Campus Units
Economics, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
6-2013
Journal or Book Title
Marine Resource Economics
Volume
28
Issue
2
First Page or Article ID Number
111
Last Page
131
DOI
10.5950/0738-1360-28.2.111
Abstract
We present a general dynamic model of within-season harvesting competition in a fishery managed with individual transferable quotas. Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE) harvesting and quota purchase strategies are derived using numerical collocation methods. We identify rent loss caused by a heterogeneous-in-value fish stock, congestion on the fishing ground, revenue competition, and stock uncertainty. Our results show that biological, technological, and market conditions under which rents will be dissipated in a standard individual transferable quota program are fairly special. We offer new insights for designing rights-based programs capable of generating resource rent in marine fisheries.
Copyright Owner
MRE Foundation, Inc.
Copyright Date
2013
Language
en
File Format
application/pdf
Recommended Citation
Valcu-Lisman, Adriana and Weninger, Quinn, "Markov-Perfect Rent Dissipation in Rights-Based Fisheries" (2013). Economics Publications. 62.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_pubs/62
Comments
This article is from Marine Resource Economics 28 (2013): 111, doi: 10.5950/0738-1360-28.2.111. Posted with permission.