Title
The Relative Efficiency of Voluntary vs Mandatory Environmental Regulation
Campus Units
Economics
Document Type
Article
Publication Version
Submitted Manuscript
Publication Date
9-1999
Journal or Book Title
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
Volume
38
Issue
2
First Page or Article ID Number
158
Last Page
175
DOI
10.1006/jeem.1999.1075
Abstract
This paper is concerned with policies for the supply of public, environmental goods from the farm sector. In particular, we characterize the buying of these goods by the public from farmers using the "Provider Gets Principle." This principle is well established in OECD countries, as we demonstrate. Results from ecological-economic modeling of the conservation of heather moorland in northern Scotland, using this principle, are described. This model enables us to identify spatially differentiated ecological targets, and to calculate the minimum necessary payments needed to achieve these targets.
Recommended Citation
Wu, JunJie and Babcock, Bruce, "The Relative Efficiency of Voluntary vs Mandatory Environmental Regulation" (1999). Economics Publications. 534.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_pubs/534
Comments
This working paper was published as Wu, JunJie and Bruce A. Babcock, "The Relative Efficiency of Voluntary vs Mandatory Environmental Regulations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 38 (1999): 158–175, doi:10.1006/jeem.1999.1075.