavior. Milgram (1964) also found that models can influence people's obedience in carrying out antisocial tasks.

Other social psychologists have investigated the influence of situational variables such as the affective state of the subject. Affect has been defined as the person's emotional response to internal or external circumstances (Selman & Jaquette, 1977). Berkowitz and Connor (1966) conclude from their research that when people are frustrated in striving for a goal, they are more likely to violate the norms of social responsibility. Conversely, they found that subjects who had a successful experience were more helpful in a moral behavior task, than those who had experienced frustration. Isen (1970) achieved similar results. The evidence seems to indicate that affect influences moral behavior.

Thus far, no studies have been reported which investigate the influence of children's situationally induced affective states on their moral judgment. Clarification of this influence may be useful for parents and teachers who are involved in guiding children. Adults are frequently in a position to nurture moral maturity in children. If affect influences judgment, then adults need to be perceptive of the children's emotional states during moral dilemmas.

**Purpose of the Study**

The purpose of the study was to investigate induced affective states on the moral judgments of older children. Ten- and eleven-year-old boys and girls were asked to try to solve four puzzles, two were very easy and two were very difficult. The easy puzzle tasks were assumed to induce
the positive affect of success, and the difficult puzzles were assumed to induce the negative affect of frustration or failure. Following each puzzle task, the children were asked to respond to the Moral Advice Test (Carroll, 1974). The effect of affective states on moral judgment performance was analyzed. It was predicted that subjects would respond differently on the moral judgment measure after difficult tasks than after easy tasks.

Null Hypothesis

No differences exist between moral judgments after performing on easy tasks and moral judgments after performing on difficult tasks.

Operational Definitions

Older child or preadolescent: A child aged 10 or 11 years; enrolled in fifth grade.

Situationally induced affect: Success or failure in an experimental task.

Success: Correctly completing a task in the time provided.

Failure: Incompletion of a task in the time provided.

Difficult task: A manual or crossword puzzle which most adults would not be able to solve in the time allocated.

Easy task: A manual or crossword puzzle which most primary school children would be able to solve in the time allocated.

Moral judgment: Score on the Moral Advice Test (Carroll, 1974).
Literature pertaining to moral development theories is reported in the first section of the review. Then, empirical research studies relating moral judgment to moral behavior and to role-taking are discussed, followed by a report of research on moral behavior and situational variables. Finally, moral judgment and situational variables are reviewed.

Overview of Moral Development Theories

Hartup (Note 1), in his presidential address to the American Psychological Association, Division 7, stated there is an unhealthy schism between the fields of social and developmental psychology. Developmental psychologists tend to emphasize the products (stages) of development, while social psychologists tend to emphasize the processes (socialization of an individual into society).

Moral development is an example of an area frequently studied by developmental psychologists, while situationally induced affect is one aspect of socialization often studied by social psychologists.

Moral development has been investigated in terms of moral emotions, moral behaviors, and moral reasoning (Hogan, 1972).

Psychoanalytic theory

Research on moral emotions, such as guilt, has stemmed predominantly from psychoanalytic theory. According to Lickona (1976), psychoanalysis assumes that man is biologically endowed with a motivation to maintain homeostasis. When the individual transgresses or deviates, an emotional
tension, such as guilt, is sensed. The person seeks to reduce this tension and as a result learns how to deal with moral dilemmas. Gilligan (1976) reviewed the psychoanalytic conception of the conscience, called the superego. He concluded that as children identify with their parents, they learn social standards. Soon children internalize these standards and values and no longer need to depend completely on others to control their behavior. The superego observes, criticizes and punishes the ego and id with guilt feelings when the individual disobeys social standards. Psychoanalytic theorists (Lickona, 1976) assume that both internal superego control and social institutions are necessary to influence individuals and keep them from destroying society. However, psychoanalysts did not include an explanation of how the superego develops through stages. In addition, psychoanalysis has limited its focus on moral emotions to guilt and ignored the influence of positive affect on moral judgment.

**Social-learning theory**

Relative to the psychoanalytic approach, the social-learning approach is less concerned with feelings surrounding morality, and more concerned with overt behaviors considered to be moral or immoral (Hogan, 1972). It is assumed that behavior is learned from the environment. Some of the specific areas include resistance to temptation, resistance to deviation, modeling, and reinforcement. The implication here is that morality is situation-specific. However, the problem is not that simple. Behavioral psychologists recognize the fact that even with the opportunity for reward, people may still resist the temptation to behave in an immoral fashion (Goldiamond, 1968). Goldiamond (1968) refers to the learning of
moral behaviors as one that occurs in an anomalous manner; it does not follow the usual pattern of conditioning. He suggests that when people resist the temptation to gain immediate rewards, they are actually considering many consequences beyond the immediate one. They have remembered the results of their past choices when tempted, and these will effect their present decision-making. Therefore, social-learning theorists may recognize covert thinking in moral development, but probably not covert emotions.

Hogan (1972) stated that one of the most amazing aspects about moral behavior is the extent to which people conform to social standards. Generally, human beings do what is expected of them. The universal thrust for social order stems from a value of conformity and a resistance to deviation. Perhaps the behavioral principle involved in conformity is avoidance behavior. Just as the pigeon learns to peck at a disc in time to avoid a shock, even though a reward for pecking is delayed, humans may be learning to behave in socially acceptable ways at appropriate times, even though gratification comes much later (Goldiamond, 1968). Modeling behavior has been investigated by Bandura and McDonald (1963). Their study supports the social learning theory in terms of the influence of the environment on moral behavior. In general, the social-learning approach highlights the oscillation of moral behaviors.

Social-cognitive theory

Selman and Jaquette (1977) advocate a social-cognition theoretical viewpoint which considers both the oscillation and the stability of children's moral development and behavior. They believe that a psychologist
must be aware of both the developmental stability that children bring to situations and the oscillation in interpersonal dynamics due to internal and external forces on the children.

The social-cognition theory is based on the assumption that children develop an interpersonal awareness termed social perspective taking, which provides a framework for moral concepts. Selman and Jaquette (1977) described stages of social-cognitive development:

- Stage 0: Egocentric or undifferentiated perspectives
- Stage 1: Subjective or differentiated perspectives
- Stage 2: Self-reflective or reciprocal perspectives
- Stage 3: Mutual perspectives
- Stage 4: Societal perspectives

Clinical and empirical research (Selman, 1971), support the position that most older children are beginning to enter Stage 2 (a self-reflective or reciprocal perspective) of social-perspective taking. At this stage, children can reflect on their own thoughts or feelings from the perspective of another person. They become aware of how they look to others, as well as what others think and feel. This capacity enables children to be empathic to other people's needs, and also increases their own self-consciousness. Selman and Jaquette (1977) state that the child's stage of perspective-taking is fairly stable across situations. However, internal forces, such as affective state may lead to oscillation in moral behavior and judgment. This influence is seen most dramatically in emotionally disturbed children.

**Holistic theory**

Simpson (1976) also acknowledges the involvement of the affective domain in moral development. Her holistic theory gives equal deference
to thoughts, emotions and motivation, as they contribute toward moral reasoning and behavior. Simpson regards moral development as one area of human competence in which people need to feel that they function well. According to this theory, basic emotional needs must be met in order for a person to be motivated to apply cognitive abilities in solving moral problems. Simpson refers to Maslow's hierarchy of needs to explain the holistic functioning of the personality. Maslow (1954, 1962) identified four fundamental needs: 1) survival, 2) security, 3) belongingness or affiliation, and 4) esteem. When these are satisfied, the individual is freed to use abilities to strive for self-actualization and mature morality.

The holistic theory explains the functioning of the personality in general rather than in specific terms. Simpson believes that whether life's challenges stimulate or defeat children depends on their past experiences and the satisfaction of their basic emotional needs.

**Cognitive-developmental theory**

A well-known orientation to moral development research is the cognitive-developmental theory, with an emphasis on moral judgment and reasoning. The major theorists have been Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg. Piaget (1965), a genetic epistemologist, offered descriptions and explanations of the cognitive growth of children. His theory of cognitive development defines stages that describe how a child's perspective changes from concrete egocentricism to a broader, more abstract understanding of the world from many points of view. Since children are actively involved with their environment, they develop new skills enabling
them to categorize, differentiate, and understand rules. Piaget observed children in their natural play situations, and made records of their actions and verbalizations. He asked direct questions, but also listened to the children's spontaneous remarks. He found differences in children at different age levels, and he categorized their responses into stages.

Piaget's theory emphasizes the characteristics of stages. Kohlberg (1969) summarized Piaget's ideas by focusing on four specific characteristics: 1) the differences in the way children approach problems at different ages, 2) the invariant sequence of the way children think, 3) the structured whole, or underlying organized thinking, which guide children in responding to tasks, and 4) the hierarchical integration of all previous stages, implying that higher stages are preferred over lower stages.

Piaget (1965) also was concerned with the manner in which children mature in their understanding of rules. He observed two general stages of moral development: heteronomous morality and autonomous morality. The former stage is characterized by children's awesome obedience to adults, literal observation of rules, and primary concern with damage resulting from a wrong action. As the children's cognitive structures develop and as social interaction with peers instead of authorities increases autonomous morality emerges in middle childhood. A sense of justice and reciprocity replaces unquestioned obedience. Mutual respect among equals and a recognition of the importance of motives predominate. Piaget felt that this stage refines with maturity, but is not actually replaced by different
stages. Overall, he emphasized that moral maturity depends on cognitive maturity.

Kohlberg (1963, 1969) followed Piaget's approach to moral development by integrating the characteristics of general cognitive stages with the specific area of morality. Similar to Piaget, Kohlberg was concerned with the structure of moral thought in addition to the content of moral decisions. By systematically presenting stories containing moral dilemmas to 10- to 16-year-old boys, and recording their responses, he was able to categorize reasonings into a developmental sequence. The result was a hierarchical stage theory which has since been subjected to a large amount of empirical research. The sequence involves three levels of morality, each with two specific stages. The six stages are as follows (Kohlberg, 1963):

**Level I. Premoral level.**
Stage 1. Punishment and obedience orientation.
Stage 2. Naive instrumental hedonism.

**Level II. Morality of conventional role-conformity.**
Stage 3. Good boy-girl morality, needs approval of others.
Stage 4. Authority maintaining morality.

**Level III. Morality of self-accepted moral principles.**
Stage 5. Morality of contract and of democratically accepted law.
Stage 6. Morality of individual principles of conscience.

Each stage provides a frame of thought from which moral judgments are made, and in this sense, moral reasoning is generalizable across situations. However, Kohlberg recognizes that moral behavior is not directly related to moral reasoning so maturity of judgment does not guarantee socially acceptable conduct.

