Working Paper Number
WP # 08021, June 2008
I exploit a major structural change that has occurred in world soccer to study the impact of incentives on outcomes in a strategic setting. A game-theoretic model is developed that captures some essential strategic elements of soccer vis-à-vis the number of points awarded to a win. The observable implications of the model are tested using a large dataset that spans 30 years and 35 countries. The empirical results support the theoretical model and show that the 3-point system has led to a statistically significant increase in the expected number of goals and a decrease in the fractions of drawn matches.
Published in Economic Inquiry Vol. 48 no. 1 (2010): 65-79.
C72, L83, C23
Moschini, Giancarlo, "Incentives and Outcomes in a Strategic Setting: The 3-Points-for-a-Win System in Soccer" (2008). Economics Working Papers (2002–2016). 217.