Why we were not there: American intervention policy and the failure to act in Rwanda

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Introduction

Two monumental events shocked the world in the last decade of the twentieth century. On December 26, 1991, President of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev declared the end of the Soviet Union and with it the Cold War. The world cheered as forty-five years of east-vs.-west propaganda, strategic maneuvering and the threat of nuclear apocalypse were over. The United States and NATO stood the victors heralding the triumph of democracy over communism. The United States stood at the helm of a new world, one believed to be free of fear and needless conflict.

A devastating civil war began in Rwanda in 1991. The small African country spent the past thirty years developing as a nation with a diverse past torn by decades of political and ethnic strife. The civil war widened the divide between the Hutu and Tutsi and laid the groundwork for the second most deadly genocide of the century.

At the time of the genocide, most people did not understand the connection between the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the murder of nearly one million Rwandans in 1994. America’s triumph over the Soviets left it in a position where the world would call on it for economic, political and military support. This position carried with it a heavy burden that American presidents George H.W. Bush and William Jefferson Clinton found hard to carry. These presidents determined that the United States needed to reassess American military intervention policy. American policy makers believed the United States needed to limit its involvement in United Nations peacekeeping missions and military interventions. Being more selective about the interventions, the United States supported would protect American military personnel and allow the United States greater resources for protecting its interests.
Limiting American intervention meant that the president and the principle policy makers did not rate every crisis a priority. States that ranked among America’s interests during the Cold War maintained priority in the aftermath. This left all other states at the mercy of the changing priorities and policy dictates of the presidency. When the political and ethnic conflict in Rwanda escalated to the point of genocide in April 1994, President Clinton decided not to intervene.

Scholars, policy makers and reporters have speculated why President Clinton refused to send a military operation to stop the killing, or to support the United Nations Mission to Rwanda in expanding its mandate to include protecting refugees. The answers range from academic policy analysis to conspiracy theories about American imperialist aims for sub-Saharan Africa. Answering this question has fascinated me since I first learned about the Rwandan genocide. To this end, I have decided to conduct my own investigation into the course of events surrounding the genocide and the evolution of American intervention policy throughout the 1990s.

This thesis has two goals. The first is to answer why the United States, under the direction of President Clinton and National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, failed to offer military intervention. I will do this by analyzing the relationship between the United States and Rwanda prior to the genocide, America’s failed intervention in Somalia, the evolution of American intervention policy, and the pressure to act from the American people, Congress and the international community on President Clinton.

The second purpose of this paper is to understand the evolution of American-Rwandan relations after the genocide. By analyzing American prevention policy and the increasing interactions between the American private sector, American government, the
Rwandan government and the Rwandan private sector, I will explain how and why America drew Rwanda closer politically, economically and militarily. Understanding how and why the United States changed its interaction with Rwanda provides a clear lens through which American intervention policy has changed since the fallout of Somalia and Rwanda.

In order to understand the change in intervention policy and American interactions with Rwanda, it is important to know Rwanda’s history. By understanding Rwanda’s history, we can identify the causes of the 1994 genocide and form an understanding why the Clinton administration believed the genocide was another phase in a long running civil and ethnic war that would likely never end. The roots of the Rwandan genocide lie in its long history of European misunderstandings and the manipulation of ethnic identities. Decades of colonial rule turned fluid ethnic identities into formalized requirements for access to higher education, better jobs and political control. As the government of Rwanda changed through the granting of statehood, the 1959 Hutu Revolution and the 1991 civil war, the ethnic identities became the dividing lines for an explosion of ethnic violence that left nearly one million Rwandan’s dead, several million as refugees and shocked the Clinton administration into a rapid change in American intervention policy.

The first chapter of my work will focus on Rwanda’s path to statehood. I will examine the early ethnic divisions between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. From there I will demonstrate how German and Belgian colonization started the process of ethnic stratification that eventually resulted in the 1994 genocide. Following Rwanda’s decolonization in 1961, I will examine the political and cultural changes instituted by the Hutu Revolution and the 1991 civil war.
Chapter 2 is dedicated to the peace process, which culminated in the Arusha Accords. I will highlight the American role in the finalization and implementation of the Arusha Accords and their ultimate failure. Chapter 3 will comprise the genocide and the international failure to intervene. Throughout the chapter, I will examine America’s limited involvement in Rwanda through the United Nations and more specifically the Security Council.

Chapters 4 and 5 will house the brunt of my arguments. I will argue in chapter four that the United States’ resistance to intervention in Rwanda was the result of a process of policy changes started under President Ronald Reagan, which blended with a unique and defeatist perception of African civil wars. The conclusion will focus on the United States’ new commitment to conflict prevention and interaction between the American private sector and the Rwandan government. I will argue that the United States has taken a direct approach to dealing with African conflicts by promoting regional stability through country development. I argue that President George W. Bush facilitated bonds between the American private sector and the Rwandan government to help the former assist the later in building a strong economy and promote stability.
Chapter One

From Tribal Alliances to Statehood and Civil War

Rwanda took its first step onto the world stage during the European scramble for Africa at the end of the nineteenth century. At this point in history, colonial holdings served as both a source of cheap labor and natural resources as well as a place to absorb excess production of the colonizing power. After Kaiser Wilhelm II removed the “Iron Chancellor,” Otto von Bismarck, Germany was racing to secure colonial holdings so that it would have comparable status and power to other European nations. Kaiser Wilhelm II argued that the German people needed “‘ein Platz an der Sonne’ (a place under the sun)”\(^1\). Africa was one of the last places in the world where European countries could add to existing colonial holdings. The unforgiving terrain and highly dispersed population made conquest difficult leaving inner Africa untouched by colonial hands until the late nineteenth century.\(^2\) As such, European colonial powers rushed to claim control of African territory resulting in the Berlin West African Conference, held from 15 November 1884 to 26 February 1885, which divided African territory among the top European powers of the nineteenth century.\(^3\)

Germany, in its search for colonies and drive to build a colonial empire of its own, took control of Rwanda and Burundi [and such other places as German East Africa of which Rwanda and Burundi were a part, German West Africa, and German Southwest Africa]. The

\(^1\) Daniela Kroslak, *The French Betrayal of Rwanda*, p. 19.
\(^2\) Jeffery Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*, chapter two p. 33-136. Herbst discusses the issues of territorial and population control in detail throughout this chapter of his book. He explains that pre-colonial rulers focused on controlling populations rather than the landscape because people could simply escape into the vast expanses of African territory. European states traditionally relied on controlling territory because there were far fewer places for populations to flee to. This presented a problem for countries like Britain who decided the cost of controlling the land and people outweighed the economic gains. For countries like Germany who game late to the game, colonies were a sign of position and power among European nations nota primary source of resources and money.
\(^3\) Herbst p. 59 and Kroslak p. 19.
German government wanted to control the region with as little cost and effort as possible. Rwanda offered little more than the prestige of having a colony so Germany wanted to keep its costs down. This led to the Germans having limited interactions with Rwandan natives and developing a distinct lack of understanding of Rwandan culture and ethnic makeup. They did not come to understand how the tribes and ethnic groups lived and worked together and survived in a, more or less, peaceful society.

The demographics of Rwanda have changed little in the last century and a half. Three ethnic groups divided among a number of clans comprised the population of Rwanda. The clan structure was fluid, allowing members to move between the clans through marriage. The Hutu, the largest of the ethnic groups comprising eighty-four percent of the population, was primarily an agricultural group while the Tutsi, comprising roughly fifteen percent of the population, were predominantly a pastoral people. The Twa people, the remaining one percent, were forest dwelling hunters and gatherers. The clans reflected the three ethnic groups and remained together by a clientele institution, whereby the king would gift cattle and other goods to elites in exchange for loyalty. Despite the composite nature of the clans, they maintained strong clan identities that, for some, lasted into the modern day. It was possible for individuals to move between the ethnic groups by the grace and pleasure of the king, or other elites. Moving from a lower prestige group to a higher one could serve as a means of rewarding supporters and friends. It was also possible for individuals and groups to move down the social ladder into less prestigious groups.

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4 The Clans of Rwanda: An Historical Hypothesis by David S. Newbury Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, vol. 50, no. 4 1980
6 Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda by Alison Desforges March 1999 p. 31-32.
7 David S. Newbury p. 390
The Nyifinya was the most prominent clan during the nineteenth century. By the latter half of the century, the Nyifinya king (the Mwami) established a centralized state within Rwanda. The Mwami controlled the surrounding clans, dispensing his favor in gifts of cattle, lands and allowing Hutu and Twa to become Tutsi.\(^8\) This system lasted until the Belgians took control of Rwanda. The German colonial authority used the control and organization of the Nyifinya and the Mwami to help control Rwanda. The German colonial authority did not understand the fluid nature of Rwandan society and believed that the Tutsi held a static position as rulers of Rwanda. They believed that the Tutsi ruled over a feudal style government that kept the Hutu and Twa subject to them.\(^9\)

The end of the First World War left Germany devastated. The Treaty of Versailles placed harsh stipulations on Germany, including accepting responsibility for the war itself. Along with forcing Germany to pay war reparations to the victors, Germany had to relinquish control of its colonial possessions to the new League of Nations. The League assigned Rwanda to Belgium. Belgium instituted a series of changes to its governing structures to fit with the method of direct rule that it had established in its other African holdings, such as the Congo.\(^10\) The Belgians wanted a stronger hand in running the country and so - during the 1920s - created a system of chiefdoms and sub chiefdoms of uniform size that controlled distribution of goods and administration of the country. The Belgian administration centralized the chiefdom system from a multilayered chiefdom of Hutu and Tutsi to one level controlled by Tutsi. The Tutsi maintained their position as the leaders while the Belgians

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\(^8\) The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996 p. 7 section 15.
\(^9\) Jones p. 18 and Des Forges p. 33.
retooled the system of sub chiefdoms and local leaders to eliminate the vast network of local and regional leaders. The Belgian colonial authority instituted a similar system where a set number of regional and local Tutsi leaders answered to the colonial authority. This worked to ease the burdens of government on the local peoples. The Belgian authority built off preexisting social and governing structures the Germans had begun and combined them with racial and ethnic misconceptions about the evolution and heredity of the Hutu and Tutsi to elevate the Tutsi into a position of administration and decreed that the Tutsi were the only group that should be officials. The Catholic Church supported this system of discrimination by socially elevating the Tutsi and granting them greater access to education. Early Catholic missionaries refused to teach Hutus because they believed them racially inferior.11 This barred the majority Hutu from higher offices and higher education as the Belgians and Tutsi expected them to subsist as the lower class.12 This forced the Hutu to reside as low income farmers and wage workers with little to no chance for economic or social advancement.

Belgian misconceptions about race, ethnicity and local power structures led to the solidification of Tutsi control of the country and served to aggravate race relations between the Tutsi and Hutu. They believed that the Tutsi most resembled the Belgians and were therefore more closely to the Europeans than the Hutu or Twa. They perceived the Tutsi as being the naturally superior group because of their supposed close genetic relationship to Europeans and missed Hutu contributions to building Rwanda.13 Belgians based this on such pseudo-scientific practices as phrenology, which used measurements of a subject’s skull and facial features to make determinations about a group of people. Such practices led Belgians

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11 Kroslak p. 20-21 Des Forges p. 33 and 34.  
12 Des Forges p. 34  
13 Des Forges p. 34
to believe that the Tutsi were higher on the evolutionary scale than the other ethnic groups and were therefore the most worthy of elevation.

These changes set the groundwork for the ethnic problems that caused the civil war culminating in the 1994 genocide. These Belgian changes made it easier for the Tutsi elites to oppress their people, as the traditional means of fleeing to other clans in different locations was no longer available. Belgian administrative changes restricted Hutu to new forest settlement and placed restrictions on moving between regions within the country. In the past, Rwandans not happy with local officials could easily move to another region or start new settlements in the forest. Belgian administrative changes prohibited these methods of escape. The only avenue of escape still open was migrating to other countries, which increased in the 1920s.\textsuperscript{14}

They also put ethnic relations in a light that fostered increased conflict. Relations that were once fluid and allowed for transition of groups were now hardened and prevented such transitions from taking place. The old system allowed for a merging of the ethnic groups and facilitated amicable relations among them. There may have been tensions and periodic wars fought between regional groups over governing and control of resources such as cattle and goods in the past, but prior to the Belgian system of Tutsi domination the three groups lived in relative peace. Use of identification cards that specified a person’s ethnic membership further strained ethnic issues. They made ethnic identity a central tool for administration and allotment of goods and resources. They also made it easier for the police and government officials to identify a person’s ethnicity and to discriminate that individual. Requiring all adults to carry these cards and present them when ordered made it difficult if not impossible

\textsuperscript{14} Des Forges p. 33 and 34.
for most Hutu to pass for Tutsi or Twa. They were a means of making ethnic membership. This practice forced ethnic issues into the public consciousness and made them impossible to ignore.\textsuperscript{15}

Mahmood Mamdani argued in his book, \textit{When Victims Become Killers}, that Belgian changes to the Rwandan government turned tribal identities into political identities. By politicizing the identities of Hutu and Tutsi, and placing the balance of power in the favor of the Tutsi, tribal identities became sources of competition and trouble. Mamdani further argued that Rwanda missed the normal course of identity development that would have had ethnic identities replaced by a national identity of the people as Rwandans. The cultural and political changes that put the Tutsi above the Hutu created the mindset of the Tutsi as a settler population forcing their control over the native (Hutu) population. Mamdani argued that these identity structures paved the way for the Hutu-Tutsi identity conflict that allowed the genocide to occur.\textsuperscript{16}

The end of the Second World War, ushered in the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, saw the founding of the United Nations and witnessed the end of European colonization. Liberation of African colonies was a key part of this decolonization movement. The United Nations oversaw the removal of colonial controls and the creation of new states to ensure that former colonies became stable states. The UN used a

\textsuperscript{15} The UN and Rwanda p. 8. Mahmood Mamdani, \textit{When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and Genocide in Rwanda}, p. 34.

\textsuperscript{16} Mamdani chapter 1: Defining the Crisis of Postcolonial Citizenship: Settler and Native as Political Identities, p. 19 to 39. Mamdani argued that there are two types of genocidal impulses originating from colonialism. The first is “genocide of the native by the settler” wherein the colonial power uses force to pacify a native population. The second is “the native impulse to eliminate the settler” where the native population uses force to throw off the rule of the colonial power. Mamdani argued that, for the perpetrators, the genocide was a case of a native population using force against a settler population. The political divisions enforced by German and Belgian rule turned the Tutsi into a settler population and the Hutu into a native population. The discussion of settler and native genocides takes place on p. 8 to 10.
trust system wherein a colony in the process of gaining independence would have a sponsor state that guided its independence. When both the UN and the sponsoring state believed a colonial holding was ready for independence it was granted statehood and membership in the UN.

In 1946, Rwanda became a trusteeship of the League of Nations, which the United Nations continued under the UN International Trusteeship System. The UN favored Rwanda becoming an independent country, but believed that it needed a period of development under the UN’s direction before it could operate on its own. Belgium became the administrator of the trusteeship because it had experience with administering Rwanda after the First World War.

Rwanda began its downward spiral towards the 1994 genocide after becoming a UN trusteeship. The Tutsi continued to dominate the government retaining the Belgian-imposed suppression of the Hutu. Groups of Hutu began pushing for a complete reform of the government and economy. Economic problems and mounting racial tensions led to a Hutu led coup at the end of the 1950s. A number of politically minded and reform oriented groups emerged at this time. Many of these groups, like Parmehutu, pushed for Hutu freedom from both Tutsi of the government and Belgian influence over the country. In 1959, the Hutu opposition, led by Gregoire Kayibanda, overthrew the Tutsi Monarchy, to whom the Belgian colonial administration had given tremendous power. Thousands of Tutsi fled Rwanda for

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18 Jones p. eight and Des Forges p. 36 and 37.
neighboring countries, primarily Uganda, fearing Hutu reprisals for decades of suppression and mistreatment and marked the beginning of the “Hutu peasant revolution”. 19

The Hutu revolution lasted for three years and ended in 1961 when The Party of Hutu Emancipation Movement took power after winning a UN supervised referendum. 20 The referendum, which took place in September 1961, placed the fate of the Mwami monarch in the hands of the voters. The Hutu swept the election claiming thirty-seven seats in the new legislature while the Tutsi won seven. The vote ended the Mwami monarchy and the Hutu and Tutsi agreed to establish a republican government. 21

During the revolution, the Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR) - the Tutsi ruling party- planned on eliminating troubling members of the Hutu elite, but the Hutu struck first. 22 Belgium initially wanted to help the Tutsi monarch hold onto power, but pressure from the UN and the desire to help Rwanda achieve independence and a growing concern over how long it would take the fading colonial power to leave Rwanda led the European state to side with the growing Hutu authority. Belgian leaders decided that it would be easier to switch support to the growing Hutu regime than to continue to aid the Tutsi monarch. 23 To this end, the Belgians helped the Hutu Party of Emancipation set up a new administration. The next year Rwanda gained full independence. On January 1, Belgium granted Rwanda autonomy and in June the UN, trusteeship ended. On July 1, 1962, the UN granted Rwanda full

19 The UN and Rwanda p. eight and Des Forges p. 36.
22 Jones p. 20. Des Forges p. 36.
23 Jones p. 20.
independence. On September 18, 1962, Rwanda and Burundi earned membership in the UN.\textsuperscript{24}

The situation in Rwanda continued to degrade throughout the 1970s. Since independence, displaced persons within Rwanda and refugees outside the country created mounting problems for the stability and development of Rwanda. In 1964, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that there were over 150,000 Tutsi refugees in neighboring countries.\textsuperscript{25} A Tutsi resistance group calling itself *inyenzi* (cockroaches) made over a dozen attacks against the Hutu regime between 1961 and 1966.\textsuperscript{26} Gregoire Kayibanda—the leader of the new Hutu dominated Rwandan government—ordered violent reprisals against those guerillas that the army could find and anyone it deemed a collaborator. Kayibanda ordered reprisal attacks against Tutsi civilians still in Rwanda, forcing thousands more to flee to neighboring countries like Burundi, Uganda, Zaire and Tanzania.\textsuperscript{27} These reprisals caused the *inyenzi* to lose their taste for fighting by 1966 and most Tutsi sought a way to live normal lives.\textsuperscript{28}

Mounting tensions with refugees, rebel groups and economic problems within the country led to the overthrow of Kayibanda’s regime. In 1973, Major General Juvenal Habyarimana—a Hutu from the northern Bushiru clan led a military coup. On July 5, he took control of the government and abolished all political parties to strengthen his position. Habyarimana spent the next five years solidifying his rule and in 1978 won a Presidential election bringing his National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND) party

\textsuperscript{24} The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996 p. 9.  
\textsuperscript{25} The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996 p. 10.  
\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Paul Kagame and Rwanda: power, genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front} by Colin Waugh p. 27-29.  
\textsuperscript{27} The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996 p. 10.  
\textsuperscript{28} Waugh p. 27-29
into full power.\textsuperscript{29} He solidified his power by consolidating political authority in the MRND, making it the only legally recognized political party, the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND), and filled its membership with members of his own clan. His clan involvement isolated both Tutsi and southern Hutu. Over the next decade, Habyarimana consolidated his power around a clan-based oligarchy called an \textit{akazu}, which his clan dominated.\textsuperscript{30}

He brought ethnic divisions into greater focus through sweeping economic and administrative changes. He instituted policies that forcibly moved groups of Tutsi and Hutu from one region to another so that the government could establish “ethnic and regional balance”.\textsuperscript{31}

After the Hutu overthrew the Mwami monarch in 1961, thousands of Tutsi fled the country fearing reprisals from the new Hutu authority for decades of one-sided government. The refugees found temporary homes in countries like Tanzania, Zaire and Uganda. Many of them spent decades living in refugee camps while others attempted to assimilate into the population of their host countries. Still others desired to return to their native Rwanda but continued to fear what the new Hutu government would do to them.