Kohlberg has argued that children's orientations change from one
stage to another when they experience a disequilibrium resulting from an inability to assimilate events with existing cognitive structures. Upon exposure to higher reasoning, children reorganize their thinking into a more complex structure enabling them to order the world as they understand it (1968).

Kohlberg (1969) stated that universal trends in moral development have a cognitive base. However, many aspects of moral judgment do not have a cognitive base, but a social base. Therefore, social and cultural influences might effect moral judgment, but they might not be explainable in cognitive-developmental terms.

Kohlberg's measure of morality is known as the Moral Judgment Scale which involves nine stories and specific questions designed to demonstrate moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1963). Despite the instrument's frequent use, it has not been standardized with published norms (Kurtines & Greif, 1974). Also, the measure involves time-consuming, subjective scoring.

Empirical Support for Moral Development Theory

Kohlberg's theory of moral development has stimulated extensive research. His initial investigation was his dissertation research (1958). In that study Kohlberg interviewed 72 10- to 16-year-old boys. Kohlberg asked the subjects to verbally respond to nine moral dilemmas, each involving two values in conflict. Then he examined their responses. As a result of his subjective analysis, he identified six developmental types of value orientations:
1) Obedience and punishment
2) Naively egoistic
3) Good boy
4) Authority and social-order maintaining
5) Contractual legalistic
6) Conscience or principles

Kohlberg (1969) concluded that the types were a hierarchical developmental sequence of stages. Based on this initial study, Kohlberg developed the Moral Judgment Scale, which has been used extensively in research in the past twenty years (Lickona, 1976).

To provide empirical support for Kohlberg's conclusion that the stages are hierarchical, Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg (1969) hypothesized that:

1) A subject would prefer reasonings above his own stage over reasonings of lower stages;
2) Stages of thinking above a subject's own stage are increasingly more difficult to understand; and
3) Exposure to reasoning of one stage above the subject's own stage would result in more assimilation than exposure to the stages two above or one below.

The 45 subjects in this study included 11 males and 11 females in the fifth grade, and 12 males and 11 females in the eighth grade.

All subjects were pretested on a partial version of the Moral Judgment Scale (five dilemmas were presented instead of nine). Then subjects were exposed to a series of moral arguments for solving dilemmas that were at three different stages in relation to the subject's dominant stage: one below, one above and two above. The subjects then evaluated and recapitulated the advice, and also gave their own advice for the situations.

Rest et al. (1969) found statistical support for their first hypothesis by analyzing the preferences in terms of a binomial distribution,
and calculating the deviations from the normal approximation. Specific numerical results of the test were not given. The second hypothesis was tested by examining the subjects' attempts at recapitulating advice statements. They found that the accuracy of the recapitulations decreased as the stage level increased (chi-square goodness of fit test was employed and the difference in accuracy was reported to be highly significant, although no numerical results were given). The third hypothesis was tested by comparing stage usage in the pretest interview with stage usage in the subject's own advice.

The comparison of stage usage shows a definite increase in use of reasoning one stage beyond the subject's original reasoning, no increase in reasoning two stages beyond, and a slight increase in reasoning one stage below (no statistical tests were reported). In summary, the results of this study give some evidence that preadolescents prefer concepts that are above their current predominant stage to those concepts that are below, they find concepts increasingly difficult at stages higher than their own, and they assimilate thinking that is just one stage beyond more readily than reasoning either one stage below or two stages beyond their own current level.

Kohlberg's approach to studying moral development has been reviewed and critiqued. Kurtines and Greif (1974) have examined this model and have identified some major problems. In general, the theory's primary measurement device, the Moral Judgment Scale, lacks standardized administration procedures, has a variable and complex scoring scheme, and no reported estimates of reliability (temporal stability and internal consistency) or standard error of measurement. In addition, the validity of
the measure is questionable, since there is an unclear relationship between moral judgment and moral behavior. Kurtines and Greif concluded that it is possible that the stages do reflect actual moral development, but the Moral Judgment Scale does not seem to be an acceptable measuring device.

Rest (1976) has responded to such criticism of the research on moral judgment by providing an alternative method of developmental assessment. Rest's measure is based on the assumption that people make judgments about the important issues in moral dilemmas (Rest, Cooper, Coder, Masanz, & Anderson, 1974). Statements were written which represent thinking at the various stages of moral development identified by Kohlberg. Subjects are given the task of reading moral dilemmas and selecting which issues are the most important to consider when trying to solve the dilemmas. Rest et al. (1974) hypothesized that statements representing principled thinking (Stages 5 and 6) would be selected more often by subjects supposed to be developmentally more advanced. In this study, 160 students made up the major sample: 40 ninth-grade subjects, 20 males, 20 females; 40 twelfth-grade subjects, 20 males, 20 females; 40 juniors and seniors in college, nearly equal numbers of males and females; and 40 male graduate students majoring in religion or moral philosophy. Additional minor samples were involved but they were smaller and less balanced in terms of sex.

The instrument developed by Rest is the Defining Issues Test (DIT). It consists of six moral dilemmas, each followed by twelve statements of issues to consider in the particular dilemma. The subjects were asked to rate and rank the statements in terms of importance. The ranking data
seemed to be more reliable than the rating data, so the results were compiled by giving weights of 4, 3, 2, and 1 to the issues ranked first, second, third, and fourth, respectively. The weights attributed to the principled issues over all six stories were summed for a score which varied from 0 to 95. The score (designated P) was interpreted as the relative importance a subject gives to principled issues when making moral judgments.

The Defining Issues Test was checked for reliability with a test-retest on 28 ninth-grade children. The resulting Pearson correlation was .81. To compare the results of the different student groups, Rest et al. (1974) reported the average percentage of ranks given to the issues of each stage, for all groups, and then performed a one-way analysis of variance between groups on the P score. The main effect was highly significant \( (F = 48.5, \ p < .01) \). The group assumed to be more advanced (graduate students) attributed much more importance to higher stage statements than the other groups. Thus the DIT P score clearly differentiated the four criterion groups.

Additional minor studies were reported relating moral judgment to Kohlberg's scale, age, and comprehension of social-moral concepts; all correlations were in the 60s. The DIT also related .35 \( (p < .01) \) to the Differential Ability Test, which is an IQ test (Cooper, 1972).

The DIT has the advantages of good test-retest reliability, standardized administration procedures, objective scoring, minimal variance due to differences in verbal expressivity, and is quick to score.

After many researchers began to use the DIT in moral judgment
research, Rest, Davison and Robbins (1978) summarized the findings of all these studies to date. Over 50 researchers had collected DIT data on 5,714 subjects in 136 different samples from a variety of backgrounds and areas of the country. Subjects were combined into student groups (junior high, senior high, college, graduate students) and the P scores were averaged. Additional adult samples were also analyzed. In general, P scores averaged in the 20s, 30s, 40s and 50s, respectively. One-way analysis of variance results for the four groups indicated an extremely high trend \( F(3,2905) = 604.9, p < .0001 \). Rest et al. (1978) concluded that the DIT effectively discriminated among the four age groups.

Rest's article also included a report and discussion of results of longitudinal studies involving the DIT. In summary, analyses of individual subjects over time indicated a decrease in lower stages of moral thinking and an increase in higher stages.

Rest et al. (1978) concluded that these results provide support for Kohlberg's model of moral development.

Kohlberg's investigations (1958), 1963, 1968) appear to have been useful for exploring the various types of thinking involved in moral judgment. The products have been the theory of the six hierarchical stages as well as numerous examples of reasonings. Rest has extended this area of research by developing a reliable, standardized measure of moral development, which was based on Kohlberg's theory, and which made use of the examples of reasonings in issue statements. Therefore, there is some evidence to suggest that moral judgment does exist in preadolescence, and that its development can be measured. However, it is not clear that moral judgment can be discriminated from intelligence.
Carroll (1974), following Rest's (1976) lead in developing instruments of moral judgment, developed a measure which permitted empirical testing of Kohlberg's moral development theory. The device is known as the Moral Advice Test. It was Carroll's objective to create a similar instrument which would be particularly appropriate for use with preadolescents.

Carroll decided to use the well-tried format of presenting moral dilemma stories. He revised three stories from Kohlberg's interviews and created one new story. After doing a pilot test on 10-, 12- and 14-year-old subjects, he edited the stories to balance the vocabulary. The new stories were then administered to seventh-grade students to check for comprehension. The stories were revised again. Then advice statements were selected or constructed to represent Kohlberg's stages of moral judgment: 1, 2, 3, 4 and P. Cooper (1972), Kohlberg (1969), and Carroll agree that stages 5 and 6 can be grouped together as a principled (P) stage. The advice statements were tested on 11- to 15-year-old subjects and then edited to balance for vocabulary and syntax. Statements were limited to two or three sentences.

Carroll tried a variety of modes of presenting the instrument in pilot tests. He concluded that ninth-grade students (or older) appear to be capable of reading the stories and rating the advice statements on paper, without assistance. However, younger adolescents often needed assistance with the stories. Carroll found that recording the stories and presenting them while the subjects read along was effective in limiting the effect of differences in reading ability.
Finally, Carroll interviewed individual pilot subjects to check for their comprehension of the stories and procedures, and their reasons for rating the advice statements. He concluded that the instrument was interesting and understandable to subjects as young as 10 years old.

After completing the pilot tests, Carroll collected data on 271 subjects in the seventh, ninth and eleventh grades of a middle-class community. The Moral Advice Test was administered as a paper-and-pencil test to groups of subjects. Subjects were asked to respond in three ways: 1) indicate whether they accept, tend to accept, tend to reject, or reject each advice statement; 2) indicate what age of person probably made each advice statement: elementary or preschool child, junior or senior high school student, or adult; and 3) indicate which key words in each advice statement influenced them in forming their opinions. Data were not analyzed on this third form of response.

The results of the rejection/acceptance rating scale indicated that there was a developmental trend toward greater consistency and intensity of rejection of lower stage (1, 2, 3) advice statements. Older subjects rejected lower stage statements more often than younger subjects. The differences in responding were highly significant ($p < .01$). The higher stage advice statements ($P$) were accepted by most subjects regardless of age or verbal ability. Internal consistency reliabilities were in the high .70s for the lower stage scales.

The second form of response (indicating age of person making each statement) minimally distinguished age groups when analyzed alone.
However, when age assignment ratings were combined with rejection/acceptance ratings the strongest discrimination of age groups was produced. This finding served as a test of construct validity.

Therefore, preadolescent and early adolescent subjects were differentiated by rejection/acceptance ratings of lower stage reasonings, in terms of consistency and intensity. Carroll concluded that the Moral Advice Test is reliable, and it may be of use in future studies with preadolescents, especially if the test is administered orally, and if the subjects are asked to give rejection/acceptance ratings alone.

