Information Sharing and Cooperative Search in Fisheries
Journal or Book Title
Environmental and Resource Economics
First Page or Article ID Number
We present a dynamic game of search and learning about the productivity of competing fishing locations. Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium search patterns for non-cooperating fishermen and members of an information sharing cooperative are compared with first-best outcomes. Independent fishermen do not internalize the full value of information, and do not replicate first-best search. A fishing cooperative faces a free-riding problem, as each coop member prefers that other members undertake costly search for information. Pooling contracts among coop members may mitigate, but are not likely to eliminate free-riding. Our results explain the paucity of information sharing in fisheries and suggest regulators use caution in advocating cooperatives as a solution to common pool inefficiencies in fisheries.
Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Evans, Keith S. and Weninger, Quinn, "Information Sharing and Cooperative Search in Fisheries" (2014). Economics Publications. 473.