 Sadly, the end of European colonization left many challenges for other peoples and governments in Africa to face. Much as the Belgians had favored the western-looking Tutsis over the majority Hutus [and minority Twas], the British imported people from the Indian sub-continent to dominate government and economy in its former territories. This only added to existing tribal and clan tensions. One place where this all boiled up was Uganda

\textsuperscript{29} US State Department website http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2861.htm.
\textsuperscript{31} The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996 p. 10 and 11.
where, from 1971 through 1979, Idi Amin Dada ruled the country, expelled these Indian sub-continent ethnic Ugandans, and engaged in brutal suppression of several ethnic groups. In 1979, the Tanzanian army augmented by Ugandan exiles expelled him.\(^\text{32}\)

After Amin’s expulsion, Milton Obote regained the presidency and began a regime characterized by authoritarian rule. Accusations of corruption spread after Obote’s 1980 presidential victory. These accusations culminated in the start of a guerrilla war led by Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Army. Museveni allied with several minority and ethnic groups in Uganda oppressed by Obote. He sided with the Tutsi refugees in Uganda, helping them find shelter and resources. He supported their plight and offered them political aid against the Ugandan government, which tired of their presence and wanted them expelled from Uganda.\(^\text{33}\)

Museveni’s promises and the support of ethnic groups inspired a group of second-generation Tutsi refugees, known as Banyarwandans and second-generation fifty-niners because their parents had fled to Uganda in 1959, to side with Museveni in his guerrilla war against Milton Obote. Museveni incorporated many of his Tutsi allies into the new government. The Tutsi guerrillas received positions in the reformed security apparatus of Uganda. Paul Kagame and Fred Rwigyema, the military and political leaders of the Tutsi guerrillas, received positions as the deputy chief of military intelligence and the deputy minister of defense respectively.\(^\text{34}\)

\(^{32}\)United States Department of the State website: Background note Uganda [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2963.htm](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2963.htm)


\(^{34}\)Jones p. 22-23 and Des Forges p. 42.
Factions within Museveni’s movement had pushed for the expulsion of the Rwandans so that Ugandans would not have to compete with them. The great economic challenges that Uganda faced helped flame ethnic tensions. Ugandans did not like the idea of outsiders attaining high ranks and prestigious positions within the new government because, though the Tutsi supporters helped overthrow Obote’s government, they were not Ugandan natives or citizens. Dissenters within Museveni’s fledgling government pushed for the removal of Tutsis from positions within the government and even removal from Uganda. Opponents to Museveni’s rule raised ethnic and racial issues as a means of undermining Museveni’s control by cutting off support from a number of native ethnic groups. They pointed to Tutsi in the government and spread rumors and propaganda about Tutsi favoritism in receiving resources and opportunities. Mounting pressures forced Museveni to side with political expediency and begin urging his supporters to seek repatriation to Rwanda.35

Increased tensions over Tutsi presence in the government and the general population brought dangers of ethnic violence. Local Ugandans resented the competition presented by those they perceived as outsiders and began finding ways of venting their anger. The Tutsi decided that it would be better to take up the fight against the ruling Hutu and return home than face attacks by Ugandan guerillas.36

The first group of Tutsi to push for repatriation formed in 1979 as a political opposition to Habyarimana’s regime.37 The Rwandan Alliance for National Unity, representing Hutu and Tutsi refugees, originally attempted to find a diplomatic solution to the

35 Jones p. 22, 23, and Kroslak p. 33 and 34.
36 Waugh p. 40-43.
repatriation issue. However, Habyarimana was not willing to allow refugees to return to the country. Habyarimana had attempted a series of economic and political changes that he hoped would lead to the development of the country and the continuation of French support. At the summit in La Baule, French President Francois Mitterrand declared that French aid would be dependent on democratic reforms in Franco-African countries. Unfortunately, Rwanda’s agriculture based economy was slow to develop due to a mix of domestic setbacks and difficult international competition.

By the 1980s, Rwanda’s population already the densest in Africa was reaching critical mass. A drastic drop in world coffee prices put great strains on the highly agrarian Rwandan economy. Coffee was Rwanda’s chief export comprising 75% of its foreign income by the end of the 1980s. In 1989, a drought followed the market drop to add further trouble to Rwanda’s poor, who lived primarily off subsistence agriculture. Habyarimana initially discounted the magnitude of the famine and demanded that production quotas continue to be met. Failure to meet the quotas would inhibit the equal distribution of resources among the ten prefectures in Rwanda.

Strict control and distribution of resources to Habyarimana’s supporters and Hutu from Habyarimana’s home prefecture of Gisenyi led to increased domestic problems. Intellectuals and political leaders demanded government and economic reforms. They targeted government corruption made evident by the blatant favoritism of Habyarimana’s

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38 Jones p. 23.
39 Kroslak p. 33.
40 Des Forges p. 40 and 41.
supporters. International donors like the World Bank who began tying economic aid to
democratic reforms mirrored calls for increased democratization among Rwandans.\textsuperscript{41}

The Rwandan government directed tensions away from its own faults with new anti-
Tutsi rhetoric. Habyarimana riled the Hutu population against both domestic Tutsi
populations and the displaced ones seeking to return home. In 1987, the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF) with many Tutsi veterans of the fighting in Uganda formed under the belief that
force was the only way to achieve repatriation.\textsuperscript{42}

What started in 1979 as a political opposition to Habyarimana’s regime became the
RPF by 1987. By 1987, Tutsi from the Ugandan army dominated the organization.\textsuperscript{43}
Throughout the 1980s, the RPF attempted a negotiated resettlement. The GOR initially
blocked all thoughts of refugees returning. In 1982, the GOR expelled thousands of refugees
pushed into Rwanda from Uganda and in 1986; the GOR announced that Rwanda was
overpopulated to allow the repatriation of all refugees. For a brief moment in 1989, it looked
as though the GOR would be willing to come to an agreement on repatriation. The GOR
formed a commission to negotiate with Ugandan officials, which met three times throughout
the year. By the final meeting, held in July 1990, it looked as though the Ugandan
government and the GOR would come to terms. However, the RPF was determined to end
the issue on its own terms and added the reformation of the GOR to its goals. It now sought
the removal of Habyarimana and the democratization of the government to secure better
Tutsi representation.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{41}Des Forges p. 41 and 42.
\textsuperscript{42}Jones p. 23.
\textsuperscript{43}Defense Intelligence Report: J2-210-94, May 9, 1994 p. 2.
\textsuperscript{44}Des Forges p. 42.
The RPA formed under the leadership of Paul Kagame and Fred Rwiyemana to serve as the military army of the RPF and to bring the exiled Tutsi home to Rwanda. The new militant Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) had a core of Tutsi guerillas that fought for Museveni. Colonel Alexis Kanyarweng, a Hutu, served as president of the political arm of the RPF and served as the public face of the organization. General Paul Kagame, born in southern Rwanda in 1957, served as the military commander of much of the RPF forces and was the mastermind of RPF policy.45

The RPF recognized the difficulty of seeking a diplomatic solution to the repatriation issue; Habyarimana resisted and even used repatriation for a rally-around-the-flag effect to keep support for his government despite failed economic and political reforms that caused waves within Rwanda. The presence of a paramilitary organization willing to use violence as a means of persuasion caused a great deal of problems for Habyarimana. The RPF poised on the border of Uganda ready to attack government positions inside Rwanda presented more than just military problems. The Hutu majority feared what an independent, largely battle-tested, armed group of Tutsi with a grudge to bear could do if they entered the country. There was a very real fear that the RPF and groups like them would indiscriminately kill Hutu in retaliation for expulsion and decades of unfair treatment. It was a very real fear of revenge for the Hutu turning the tables on the Tutsi during the revolution of the 1960s.

Habyarimana sought allies and assistance to resist the RPF. In December 1989, he asked Herman Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa from 1989 to 1993, if the United States had any information on RPF movements along the Ugandan border. The CIA stopped monitoring events in the Great Lakes Region but was hesitant to reveal its lack of

involvement so Cohen told Habyarimana that his government did not have any information on RPF movements.\textsuperscript{46}

The RPF launched a major attack on the Habyarimana government on October 1, 1990, from bases in Uganda aiming to take the capital Kigali. The RPF engaged FAR with 7,000 troops under the command of Fred Rwigyema, who died during the opening salvos leaving Paul Kagame in command.\textsuperscript{47} Kagame reorganized the offensive from a conventional assault on Government forces and positions to a guerilla war.\textsuperscript{48} The RPF chose October 1 because Habyarimana was in France attending the Franco-African summit and the RPF leaders wanted to capitalize on his absence. The rush for Kigali failed because government troops were better equipped and knew the terrain better than the RPF and the local population had been subject to a propaganda campaign instilling fear of the RPF.\textsuperscript{49} Government forces received support from Zairian troops and French officers who trained and armed the troops.\textsuperscript{50} Government troops had numerical and technological superiority over their RPF counterparts, but the RPF guerillas had experience. The disparity in training gave the RPF the advantage so by 1993 the RPF controlled nearly two percent of the territory in north along the border with Uganda.\textsuperscript{51} When the RPF invaded, Habyarimana quickly increased the size of the Army of Rwanda (FAR) from 5,000 to 30,000. The government of Rwanda (GOR) sacrificed training for numbers when it rapidly increased the size of the army. Habyarimana feared that the battle-tested RPF would overwhelm the limited Rwandan army.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{46} Jones p. 29.
\textsuperscript{47} Klinghoffer The International Dimensions of Genocide in Rwanda p. 15. The Rwandan Patriotic Front by Gerard Prunier, in African Guerillas edited by Christopher Clapham, p. 130 (Prunier 1)
\textsuperscript{48} Defense Intelligence Report: J2-210-94 May 9, 1994 p. 2.
\textsuperscript{49} US State Department website and Prunier 1 p. 128-133.
\textsuperscript{50} Defense Intelligence Report: J2-210-94 May 9, 1994 p. 2.
\textsuperscript{51} Defense Intelligence Report: J2-210-94 May 9, 1994 p. 2.
\textsuperscript{52} Prunier 1 p. 137 and Arthur Jay Klinghoffer p. 21.
Despite initial setbacks the war continued. The RPF achieved much greater success after Paul Kagame turned to a guerilla war. Tutsi veterans from the Ugandan civil war had prior experience fighting a guerilla war giving them a distinct advantage over the government troops who had no experience resisting a guerilla force. Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko viewed Uganda as a threat and so wanted to check any advance of Ugandan power in the region. Mobutu saw this as a chance to garner more favor with France and Belgium who were coming to Habyarimana’s aid. He therefore agreed to have 500 Zairian troops support government soldiers in the early days of the civil war. The government lost faith in the Zaire troops after their devastating loss to RPF guerillas in a very limited engagement and reports of their looting nearby towns and villages.\textsuperscript{53} The Rwandan army removed the troops by October 18 after their loss believing that their undisciplined and ineffective fighting would do more harm than good if left in the field.\textsuperscript{54}

The US believed that a government victory depended on foreign support. Their troops were outmatched and the only way they would be able to stand up to continued guerilla war was if they could continue to outnumber RPF troops. The only way the government forces could win was with continued support of arms and equipment to supply the rapidly expanding army. Government officers and officials believed they could win through strength of numbers supported by increased flow of arms from allies like France.\textsuperscript{55}

By 1993, the RPF had pushed government forces out of much of the border regions with Uganda. Supported by supply routes from bases in Uganda the RPF was able to build

\textsuperscript{53} Klinghoffer p. 16, Prunier 1 p. 137, and Joel Stettenheim, \textit{The Arusha Accords and the Failure of International Intervention in Rwanda}, p. 221.
\textsuperscript{54} CIA FOIA 1315 October 27, 1990, and NIC 01075/90.
\textsuperscript{55} NIC 01075/90 October 22, 1990.
forward positions from which to launch further attacks on GOR troops and positions.\textsuperscript{56}

Though it did not hold a large percentage of territory, the PRF was able to use what it did have as a doorway for its guerilla forces to enter Rwanda and plague FAR contingents. It was a small holding, but large enough to allow the RPF to continue its war against the GOR.

Starting on October 2, France provided unofficial military assistance to the GOR. The operations began with 300 French troops sent to evacuate 200 French nationals in Rwanda. From there they supported the FAR and GOR by providing $10 million dollars in weapons and equipment, guarding the Kigali airport and roads, establishing communications and providing pilots for aircraft.\textsuperscript{57}

Between October 15 and 18 Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens, along with several of his top officials, met with President Habyarimana and regional leaders to discuss a ceasefire. Both Museveni and Mobutu were present due to their participation in the war. Habyarimana purposefully excluded the RPF from the talks. Despite Habyarimana agreeing to repatriate refugees and allow a joint African force monitor the ceasefire, the talks failed to end the fighting because the RPF and the GOR did not have a chance to negotiate over the terms together.\textsuperscript{58} Throughout the final months of 1990 and the beginning of 1991, the RPF and GOR continued to fight while regional leaders attempted to negotiate a ceasefire. Failure to bring both parties to the table resulted in a series of failed talks. It was not until Habyarimana met with Museveni on February 17 that the RPF and GOR talked directly. The initial ceasefire lasted until the spring of 1992 when fighting renewed due to the failure of the

\textsuperscript{56} Defense Intelligence Report J2-210-94 May 9, 1994.
\textsuperscript{57} Klinghoffer p. 16 and Stettenheim p. 221 and 222.
\textsuperscript{58} Klinghoffer p. 17. Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens and Defense Minister Guy Coeme were the Belgian officials who accompanied Prime Minister Martens to the talks. Tanzanian president Ali Hassan Mwinyi was also present at the talks.
parties to maintain a politically neutral monitoring force. Frantic talks took place between the RPF, the GOR, regional leaders and European supporters throughout the rest of the year. Eventually international political pressure forced the GOR and RPF to reach a lasting ceasefire, negotiated at Arusha Tanzania. The Arusha Accords presented the chance to end more than the civil war. If the RPF and GOR could honor their commitments to creating a power sharing government the long-standing problems between Hutu and Tutsi would have a way of ending.

59 Klinghoffer p. 25-30.
Chapter Two

Hopes for peace and thoughts of death:

The Arusha Peace Accords, Hutu Power and Blueprints for Death

Joel Stettenheim argued that the Arusha peace process needs examined in three primary parts. The first was the pre-negotiation phase where regional leaders pressured the GOR and RPF to negotiate an end to the civil war. Included in this phase was a series of stalled talks and failed ceasefires that attempted to bring the warring parties to the same table. The second part was the talks in Arusha. Regional leaders and the UN facilitated these talks. Throughout the course of the talks, Habyarimana and Hutu extremists took every opportunity to prevent the signing of an agreement, but pressure from France and Belgium convinced Habyarimana to play ball. Issues of refugees and demilitarization were integral parts of these talks. The Arusha talks ultimately ended in an agreement for an integrated government and military and the return of refugees displaced before and during the civil war. Stettenheim argued that the third part necessary to understanding the peace process was the failed implementation of the Arusha Accords and the genocide that followed.  

Initial peace efforts focused on humanitarian incentives, namely the mounting refugee problem. On February 19, 1991, Habyarimana attended a summit at Dar-es-Salaam where he signed the Declaration on Rwandese Refugees Problem. The Declaration sought the repatriation of Rwandan refugees. Shortly thereafter Habyarimana signed the Zanzibar Communiqué in which he finally agreed to negotiate directly with the RPF.  

On March 29, 1991, the RPF and the Government of Rwanda (GOR) signed the N’sele Cease-fire agreement. It set the agenda for future peace talks between the RPF and

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61 Stettenheim p. 222-223.
the Rwandan government. The N’sele Ceasefire failed almost immediately as FAR troops attacked RPF positions. On September 16, the RPF and GOR signed a second ceasefire at Gabolite, Zaire. The ceasefire at Gabolite solved a greater problem with the negotiation efforts. Previously, President Mobutu of Zaire served as mediator of the talks, but he had favored Habyarimana. His favoring of the GOR stalled the peace efforts because he was unwilling to assist the RPF in gaining greater concessions. The Gabolite ceasefire replaced Mobutu with President Mwinyi of Tanzania as the mediator, who was willing to be neutral at the negotiations.

Key to the Arusha agenda was preparing the way for the Arusha Peace Accords, started in June 1992 in Arusha, Tanzania. The Arusha Accords were a major international effort. The US, France, the UN, Uganda, Senegal, Zaire, Zimbabwe and Nigeria went to great efforts to facilitate the peace talks and to secure stability in the Great Lakes Region. Uganda severed as the guarantor of the RPF’s involvement in the talks since Musevini’s government held a strong measure of influence over the RPF based in the country. Senegal’s Abdou Diouf served as chair of Organization of Africa Union (OAU) and filled the role of the “honest broker”. Zaire stepped in after its notable absence in earlier peace talks. Zaire had a strong concern over the outcome of the talks since it shared a fragile border with Rwanda. Zimbabwe and Nigeria worked as military observers and signatories for the Accords. The Mwanza Communiqué formed during talks between Habyarimana, the Belgian Prime minister, foreign minister and defense minister. The Communiqué formalized

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62 Jones p. 55.
63 Stettenheim p. 223.
64 Stettenheim p. 223.
65 Jones p. 69.
66 Jones p. 74.
the involvement of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and several other neighboring countries in the peace talks. It shifted the focus of the talks to the guidance of the OAU. The Zanzibar Communiqué later restated the commitment to finding a peaceful solution through a cease-fire agreement and later peace accords. The Zanzibar Communiqué established the need for a regional conference to handle growing problems with refugees.\(^{67}\)

The US put pressure on Uganda to put pressure on the RPF to agree to the talks. The US’s goal was to take the Ugandan military out of the situation. The Ugandan military had been giving support to the RPF in the form of arms and other supplies and cutting off the flow of these supplies was a key US strategy for getting the RPF to enter the talks. The US claimed its involvement was to ensure the continuation of Cold War policy of maintaining peace and security in Africa. Deputy Secretary for Africa within the State Department Irvin Hicks organized meetings between the RPF and the GOR to keep the negotiations open.\(^{68}\) US officials helped the negotiations in other ways. Charles Snyder helped the GOR prepare negotiation books they could use keep information clear during talks. John Byerly helped the RPF develop negotiation tactics so it was on equal footing with the GOR during peace talks. The US was able to bring new ideas and proposals to the negotiating table because both sides saw it as an unbiased source, unlike France who had a long history of supporting the GOR.\(^{69}\)

The lack of a neutral arbitrator stalled early peace efforts. The RPF wanted Museveni to serve as the arbitrator but the GOR, Habyarimana and others suspected the Ugandan leader of favoring the Tutsi. This suspicion was not without some measure of truth as fifteen

\(^{67}\) Jones p. 53-55.
\(^{68}\) Jones p. 56, 64 and 75.
\(^{69}\) Jones p. 76.
percent of Musevini’s army was comprised of Tutsi from the refugee community within Uganda.  

France played a mixed role in first the civil war and then the peace negotiations. Prior to the war, France established close ties with the GOR. France had won the favor of the GOR away from Belgium during the revolution of the 1960s. France aimed at having a greater amount of influence in Francophone Africa. This led France to develop relations with Rwanda so that it could build and maintain its influence in the Great Lakes Region. The Quai d’Orsay—the French political party involved in the Arusha Accords—believed that supporting the peace talks were the best way to end the conflict in the region without losing its own influence there. The Quai d’Orsay believed that the RPF was able to defeat the GOR military and oust the Hutu government making supporting the GOR extremely costly. Supporting the peace process would be less costly for the French and give them a chance to maintain their influence in the area. 

The Communite’ Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs (Economic Community of Countries of the Great Lakes Region or CEPGL) was a political grouping of countries in the Great Lakes Region that attempted to help with the peace process. The CEPGL agreed to provide a monitoring force for the Rwanda Military Observer Group (MOG) under the observation of the OAU Liberation Committee.

