Title

The Relative Efficiency of Voluntary vs Mandatory Environmental Regulation

Campus Units

Economics

Document Type

Article

Publication Version

Submitted Manuscript

Publication Date

9-1999

Journal or Book Title

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volume

38

Issue

2

First Page or Article ID Number

158

Last Page

175

DOI

10.1006/jeem.1999.1075

Abstract

This paper is concerned with policies for the supply of public, environmental goods from the farm sector. In particular, we characterize the buying of these goods by the public from farmers using the "Provider Gets Principle." This principle is well established in OECD countries, as we demonstrate. Results from ecological-economic modeling of the conservation of heather moorland in northern Scotland, using this principle, are described. This model enables us to identify spatially differentiated ecological targets, and to calculate the minimum necessary payments needed to achieve these targets.

Comments

This working paper was published as Wu, JunJie and Bruce A. Babcock, "The Relative Efficiency of Voluntary vs Mandatory Environmental Regulations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 38 (1999): 158–175, doi:10.1006/jeem.1999.1075.

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