Moral Judgment and Moral Behavior

Moral judgment has been investigated in terms of its relationship to a variety of dimensions of personality. Harris, Mussen, and Rutherford (1976) focused on children's moral judgment, intelligence, moral conduct, honesty, reputation, self-confidence, and security in social relationships with peers. Their study involved 33 fifth-grade boys (X age = 10.5 years), who participated in four testing sessions. In the first session, the boys responded to a sociometric questionnaire in which they nominated classmates on items dealing with conformity to rules, honesty, generosity and helpfulness. The responses were intercorrelated and factor analyzed. These analyses yielded two factors: honesty and altruism. Scores for these factors were derived for each subject by selecting the items that had the highest loading on each of these factors and summing the standard scores for these items. The children also responded to a self-concept scale containing items in four categories: adjustment to parents,
adjustment to peers, school adjustment, self-confidence. In the second testing session, two intelligence tests were given to the children in groups. The researchers made duplicates of the children's responses. During a third session the children were asked to help score their own tests, thus providing an opportunity for cheating. Their moral conduct scores, therefore, consisted of comparisons of the original responses with the corrected tests. Intelligence was assessed by the actual intelligence tests. The fourth testing session involved individual administration of Kohlberg's nine-story Moral Judgment Scale.

The correlation between moral judgment and intelligence was .52 ($p < .01$), and the correlation between moral judgment and honesty was .45 ($p < .05$). Scores on the altruism factor correlated .41 ($p < .05$) with moral judgment. Moral judgment correlated with self-confidence in peer relationships at .45 ($p < .05$). Several other results were given that involved statistically partialling out intelligence. However, this technique is no longer acceptable, so those results will not be reported here (Note 2).

Sullivan, McCullough and Stager (1970) also were concerned with the relationship between moral judgment and moral behavior. They worked on the assumption that ego strength was an essential dimension of moral character and may be a bridge between moral judgment and behavior. One aspect of their study involved assessing the moral judgment and ego development of 120 12-, 14-, and 17-year-old children (60 males and 60 females). Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Scale, using all nine dilemmas, was
administered to the group. The ego development measure, developed by Loevinger and Wessler (Note 3), was administered to the group on a separate day. This measure consisted of 36 stems to be completed with words to form single sentences. The responses to the sentence completion test were judged and assigned to the stages of ego development: symbiotic, impulse ridden, opportunistic, conformist, conscientious, autonomous, and integrated. From the judged responses, a single rating was assigned which reflected the distribution of item ratings. The subjects' moral judgment correlated with ego development at .40. This result was interpreted by Sullivan et al. (1970) to be an indication that the constant capacity of the ego to make decisions accounts for consistencies in moral judgments and moral behaviors.

Moral Judgment and Role-taking Skills

Selman and Jaquette (1977) also focused on the consistency in the child's moral development. In their theory of social cognition, they described the capacity to role-take as stable, although oscillation in behaviors and judgments occur due to internal and external situational variables. Selman (1971) has offered empirical support for this theory in his study which explored the relationship between role-taking ability and moral reasoning. Role-taking is defined as the ability to understand the interaction between the self and another as seen through the other's eyes. The subjects were 60 middle-class children age 8, 9, and 10 (30
males and 30 females). Moral judgment was measured by Kohlberg's scale, in individual interviews. Role-taking was measured by two instruments developed by Flavell (1968). One role-taking task involved the child trying to outguess a peer in choosing money from two boxes. Responses and reasons were analyzed and scored at one of three qualitatively different levels: 1) lack of awareness of another's motives, 2) awareness of the existence of motives but unaware of the relevance of another's motives, and 3) awareness of importance of another's motives. The second role-taking task involved telling a story with a series of pictures. When specific pictures were removed, the child was asked to retell the story as a peer would who had not heard the first story. Since the removed pictures eliminated the segment of the story involving a motive, the task was to see if the child could change the story appropriately. Again, responses were analyzed and scored into three levels of role-taking. However, for data analysis, the focus was on scores in Categories 2 and 3, to emphasize the key difference between reciprocal and nonreciprocal role-taking.

The results were of a categorical (ordinal) nature, so the data were analyzed nonparametrically. The two role-taking tasks were significantly associated (χ² = 18.055, p < .01). Moral judgment was significantly associated with scores on both of the role-taking tasks (χ² = 18.921, p < .01; χ² = 13.203, p < .01). Most of the children tended to use Stage 2 moral judgment reasoning, which is predominantly a concern for one's own needs. Selman concluded that when older children mature in their moral judgment
from Stage 2 to Stage 3 (concern for others' needs and approval) that this increase is due in part to an increase in reciprocal role-taking (1971).

Moir (1974) investigated the same relationship in his study involving 40 11-year-old girls. He individually administered Kohlberg's moral judgment measure with all nine dilemmas, and administered three different role-taking tasks. The three tasks involved visual role-taking, perception of another's motives in manipulating objects, and perception of another's feelings in interpersonal relationships. Responses were analyzed and scored as in the Selman (1971) study. Moir found that most of the girls scored at Stage 2 (33%) or Stage 3 (27%) of moral reasoning. So, he concluded that conventional morality was just beginning to emerge. The subject's overall role-taking scores correlated with moral judgment at .71 (p < .005). The individual role-taking tasks differed in their correlations with moral judgment. Moir interpreted his findings to mean that the emergence of conventional moral thinking is gradual, fluctuating, and consisting of a sequence of many small transitions. He did not discuss the results in terms of the influence of situational variables.
Moral Behavior and Situational Variables

Moral judgment seems to be related to moral behavior (Harris, Mussen & Rutherford, 1976), ego development (Sullivan, McCullough & Stager, 1970) and role-taking skills (Selman, 1971; Moir, 1974). Thus, the increasing ego-strength and capacity for mature role-taking may account for some of the stability in older children's moral maturity. However, older children do fluctuate between moral Stages 2 and 3, and these are strikingly different stages. Since the difference between these two stages involves a concern for others' needs, this contrast in stages of judgment seems to parallel the contrast in nonaltruistic vs. altruistic moral behaviors. If situationally induced affect has an influence on moral behavior, then perhaps it also influences moral judgment at the point of transition from Stage 2 to Stage 3.

Berkowitz and Connor (1966) investigated the influence of situationally induced affect of adults' willingness to help other people. One hundred and eight male college students volunteered in this study. Only one aspect of the study will be reported here. The subjects were divided into two experimental groups and one control group. Those in the first group were asked to individually solve a jigsaw puzzle which was so difficult that they each met with failure. The second group of subjects were asked to solve an easy jigsaw puzzle which each subject succeeded in doing. The control group waited for a similar time period. Then each subject was involved in an envelope-making task, in which they were led to believe that another person would benefit by the quantity of their production. The results indicated that previous experience with a puzzle
had a significant effect on the subject's production ($F = 7.1, p < .01$), and the authors interpreted this to mean that the previous successful experience increased the subjects' willingness to help other people, while the previous frustrating experience tended to reduce this willingness.

Isen (1970) also investigated the effects of success or failure on altruism. She formulated the warm glow of success hypothesis, which summarized her expectation that those who had succeeded on a task would be more helpful and generous to a stranger than those who had not succeeded. In the first of three studies reported, Isen randomly assigned 14 male and female school teachers to two groups. Subjects were met individually, and given a series of perceptual-motor and creativity tasks. Upon completion, the subjects were given a dollar in change, and told that they had performed either extremely well or extremely poorly. Then the experimenter left the room and a confederate entered carrying a money collection can. The can had a sign saying "junior high air-conditioning fund". The confederate explained about the fund, then left. The amount of money donated was the dependent measure of generosity. The success subjects donated significantly more than failure subjects ($t = 1.99, p < .05$).

The second of three studies involved 12 different teachers in a similar setting. Half the subjects experienced success and half experienced failure. Then, a confederate entered the room carrying an armload of items that began to spill. The amount of help offered was the dependent measure of helpfulness. The success subjects were more helpful than those who had failed ($t = 1.91, p < .05$). Similar findings occurred in the third study, involving college students.
Later, Isen was joined by two other investigators (Isen, Horn, & Rosenhan, 1973) in a series of experiments involving older children. In the first of three studies, 75 fourth-grade children were seen individually. Each child was given 25 pennies for participating, and then was given a chance to play a marble game alone. The game was rigged to allow the child to experience success, failure or no score, depending on which group he/she had been assigned. When the experimenter returned to discuss the toy, another experimenter entered with a contribution can bearing a sign saying "toy fund for poor children" and then left. For a minute, the child was alone and had the opportunity to contribute. The amounts contributed were analyzed nonparametrically, and the experience of success or failure significantly effected the amount contributed ($H = 9.77, p < .025$). In the second of three studies, it was hypothesized that the generosity of children would be influenced by whether the children failed the task privately or in the company of an adult. In this study 60 third-grade children were tested individually. Each child was told from the beginning that he/she could contribute money to a toy fund, then play with the (rigged) marble toy alone. When the child completed the game, the experimenter returned, discussed the game, and left the child alone which gave the child a chance to contribute. Children experiencing success contributed significantly more than children in the control group ($U = 133, p < .05$), but not more than children experiencing failure. In the third study, the effects of failure only were studied. Sixty fourth-grade children were tested individually in a situation similar to the previous studies, however, the toy fund can was not introduced at the
beginning. Children failed the game either in the presence of the experimenter or in private, or played the game with no score. As in the second study, the toy fund can was presented, and the child was left alone with it. Children with public failure experiences contributed much more than those with private failure experiences ($t = 3.37, p < .005$). In conclusion, Isen et al. (1973) demonstrated that success leads to greater generosity in children and that public failure leads to greater generosity than private failure. Isen et al. suggested that perhaps the latter finding occurred because the children who failed publicly may have wanted to improve their image in the experimenter's eyes.

Moore, Underwood and Rosenhan (1973) investigated the influence of affect on moral behavior in a more direct manner. Instead of presenting the subjects with tasks which would result in success or failure, they asked the subjects to think of happy or sad things. Forty-two girls and boys, between seven and eight years of age, were randomly assigned to one of three groups (happy, sad, control). Children were tested individually with an experimenter who indicated that the task was a hearing test. Each child received 25 pennies for participating, and was told that not all children could participate. However, anyone could contribute to a fund to share the money with those children who did not participate. After a hearing test the child was told to think of happy or sad things, was asked to count, or sat quietly for 30 seconds. Then the child was left alone for 90 seconds, and given an opportunity to privately contribute. The amount of pennies contributed was the measure of altruism. The affective state main effect was significant ($F = 4.71, p < .025$). It seems that
even a transient experience of suggested positive affect makes a child more generous.

