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Recently, a number of authors have constructed axiomatic defences of Borda's rule [2, 4, 8], In every case, it Is assumed that voters mark their ballots honestly, in accordance with their preferences. That this assumption may be unrealistic was known to Borda himself [ij. Elsewhere • [3, 5], it has been shpwn how Borda's rule can reward misrepresented pref erences on the part of individual voters. This result is in the same spirit as, but not a consequence of, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [6, 7], since Borda's rule allows ties. This is in marked contrast to Condorcet's rule, where such misrepresentation is not rewarded.

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This paper was published in Public Choice, Vol. 30, Issue 1, pp 43-50, Summer 1977