Campus Units
Economics
Document Type
Article
Publication Version
Published Version
Publication Date
2012
Journal or Book Title
Journal of Labor Economics
Volume
30
Issue
4
First Page or Article ID Number
915
Last Page
962
DOI
10.1086/666654
Abstract
The optimal balance between keeping marriages intact, despite spousal conflict, and allowing for divorce is a subject of policy debate in the United States. To explore the trade-offs, I construct a structural model with information asymmetries, which may generate inefficient outcomes. Parameters are estimated using data from the National Survey of Families and Households. I find that eliminating separation periods decreases the conflict rate by 9.2% of its baseline level and increases the divorce rate by 4.0%. Perfect child support enforcement decreases the frequency of conflict and divorce by 2.7% and 21.2%, respectively, and reduces the incidence of inefficient divorces.
Copyright Owner
The University of Chicago
Copyright Date
2012
Language
en
File Format
application/pdf
Recommended Citation
Zhylyevskyy, Oleksandr, "Spousal Conflict and Divorce" (2012). Economics Publications. 31.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_pubs/31
Comments
This is an article from Journal of Labor Economics 30 (2012): 915, doi:10.1086/666654. Posted with permission.