In summary, affect which is directly induced by suggestion or induced by experience with difficult or easy tasks seems to influence moral behavior in terms of generosity or altruism.

Moral Judgment and Situational Variables

Social learning theorists challenge stage developmentalists because they assume that moral responses vary according to the unfolding of genetically programmed response predispositions (Bandura & McDonald, 1963). Instead, social learning theorists assume that children learn social-moral responses from the environment, and these responses can be influenced by models and reinforcers. Bandura and McDonald (1963) tested this assumption in their study involving 155 children aged 5 to 11 years. The subjects were individually pretested with pairs of stories similar to those designed by Piaget (1965). In each pair of stories, one story described a well-intentioned act with a large amount of damage done, and one story described a character with a selfish motive resulting in minimal damage. In answer to the question "Who did the naughtier thing?", a child's original moral orientation (heteronomous vs. autonomous) was detected. Then the experimenters divided the children into groups. In the experimental groups some children discussed more stories with a model who verbalized responses opposite of what the child originally offered. In other groups, the children were reinforced for any responses opposite to their original responses. All children were posttested with more stories. Older
children tended to offer more autonomous responses in the whole experiment as Piaget had described \((F = 4.84, \ p < .01)\)\(^1\). The effect of the different experimental conditions was significant \((F = 3.24, \ p < .05)\)\(^1\). Further analyses indicated that the children exposed to models gave significantly more moral responses that were different from their original responses, than the control group. Reinforcement was not as effective as models in altering the children's moral responses.

Arbuthnot and Andrasik (1973) also examined the influence of situational variables on moral judgment. Eighty male college students participated as subjects in this study. There were two levels each of environmental conditions (comfortable room vs. hot, crowded room), model (low vs. high moral reasoning), and individuation (individuated vs. deindividuated). All subjects were assessed using Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Scale, before and after all experimental manipulations. In the individuated conditions, subjects were made to feel responsible and personally involved by being introduced to others in the experiment, and by putting their names on instruments. Deindividuated subjects were made to feel anonymous by wearing waist-length white hoods and meeting no one personally. After individual moral judgment assessments on three dilemmas, subjects were gathered in groups of 10 to discuss another dilemma in the different environmental conditions, with different models present, and under different individuation conditions. Then subjects responded individually to the same dilemma on paper. The data were subjected to analysis of variance. The results showed that subjects in the deindividuation condition scored lower in moral judgment than in the individuation condition \((p < .01; \ \bar{X}_D = 3.90)\)\(^1\).
\( \bar{X}_1 = 4.29; F \text{ and } df \text{ not reported} \). Also, subjects tended to increase in moral maturity across trials. Modeling and physical environmental conditions were not significant, nor were their interactions. However, the interaction of deindividuation and modeling was of interest. Subjects with a high moral model tended to give higher moral judgments when individuated than when deindividuated. Apparently, when a person is held responsible for his/her moral judgments, highly moral models have a positive influence, but when not held accountable, the person reacts in the opposite direction.

Turiel (1966) investigated the influence of various stages of moral reasoning on preadolescent boys. His research was not based on social-learning assumptions of the influence of the environment, but rather on the assumption that passing from one stage to the next involves the integration of previous stages. Therefore, people learn more when they are exposed to reasoning at one stage above rather than one stage below their own. Forty-four subjects were pretested by Kohlberg's measure, and then distributed among three experimental groups and one control group. In the treatments, two weeks later, subjects were exposed to arguments in moral discussions that represented moral reasoning at stages one above, one below or two above their original level. Control subjects received no treatment. A week later, all subjects were posttested on Kohlberg's scale, again. The results indicated that the influence of reasoning one stage above the original responses was significantly greater than that of reasoning two stages above \( (t = 3.55, p < .005) \), and somewhat greater than that of reasoning one stage below \( (t = 1.43, p < .10) \).
concluded that these results provided empirical support for Kohlberg's assumption of the hierarchical integration of stages.

Arbuthnot (1975) also studied the influence of various stages of moral reasoning, but he involved college students instead of preadolescents. Ninety-six males and females participated in this study. They were pretested on Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Scale, then distributed into control and experimental groups. For the treatment, subjects met in pairs and were asked to role-play a moral dilemma and try to convince each other of their own positions. All subjects were posttested on a portion of Kohlberg's measure immediately afterwards. All but one of the control groups were also assessed one week later. Subjects paired with opponents having more mature reasonings compared to control subjects increased significantly ($p < .001$), and this increase also was present after one week ($F = 6.72, p < .02)$. However, Arbuthnot's study did not replicate Turiel's (1966) finding that subjects showed the largest increase when presented with arguments just one stage higher than their own. The inconsistency in the findings may be due to the age differences in subjects.

It would appear that moral judgment responses may be altered, somewhat, by exposure to different reasoning from older models and peers, and by deindividuating circumstances.

In summary, several theories of moral development indicate that moral judgments may be influenced by affect. While the cognitive-developmental theory of moral judgment has been supported by empirical research, it is not clear how moral judgment relates to moral behavior. Moral behavior has been shown to be altered by situationally induced affect.
judgment has been shown to be altered by a few situational variables, however, no research has been reported which indicates the influence of situationally induced affect.
1. Degrees of freedom (df) were not included in the Review of Literature when they were not reported in the original reference.
METHODOLOGY

The focus of the research was on the effect of affective states on moral judgment performance in older children. The general research design was a Graeco-Latin Square design (Kirk, 1968), to control for the nuisance variables of groups of subjects, order of testing sessions, and versions of the Moral Advice Test (Carroll, 1974). The independent variable of interest was different puzzle tasks, while the dependent variable was moral judgments made after performing on puzzle tasks.

Subjects

The subjects involved in the study were 40 fifth-grade children (14 boys, 26 girls). They ranged in age from 10 years, 7 months to 11 years, 9 months, with an $\bar{X}$ of 11 years, 0 months. All subjects were Caucasian, and residents of two middle-class communities in the midwestern United States. Names of subjects were obtained from four sources: 4-H club membership lists, parochial school class lists, students known to a former public school teacher, and children of parents acquainted with the experimenter. All the children were unfamiliar to the experimenter.

Instruments

The instruments for the study included the equipment needed to establish tasks for inducing positive and negative affect and a test for measuring moral judgment.
Tasks

In order to situationally induce positive and negative affect, equipment was needed which would provide the children with both successful and frustrating experiences. It was decided that difficult and easy tasks could provide such experiences. The criteria for selecting appropriate tasks included the following considerations:

1) The tasks should be interesting to older children.
2) The tasks should be able to be administered in a few minutes.
3) The tasks should be similar in appearance so that degree of difficulty would not be immediately obvious.
4) There should be more than one opportunity for frustration to occur and more than one opportunity for success to occur.
5) The tasks should be designed to require different dimensions of intelligence, because not all children perform equally well in all dimensions (Wechsler, 1974).

Based on these considerations, four puzzles were selected for the tasks. Two were puzzles which required verbal comprehension (crossword puzzles), and two required nonverbal manipulation of materials (manual puzzles). There was one difficult and one easy puzzle of each type of puzzle.

Manual puzzles Both of the manual puzzles are peg form-board type puzzles. Each has a base constructed out of sturdy, translucent plastic, which measures 9" by 12" by \(\frac{1}{2}\)". Each base has four rows of pegs on which six forms are positioned. The pegs and forms are made of the same type of plastic as the base. The pegs are \(\frac{1}{2}\)" wide cylinders,
standing \( \frac{1}{2} \)" high off the base. There are three pegs for the three holes in each form. Each puzzle has six forms, including three circles measuring \( 3\frac{1}{2} \)" in diameter by \( \frac{1}{2} \)" deep, and three triangles measuring 4" on each side by \( \frac{1}{2} \)" deep. For the easier puzzle, all the triangles fit onto all the sets of pegs for triangles, in any position; and all the circles fit onto all the sets of pegs for circles, in any position. The difficult puzzle appears identical to the simple puzzle when all the pieces are in place. The circle forms are the same shape and size as those of the easy puzzle, however, the triangle forms are not quite equilateral. The three pegs and holes for each form are arranged in slightly askew formats, so that there is only one way to fit each form onto the puzzle base (Appendix A).

Doak (1968) originally developed these manual puzzles for her research. She reported that the difficult puzzle usually takes adults three to five minutes to complete, while the easy puzzle usually takes children less than a minute to complete.

When the puzzles are administered, the experimenter places one of the puzzles on a table in front of the subject. All the pieces are in place on the puzzle base. The experimenter removes the pieces off the base and jumbles them up on the table, near the base and says:

\textit{Now, it's time for a puzzle. It's your job to put this puzzle back together in four minutes. This puzzle can be solved. It is possible. Go ahead and do the best you can.}

Then the experimenter sets the timer for four minutes.

When the child completes the puzzle or when the four minutes are up, the experimenter removes the equipment from the table. After the testing
session is over, the experimenter records whether or not the child completes the puzzle.

**Crossword puzzles** Both the difficult and easy crossword puzzles have eight words. The easy crossword puzzle was developed by the experimenter. It is assumed that if the words in the puzzle are familiar to children that it is an easy puzzle. Seven of the words are among the 500 words occurring most frequently in the English language (Thorndike & Lorge, 1952), and also found to be recognized with high frequency by primary school children (Johnson, Smith, & Jensen, 1972). The eighth word is assumed to be simple ("ss" = the sound a snake makes). The experimenter developed the clues. The puzzle is shown in Appendix B.

The difficult crossword puzzle is derived from a portion of a *New York Times* crossword puzzle, entitled "Remark from Mark", by Caroline G. Fitzgerald, edited by Eugene T. Maleska. It was published in the *Des Moines Sunday Register* in April, 1979. It is shown in its entirety in Appendix C. Just one portion of the puzzle was selected, and two of the words were shortened ("aprilithisis" to "April", and "roamer" to "roam"), so that the length of the words in the two puzzles would be comparable. The clues for six of the words are the same as those appearing in the published puzzle. The experimenter developed the clues for the shortened words. The puzzle used in the study is shown in Appendix D.

The crossword puzzles were subjected to a pilot study to determine the length of time required to complete the puzzles. The easy crossword puzzle was administered to a class of 18 third-grade children. All but one child successfully completed the puzzle in three minutes or less.
The difficult crossword puzzle was given to 15 college-educated adults. Nine adults were unable to complete the puzzle in four minutes. All 15 adults agreed the puzzle would be challenging for most fifth-grade children.

As a result of pilot tests, it was decided that the two crossword puzzles differentiated enough in difficulty levels so that most older children could probably complete the easy puzzle, and probably not complete the difficult puzzle in four minutes. Therefore, no further work was done on the development of the puzzles.