On July 12, 1992, after over twenty years of fighting, negotiating, killings and repression, the two sides signed the N’Sele cease-fire in an attempt to end the fighting. The

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70 CIA FOIA Document 1315.
71 Jones p.
72 Jones p. 54. This decision was made during the Gbadolite meetings held early on in the talks by the CEPGL. The meeting reissued the N’Sele cease-fire and called for the creation of an observer group to assist in maintaining the tenets of the talks.
ceasefire laid the groundwork for future talks to take place at Arusha, Tanzania. It was believed that the RPF and GOR would finally end their fighting and find a solution to the disagreements and conflict.\textsuperscript{73}

The main tenets of the accords were the creation of a shared government between the Hutu and Tutsi using multiparty elections and integration of the RPF into the state army.\textsuperscript{74} Though designed to bring peace and stability to Rwanda, the implementation of the Arusha Accords provided motivation and excuse for extremists within the Hutu government to take drastic actions to protect their own positions.

The US participated in initiating the accords. Through the work of Carol Fuller, Rwandan desk officer for the State Department, and Herman J. Cohen, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs during the administration of President George H.W. Bush, the RPF and the Hutu government came together for negotiations. Cohen achieved this miracle through working with president Musevini of Uganda, who had been working with RPF leadership for several years, by suggesting that Musevini would be able to make a move on the refugee issue and take a stab at his long time opponent Habyarimana.\textsuperscript{75} Cohen also argued that the war was stalling and continued fighting would destroy the Rwandan economy. He tried to impress the RPF representatives that they would not be able to gain more territory than they had and that to attempt new gains would result in their defeat.\textsuperscript{76} Museveni then pressed RPF leadership to be more proactive in returning the refugees to Rwanda.

\textsuperscript{73} Klinghoffer p. 26, Stettenheim p. 229 and Alan Kuperman, \textit{The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda}, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{74} Defense Intelligence Report J2-210-949 May 1994 Rwanda: The Rwandan Patriotic Front’s Offensive.
\textsuperscript{75} The Arusha Accords and the Failure of International Intervention in Rwanda by Joel Stettenheim p. 11.
\textsuperscript{76} Stettenheim p. 223.
Cohen then met with representatives of the GOR and Habyarimana. On May 10 and 11, he attempted to convince Habyarimana to negotiate with the RPF, but Habyarimana initially refused claiming that the RPF were not Rwandans but Ugandans. Cohen finally convinced Habyarimana to negotiate with the RPF by agreeing to remove the clause that Habyarimana step down and allow an interim government to take power. He told Habyarimana’s representatives that he considered the RPF demands to be unreasonable and that Museveni would soon press the RPF to lessen them to facilitate negotiations. Cohen also threatened to remove American aid to Uganda if Museveni did not work to end the war. He claimed that the refugee situation was rapidly draining American aid resources and that if the war did not end in a timely fashion the US would not be able to continue current aid programs.  

During the negotiations of the Accords, the US functioned as a neutral mediator and source of information for the two parties. The Clinton administration was heavily involved in negotiations and peace talks in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Liberia and Namibia, preventing the US from taking a more proactive role in the Arusha talks. Charles Snyder, the director of the Office of African Regional Affairs in the State Department, spent his time trying to work a cease-fire and identifying issues that the parties would have to labor through in future talks.  

The Arusha Accords sought to solve the problems of shared government and military between the RPF and GOR, the voluntary repatriation of all refugees, both those from the 1959 revolution and the current civil war, and the creation of a transitional government. The RPF and GOR approached the negotiating table with different negotiating standpoints that

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77 Stettenheim p. 224.
78 Stettenheim p. 223-224.
influenced the course of the talks. The RPF continued its trend of discipline and preparedness by arriving with clear goals in mind outlined in a series of position papers. The RPF was primarily concerned with security issues and wanted, among other things, the return of refugees, a power sharing government and the establishment of the rule of law that protected individual rights and removed legal protections based on ethnicity. The RPF elicited support of opposition parties within the GOR that wanted to remove Habyarimana from power. The RPF believed that their support would strengthen the RPF’s bargaining position.\(^79\)

In contrast, the GOR, weakened by its fragmented nature, lacked a strong bargaining position at the summit. The representatives could not agree on bargaining positions and Habyarimana complicated matters by repeatedly moving his support between moderates who wanted some kind of reconciliation and hard-liners who did not. The hard-liners’ clear objective was the breakdown of the talks and the continuation of the war. International pressures to find a peaceful settlement blocked those goals, but Habyarimana’s continued resistance aided their position at the talks. The moderates caught in the middle of the debate between the RPF and the hard-liners were unable to make a solid stand on any position. Habyarimana and the hard-liners feared that the RPF would take control of the government through the peace settlement. The RPF stood to gain control over a large portion of both the army and the government, as it and the Hutu opposition parties would get the majority of seats in the new assembly before the first elections.\(^80\)

\(^{79}\) Stettenheim p. 225-226.

\(^{80}\) Kuperman p. 11.
The moderates opposed the war because they believed it was only between the RPF and the northern Hutus who made up Habyarimana’s regime, and because they did not fully trust the RPF. They were plagued with fears of Tutsi plots and schemes to take control of Rwanda through the negotiations. Old prejudices of the Tutsi as intellectually superior to the Hutu and always scheming for power fed the moderates’ fears.\textsuperscript{81}

Habyarimana could not prevent discussions of power sharing from completing. He specifically targeted negotiations over the nature of the transitional government and the merging of the army because they would destroy his power base. Throughout the course of the talks, a number of firefights and large-scale killings occurred that increased international and domestic pressures on him. RPF retaliation and their victories increased the likelihood that the FAR would lose to the guerillas. The RPF made considerable territorial gains during an offensive in February 1993 giving them a stronger negotiating position. The offensive was in response to a massacre at Bgogwe where 300 Tutsi died.\textsuperscript{82} Domestic pressures increased as the cost of the war mounted and the threat of an RPF victory became more prevalent. Opposition parties working with the RPF, despite fears and mistrust of the Tutsi dominated organization, increased problems for Habyarimana and combined with international pressures to force Habyarimana to the table. France threatened to remove its troops, which Habyarimana depended on to protect communications and transportation lines, in conjunction with other Western supporters threatening the removal of financial aid finally convinced Habyarimana to cooperate.\textsuperscript{83

\textsuperscript{81} Stettenheim p. 225-226 and Kuperman p. 11. 
\textsuperscript{82} Stettenheim p. 231. 
\textsuperscript{83} Kuperman, p. 10-12.
The Arusha Accords, signed on August 4, 1993, set up a framework for an integrated government and military. The FAR and Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the military branch of the RPF, would merge with 60 percent of the troops coming from the FAR and 40 percent coming from the RPA. They would divide the officer ranks equally between the two. Furthermore, they were to reduce the size of the army to 13,000 troops and officers, meaning that 30,000 soldiers would be out of work.\textsuperscript{84}

One of the most important parts of the peace process was the creation of a UN peacekeeping force to monitor the cease-fire and implementation of the Arusha Accords. Sustaining a ceasefire required the presence of monitors of the implementation of peace agreements. To this end, the UN established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) on October 5, 1993.\textsuperscript{85} UNAMIR’s mandate was to:

\begin{quote}
(A)ssist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali; monitor the ceasefire agreement, including establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone and demobilization procedures; monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government’s mandate leading up to elections; assist with mine-clearance; and assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations.
\end{quote}

General Romeo Dallaire (the commanding officer of UNAMIR) wrote in specific instructions on what the UN soldiers were to do if they encountered crimes against humanity. He wrote, “UNAMIR will take the necessary action to prevent any crime against humanity.”\textsuperscript{87} Aside from this one order UNAMIR’s other rules of engagement were ambiguous. The peacekeepers could not use force except under strict circumstances. They

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\textsuperscript{84} Klinghoffer p.30. A large number of Hutu extremists and hardliners came out of this group. They worked to undermine the implementation of the Accords to preserve their jobs and prevent the RPF from taking power.
\textsuperscript{87} Des Forges p. 133.
\end{flushright}
had to do their work by the force of their presence and their ties to the greater UN on its own. They were allowed to use violent force in joint operations with the Rwandan national police or if they came under fire from enemy combatants.\footnote{Kuperman p. 40.}

General Dallaire received 2,548 troops to monitor and enforce the ceasefire and implementation of the Arusha Accords.\footnote{Des Forges p. 132 and Ghosts of Rwanda documentary.} The troops came from UN member states who volunteered members of their military to assist in UN peacekeeping operations. Belgium provided 420 peacekeepers for the UNAMIR operation while the majority of the UNAMIR troops (2,100) came from African countries—such as Ghana, which could supply men but few arms and other equipment. Six hundred engineering, medical, logistics and headquarters personnel that were to help in the daily, non-combat operations of the mission supported these troops. They made up for the shortage of equipment through donations of arms, vehicles, food and medical supplies by other UN member states that were willing to supply material support for UN peacekeeping missions but not combat personnel.\footnote{Kuperman p. 40.}

UNAMIR personnel faced an operation expecting them to prevent two warring factions from restarting a war fueled by nearly one hundred years of ethnic hatred with little more than the white “UN” letters painted on their light-blue helmets. When their situation began to lead toward renewed war, UNAMIR faced a devastating lack of support from the very organization that created it and the world powers that were supposed to lend it their credibility. General Dallaire and his command staff saw a wealth of warning signs that told them the violence was going to begin again. Dallaire attempted to inform his superiors at the

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\footnote{Kuperman p. 40.}
UN of the impending violence and to seek their support in changing UNAMIR’s mandate to allow it a more proactive role in keeping the peace.

Between August 1992 and April 1994, the Habyarimana regime and the RPF struggled over how to implement the Arusha Accords. Habyarimana played a delicate balancing game of cooperating with the implementation process at some points and then blocking it at others. He attempted to protect his position from domestic contestants within the GOR who wanted to prevent the implementation of the Arusha Accords and renew the war, and international pressures demanding the full implementation of the Accords. Failure to keep his domestic opposition appeased risked an internal coup and likely his death. Failure to appease international pressures risked the loss of international aid and greater efforts by the UN, France and other interested parties to push through the Accords.

Dissenters within the government sought to protect their own positions in power—which they stood to lose with the full implementation of the Accords. They also wanted to prevent the sharing of power with the Tutsis they had spent their lives hating and repressing. Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, who worked with the Minister of Defense, and had taken part in the negotiations for the Arusha Accords, faced forced retirement and the loss of position when they integrated the Rwandan Army and the RPA. He was a life-long military man who believed that the Tutsi needed to be defeated in a military conflict and that negotiations like those at Arusha were a mistake. Bagosora won support among military, political leaders and other influential members of the Hutu hierarchy. His supporters included Habyarimana’s wife and brother.

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A number of other Hutu officers faced this same fate, and joined under Bagosora’s leadership to find a way to protect their power. A handful of political and military leaders within the MRND party initially sought to hold onto their power within the government and as such worked to prevent the Accords from implementation. The group became a political group calling itself Hutu Power, and built its political plank around ethnic strife and called for a Hutu uprising over the growing influence of Tutsis and the RPF in Rwanda. These plans eventually evolved into plans for the mass murder of every Tutsi within Rwanda’s borders.

Bagosora and his supporters enacted plans to counter RPF influence and moderates within the Rwandan government. They required a political and military aspect to their plans. They centered the military aspect of their plan on control of elite troops like the Presidential Guard and local militias called *interahmwe*. The Presidential Guard opposed integrating with RPF soldiers. The Presidential Guard began targeting prominent Tutsi and moderate Hutus sympathetic to reconciliation between the GOR and RPF within the country.

The *interahmwe* began as a program to support the military during the civil war. The idea was that the Rwandan Army would focus on fighting the war while the militia would serve as a security apparatus for the frontier regions that lacked a strong army presence. Eventually, extremists turned them into the military arm of their political and opposition parties within the government. Army officers trained militia members in the use of traditional weapons; spears, bows and arrows, clubs and machetes, to cut expenses of arming

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93 Ghosts of Rwanda.
94 Ghosts of Rwanda.
96 Kuperman p. 39. Philip Gourevitch, We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: stories from Rwanda p.104. (Gourevitch)
and training them in the use of modern weapons like Kalashnikovs. Once the *interahmwe*
became an arm of the Hutu Power, the dissenters within the MRND began training them in
secret to prevent both their opposition within the government and the RPF from knowing
about them.⁹⁷ During the early 1990s, France helped train and arm the militias assuming that
they would support the Rwandan armed forces against the RPA.⁹⁸ The training process
included political indoctrination that set them against first the Tutsis of the RPF and second
Hutu that would oppose the impending genocide.

Part of the indoctrination of the militias and the army included clearly defining who
the enemy they were preparing for was. Military and political leaders met to determine who
to target and how to present these targets to their subordinates. Colonel Nsabimana- the
army chief of staff- issued a letter defining who the enemy was on September 21, 1992. The
letter was the formalization and dissemination of a memo circulating among the army high
command earlier in September. The memorandum and the letter pointed to Tutsi seeking to
reassert Tutsi domination of Rwanda and the RPF as the primary enemies of the people and
the government.⁹⁹

This program was supported by AMASASU (Alliance of Soldiers Provoked by the
Age-Old Deceitful Acts of Unarists) a political body of soldiers that were opposed to
Habyarimana’s cooperation with the Arusha Accords and feared the return of the Tutsi
Royalist Party.¹⁰⁰ AMASASU received support from Akazu, another extremist group within
the government that warned that the RPF were trying to return Rwanda to a time when the
Tutsi monarch ruled over the Hutu. These groups worked with the Party for the Coalition for

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⁹⁷ Des Forges p. 81-82.
⁹⁸ Kuperman p. 39.
⁹⁹ Des Forges p. 62.
¹⁰⁰ Des Forges p. 103.
the Defense of the Republic (CDR) to progress their aims of stopping the integration of the
government and army and the return of the Tutsi to a position of power in Rwanda.\textsuperscript{101}

Despite the efforts taken to keep these programs secret, clues to their existence and
their objectives leaked to those who could have possibly stopped them. Rumors of training
camps, arms shipments and secret lists of supporters of these programs and those that stood
in their way circulated among a handful of people within the GOR. These rumors and hard
evidence of these events reached members of the international community and the deaf ears
that directed them.

The US was directly involved with the extremely poor handling of the many warning
signs of the impending tragedy. Major General Romeo Dallaire, commander of the United
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), had seen the violence coming; but the
UN mandate limited him to a passive observation role and was unable to do more to stop the
genocide.

On January 11, 1994, Dallaire requested protection for an informant, a man in charge
of training \textit{interahamwe}, which had given him an outline of the plans made for the genocide.
Included in these plans were locations of militia arms caches and plans to run the Belgian and
UN peacekeepers out of the country by targeting Belgian troops at the beginning of the
killings. The planners had spent months buying machetes in bulk to be given to the militias
and compiling lists of Tutsis and moderate Hutus to target when the chaos began. The
Security Council, through Kofi Annan the head of UN peacekeeping operations, told General
Dallaire to leave the weapons alone and to inform the Rwandan President of the leaked
information despite knowing that those behind these training camps and weapons caches

\textsuperscript{101} Jared Cohen, \textit{One Hundred Days of Silence: America and the Rwanda Genocide}, p. 13. (Cohen)
were members of the President’s inner circle. Annan initially doubted the validity of the information, thinking that the informant intended to lead the UN mission in the wrong direction. Annan believed that the UN would be able to deter the outbreak of violence by informing the extremists within Habyarimana’s party that the UN knew about their plans.

There had been a number of other reports on the buildup of weapons and troops by Belgian intelligence officers, the Belgian ambassador to Kigali and clergy in Nyundo, a northeastern region. There were other warning signs that the UN ignored. RTLM radio in Kigali broadcasted anti-Tutsi propaganda for months prior to the genocide. The broadcast spread rumor of RPF plans to infiltrate the country and to subvert the government. They claimed that the RPF would kill any Hutu that they could in a war between the ethnicities. They based many of these rumors on events taking place in Burundi. Ethnic problems in Burundi mirrored those in Rwanda. Tutsi had dominated the Burundian government until 1993 after which the government became more open to Hutu. They held open elections for the first time in decades in which Melchior Ndadaye won the presidency. He worked to integrate Tutsi and Hutu in the government to bring both sides to the ethnic conflict together. Tutsi extremists in Burundi wanted to hold onto their power, in the same way that Hutu extremists did in Rwanda. On October 21, 1993, Tutsi army officers assassinated Ndadaye and set off a series of mass murders perpetrated by both Tutsi and Hutu militants. Announcers on RTLM warned that the RPF was in league with Tutsi in Burundi and that they would bring the killing to Rwanda once they took power in Burundi.

Scattered killings and attacks throughout the months leading to the genocide, and during the negotiations of the Accords, served as practice for the perpetrators and as a means of testing international reaction to new outbreaks of violence. On August 20, 1992, Hutu extremists massacred Tutsi and opponents of the Habyarimana regime at Kibuye. Extremists incited further small riots and isolated mass killings as a means of preparing their troops for genocide and testing their plans. Human rights organizations ARDHO and Association des Volontaires de la Paix reported these attacks on civilians throughout the country in November and December 1993. Similar incidents in Burundi helped increase acceptance that the peace process would not work in Rwanda because the situations between the two countries were so similar. The lack of an interfering response by the UN and others in the international community convinced Hutu extremists that the international community was willing to tolerate mass murder in the Great Lakes Region for political ends. This convinced these extremists that they would be able to not only implement their plans for genocide, but succeed without fear of reprisal from outside powers. The only reprisals the extremists faced were from RPF troops. On February 8, 1993, the RPF attacked FAR positions along the northern front. The RPF claimed that these attacks were to stop the killing of Tutsi and political targets that took place in January.

Information about arms shipments concerned some in the UN. The nature and quantity of the weapons suggested that the FAR did not intend them for use. The most prevalent of these shipments were shipments of machetes from China. Habyarimana imported an estimated 581,000 machetes in 1993 used to arm the *interahamwe* in place of

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105 DesForges p. 96.
106 Triumph of Evil: Warning Signs and DesForges p. 113-118.
expensive guns. The GOR claimed that the machetes were going to farmers for use in the upcoming harvest season. Military personnel distributed the weapons to interahamwe bands. Being able to buy them in bulk from a country not interested in asking too many questions made them the perfect weapons to arm a large body of troops trained to use traditional weapons.

As Bagosora and the Hutu extremists planned for the destruction of the Tutsi and the RPF, the RPF prepared plans for the continued war against the GOR. The RPF leadership did not trust that the Arusha Accords would actually bring peace to the country. They were counting on decades of racial tension to continue despite international efforts to end the civil war. The RPF began a recruiting campaign of young people, who they trained in RPF controlled territory in northern Rwanda. They trained these recruits as soldiers to fill the gaps in their ranks left by losses during the civil war. The RPF trained a number of these recruits to work as political agents within a preexisting intelligence and support network in Rwanda. Their orders were to build sympathy for the RPF cause and gather information of local conditions among civilians, the military and the government. They trained the agents in Marxist rhetoric on philosophy, history and economics. These recruits worked in ethnically integrated cells of six to twelve members. The RPF required these cells to have Hutu members working with Tutsi members because they believed it would be easier for the GOR to find cells that were exclusively Tutsi. Ironically, these intelligence cells were the very infiltrators that Hutu propagandist spread rumors about over the radio to increase fear of Tutsi manipulations and plans for the conquest of Rwanda.

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109 Des Forges p. 97.
110 Des Forges p. 98 and 99.
The US and France, along with other members of the Security Council, argued that the best way to prevent future violence was to implement the Arusha Accords. Belgium pressed for a greater international commitment to preventing the violence and solving Rwanda’s internal problems, but the US and the United Kingdom blocked this through the Security Council. The Security Council was hesitant to attempt to head off the preparations of the Hutu extremists. The Clinton administration mirrored this sentiment. Anthony Lake, President Clinton’s National Security Advisor, doubted that the proposed increase of troops would not be enough to prevent a slaughter if one happened.

