Document Type

Working Paper

Publication Date


Working Paper Number

WP #08006, March 2008 revised November 2008; Old working paper #12882


Competitive behaviors such as outbidding one's rivals may be countered by the rivals' threat of mutually destructive objections. In an Arrow-Debreu model of production economies with firms privatized by property rights, we model such hindered competitive behaviors as a coalition's attempt to block a status quo given the threat that the outsiders of the coalition, especially those with whom the coalition shares ownership of firms, may resort to production-ruining secession. We introduce new concepts of the core such that a coalition's blocking plan is feasible only if it is not blocked by the outsiders with such secession. Based on such notions, we prove core equivalence theorems in the replication framework.

JEL Classification

D51, D2

File Format



30 pages

File Function

Revised version: November 2008 (Original draft: March 2008)

Included in

Economics Commons