When the puzzles are administered, the experimenter places one puzzle and a pencil on a table in front of the subject and says:

Now, it's time for a puzzle. It's your job to complete this puzzle in four minutes. This puzzle can be solved. It is possible. Go ahead and do the best you can.

Then the experimenter sets the timer for four minutes.

When the child completes the puzzle or when the four minutes are up, the experimenter removes the paper and pencil from the table. After the testing session is over and the subject is gone, the experimenter records whether or not the child completes the puzzle.

**Moral Advice Test**

The criteria for selection of the measure of moral judgment included the following considerations:

1) The instrument should be based on Kohlberg's theory of the development of moral judgment.

2) The instrument should be interesting and understandable to older children.
3) The instrument should be able to be administered to children on an individual basis.

4) The instrument should involve objective scoring.

5) The instrument should have demonstrated reliability and validity.

6) The instrument should be able to be divided into several testing sessions to avoid subject fatigue.

Carroll's (1974) Moral Advice Test was selected for the research (Appendix E). Carroll reported that the Moral Advice Test's reliability score is in the high .70s. The construct validity of the measure was demonstrated by combining age assignment ratings with rejection/acceptance ratings, and this strongly discriminated between different age groups (7th, 9th and 11th grades).

The present experimenter made revisions on the Moral Advice Test, to make the language sound more informal and concrete. Based on this criteria the advice statements were edited in three ways: 1) contractions were used, 2) vague references to "this situation" were replaced with specific actions, and 3) some pronouns were replaced with story characters' names. The response choices were edited, also, to sound more informal. Carroll's choices were:

1) **I accept** these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

2) **I tend to accept** these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

3) **I tend to reject** these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

4) **I reject** these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.

The present experimenter changed these choices to:

1) **Good**. They are good enough reasons for making this
important decision.

2) **Pretty Good.** They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

3) **Pretty Bad.** They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

4) **Bad.** They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.

The choices are written on a 4" x 12" card in large capital letters (Appendix F). The key words (GOOD, etc.) are written on colored paper adhered to the card. The colors range in hues from orange to pale yellow, corresponding to the range of choices from GOOD to BAD. Four dozen 1" square colored chips match the four colors on the card. The chips are kept in four 4" x 4" plastic containers and arranged on the table behind the card during testing sessions (Appendix G).

The four moral stories are used as Carroll developed them. Each moral story is called a version of the Moral Advice Test. One version is used in each of four testing sessions. Each story is typed on paper which is adhered to an 8" x 12" card. In addition, the stories are recorded on cassette tapes, to standardize the presentation of the stories. The voice on the tapes was that of the present experimenter. Illustrations accompany each story. There are two pictures per story (Appendix H). The forty advice statements are written in large capital letters on 4" x 6" cards (Appendix I). Each testing session involves 10 advice statements. There are two statements for each of five stages of moral reasoning (1, 2, 3, 4, and P), in each testing session. The order of presentation of the advice statements was balanced by Carroll, and this order was followed in the present study (Appendix J).

The revised Moral Advice Test is administered, individually, in four
sessions. At the first session, the experimenter places a copy of the written story and two illustrations on the table in front of the subject, and says:

Now, it's time to listen to a story of a person with a big problem, and the person doesn't know what to do about it. So, lots of people are giving the person advice. It will be your job to give me your opinion about whether the advice is good, pretty good, pretty bad, or bad. When I say bad advice, I mean that it doesn't make sense, or the ideas aren't complete, in your opinion. You can look at some pictures or read along while we listen. Let's hear this person's problem.

At this point, the experimenter turns on the tape recorder and plays the tape. Then, the experimenter removes the written story and pictures, and places the choice chart, containers with chips, and pile of advice statements in front of the subject, and says:

I'm going to read out loud ten different pieces of advice for the person in the story. I'll read one at a time, and you can show me your opinion by putting a colored chip on each card, then pushing it to the side of the table. You might think some statements are good, some are pretty good, some are pretty bad, and some are bad. You decide. If you can't decide right away, we can always come back to it. I'd like you to pay attention to the reasons for the advice.

The experimenter reads each advice statement out loud while the subject reads along, silently. The subject responds to each advice statement by placing a chip on the card. After the subject has responded to all ten statements, the experimenter says:

Now, let's look at these again. Are there any you would like to change, or do you feel pretty sure?

When the subject indicates that s/he is finished, the experimenter thanks the subject and escorts him/her from the room.

At the second, third, and fourth testing sessions the experimenter follows the same procedure. However, the instructions are shortened to
reminders about hearing a story, giving opinions, and using the colored chips.

The responses are scored and coded by assigning numbers to correspond to the opinions of the subject (1 = bad, 2 = pretty bad, 3 = pretty good, 4 = good). The numerical scores for the pairs of advice statements representing similar moral stages are added together. The resulting data consist of five scores for each testing session. The score sheet is included in Appendix K.

In summary, the research instruments include:

two manual puzzles
40 easy crossword puzzles
40 difficult crossword puzzles
timer
pencil
four typed stories
cassette tapes of stories
tape recorder
eight drawings
40 advice statements
choice chart
48 chips in four containers
40 score sheets
written instructions

Procedure

The first steps in the procedure involved selecting instruments and writing the research proposal. Permission for using children in the research was obtained, in April 1979, from the university committee on the use of Human Subjects in Research (Appendix L).

Subjects were contacted from four sources. As soon as parental permission was obtained (Letter to Parents in Appendix M), a child was assigned to one of four groups. The experimenter attempted to include
children from each source and both sexes in the four groups. As shown in Tables 1 and 2, the groups are not identical in terms of sex and source, but they are of equal size.

Table 1. Number of subjects in four groups by source of subjects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of subjects</th>
<th>Groups&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-H Club</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parochial school</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public school teacher</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquaintances</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>n = 10 in each group.

Table 2. Number of subjects in four groups by sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Groups&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>n = 10 in each group.
**Experimental design**

The general design was a Graeco-Latin Square design (Kirk, 1968). In order to use this design it was necessary to have equal numbers of 1) versions of the Moral Advice Test, 2) testing sessions, 3) tasks (puzzles) for a situationally induced affect, and 4) groups of subjects.

The Graeco-Latin Square design (Kirk, 1968) permitted the isolation of three nuisance variables: groups of subjects, order of testing sessions, and versions of the Moral Advice Test. The independent variable of interest was the different tasks, which were assumed to induce positive or negative affect. Each of the independent variables had four levels, and interactions were assumed to be zero. Kirk suggested rules for randomization of Latin Squares. For the 4 x 4 Latin Square, "select one of four standard squares at random. Randomize the order of rows and columns of the standard square independently" (Kirk, 1968, p. 154). This procedure was followed to set up a Latin Square. A Graeco-Latin Square Design consists of two superimposed orthogonal squares. Squares are orthogonal to each other if every letter of one square occurs once and only once with every letter of the other square. The second Latin Square was balanced to be orthogonal to the randomly selected square. The resulting design is shown in Figure 1.

The ten children in each of the four groups received the same sequence of tasks and stories. Based on the design illustrated in Figure 1, it was determined which subject would receive which puzzle, and which moral story (version of the Moral Advice Test), in each testing session. This is outlined in Table 3.
A = groups of subjects  
B = order of testing sessions  
C = tasks for situationally inducing affect  
D = versions of the Moral Advice Test

Figure 1. Experimental design
Table 3. Tasks and stories for groups of subjects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Story</th>
<th>Order of testing session</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>A2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>B2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A1</td>
<td>C1 easy</td>
<td>D1 Heinz</td>
<td>C4 difficult crossword</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>manual puzzle</td>
<td>story</td>
<td>puzzle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C4 difficult crossword</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>puzzle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D4 war story</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Story</td>
<td>D4 war story</td>
<td>D3 newspaper story</td>
<td>D2 Gail story</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D2 Gail</td>
<td>D3 newspaper story</td>
<td>D1 Heinz story</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>story</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D4 war story</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3</td>
<td>C2 difficult</td>
<td>D4 war story</td>
<td>C3 easy crossword puzzle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>manual puzzle</td>
<td>story</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D1 Heinz story</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Story</td>
<td>D1 Heinz</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>story</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D2 Gail story</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A4</td>
<td>C4 difficult</td>
<td>D3 newspaper story</td>
<td>C1 easy crossword puzzle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>crossword puzzle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D1 Heinz story</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Story</td>
<td>D1 Heinz</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>story</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D2 Gail story</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| a_n = 10 for each group.
Data collection

There were two experimenters involved in administering the tasks and stories to each child. Both were female adults. One experimenter tested the 11 children from the parochial school, and the other experimenter tested the other 29 children.

Each child was tested individually, four times. The 11 children from the parochial school were tested in a simple, spare room located in the adjoining convent. The other 29 children were tested in a research room in the Child Development Department. Both testing rooms were furnished with tables and chairs and the research apparatus.

The number of days between the subjects' first and last testing sessions ranged from 1 to 19 days, $\bar{x} = 5$ days. All but six of the subjects were tested with two sessions per day, for two days. When a subject was tested twice in a day, a break time was allowed which lasted approximately 15 minutes. During the break, each child was invited to play with a miniature racing car game. This game was selected because it took only a few seconds to demonstrate, could be operated by either one or two people, could be interrupted at any time, and allowed each child to have a positive experience between testing sessions.

At the beginning of the first testing session, the experimenter said:

I'll be meeting with you four times for this project. We might meet on four different days, or a couple of times in the same day. Each time we meet I'm going to give you a puzzle to do and then we will listen to a story on the tape recorder. Then, I will ask you for your opinions about some advice given to a character in the story. I'll tell you more about that part later. You can ask me questions about this project and I will try to answer them. You are free to stop being involved at anytime.
The experimenter administered one of the puzzles and one of the versions of the Moral Advice Test, in each testing session. Each child was tested four times, and then debriefed after the last session. The children were informed that two of the puzzles were difficult and two were easy, and that the purpose of the study was to see if children have different opinions after experiencing difficult or easy tasks.

The number of subjects completing the four different puzzle tasks in the present study is shown in Table 4.

Table 4. Number of subjects completing puzzle tasks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Puzzle task</th>
<th>Performance</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Complete</td>
<td>Incomplete</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easy</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crossword</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easy</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data analysis

The data were scored and coded by the experimenter. Repeated measures 4 (group) x 4 (sessions) x 5 (stages of moral judgment) analyses of variance were performed on the data. In the analyses, groups of subjects,
which differed in the sequence of task and story experiences, served as
the between-group variable. Sessions, which differed in puzzle tasks,
and stages of moral judgment served as the within-group variables. The
dependent variable was responses to the Moral Advice Test.
RESULTS

The null hypothesis for the present study stated that there would be no difference in children's moral judgments after experiencing difficult puzzles and after experiencing easy puzzles. The hypothesis was statistically tested by the session x stages of moral judgment interaction. This interaction was not significant, $F(12,432) = .88$. Therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected.