111 Des Forges p. 131.
112 Des Forges P. 132-133.
Chapter Three:

A Month for each Horseman: the genocide in Rwanda

Early in the morning of April 6, 1994, Rwandan President Habyarimana was returning from peace talks in Dar es Salaam, where he supposedly agreed to institute a new transitional government. Cyprien Ntaryamira—the President of Burundi—and General Nsabimana—the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army (FAR), accompanied him. As the presidential plane approached the airport in Kigali rockets fired from hidden positions near the airport shot down the plane killing all passengers.\(^{113}\)

Within hours of the plane crash, the Hutu hardliners began a systematic mass murder of hundreds of thousands of Tutsi and Hutus throughout the country. Colonel Theoneste Bagosora quickly exerted control over the ministers and other high-ranking members of the government inside of meetings to determine how to handle the growing crisis. Part of his aim in the meeting was to work the MRND into a position of greater power. General Dallaire urged Bagosora to keep Prime Minister Agathe involved in the proceedings to help maintain government stability and their honoring of the peace agreements, but Bagosora and other officials refused to heed Dallaire’s advice because he was an outsider and they wanted to keep the Prime Minister out of the new government they were creating. The ministers did agree to keep a measure of civilian control over the government, supported by a number of army officers who argued that the military had no place in politics.\(^{114}\)

\(^{113}\) Des Forges p. 145 and Kroslak p. 46. Prudence Bushnell email to The Secretary April 6, 1994 subject: Death of Rwanda and Burundi Presidents in Plane Crash Outside Kigali.

While Bagosora met with the council of ministers and military officers over the formation of the government, members of the Presidential Guard and the National Police erected barricades and checkpoints all over Kigali. They claimed these barricades were to keep the peace, and to protect the part of Kigali where most of the government officials lived when in reality they were the first step in implementing the plans for the genocide. During the opening hours of the genocide, the Presidential Guard and National Police eliminated anyone who could have legitimately taken control of and led the government and those within the government that Bagosora and his supporters believed would attempt to block their plans. By midday of April 7, all those who could have taken legitimate control of the government were gone.\textsuperscript{115}

On the morning of April 7 Bagosora ordered soldiers from the Presidential Guard to arrest Prime Minister Agathe. He targeted her because she stood in the way of his return to power and opposition to the genocide. General Dallaire had already sent UNAMIR troops to protect the Prime Minister at her residence. Belgian and Ghanaian troops entered a standoff with the government troops for several hours as Prime Minister Agathe sought a way to escape. At one point, she attempted to climb over the wall to her neighbor’s home but the Presidential Guard saw her and stopped her. The standoff ended when GOR troops stormed the Prime Minister’s residence, took the peacekeepers hostage and arrested Agathe. Prime Minister Agathe was tortured and killed then put on public display as a sign of what would happen to those who stood against Bagosora and his supporters. The GOR troops allowed the Ghanaian peacekeepers to leave the Prime Minister’s residence but captured and killed the Belgian troops after a day long standoff. Belgium removed its support from the

UNAMIR mission and its troops from Rwanda after the death of the troops. Bagosora
wanted to get the states supporting UNAMIR to remove their troops from the country and
calculated correctly that killing the Belgian troops would get Belgium to do just that. His
end goal was to keep the international community from preventing the genocide and so he
had to run their troops out of the country.\textsuperscript{116} This same day the Security Council issued a
directive condemning the violence and ordering the GOR and RPF to honor the Arusha
Accords.\textsuperscript{117}

Reports have indicated that the initial number of government troops and others
supporting their efforts to kill Tutsi and government targets in Kigali were between six and
seven thousand.\textsuperscript{118} The movements of the army troops and militia in the opening days of the
killing made the exact nature of the fighting confusing to outside observers. During the first
days, RPF forces within Kigali, numbering around six hundred as per the agreement of the
Arusha Accords, fought against GOR troops carrying out plans for the genocide. The RPF
troops received support from RPF intelligence cells within Kigali that were comprised of
Hutu and Tutsi. These confrontations made the killings appear as nothing more than the
renewal of the civil war. This confusion over the nature of the fighting led some in the UN to
refrain from action during the early days of the killing.\textsuperscript{119}

This confusion was not limited to the international community. It was unclear who
was actually in control of the government. This affected the chain of command as

\textsuperscript{116} Des Forges p. 150. Dallaire p. 235-244. Dallaire laments his failure to save the Belgian peacekeepers when
he was informed of their situation. He states that he wanted to attempt a rescue of the men held at Camp Kigali
but was forced to resort to negotiating because he lacked the forces needed to take Camp Kigali by force.
\textsuperscript{118} Des Forges p. 155.
\textsuperscript{119} Des Forges p. 151. Dallaire p. 254. Dallaire describes being caught in a cross fire between the RPF and
Presidential Guard units near Meridien hotel while returning to UNAMIR headquarters. The UN ordered
Dallaire to refrain from engaging the combatants unless UNAMIR personnel were specifically targeted.
Though they were attacked in the cross-fire, it is believed they were not the specific target.
commanders made decisions that their subordinates did not always follow. There were rumors about orders coming through secret networks directing soldiers against targets. Rumors of the secret network and confusion about who controlled the government led to problems among the lower ranking officers and soldiers over which orders to follow and which superiors to trust. The organization and leadership of the genocide relied less on obedience of subordinates than on their willingness to commit mass murder. The loyalty of troops to the military hierarchy came in second to their loyalty to the cause of the genocide. During the genocide, subordinates could easily disobey orders from superiors so long as they were killing Tutsi. Low ranking officers and soldiers often took their own initiative to kill Tutsi as means of gaining advancement. Those willing to kill hundreds and thousands of their fellow citizens could receive promotion and other rewards for organizing and perpetrating massacres.  

Military officers directed the course of the genocide. They distributed orders to FAR and *interahmwe* units directing them towards groups of Tutsi and high priority targets. Army officers also gave direction to civilians. They ordered local populations to support the genocide by telling FAR and *interahmwe* soldiers where to find the hiding places of local Tutsi and even to engage in killings of their own. Soldiers and officers used threats of force and withholding government assistance against groups and local leaders who were unwilling to support or attempted to stop the genocide in their areas. Neighbors, teachers, friends and even children pointed out hiding places and identified Tutsi in their towns. The threats and 

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120 Des Forges p. 151 and 176; Hintjens p. 271. Hintjens argued that the civilian population and military personnel followed the directions of the orchestrators with limited resistance. The earlier propaganda campaigns had solidified the majority of the Hutu population against their Tutsi neighbors to such an extent that they were willing to abandon prior relationships for the campaign of ethnic cleansing started by the Hutu extremists.
propaganda worked so well that family members turned in or killed their own husbands, wives and extended family. As the genocide grew in force and focus, FAR officers allowed *interahamwe* leaders and gangs to threaten and intimidate members of the administration and local peoples to ensure their cooperation.\(^{121}\)

After April 6, Army officers gave weapons to civilians and offered military support to Hutu fighting against local cells of Tutsi trying to survive. There are examples of Army officers responding to calls for help by local leaders and Hutu attempting to direct the killings in their own areas. There is one such request in a letter from a Hutu medical assistant in the commune of Ntyazo:

Mr. Muhutu A.
Deputy

We have a large number of Tutsi at Karama (sector headed by the councilor Kanamugire). We have tried to fight them, but they have turned out to be stronger than we expected. So we ask for your help once again; send us a few National Police and four other [communal?] police to help the population that is fighting with bows.

P.S. We have guns and grenades.

Mathieu
27/4/9410\(^{122}\)

On April 8, RPF troops crossed into Rwanda embarking on a campaign to end the killing and to rescue the six hundred RPF personnel trapped in Kigali. RPF leadership had warned GOR officials that they would renew military efforts if they did not immediately stop the violence. They launched their campaign to retake Rwanda and rescue Tutsi from the violence of FAR and the *interahamwe*.\(^{123}\) The renewed RPF offensive did help mask the

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\(^{121}\) Des Forges p. 177-178. Helen M. Hintjens p. 269-270.


\(^{123}\) Triumph of Evil genocide timeline: [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/p./frontline/shows/evil/etc/slaughter.html](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/p./frontline/shows/evil/etc/slaughter.html)
nature of the violence. To outsiders, it looked as though the civil war was simply beginning again as FAR and RPF troops engaged along the northern border and inside Kigali.\textsuperscript{124}

Over the next week, the violence escalated from attacks directed against political targets inside Kigali to attacks against the general Tutsi population. By April 11 an estimated 20,000 people were dead. An attack on the hospital in Mugonero ended in a systematic massacre of Tutsi and moderate Hutu seeking refuge there. The attackers read the names of targeted individuals over the hospital public announce system telling them to come forward and directing soldiers on whom to look for. One survivor described what happened when the killing ended:

They sent people in among the bodies to verify who was dead. They said, “Here is the treasurer and his wife and daughter, but where is the younger child?” Or, “Here is Josue’s father, his wife and mother, but where is he?” And then, in the days after, they tried to hunt you down if they thought you were still alive. They would shout out, “Hey Josue, we see you now” to make you jump and try to run so that they could see you move and get you more easily.\textsuperscript{125}

The FAR and \textit{interahmwe} attackers specifically targeted attacks hidden behind the curtain of general slaughter. While executing any Tutsi they found, the attackers searched for specially targeted individuals that posed threats to their ability to complete their plans.

On April 12, MRND Power leader Frodault Karamira spoke on Radio Rwanda in an attempt to rally public support for the genocide. He claimed that the war was “everyone’s


\textsuperscript{125} Des Forges p. 159.
responsibility” and that they should assist the government in the fighting by helping them find the enemy within the cities and prefectures and by raising arms against the RPF.\footnote{Des Forges p. 156 and 157; Dallaire p. 252; Cohen p. 35 and 36.}

Paul Kagame countered Hutu Power radio appeals to the public with broadcasts of his own. Kagame went on Radio Muhabura to denounce calls for ethnic violence and illuminate the political nature of the violence. He wanted to point out the regional and partisan nature of the killings. Radio des Mille Collines (RTLM) radio countered Kagame’s broadcasts by arguing about the damaging Hutu-Tutsi cohesion within the RPF. RTLM radio disseminated false information that Kagame and Kanyarengwe (the Hutu president of the RPF) had killed each other in the first days of the violence and that the RPF was going to fall into internal chaos.\footnote{Des Forges p. 157.} Having the leaders of the RPF kill one another was an attempt to drive Hutu and Tutsi further against one another.

The goal of the broadcasts was to break the unity between Hutu and Tutsi that were fighting against Hutu Power loyal troops and militia throughout April. Hutu and Tutsi had been mutual members of the RPF for several years. Intermarriage between Hutu and Tutsi within Rwanda over decades built family bonds between the groups that they would not abandoned during the genocide. Hutu came to the defense of Tutsi family members during raids and at checkpoints while they fled the cities. Ties of friendship put Tutsi and Hutu side by side against Presidential Guard and militia groups.\footnote{Des Forges p. 156.}

Bagosora and his supporters made extensive use of Rwanda’s radio stations throughout the genocide. Broadcasters and disc jockeys, like Belgian announcer Georges Ruggiu working for RTLM, who supported the genocide routinely broadcast anti-Tutsi
propaganda and the locations of groups of Tutsis trying to flee the country. For months prior to the genocide, Hutu Power affiliated radio stations broadcast anti-Tutsi propaganda. They spread stories of Tutsi conspiracies to take Rwanda and kill Hutu in retaliation for the 1959 revolution. Once the genocide started, the radio stations claimed that the Hutu had to destroy their enemy before the Tutsi destroyed them. They claimed that all Tutsi were going to rise against the Hutu and slaughter them like animals. The broadcasts told Hutu where to find Tutsi and how to kill them. They reported the success of operations and attacks throughout the country. They designed the broadcasts to incite greater hatred of the Tutsi and to spur the violence to increase in speed and intensity. In one such broadcast Ruggui said:

...the population is very vigilant, except in certain sectors...where people are still downcast; otherwise, everywhere else, they have sacked all the houses, the rooms, the kitchens, everywhere! They have even torn out all the doors and windows in all the uninhabited houses, [and] in general, they find inkotanyi hidden inside. They have searched everywhere!...If they [the inkotanyi] get hungry, they’ll all come out before you arrive. That is why you must act very fast! Force them to come out! Find them at whatever cost.

A similar broadcast directed interahmwe to watch for Tutsi groups on the move.

around the hill Mbunabutuso [sic, Mburabuturo], in the woods...suspect movements of people have been observed...People of Rugonga [sic, Rugunga], of Kanongo [sic, Kanogo], by the gas station, pay attention, go to check out that woods, go ensure security and that the inyenzi have not gotten in there.

FAR and interahmwe troops utilized these broadcasts to track large groups of Tutsi and other targeted individuals throughout the country. The radio broadcasts allowed the orchestrators

130 Des Forges p. 160.
131 Des Forges p. 160.
to send orders to their agents in the field who may have lacked two-way radios. *Interahmwe* groups most likely relied on these broadcasts for directions because they likely had regular radios where they lacked military ones.

Aside from taking direction from broadcasts and direct orders from FAR officers, the *interahmwe* operated on their own. They targeted large populations of Tutsi, such as towns and communities set up during Habyarimana’s forced repopulation efforts during the previous decades. They targeted places where their victims were likely to flee. The GOR tricked and forced Tutsi to go to these safe houses so that it would be easier to kill them. As early as 11 April, government officials began telling refugees and victims that they could find protection in designated safe zones. At times the GOR and FAR forced Tutsi to leave their homes and towns to enter these safe zones arguing that GOR would protect them in these places. In the prefectures of Kibuye and Cyangugu, refugees were placed in sports stadiums so that the GOR and FAR could keep a close eye on them. Kivumu, the prefect of Kibuye, put a number of Tutsi in the Byange church so that the refugees’ movements could be limited. As would become the pattern, these refugee centers became the sites of massacres as FAR and *interahmwe* used them as convenient killing grounds, forcing Tutsi to stay until their killers arrived.  

Churches, hospitals and schools became sites of massacres. In the northwest prefecture of Gisenyi fifty people were killed while seeking refuge at the Nyundo seminary. Forty-three people died at the Church of Busogo and one hundred and fifty lost their loves at the Busasamana parish. East of Gisenyi at the campus of the Seventh Day Adventist University in Mudende prefecture saw Burundian students and a group of wounded soldiers

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kill a group of Tutsi trying to hide there. In Kigali, the Church of Nyamirambo was the site of a massacre on 8 April. The Mosque at Nyamirambo and the Gikondo Church in Kigali were the sites of over one hundred deaths on 9 April. At Gikondo Church, police and presidential guard corralled Tutsi into the church, took their identity cards, and then left the crowd to the machinations of the militia. The police and presidential guard held a UNAMIR contingent of five soldiers at gunpoint when they attempted to interfere and forced them to watch the slaughter. General Dallaire says, “They confronted a scene of unbelievable horror—the first such scene UNAMIR witnessed—evidence of the genocide, though we didn’t yet know to call it that”.  

Between April 11 and May 1, the worst slaughters of the genocide took place. St. Josephs center in Kibungo, Nyamesheke and Mibirizi churches in Cyangugu, Kibeho, Cyanika and Kuduha churches in Gikongoro, Butare hospital at the University in Butare, Nyundo Cathedral in Gisenyi, and the ETO school in Kigali were all sites of devastating massacres where hundreds of thousands of Tutsi were killed.

Among these tragedies many Tutsi found refuge among the arms of the RPF. RPF camps at Kabgay in the Gitarama province saved 24,300 Tutsi. A number of National Police officers disobeyed orders to participate in the genocide and protected Tutsi that found their way to them. At Nyarushishi in the prefecture of Cyangugu Colonel Bavugamenshi of the National Police protected roughly ten thousand Tutsi until the French Operation Turquoise

133 Des Forges p. 160. 
134 Dallaire p. 279-281. 
relieved them. At Butare the prefect refused to follow orders to kill local Tutsi costing him his life when FAR and interahmwe took control of Butare.\textsuperscript{137}

Other Tutsi survived the early days of the killings by fighting back. At Rubona Hill in Butare prefecture and Bisesero in Kibuye prefecture Tutsi fought sieges against Hutu attackers. They hid in the brush and jungle to draw their attackers into ambush. The defenders utilized a tactic known as \textit{kwiunga} (merging). They waited for their attackers to get close enough so that they could ambush FAR and interahmwe by suddenly appearing within the ranks of their attackers. The Tutsi hoped that engaging their enemies in close quarters would prevent the FAR and interahmwe from firing on their own men, giving an advantage to the Tutsi who many times fought with farm tools and knives because they lacked guns.

These sieges lasted for weeks with mostly interahmwe surrounding the hills Tutsi hid on hoping to starve them out of hiding. The Tutsi managed to survive by foraging for food on the large jungle covered hills. The Tutsi organized themselves into leadership positions to organize defense and feeding efforts. They planned to retreat further into the forests when attacked. The Tutsi at Bisesero organized and fought so well that their siege lasted from April 8 to July 1. They utilized the steep cliffs of the hills to see approaching interahmwe and FAR troops so that they were prepared for the attacks before the attackers arrived. The siege at Bisesero ended on June 20 when FAR soldiers arrived to support National Police

\textsuperscript{137} Hintjens p. 272.
surrounding the hills. The FAR soldiers attacked the hills killing roughly 1,500 Tutsi who spent months starving and clinging to life on the hills.\textsuperscript{138}

A number of Tutsi who did not look Tutsi escaped death by passing as Hutu. They got through roadblocks and checkpoints using forged ID cards. Those who looked Hutu enough escaped death because the killers identified Tutsi through body features, features like long thin noses, as much as through their identity cards.\textsuperscript{139}

Other Tutsi survived by repeatedly running and hiding from FAR and \textit{interahmwe} patrols. They traveled in small groups to make it more difficult for them to be found and they fled to RPF controlled territory and neighboring countries like Tanzania and Zaire. These Tutsi survived by hiding from and bribing FAR and \textit{interahmwe} they encountered. They would offer anything of value they might have to pay off their potential killers to let them go. Watches, cash and even sexual favors were favored currency for FAR troops looking to profit in some way from the killings. In some cases, Tutsi took advantage of confusion within the ranks of the FAR and \textit{interahmwe} to escape death. In two instances, young Tutsi women utilized the distraction of soldiers preparing for a massacre to escape. Des Forges describes these events as:

\begin{quote}
One woman at the crowded Kabgayi camp who was selected for killing by militia begged the chance to suckle her infant one last time. While she was doing so, her captor got bored and looked away and she disappeared into the crowd. A teenaged girl was lined up with others waiting to be killed at the edge of a grave. When the killers began to dispute the division of the spoils taken from the victims, she sped off into the night.
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{139} Hintjens p. 272-273.
These women capitalized on the confusion of forcing Tutsi together for their deaths and the disorganized concerns of their attackers to slip out of captivity and save their own lives.\textsuperscript{140}

As the genocide progressed some in the international community called for a unified intervention. General Dallaire pleaded with the Security Council for an increase in the size and mandate of UNAMIR operations. He wanted permission and resources to set up safe zones where UN troops could protect refugee Tutsi and Hutu. Some in the UN agreed and petitioned the Security Council and the UN to stop the killings. General Dallaire had orders to avoid armed confrontations with the fighting sides. His superiors ordered him to continue to work toward a diplomatic solution to the fighting by negotiating with FAR and \textit{interahmwe} leaders to end the killings. General Dallaire was able to buy time for Tutsi and others to escape murder by strategically placing UN peacekeepers in supposed safe zones. This prevented some FAR and \textit{interahmwe} from attacking refugees because reporters often accompanied peacekeepers. Bagosora and his supporters were still concerned about the prospects of an international intervention that they did not want the true nature of the violence reported in the media. Many of the killers in the fields felt the same way and decided it best to wait until the peacekeepers and reporters left to stage attacks.\textsuperscript{141}

Despite the calls for intervention, the UN and the Security Council dragged its feet on the issue. Arguments revolved around the nature of the conflict and to what extent the UN was required to get involved. Many within the international organization doubted that an increased peacekeeping force would be able to end the killings and restore peace and so wanted to find alternative solutions to ending the violence. The United States, among others, continuously stressed the belief that forcing the implementation of the disarmament tenets of

\textsuperscript{141} Ghosts of Rwanda. Dallaire p. 229 and 230.
the Arusha Accords through negotiation, diplomacy and threat of economic sanctions against
the GOR would convince Bagosora to withdraw his troops from the field and order the
interahmwe to stand down. They then reasoned that if the FAR and militias stopped
attacking RPF and Tutsi targets that the RPF would halt its advance from the north and the
two sides could find another diplomatic solution to their problems.

