Title

Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers

Campus Units

Economics

Document Type

Article

Publication Version

Submitted Manuscript

Publication Date

9-2021

Journal or Book Title

Games and Economic Behavior

Volume

129

First Page or Article ID Number

536

Last Page

548

DOI

10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.005

Abstract

In many real-world matching applications, there are restrictions for institutions either on priorities of their slots or on the transferability of unfilled slots over others (or both). Motivated by the need in such real-life matching problems, this paper formulates a family of practical choice rules, slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers (SSPwCT). These rules invoke both slot-specific priorities structure and transferability of vacant slots. We show that the cumulative offer mechanism (COM) is stable, strategy-proof and respects improvements with regards to SSPwCT choice rules. Transferring the capacity of one more unfilled slot, while all else is constant, leads to strategy-proof Pareto improvement of the COM. Following Kominers' (2020) formulation, we also provide comparative static results for expansion of branch capacity and addition of new contracts in the SSPwCT framework. Our results have implications for resource allocation problems with diversity considerations.

JEL Classification

C78, D47

Comments

This is a working paper of an article published as Avataneo, Michelle, and Bertan Turhan. "Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers." Games and Economic Behavior 129 (2021): 536-548. DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.005. Posted with permission.

Copyright Owner

Elsevier Inc.

Language

en

File Format

application/pdf

Published Version

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