Of secondary interest, was the trend in the children's overall responses to the Moral Advice Test. Advice statements representing lower level moral reasoning were generally rated lower than advice statements representing higher level moral reasoning. The difference in these ratings was statistically tested by the main effect due to stages of moral judgment. This main effect was highly significant, $F(4,144) = 38.72$, $p < .01)$. The trend is illustrated in Figure 2.

![Figure 2: Overall mean ratings of advice statements representing different stages of moral judgment](image-url)
In addition, both the session x group interaction, and the session x group x stages of moral judgment interaction were highly significant; $F(9,108) = 5.34, p < .01$, and $F(36,432) = 2.32, p < .01$, respectively. These significant effects are conglomerate effects of the three nuisance variables of the Graeco-Latin Square Design. The conglomerate effects may have been influenced by the order in which the subjects were tested, or the differences in groups, or the differences in the four versions of the Moral Advice Test. While the interactions are significant, they have no bearing on this particular study, so no further analyses were conducted on these interactions.

Subjects showed highly significant individual differences. This is shown in the main effect due to child/group, $F(36,432) = 6.62, p < .01$. This result indicates that the measurement procedure was reliable. In addition, the interactions of session x child/group, and stages x child/group were highly significant; $F(108,432) = 2.30, p < .01$, and $F(144,432) = 1.62, p < .01$, respectively. These interactions indicate that not all the children responded the same way to the different testing sessions and the different moral advice statements representing the five stages of moral development.

The entire analysis of variance summary table is shown in Table 5.
Table 5. Analysis of variance summary table for the dependent variable of moral judgment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19.47</td>
<td>2.26**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child/group</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>8.61</td>
<td>6.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Session</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.05**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Session x group</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15.97</td>
<td>5.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Session x child/group</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>2.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stages</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>81.69</td>
<td>38.72**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stages x group</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>.56**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stages x child/group</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Session x stages</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>.88**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Session x stages x group</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>2.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Session x stages x child/group</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p < .01.
DISCUSSION

The major hypothesis was not supported in the present research. Older children's moral judgments did not vary as a function of different puzzle task experiences. This result is in contrast to the body of research which indicates that moral behavior varies as a function of situationally induced affect (Isen, 1970; Berkowitz & Connor, 1966). However, the instrument selected for measuring moral judgment appears to be sensitive to children's moral judgments. Failure to demonstrate the influence of situationally induced affect on moral judgment may be explained in terms of either methods or theory. Both methodological concerns and theoretical implications will be discussed, followed by suggestions for future research.

Methodological Concerns

The puzzles which were selected for the present study appeared to be appropriate. Most of the time the children did not complete the difficult puzzles but did complete the easy puzzles, as shown in Table 4. In addition, it was useful to have both manual and crossword puzzles for the purpose of comparing types of tasks. The difficult crossword puzzle appeared to be more challenging than the difficult manual puzzle, and the easy manual puzzle appeared to be simpler than the easy crossword puzzle. Yet, even though the experimental situations usually resulted in the predicted experiences of success or failure, it is not clear whether or not the children felt strong positive and negative emotions during the
In selecting methods for situationally inducing negative affect, the researcher was limited by a concern for placing subjects at risk. Experiences with difficult puzzles may not have been challenging enough to result in strong negative feelings of frustration. However, the children may have been at risk if the study involved the induction of more controversial negative feelings as depression, anger, or jealousy. Regardless of which method is selected for inducing negative affect, future research should include a measure of the subject's feelings. The measurement should occur immediately after the negative situation. It could be either an attitudinal measure or an observation of the subject's behavior. Inclusion of such a measure might resolve the question of whether or not children feel strong positive and negative emotions, as a result of experimental manipulations.

Assuming that strong negative affect can be situationally induced, the question still remains as to whether or not the affect influences moral judgment. In the present study, two details in the procedure may have inhibited the detection of the influence of the puzzle situation. The first detail related to the fact that an adult experimenter was present during the entire testing sessions. Isen, Horn, and Rosenhan (1973) found that older children's moral behavior (generosity) differed as a function of the presence or absence of an adult experimenter, during the time when the children failed on difficult tasks. Children were more generous after failing in public than after failing in private. The researchers concluded that perhaps the children wanted to save face in the
eyes of the adult. A similar self-consciousness may have been present in the subjects in the current study. It is possible that if the children were embarrassed they may have suppressed their negative feelings of frustration.

The second procedural detail of concern related to time. The minutes that passed between the end of the time allowed for completing the difficult puzzle and the moment when the child began responding to the Moral Advice Test may have served as a cooling-off period. During that period, the child passively listened to instructions and a moral story. If the child had felt frustration when the timer bell rang, it may have subsided by the time s/he was actually called upon to make moral judgments.

The method selected for measuring moral judgment had several strengths and weaknesses. In addition to satisfactorily meeting the criteria for selection of the instrument, the Moral Advice Test appeared to be sensitive to eleven-year-olds' moral judgments. The significant main effect due to stages of moral judgment indicated that the children responded differently to statements representing different moral stages. The fact that the trend was generally linear (Figure 2) provided support for Kohlberg's (1969) theory of moral development. A possible weakness in the moral measure was that the four versions may not be equivalent. The present study controlled for variability by treating the versions of the measure as a nuisance variable. Further analysis of the differences between versions was not conducted. Due to the fact that sessions interacted significantly with several other variables, there was
an indication that the versions were not equivalent. In addition, the researcher observed that during the debriefing sessions, several individual subjects mentioned preferences for specific stories. Perhaps, future research could involve a focus on whether or not the four versions are similar enough to be comparable.

Theoretical Implications

A theoretical explanation for the results of the present study is that even though affect influences moral behavior (Isen, 1970; Berkowitz & Connor, 1966), it does not influence moral judgment. The way children judge a hypothetical situation may be quite different from the way they spontaneously behave. Since the present study was a controlled experiment, the results could be considered as evidence for the difference in the natures of moral judgment and moral behavior. In speculation, perhaps the development of moral judgment is slow and stable, while the acquisition of moral behavior is relatively quick and fluctuating. This concept extends Selman and Jaquette's (1977) theory of social cognition. Selman and Jaquette stated that some aspects of the child's personality are stable while some oscillate, but they did not make the distinction between judgment and behavior.

The results of the present study had an additional implication for theory. The main effect due to child was significant, implying that there are individual differences in the children's responses to the Moral Advice Test. Perhaps children vary in their sensitivity to the stress involved in trying to complete difficult tasks. This variation
may be reflected in their moral judgments. Meyer and Noble (1958) found that adults who score high on an anxiety test respond differently to stressful situations compared to adults who score low on an anxiety test. In addition, the present researcher observed that several children responded in distinctive patterns after struggling with the difficult tasks; for instance, some children rated every advice statement as "good". Based on Meyer and Noble's finding, and the observation and results of the present study, it seems likely that the influence of situationally induced affect on moral judgment may vary as a function of children's individual differences in temperament. Theories of moral development have not included a consideration for individual differences in temperament.

**Future Research**

In conclusion, future research in the area of affect and moral development should address several important issues. First, the degree of affect, which is assumed to be situationally induced, should be measured immediately and directly. Second, both moral judgment and moral behavior should be included as dependent variables in a controlled study, in order to compare the influence of the affect. Third, individual differences in temperament should be considered as an independent variable. Finally, a few methodological issues need to be considered: Presence of the experimenter during testing, timing of the procedure, and differences in various stories in the Moral Advice Test.

If these issues are resolved, perhaps the influence of affect on moral judgment will be better understood.
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My three other committee members, Dr. Samuel Clark, Dr. Don Charles, and Dr. Jacques Lempers have been continually supportive of my graduate school experience.

I extend my appreciation to Dean Deacon of the Home Economics College and to Dr. Samuel Clark of the Child Development Department for providing me with the necessary funds to carry out this research.

And finally, I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my husband and very best friend, Neil Werner.
APPENDIX A: ILLUSTRATION OF MANUAL PUZZLES
APPENDIX B: EASY CROSSWORD PUZZLE
ACROSS

1. the sound that a snake makes
4. the day in between yesterday and tomorrow
6. it has four walls
7. more than one man

DOWN

1. road
2. in the near future
3. what people call you by
5. it rhymes with to

Answers:

ss n
today
room
t
d
e
Entire crossword puzzle from Des Moines Sunday Register.
APPENDIX D: DIFFICULT CROSSWORD PUZZLE
ACROSS
1. automobile trim
5. what nomads do
6. the rainiest month
7. sports event

DOWN
1. study hard
2. Rhode Island motto
3. beef order
4. skip

Answers:

chrome
roam
april
meet
APPENDIX E: ORIGINAL MORAL ADVICE TEST
In Europe a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and began to think about breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.

Should Heinz steal the drug for his wife?

____ Yes, he should steal it.

____ No, he should not steal it.
You should steal the drug because you love both your wife and children. Saving the life of your wife and of a mother is much more important than a druggist losing a little bit of a drug. Of course, people feel bad about losing money or being robbed, but think of what it does to children to lose their mother.

I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.

If you help your wife now, you can count on her to help you out if you ever get into trouble. And, even if she never saves your life, she could probably help you in a lot of other ways. So, you really would not be losing anything by helping her.

I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.
You can't let somebody die like that. It's your duty to save her. But you can't just go around breaking laws and let it go at that. You must pay the druggist back and you must take your punishment for stealing.

_____ I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

_____ I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

_____ I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

_____ I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.

If you take the drug, you really can't be blamed. The druggist should have helped you. A druggist is supposed to be in business to help people, not to let them die.

_____ I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

_____ I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

_____ I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

_____ I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.
You are only doing this out of love. It is only natural to steal to save someone you love.

____ I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

____ I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

____ I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

____ I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.

If you don't take the drug, you are going to be all alone. It would be stupid not to steal because you want your wife and because the most they could give you would be a short jail term. Jail is no fun, but it wouldn't bother you that much if it were only for a short time.

____ I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

____ I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

____ I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

____ I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.
Where the choice must be made between disobeying a law and saving a human life, the higher principle of preserving life makes it morally right—not just understandable—to steal the drug.

_____ I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

_____ I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

_____ I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

_____ I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.

If you let your wife die, you will get in trouble. You will be blamed for letting her die. Then there will be an investigation of you and of the druggist for your wife's death.

_____ I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

_____ I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

_____ I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

_____ I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.
You have to follow your conscience. Obeying the law is not as important as doing what you think is right. A person has to live up to the values that he believes in.