President Bill Clinton’s administration was initially quiet on the opening round of
killings because the American public had yet to pressure the government to take action.¹⁴²
Many high-ranking members of the State Department thought tensions between the Hutu and
Tutsi were too old for intervention to stop. Others in the Clinton administration thought the
price of intervention required to stop the fighting and killing, in money and soldiers, would
be higher than the American public would pay. Secretary of State Warren Christopher told
Madeline Albright, the American ambassador to the UN, to press for removal of the entire
UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda. She argued with Christopher over the phone from the
UN about how and if they should remove the troops. She argued him down from removing
the entire mission to removing ninety percent of the troops. This reduction would have left
the mission with four hundred fifty troops to negotiate and enforce a cease-fire between two
parties intent on fighting out their dispute.¹⁴³

President Clinton’s primary objective in regards to the killings in Rwanda was to
evacuate all American personnel. Clinton personnel organized a joint US-Belgian-French
operation to evacuate their respective civilians and few military personnel inside Rwanda.

¹⁴² Des Forges p. 477
As part of this operation, Belgian officials requested that the United States provide equipment and vehicles needed to evacuate their nationals.\textsuperscript{144}

On April 9, one hundred and ninety French paratroopers took control of the Kigali airport to begin Operation Amaryllis. The French were to hold the airport while French, American and Belgian civilians made their way there and then use American military aircraft to evacuate the civilians.\textsuperscript{145} There were 255 Americans in Rwanda when the genocide began. They were primarily personnel attached to the US embassy in Kigali and a handful representing private business and nongovernmental organizations. Evacuating American civilians was the initial objective of the US government when the killing started.\textsuperscript{146}

American expatriates gathered at the US embassy in Kigali for evacuation.\textsuperscript{147} The Pentagon organized a force of three hundred marines, stationed off the coast of Somalia at the start of the genocide, to evacuate American civilians. The Marines used a force of four KC-130 airborne tankers, three CH-53 troop-carrying helicopters and four Air Force C-141 transport aircraft to move those evacuees who did not wish to stay in Rwanda.\textsuperscript{148} Laura Lane (an embassy worker in charge of organizing the expatriates for evacuation) wanted to turn the embassy into a safe zone to protect as many Rwandans as they could, but George Moose (the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa) told her to abandon the idea because the US did not have a way of protecting them.\textsuperscript{149}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{144}{Executive Secretariat Situation Report #6 April 8, 1994. Dallaire p. 282-285.}
\footnotetext{145}{Kuperman p. 40. Cohen p. 73.}
\footnotetext{146}{Pearl 1. Cohen p. 73.}
\footnotetext{147}{Ghosts of Rwanda.}
\footnotetext{149}{Ghosts of Rwanda: Interview with Laura Lane. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/p./frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/lane.html}
\end{footnotes}
Carl Wilkens, an aid worker and the only American to stay behind, kept a video diary of what he saw. In one recording, he discovers a group of *interahmwe* surrounding an orphanage. Wilkens quickly and successfully petitioned the acting Prime Minister to protect the orphanage and saved the children.¹⁵⁰ Gregory “Gromo” Alex, a UN aid worker remained in Kigali to head humanitarian relief operations by delivering food and medical supplies to safe zones established inside Kigali.¹⁵¹

The Clinton administration had lost its will for intervention after the failed mission to Somalia three months prior. Eighteen Marines died in a mission to capture faction leaders in Mogadishu. The Somalia mission failed in such a horrendous way that the Clinton administration reexamined its stance on intervention and decided to take every measure to avoid a similar disaster. It saw intervention in Rwanda, prior to and during the genocide, as a risk it was not willing to take, both politically and in American lives. For the government in Washington, Rwanda was one more failed state that would take a great military effort to put back together, one it was not willing to take.¹⁵²

The Clinton administration took a great deal of criticism for not taking a proactive stance on the killings shortly after they started, but the American government was worried about repeating the mistakes of the previous year. The Clinton administration lost much of its nerve for intervention in Africa after the deaths of eighteen American Special Forces soldiers in Mogadishu the previous October.¹⁵³ Most members of the administration wanted to avoid a repeat of the failure in Somalia despite the rising number of dead. Despite this,

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¹⁵⁰ Ghosts of Rwanda interview with Carl Wilkens.  
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/p./frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/wilkens.html

¹⁵¹ Ghosts of Rwanda interview with Gregory Alex.  
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/p./frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/gromo.html


¹⁵³ For West, Rwanda is not worth the political candle by Elaine Sciolino. New York Times, April 15, 1994.
there were those in the administration who wanted to act. Higher-ranking members of the administration were content to leave attempts to help to lower members. In an interview for the PBS documentary, “Ghosts of Rwanda,” Anthony Lake, President Clinton’s National Security Advisor, said, “It never became a serious issue for senior levels of the administration. They never really considered the issue of international intervention.”154 They left the issue in the hands of the bureaucracy. Prudence Bushnell (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa) led an inter-agency working group seeking an end to the crisis. She argued with members of the Pentagon over such issues as jamming radio transmission by such stations as Radio Rwanda and Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines that pushed anti-Tutsi propaganda and helped direct militias to survivors hiding places. The Pentagon refused, arguing that doing so would violate First Amendment rights of free speech and freedom of the press.155 Senior defense officials cautioned that jamming the radio stations could be the first move in process that would drag the US into direct military intervention. Doing so would directly violate the policy stance and goals of senior members of the President’s cabinet, the State Department and the President himself.156

The US called for a complete withdrawal of UN peacekeepers during a meeting of the Security Council. On April 15, the US declared that the UNAMIR task force no longer had a job to do in Rwanda. The US argued that the task force arrived in Rwanda to observe and maintain the cease-fire, since hostilities restarted, the cease-fire had failed and there was no longer a reason to keep the task force in country. On April 21, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to remove UNAMIR troops, cutting the UN forces from 2,500 to two

154 Ghosts of Rwanda, Interview with Anthony Lake.
155 Ghosts of Rwanda, Interview with Prudence Bushnell.
hundred seventy.\textsuperscript{157} The Rwandan government took part in this vote having become a nonaligned member of the Security Council shortly before the genocide commenced.\textsuperscript{158}

General Dallaire disobeyed orders to evacuate his people and attempted to protect as many Tutsi and Hutus as he could. On April 16, he established protection zones at Amahoro Stadium, King Faisal Hospital and a number of other locations near Kigali. At the stadium, his limited forces protected roughly fifteen thousand refugees. At the hospital, he protected roughly six thousand refugees. General Dallaire ordered a contingent of UN peacekeepers to protect Hotel Mille Collines in Kigali after witnessing a group of \textit{interahamwe} constructing barricades outside of the hotel. The \textit{interahamwe} claimed they were preventing traitors from leaving the hotel, but that they would allow anyone to enter. Dallaire realized the militia intended to use the hotel as convenient killing ground and ordered the hotel under UN protection.\textsuperscript{159}

The Clinton administration spoke out several times against the killings while they were taking place, but never once referred to them as genocide. Six weeks into the bloodshed, President Clinton made a public statement where he declared that American intervention in the future would depend on its effect on US interests in the given situation. If a crisis did not have a large effect on American interests, it would be unlikely that the US would intervene.\textsuperscript{160} On May 20, the State Department issued a secret intelligence report referring to the killings as genocide. The memo urged the US to acknowledge the genocide

\textsuperscript{158} Sciolino
\textsuperscript{160} \textit{Ghosts of Rwanda}: Clip of President Clinton’s press address. The address referenced the new intervention policy formalized in Presidential Directive Decision 25. See chapter four for more details on PDD-25.
to preserve American credibility with human rights groups and the public. The memo argued that the US could avoid forced involvement because the 1948 Genocide Convention only stipulated the persecution by the courts of persons responsible for genocide. Because there was no tribunal established to confront this issue, and because no US citizen committed acts of genocide, the United States would not be legally obligated to intervene, judicially or militarily. Despite these considerations, the US refrained from openly acknowledging the killings as genocide.

On April 30, the Security Council publicly condemned the killings, but refrained from calling it genocide for the same reasons as the US. By not officially declaring the violence to be genocide the United States and United Nations were able to buy themselves more time to deliberate on the issue of how to approach the violence, what—if anything—they should do and how they should go about doing it. Officially recognizing the violence as genocide would force the US and UN to arrest and detain the perpetrators. The danger lies in attempting to arrest the perpetrators. Jared Cohen argued that the Clinton administration feared that NGOs and the media would interpret the language of the Genocide Convention in such a way that called on direct military intervention. The specific language of the Genocide Convention does not make military intervention a required action, but by openly declaring the killings genocide, the door is open for non-government groups to interpret the Convention in such a way that would put new pressure on the government to act.

The Security Council eventually decided to send aid to Rwanda after several weeks of arguments. On May 17, the UN agreed to a two-stage plan to end the fighting. The first

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162 Triumph of Evil: Time Line.
163 Cohen p. 130-132.
stage required sending relief efforts and establishing a new cease-fire. The second stage called for sending 5,500 African troops to oversee and enforce the cease-fire. The new mandate authorized creation of safe zones outside of Kigali and protecting humanitarian organizations working in the country. The United States originally agreed to pay one-third of the cost to send the new operation to Rwanda.  

Despite finally making a decision, the US slowed the response of the Security Council by raising issues over who was going to pay to supply and transport the peacekeepers. The US originally agreed to the plan on May 13, but the US changed its mind about the makeup of the African forces on May 16. The US argued that it would be better for the UN to send eight hundred fifty Ghanaian soldiers supported by one hundred fifty military observers to secure the Kigali airport to bring in troops and relief efforts. On May 19, the UN asked the US to supply fifty armored personnel carriers for the relief troops. The US debated over who would pay for transporting the vehicles and compensation if they were lost. In the end, the US agreed to pay one third of the cost for sending troops to Rwanda.

On June 20, tired of the stalling within the Security Council and seeking to protect its position in Africa, France informed the Security Council that France and Senegal were preparing to send a military force to Rwanda. They wanted the operation to gain approval under Chapter VII of the UN charter, which would allow the use of military force for the maintenance or repair of international peace and security. Refugees had been pouring into neighboring countries since the first week of the genocide, creating an international crisis for the countries bordering Rwanda.

166 The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996 p. 54 section 157.
Authorized on June 22, 1994, Operation Turquoise made France the first European country to make an actual attempt to send help to Rwanda. UN resolution 929 authorized UN member states to use “all necessary means to achieve the humanitarian objectives of UNAMIR II.”¹⁶⁷ This marked the sixth time that the Security Council authorized the use of military force under Chapter VII of the UN charter and the second time it authorized a group of member states to use of military force for humanitarian intervention of an internal conflict not placed under UN control.¹⁶⁸ The mission objective was to deploy French and Senegalese troops to southwest Rwanda and create a safe zone in the government-controlled territory.

The operation deployed to Goma and Bukavu in Zaire because their positions near the border with Rwanda made them ideal for moving troops and supplies to operations within Rwanda. The mission moved 2,330 French troops and thirty-two Senegalese troops into Rwanda.¹⁶⁹

French Special Forces entered Rwanda on June 23 from American bases set up outside the country. Three thousand French troops established bases and supply chains in Zaire while 1,800 entered Rwanda to establish a safe zone and set up logistic positions. They established a safe zone of roughly two thousand square miles (or roughly 20% of Southwest Rwanda) and attempted to protect and support a refugee population of roughly 1.5 million.

Despite difficulties presented by protecting such a large territory with so few troops, French

¹⁶⁷ The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996 p. 54 section 158, United Nations Security Council Resolution 929 (S/RES/929 June 22, 1994), Kroslak p. 263-265, and Brunk p. 313. The Security Council vote consisted of ten in favor, zero against and five abstentions. New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Brazil and China abstained. It is not surprising that Pakistan abstained when we take into account its role in the failed mission to Somalia. It is likely that Pakistan wanted to avoid a similar outcome much like the United States did. Abstaining would allow Pakistan a chance to stay out of involvement while maintaining a better diplomatic position by arguing that they did not vote directly against a mission to Rwanda.

¹⁶⁸ The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996 p. 54 section 159, and Kroslak p. 264. Kroslak argued that the UN interpreted Resolution 929 very broadly allowing the French to create the safe zones and that this interpretation would have allowed them to separate FAR soldiers and militia from refugees. The French would then detain the perpetrators on charges of genocide.

officials claim to have saved thousands of lives. They estimate that Operation Turquoise saved between fifteen and seventeen thousand people from at least three major locations. Between eight and ten thousand people survived at the stadium in Cyangugu, one-thousand-one-hundred at Bisesero (the site of the long running siege), six thousand at Gikongoro. French officials claim to have saved one thousand orphans and six hundred religious officials from Rwanda, but details are unclear as to where they were evacuated from within the country and how many of them were Tutsi.170

Aside from physically protecting thousands of refugees, Operation Turquoise gave the UN and the Security Council its first real look at the anti-Tutsi nature of the genocide. France had previously maintained its ties to the GOR and readily believed their claims that the violence was not genocide but a revisit of the civil war. French forces on the ground in Rwanda saw the truth of the matter and, for the first time, the French government openly acknowledged that the GOR lied to it. This turned the French government against Bagosora and the GOR, even though it was not in favor of the RPF either. Their reports also led to the declaration of a new humanitarian mission to help stop the violence and relieve growing humanitarian concerns over the growing number of refugees.171

Daniela Kroslak argued that the French turned on the GOR after realizing that the RPF had made too many military gains. Pushing the RPF out of the country would have cost

170 Kuperman p. 44-45 and 50. Kroslak p. 227-241. If these numbers are even remotely accurate, Operation Turquoise is indeed an impressive achievement when we consider the extremely limited number of troops used to guard and evacuate a refugee population numbering 1.5 million and the closed quarters of the established safe zone. It is fair to consider how successful other similar missions would have been when compared to the success of the French mission. The reason for their success is questionable. It could be attributed to the skill and equipment of the French soldiers, or to because the FAR and interahamwe did not want to engage foreign troops. Why would the US and other members of the Security Council continue to say that foreign military intervention would not help if the French had proven that even a limited force could save so many? The answer may lay in the fact that the official end of the genocide was mere weeks away from the success of Operation Turquoise.

171 Kuperman p. 46 and 47.
the French too much politically and militarily. The French believed the effectiveness of their operation was limited by basing their mission out of Zaire. After determining these limitations, Kroslak argued, the French decided to create “Safe Humanitarian Zones” and sever their ties to the GOR. 172

The US wanted to rely on diplomatic pressures on the Hutu government to stop the violence. General Dallaire’s orders were to bring the Hutu leadership and the RPF together to negotiate a cease-fire and reach a settlement to end the crisis. He repeatedly met with Bagosora and leaders of the interahmwe to find a way to bring them to the negotiating table. He learned that neither Bagosora nor Kagame were willing to negotiate an end to the violence. The war was going to end with one group defeating the other. 173 US officials within the UN blocked increasing the troops and mandate for UNAMIR because the Clinton administration wanted to prevent raising the cost of the mission. Anthony Lake openly doubted that the requested increase in troops would be able to prevent further massacres. 174

Not all parties involved in the genocide were in favor of an UN mission designed to end the genocide. Throughout the UN discussions over intervention, members of the RPF expressed concerns that the proposed safe zones would protect perpetrators of the genocide. They also feared that it would help Bagosora keep his position. 175 There was also concern among refugee populations that their attackers would use new safe zones as convenient killing grounds in the same way they used Hutu established refugee and protection areas early in the killings.

172 Kroslak p. 230.
173 Ghosts of Rwanda: Des Forges p. 132 and 133.
174 The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996 p. 56 section 163.
At the time of the genocide, GOR represented Rwanda on the Security Council. Rwanda received a two-year term on the Security Council during the fortieth session of the General Assembly, beginning its term on January 1, 1994. Their position on the Security Council was in jeopardy after the start of the genocide because Rule 13 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council requires that the representative of the country in question have official credentials presented to the Security Council by their head of state or Minister of Foreign Affairs. The interim government of Rwanda established by Bagosora and his supporters lacked a recognized head of state.\textsuperscript{176} The GOR under Habyarimana supplied the required credentials to Boutros-Ghali during the previous August, securing Rwanda’s place among the Security Council and gaining it the presidency of the Security Council throughout December 1994.\textsuperscript{177} The General Assembly and the Security Council not recognizing the interim government as the formal government of Rwanda jeopardized this position. Having their position on the council would have benefitted the GOR in its international negotiations and dealings by supplying more credit and influence to the African country, but as things progressed; its standing in the international community was on uneven ground. The only reason that this would have concerned Bagosora was that by being on and even leading the Security Council in December 1994 the GOR under his leadership would have been able to block intervention efforts by voting against them and thus continue his campaign for power.

The media has repeatedly condemned the slow response time of the UN. An article in the \textit{World Press Review} argued that the UN’s bureaucratic structure slowed down response

\begin{footnotesize}

177 The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996 p. 60 section 176.
\end{footnotesize}
time hurting military support by increasing the time it takes to make a decisions and by member states only offering troops or arms.\textsuperscript{178}

The genocide finally ended when the RPF took control of Kigali and drove Government forces and \textit{interahmwe} out of the country. In mid July, RPF forces fought their way to Kigali and drove the government forces from the capital. Two million refugees fled the RPF through the French safe zones fearing Tutsi revenge.\textsuperscript{179} International action failed to end the murder of nearly one million people. The RPA ended the fighting by driving the FAR and the Hutu extremists from Rwanda. Their victory provided a temporary relief from Hutu led killings as FAR and GOR remnants began a guerilla war of their own from refugee camps in neighboring countries.

The RPA victory secured the RPF control of the Rwandan government bringing with it a new set of military and diplomatic problems. Distrust and hatred for the UN’s inaction put a cloud over Rwandan-UN relations for several years to come. The UN attempted to repair its damaged reputation and diplomatic influence with relief and humanitarian missions.

\textsuperscript{178} The UN Crawls to the Rescue in World Press Review September 1994.
\textsuperscript{179} Triumph of Evil: Time Line and US State Department website
Chapter Four

What were we thinking?

American intervention policy and failure to act in Rwanda

Politicians, scholars, members of the media and regular people have questioned President Clinton’s refusal to intervene during the genocide in Rwanda. The debate is often lost amid argument over whether or not the United States could have stopped the killing. The media has argued that the United States and the United Nations could have stopped the Rwandan genocide if it reinforced UNAMIR with combat ready troops. Scholars continue to argue the exact role the US played during the genocide with some arguing that the US refused to act out of a belief that the killings would allow the US to gain greater control of sub-Saharan Africa. It appears that the debate has overshadowed any study of the exact timing of US policy in accordance with American policy in sub-Saharan Africa and the world. The purpose of this chapter is to do just that. The research has shown that the American decision to stay away from the genocide was not one made lightly. A series of policy changes begun before the horrific event were influenced by American misunderstandings of the conflict and American hesitance to enter another conflict in Africa. These misconceptions and fears influenced a carefully thought out policy debate to rapidly end in the face of a new and unforeseen crisis.

