Campus Units

Economics

Document Type

Article

Publication Version

Published Version

Publication Date

12-2015

Journal or Book Title

Agricultural and Resource Economics Review

Volume

44

Issue

3

First Page or Article ID Number

340

Last Page

345

DOI

10.1017/s1068280500005098

Abstract

The authors present an analytical model of a ϐirst-price sealed-bid cattle auction in which a spot and coordinated markets are interconnected. The model reveals that the conventional wisdom that market coordination negatively affects the bid price in the spot market is an oversimpliϐication. The relationships between key market variables impact bids and bid shading in complex ways. While captive supplies can lead to lower spot prices, the price reductions do not necessarily stem from an increase in market power due to contracting. The model emphasizes the importance of several variables for future empirical studies.

Comments

This article is from Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 2015, 44(3); 340-345. DOI: 10.1017/s1068280500005098. Posted with permission.

Copyright Owner

Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association

Language

en

File Format

application/pdf

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