_____ I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

_____ I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

_____ I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

_____ I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.

---

You tried to pay for it first. You wouldn't do any other damage or take anything else, and the drug you would take is only worth $200. You are not really taking a $2000 drug.

_____ I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

_____ I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

_____ I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

_____ I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.
Ann took several pens and some money from a school secretary's purse. She spent the money and threw away the pens. When she saw Gail, her best friend, she told her that she had something very serious and personal that she wanted to talk about. But, before she told Gail anything about the incident, she asked her for her promise not to tell anyone what she said. Gail agreed to keep everything she heard a secret.

When the truth had been told, Gail was in a difficult position. She has given her word not to tell anyone, but she knew that until the thief was caught there would be no passes or special privileges for any students. Also, several innocent students were suspected of having taken the pens and money.

Should Gail tell someone that Ann took the pens and money?

_____ Yes, she should tell someone.

_____ No, she should not tell anyone.
If you don't tell someone before Ann gets caught, then you will be punished too. Ann will be caught soon anyway. If you help a thief, you will be punished. You might even be accused of the theft.

I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.

When a law is broken it is every person's duty to help by finding the person who broke the law and by reporting them to the proper authority. The sooner you tell someone, the sooner Ann will be able to face the proper punishment and pay for her theft. The property of each person should be protected, or everyone's property is in danger.

I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.
There is nothing that Ann can do for you that will ever pay you back for keeping such a troublesome secret. If you tell the truth now, other students will appreciate the fact that you were the one who got the passes and privileges returned to them.

____ I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

____ I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

____ I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

____ I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.

Item 14

You have to decide what you think a really fair person would do in this situation. If you don't tell anyone, you will be leaving Ann in a very uncomfortable position. Considering what is fair and what you would think would be best for anyone in her situation, your best action is to let someone know.

____ I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

____ I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

____ I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

____ I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.
If you explain what your problem is to your parents or to a teacher or counselor, they will help you. You won't really break your promise by asking someone what you should do about this situation. Ann will understand better this way and your action will certainly have the approval of your parents and teachers.

I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.

---

If you tell the authorities, they will give you a reward for having come forward with the truth. Your punishment will be severe if you keep such a big crime a secret.

I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.
If you let one person get away with one theft, they may go on to steal more things. If you don't help keep the law you will be helping those who would ruin the law and order of our country. You can't think of just your friend. It is best for everyone if thieves are reported and punished.

I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.

It will be too painful to keep the information secret. If you tell someone now they will praise you for your truthfulness. Besides, this friend is in big trouble. She is more likely to cause you trouble than she is to help you.

I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.
You must decide for yourself what is right and good. Obeying laws is not as important as obeying your conscience. If you must break your promise to live up to the values you believe in, then that is what you should do.

____ I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

____ I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

____ I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

____ I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.

A nice person can't protect a person who did something like this. Your other friends and the adults you respect expect you to do the right thing in this situation. They will approve of your action and will understand why you could not keep your promise.

____ I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

____ I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

____ I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

____ I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.
Fred wanted to publish a mimeographed newspaper for students so that he could express many of his opinions. He wanted to speak out about major problems in the United States and against some of the school's rules.

Fred was a very good student, a student council representative, and a winner of a speech contest concerning, "What America Means to Me."

When Fred started his newspaper, he asked his principal for permission. The principal said it would be all right if before each publication Fred would turn in all his articles for approval. The principal approved all of them, and Fred published two issues of the paper in the next two weeks.

But the principal had not expected that Fred's newspaper would receive so much attention. Students were so excited by the paper that they began to organize protests against two school rules about which Fred had written. Fred's friends urged him to print more issues of his paper. Angry parents objected to Fred's opinions. They phoned the principal telling him the newspaper was unpatriotic and should not be published.

As a result of the rising excitement, the principal ordered Fred to stop publishing. He gave as a reason that Fred's activities were disruptive to the operation of the school.

Should Fred continue to write and hand out newspapers?

_____ Yes, he should continue.

_____ No, he should not continue.
You don't have to obey the principal if you don't want to. If it is more important to you to publish your paper, then go ahead and do it. But, the principal may suspend you.

I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.

The principal should only stop you if you are taking away someone else's rights. People who don't like your idea have the right to publish their own ideas.

I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.
If you publish another edition of your newspaper, nothing bad will happen. The principal won't tear up your papers or hurt you.

I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.

You won't do any damage by publishing your newspaper. If other students make trouble by protesting about rules, they will be punished. You are a good student and had the principal's approval. You won't be punished.

I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.
The principal gave you his word that it would be all right. People should not break a promise just because it is difficult to keep it.

--- I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

--- I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

--- I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

--- I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.

---

Your friends have helped you publish your newspaper. You won't be a good friend if you turn your back on them now. The people who really matter know you are a good student working towards good goals.

--- I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

--- I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

--- I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

--- I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.
The principal must consider all points of view, but he must not take orders from one group. Just because the principal is head of the school doesn't permit him to take away your rights.

I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.

Consider all the work you put into starting up the paper. You would be throwing it all away if you stop now. Even if you keep publishing, the principal probably won't do much to you.

I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.
You feel badly about the principal's problems, but you will feel much worse about letting your friends down. As long as you have your friends' support you should publish.

____ I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

____ I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

____ I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

____ I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.

---

You really have the right to publish your paper. The principal shouldn't change his rules because of some noisy people's protests. You can't allow a school or a country to be run by a noisy few.

____ I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

____ I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

____ I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

____ I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.
Story 4

In a war zone, a company of Marines was outnumbered and retreating. The company had crossed a bridge over a river, and the enemy was still on the other side. If someone went back to the bridge and blew it up as the enemy was coming over it, it would weaken the enemy. With the head start the rest of the men in the company would have, they could probably escape. But the man who stayed back to blow up the bridge would probably not be able to escape alive; it would be most likely that he would be killed. The captain of the company has to decide who should go back. He asks for volunteers, but no one will volunteer. Finally, the captain decided to order one of the men to stay behind. He ordered a man who had been a troublemaker to stay and blow up the bridge. The man was strong and courageous, but he did not know whether or not to follow the order.

Should the soldier obey the captain's order to go back and blow up the bridge?

_____ Yes, he should obey.

_____ No, he should not obey.
Your responsibility is to stay with the other men of your rank. The officer is the one with the duty to stay and save his men. He must be willing to give his life for his men.

- I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.
- I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.
- I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.
- I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.

When you have to make hard decision like this you have to go by what you really think is right. You can only disobey an order when you know the order is not right.

- I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.
- I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.
- I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.
- I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.
What have these men ever done for you that is worth your taking such a risk? What could they do for you even if you manage to live? It would be stupid to obey.

___ I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

___ I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

___ I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

___ I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.

If you stay behind you will be the only one left to fight the enemy. There is a good chance you will be caught and beaten or killed.

___ I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

___ I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

___ I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

___ I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.
The officer might not like it if you don't stay, but your friends and your mother and father will approve of your attempt to get home to help them. You must be brave enough to say "no" to the officer.

_____ I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

_____ I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

_____ I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

_____ I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.

Item 36

A man or a group of men have no right to say one life is worth more or less than any other life. All men are created equal. The right to life is more important than what any captain says.

_____ I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

_____ I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

_____ I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

_____ I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.
Even though you are called a troublemaker, you are basically a good person. The captain might not feel badly if you are killed, but you have many friends at home who would feel very sad.

I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.

Nobody wants to die when they are young and healthy. It would be foolish to stay and die. You want to live as much as any of the other soldiers.

I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.
If you stay behind you might get captured. When you are captured the enemy will torture you or shoot you. You will suffer.

___ I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

___ I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

___ I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

___ I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.

Even though the captain is in charge, it isn't part of his duty to leave someone to die. You should obey a captain's orders, but not for something like this.

___ I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for making this important decision.

___ I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

___ I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be good enough reasons for making this important decision.

___ I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons for making this important decision.
APPENDIX F: ILLUSTRATION OF CHOICE CARD
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOOD</th>
<th>PRETTY GOOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THEY ARE GOOD ENOUGH REASONS FOR MAKING THIS IMPORTANT DECISION.</td>
<td>THEY SEEM TO BE GOOD ENOUGH REASONS FOR MAKING THIS IMPORTANT DECISION.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRETTY BAD</td>
<td>BAD</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEY DO NOT SEEM TO BE GOOD ENOUGH REASONS FOR MAKING THIS IMPORTANT DECISION.</td>
<td>THEY ARE NOT GOOD ENOUGH REASONS FOR MAKING THIS IMPORTANT DECISION.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX G: EXAMPLES OF COLORED CHIPS
APPENDIX H: ILLUSTRATIONS FOR THE MORAL ADVICE TEST STORIES
APPENDIX I: REVISED MORAL ADVICE STATEMENTS
ITEM 1.
You should steal the drug because you love both your wife and children. Saving the life of your wife and of a mother is much more important than a druggist losing a little bit of a drug. Of course, people feel bad about losing money or being robbed, but think of what it does to children to lose their mother.

ITEM 2.
If you help your wife now, you can count on her to help you out if you ever get into trouble. And even if she never saves your life, your wife could probably help you in a lot of other ways. So, you really would not be losing anything by helping your wife.
ITEM 3.
You can't let somebody die like that. It's your duty to save your wife. But you can't just go around breaking laws and let it go at that. You must pay the druggist back and you must take your punishment for stealing.

ITEM 4.
If you take the drug, you really can't be blamed. The druggist should have helped you. A druggist is supposed to be in business to help people, not to let them die.
### ITEM 5.
You are only doing this out of love. It is only natural to steal to save someone you love.

### ITEM 6.
If you don't take the drug, you are going to be all alone. It would be stupid not to steal because you want your wife and because the most they could give you would be a short jail term. Jail is no fun, but it wouldn't bother you that much if it were... only for a short time.
WHERE THE CHOICE MUST BE MADE
BETWEEN DISOBEYING A LAW AND
SAVING A HUMAN LIFE, THE HIGHER
PRINCIPLE OF PRESERVING LIFE MAKES
IT MORALLY RIGHT--NOT JUST UNDER-
STANDABLE--TO STEAL THE DRUG.

IF YOU LET YOUR WIFE DIE, YOU
WILL GET IN TROUBLE. YOU WILL
BE BLAMED FOR LETTING HER DIE.
THEN THERE WILL BE AN
INVESTIGATION OF YOU AND OF
THE DRUGGIST FOR YOUR WIFE'S
DEATH.
ITEM 9.
You have to follow your conscience. Obeying the law is not as important as doing what you think is right. A person has to live up to the values that he believes in.