The Cold War ended in 1991 and the United States stood as the victor. This role brought with it a mandate and belief that the US needed to guide the development of the hundreds of countries freed from Soviet domination. American policy makers needed to determine the best way to facilitate the democratization of dozens of countries in Eastern Europe and to prevent the spread of civil war. The power vacuum created by the fall of the
Soviet Union created many opportunities for power hungry dictators and desperate rebel factions to fight for control of their countries. The US was concerned with the spread of civil war because a civil war in one country could easily destabilize its neighbors and undo months and years of democratic development.

Coming into office on the heels of President Ronald Reagan, President George H.W. Bush (Bush 41) had seen firsthand the dangers of unilateral military intervention. The failures of Panama, Granada and the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut convinced policy makers that unilateral military operations were not the way to approach foreign policy. They endangered American lives and dragged presidential administrations into political quagmires that could devastate foreign policy. President Reagan’s Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger, created a new policy for American leaders to follow. The Weinberger Doctrine created six tests for a situation to face when the president considered military action. Weinberger argued that the President needed to consider:

1) vital interests must be at stake, 2) overwhelming force should be used as as to ensure victory; 3) objectives, both political and military, must be clear; 4) proper resources must be made available, and if the situation on the ground changes, the force structure must be adapted; 5) before troops were deployed, there must be bipartisan support from Congress and from the American people; and 6) the use of armed force should be the last resort.

These tests, similar to those used later by President William Clinton, did not apply to UN peacekeeping missions because American policy makers did not consider them a viable option at the time. The nature of the Cold War world prevented the superpowers from militarily participating in such operations for fear of starting a nuclear war. The Weinberger
Doctrine dealt solely with unilateral missions, and worked to decrease the number of such missions the US would undertake.\textsuperscript{180}

President Bush 41 abided by the altered view on the importance of multilateral operations and agreed to support UN peacekeeping operations in the future. The success of Operation Desert Storm convinced Bush 41 that the UN could take the lead in creating a new world order.\textsuperscript{181}

Somalia changed Bush 41’s position on the UN. Shortly after the approving the operation’s mandate, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali asked President Bush to engage in a greater scope of activities. The original mandate for the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was to provide a safe environment for aid workers to distribute food and medical supplies. Somalia was in the midst of a civil war where tribal militias fought for control of the country following President Said Barre’s removal from power. Casualties and war damage increased after a drought devastated the country’s already fragile agricultural economy in 1992. The chaotic conditions throughout the country prevented aid workers from distributing emergency food rations to the dying, as they were prey for militias. Boutros-Ghali wanted American troops to disarm the militias and aid UN peacekeepers in removing landmines. He argued that orchestrating the stable outcome to the war would provide the best environment for aid workers to distribute needed goods. President Bush 41 resisted these changes arguing that it was not America’s place to undertake state building through military intervention. The conflict over UNITAF’s mandate inspired Bush 41 to revising policy so that the US could


\textsuperscript{181}MacKinnon p. 13 and 14.
avoid forced assistance for UN peacekeeping missions that risked trapping American troops in a quagmire.¹⁸²

For these policy changes, President Bush 41 argued that the United States would no longer be able to support United Nations interventions and peacekeeping missions in the same ways that it had in the past. He argued that the number of possible interventions the UN would engage in was increasing with the end of the Cold War. The UN previously only engaged in peacekeeping and intervention operations that did not risk American-Soviet conflict. The fall of the Soviet Union opened the door for an increased number of UN operations.

President Bush 41 recommended that American policy needed to alter to match the growing number of conflicts and difficulties in the post Cold War world. Bush 41 recommended a change to preventing destabilization instead of intervention. The United States would be better able to aid countries through preventative measures than intervention. Prevention allowed the US to spread its resources further across the globe without fear of threats to its interests and people. Prevention also allowed American policy makers greater mobility in determining which states deserved priority. The greater spread of resources would allow the US to assist more states and reduce the need of determining priority. Policy makers had growing concern over which countries would receive priority assistance and prevention would make this easier.

The former Eastern Bloc was undergoing great political changes. Democratic regimes rapidly replaced former satellite governments and promised freedom and equality for all. Countries once held together by Soviet Union puppet governments broke apart as ethnic

¹⁸² MacKinnon p. 17 and 18.
groups and polities once forced to live together fought to create their own countries. At the same time the Eastern Bloc was undergoing a political restructuring, a number of African states formerly loyal to the Soviet Union faced the same problems. Former dictators supported by the Soviet Union found themselves without Soviet power backing their rule and ten formerly one-party states transitioned to democratically elected multi-party states.\footnote{National Security Review #30, June 15, 1992. (NSR 30) The document neglects to name the states in question.}

The US and Soviet Union never saw Rwanda as a priority. They directed their strategic thinking to countries that presented tactical advantage in the event of a nuclear war, or those with important resources. After the end of the Cold War, the US directed new attention to promoting regional stability. The Rwandan civil war presented such a threat to the stability of the Great Lakes Region of Africa because of the refugee flows and RPF ties to Uganda. The growing dangers of the Rwandan civil war and the democratization of much of Africa brought up new concerns for the development of Sub-Saharan Africa. President Bush 41 addressed the concerns over Rwanda by wrapping them into his general policy on Sub-Saharan Africa.

President Bush 41 argued in National Security Review 30 (NSR 30) that sub-Saharan Africa declined in strategic importance after the end of the Cold War and Operation Desert Storm.\footnote{NSR 30 p. one.} This is no surprise as the US no longer countered every expansion of Soviet influence into the region and the war with Iraq signaled a change in regionally strategic thinking. Operation Desert Storm, along with terrorist threats from Libya and the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, shifted American regional concerns to the Middle East while the reorganization of the former Soviet Union shifted
further attention to Eastern Europe. In light of the decline of the region’s already limited strategic importance, Bush 41 limited the prospect of intervention in the region and stressed the use of preventative measures to protect American and humanitarian interests.

President Bush 41 wanted to increase relations between the American private sector and African private sector to develop African economies. Private sector development would eliminate dependence on foreign loans, better facilitate democratization and improve the standard of living for all citizens. Since democratization has a better chance at success in countries with stable economies, building a stronger private sector and cutting dependency on foreign loans would lower the risk that a democratic regime would fail under pressure from its people.

President Bush 41 targeted the use of foreign loans from organizations like the World Bank by corrupt governments to line their own pockets and to pay for the loyalty of supporters within the military. He planned to combat the support networks of such leaders by tying the amount of economic assistance to military spending. This would limit the capital corrupt leaders would have with which to pay off military officers for continued support of their regimes. This policy is directly relevant to the Habyarimana regime as his position as head of the government relied on keeping military supporters happy with him. This would allow him to keep high-ranking officers from seeking his replacement and direct the military against the RPF throughout the civil war.

Stabilizing economies and limiting the weapons dictators had to hold onto power would strengthen the democratization throughout the region. This is a continuation of American Cold War policy of countering the spread of Soviet Communism by spreading

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democratic government to neighboring states. Since the end of the Cold War, the US no longer faced the same urgency to spread democracy. Due to this lack of urgency, the US could take covert and overt military intervention off the table and rely on other methods to stabilize a region and protect American interests.

President Bush 41 addressed the debate over American support for intervention in National Security Direct 74 (NSD 74). NSD 74 began US policy turning away from active military intervention in the affairs of other states. Within the directive, President Bush 41 established that:

The United States policy on the UN’s mobilizing national forces is that they should be made available only after the request of the United Nations Security Council and with the approval of the states providing them. United Nations member states must retain the final decision on the use of their troops.

President Bush 41 set up American policy so the US would continue to support UN missions while allowing the US to bow out of a mission without losing credibility by putting the final decision to support a mission in the hands of the state supplying the troops. The policy suggests that the US would not begrudge any UN member state from denying the call for assistance and so the US should have the same courtesy.

President Bush 41 defined the nature of American support for peacekeeping missions in NSD 74. He directed the US to play a supporting role for future missions by offering its considerable logistic capabilities-through transporting troops, providing supplies, intelligence and medical personnel- and through training foreign military personnel.187

In section six of NSD 74, President Bush 41 argued that:

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187 NSD 74 section five.
...the United States should propose that member states provide the United Nations on a regularly updated basis with information about the equipment they would in principle be willing to provide to equip other nations’ contingents, subject to case-by-case national review. The United States should state its willingness to provide such information and should prepare a submission.\textsuperscript{188}

This section held that the US would continue to honor agreements to provide information on American capabilities that it “would in principle be willing to provide”.\textsuperscript{189} This clause granted the US more room to maneuver and greater opportunity to avoid getting involved in a mission because it applied these terms to all UN member states.

National Security Directive 75 (NSD 75) issued December 23, 1992, dealt directly with sub-Saharan Africa. President Bush 41 recognized the changing and troubled nature of the region in a post Cold War world and that more and more countries would turn to the US for economic and diplomatic support. President Bush issued that, in light of the benefits the US would obtain from a continued presence in the region the US would:

Continue to promote peaceful change, political stability, conflict resolution, democracy, improved governance, more commerce, sustainable development, and solutions for transnational issues. To achieve these goals we will maintain an appropriate and active diplomatic presence in each country.\textsuperscript{190}

The introduction to NSD 75 argued for prevention over intervention and diplomacy over military force. Development of good governance and economy could prevent the creation of threats to American interests.

President Bush 41 stated that the primary objective of American involvement in the region was promoting stability through conflict resolution. He further stated that the US

\textsuperscript{188} NSD 74 section six.
\textsuperscript{189} NSD 74 section six.
\textsuperscript{190} National Security Directive 75, December 23, 1992: Introduction. (NSD 75)
needed to operate only within the limits of our own resources and in conjunction with states affected by the troubled region.\textsuperscript{191} America would develop economic and diplomatic ties only with regimes “that are committed to political and economic freedoms” to ensure the greater stability of troubled regions and the greater security of American interests therein.\textsuperscript{192}

Under NSD 75, President Bush 41 established that America would limit its military involvement in sub-Saharan Africa. He stated that:

\begin{quote}
\ldots we should engage militarily only under extraordinary, compelling circumstances. Instead we must rely on well-informed and vigorous bilateral diplomacy, and multilateral engagement to preempt and mediate strife.\textsuperscript{193}
\end{quote}

President Bush 41 created an extremely limited role of America in military intervention while maintaining a commitment to creating stability through multilateral operations and diplomacy. President Bush 41 acknowledged America’s dwindling resource base for operations of that kind and proposed that the US work in accordance with other states with growing interests in the region and with the UN. He also argued that, “Collective engagement among Africans for peacekeeping and economic development should be both a goal of US policy and a modality for pursuing our interests.”\textsuperscript{194} This was the first instance where President Bush 41 directly tied prevention as a goal and as a way of pursuing other interests. By pushing preventative measures, the US would be better able to promote democratization throughout the region.

\textsuperscript{191} NSD 75 p. 2: Conflict Resolution.
\textsuperscript{192} NSD 75 p. 2: Conflict Resolution.
\textsuperscript{193} NSD 75 p. 3: US and International Engagement in Africa.
\textsuperscript{194} NSD 75 p. 4: US and International Engagement in Africa. President Bush notes that France, England, Portugal and Japan have growing interests in sub-Saharan Africa and proposes collective engagement as a way to reduce the cost of engagement to the US and to increase the diplomatic and military success of any operations in the region.
He stressed the use of diplomatic and economic incentives to protect American interests in sub-Saharan Africa, but did state that the US is willing to use military force to protect American citizens in the region. He further stated the only military interest the US has in the region is the protection of American citizens. Those military interactions we do have were to be limited to fostering better relations through assisting in training programs for local militaries and US training exercises to better prepare American troops for possible operations in the region.

Much like NSR 30, NSD 75 argued for economic development as a means of protecting American interests. President Bush 41 argued that promoting economic stability through instituting free market principles would lower the cost to the US of intervention by preventing civil conflict and humanitarian crisis. Governments would receive economic aid based on their commitment to democratic and free market principles. This would allow the US to disrupt corrupt governments and increase regional stability by targeting the wallets of dictators and corrupt regimes that relied on international aid to finance their regimes. President Bush 41 stated that only those countries that had the best prospects of helping the US achieve its objectives would have priority to receive American aid.

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195 NSD 75 p. 7: Achieving Our Security Objectives.
196 NSD 75 p. 7 and 8: Access and US Military Activities sections. President Bush senior argued that the US needed to increase the number of soldiers retiring from service and entering other fields of work to limit the dangers of war. He wants to do this by directing the funding freed by decommissioning soldiers into programs designed to put them to work in other fields. This will increase the success of conflict resolution efforts by redirecting the energies of a potentially dangerous group into efforts that will benefit the country in question. Unemployed soldiers are likely to return to violent professions that can destabilize a country if they do not have other viable options for employment.
197 NSD 75 p. 4. Part of these economic and political developments was requirements that countries receiving aid improve the position of women in their economies and societies. President Bush pushed for the use of American aid to promote American societal ideals and argued that they assisted in stabilizing states and therefore protected American interests. President Bush also argued for support of AIDS relief efforts and organizations in sub-Saharan Africa. He says that the US will continue to support the Organization of African Unity Council of Ministers Action Plan on AIDS to develop greater HIV prevention and health care for those already sick. He specifically targets developing cost effective care and treatment methods for the sick.
President William Jefferson Clinton continued the intervention debate when he entered office in 1993. The fallout from the Somalia operation forced President Clinton to increase efforts to analyze and redefine American peacekeeping policy. The specter of Somalia shaped President Clinton’s policy on American cooperation in UN peacekeeping missions. He redesigned American policy to give the US greater ability to avoid direct assistance of peacekeeping missions through adding increasingly rigorous standards on participation.

Presidential Decision Direct 25 (PDD-25), issued by President Clinton on May 6, 1994, details President Clinton’s intervention policy. Through PDD-25, President Clinton established that America would not support a UN peacekeeping operation, especially one they expected to involve American combat personnel, unless the UN made changes to its peacekeeping process. These reforms targeted financing and administration of peacekeeping operations. President Clinton argued that they needed to streamline the administration to eliminate redundancies and drains on resources. Increasing the efficiency of operational administration, starting at the top most levels of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), would increase their success rate, decrease the threat to American combat personnel and reduce the cost of peacekeeping operations.198

President Clinton acknowledged that peacekeeping operations could be a tool to prevent civil and regional conflicts from becoming direct threats to American interests. Like President Bush 41 before him, President Clinton argued that the promotion of democracy,

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198 Presidential Decision Directive #25: "US Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations." May 6, 1994. (PDD-25) [http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm](http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm) It is important to note that President Clinton uses peacekeeping operations as a blanket term for all UN operations that have increasing peace and stability at their core, but require the use of UN troops. He uses the term to describe operations that may and may not require combat personnel to fulfill their mandate. This also includes operations that others would call interventions because they fall under the command of the DPKO. Cohen p. 51.
economic growth and security could support US interests, which peacekeeping operations would achieve.\footnote{199}{PDD-25: p. one.} After acknowledging the potential benefits of peacekeeping operations, President Clinton proposed a number of changes designed to increase their success rate.

President Clinton targeted six issues within existing peacekeeping operations that needed change if America was going to support future missions. PDD-25 stated that the UN needed to make the involvement in operations more selective, reduce the financial contribution of the US to operations, allow the US to maintain command of all American combat troops taking part in an operation, and improve management of all operations. President Clinton argued that the United States needed to adopt a position of shared responsibility between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of the State (State) for financing American involvement in operations and increase cooperation between “the Executive, Congress and the American public on peace operations”.\footnote{200}{PDD-25: p. one.}

These criteria came at the end of years of debate over the American role in UN peacekeeping missions. The debate gained new strength during the summer and fall of 1993 as Operation Restore Hope faced problems of increasing violence and famine in Somalia. The increased violence in Somalia earned a harsh backlash from Congress and the American public, who did not want to put American lives at risk on UN peacekeeping and state building missions.\footnote{201}{Darren C Brunk, \textit{Curing the Somalia Syndrome: Analogy, Foreign Policy Making, and the Rwandan Genocide} p. 302.} The ultimate failure of Operation Restore Hope served as a killing blow for American support to UN peacekeeping and intervention missions. President Clinton was unwilling and unable to face further public and political backlash for endangering American lives on missions that did not support American interests. Further
damage to his administration’s credibility would damage his domestic, economic reforms. The genocide in Rwanda forced President Clinton to make a final ruling on how the US would deal with calls for help from the UN.

President Clinton designed PDD-25 to give the US greater opportunity to deny help to UN peacekeeping missions while allowing the US, at least on some level, to maintain face. The US would continue to honor a degree of commitment to UN missions, but it would not provide material support until the UN made the required changes. President Clinton cites problems with financing missions as one of the two primary problems with the current state of UN missions. He dictated that the percentage of the cost of a mission that the US is responsible for fronting needed reduction from 31.7% to 25% and stated that Congress is likely to deny funding for operations above 25%. This is keeping with policy concerns outlined by President Bush 41 in calling for reducing the cost to the US of supporting peacekeeping operations. PDD-25 continues to search for lower costs by defining specific areas of operations costs that need reformed to lower costs.

Throughout section III of PDD-25, President Clinton argued for the establishment of an independent office of Inspector General to provide better oversight for peacekeeping operations. This office would oversee a unified operations budget from which all peacekeeping operations will draw their financing. The first point of financial reform that most benefited the United States’ goal of reducing cost, were the formation of a “cadre of budget experts from member states, particularly top contributing companies, to assist the UN in developing credible budgets and financial plans”. The second point prohibited the UN

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from using money from standing peacekeeping funds for use in budget gaps for general UN operations.\textsuperscript{204}

The first point granted the United States, as one of the chief contributors, greater control over the standing peacekeeping budget. The US would be able to make budget suggestions to the UN by virtue of its position as a chief contributor to the peacekeeping fund and subsequently a member of the finance cadre. The second point protected peacekeeping funds from consumption by other parts of the UN. President Clinton continuously referred to problems of peacekeeping administration and this point extended those problems out to the general UN. As other UN, departments and offices took peacekeeping financial assets to fill gaps in their own budgets peacekeeping operations suffered from a drain of general resources. This forced member states contributing to the peacekeeping budget to replace the missing resources and in turn increased their cost of assistance. Preventing the redistribution of peacekeeping funds to other functions would then lower the cost to the US and keep with American peacekeeping policy outlined in PDD-25.

President Clinton placed command over American troops at the center of his policy changes in PDD-25. He argued that American military personnel have operated in conjunction with international operations dating back to 1948, but that no American troops would be subject to the command of foreign officers. He cited constitutional provisions of the President being supreme commander and chief over American Armed Forces as reasoning for this and argued that to allow foreign personnel command American combat troops would violate the constitution.\textsuperscript{205}

\textsuperscript{204} PDD-25 section III: Reducing Costs, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{205} PDD-25 p. 6, section V: Command and Control of US Forces.
President Clinton made a point of defining the difference between operational control and operational command. For President Clinton command “constitutes the authority to issue orders covering every aspect of military operations and administration”. He stated that operational control was “a subset of command. It gives for a specific time frame or mission and includes the authority to assign tasks to US forces already deployed by the President, and assign tasks to US units led by US officers”. It is important to note that these definitions allowed American troops to take part in peacekeeping operations under the direction of non-US personnel while not relinquishing the President’s positions as Commander and Chief. It also granted the US a way out of any possible peacekeeping operation if US troops would be under the command of foreign officers.

This clause is pertinent to the situation in Rwanda because it gave the US a legitimate policy position to negotiate from over the set up of possible intervention missions. President Clinton could, and did, refuse American aid in the form of troops, to any operation that would involve combat and have American troops under the command of non-American officers. As Rwanda became an increasingly dire issue, President Clinton sought ways to avoid committing American troops to possible intervention operations. The points within PDD-25 strongly suggest that President Clinton created PDD-25 with Rwanda in mind. His administration had weathered harsh reprisals for the failure of Operation Restore Hope and did not want to risk a similar outcome in Rwanda.

