Working Paper Number
We present a dynamic game of search and learning by fishermen who seek the true location of a partially observable fish stock. Bayesian Nash equilibrium search patterns for non-cooperating fishermen and members of an information sharing cooperative are compared with first-best outcomes. Independent fishermen do not internalize the full value of information and do not replicate first-best search. A fishing cooperative faces a free-riding problem as each member prefers another undertake costly search for information. Contractual agreements among coop members may mitigate, but not likely eliminate free-riding. Our results explain why information sharing is rare in fisheries and offer guidance for improving fishery management.
This working paper is published in Environmental and Resource Economics 58 (2014): 353–372, doi:10.1007/s10640-013-9701-8.
Evans, Keith S. and Weninger, Quinn, "Information Sharing and Cooperative Search in Fisheries" (2011). Economics Working Papers (2002–2016). 254.