ITEM 10.
You tried to pay for it first. You wouldn't do any other damage or take anything else, and the drug you would take is only worth $200. You are not really taking a $2,000 drug.
ITEM II.
If you don't tell someone before Ann gets caught, then you will be punished too. Ann will be caught soon anyway. If you help a thief, you will be punished. You might even be accused of the theft.

ITEM 12.
When a law is broken it is every person's duty to help by finding the person who broke the law and by reporting them to the proper authority. The sooner you tell someone, the sooner Ann will be able to face the proper punishment and pay for her theft. The property of each person should be protected, or everyone's property is in danger.
ITEM 13.
There is nothing that Ann can do for you that will ever pay you back for keeping such a troublesome secret. If you tell the truth now, other students will appreciate the fact that you were the one who got the passes and privileges returned to them.

ITEM 14.
You have to decide what you think a really fair person would do in this situation. If you don't tell anyone, you will be leaving Ann in a very uncomfortable position. Considering what is fair and what you would think would be best for anyone in her situation, your best action is to let someone know.
ITEM 15.

If you explain what your problem is to your parents or to a teacher or counselor, they will help you. You won’t really break your promise by asking someone what you should do. Ann will understand, and your action will certainly have the approval of your parents and teachers.

ITEM 16.

If you tell the authorities, they’ll give you a reward for coming forward with the truth. Your punishment will be severe if you keep the stealing a secret.
ITEM 17.

If you let Ann get away with one theft, she may go on to steal more things. If you don't help keep the law, you will be helping those who would ruin the law and order of our country. You can't just think of your friend. It is best for everyone if thieves, like Ann, are reported and punished.

ITEM 18.

It will be too painful to keep Ann's stealing a secret. If you tell someone now they will praise you for your truthfulness. Besides, Ann is in big trouble. She is more likely to cause you trouble than she is to help you.
ITEM 19.
You must decide for yourself what is right and good. Obeysing laws is not as important as obeying your conscience. If you must break your promise to live up to the values you believe in, then that is what you should do.

ITEM 20.
A nice person can't protect a person who did something like stealing. Your other friends and the adults you respect expect you to do the right thing. They'll approve of your action and will understand why you couldn't keep your promise.
ITEM 21.

You don't have to obey the principal if you don't want to. If it is more important to you to publish your paper, then go ahead and do it. But, the principal may suspend you.

ITEM 22.

The principal should only stop you if you are taking away someone else's rights. People who don't like your idea have the right to publish their own ideas.
ITEM 23.

IF YOU PUBLISH ANOTHER EDITION OF YOUR NEWSPAPER, NOTHING BAD WILL HAPPEN. THE PRINCIPAL WON'T TEAR UP YOUR PAPERS OR HURT YOU.

ITEM 24.

YOU WON'T DO ANY DAMAGE BY PUBLISHING YOUR NEWSPAPER. IF OTHER STUDENTS MAKE TROUBLE BY PROTESTING ABOUT RULES, THEY'LL BE PUNISHED. YOU'RE A GOOD STUDENT AND HAD THE PRINCIPAL'S APPROVAL. YOU WON'T BE PUNISHED.
ITEM 25.

The principal gave you his word that it would be all right. People shouldn't break a promise just because it is difficult to keep it.

ITEM 26.

Your friends have helped you publish your newspaper. You won't be a good friend if you turn your back on them now. The people who really matter know you are a good student working towards good goals.
ITEM 27.
The principal must consider all points of view, but he must not take orders from one group. Just because the principal is head of the school doesn't permit him to take away your rights.

ITEM 28.
Consider all the work you put into starting up the paper. You would be throwing it all away if you stop now. Even if you keep publishing, the principal probably won't do much to you.
ITEM 29.

You feel badly about the principal's problems, but you will feel much worse about letting your friends down. As long as you have your friends' support you should publish.

ITEM 30.

You really have the right to publish your paper. The principal shouldn't change his rules because of some noisy people's protests. You can't allow a school or a country to be run by a noisy few.
ITEM 31.

YOUR RESPONSIBILITY IS TO STAY WITH THE OTHER MEN OF YOUR RANK. THE OFFICER IS THE ONE WITH THE DUTY TO STAY AND SAVE HIS MEN. HE MUST BE WILLING TO GIVE HIS LIFE FOR HIS MEN.

ITEM 32.

WHEN YOU ARE HAVING A HARD TIME DECIDING WHETHER OR NOT TO OBEY THE OFFICER, YOU HAVE TO GO BY WHAT YOU REALLY THINK IS RIGHT. YOU CAN ONLY DISOBEY AN ORDER WHEN YOU KNOW THE ORDER IS NOT RIGHT.
ITEM 33.
WHAT HAVE THESE MEN EVER DONE FOR YOU THAT IS WORTH YOUR TAKING SUCH A RISK? WHAT COULD THEY DO FOR YOU EVEN IF YOU MANAGE TO LIVE? IT WOULD BE STUPID TO OBEY.

ITEM 34.
IF YOU STAY BEHIND YOU WILL BE THE ONLY ONE LEFT TO FIGHT THE ENEMY. THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE YOU WILL BE CAUGHT AND BEaten OR KILLED.
ITEM 35.

The officer might not like it if you don't stay, but your friends and your mother and father will approve of your attempt to get home to help them. You must be brave enough to say "no" to the officer.

ITEM 36.

A man or a group of men have no right to say one life is worth more or less than any other life. All men are created equal. The right to life is more important than what any captain says.
ITEM 37.
Even though you are called a troublemaker, you are basically a good person. The captain might not feel badly if you are killed, but you have many friends at home who would feel very sad.

ITEM 38.
Nobody wants to die when they are young and healthy. It would be foolish to stay and die. You want to live as much as any of the other soldiers.
**ITEM 39.**
If you stay behind you might get captured. When you're captured the enemy will torture you or shoot you. You will suffer.

**ITEM 40.**
Even though the captain is in charge, it isn't part of his duty to leave someone to die. You should obey a captain's orders, but not for something like this.
APPENDIX J: ORDER OF PRESENTATION OF MORAL ADVICE STATEMENTS
## STAGE REPRESENTED BY EACH STATEMENT

<table>
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<th>Item Number</th>
<th>Stage Represented</th>
<th>Item Number</th>
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APPENDIX K: SCORE SHEET
Session B_1:

PUZZLE: Type: E-manual, D-manual, E-crossword, D-crossword
Performance: complete incomplete

MORAL ADVICE TEST: Story: Heinz, Gail, Newspaper, War
Responses:
- Bad
- Pretty Bad
- Pretty Good
- Good

Session B_2:

PUZZLE: Type: E-manual, D-manual, E-crossword, D-crossword
Performance: complete incomplete

MORAL ADVICE TEST: Story: Heinz, Gail, Newspaper, War
Responses:
- Bad
- Pretty Bad
- Pretty Good
- Good

Session B_3:

PUZZLE: Type: E-manual, D-manual, E-crossword, D-crossword
Performance: Complete incomplete

MORAL ADVICE TEST: Story: Heinz, Gail, Newspaper, War
Responses:
- Bad
- Pretty Bad
- Pretty Good
- Good

Session B_4:

PUZZLE: Type: E-manual, D-manual, E-crossword, D-crossword
Performance: Complete incomplete

MORAL ADVICE TEST: Story: Heinz, Gail, Newspaper, War
Responses:
- Bad
- Pretty Bad
- Pretty Good
- Good
APPENDIX L: PERMISSION FROM THE HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH COMMITTEE
Title of project (please type):  Affect and Moral Judgment in Older Children

I agree to provide the proper surveillance of this project to insure that the rights and welfare of the human subjects are properly protected. Additions to or changes in procedures affecting the subjects after the project has been approved will be submitted to the committee for review.

Sonia Soneson Werner
April 1979
Typed Name of Principal Investigator
Date
Signature of Principal Investigator

Child Development
Campus Address
294-3040
Campus Telephone

ATTACH an additional page(s) (A) describing your proposed research and (B) the subjects to be used, (C) indicating any risks or discomforts to the subjects, and (D) covering any topics checked below. CHECK all boxes applicable.

☐ Medical clearance necessary before subjects can participate
☐ Samples (blood, tissue, etc.) from subjects
☐ Administration of substances (foods, drugs, etc.) to subjects
☐ Physical exercise or conditioning for subjects
☐ Deception of subjects
☐ Subjects under 14 years of age and/or Subjects 14-17 years of age
☐ Subjects in Institutions
☐ Research must be approved by another institution or agency

ATTACH an example of the material to be used to obtain informed consent and CHECK which type will be used.

☐ Signed Informed consent will be obtained.
☐ Modified Informed consent will be obtained.

Anticipated date on which subjects will be first contacted: April 20 1979
Anticipated date for last contact with subjects: June 15 1979

If Applicable: Anticipated date on which audio or visual tapes will be erased and/or identifiers will be removed from completed survey instruments: Sept. 1 1979

Signature of Head or Chairperson  Date  Department or Administrative Unit

Decision of the University Committee on the Use of Human Subjects in Research:
☐ Project Approved  ☐ Project not approved  ☐ No action required
George G. Karas  4/79
APPENDIX M: LETTER TO PARENTS
Dear Parents,

I am a graduate student in Child Development at Iowa State University, in Ames. For my dissertation research, I am studying older children. I am interested in how children of the same age vary in judging the values that story characters must consider when facing serious life problems, such as death and stealing. I am also interested in seeing if the judgments children make relate to the way they solve problems, particularly crossword and manual puzzles.

I would like to use your child in this research project. The procedure would involve your child meeting with me or my assistant four times. Each time we meet, the child would work on a puzzle and then look at a story and give opinions about the story characters. Your child will probably need about twenty minutes for each session, and the sessions will occur in the Child Development Building. I would be willing to help with transportation. It is acceptable to me to schedule more than one of your child's sessions in a day, on a Saturday or late afternoon.

Your child will be told that any questions about the study will be answered, and they may withdraw from participating at anytime. Your child's performance on the puzzles and opinions about the stories will be held confidential. No one except me and my research committee will see individual responses. Since my research interest is in children in general, names will be removed from all our records by September 1975.

I need to have your permission, in writing, to involve your child in this research project. Please fill out the form below and return it in the stamped, self-addressed envelope that is provided for you. I would appreciate it if you could return this by ___________.

If you do grant me permission, I will be in touch with you soon, by phone, to arrange times and transportation.

Thank-you for your cooperation,

Sonia Soneson Werner
Sonia Soneson Werner, Ph.D. Candidate

Damaris Pease, Distinguished Professor

I grant permission for my child ______________________ to be a subject in Werner's research project.

Signature of Parent ___________________________ Date ______________

Phone Number ___________________________