American inaction in Rwanda brings with it questions about why the US refused to act. Answering these questions is a maze of understanding American policy positions and intelligence. To understand the administration’s final decision it is important to understand

206 PDD-25 p. 6, section V: Command and Control of US Forces.
207 PDD-25 p. 6, section V: Command and Control of US Forces.
what they knew about the violence in Rwanda and how they perceived that information. There is much debate over what the international community knew about the genocide. While some claim that the nature of the killings was clear from the start, many scholars and former policy makers argue that things were not that clear. Initial understanding of the conflict was that it was a renewal of the civil war. The RPF retaliatory invasion and the movement of RPA forces inside Kigali shortly after the killing started certainly supported this belief as it appeared the FAR and RPF were targeting one another. Political assassinations perpetrated by the FAR and RPF further supported the misconception that Rwanda was revisiting its civil war.\^208

General Dallaire argued that UNAMIR administration was plagued with communication issues because of the composition of its forces. In his book, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, General Dallaire argued that the UNAMIR operation had few administrative personnel that spoke the same language as the peacekeeping troops. Internal communication problems caused communication problems with the UN. Gathering intelligence on the course of the genocide took time and energy that was sparse to begin with. Added to the complication that few members of the mission could communicate between detachments and with the UN, administration in New York City and matters were further complicated. General Dallaire argued that UNAMIR was plagued with communication issues stemming from administrative red tape prior to the genocide. The administrative gridlock made requisitioning equipment as basic as food, clothing and gas for transportation nearly impossible. General Dallaire argued that the constant battle with UN administration in New

\^208 Kuperman p. 25. Cohen p. 133.
York City and his administrative personnel hindered UNAMIR’s mission by depriving it of needed equipment and approvals for operations from UN headquarters.\footnote{Dallaire p. 231-240.}

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) gathered misleading reports about the nature of the fighting throughout the first weeks. The DIA’s ability to gather accurate intelligence was limited because of a lack of operatives in the Great Lakes region. The US had only one intelligence agent operating in the region, the defense attaché deployed to Cameroon. It was fortunate for the DIA that the defense attaché was in Rwanda at the start of the genocide, but his work centered on determining the threat level posed to American nationals and how best to evacuate them.\footnote{Kuperman p. 32. Cohen p. 133.}

Inaccurate reports hampered the decision making process for sending an intervention. Initial reports indicated that the fighting was on the wane after only a few weeks and that calm was spreading throughout Kigali. The inability of groups like the Red Cross to gather accurate information led to early casualty reports to be grossly underestimated. These reports exclusively focused on the fighting in Kigali excluding the outer regions. The first call of genocide did not emerge until the end of the second week of the killings.\footnote{Kuperman p. 24. Cohen p. 133 and 134.} False reports spread by the RPF and FAR compounded problems generated by faulty reporting. The RPF wanted to gain support from FAR and government moderates while the Hutu extremists wanted to hide the genocide so they could continue it.\footnote{Kuperman p. 25.}

The chaos inside Rwanda and lack of a strong intelligence network within Rwanda increased the difficulty in accurate reporting. There were concerns that the DIA possessed an RPF bias because the organizations were close. The DIA refused to reveal its sources
making it impossible to determine their validity. The DIA also refused to reveal its methods for gathering intelligence, citing government regulations, causing further problems in determining the validity of reports. This led to skepticism over casualty estimates among other American and international agencies.\textsuperscript{213} The Red Cross was the only humanitarian organization to remain in Rwanda during the genocide. It maintained its operations despite attempts by FAR to hinder it. Red Cross workers formed a network of aid stations that provided estimates on the number of injured and killed throughout the genocide. The Red Cross estimated 300,000 killed in the first four weeks of the genocide. The accuracy of their reports was subject to what they could witness at their stations, but they were the only estimates coming out of Rwanda not tied to one of the combatants.\textsuperscript{214}

Jared Cohen argued that President Clinton did not know enough about Rwanda outside of the genocide to ask the right questions about the crisis. President Clinton knew little about the region and country because he was not an African expert. He was a domestic president, placing stabilizing the economy and creating a national health care plan at the forefront of his presidency. Foreign policy, particularly for sub-Saharan Africa, occupied a backseat to his concerns despite the monumental task of dealing with the end of the Cold War. His limited understanding of Rwanda and African conflicts led President Clinton to believe the only way to end the killing, or any ethnic conflict in Africa, was through extended

\textsuperscript{213} Kuperman p. 34.
\textsuperscript{214} Ghosts of Rwanda, Philippe Gallard, leader of the Red Cross mission, challenged the extremists after FAR troops killed six Tutsi under his care. The patients were taken from a Red Cross ambulance stopped at a roadblock and killed. Gallard made the incident public, shaming extremist leaders into allowing the Red Cross unrestricted travel throughout the country. Cohen p. 134 and 135.
military intervention, a course of action that the American people and principle policy
makers in the government refused to take.\footnote{Cohen p. 96 and 97.}

Coupled with the confusion over what was going on was a lack of a widespread call
for intervention among Americans. The American people did not pressure President Clinton
because, like many in his administration, they did not want to go through another Somalia.\footnote{Des Forges p. 477.}

This is due to a number of reasons. The first is that there was little reporting on the genocide
in the American media because the American media was as misled to what was going on as
the government was. What little coverage Rwanda did receive focused on determining the
cause of the conflict but not the nature of it. Professor Deo Nsavyimana, of the University of
Burundi, commented in the June 1994 edition of the World Press Review that ethnic-based
political parties competing for control caused Rwanda’s troubles. The ethnic nature of the
parties unbalances them and makes democratization impossible. Professor Nsavyimana
argued that the only way “to ensure peace and stability is through repeated action by the
government dedicated to justice and human rights, not through speeches” and to have “an
elected president balanced by a representative assembly”.\footnote{World Press Review Regional Report p. 28, June 1994.}

Cohen argued that American media was focused on the same international issues that
dominated President Clinton’s administration and on sensational domestic stories like the
deaths of former President Richard Nixon and Jackie Onassis. Even the arrest of O.J.
Simpson garnered more press time then the attempted destruction of an entire people. Cohen

\footnote{216 Des Forges p. 477.}
argued that “African coverage has been historically less appealing to media organizations unless the particular crisis involves western expatriates, diplomats, or floods of refugees”. 218

Despite the fact that each of these criteria have a place in the Rwandan story, the media focused on other stories they thought more appealing to their viewers. Initial reporting on Rwanda focused on the rising body count, sacrificing op-ed pieces by African experts – like Alison Des Forges- for sensational pictures and footage of corpses. The media ignored the, politically, more pressing concern over the government forces driving the genocide. Fitting with Brunk’s arguments of the African schema, media organizations portrayed the genocide as another ethnically charged civil war that was stereotypical of Africa. 219

Cohen argued accurately about the lack of on the ground reporting. Contemporary research has found very few stories about the genocide written at the time of the killings, as the reporting at the time focused on other issues. What limited reporting on Rwanda there was is limited to small articles about the start of the violence and small speculation about the death toll. Deeper analysis and attempts to understand the nature of the genocide did not surface in the media until after the killing ended.

There was little call for action from Congress. Congress shared President Clinton’s aversion to intervention, and for the same reasons. Anthony Lake later commented that neither Congress nor the president wanted to risk starting a trend of involvement in ethnic conflicts that would force the US to intervene in future ethnic conflicts. The war in Bosnia was chief in their minds as they considered their options for Rwanda. If the US utilized a large ground force to stop the killing in Rwanda they would be expected to do the same in

218 Cohen p. 65.
219 Cohen p. 64-69.
Bosnia. Congress allowed the NGOs closest to the crisis to lead the call for action. The only NGO to call for strong, military intervention was Human Rights Watch, while the others called for the US to take diplomatic measures to end the killing. Jamming Rwandan commercial radio signals was the extreme action requested by the NGOs.\textsuperscript{220}

It is necessary to understand the changes started under NSR 30, NSD 74 and 75, and culminated in PDD-25 to understand why the United States did not intervene in Rwanda. Presidents Bush 41 and Clinton initiated policy changes in response to international events. Bush 41 faced a changing landscape that required the US to play a greater role in directing the development of newly formed and freed nations. President Clinton continued the operations started by Bush 41, and as such received much of the credit for their success and failure. The failure of Operation Restore Hope in Somalia influenced Clinton to finish policy changes started by Bush 41. Citing similar reasons as Bush 41; administrative troubles in the UN, reducing the cost in men and resources, President Clinton designed American intervention policy to allow him and succeeding presidents to hesitate on joining missions. Bush 41 committed American combat personnel to the Somalia operation under previous agreements to aid UN operations. Clinton wanted to prevent standing policy forcing the US to commit troops to future operations.

When the US did finally agree to an operation, American representatives to the UN began heated negotiations over reimbursement of American supplies and transpiration. These negotiations fit with PDD-25 policy about reimbursement. Using this policy, the US would not commit its logistics capabilities until it secured reimbursement for its supplies and transportation costs. American officials followed this stance as a means of reducing

\textsuperscript{220} Cohen p. 99.
American costs for supporting peacekeeping missions and as a way of keeping the US out of the proposed intervention.

The joint French-Belgian-American operation to evacuate respective nationals functioned under ideas of operational control. Each military detachment operated within its own chain of command while combining their independent operations for greater success. The French troops held the Kigali airport while American, Belgian, and French personnel secured the evacuation of their nationals through it. PDD-25 allowed this operation because it did not put American combat personnel under the command of foreign personnel. American soldiers may have submitted to the operational control of Belgian officers for use of the Kigali airport, but they did not take orders from the Belgians.

Taking the opinions of American policy makers in conjunction with policy decisions made by President Clinton it is clear that US personnel did not want to get involved in Rwanda. Scholars have argued that Clinton and his subordinates wanted to avoid another Somalia. Clinton’s administration was shaken by the failure of the mission and the American people refused to see their soldiers killed over a conflict in a country they knew nor cared nothing about. The majority of Americans knew of and cared little for Rwanda before headlines and prime time news carried stories of a rampaging army ethnically cleansing a country.

Darren Brunk argued in his article, *Curing the Somalia Syndrome: Analogy, Foreign Policy Decision Making, and the Rwandan Genocide*, that the specter of Somalia covered the Rwandan genocide because American policy makers viewed its events through the African schema. The African schema forced a view that all African conflicts were tribal conflicts
pitting ethnic groups against one another in unending wars for supremacy, making any intervention inherently unwinnable. 221

Brunk argued that American policy makers viewed Rwanda through this schema and by doing so drew false similarities between Rwanda and Somalia. Policy makers saw Rwanda as a hopeless cause because it was an African conflict and it had several similarities with Somalia. Both conflicts revolved around civil wars that pitted rebel groups against a recognized government. Agricultural and economic devastation characterized both conflicts. A drought that killed crops leading to famine and economic turmoil spurred on the Somali Civil War. A drop in worldwide coffee prices, which drained money from the economy and cost thousands of workers their jobs, had spurred on the Rwandan Civil War. In both conflicts, authoritarian rulers attempted to maintain their position through bribing important officials and manipulating tribal and ethnic histories to gain support for their positions. Both conflicts drew their countries into chaos putting the noncombatant populace in great danger. 222

Both Brunk and Alan Kuperman argued that American policy makers made these connections but failed to see the important differences between the two cases. Somalia was a war torn country facing famine and political instability created by multiple warring factions. Rwanda in 1994 was not a country torn by civil war, but one marred by a government orchestrated genocide. The combatants in Somalia were willing to fight international peacekeepers but Rwandan combatants were not. RPF and FAR soldiers maneuvered around

221 Darren Brunk, Curing the Somalia Syndrome Analogy, Foreign Policy Decision Making and the Rwandan Genocide. (Brunk)
222 Brunk p. 303. Kuperman p. 34 and 35.
French soldiers participating in Operation Turquoise. The RPF engaged French soldiers on rare occasions, and each time quickly withdrew.

American policy makers would have seen Rwanda in a different light if they had recognized these differences. Rwanda would have appeared as a winnable situation because the combatants were not willing to engage foreign troops. A large UN force would have been able to create safe zones to prevent further killing. Operation Turquoise lends credence to this case. FAR and RPF were hesitant to engage one another or their victims when near French troops. Refugees who made it to the safe zones were safe from the militias’ machetes because they did not want to fight foreign troops. The success of France’s unilateral mission supports the idea that a larger mission composed of multiple states would have achieved similar success over a larger area. Administrative conflicts are the most likely problems that could have prevented the success of a larger military mission as it would have hindered troop movements and on the spot decision-making. The other possible hindrance to a larger mission would have been the intervention by other African states, though this was unlikely because ending the genocide was in the best interests of Rwanda’s neighbors.

It becomes clear why many policy makers believed the Rwandan crisis was similar to other African crises when we examine the history of the conflict. The genocide’s origins lie in Rwanda’s colonization a century earlier as European racism and cultural misunderstanding set the groundwork for the ethnic conflict that erupted in the Hutu revolution and later in the RPF invasion of 1991. The long running conflict was distinctly ethnic based, through very real discrepancies in the distribution of wealth and opportunities between Hutu and Tutsi within Rwanda and through the propaganda used to spur the country’s population to mass murder. As implementation of the Arusha Accords failed and the genocide commenced,
American policy makers, particularly those with little interest in East Africa, increasingly viewed the situation through a schema that told them the fighting would never end.

Brunk’s argument is accurate when taken in collusion with three other points, the ongoing change to American intervention policy, the lack of public outcry for intervention, and the fact that Rwanda was not a priority for the Clinton administration. These four points only explain part of why the United States refused to act in Rwanda. Together, they give a complete picture of what President Clinton and policy makers were thinking when they decided not to join the UN in stopping the genocide.

Brunk’s argument provided a lens for policy makers to view the Rwanda crisis through and try to understand it. They were in the midst of the political fallout from Somalia and reassessing America’s intervention policy, both of which had drastic affects on the role policy makers saw for the US in the future. Arguments started by President Bush 41 found new footing in the Clinton administration as policy makers faced what they perceived to be another Somalia, a high cost operation likely to fail in the light of age-old ethnic tension. The lack of a large public outcry for intervention, encouraged through the lack of press coverage of any kind during the genocide, allowed policy makers to deny military assistance without facing further domestic political backlash.

Rwanda was not an American priority in 1994. The State Department focused on problems in Eastern Europe like the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Israel-Palestine conflict. They did not consider sub-Saharan Africa a priority prior to the genocide because larger world events that directly affected the United States overshadowed it. Not being a

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223 Timeline: Break-up of Yugoslavia: A brief history of the dramatic and violent changes that took place as the Yugoslav Federation disintegrated during the 1990s. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4997380.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4997380.stm)
priority meant that there were few American interests in Rwanda that needed protection when the genocide began. They quickly evacuated the few American nationals in the country at the start of the genocide through the joint American-French-Belgian mission. The only interest left for the US was humanitarian and preventing damage that the failure to act would do to America’s international advantage. It is not surprising that President Clinton weighed the preservation of American lives, and subsequently his administration’s public support, over the lives of nearly one million Tutsi and Hutu. President Clinton’s two terms in office were marked with domestic developments and interests. He held few international interests outside of Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

The United States failed to act in Rwanda because President Clinton and his staff did not see Rwanda as a priority state, were not pressured by their constituency to act, and because they had already turned away from intervention in sub-Saharan Africa, a region they saw as hopelessly caught up in ages old ethnic conflicts. The preservation of life was their only incentive to act. International organizations like the Red Cross and UN were the only source of pressure on the US to intervene.
Conclusion

A New Commitment and a sad failure:

America’s Commitment to Prevention

Chapter four argued that the United States refrained from intervention in Rwanda because constituents did not pressure the Clinton administration to act, the Clinton administration viewed Rwanda through a schema that deemed intervention futile and because American policy was in the process of turning away from intervention. The long history of tensions between Hutu and Tutsi fueled by European misconceptions of their preexisting relations facilitated the genocide and gave the appearance that the conflict was an ancient affair. Embedded in the justifications for inaction is a new policy course for the United States. The 1994 genocide forced America to change its approach to injecting American military personnel in the middle of conflicts. This change entailed a move from intervention to prevention. By providing developmental aid to a conflict torn nation, the United States could eliminate the problems that caused civil wars. Prevention required a greater American presence in the target countries. Where the US previously left Rwanda to its own business, getting involved in diplomatic affairs only when conflict threatened regional stability, it took a stronger hand in Rwanda’s development.

American policy shifted from intervention to prevention under Presidents Bush 41 and Clinton because they believed it better for American interests. American policy makers adopted a new commitment to conflict prevention that required the American private sector and international actors to rebuild Rwanda’s economy and solve the refugee problem. The United States extended its Rwandan interests to facilitate state building, finding diplomatic solutions to the contested repatriation of refugees and to end the conflict between Rwanda
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). American policy makers believed that they could prevent future wars between the Hutu and Tutsi by fostering the creation of a stable Rwandan state. This required the creation of a stable economy and government that could prevent the escalation of racial, economic and political conflicts to war. American policy makers argued that a stable state possessed the needed apparatuses to defuse economic and political conflicts and prevent the outbreak of an internal war.

The Rwandan genocide devastated more than the country’s population. The displacement of hundreds of thousands of people left farms untended and businesses void of employees and customers. Health, food and housing problems existed among those who remained in Rwanda. When the dust cleared and the RPF took control of the government, the first order of business was fixing these problems.

The United States, along with others in the international community, answered the call for assistance. Rebuilding Rwanda was a way for the US to follow its policy aims of conflict prevention and to seek forgiveness for its failure to intervene during the genocide. The United States Agency for International Development program (USAID) took the lead in aiding Rwanda. USAID targeted health problems, like the spread of AIDS and malaria, and repairing Rwanda’s agricultural industry.224

The Central Intelligence Agency estimated that “by 2007 150,000 Rwandans were infected with AIDS”, or put differently 2.8% of the total population.225 USAID achieved great success in combating the spread of AIDS through making HIV and AIDS testing more available, educating people to the importance of testing, promoting and providing better birth

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control usage, and engaging private for-profit and not-for-profit organizations to increase testing and the distribution of AIDS medication to the general population. Combining government run and NGO operations for testing with private sector operations increased the percentage of people tested. Though the wealthier members of the country utilize the private sector for-profit organizations resources more, the presence of non-profit-organizations and NGOs offering care and testing increased the distribution of care to low income Rwandans.\textsuperscript{226}

Combating the spread of AIDS in Rwanda is an American interest because of the damage it did to Rwanda’s economy and population. Given that Rwanda was in a state of economic turmoil after the genocide, combating the spread of AIDS helped repair the economy by easing the burden on those who care for the sick and preventing a reduction in the working population. Because repairing Rwanda’s economy was at the top of its priorities for ensuring continued stability, combating any factor that damaged the economy was a key means of assuring the success of the policy objective. Prior to the genocide, Rwanda’s economy was primarily agricultural. The economy depended on a large labor force that cultivated cash crops like coffee, Rwanda’s chief export crop. The spread of AIDS depleted the labor force needed for prosperous cultivation by weakening potential workers and drawing others away from the fields to care for the sick. The best way to prevent this was to prevent the uncontrolled spread of AIDS by providing adequate health education and care for the sick.

