Title

Slede: a domain-specific verification framework for sensor network security protocol implementations

Campus Units

Computer Science

Document Type

Conference Proceeding

Conference

WISEC Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks

Publication Version

Accepted Manuscript

Link to Published Version

https://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1352533.1352551

Publication Date

3-31-2008

Journal or Book Title

Proceedings of the first ACM conference on Wireless network security (WiSec '08)

First Page

109

Last Page

118

DOI

10.1145/1352533.1352551

Conference Title

The first ACM conference on Wireless network security (WiSec '08)

Conference Date

March 31-April 2, 2008

City

Alexandria, VA

Abstract

Finding flaws in security protocol implementations is hard. Finding flaws in the implementations of sensor network security protocols is even harder because they are designed to protect against more system failures compared to traditional protocols. Formal verification techniques such as model checking, theorem proving, etc, have been very successful in the past in detecting faults in security protocol specifications; however, they generally require that a formal description of the protocol, often called model, is developed before the verification can start.

There are three factors that make model construction, and as a result, formal verification is hard. First, knowledge of the specialized language used to construct the model is necessary. Second, upfront effort is required to produce an artifact that is only useful during verification, which might be considered wasteful by some, and third, manual model construction is error prone and may lead to inconsistencies between the implementation and the model.

The key contribution of this work is an approach for automated formal verification of sensor network security protocols. Technical underpinnings of our approach includes a technique for automatically extracting a model from the nesC implementations of a security protocol, a technique for composing this extracted model with models of intrusion and network topologies, and a technique for translating the results of the verification process to domain terms. Our approach is sound and complete within bounds, i.e. if it reports a fault scenario for a protocol, there is indeed a fault and our framework terminates for a network topology of given size; otherwise no faults in the protocol are present that can be exploited in the network topology of that size or less using the given intrusion model. Our approach also does not require upfront model construction, which significantly decreases the cost of verification.

Comments

This is a manuscript of a proceeding published as Hanna, Youssef, Hridesh Rajan, and Wensheng Zhang. "Slede: a domain-specific verification framework for sensor network security protocol implementations." In Proceedings of the first ACM conference on Wireless network security, pp. 109-118. ACM, 2008. doi:10.1145/1352533.1352551. Posted with permission.

Rights

© ACM, 2008 This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of ACM for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in Proceedings of the first ACM conference on Wireless network security, pp. 109-118. ACM, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1145/1352533.1352551

Copyright Owner

ACM

Language

en

File Format

application/pdf

Published Version

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