Since the genocide, the United States provided millions of dollars in humanitarian and developmental aid directly to Rwanda. In 1995, the US provided $125.9 million dollars in humanitarian aid to Rwanda earmarked for developing Rwanda’s healthcare system.\textsuperscript{227} This included building hospitals and training medical personnel and providing incentives for people to seek medical care. In 2007, the US increased the direct aid to $140.4 million and in 2008 to $152.7 million. President Bush made Rwanda a focus country of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief to promote greater tracking of AIDS infected people. Through better tracking, relief workers can ensure follow up doctor visits for sick individuals and increase the effectiveness and frequency of treatment.\textsuperscript{228}

Rwanda has been home to the most densely packed population in Africa for several decades. The population density caused problems with the country’s agricultural economy over the decades. The traditional family holdings broke down after the genocide as entire towns and villages died or fled the violence. The family holdings faced problems of over cultivation as families initially spread to new lands when their numbers grew too large for their land. This eventually decreased the amount that individual farms produced. Lower crop yields and loss of farming population triggered food shortages throughout the country.\textsuperscript{229}

The international community combated the growing hunger problem through food relief and programs designed to improve the agricultural economy. The Word Food Program (WFP) implemented a seed protection program during the planting season to prevent the death of crops and preserve seeds for later seasons. The program limited the amount of seed

\textsuperscript{227} The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996 p. 105.  
\textsuperscript{228} Ted Dagne, \textit{Rwanda: Background and Current Developments} p. 8.  
\textsuperscript{229} John May, “Policies on Population, Land Use, and Environment in Rwanda” in \textit{Population and Environment}, vol. 6, no. 4 1995 p. 300. (May)
farmers used while seeding their lands and took measures to protect the seeds planted to ensure greater crop yields. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations distributed essentials for farming like seed, tools and fertilizer to Rwandans throughout 1995. Developing a stronger agricultural economy was essential for Rwanda’s stability and development, as it would provide food for the hungry and work for the poor. In 2010, the CIA estimated that 90% of Rwanda’s total population worked in subsistence agriculture and that the majority lived below the poverty line. These individuals earned less than 250 Rwandan francs (or US $0.43) per day. Combating problems in food production, inflation and trade deficits was a primary interest for American and international assistance organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

The 1994 genocide and changing farming practices caused a great deal of damage to Rwanda’s agricultural economy. The death and displacement of nearly half of Rwanda’s population left crops to die in the field. John May argued that Rwanda’s soil fertility weakened over the past twenty years due to the conversion of pastureland to cropland. The decrease in pasture animals caused a decrease in manure and subsequently fertilizer production. Pasture manure had traditionally been a cheap and easily obtainable source of fertilizer for farmers. The loss of this fertilizer caused the loss of soil fertility and an increase in imported fertilizers. Poor farmers could not afford large quantities of imported fertilizers leading to the dominance of wealthier farmers and politically connected communes. May further argued that the use of imported fertilizers did not prevent soil degradation but only masked it, as their affects were only temporary.

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232 May p. 325.
In 2004, the US backed the ADAR project (Assistance á la Dynamisation del’Agribusiness au Rwanda). The project used education and financial assistance to encourage entrepreneurs to create new businesses. President George W. Bush (Bush 43) issued $10.5 million in aid to the ADAR program. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) assisted in determining whether the traditional collectives approach to farming was the best method for rebuilding the coffee industry or if a system of entrepreneurs would be better. Rwanda’s chief agricultural industry was coffee production, which suffered during the late 1980s when international coffee prices dropped. The Partnership to Enhance Agriculture in Rwanda worked through linkages with the American backed Project Pearl to reorganize the farming industry to place small, organized groups of farmers at the center of the coffee industry. Project Pearl helped obtain World Bank loans for developing farms and to build farmer owned seed washing stations. Coffee harvests needed proper cleaning before sale on the international market. The new stations allowed smaller farmers to avoid exploitation by larger farmers and government supporters who controlled the older washing stations and charged impossible fees for their use.

The US backed these organizations to help stimulate Rwanda’s economy. Countries with stable economies were less likely to engage in civil wars because their populations were less likely to be angry with their governments. When people were making money and providing for their families, they were less likely to take issue with the government. When their economic reality fell below their expectations, they began to take issue with the government. In countries with a violent past, these issues could escalate into civil violence. American policy makers applied this theory to prevention policy in Rwanda. The more

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stable they could make the Rwandan economy, the less likely the civil war would restart. Economic troubles factored prominently into the 1959 revolution as Hutu leaders targeted the disparity in wealth between Tutsi and Hutu, and again during the genocide as MRND proponents capitalized on economic troubles caused by the drop in international coffee prices to rile the Hutu population against the Tutsi.

Other forms of economic assistance came through loan relief. In 2006, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank placed Rwanda on the list of countries eligible for the Heavily Indebted Poor Country initiative (HIPC). The HIPC allowed poor countries a measure of debt relief, by granting exemptions on loans and interest payments, if they meet a series of criteria. When a country met the requirements of the two-step relief program, they were eligible for interest payment and loan relief. The purpose of the HIPC initiative was to free up money government needed to repay debt for use in other areas. Once the countries freed these funds, they could use them for developing health care facilities and schools among other social works.\textsuperscript{234}

The Bush 43 administration took measures to facilitate private sector involvement and development in Rwanda. In 2008, President Bush 43 signed a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with President Paul Kagame of Rwanda. American investors in Rwanda’s development received legal protections under the BIT. Under the BIT, investors were assured non-discriminatory treatment, the free transfer of investment funds between the US and Rwanda, compensation for funds lost to expropriation and transparency in governance,

and the right to bring investment disputes to a neutral, international arbitration panel. These guarantees facilitated foreign investment in Rwanda by offering protection of investment funds and means of settling disputes between foreign investors and domestic partners. The BIT protections fostered growth in US-Rwandan trade over the years since the genocide. The BIT facilitated a forty percent increase in trade from 2006 to 2007. America imported $13 million worth of Rwandan imports during the yearly period.

Since the genocide, the United States has maintained a commitment to upholding human rights legal traditions. The US did this through cooperation with the UN International Tribunal for Rwanda and through hearing cases under the Alien Tort law of 1789.

Immediately following the genocide, the United Nations moved to establish a criminal tribunal to prosecute the perpetrators of the genocide. UN Resolution 955 established the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda. The UN established the tribunal under Chapter VII of the UN Charter concerning threats to international peace. The presence of the tribunal helped prevent international incidents over the contested extradition of accused persons. The tribunal required all UN member states to cooperate with the detaining and extradition of defendants to stand trial. This included detaining and turning over those indicted for genocide and crimes against humanity during the 1994 genocide as established by the Geneva Convention. The Tribunal’s mandate extended its jurisdiction over crimes committed by Rwandans and non-Rwandans between January 1, 1994 and


237 Des Forges p. 738.

December 31, 1994. It also covered crimes committed by Rwandans in neighboring countries.\textsuperscript{239}

The NGOR initially voted against resolution 955 citing problems with terms of the resolution. The NGOR did not trust the tribunal because of UN failure to help during the genocide. Government officials did not believe the UN was capable of helping Rwanda and that Rwanda would have to handle the prosecution of the perpetrators. The Tribunal’s first two years were marred with administrative mishaps. Funding issues and administrative discrepancies hindered The Tribunal’s progress. From 1996 to 1998, the UN performed a series of audits that fixed the funding issues and improved the Tribunal’s performance.\textsuperscript{240}

The Alien Tort law and Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789 gave US federal courts jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”.\textsuperscript{241} Under the law, American courts could hear non-criminal abuses from any country so long as the crime violated recognized international law. This meant that American federal courts could hear cases of genocide and crimes against humanity because the United States adhered to international laws such as the Geneva Convention. The laws first use was in 1978 by a group of Paraguayans seeking justice for the murder of the son of Dr. Joel Filartiga. The police officer guilty of killing Dr. Filartiga’s son escaped justice in Paraguay, but members of Dr. Filartiga’s family filed suit against him in New York. The New York Court of Appeals for the second Circuit heard the case and awarded the Filartigas $10 million in damages. The Filartiga case set the precedent that the US would be willing to try non-criminal cases for violations of international laws. Plaintiffs

\textsuperscript{239} Des Forges p. 738.
\textsuperscript{240} Des Forges p. 741-745.
\textsuperscript{241} Anne-Marie Slaughter and David L. Bosco \textit{Alternative Justice Facilitated by Little-Known 18th-Century Law}. (Slaughter and Bosco)
could bring a case to court regardless of the citizenship of the plaintiff and defendant. This allowed plaintiffs from any country a chance at the justice they were previously denied. The Supreme Court reinforced this by refusing to overturn the Filartiga ruling, making the law a favored weapon of human rights groups.  

In 1994, Human Rights Watch sued Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza in the name of Rwandans in the US related to genocide victims. Judge John Martin of the second District Court of New York found Barayagwiza, chair of Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Colliness, guilty of assisting in the planning and implantation of the genocide. Judge Martin ordered Barayagwiza to pay $105 million in damages to the plaintiffs. Despite the plaintiffs receiving little of the money owed to them, the ruling opened the door for other Rwandans to bring similar cases to American courts. Having these cases heard in the United States provided new exposure for human rights violations and a new venue for their persecution. The courts would only bring cases to trial if the defendant enters American territory. American law enforcement and courts would not make a case for extradition because they were not criminal cases. The courts refused to hear cases against heads of state and foreign governments respecting their diplomatic immunity. The Clinton Administration resisted relaxing rules that would allow for the easy seizure of foreign assets so plaintiffs could receive their compensation because it risked American assets abroad. If the US attempted to seize a defendant’s foreign assets, other governments would have a legal precedent set by the US to do the same against the US. However, President Bush 43 leaned in favor of plaintiff rights because it granted his administration another diplomatic weapon against countries and

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242 Slaughter and Bosco.
243 Des Forges p. 766.
individuals supporting terrorists.\textsuperscript{244} The United States would be able to seize assets used by defendants found guilty under the Alien Tort Law. Taking these assets could weaken terrorist groups tied to these defendants.

In December 1994, the UN passed a resolution that encouraged international, intergovernmental, nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and development organizations to aid in rebuilding Rwanda. Rebuilding the economy and infrastructure would increase Rwanda’s stability.\textsuperscript{245} This resolution encouraged the new government of Rwanda (NGOR) to create conditions that would encourage refugees to return. Three million of Rwanda’s seven million people fled Rwanda after the RPF took control of the country.\textsuperscript{246} Between 13 and 18 July 850,000 refugees crossed the border into Zaire. The refugees settled in the Kivu and Goma regions, but the government of Zaire lacked the needed infrastructure to support them and attempted to redirect the refugees to camps established in other regions.\textsuperscript{247} The UN eventually established Goma as the logistical base for humanitarian relief operations set up to aid a refugee population reaching into the millions.\textsuperscript{248}

These camps proved to be a source of increased regional tensions. Hutu extremists and remnants of the former government of Rwanda (FGOR) hid among the refugees. French Troops operating as part of Operation Turquoise helped members of the FGOR and FAR escape to Zaire because they wanted to keep possibilities for future negotiations and a power

\textsuperscript{244} Slaughter and Bosco.
\textsuperscript{246} Klinghoffer p. 3.
\textsuperscript{247} The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996 p. 73 and 74, section 217. These other regions were Kibumba, Katale, Mugunga and South Kivu.
sharing government open.\textsuperscript{249} Militia and FAR soldiers and leaders took control of the camps’ populations to prevent repatriation of the Hutu refugees and to control the flow of aid goods throughout the camps.\textsuperscript{250} Eventually, the GOR remnants began a guerilla war against the FGOR using the refugee camps in Zaire as bases. Between 17 and 18 April, the NGOR closed eight refugee camps in southern Rwanda without prior notification. FGOR guerillas based operations out of these camps, using violence to control the camp populations so they could use the refugees as human shields. The NGOR planned to close the camps and force the refugees to return to their homes. Doing so would deprive FGOR supporters of supplies and bases, making it easier for the NGOR to find them. FGOR hardliners forced refugees to stay.\textsuperscript{251}

FGOR attacks on Rwandans within their borders led to NGOR retaliations against Hutu populations believed to be helping the FGOR troops. FGOR troops actively trained new recruits in the Zairian refugee camps and moved arms shipments between camps to arm the new soldiers. This caused President Kagame to order the borders with Zaire re-secured under more strict conditions. The UN Security Council attempted to alleviate tensions by reaffirming Council Resolution 918 (1994), which placed an arms embargo on Rwanda and Zaire. Chapter VII of the UN Charter bared countries from supplying arms to a neighboring nation that might use them in or sell them to Rwanda.\textsuperscript{252}

Not wanting to contend with the refugee problem, the government of Zaire initiated a program of forced repatriation on August 19, 1995. The government closed five of the eleven refugee camps in the Uvira area and forced 14,000 Rwandan and 2,000 Burundian

\textsuperscript{249} Kuperman p. 50.  
\textsuperscript{250} The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996 p. 78, section 232.  
\textsuperscript{251} The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996 p. 86, section 256. Gourevitch p. 188-194.  
\textsuperscript{252} The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996 p. 87 and 88.
refugees into Rwanda. Some 84,000 refugees fled into the hills and forests around the camps to escape the forced repatriation. This came in response to the UN easing arms embargos against Rwanda for security purposes and clearing minefields left from the civil war. On August 17, Prime Minister of Zaire Étienne Tshisekedi wrote to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the Secretary General of the UN, concerning the refugee situation. Tshisekedi argued that lifting the arms embargos endangered Zaire and further complicated the refugee situation. He informed Boutros-Ghali of his government’s intention to relocate the refugees to other countries. On August 23, the UN Security Council called on Zaire to honor its humanitarian obligations and the government of Zaire halted the forced repatriation of refugees the next day.  

Pressure from the US and UN to resolve the conflict and peacefully repatriate the refugees failed. In 1996, Kigali ordered the Rwandan army to enter Zaire, eliminate the Hutu rebels and overthrow President Mobutu Sese Seko for his support of the Hutu rebels. The 1996 war ended with Kagame replacing Mobutu with Laurent-Desire Kabila, the leader of the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques por la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL). Kabila took power on May 17, 1997 and renamed Zaire the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The peace did not last as Kabila ordered all foreign troops, who remained in the DRC to aid internal security, to leave the country in July 1998. Rwandan troops violently resisted the expulsion in August, but a joint effort by Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia stopped them. The conflict quickly escalated into an international war in central Africa. Rwanda claimed control of portions of eastern DRC in 1998, while Uganda claimed northern DRC in 1999. UN, the European Union pressured the combatants to stop fighting by tying

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253 The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996 p. 89 and 90.
the continuation of aid programs to ending the conflict. Rwanda’s neighbors brought about the Lusaka Accords, which attempted to enforce a cease-fire backed by a UN peacekeeping mission, but administrative troubles derailed the mission and the implementation of the Accords failed. The fighting ended in 2003 under further international economic and diplomatic pressure.254

Rwanda and DRC continued to have conflict over rebel operations in eastern DRC despite the enforcement of a formal peace agreement. The continued rebel conflict threatened another war between Rwanda and DRC until the UN successfully pressured President of Rwanda Paul Kagame into establishing peaceful ties with the government of DRC. In 2009, the DRC and Rwanda agreed to a combined military operation to deal with the rebels in eastern Congo. Some experts have speculated that President Kagame was shamed into making this agreement by the public release of a UN report in December 2009 that Rwanda supported Laurent Nkunda, the rebel leader fighting the DRC government. This report and others that argued the RPF murdered Hutu refugees in Rwanda and DRC cost Rwanda millions in foreign aid and diplomatic credibility. As part of the agreement between Rwanda and the DRC, NGOR arrested Nkunda while DRC turned on rebels it had supported.255

The Rwanda-DRC war marked a failure of American prevention policy because despite the efforts to prevent the resurgence of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict the fighting continued. The international protection and humanitarian support provided to the refugee camps provided the GOR remnants with a new base of operations to launch a guerilla campaign

255 McCrummen 2009.
against the NGOR. The US, through its influence in the UN, attempted to solve the refugee problem to prevent the spread of further violence, but Rwandan internal issues prevented this. Racial tensions spurred further violence as Tutsi engaged in reprisal killings and GOR remnants attacked RPF holdings. American and international efforts to rebuild Rwanda in the years following the genocide have been successful, but have not been enough to prevent further fighting.

The prevention policy did not work. The Hutu rebels operated from bases inside the DRC in the same way the RPF did in Uganda in the 1990s. However, the Hutu rebels did not launch a full-scale invasion of Rwanda in the same way their RPF predecessors did. The rebel attacks, failure by the government of the DRC and UN to close the camps finally caused the NGOR to attack the camps in eastern-DRC turning the internal conflict, in the sense that it is Rwandans fighting Rwandans, into a regional one.

The invasion turned into a series of conflicts that escalated into the largest African war in history. Despite the success of the American private sector’s initiatives to rebuild Rwanda, the conflict prevention policy behind the initiatives failed. International efforts were eventually able to stop the continued conflict. Diplomatic and economic pressures applied to combatants on all sides eventually inspired the NGOR and government of the DRC to work together to solve their mutual problems.

It is unknown if the current cooperation will continue, but the history of its formation leads to questioning the usefulness of American intervention policy. Yes, increased American private sector involvement helped create a stable economy and decreased Hutu-Tutsi conflict within the country, but it did not create internal or regional stability. The
decrease in conflict is not the cessation of it as seen by the NGOR invasion of first Zaire then DRC.

The economic and political development facilitated by the international community failed to prevent governing issues. Controversy surrounded the August 9, 2010 Presidential election. Human Rights Watch investigated rumors and accusations of politically charged violence in the months leading to the election. Human Rights Watch has collected reports of attacks on journalists, silencing members of opposition parties, prohibiting opposition party members to run in the election and even several counts of politically motivated murder.

Throughout January and May 2010, police prevented the FDU-Inkingi and the Democratic Green Party from holding their annual congress meetings. Both parties were unable to register their candidates for the election because holding these meetings was a registration requirement. Throughout the next several months, police and government supporters attacked members of the opposition parties, imprisoned independent journalists, shut down periodicals, denied refugees work visas, and drove opposition leaders into exile.²⁵⁶

The political violence is reminiscent of Habyarimana’s regime and risks a resurgence of ethnic conflict in Rwanda as the RPF is an apparatus of Tutsi domination. The oppression of political parties and independent citizens who criticize the Kagame administration supported this comparison as Habyarimana engaged in a great deal of political violence and maintained a single party state for the majority of his tenure as president. Human Rights Watch specifically targeted the 2008 genocide ideology law as a tool of government

suppression of free speech and political dissent. The law allowed the government to arrest any individual for using language that threatened racial violence. Human Rights Watch argued that the government used the law to suppress opposition to the government by claiming they were preventing the spread of racially charged speech. The NGOR detained anyone accused of breaking the law. The allowed the NGOR means to silence and prevent the growth of political parties opposed to the Kagame administration. Any dissent or criticism of the government resulted in arrest and imprisonment.257

Rwanda holds an intriguing and tragic place in the history of American foreign policy. The refusal to act during the 1994 genocide is one of America’s most lamentable policy decisions. America’s commitment to protecting human rights was shattered when the Clinton administration refused to reinforce UNAMIR. The refusal to act emerged as part of the transformation of American intervention policy started by President Bush 41. The genocide presented a situation that called for an immediate decision on the direction of American policy. Clouded by the failure of UNOSOM and a schema that told them involvement in any African conflict was a futile effort, President Clinton and his chief policy makers decided that the best thing the US could do was to stay away.

Rwanda and the US grew closer together as President Bush 41 added it to American foreign interests. President Bush 41 engaged the American private sector in efforts to rebuild Rwanda’s economy and government, thereby facilitating the cessation of Hutu-Tutsi hostilities. Sadly, these attempts failed as much as they succeeded. Rwanda’s economy has greatly increased in recent years, but economic reconstruction did not prevent new Hutu-Tutsi violence. The NGOR pursued Hutu rebels operating from refugee camps in Zaire. The

Rwandan army invaded Zaire three times over the past twenty years, one of which replaced the Zaire government with the DRC and another instigated the largest international war in African history. Accusations of reprisal killings against Hutu populations spread as the Rwandan army engaged rebel forces throughout eastern-DRC. The fighting ceased only after the international community utilized economic and diplomatic pressures against Rwanda and the DRC.
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